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Institutional constraints on profligate politicians: the conditional effect of partisan fragmentation on budget deficits

Wehner, Joachim (2010) Institutional constraints on profligate politicians: the conditional effect of partisan fragmentation on budget deficits. Comparative Political Studies, 43 (2). pp. 208-229. ISSN 0010-4140

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Identification Number: 10.1177/0010414009347828

Abstract

The literature on the common pool resource problem in budgeting has thus far not explored the likely interaction between size fragmentation (the number of decision makers) and procedural fragmentation (the structure of the process in which they interact).The argument put forward in this article is that the effects of these two types of fragmentation should not be additive, but multiplicative, because theory suggests that the impact of size fragmentation on fiscal policy is conditional on the extent of procedural fragmentation. Using panel data for 57 countries over the period of 1975 to 1998, the author empirically investigates this interaction in the legislative context and finds strong evidence that partisan fragmentation is associated with higher deficits only when it is not moderated by limits on parliamentary amendment authority.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://cps.sagepub.com/
Additional Information: © 2010 SAGE Publications
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Sets: Departments > Government
Date Deposited: 15 Jul 2010 10:29
Last Modified: 21 Nov 2014 11:44
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/28649

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