Jo Beall, Thomas Goodfellow, and James Putzel
Introductory article: on the discourse of terrorism, security and development

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ABSTRACT

This paper introduces the policy arena by examining the increasing interlinking of international development policy with security concerns, particularly at a discursive level in the global North and especially since the declaration of the United States led 'War on Terror'. The authors propose that, it is not only the US which has altered its approach to development in light of the new security agenda, but so too have some multilateral development organisations, along with bilateral donors, which in the past have been associated with a more altruistic and less directly political development cooperation. The incorporation of security concerns into development thinking is not new and dates back at least to the Cold War era. Although the security development nexus can be construed positively, the linkage has taken on new forms and dynamics in the contemporary context. Increasingly, development is viewed by some actors as a means of addressing 'looming threats' emanating from the global South towards the North. The authors suggest that if security for the North becomes a central guiding principle for development in the South, this will be damaging for the project of global poverty reduction as well as global security.

1. INTRODUCTION

* Correspondence to: Jo Beall, Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. E-mail: J.Beall@lse.ac.uk
Canadians, who come from every corner of the globe, understand that the life we enjoy in Canada depends increasingly on helping to make the world a better place [...] Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world, or healthy in a sick world; nor can we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world. Failure to achieve significant political, economic, social and environmental progress in the developing world will have an impact on Canada in terms of both our long-term security and our prosperity. Security and development are inextricably linked.

*Canada’s International Policy Statement on Development, CIDA 2005*

Security is a necessary precondition for development. A contribution to the re-establishment of security and the promotion of peace, in countries and regions where there previously was systematic violence, crime and terror, is an investment in poverty reduction and economic growth […] Denmark is one of the first countries to establish clear principles for development activities against terrorism.


These two extracts illustrate the extent to which foreign ministries and development agencies are coming to view security and development as two sides of a coin. The first reflects the view that in order to achieve sustainable security ‘at home’, the pursuit of progress in the developing world is now vital as a tool of foreign policy. The second appears to express the linkage from the opposite perspective – that economic development in developing countries is itself dependent on security. Thus security is conceptualised both as objective and as instrument. What is striking about these extracts is that they are taken not from statements about security, but from general statements about overseas development priorities. What is even more striking is that the two countries concerned, Canada and Denmark, are often perceived to be among the more benign and beneficent in terms of their stance on development cooperation and international relations. While the Danish statement suggests that security in developing countries is vital to their prosperity, there are also overtones that Danish national security is itself at stake. Indeed, Denmark has taken a lead in applying development thinking to the question of *its own security*, despite its history of disbursing aid in accordance with relatively altruistic and apolitical criteria. While at one level this shift in discourse
represents a worrying turn in development policy, at another level it is not a new
departure at all. The introduction to this policy arena sets out to explain changes in
development cooperation, explore the problems these changes throw up and the
implications for development in the early 21st century.

The marriage between security and development objectives represented in these
statements suggests a return to the early Cold War years when the United States put
together the first governmental agency to address problems of development in regions
that would become known as the Third World and later, the global South. This was the
Mutual Security Agency (MSA) set up under the Mutual Security Act passed in 1951
‘designed to unite military and economic programs with technical assistance’ (USAID,
2005). Through much of the 1950s and 1960s mainstream ‘development work’, as
propagated by the United States, took place largely within a security paradigm.1 It took a
long fight, via the movements for decolonisation in Africa, the movement against the
Vietnam War and the establishment of the United Nations agencies, to achieve a
separation of development assistance from foreign policy concerns driven by security
objectives and the trading interests of the wealthy countries. For the United States, even
after the MSA was replaced first by the International Cooperation Administration and
finally by the Agency for International Development (USAID), foreign assistance was
always justified in terms of national security (US, 2000).

That there are important links between economic and social development and the absence
of violent conflict has surely always been the case. However, notwithstanding these
obvious connections, over the past 30 years a great deal of effort has been made to keep
the fields of development and national security separate. Defence and Foreign ministries
exist largely to deal with the security and interests of the states in which they are situated,
while government agencies dealing with international development and aid ostensibly
exist to assist other countries in achieving prosperity and stability. Of course such

1 In a standard textbook on development planning Earl Kulp (1970) included among chapters on urban and
rural development planning, a chapter on basic counter-insurgency principles. This represented a synthesis
of a textbook by a French veteran of the Algerian war, Commandant David Galula (1964) to whom Kulp
dedicated his own book. Kulp (p.15) wrote, ‘rural development includes the paramilitary and civil aspects
of counterinsurgency, the environment and the planning techniques of which are basically the same’.
endeavours are invariably related to the national interests of the donor; but by the mid-1970s the explicit aim of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) came to be seen as promoting Third World poverty reduction and economic growth as ends in their own right. If international development cooperation is to retain legitimacy, the separation of development policy from the elements of government dealing exclusively with the national interest is essential.

Nevertheless, a re-emerging development-security nexus is increasingly evident. This is hardly surprising given the international context of the past few years, but it poses a serious danger. For all the discussion of a two-way relationship between security and prosperity and the notion that the merging of development and security agendas is mutually beneficial, the trend seems to be that security at home is becoming the overriding priority of both agendas. Security may indeed be conceptualised as both objective of, and instrument for, development. As an objective of development, security has been a focus of development cooperation since the 1990s and there are positive elements to the concomitant concern with fragile states, humanitarian action and peace-building. As an instrument for development, however, the sudden reappearance of security at the top of the agenda is quite clearly a response to the insecurity felt by the developed North in the post 9/11 environment.

There are a number of dilemmas associated with addressing security and development in relation to terrorism and raised in the articles included in this policy arena. In the first place, there is no obvious link between poverty and terrorism. For example, few known al-qa’ida recruits are of particularly low economic status. Second, it would be impossible to attribute a reduction or increase in terrorist risk to a particular development intervention or set of policy initiatives. Third, development studies does not often address psycho-social issues, which are critical to many studies of terrorism and similarly, a policy arena on terrorism implies more of an engagement with geopolitics than usually characterises the field. Lastly, there is a danger when discussing terrorism and development in the same breath, that in the current security climate the former becomes automatically equated with political Islam. These considerations inform this policy arena
in the following ways. First, in the introduction we analyse the discourse rather than the impact of bringing together of the security and development agendas. Second, we include an article by James Putzel in the policy arena, which offers an insight into the geopolitics underpinning the security development nexus, followed by David Keen’s article that provides something of a social psychology of the ‘War on Terror’. Third, the articles by Jo Beall and Jude Howell address development concerns more directly - both the implications of particular policies, programmes and projects, as well as changes in the dynamics of institutional interaction and cooperation. Lastly, to show that terrorism is linked to the struggle for development in multiple ways, we include an article by Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín on Colombia, a country that consistently experiences a higher incidence of terrorist attacks than anywhere else (Barker, 2003).

Another important issue is the definition of terrorism we employ. Legal definitions are decidedly unhelpful. Indeed, Baxter has argued that we:

> have cause to regret that a legal concept of ‘terrorism’ was ever inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose (Baxter, 1974, p.380).

The definitions used by different international and regional bodies differ quite substantially in their emphasis. Some focus on violence or the threat of violence, others on its impact and yet others on the intention of terrorist activity. Many definitions are vague and allow a degree of discretion that is dangerous for the protection of civil liberties (Rehman, 2005, Chapter 3.) Further complications in identifying ‘terrorists’ are outlined by Rehman:

> In any ideological and political conflict, is it possible to objectively distinguish between a terrorist from a freedom fighter? In contemporary politics, our perceptions of acts of violence conducted by such groups as the Palestinians, the Kashmiris, the Tamil Tigers and Northern Irish Republicans is variable. There is a great measure of truth in the well-known cliche that ‘One man’s terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter’. It is also the case that views and values of whether a particular individual or entity is pursuing terrorist acts is subject to political persuasion and nationalistic sentiments (Rehman, 2005, p. 74).

Moreover, as David Keen suggests in his article, Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban have all at one time been deemed allies of the United States. Because the question of who is employing or threatening terrorism is open to interpretation, in her article Jo Beall follows Jonathan Barker who argues that only actions are unambiguously terrorist (Barker, 2003). Beall, Gutiérrez Sanín and Putzel all include in their analysis the notion of ‘state terrorism’, that is acts of terror perpetrated by governments, with the rationale for this provided in the article by Jo Beall.

**CHANGING APPROACHES TO OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

After the Cold War, changes in the way ODA was targeted were widely welcomed in the development community. Without the superpower competition that had characterised – and indeed politicised – so much of the assistance provided to the developing South since the Second World War, there was a sense of optimism about the potential for aid to focus on countries most in need, irrespective of the political leanings of the recipient regime. Assistance that had previously sought to bolster the military capacity of key states in the face of a communist threat could now be directed towards fostering economic growth, poverty reduction and democracy in the world’s poorest countries. In this respect, ODA could become more true to its redefinition in 1969 by the Development Assistance (DAC) of the Committee Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which excluded military aid and non-concessional financial flows (Führer, 1996, p. 21). More recently this approach was strengthened by moves in a number of countries, such as the United Kingdom, towards the untying of aid. The 1990s were thus perceived by many as a turning of the tide at last in favour of the interests of the global South.
It was common during the 1990s to lament the decline in aid spending since the end of the Cold War and the fact that aid had been separated from other government departments. For example, Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (1999, p. 5) argued that since the end of the Cold War foreign aid has been associated with poor, marginalised countries and is therefore less interesting to economically and politically powerful decision-makers, who instead leave development cooperation to more marginal groups in donor countries. This was to change following the mounting success of a number of bilateral development agencies in raising the profile of ODA. An apposite example is the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) under the stewardship of Claire Short. In what may well turn out to be a case of ‘be careful what you wish for’ this increased profile has put DFID in the lime light, with other line ministries no doubt looking on enviously at the accompanying budget enhancement enjoyed by DFID. Not just in relation to the UK but overall, aid has gone up considerably, with a rise of 4.6% in real terms between 2003-2004, following a 4.3% increase the previous year (OECD, 2005a). Ironically, it seems that at just the time when development funding is better than it has been for a long time, the autonomy of agencies administering ODA is under threat.

That the turning of the tide in favour of the global South has been reversed has become rapidly apparent since 9/11 and the declaration of the ‘War on Terror’. Multilateral organisations and leading bilateral donors alike have released statements emphasising a shift in priorities for development, with the need to combat international terrorism taking centre stage. It is difficult to demonstrate accurately just how much these statements are backed up by aid flows because the figures of the OECD’s DAC only go up to 2003, which predates the recent rhetoric on security and development. Nevertheless, trends can be discerned. For example, aid to Afghanistan and Iraq rose by at least USD 1.5 billion in 2004, while gross debt relief grants fell by USD 2.1 billion (OECD, 2005a). In regional terms, countries central to the security interest of DAC countries are benefiting in all sectors, not just those relating to the military or connected with security. For example, in 2003 total DAC aid to Pakistan was the highest of any single country for that year, higher even than Iraq, and more than twice the combined ODA to Latin America in that year.
Hence, aid to strategically significant countries that have aligned themselves with the US in its new ‘war’ has increased, while many low and middle-income countries have seen their ODA cut. Moreover, those countries that now find themselves major recipients of aid are receiving assistance with a heavy counter-terrorism focus, as aid is increasingly targeted at the ‘front-lines’ in the ‘War on Terror’ (Tomlinson, 2003, p. 7).

With regard to bilateral aid, the shift in development priorities of the United States and the tendency towards the militarization of aid is the most significant. This should come as no surprise given the current administration and geopolitical agenda of the US, discussed by Putzel in his contribution to this policy arena. According to OECD figures, American ODA increased by 15% in real terms in 2002, and 20% in the following year (OECD, 2005). However, the majority of these increases were responses to the 9/11 attacks and short-term humanitarian projects relating to the ‘War on Terror’, while the figures show a sharp decline in aid for long-term agricultural development in 2003 (OECD, 2005). There was also a massive increase in aid to strategically important allies such as Pakistan, which went from receiving an average of a little over 1% of US aid in the 1980s and 1990s to over 4% by 2002-03, or a five-fold increase (OECD, 2005). According to Christian Aid (2004), much of the aid directed at Afghanistan is being diverted to military or military related projects rather than long-term redevelopment, dictated more by US objectives in fighting the war on terror than by objectives to improve security in Afghanistan itself; and huge amounts of aid are inevitably being directed at Iraq. Furthermore, the US increase in spending on defence projects dwarfs the amounts being given in ODA. Between 2001 and 2004, US military spending increased by US $130 billion, or about 40% (SIPRI, 2005). In 2003, US military spending of US $414 billion was 25 times its official development assistance (SIPRI, 2005; OECD, 2005). Furthermore, under the banner of the ‘War on Terror’ the US has become increasingly involved in parts of the world hitherto largely ignored; and the reasons for its involvement are often very far removed from long-term development and poverty alleviation.
With respect to US presence in the Sahara-Sahel region of Africa, Jeremy Keenan argues that a terrorist threat in the region has been exaggerated or even fabricated in order to allow the US to pursue its interests there, which has involved increased assistance to Algeria as its main regional ally (Keenan, 2004). Another prominent example is that of the Philippines, who were given a massive increase in military support for their struggle against the Abu Sayyaf Group in Mindanao. In 2001 the Bush administration pledged a 15-fold increase in Foreign Military Financing to the Philippines, rising from US$1.9 million in 2001 to $29 million until 2003. The US was in the process of re-establishing a closer relationship with the country before the September 11 attacks, and this pledge was originally made in April 2001 – but the ‘War on Terror’ accelerated the process, with the total aid and arms offered to the country for the fiscal years of 2001 and 2002 estimated at $100 million. While the targeting of development assistance by the US in favour of its own national security interests is hardly surprising, the degree to which other countries have rewritten their rulebooks on ODA appears to mark more of a radical departure.

The case of Canada, for example, is one country whose development outlook has generally been thought of as relatively benevolent and independent of its security concerns. It was, after all, the Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson who in 1969 called for rich countries to divert 0.7% of their GNP towards overseas aid – a proposal adopted unanimously by the OECD countries the following year. However, by 2005 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), whose statement is cited above, wrote, ‘Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously’; the statement continues, ‘Development makes everyone more secure’ (CIDA, 2005). The fact that an aid agency should view development as ‘a line of defence’ is a major departure from recent norms in development thinking and has more in common with Cold War era imperatives. However, it is also in line with the thinking emerging from the March 2002 International Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey that saw significant new commitments to international

development spending, driven in part by the notion that such investment would contribute to greater security, both for donor and recipient countries.

Denmark led the way in attempting to tackle the problem of terrorism through development. At the start of 2004 it released its ‘Principles Governing Danish Development Assistance for the Fight against the New Terrorism’, which is explicit in its suggestions about the redirection of development resources, proclaiming that ‘development assistance is an active foreign policy instrument’ and ‘The Government will, therefore, increase the development assistance contribution to the fight against global terrorism’ (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). It ought to be borne in mind that at the same time, Danish ODA has actually decreased as a proportion of GNI.\(^3\) As Denmark is the country that historically has given the highest proportion of its GNP to overseas aid, and that has generally been thought of as doing so primarily on the basis of targeting poverty, it therefore came as something of a surprise when the Danish government announced that security would be the second most important of its criteria for deciding aid allocations from 2004-8 (Christian Aid, 2004). As with Canada, the position taken by Denmark on the development and security nexus might be explained by its conviction that a stronger link between security and development could reduce the marginalisation of international development objectives.

However, the impact of 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’ cannot be discounted. The USA, Canada and Denmark are not alone and other major donors have similarly been redirecting their bilateral aid. French assistance to Algeria, while always substantial, shot up in 2003, accompanied by a massive increase during that year in French assistance to Central Asia. AusAID has announced a number of new initiatives with a counter-terrorism focus, while its aid as a percentage of GNI remained stagnant at 0.25% from 1999 to 2003 (OECD, 2005). One significant initiative is the counter-terrorism assistance being channelled to the Philippines in its fight against Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao. Japan has gone even further in actually redefining its concept of ODA; in 1992, the Japanese

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\(^{3}\) From an impressive high point of contributing aid of 1.06% of gross national income in 2000, Danish aid fell to 0.84% of GNI in 2003, still second only to Norway (OECD, 2005).
ODA charter stated that its use for military purposes should be avoided, but this was effectively revoked in a section of Japan’s white paper in August 2003 entitled ‘The Revision of the ODA Charter and Japan’s New Approach’, where the Japanese approach fell in line with that of the US. The new charter states that ODA should consider the national interest and opens the way for its use for military purposes. It highlights terrorism as a focus for aid, and in an extensive section on Iraq states that as a development issue the reconstruction of Iraq ‘is also of direct relevance to the national interest of Japan, which depends on the Middle East region for nearly 90% of its oil supplies’ (MOFA, 2003). Japan’s aid to Afghanistan shot up in 2002 from a virtually nil base and stayed at a high level in 2003. Moreover, in October 2003 Japan announced a financial assistance package for Iraq totalling some $5bn (MOFA, 2005).

Britain, of course, has its own particular role to play in this enmeshing of security and development concerns. Optimism about aid increases has been widespread in Britain, as intense lobbying by NGOs in 2004 led to a pledge by the Chancellor Gordon Brown to meet the target of 0.7% of GNP by 2013. As hosts of the G8 Summit in July 2005, Brown and Blair sought to place Africa firmly on the development agenda, with the continent occupying an important place in the British government’s discourse on international development co-operation. The UK’s colonial history in Africa has contributed to the concentration placed on the continent by the British as it contributes to its focus on Asia as well. However, while the British approach to development in the current climate thus appears to differ significantly from that of the US, it is nonetheless influenced by underlying security-related concerns. In the context of the ‘War on Terror’ in which the UK is America’s closest ally, the objectives of development assistance in Africa are in danger of being subordinated to geopolitical objectives in British foreign policy. Rita Abrahamsen argues that the overriding objective of the New Labour government is a ‘securitisation’ of the continent, and that dealings with Africa have moved from the realm of development and humanitarianism into one of ‘risk/fear/threat’ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 677). While this may be a somewhat exaggerated claim, in a 2002 speech about ‘Failed and Failing States’ with many specific references to Africa, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw did make the following statement, with now all too familiar echoes:
… we need to remind ourselves that turning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the world, however distant, invites direct threats to our national security and wellbeing. (Cited in Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 679).

Furthermore, the presence of Islam in large parts of Africa has increasingly been highlighted as a reason why the British public should be concerned about the continent, with Foreign Office minister Chris Mullin pointing out that *al-qa’ida* attacks are more prevalent in Africa than anywhere else in the world and that there are ‘more Muslims South of the Sahara than in the Middle East’ (Cited in Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 679). Thus there is a degree of alarmism over Islamic Africa being employed in the UK as well as in the US. As Abrahamsen points out, ‘In the post-September 11 world, these are not innocent statements of geographical fact. They are instead highly political statements, with a potentially profound impact on how policies towards Africa are formulated and implemented’ (Abrahamsen, 2004, 680). The linking of agendas driven by the ‘War on Terror’ with the Department for International Development (DFID)’s long-term focus on poverty and growth and its more recent concern with addressing rights and tackling inequality threatens to undermine the legitimacy of British development assistance, so painstakingly built by civil servants working on these agendas in recent years. It is, however, worth pointing out at this juncture that DFID have clearly discerned these potential dangers and responded accordingly. Unlike many other development agencies in the North, they have perceived the significance of the development/security nexus, but subjected it to a more penetrating analysis. In a March 2005 report entitled *Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development*, they argue that the link between development and security is vital; however it is the security of the world’s poorest people, not of the Northern states, that must be the guiding principle for development. This approach will be examined further in the following section. Regrettably, few other agencies have yet followed suit in questioning exactly whose security should be a matter of concern for the development community.
The extent to which the security and development agenda has infused multilateral development agencies is interesting. Clearly, it is not just individual countries that are rewriting development agendas in the light of the threat from terrorism. The appointment of Paul Wolfowitz to the World Bank Presidency, and of John Bolton as US Ambassador to the United Nations, is testimony enough to this. While the first appointment sent shockwaves through the development world, the second was an outrage as President Bush employed presidential power to place Bolton in the job. Frustrated by the refusal of Senate Democrats to permit a final vote on Bolton's nomination, Bush did this in order to ‘break through a wall of Democratic opposition to Bolton's confrontational brand of conservatism’ to ‘circumvent ‘partisan delaying tactics’ in Washington’ and to ‘send a resounding message that the White House is serious about reforming the United Nations’ \textit{(Washington Post, 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 2005)}. 

The matter is not helped by the fact that multilateral organisations such as the World Bank are so firmly within the grip of US influence. Given the clear line of divergence in the Bank between the Part I countries who drive the agenda – and are currently preoccupied with counter-terrorism concerns – and the Part II countries to whom aid, loans and their attendant rules actually relate, it is clear that the Bank is likely to continue pursuing an agenda broadly along the lines of the wealthy bilateral donors examined above. The US has inordinate influence over the direction of the Bank, as the largest single shareholder with 17\% of the vote (Wade, 2002, p. 203). In the past the Bank’s work in developing countries was often subordinated to Cold War objectives promoted by the US, thus it promoted programmes of support for dictatorships in countries like the Philippines in the late 1970s and early 1980s turning a blind eye to mismanagement and corruption \textit{(Bello et al, 1982)}. If the Bank adopts, wholesale, US priorities in its ‘war on terror’ given the influence it exerts over other development organisations, it seems unlikely that the multilateral donor and development communities will be able to do much to challenge the growing fusion of the development and security agendas. This is an area for vigilance amongst the development community, especially given the large increases being made to the World Bank’s International Development Agency; in
February 2005 donors agreed to contribute USD 18 billion to the IDA, with the intention of increasing its grants and loans by at least 25%.

Also of concern is the publication of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in 2003, entitled *A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention*. As a body the business of which ought to be development as an end in itself, this redirection of DAC’s focus is a matter of concern. More specifically, the notion that terrorism is replacing poverty as the main *raison d’être* for development co-operation, especially when the links between the two are extremely complex, is a cause for alarm. In the current context of international terrorism, the DAC report argues:

… it is not simply a question of donors doing better what they have already committed to do. Applying a development co-operation lens to terrorism prevention has implications for key policy and programme areas that may require donor agencies and their governments to calibrate approaches to efforts already underway. This may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria (OECD DAC, 2003).

This amounts to nothing less than an explicit proposal that there be a shift in priorities with regard to development aid. Significantly, the 2003 document marks a substantial change of gear from the line articulated by the DAC in its 2001 guidelines, *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, which mentioned terrorism only once in 155 pages, and discussed international cooperation on conflict prevention but stopped short of recommending the diversion of aid in the interests of security.

**EXPLORING THE PROBLEMATIC**

Is it necessarily such a bad thing that development concerns be incorporated into security policy, and vice versa? At one level, it might be seen as beneficial that the international community is attempting to deal with the root causes of terrorism through development
assistance, rather than ignoring the deeply troubled parts of the world that foster such levels of economic, social and political exclusion that it is unsurprising that support for terrorist movements flourishes. Some commentators have presented the emerging development-security nexus as benign or even positive. Frances Stewart argues that ‘conflict has heavy development costs, so that promoting security is instrumental for development’, and that ‘inclusive patterns of development are an important element in avoiding conflict, so that development is instrumental to the achievement of security’ (Stewart, 2004, p. 278). Similarly, Robert Picciotto talks of a ‘two-way causality’ between the two, and argues that ‘The future of aid lies at the intersection of security and development’ (Picciotto, 2004, p. 543). These authors, in the spirit of pre-9/11 thinking on development cooperation and consistent with the Monterrey consensus, promote the idea of a win-win situation, where aid can serve the security interests of both donor and receiver.

However compelling these arguments might be, the relationship between security and development is by no means straightforward. In many discussions of this nexus, it is unclear whose security is being referred to; a sharp distinction needs to be drawn between the security of those people in the countries where development is being pursued and security in the country of the donor. Also, whether or not the shift towards a closer linkage between development and security is a positive one depends on one’s perspective on aid patterns before this shift took place. These arguments are worth briefly examining.

In terms of the potentially positive aspects of the increasing interlinking of security and development agendas, it might be argued that bringing a counter-terrorism element into certain development issues is a way of leveraging additional aid resources. A public concerned for their own security is more likely to be amenable to large amounts of overseas expenditure from their taxes if they feel it will make them more secure. The new counter-terrorism focus has indeed resulted in a considerable overall increase in ODA. Placing an issue within a narrative of security gives it a new sense of urgency and can help to legitimate these increases – from this perspective, ‘the securitisation of Africa and underdevelopment could be a potent weapon against the marginalisation of the continent
and a way of justifying increased development assistance to a disgruntled British electorate, preoccupied with hospital queues and late commuter trains.’ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 682).

Furthermore, the guiding principles of ODA in the Clinton era before the renewed focus on security were not entirely benign themselves. Picciotto argues that aid in the 1990s was largely about encouraging poor and post-communist countries to commit to market-oriented policies in order to expand marketplaces for the industrialised North. ODA was thus strongly guided by a general triumphalism about liberalisation and privatisation. In this context, ‘local wars were left to fester’, given that ‘they did not directly threaten the welfare of electorates in rich countries’ (Picciotto, 2004, p. 547). Even atrocities such as the Rwanda genocide did not trigger outside intervention. In the new paradigm where security is paramount, Picciotto suggests that due attention is now being paid to conflict-ridden states. As part of the new outlook, the emphasis is shifting from ‘human development’ to the preferred ‘human security’, which takes more account of risk. This idea is complementary to Stewart’s recognition of the heavy development costs of conflict and her acknowledgement that it is possible to encourage a positive interaction of the security and development agendas (Stewart, 2004).

To this extent the security-development nexus can be characterised in a positive light. One strain of this argument might be summed up as suggesting that if foreign and defence ministries are starting to think about development as beneficial and necessary for national security, this places a renewed importance on development initiatives and results in increased ODA. However, it is not difficult to see where this argument breaks down. As we have already observed, the type of ODA emerging from the new security situation is often not focused on poverty reduction and long-term development. Rather it is concerned either with palliative or humanitarian interventions or alternatively with high profile and decidedly visible projects such as roads and bridges, which often have a security dimension as well. In trying to assess the way that development interventions could manoeuvre in order to benefit from the security situation, Picciotto ironically hits
the nail on the head regarding why, in the end, it is the defence rather than development agenda that wins out:

‘In the real world, policy coherence for defence always trumps policy coherence for development, so the case for switching expenditures from defence to development budgets will have to be made on strict security grounds’ (Picciotto, 2004, p. 545).

An allocation of resources for development on the basis of security concerns may ultimately serve the latter rather than the former. A more helpful approach to the potentially positive interaction between security and development is that adopted by the recent DFID report, which argues that security is a major concern for the world’s poorest people but ‘Promoting the security of the poor is, however, not the same thing as promoting the security of states…indeed, security measures by the state can be implemented in ways that increase poor people’s insecurity.’ (DFID 2005, p. 5). Thus the only justification for international development actors becoming involved in security matters is if it can be shown that this involvement positively impacts on the security of poor people in the developing world.

The NGO community has also not remained silent on the issue. In a 2004 report, The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War, Christian Aid launched a vehement critique of linking aid to the ‘War on Terror’, warning that despite the genuine threat from terrorism, governments’ attempts to protect their citizens ‘should not and cannot be done by annexing the language and budgets of aid’ (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 2). The report argues that, in a manner not dissimilar to the strategic allocation of aid for allies in the cold war, the ‘growing politicisation of aid […] threatens to obscure the goal of poverty reduction’, and calls for a re-balancing of the international agenda (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 249). After decades of support for liberalisation policies that tended to ignore or weaken states, it is important that the donor community understands that both poverty reduction and stability depend on healthy public authorities and that there may have been a security cost to liberalisation policies. Some adjustment in donor policy in this regard is
no bad thing. The danger, however, is in security becoming the over-riding priority for resources to the extent that poverty-reduction programmes, particularly in certain regions, are marginalized.

A new language of policy ‘coherence’ has emerged, coupled with a redefinition of the concept of ‘humanitarian’ aid to include activity that is essentially military. Again, this linking of policies across government departments is something which can be seen as positive for development; in Britain for example, joint efforts made by the FCO, MoD and DFID could mean that development concerns are debated in the context of foreign and defence policies, where previously they might have been sidelined. However, in seeking to situate military, political and development aid projects as part of the same overall goal, pushing ‘coherence’ or ‘joined-up governance’ could end up squeezing the space and leverage available for development assistance. In Japan, for example, the trinity of ODA, investment and trade – which had characterised Japanese development assistance for decades until a few years ago – has now been replaced by a trinity of ODA, NGOs and the Military. This creates a ‘vicious ‘coherence’’, which, amongst other things, strips NGOs and aid workers of their neutrality rendering their work more difficult and more dangerous (Reality Check, 2004). Similar patterns, resulting in confusion between combat troops and peacekeepers or aid workers, are evident in the approach of other developed countries, particularly in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq. ‘Coherence’ is a complex issue; development, defence and diplomacy do need to work together but, as the March 2005 DFID report points out: ‘integrated missions should not result in the ‘ politicisation’ of humanitarian activities, where aid is allocated for political ends rather than genuine need. If this were to happen – or be perceived to happen – then the safety of humanitarian workers could be compromised, and their access to affected populations limited.’ (DFID 200, p. 19). Howell explores these issues in her contribution to this policy arena, along with the way the Global War on Terror has led to changing perceptions of civil society, now often characterised by governments as a suspect and potentially dangerous realm. Not only can this potentially be damaging for democracy and civic engagement, but it paves the way for opportunistic governments to clamp down on internal opposition and introduce repressive policies.
TERRORISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT-SECURITY NEXUS: CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT

One of the dangers of the securitisation of development is that, as a paradigm, it ignores certain crucial aspects of the development process, not least the development agendas of partner governments and other regional, national and local organisations. Furthermore, turning development into a vehicle for security may actually make the latter more elusive. The tendency now is towards increased aid, and large amounts of aid with a military counter-terrorism bias; but development is of course not just about aid. Quite aside from the interventions that are being jettisoned or that are losing out financially because funders do not perceive them as relevant to the new security agenda, there is also the question of how healthy civil societies and good governance should be fostered in the first place. Thus there is a problem that not only does the security-development nexus endanger the poverty reduction focus of aid, but it ignores some of the most effective means by which development can be harnessed to make societies more secure.

It is also the case that not only will countries with little conflict or terrorism suffer in terms of development support, but those where violence and terrorism is not perceived to relate to the US vision of a co-ordinated Islamic terror threat are likely to lose out. Colombia, for example, was the 7th highest recipient of US ODA in 1999 – 2000, and remained in a similar position as the 8th highest in 2002-2003. Pakistan and Iraq, on the other hand, went from being outside the top 10 aid recipients in 1999 – 2000 to being number 6 and 3 respectively in 2002-3.4 In this way Colombia, where patterns of violence are explored by Gutiérrez Sanín in his article on ‘Internal Conflict, Terrorism and Politics’ in this policy arena, has not seen the same kind of hikes in military aid as countries with Islamic terrorist activity, despite its continuing violence. Much of the response to terror and conflict in the past decade has been shaped around the notion that the nature of war has changed fundamentally, and that in these ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999)

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casualties from both ‘criminal’ and ‘terrorist’ activity have massively increased relative to combatant deaths. Gutiérrez argues that for Colombia this is not the case; nor can this be argued’ even in Iraq, as Putzel shows, unless one accepts all Iraqi combatants are ‘terrorists or ‘criminals’.

Terrorism and its impact on development raise some vital questions for development rhetoric and practice. The challenges posed by the securitisation and militarization of aid explored above are substantial; it is likely that interventions with a clear relation to the overarching strategic security agenda will continue to prevail at the expense of other poverty-reduction measures. A bridge in Baghdad, for example, is both more visible and more ‘relevant’ to enhancing global security in the current climate than inoculations in Mozambique. Overall the swing is towards security as a priority over development in the conventional sense, and the ironic danger here is that failure to achieve significant long-term development can end up undermining security anyway. In Balochistan, the troubled Western Province of Pakistan, security has been a major priority due to its 600-mile border with Afghanistan, leading the army to propose a massive new presence in the province. In the meantime, however, levels of development and the quality of life are devastatingly low, contributing to a pool of jobless frustrated young men and the potential of an armed uprising looming on the horizon (Khan, 2005). Elsewhere too self-defeating aspects of securitisation are evident; as Keenan argues with respect to the Sahelian Sahara, the US and Algeria have ‘managed to create the conditions for the emergence of terrorism that previously only barely existed’ (Keenan, 2004, p. 491). In his contribution to this policy arena, David Keen explores the idea that recent military interventions by the US in Afghanistan were ‘predictably counterproductive’, and seeks to explore the ways in which one can attempt to rationalise the seemingly irrational ‘magical thinking’ of the US administration. Drawing on his own research on contemporary civil wars, he examines the idea that the War on Terror is not a ‘contest’ between two opposing sides with the aim of ‘winning’, but a ‘system’ with multiple, often psychological, functions.
Not only can securitisation at the expense of development thus endanger security, but it can have further more subtle knock-on effects for economic development and growth. The impact of post 9/11 counter-terrorism and surveillance measures has inevitably had an effect on migration and labour flows. Such movements of labour have generally, by means of international remittances to developing countries, resulted in the flow of much larger amounts of money into the developing world than total official aid. However, given that migration is shaped by security policies of labour-importing countries, the increased difficulty of migration in recent years along with new banking rules intended to reduce terrorists’ abilities to transfer funds ‘reduces both the volume and the development impact of funds returning to migrants’ countries of origin’ (Page, 2004, p. 305).

Moreover, the securitisation of aid is not confined to Western policy domains and organisations in developing countries are also making a stronger link between security and development in their bids to gain access to funds. In the Islamic world it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the political, military and welfare functions of radical Islamic groups. For example Hizbollah, for whatever reasons, while notorious in the West for its suicide attacks, also manages an extensive network of hospitals and other welfare and educational services (Macrae and Harmer, 2003).

The transnational nature of the issues associated with the global security agenda raises further questions for development. Is there still a valid distinction to be made between the ‘developing’ world and ‘developed’ world, or does the prevalence of highly globalised networks cause the distinction to break down? Beall explores this question in this policy arena with specific reference to the importance of cities and terrorism. The distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in security terms has always been critical; but as Abrahamsen points out with regard to Britain’s foreign policy, ‘the question of how to deal with the ‘elsewhere’ in order to secure the ‘here’ occupies an increasingly central role’ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 679). Recent events in London, perpetrated by British citizens, have to some extent exposed the weaknesses in this approach, and indeed in the

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5 This issue is also raised in DFID’s March 2005 Report, ‘Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World’. In Somalia, for example, informal remittances operate through the Hawala system, and such remittances ‘amount to more than five times foreign aid to Somalia.’ Furthermore, The impact of the ‘War on Terror’ in this regard has been substantial; ‘The closure of Hawala outlets in the US and UK after the September 11 Terrorist attacks left many Somali families destitute.’ (DFID 2005, p. 15).
presupposition that all insecurity derives from the global South. As Beall suggests, it
could be that terrorism is one of the most important factors exposing the illusory nature
of a rigid binary between ‘developed and ‘developing’ cities or indeed countries.

Beall also addresses the thorny but vital question of how terrorism should be defined.
Whether certain activities are included or excluded from the category of ‘terrorism’ is
often central to the justification for directing aid towards them; but all too often (as is the
case in the DAC document outlined above) discussions of a definition are avoided. For
decades, attempts to deal with terrorism in international law have been crippled by the
pervasive failure to settle upon a unanimously agreed definition (Rehman, 2005). This is
posing major problems for the UN in current debates. Gutiérrez also discusses
definitional issues in his article, especially with regard to the way conflicts such as that in
Colombia are depoliticised in discourses about terrorism. The denial of the political
nature of many terrorist struggles, so forcefully demonstrated in a recent book by
Mamdani (2005), leads to the assumption, central to the development-security linkage,
that we can somehow ‘develop’ our way out of terrorism without really engaging with the
political agendas and grievances of those who perpetrate it.

The prevalence of security in development agendas forces us to revisit the question of the
purpose of development itself. Given the high profile nature of debates about
immigration and flexible borders that have accompanied the new concerns about security,
there is a fear in some quarters that the purpose of development is increasingly to target
‘looming threats’ to the North and basically stop people – and the terror they might
support or perpetrate – from entering by improving their situations at home. Not only is
this a world away from the goal of poverty reduction or economic development for its
own sake, but it is a move towards using development as a sort of foreign relations
exercise ultimately perpetuating a divided world in a manner not dissimilar to that of the
Cold War. ‘It would all be too easy’, the 2005 DFID report notes, ‘to unravel the
international consensus for aid to be used in the fight against poverty, by allowing
development budgets to be diverted to tackling high-profile threats such as terrorism or
weapons of mass destruction. These threats affect rich and poor alike and urgently need
to be addressed.’ Ultimately, however, it is not the role of international development organisations to take these threats as their priority. As the report goes on, ‘the distinct contribution of development assistance is to tackle the longer-term, underlying causes of global insecurity linked to poverty and inequality.’ (DFID 2005, p. 18). Given that the linkage of security and development can potentially divert huge sums of money away from the world’s poorest, it is vital that bilateral and multilateral development agencies follow the lead of this DFID report in using their budgets ‘to finance activities which constitute Official Development Assistance (ODA) under internationally-recognised criteria, and that these budgets should not be diverted toward technical assistance for short-term global or national security objectives.’ (DFID 2005, p.18). This is not to say that other agencies have not sought to protect poverty-reduction measures from the influence of the security agenda, but few have yet been so explicit in putting these safeguards in place as DFID in this recent report.

The critical development community now faces an urgent task in keeping a close eye on where aid and development activity is occurring, and why. Does the renewed focus on Africa distract from other less virtuous spending happening elsewhere? Are governments, such as that of Macapagal-Arroyo in the Philippines, using the ‘War on Terror’ to bring aid into their countries and then using it not so much for poverty reduction but for business-related or purely military projects? Where claims are made that combating terrorism and combating poverty are basically the same thing, a notion linked to the idea of ‘coherence’, there are reasons to be sceptical: at some point the two goals will come into conflict, and it is clear which objective carries the most weight in international politics. As Krueger and Maleckova point out, ‘any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is at best indirect, complicated and probably quite weak.’ Thus the exact nature of purportedly poverty-related measures justified on security grounds must be rigorously scrutinised. This bequeaths to development and research organisations a watchdog role and the task of vigilant and critical interrogation of the security-

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development nexus. While this may well be worthy it potentially renders these actors reactive and defensive, leaving the agenda-setting to be undertaken elsewhere.

Ultimately, a central question regarding the security-development nexus is whose security we are talking about. Failure to adequately distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violent conflict contributes to the vagueness of statements about ‘security’ being furthered by development and vice versa. While it is of course undeniable that states ravaged by internal conflict will face substantial development difficulties, this is a very different issue from using ‘development’ to make donor country citizens feel less insecure at home in the North. All too often the development-security nexus exists to manipulate development for ‘them’ with the ultimate purpose of enhancing security for ‘us’. This approach is not only a rewriting of the aims of ODA but is potentially dangerous and self-defeating, tearing huge holes in the overall development goals of progress, prosperity and peace.

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