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**RWANDA'S ORDINARY KILLERS:
INTERPRETING POPULAR
PARTICIPATION IN THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE**

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Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting popular participation in the Rwandan genocide

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Abstract

This paper examines the question of why so many ordinary Hutu participated in genocidal killing of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. I find that mass mobilisation was contingent on the fulfilment of two main conditions. Firstly it required a mindset – the internalisation of a set of historical and ideological beliefs – within the Hutu population. These were predominantly beliefs in a historical Hutu oppression at the hands of Tutsi and in an ideological definition of the ongoing civil war as an ethnic one, a Tutsi attempt to reinstate this historical order. Secondly, it required the commitment of State institutions to the genocidal project. This commitment provided the initial trigger, legitimacy and impunity for civilian participation in an anti-Tutsi programme. However, once triggered the degeneration into genocidal violence was the product of a complex interaction of other motives ranging from coercion, opportunism, habituation, conformity, racism, and ideological indoctrination.

At the time of writing, just over ten years have elapsed since the world stood by and witnessed a genocide unfold in Rwanda. Since then new scholars from disparate fields of research have been drawn to Rwanda seeking explanations of this macabre phenomenon. With the passage of time their research has born competing hypotheses concerned in various hues with the perplexing questions of 'How and why did this happen?' Beyond the simple human tragedy of the violent nature of so much death, these questions are also driven by the terrible peculiarities of these killings. The main agents of the Rwandan genocide were ordinary civilians, wielding crude instruments of death often against those they personally knew. Moreover, this genocide was not confined to specific regions of Rwanda – massacres committed by a few – but took place on a national scale at a terrifying speed, and with the active participation of a sizeable part of the population.¹ It was not possible for any Rwandan not to know what was taking place in his/her country. This empirical paper presents part of the results of a research project whose primary objective is to examine exactly how Hutu farmers were mobilised into committing acts of genocidal violence against their Tutsi neighbours.²

In summary, I argue that mass mobilisation, including collective violence, during the genocide was contingent on two main conditions, fulfilled in different ways in different parts of Rwanda. Firstly, mobilisation required a mindset: the prior internalisation within the Hutu population of a particular set of historical-ideological beliefs. The historical component, deeply rooted in Hutu collective memory, was of Hutu oppression at the hands of Tutsi that the Hutu Revolution had ended in 1959. The ideological component defined an external

¹ The terms 'active participation' and 'sizeable' both require definitions that appear subsequently in this paper.

² This research is being conducted for a doctoral dissertation at the Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics. I am grateful to Drs. David Keen and Peter Uvin for supervising it as well as the UK Economic and Social Research Council for providing the funding for it.

threat, the ongoing war, in historical and ethnic/racial terms and rested on twin beliefs:³ one, a belief that the war was an ethnic/racial one, a collaboration between Tutsi outside the country (the enemy without) with Tutsi inside the country (the enemy within) against the indigenous Hutu majority; two, that military defeat would reverse '*les acquis*' of 1959, and return the Hutu to a position of subordination and inferiority. The second condition necessary for mass mobilisation was the commitment of state institutions, which still had authority and/or power in the eyes of the population, to the genocidal project.⁴ This commitment provided the trigger point for mobilisation, the initial legitimacy to the actions of the mobilisers and the mobilised, and the impunity necessary for these actions to rapidly and ultimately degenerate into genocidal violence.⁵ However, this subsequent degeneration was the result of a complex interaction of individual motives and not only the consequence of the State's continuing authority and power.

Scholarship on the genocide to date has tended to focus either on the role played by important individuals, elites acting within the key institutions of the State's civilian and military apparatus, or on the context of specific structural forces, macro-political and macro-economic trends at play in Rwanda at the time, or on some combination of both.⁶ As a result, meso- and micro-level variations in the causal mechanisms behind the violence in Rwanda are not properly captured and the genocide is instead misleadingly conceived of as a homogenous, indivisible event.⁷ Grand theories of genocide based on research or evidence at this level cannot fully address the complex task of isolating those conditions that were conducive to genocide, and those conditions that were not. In different parts of the country there were different routes to genocide. There is also a paucity of research that examines the actions and beliefs of the principal instruments of the genocide, ordinary rural Hutu, and the specific local contexts in which they operated. Through micro-level research in four communities (cells) and a meso-level survey in two prefectures in Rwanda conducted over 2002 and 2003, I undertook to investigate the causes of popular participation in the genocide by identifying the mechanisms through which ordinary Hutu farmers, the majority in-group, were mobilised against the minority Tutsi out-group ultimately into committing genocidal violence.

³ By race I refer to the belief that the Tutsi were alien to Rwanda, originating outside of the country, and by ethnicity I refer to the belief that the Tutsi were Rwandan but formed a subgroup distinct to the Hutu. The former view was predominant during the first Republic of Rwanda (1959- 1973) and the latter predominant during the second Republic (1973-1994), and were reflected in the terms used in official documents from those periods (e.g. *Les Rapports Annuels* for each Prefecture). However, as we shall see later, the divisionist media in the years leading up to the genocide revived the notion of 'race'.

⁴ I distinguish authority from simple power by defining it here as *legitimate* power. For example in Rwanda I would *prima facie* consider a civilian burgomaster to have more authority than a military soldier and a military soldier to have more authority than an *interahamwe* militiaman, though all may be powerful.

⁵ As I shall explain later, genocidal violence is only one and the final choice of action during this mobilisation. Other actions that took place on a massive scale as part of the evolution of violence included conducting night patrols, manning roadblocks, spying Tutsi, controlling Tutsi movements, looting Tutsi property, destroying and burning Tutsi homes, killing Tutsi men, raping Tutsi women, and killing Tutsi women and children.

⁶ Excellent syntheses of the roles played by civilian and military elites and macro-economic and macro-political forces in the genocide can be found in G. Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis, 1959-1994: history of a genocide*, London: Hurst and Company, 1995; and A. L. Des Forges, Human Rights Watch (Organization), *et al.*, "*Leave none to tell the story*": *genocide in Rwanda*, New York and Paris: Human Rights Watch and International Federation of Human Rights, 1999.

⁷ By 'meso-level' I am referring to prefectures and communes; and by 'micro-level', I am referring to sectors and cells. In 1991, at the time of the last census before the genocide, Rwanda was organised administratively into 11 prefectures, 145 communes, and 1490 sectors. A sector, whose average mean population was approximately 4800 residents, was then subdivided into cells. In the 20 sectors where I conducted the survey were a total of 87 cells ranging in size in from 174 to 2902 residents and whose mean population was 902.

As research sites I chose two cells from the North (Ruhengeri prefecture, Kinigi and Nkuli communes) and two from the South (Butare prefecture, Maraba and Shyanda communes) of Rwanda.⁸ In each 'pair' I selected one that had experienced a relatively high level of *in situ* killings and one that had experienced a relatively low level of *in situ* killings.⁹ My primary source of information was oral testimony, collected using semi-structured interviews and an enumerator-administered survey.¹⁰ The semi-structured individual and focused-group interviews captured a cross-section of each community comprising of Tutsi survivors, imprisoned Hutu perpetrators, bystanders, figures of state and social authority, and older residents with historical knowledge of the community.¹¹ The broader survey in turn sampled prison inmates and free citizens not accused of genocide-related crimes,¹² and who were all resident in those cells in April 1994. In other words, it was an attempt to sample perpetrators and non-perpetrators from the same communities. The second main source of information was the hill *gacaca* committees in each of these four cells, as well as the corresponding *gacaca* committees established in the prisons.¹³ As part of the record of the genocide, each *gacaca* committee at the cell-level established the overall population of the cell in April 1994, the number of those accused of genocide-related crimes, and the number of victims. In other words, I knew who stood accused, what they were accused of doing, against whom they did this, and when and how they were said to have done this.¹⁴ Finally, I was able to access a limited amount of archival data for the chosen prefectures and communes, though much had been destroyed or lost during and after the genocide.¹⁵ These records consisted mainly of prefectural annual reports, commune monographies, correspondence between burgomasters of the communes and the Prefect, and birth, death, and marriage registers that included data on ethnicity.

⁸ I have chosen to keep the names of the cells anonymous and refer to them only by the name of the commune in which they are located.

⁹ I took as a measure of the level of violence the number of Tutsi who were resident and killed within the territory of those communities (that is *in situ*) as a proportion of the overall Tutsi population of the cell. In the Maraba and Kinigi cells, these were 8.3% (7 out of 84) and 2.9% (1 out of 35) respectively. In the Shyanda and Nkuli cells these were 56.9% (41 out of 72) and 77% (46 out of 60) respectively.

¹⁰ The survey was conducted in Ruhengeri and Butare prefectures involving 296 respondents and was representative at the prefectural level. The survey instrument was first translated into Kinyarwanda and then translated back into French by a different individual. Questions in the interviews were asked in Kinyarwanda while the answers to open-ended questions were recorded in French. Altogether the questionnaire comprised 223 questions of which 63 were open-ended. The non-perpetrator stratum of the survey was conducted by 19 Rwandan enumerators each of whom had previous knowledge of the communities they were working in and at a minimum who had completed secondary school education. The enumerators were a mix of Hutu and Tutsi. I also asked them to complete the survey questionnaires personally first to see whether there were any worrying biases in their backgrounds and attitudes. I also interviewed them each individually. The perpetrator stratum of the sample was conducted by myself with the aid of an interpreter, as a personal authorisation was required to access prison inmates.

¹¹ In total the project conducted 42 semi-structured and structured interviews of residents of the cells: 10 respondents from the Maraba cell, 11 respondents from the Shyanda cell, 10 respondents from the Kinigi cell, and 11 respondents from the Nkuli cell.

¹² The prisoners interviewed include both those who had confessed and those who had not confessed but stood accused by others. The hill residents were chosen randomly (where possible every one hundredth name) from the *gacaca* lists of the cell population as it existed in April 1994, while ensuring that they did not also figure on the *gacaca* list of the accused.

¹³ In 2002 the Rwandan government instituted a pilot system of community-administered justice, based on a traditional dispute-resolution mechanism called *gacaca*, one of whose objectives was to try and convict members of those communities for genocide-related crimes. *Gacaca* had also been instituted in the prisons prior to this and I used information from the prison *gacaca* to verify the information gathered from the hill *gacaca*.

¹⁴ It should be borne in mind that at the time of my research the *gacaca* programme was still in its pilot phase and those accused had not yet been tried and convicted.

¹⁵ Prefectural level archives existed in both Butare and Ruhengeri, but communal level data only existed for Nkuli. Records for Kinigi, Maraba, and Shyanda had been lost or destroyed.

In this paper I reject two propositions: that popular participation was simply the product of a longstanding tradition of obedience to state authority;¹⁶ and that genocidal violence was the inevitable outcome of longstanding and overt Hutu racism or ethnic prejudice against Tutsi.¹⁷ I argue that people did not kill simply because they were told to kill, nor did the Hutu kill the Tutsi simply because their hatred finally had an opportunity to express itself. The first part provides a brief description of the genocide in each of the four communities. This is followed by an examination of the two central questions. An appendix is included that summarises the most important findings in each of the four communities.

Describing the genocide

Maraba cell, Butare, southern Rwanda

The genocide in the Maraba cell began thirteen days after Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane was brought down on 6 April 1994. Of the 84 Tutsi who were resident, only 26 were to survive. The cell was close to the frontier with neighbouring Gikongoro prefecture where the killing had already started. Tutsi fleeing these attacks passed through the Maraba cell seeking refuge at the nearby Simbi Parish, pursued by their assailants. Initially the burgomaster and the *conseiller* appealed for calm and urged villagers not to join the attacks.¹⁸ Meanwhile, Tutsi from the sector joined their Gikongoro compatriots at the Parish having either been forced to flee under threat from looters or having fled out of fear. Finally, the visit to Maraba of the newly-appointed pro-genocide President, Sindikubwabo, on 17 April, unleashed attacks on the 3000-5000 Tutsi who had gathered at the Parish; and with the removal to Butare of the Tutsi prefect opposed to the genocide, the burgomaster committed himself to the genocidal project that same evening by radio. Two days later, attack groups were organised and roadblocks erected in the cell itself by longstanding racists, former soldiers, and MDR-Power leader E.R.¹⁹ Meeting almost every morning, the attack groups hunted down Tutsi who had either hidden or chosen to remain in their homes, looting homes in their wake. Tutsi continued to be hunted and killed throughout May and June, though the majority had already been massacred at the local parish and health dispensary in April. The groups continued their operations until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) arrived on 2 July.²⁰

¹⁶ For examples of the 'obedience' argument being advanced, see Prunier (1995), p.248; H. Hintjens, 'Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37:2 (1999), p.271; Philip Gourevitch, 'After the Genocide', *The New Yorker*, 18 December 1995, pp.84 & 93. For examples of the 'ancient, tribal hatreds' explanation, see CNN broadcast, 'Burundi and Rwanda sites of ethnic violence', 7 April 1994 (transcript obtainable through Lexis-Nexis); R. Dowden, 'Rwanda's Twins locked in eternal war', *The Independent*, 10 April 1994; W. Schmidt, 'Strife in Rwanda', *The New York Times*, 10 April 1994.

¹⁷ Given the space constraints of this chapter, I treat only two of the five questions that were under investigation in the project here. The other three questions under investigation were: To what extent did the advent of *political parties* in 1991 promote the ethnic division and consequent violent mobilisation along ethnic lines of the rural poor? To what extent and through what mechanisms did the context of the ongoing *civil war* influence participation rates in the genocide? To what extent was violence the product of poverty, that is a structural decline in *socio-economic living conditions* through the mechanisms of demographic pressure, land degradation, and land scarcity? The answers to these questions appear in my forthcoming dissertation.

¹⁸ As explained earlier Rwanda in 1994 was organized on four principal administrative levels. In descending order of size these were: Prefectures headed by a Prefect, Communes headed by a Burgomaster, Sectors headed by *Conseillers*, and finally Cells headed by *Responsables*.

¹⁹ The Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) had strong roots in the ParmeHutu party credited with the Hutu Revolution of 1959, and enjoyed strong support in Gitarama prefecture and the *northern* communes of Butare prefecture. It was split between a moderate and extremist wing, MDR-Power.

²⁰ The RPF's army, comprised mainly of the descendants of Tutsi exiles from the 1959 Revolution, invaded from Uganda in October 1990. It is also this army that put an end to the genocide.

Shyanda cell, Butare, southern Rwanda.

The remotest of the cells, Shyanda, was also the last to descend into the genocide, some eighteen days after Habyarimana's assassination. Initially the sector *conseiller* and cell *responsable*, along with their constituents, were very concerned as to who was behind the looting and burning of homes they could see on the neighbouring hills. It was not yet apparent that Tutsi were the targets. This uncertainty impelled the sector *conseiller* to continue to organise night patrols and also establish roadblocks, activities in which both Hutu and Tutsi participated, to ensure the security of his sector against unwelcome intruders. Meanwhile burgomaster T.S. had been summoned to a meeting in Butare town with the new Prefect. The substance of this meeting is unknown. However, on 22 and 23 April, following his return, assistant burgomasters D. and I., along with veterinarian G., accompanied by villagers, conducted the first looting and burning raids on Tutsi homes in neighbouring sectors, during what were ostensibly night patrols. The following morning they came to the centre of the sector in which the Shyanda cell was also located, and demanded the whereabouts of all the Tutsi. Eyewitnesses report that they told the crowd they should not eat the cows until their work was done. In response E.K., a local butcher, a well-known and longstanding Hutu extremist, immediately mobilised a group of men and went to search the Tutsi homes, but found them empty. The Tutsi in fact had suspected something was afoot and had spent the night hiding in the sorghum fields. The next day, however, a group gathered at 7 a.m. at the local *cabaret* (bar), as E.K. had ordered, and several parties were organised and set out to hunt down the Tutsi where they were hiding. Almost all the 41 Tutsi killed from the cell met their end that day. The bodies were buried by villagers the following day. Having exterminated the Tutsi, no more attack groups were conducted in the cell, but villagers subsequently maintained night patrols and participated in groups that raided other areas. This continued until the RPF arrived in July, when the surviving 11 Tutsi of the cell dared to return to their homes.

Nkuli cell, Ruhengeri Prefecture, northern Rwanda

The Nkuli cell boasted a population of 60 Tutsi, a sizeable minority (7.6%) for a community in Hutu-dominated Ruhengeri. Interethnic troubles began in the cell long before Habyarimana was killed. The proximity to the war led to early suspicions that the Tutsi were acting as accomplices of the invading RPF army, and in 1992 two Tutsi men were arrested from the cell. From that point the remaining Tutsi men began to flee, leaving their families behind as it was initially thought that only the educated men were being targeted as collaborators. However, in 1993, in reprisal for the RPF violation of the ceasefire, a family of seven Tutsi was burned alive in their home in the neighbouring cell R. by soldiers working together with villagers. By this time the movements of the remaining Tutsi in the cell were extremely restricted by the vigilance of their suspicious Hutu neighbours. On 7 April 1994, immediately after it was known that Habyarimana had been killed, the *conseiller* of the sector, aided by villagers, *Coalition pour la Défense de la République* (CDR) extremists,²¹ and soldiers from the resident army camp, led a systematic campaign of attacks on all the Tutsi left in the cell. Unable to hide or flee, within two days the extermination was all but complete, with 88% of the Tutsi population killed. Forty-six met their end within the cell, and seven in the adjoining military camp.

²¹ *La Coalition pour la Défense de la République*, the CDR, was a political party that ran on an open anti-Tutsi platform and was often identified as the extremist arm of Habyarimana's MRND party.

Kinigi cell, Ruhengeri Prefecture, northern Rwanda

The seven Tutsi homes that were occupied at the beginning of the war were deserted by April 1994, their 35 occupants having either fled or been killed in 1991. Located on a frontline of the war, bordering the then Zaire, the villagers lived in a state of permanent insecurity, fleeing their homes twice following RPF incursions into the area. The burgomaster of Kinigi commune, T.G., chose to exact revenge for the war on his Tutsi population. In the cell this first led to the arrest in October 1990 of three members of a Tutsi family by villagers from a neighbouring sector, K., as part of a wave of 8000 arrests that had swept the country, following the FAR's simulated attack on the capital.²² They were released a week later, having been beaten. Several days following the RPF raid on the Ruhengeri prison, on 23 January 1991, a group of villagers from the same K. sector came and killed the male head of that same family. As in Nkuli, the movements of the Tutsi were closely monitored by the population. In February 1991, FAR soldiers took and killed two more Tutsi men. Shortly thereafter villagers from the same K. sector dealt the same fate to another Tutsi man. The women and children who were remaining fled. By July 1991 the cell was empty of Tutsi. When Habyarimana died on 6 April 1994 there were no Tutsi left to kill in the cell. In any event, the cell was occupied the next day by the RPF who began their advance, causing the majority of the population of the cell to flee to Zaire.

State Authority and the Legitimisation of Violence

To what extent was participation in *ibitero* (attack groups) and other activities during the genocide, such as manning checkpoints and conducting *irondo* (night patrols), simply the result of villagers following the orders of state authorities? At one extremity of this argument lies the belief that rural Rwandans, largely uneducated, had grown up in a culture of obedience, and thus responded unthinkingly to the call of the authorities to kill the Tutsi enemy: they killed because they were told to kill.²³ At the other pole lie those who seek to credit the 'masses' with individual agency and autonomy in making strategic choices in their own interest: they killed because they wanted to kill.²⁴ However, my research indicates that it was only once a commitment to genocide had been made by state authority figures who were still authoritative in the eyes of the population that mass mobilisation in an anti-Tutsi programme of action was triggered. Until that point, the pro-genocide position had support only among a minority of extremists, and it was not yet a popular or predominant position. However, it was not enough for the State to simply give the order. The massive response that was eventually seen additionally depended on the prior internalisation within the population of a particular set of historical and ideological beliefs. Also, although it was the above signal that triggered an anti-Tutsi programme, it was not the State's authority that lay behind the programme's subsequent degeneration into genocidal violence. There were other forces at work here. Thus popular participation was not simply the product of a longstanding Rwandan tradition of obedience to authority.

I present the analysis behind these conclusions in three timeframes. Firstly, I examine the relationship between the state authorities and the population in the war years leading up to the genocide. Secondly, I look at what happened immediately after Habyarimana was killed on 6

²² See Prunier (1995), p.109 for a description of this event in which the government pretended that the RPF had launched an attack on the capital, Kigali, to legitimise the wave of arrests that followed.

²³ Prunier (1995), p.57; P. Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: stories from Rwanda*, New York: Picador USA, Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1999, p.23.

²⁴ The strongest and best case for this explanation is J. P. Kimonyo, *Revue Critique des interprétations du conflit rwandais*, Vol.1, Butare: Université Nationale du Rwanda, Centre de gestion des conflits, 2000.

April 1994. Finally, I consider the three months that followed, during which most of the killings took place in each community, until the RPF took control of most of the country.

The Impact of War and Multi-partyism (1 October 1990 – 5 April 1994)

In both Maraba and Shyanda, from the time that opposition political parties established themselves in 1991, there was an erosion in the authority and power of the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND) at the local level in the South. The vulnerability of the MRND was visible and felt at the cell level, but the situation of the burgomasters at the commune level was largely unknown, and their authority remained intact for the ordinary population. In the Maraba cell the struggle was between the MDR, the most popular opposition party, and the MRND. Eventually, with the eclipse of the moderate wing of the MDR at the national level, it was the extremist wing, MDR-Power under the leadership of a former soldier, E.R. that was to establish itself as the chief challenge to the authority of the MRND in the community. The *responsable* of the Maraba cell found himself sidelined in the power struggle:

I did not join any political party and I stopped going to the MRND meetings. There would be abuse hurled between the parties. The PSD was full of young delinquent men (*ibarara*). But the real problem was between E.R. who was in MDR-Power and his elder brother who was in the MRND. There was tension and they exchanged bad words after meetings.²⁵

In the Shyanda cell, the *responsable* found himself in a similar predicament, though his position was being threatened not by an opposition party leader but by the local butcher,²⁶ well-known for his racism and feared for his skill with a machete, and whose extremism became increasingly vocal as the war progressed. A genocide survivor reports how he would always pinch her nose whenever he saw her saying he could not wait for the day that he could shave it.²⁷ Another villager remembered how the same butcher would come and sell banana beer directly in front of the *cabaret* (bar) that the *responsable* owned to show to everyone that he was more powerful than the *responsable*.

In the North the situation was quite different. In both communities the MRND was predominant and the survey shows it enjoyed overwhelming grassroots support within Ruhengeri, among Hutu and even Tutsi initially. The popularity of the MRND was not surprising, as it was well known (and the survey corroborates this)²⁸ that Ruhengeri, along with Gisenyi prefecture, had been favoured by Habyarimana as the region of his birth. Opposition was weak and parties were closely monitored and intimidated by the MRND.²⁹ Opposition party activists were labelled as accomplices (*ibytso*) of the enemy RPF, and the survey shows they had few professed supporters.³⁰ Instead it was the war that preoccupied

²⁵ Interview with former member of the cell committee, Maraba cellule, Butare, Rwanda, April 2003

²⁶ E.K. was a supporter of the PSD party, the party dominant in this area, but was not a political leader.

²⁷ Long noses were a stereotyped characteristic of Tutsi.

²⁸ 86% of all respondents thought that the *northern* prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were favoured by President Habyarimana.

²⁹ In Nkuli's commune records, I discovered a copy of an almost verbatim report of the proceedings of an MDR meeting in 1991 written by an MRND infiltrator and submitted to Ruhengeri's Prefect, the most senior regional MRND representative. In addition an MDR office building had been destroyed and there was correspondence from the burgomaster denying his authorisation of this action.

³⁰ 88% of the respondents in the North who admitted to supporting a political party stated that this party was the MRND. The next most popular party was the MDR, scoring 10%.

the state authorities and distrust of the Tutsi ‘enemy within’ was deep. The state authorities instituted anti-Tutsi campaigns in response. In the Nkuli cell in 1993, soldiers aided by villagers burned a family of Tutsi alive in their home in reprisal for the RPF violation of a ceasefire. Similarly, in Kinigi the burgomaster ordered the arrest of Tutsi following the RPF invasion in October 1990. Then again, following the RPF attack on Ruhengeri prison in January 1991, the same Tutsi family was the target of an attack leaving the head of the household dead. Ordinary villagers were co-opted into these campaigns from early on too. It was villagers, albeit from a neighbouring sector, who arrested and brought three Tutsi to the commune for interrogation following the alleged RPF attack on the capital in 1990. It was the same villagers who killed the first resident of the cell in the reprisal attack for the RPF raid on the Ruhengeri prison in 1991; and it was villagers in Kinigi and Nkuli who curtailed the movements of Tutsi in their cells, manned roadblocks, and conducted night patrols in the years before the genocide. There was a commitment by the State to an anti-Tutsi position already in place, and it was a commitment that the population accepted and was complicit in.

So we see quite clearly a sharp contrast in the years leading up to the genocide in the relationship between the population and the state authorities in these two regions. Although the MRND was under pressure and unpopular in the South, the war was distant and the Tutsi threat appeared negligible. In contrast in the North, the power and authority of the State went unchallenged, but the war provoked a strong anti-Tutsi backlash from the State and the population. As we shall see in the next section, these differences determined both the trigger point and the configuration of forces involved in the killings after Habyarimana was assassinated. However, they did not affect the eventual outcome: a massive and popular effort to exterminate the Tutsi.

Choosing Genocide (6 April 1994)

Once the news of Habyarimana’s assassination on 6 April 1994 became known, two very different responses were seen in the North and the South. In the Nkuli cell, killings began the following day, but in Maraba and Shyanda in the South the killing did not start for another two weeks.³¹ The difference lies in the moment of commitment of the meso-level (commune) authorities to anti-Tutsi violence. In the North this occurred long before Habyarimana was killed, but in the South it did not occur until mid-April. In addition, once the burgomasters had signalled their pro-genocide position, the violence was organised and led at the local level by different figures in the North and South. It was the state *conseiller* in the Nkuli cell who gave the signal, while the state officials giving the signal were an extremist and a political opportunist in the Shyanda and Maraba cells respectively. This reflects the regional difference in the authority and power of the state in the years leading up to the genocide.

In the North, the commitment from the State to an anti-Tutsi position was in place before 1994. The constellation of forces was already perfectly aligned in the North. The meso- and micro-level civilian authorities, the military authorities, the extremist politicians, militia, and the general population had all been complicit in anti-Tutsi activities from as early as 1991. It was unsurprising, then, that on 7 April we saw in the Nkuli cell that the sector *conseiller* immediately took the lead, assisted by villagers, CDR supporters, militia, and soldiers from

³¹ The killing in the Maraba cell began on 19 April and in the Shyanda cell on 24 April. In the Kinigi cell there were no Tutsi remaining, having either been killed or having fled in 1991. The day after Habyarimana died the RPF advanced from its position to occupy the Kinigi cell and the majority of the population fled.

the adjacent military camp, in attacks against the Tutsi in his area. In other words, it was the same configuration as before.

The chronology of events was different in the South. With Habyarimana's death, the situation became fluid and ambiguous, and the burgomasters found themselves at the centre of competing forces. There was no precedent for killing Tutsis as there had been in the North. On the one hand, the Tutsi Prefect of Butare, Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana, the most senior civilian authority in the region, remained opposed to the genocide. On the other hand, the new central authorities in Kigali were calling for blood, as were extremist elements from within the commune and from neighbouring communes.

In Maraba, burgomaster J.M.H. found himself in a dilemma over what to do with the several thousand Tutsi refugees gathered at the Simbi parish. However, his mind was made up on 17 April when the interim President, Sindikubwabo, visited Maraba, and the Butare Prefect was removed from office over the radio. The massacre at the Parish immediately commenced, in which J.M.H. participated. He had signalled his pro-genocide position. Two days later, on 19 April, the first *ibitero* (attack groups) were organised in the cell. In Shyanda, burgomaster T.S. held out longer, but immediately after returning from a meeting in Butare town with the new Prefect, his assistant burgomasters led looting raids with the population. Upon their arrival in the Shyanda cell on the morning of 24 April in a commune vehicle, the first *ibitero* were organised by the racist butcher, E.K. Their arrival and address to the population sent the unequivocal signal of the Shyanda commune's pro-genocide position.

This reversal of position by the burgomasters effectively neutralised the power of the micro-level authorities, the *conseillers* and *responsables*, to stop the killing in the southern communities. Overtaken by events and wrong-footed by their superiors, they could now either join in the genocide or be left aside. Their initial uncertainty and ignorance of the genocidal project resulted in their eclipse by their rivals from before: the racist in Shyanda, and the extremist/political opportunist in Maraba. In the general instability and fear following Habyarimana's death, the gap in authority and power at the micro-level was quickly filled by these two figures. In any event, the authority of the *conseillers* and *responsables* had been waning in the years leading up to the genocide. Unlike in the North, it was the non-state actors influential from before who organised and led the anti-Tutsi campaign. One eyewitness, who became the *responsable* after the genocide, described this marginalisation of the micro-level authorities in the Shyanda cell:

They [the *responsable* and the *conseiller*] did not stop the genocide because it was supported by the high authorities. They were saying that the high authorities had more powers than them and that they would be killed too. Once the *responsable* asked a group of people why they were going to kill and loot at a certain home. They responded that the leniency you have will sabotage our programme. So he was afraid and was even told by the leader of this group that he was no longer the *responsable*.³²

Thus it was only once the higher, meso-level authorities signalled their pro-genocide position to the villagers that the population could be mobilised on a massive scale, rapidly climaxing in genocidal violence. It was clear from the interviews that ordinary villagers were oblivious to the vulnerability of the burgomasters and the pressures they had been under from Kigali, as well as pressure from political rivals and extremists within their communes. The meso-level

³² Interview, Shyanda, Rwanda, May 2003.

authority of the burgomasters was still intact in the population's view. The burgomasters' eventual endorsement of the genocide consolidated the positions of the racist in Shyanda and extremist/political opportunist in Maraba, and legitimised them as the new authorities in their communities. In these new roles they quickly embarked on the, by now, state-sanctioned programmes to eliminate the Tutsi that I shall describe in the next section. Thus the defection of the burgomasters, and the rise of new authority figures at the micro-level were critical to mass mobilisation. Until this point, there had been growing pressure from a minority of extremists within the commune to adopt the genocidal position, but there was not as yet a popular commitment to the project.³³

The Evolution of Violence (April – July 1994)

I have tried to show that the State's authority was necessary to trigger and popularly legitimise a programme of action that was to culminate in the elimination of the Tutsi. In the Nkuli cell in the North, genocidal violence occurred immediately after Habyarimana was killed. It took only two days to kill 46 Tutsi. The speed of this response was due to the alliance of necessary forces already existing, having collaborated with impunity in an anti-Tutsi campaign long before April 1994. It was therefore not a large step to total elimination in this already-established campaign.

The South presents a bigger puzzle. There had been no earlier state-sanctioned anti-Tutsi programme of activity. Once Habyarimana died, there was not an automatic move to violent elimination. It was not until the moment that a representative of the State, whose authority was still intact in the eyes of the population, signalled a pro-genocide position that we see the start of an anti-Tutsi programme in the South. This programme comprised a spectrum of increasingly anti-social activities that ended in genocidal violence. In this section I argue that it was not the simple authority or brute power of the State alone that sustained and intensified popular participation in this programme. In Maraba, for example, the population was engaged (without the intervention of figures of State authority) for three whole months in the hunt for Tutsi before the RPF arrived in July 1994. The rapid degeneration to genocidal violence in the South was, instead, the result of the complex interaction of a number of dynamics.

In the South, the population was progressively but rapidly co-opted into the new programme for action. There was a broad similarity between the two communities, showing a pattern of increasingly anti-social events. First, Habyarimana's death created fear and uncertainty. Extremists began a campaign of anti-Tutsi rhetoric. Homes could be seen burning on neighbouring hills, but the cause was not yet known. As a result, night patrols and roadblocks were organised, in which both Hutu and Tutsi participated, to ensure the security of the areas. Second, it became clear that the Tutsi were the targets. Reports came in of anti-Tutsi violence in neighbouring communities. The meso-level authorities signalled their defection to an anti-Tutsi position in their own communities. As a result, the looting of Tutsi property and destruction of Tutsi homes began. Third, the micro-level authorities were eclipsed by the extremist in Shyanda and the political opportunist in Maraba, who mobilised and led part of the population in the first *ibitero*. As a result, the killing began. Tutsi men were initially

³³ Ideally one would have the counterfactual situation among the selected research sites to see whether mass mobilisation would *not* have occurred if a burgomaster continued to hold out and the extremists did not come to the fore. However, it is my view that in such a situation a burgomaster would simply have been removed or killed, as the Prefect Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana had been, and replaced by someone willing to toe the genocidal line.

targeted, but the number of participants in *ibitero* quickly increased and the violence became genocidal. Tutsi women and children were also killed. Fourth, the *ibitero* multiplied,³⁴ and moved to other communities. They continued until the RPF arrived in July 1994.

In summary, there were different routes to commitment to genocide in the North and the South. In the North, the State's authority at all levels was undisputed, as opposition parties were weak or non-existent and the MRND (the party synonymous with the State) was popular. In response to the outbreak and the continuing proximate threat of the perceived 'Tutsi' war, anti-Tutsi activities had been initiated from as early as 1991. All elements, namely the State institutions (civilian and military, meso- and micro-level), the non-state extremists, and the general population were already aligned in an anti-Tutsi constellation. When Habyarimana was assassinated in April 1994, the response was swift and unequivocal. In Nkuli, Tutsi began to be killed the following day; while in Kinigi there were already no Tutsi left: they had been eliminated or had fled since 1991.

In contrast, in the South the war was distant, but the authority of the State had been under threat at the local level since the introduction of opposition political parties in 1991. In Maraba, the sector *conseiller* was challenged by an MDR-Power leader, and in Shyanda the cell *responsable* was being undermined by a local racial extremist. Once Habyarimana had been killed, the two commune burgomasters, under pressure from the new central command in Kigali and a minority of extremists from below, succumbed, and committed themselves, to an anti-Tutsi programme. It was at that precise moment that violence erupted at the grassroots level. However, unlike in the North, the violence in the South was organised and led at the local level by the two figures who had previously challenged the State's authority. Once the burgomasters defected to the pro-genocide position, these two were able to establish themselves as the new legitimate authority figures at the local levels, completing the eclipse of the sector *conseiller* and cell *responsable*. In this sense, state authority was necessary to legitimise the extremists' position, and thereby their programme of action into which they co-opted the population (with its particular mindset). However, once triggered and legitimised, this anti-Tutsi programme of activity was sustained and intensified by forces independent of the state's authority and power. The violence had a momentum of its own to which the State continued to lend its influence. In the absence of any State sanction for their increasingly anti-social actions, the mobilised population rapidly degenerated into genocidal violence.

It is difficult to convey, let alone analyse, the villagers' perceptions of events during these different stages in the degeneration towards genocidal violence. Their own words best illustrate the diversity and contradictions in motives. The first account is that of a confirmed non-participant in the genocide from the Maraba cell:³⁵

When villagers went to the places where the Tutsi fled to, they said they could not leave them alive there and take their things as they knew each other. And the community had been sensitised that one group was the enemy and this gave them the energy to do what they did. It was clear in the *gacaca* meetings that some people participated because of sensitisation and so most people killed to get rid of the enemy and those people who were being killed were the supporters of the enemy. I would say that in general there was a personal liking of each other and it was the authorities who are to blame as they turned them against these people.

³⁴ In Shyanda the *ibitero* only lasted two days in the community but *irondo* continued and people participated in *ibitero* in other communities.

³⁵ This interviewee was a Vice-President of the *gacaca* committee for Maraba. One of the qualifications for this position is that a person not be accused by the community of having participated in the genocide.

Some of the villagers were saying that because the authorities told them to do this they thought that they would not have to answer for anything. But now people see it was wrong. Now it is the villagers who are suffering and those in the prison who are in suffering while those who organised the genocide are in Arusha where they get television and complain of not having enough to eat.

If they were going to attack a rich person, more people would join. If they were going to attack a poor person, there would be less people. For example in A.'s case, her father had many cows and so many people, more than 20, went. There were no women in our cellule who did this. In other parts of the country, there were women. They would do something that matches their strength like uproot sweet potatoes but they would not kill. *Ibitero* were everyday. When they attacked a home, somebody would say that "so and so had cows" and they would plan to meet there. In the first days people went by force to go and fight in the war (*gutabara*) and after that they went voluntarily because they could get property.³⁶

This observer's account is rich in contradictory motives. His initial account explains that Hutu reasoned that they had to kill the Tutsi if they wanted to keep their possessions. In the same breath he ascribes the killing to the ideological messages that the Tutsi were the enemy. He goes on to say that people felt emboldened, and that they could act with impunity since the authorities did not stop them. In his second account, he explains how initial coercion was quickly replaced by material incentives for participation. Evidence from the broader survey supports the coercion argument to some extent. In-group sanctions did exist, but they were overwhelmingly monetary: a cash fine or property looted. Although many believed in the threat of physical harm, "putative duress",³⁷ there was not a single instance of anyone being killed for not participating or even for hiding or helping Tutsi. His use of the Kinyarwanda word, *gutabara* (to go and fight a war, to go to save) also affords us a little insight into an ideological mindset of war.

The next account is of a confessed killer from the Shyanda cell:

The next house was G.'s. There was no one in the house. I was in this attack group. I just came across these people and followed as I was coming back from a bar and was drunk. I did not go in earlier attack groups as I did not know what was happening. The house was already looted. They had taken everything. I don't know who did this. As it was a tiled house it was not burned. Instead they looked for the occupants of the house and killed them. When they found them they killed 8 people including G.'s family. 5 members of his family were killed. The others were just hiding with them. I stoned one of them but it was my neighbour who finished him. There were many in the attack group—between 20 and 30. About 10 had *pangas*. It was not all 10 who used their *pangas* – only about 4 did. The others watched only and were shouting words corresponding with what they were doing. The bodies were buried the next day. We all participated in the burial. We were over 100. It was to prevent the dogs from eating them.³⁸

³⁶ Interview with Vice-President of *gacaca* committee, Maraba commune, Butare, Rwanda, April 2003.

³⁷ This phrase is used by Browning to describe the fear of members of the German battalion responsible for the massacre of Polish civilians in World War II if they did not obey orders (C. R. Browning, *Ordinary men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland*, New York: HarperCollins, 1992).

³⁸ Interview with confessed prison inmate, Butare central prison, Rwanda, May 2003.

In his account, this perpetrator attempts to explain that his participation in this killing was accidental. He did not plan to kill anyone as he only met the attack group on his way home. Also, the killing came as a surprise to him. He did not know that there was a plan of attack against the Tutsi. There is also evidence of group de-individuation, the absence of a sense of individual responsibility. Everyone participated in this kill either as machete-wielders or as pro-active bystanders. They all had a role to play, but no single person was responsible. In addition, a clue to the extent of mass mobilisation for the genocide is given in the number, more than one hundred, of villagers who buried the bodies the following day.

The following account is of a genocide survivor from the same cell as this perpetrator:

When the President died on the 6th, it took a long time for such things to happen here in [Shyanda cellule]. On Friday April 24th, one of the boys coming from the market said that the President said all Tutsi should be killed. The following day, Saturday, the *conseiller* told us not to flee and we even went out to dig in the fields. That same day at 2 p.m. we saw houses burning and we saw it was only the Tutsi houses. We did not sleep at home that night. We slept on the hills. When I was hiding in the sorghum, I heard gunshots but later we heard that they were just making a noise so that people would come out to be killed. In the morning we came back and then E.K. came and wanted to take the cows of my husband. My husband refused and then he took the cows by force. My husband's brother gave E.K. one free cow and so he left him alone. That was in the morning. Then at around 3 pm that is when all my family members were killed except my husband who was killed 2 days later on Tuesday.

I saw one attack group that killed my family members (my in-laws). I was hiding in the house and I heard them being killed. There were a lot of people. I heard them drumming and whistling and after they had killed them they came in the house. I had locked myself in one of the rooms with a child I was breast-feeding. The leader sent in 2 men and they took away my 2 children and when they reached outside, they undressed them to see whether they were boys or girls. They were arguing among themselves as to whether they should kill them. My elder child was begging for forgiveness. One of the men said let us leave them as they are only girls. I was not killed as I was Hutu married to a Tutsi. They only started hunting the women when the *Inkotanyi* were approaching. Then they said we should start killing all those married to Tutsi so that they cannot tell them what happened here.³⁹

This genocide survivor's account illustrates the uncertainty in Tutsi minds, and the initial faith they placed in their sector *conseiller* after Habyarimana's death. It was not clear even to them that they were the targets. As she is from the same cell as the perpetrator above, her testimony possibly corroborates his claim that he did not know that the Tutsi were being targeted until he joined an attack group. The second account confirms that it was initially only Tutsi men and boy children who were being hunted in this community. Women were not targeted, as ethnicity is patrilineal in Rwanda. However, women became targets later on when Hutu feared reprisals from the approaching RPF. The degeneration into genocidal violence, that is the total elimination of Tutsi, was complete.

³⁹ Interview with genocide survivor, Shyanda commune, Butare, Rwanda, May 2003.

From these abbreviated anecdotes of the micro-dynamics of the genocide in the South, a multiplicity of possible motives for popular participation in the various activities leading up to and including genocidal violence can be inferred. It was clearly not simply because the authorities had told them to do so, but seems to have been a complex interaction of racism, ideological indoctrination, opportunism, habituation, conformity, and coercion.

There are obvious difficulties in attempting to quantify the determinants of free will or in analysing human motivation generally. Individuals may have several motives at once. Their motives may change as their participation in the activity progresses. They may remember their motive differently after the event. Their conscious motivation may be different to their unconscious motivation. They may choose to represent their motivation differently to third parties. The research techniques used in this project are too crude to find conclusive answers to such questions that really belong to a number of subfields of psychology. These risks are highlighted by the different responses made to two questions. Respondents were asked why they *personally* participated in night patrols or manned roadblocks. The most popular response was that it was the law or an obligation (*itegeko*) (obedience to authority, 57%). The second most common answer was that they were fighting for their country or defending themselves against the enemy (ideological mindset of war, 33%). The third most popular answer was that they or their loved ones were under physical threat if they did not participate (coercion, 20%).⁴⁰ However, when asked why *other people* joined the attack groups, the responses were quite different. The most popular answer was that these people stood to gain materially from the looting (opportunism, 40%). The second most popular answer was either that they thought the Tutsi were the enemy, that they were fighting for their country or that they were defending themselves against the enemy (ideological mindset of war, 22%). The third most popular answer was that it was simply the law or an obligation (obedience to authority, 19%). In other words, there is a tendency to explain *personal* motivation in terms of having no choice. However, the same individuals tend to explain *other peoples'* motivation in terms of opportunism, that is a self-interested choice.

From Chauvinism and Racism to History and Ideology

Although the authority of the state was necessary to trigger and initially legitimise an anti-Tutsi programme of action that very swiftly escalated into genocidal violence, once triggered there was a complex interaction of dynamics, independent of the State's authority and power, laying behind the rapid increase in the number of ordinary participants in these activities, as well as the genocidal direction that these activities took. A new and unstable norm, legitimising and in some cases institutionalising anti-Tutsi violence, was becoming rapidly established within these communities. In this section I argue that there was a deeper historical-ideological basis, a set of beliefs internalised by Hutu in the North and South of the country. This mindset was also a necessary pre-condition for mass mobilisation, and in part explains the speed with which such a norm could be assimilated. Without it the commitment of the state to the genocidal project could not have been implemented. The bulk of the population must also have been primed and ready to respond to the right signal from state authorities, even if subsequently driven by a complexity of motives.

⁴⁰ As individuals were allowed to give more than one possible motive for their participation, these percentages signify the proportion of individuals who gave that answer. They do not signify any particular answer as a proportion of all possible answers.

Refuting racism and ethnic prejudice

To what extent can popular participation in genocidal violence be explained by longstanding and overt racism or ethnic prejudice that Hutu had for Tutsi?⁴¹ Behind this proposition is the idea that the Hutu killed the Tutsi because they finally had the chance to do so, having always hated them. I would argue against longstanding racism and ethnic prejudice being seen as the basis of popular participation in an anti-Tutsi campaign.

Starting from a definition that a racist has an inherent sense of superiority, I find that Hutu from the North and South of the country did not meet this criterion. Hutu respondents were asked whether it had ever been possible for a Hutu to change his/her ethnicity and become Tutsi. Those who answered affirmatively were then asked why a Hutu would want to do so. The most popular response was that they had either become wealthier or acquired more cows (superior economic status, 47%), while the second most popular answer was that they sought the prestige or honour of being Tutsi (social status, 17%). Interestingly, half of those who spoke of social status also equated this with having more cows or more wealth generally. However, it was unclear whether respondents felt that this ability to change ethnicity only existed under the Tutsi monarchy: that is to say, it was a *historical* sense of inferiority; or whether it still existed as a *contemporary* sense of inferiority.

Before Habyarimana's death in April 1994, Hutu and Tutsi were less integrated in the North than in the South. Not only were there fewer Tutsi living in the North as a whole, but there were proportionately fewer inter-ethnic marriages too. In the South, 21% and 12% of the Tutsi population in the Maraba and Shyanda cells had married Hutu, compared with only 3% and 0% in the Nkuli and Kinigi cells respectively.⁴² This statistic becomes even more telling when one considers that the relative number of Tutsi living in the northern Nkuli cell (7.6%) was higher than in the southern Maraba cell (5.6%). The absolute number of Tutsi living in Nkuli, however, remains lower than in Maraba. Indeed, when I probed further into the Tutsi families in the Kinigi cell, where there were no interethnic marriages at all, I discovered that of the two distinct, unrelated Tutsi families resident, all the marriageable members had gone to other sectors, and in one case had gone as far as Gisenyi, a neighbouring prefecture, to find Tutsi partners.

In addition to looking at ethnic preferences expressed in individual behaviour when choosing marriage partners, I also asked a series of questions designed to gauge opinions and attitudes. The results again suggest a lower level of ethnic prejudice in the South than in the North. I first asked a question intended to measure *perceived* ethnic inequality. Respondents were asked whether the Tutsi in their communities generally had more land or more cows than their Hutu neighbours. The data revealed that, in both the North and the South, Hutu respondents felt that this was the case. However, when asked the follow-up question intended to measure the *legitimacy* of this Tutsi success, the consensus was different. More Hutu in the North than in the South perceived this advantage as a result of special treatment the Tutsi had received historically rather than as a result of their own hard work. In other words, Hutu in the North were more likely to feel aggrieved by perceived Tutsi socio-economic superiority. In contrast, one Hutu respondent in the South recognised that while some Tutsi in their

⁴¹ One of the best cases made for the importance of longstanding racism in the genocide is made by P. Uvin, *Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda*, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998, p. 31

⁴² It is interesting to note that the majority (76%) of these marriages were between Hutu men and Tutsi women, and more rarely between Tutsi men and Hutu women.

communities did have more cows than the Hutu, this was customary and did not confer upon the Tutsi a superior socio-economic status in his opinion.⁴³

Ethnic distrust also increased as a result of the war in 1990, particularly in the North, and to a lesser extent in the South, as a result of the rise in the extremist 'Power' factions within the opposition parties in 1993. In the North the suspicion of the 'enemy within' was very pronounced. Hutu suspected Tutsi, particularly educated Tutsi at the beginning, of collaboration with the RPF. In my interviews I came across a variety of suspicions. They were accused of knowing in advance that the invasion was planned, of providing intelligence to the RPF, of sending their sons to join the RPF ranks, and even of stockpiling guns to use against the Hutu. These suspicions were shared by the state authorities and the villagers, and as a result Tutsi were arrested, harassed, intimidated and murdered by villagers working in tandem with state authorities in the years leading up to the genocide. Distrust was therefore deep and prevalent in the North, and Tutsi were targeted without proof of complicity. Such indiscriminate targeting and distrust, I argue, is further proof of ethnic prejudice in the North.

In contrast, while the war did cause Hutu to 'begin to look at Tutsi with a bad eye' (*batanjiye kureba abatutsi nabi*), it was not a suspicion that was very strong or very widely held in the South. It was mostly confined to a few extremists. This difference in ethnic distrust between the North and South is confirmed by the interethnic marriage rates during the war. I found that they declined in the North but were maintained in the South. Between October 1990 and July 1994, only two interethnic marriages were recorded in Nkuli commune, whereas between January 1986 and September 1990 there were 7.⁴⁴ This was at a time in which the Hutu-Hutu marriage rate increased substantially. Thus in the North, inter-ethnic marriage rates did decline during the war, confirming the rise in inter-ethnic distrust. In contrast, however, I discovered that three mixed marriages had been contracted in the war years in the Shyanda cell alone, and one as late as 1993, suggesting that distrust was much weaker in the South.

To verify this inference of the differential impact of the war on inter-ethnic relations in the North and South, I also asked when respondents thought relations began to deteriorate between Hutu and Tutsi. In the North, 54% of the respondents thought it was when the war began in 1990 compared with only 22% of respondents in the South. In contrast, only 38% of respondents in the North thought that relations were good up until the genocide began in 1994 compared with 56% in the South. Finally 18% of Hutu respondents from the South attributed the deterioration in interethnic relations to the advent of multipartyism compared with only 5% from the north. When I eliminated Hutu respondents and sampled only genocide survivors these results were corroborated,⁴⁵ though there was a slight increase in the proportion of respondents in the South who attributed the decline of inter-ethnic relations to the start of multipartyism in 1991.

Interviews provide additional confirmation of this interpretation of the state of inter-ethnic relations before Habyarimana's death. Besides the obvious difference that Tutsi were killed in the North but not in the South in the war period, there was also the testimony from genocide survivors that confirms this difference in prejudice levels. In the Maraba cell, a

⁴³ Interview with inmate formerly resident in the Shyanda cell, Butare central prison, Rwanda, May 2003. Note that although he believes ownership of cows does not confer superior *socio-economic* status, this does not exclude the possibility that this confers superior *social* status.

⁴⁴ All these interethnic marriages were between Hutu men and Tutsi women. Nkuli communal registers.

⁴⁵ Genocide survivors include respondents of Tutsi origin and Hutu women who were married to Tutsi men that were killed during the genocide.

baptism of a Tutsi child took place on 10 April 1994 to which both Tutsi and Hutu were invited, even though only four days had elapsed since the death of Habyarimana. In Shyanda, one genocide survivor described relations in her cell as this:

At the start of the war, all people were afraid – not just the Hutu but also the Tutsi as they heard there was war. There were, however, no problems between Hutu and Tutsi as a result in my cell. Nothing bad was said about Tutsi at the time, though perhaps they said it in their huts. After the political parties started there was one person who was strong here and every time he saw me he would pull my nose and say he wished he could shave it. There was no-one else in [the Shyanda cell] like this man [E.K.] I don't think there were others who disliked the Tutsi. Perhaps in their huts they said things but he was the only to reveal it to me.⁴⁶

In contrast, in the Kinigi cell a survivor spoke of her days in school under Habyarimana's regime (before the war started), when she would not linger after classes as she would be teased and hounded by Hutu students because she was Tutsi. As these anecdotes suggest, prejudicial feelings were much more overt and pronounced in the North than in the South, even before the war started in 1990.

In summary, racism, when defined as a sense of inherent superiority, was contradicted by the presence of a historical sense of Hutu inferiority. However, we do see ethnic prejudice, though this was more overt and longstanding in the North than in the South, dating from at least October 1990 when the war broke out and possibly earlier. While there was also some ethnic distrust in the South (possibly due to the rise of extremist factions in opposition political parties) it did not resemble the profound suspicion in the North that drove the state authorities and villagers to arrest, chase and kill the Tutsi there. Given these differences between the two regions, and that genocidal violence was to occur in both places, it would be difficult to maintain the view then that longstanding or overt ethnic prejudice was thus a necessary condition for mass mobilisation. This point is subtly underlined when one considers that among the 111 perpetrators counted in the South, five of them had been married to Tutsi wives before the genocide. Clearly, then, not all killers were established racists or chauvinists. Having argued against a racist and chauvinist mindset, in the next part I argue that the mindset that did prevail was an historical-ideological one instead.

Collective historical memory and the ideology of war

For the State's call to arms to resonate with Hutu, I argue that there must first have been a set of popular beliefs, or mindset, in place: a set of ideological beliefs, instilled relatively recently from above through State institutions and the extremist media in the context of an external threat, the ongoing war; and a set of historical beliefs, a collective Hutu historical memory, embedded from an early age from below through the school system and through the family. It was the fusion of these two sets of beliefs that formed the Hutu mindset at the time of Habyarimana's assassination in April 1994, and allowed the progressive but rapid co-optation of the population into the anti-Tutsi programme.

1. Collective historical memory

Prior to the genocide, the dominant discourse amongst Hutu, and to a lesser degree Tutsi, was one of ethnic solidarity and collaboration in the South. Hutu and Tutsi were good friends,

⁴⁶ Interview, Shyanda cell, Butare, Rwanda, May 2003.

shared local beer, and married each other; and this opinion seems to have been borne out objectively in the inter-ethnic marriage rates in the South. However, perceived ethnic differences reappear when looking at collective historical memory, and it is in the past that we encounter a divergence of opinion between Hutu and Tutsi, but a remarkable unity of opinion between Hutu of the North and South.

Hutu historical beliefs, in both North and South, were shared across generations, including among those too young to have direct knowledge of these historical events, as well as across the prison and non-prison populations. Overwhelmingly Hutu respondents believed that Tutsi were treated more favourably under monarchic rule by the *mwami* (75%)⁴⁷, and also under colonial rule by the Belgians (68%).⁴⁸ Similarly the quasi-feudal relationship of *ubuhake* prevalent during the reign of the Tutsi monarchy was remembered as an oppression forced upon the Hutu (85%).⁴⁹ Tutsi were generally remembered as being at the top of the social hierarchy, usually the *shebuja* (patron or master), while the Hutu was the *mugaragu* (vassal or servant) (85%). It is widely believed that Hutu received unjustified and cruel punishment from the Tutsi in the form of the *ingoyi*, the whip. Similarly, it emerged that there was a widespread shared view of the socio-historical origins of the three ethnic groups: the Twa were the indigenous hunter-gatherers, the Hutu were farmers, and the Tutsi were cattle-herders. However, in the survey about half of the respondents were unwilling to answer the controversial question about where exactly Hutu and Tutsi originated from. Of those who were willing, 27% claimed the Hutu were indigenous to Rwanda and 50% claimed the Hutu came from Chad but arrived before the Tutsi. Of these same individuals, 92%, however, believed that the Tutsi came from outside of Rwanda and 62% specified Abyssinia/Ethiopia as their country of origin. Perhaps the most sensitive question I asked was about the Hutu memory of the events of 1959, the year of the Hutu revolution in which the Tutsi monarchy was disempowered and the first Hutu Republic inaugurated. All respondents were aware of what transpired. However, when asked whether the revolution was a good or bad event, only 38% were willing to call it good, while 55% called it bad. Part of this discrepancy lies in the problem of self-censorship under a Tutsi-dominant regime. However, part of it is explained by the follow-up question of ‘Why was it bad?’ – 22% of these individuals thought that it bad because it was the origin of the ethnic conflict today between Hutu and Tutsi. In other words, the genocide and its consequences had influenced their opinion of the revolution. Of those individuals who described it as a good event, the overwhelming majority thought it was so because it brought Hutu freedom from Tutsi oppression.

So a clear picture of ethnic grievance emerges from the collective Hutu memory. Hutu were seen as having been oppressed, discriminated against, and the victims of injustices under the Tutsi. Moreover, the Tutsi were seen as indubitably foreigners to the Hutu. This was an important mytho-historical belief that the first Republic had instilled, and the extremist media reinforced before the genocide.⁵⁰ In their minds, the Tutsi did not belong to Rwanda. Interestingly this memory is specific to the Hutu, and is not shared by the Tutsi respondents, who overwhelmingly gave the opposite answers to these same questions. This underlines the relative importance of the family and ethnic community in the formation of such beliefs, as

⁴⁷ The traditional Tutsi king.

⁴⁸ Note that these percentages become even higher (82% and 88% respectively) when we discount those Hutu who chose not to answer or claimed not to know – unsurprising given the climate of the current regime.

⁴⁹ 92% if we do not include those who did not answer or claimed they did not know.

⁵⁰ One of the most famous examples is the speech of Leon Mugesera, the extremist advocate of the Parti Liberal in November 1992 in which he urged Hutu to send the Tutsi back to Ethiopia where they came from but this time through the Nyabarongo river (that flows northwards).

both Hutu and Tutsi attended the same schools under the first and second Republics, in which the history of Hutu oppression was taught. However, the role of the school system should not be underestimated. Respondents from Butare and Ruhengeri who were in primary schools during Kayibanda's first republic (1959-1973) reported that teachers asked Tutsi children first starting school to stand up to distinguish them from their Hutu friends. Those who did not know their ethnicity were told to go home and ask their parents. Hence ethnic consciousness was instilled from a very early age, typically less than ten-years old according to the survey. The history of Rwanda continued to be taught in terms of Tutsi suppression of Hutu under Habyarimana's regime (1973-1994). One young Hutu man, now serving in the *gacaca* committee for the Maraba cell, was a primary school student in the early 1980s:

They taught us that the Tutsi lived better than the Hutu and that the Tutsi had come to colonise them. They said that the Tutsi had many cows and that for a Hutu to get one cow he had to look after their cows for many years. So we grew up thinking that the Hutu were oppressed.⁵¹

Similarly, in the North a Tutsi survivor from the Kinigi cell described her school days also under Habyarimana in this way:

When I was in school they taught the history of Rwanda and this might have caused suspicions among the students. They taught that the Tutsi were ruling with an iron hand. The students would then tease me because I was Tutsi. After classes you had to hide to avoid being teased or beaten. You would not linger in case they got hungry and you would rush straight home.⁵²

How can this collective Hutu memory of grievance, present in both the North and South of the country, be reconciled with the earlier observation that southern Hutu had low levels of prejudice against the Tutsi in their communities? Part of the discrepancy can be explained by the difference that often exists between how one perceives individuals personally known, and perceptions one has of the wider category or group to which they belong. The Tutsi in these southern cells were indeed on friendly terms with their Hutu neighbours, but on another mytho-historical level Hutu were also the aggrieved victims and the Tutsi their age-old oppressors. This is best illustrated in the discrepancy between the answers to two similar questions in the survey. A lower percentage of Hutu in the South felt that the Tutsi *in their cell* (47%) had received special treatment compared with a higher percentage who felt the Tutsi *in general* (73%) had been favoured by the *mwami*. Thus the individual-individual relationship is perceived differently to the inter-group relationship. Part of the discrepancy also lies in the relative importance we assign to behavioural outcomes over cognitive processes. By this reasoning, simply having the memory of being wronged does not make a person racist or prejudiced *until the moment the person acts in some discriminatory way towards members of this group*.⁵³ In the South we do not encounter any overt form of Hutu discrimination against Tutsi, certainly not before the war broke out in 1990 and probably up until Habyarimana's death in 1994.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Interview with *gacaca* committee member, Tare cell, Butare, April 2003

⁵² Interview with Tutsi survivor, Kinigi cell, Ruhengeri, June 2003

⁵³ For a discussion of how political scientists engaged in explaining ethnic violence tend to ignore cognitive processes while psychologists are preoccupied with the measurement of attitudes and beliefs without testing their effect on real world situations, see Green & Seher, 'What is the Role of Prejudice in Ethnic Conflict?', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6 (2003), pp.509-531.

⁵⁴ Confirmed by Tutsi survivors from those communities.

2. The Ideology of War and Justification

The messages contained in State and other extremist media in the years leading up to the genocide have been well documented and analysed by scholars, and do not need to be repeated here.⁵⁵ However, what is missing from the scholarship is a sense of the extent to which these messages were internalised by their intended audience. What exactly did Hutu remember and believe of what they were being told? I argue there were two fundamental and widespread messages that did take root among Hutu because they resonated with the collective historical beliefs embedded from much earlier on: firstly, that this was an ethnic war; and secondly, that this war, if lost, would reverse the gains, '*les acquis*', of the 1959 Hutu revolution. An external threat was needed, that could be defined in these ethnic and historical terms and thereby activate these latent mytho-historical beliefs in the Hutu population.

Respondents were asked whether they thought the enemy during the war years was just the RPF or all Tutsi, including those inside the country. Seventy-one percent of all Hutu respondents, with no significant difference between the North and the South, affirmed that they thought all Tutsi were the enemy compared with 28% who thought it was the RPF only. Respondents from the North were also asked what the war refugees from other regions were saying when they reached their communities.⁵⁶ Fifty-one percent of Hutu respondents answered that they were told that the RPF was killing and committing atrocities specifically against Hutu; and an additional 9% described it as a war between Hutu and Tutsi. That this was an ethnic war was a very strong belief in the minds of the Hutu population surveyed.

Respondents were also asked what they thought would happen if the RPF won the war. Forty-seven percent of Hutu respondents from the North and South believed that the RPF and Tutsi would kill or exact vengeance on the Hutu specifically, and an additional 24% believed either that the Tutsi monarchy would be reinstated or Hutu would be oppressed and disfavoured again. Here, again, we have evidence that it was perceived as a war of Hutu against Tutsi, but also evidence of the belief in a link between the 1959 revolution and the current war. Specifically, they feared that the political and economic gains of the 1959 Hutu revolution would be lost. The Tutsi would be on top again, and the Hutu returned to their pre-revolution position as the servile and oppressed majority. One interviewee in Shyanda expressed the fear that the land forfeited by the Tutsi exiles in 1959 would be taken back as well as "the air that people breathed".⁵⁷

Did people think that what they were doing was *right* during the genocide? When asked whether they felt that other people thought their actions were justified during the genocide, 86% of Hutu respondents in the North who replied answered that people felt justified, compared with 65% in the South. The results were broadly similar when broken down by whether the respondent was in prison or not. The regional difference might be explained by the North's proximity to the frontlines of the war, and it would be reasonable to surmise that

⁵⁵ One of the best analyses of the Rwandan media before and during the genocide can be found in J.-P. Chrétien, *J.-P. Rwanda : les médias du génocide*, Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1995.

⁵⁶ This question was developed in the North after I had administered the survey in the South. However, when I returned to the South to ask this and other questions, I received a letter from the Rwandan government advising me that my research was no longer authorised, as it was ethnically divisive. I would like to point out to others considering research in Rwanda the danger that their research may place local research assistants in if their research project falls foul of the administration's sensitivities.

⁵⁷ Interview, former member of the cell committee, Shyanda cell, Butare, Rwanda, May 2003.

ideological messages about the war would resonate more strongly with inhabitants there. In general, though, the majority of Hutu clearly thought that their compatriots felt justified in their actions during the genocide. I then asked those respondents who answered affirmatively *why* these people thought themselves justified. A slightly stronger ideological mindset in the North was again confirmed by these results. The most popular answer in the North was that they thought that the Tutsi was the enemy (40%), compared with only 18% in the South. In contrast, the most popular answer in the South was that it was the law or that the authorities had ordered it (25%), compared with only 4% in the North. The answer on which both northern and southern Hutu seemed strongest and closest to each other was that it was because the authorities did not stop or punish them for their actions (18% and 29% respectively). In other words Hutu in the North had a bias towards justifying the genocide in terms of fighting the wartime enemy, while Hutu in the South had a bias to justifying it in terms of the legitimacy conferred by the State's order to kill, and both groups felt that impunity was an important factor.

This ideology was indeed a justificatory one for the Hutu I interviewed. However, I believe it was not only to justify their particular degree of participation to third parties like myself, or even to themselves *ex-post*. It was also needed to justify it to themselves *ex-ante*, at the trigger moment for the anti-Tutsi programme. Indeed it was also needed *during* the degeneration into genocidal violence, even though at that point they may really have been acting under an amalgam of forces, such as conformity or habituation or opportunism, as described earlier. Self-acceptable answers to the questions of 'why should I do this?' and 'why am I doing this?' were needed as much as for the question 'why did I do this?' Their own interpretation of the anti-Tutsi actions they acquiesced to and participated in was necessary at a cognitive level to justify and also drive their behaviour. The ideological messages that were being hammered from above provided ready-made, acceptable justifications that more importantly sounded right when laid on top of their own collective historical memory of grievance.

Counting the victims and killers

When one looks at the data that the *gacaca* process has revealed for the four cells, at first glance they seem to fall far short of *mass* mobilisation. In the *southern* cells of Shyanda and Maraba the percentages of adult men who stood accused were 16.8% and 24% respectively. Counter-intuitively, given the higher level of ethnic prejudice in Ruhengeri, in the *northern* cells of Nkuli and Kinigi the percentages were even lower at 4.6% and 0.8% respectively. The reason for the regional difference in participation rates is relatively straightforward. Most of the Tutsi had fled the Kinigi cell in 1991 before the killing had reached genocidal proportions. There was no one left to kill in 1994. In the Nkuli cell, much of the killing was also said to be done by FAR soldiers based in the adjacent military camp. This interpretation is supported by the data that show that while only 9 individuals from the cell itself stood accused, 24 individuals from areas outside the Nkuli cell were credited with crimes committed within the cell.

Nonetheless, the bigger puzzle remains concerning how one explains the still relatively low proportion of perpetrators in all four communities. The problem is mainly definitional. The overwhelming majority of the prison inmates whom I personally interviewed, as well as those others for whom I collected information on their criminal charges, were accused of either actually killing/wounding or being present at that time (that is as a member of *ibitero*).

However, as I described earlier, there were many activities other than participation in attack groups that were part of the anti-Tutsi programme of action. We saw in both the *northern* and *southern* cells that Tutsi attempts to flee their communities were thwarted by the general population. In Nkuli, Tutsi who fled were captured and returned to the *conseiller*. Tutsi who were in hiding in others' homes were denounced. In addition to this popular surveillance there was the considerable verbal abuse of Tutsi after Habyarimana was killed, as the RPF was widely believed to be behind his assassination. In Shyanda more than 100 people participated in the burial of a Tutsi family. However, participation in any of these acts did not make one a criminal accomplice in the interpretation of the 1996 Rwanda Genocide Law. None of the perpetrators in my sample were accused of committing such relatively minor acts. The *gacaca* judges' training manual, which explained among other things what kinds of behaviour are criminalised under the Genocide Law, was silent on the definition of what constitutes an *accomplice*.⁵⁸ Yet these acts of complicity occurred on a wide scale, and do indicate a broader, but ultimately unquantifiable, level of involvement or mobilisation of the population. In this sense it is possible to speak of the active participation of a sizeable part of the population.

The data on victims also need explaining. Having selected the communities on the basis of the proportion of victims killed *in situ*, I found that these numbers were the result of idiosyncratic factors, and that as a 'dependent variable' they did not provide a meaningful contrast from which to infer possible determinants of popular participation. For example, in the Shyanda cell, the last to descend into genocide and where political activity and ethnic prejudice were relatively low, I counter-intuitively found had one of the highest proportions of Tutsi killed (56.9%). It was precisely because it was the last cell to receive the signal from above that so many Tutsi were killed *in situ*. The delay in mobilisation meant that the populations of the surrounding cells had already begun to patrol the perimeters of their communities making it impossible for the Tutsi to flee. Conversely, in Maraba very few Tutsi were killed *in situ* (8.3%), as the warning signals of an impending threat were clear. Due to its proximity to the border with Gikongoro, where the attacks had already started, the fleeing Tutsi passed through the Maraba community pursued by their attackers, alerting the Tutsi of Maraba. These then fled their homes and congregated at the Parish of Simbi where most of them (60.7%) were massacred. In both Shyanda and Maraba, then, the number of Tutsi killed was largely the accident of geography: Shyanda's distance from the communal authorities and Maraba's proximity to the border of Gikongoro.

Finally, I should point out that not all the victims were Tutsi and not all the perpetrators were Hutu. Firstly, in the Maraba cell I discovered that 2 out of the 7 residents killed within the community were in fact Hutu women who were *not* married to Tutsi husbands. One was perceived as the local madwoman who had insulted a group manning a roadblock that then pursued and killed her. The second woman, allegedly, was killed by her stepbrothers in relation to a land dispute. Thus I have a very small amount of evidence for personal score-settling occurring under the cover of the genocide. Secondly, regarding perpetrators, in the Shyanda cell I discovered one Tutsi adolescent among the 48 persons accused of violent crime there, and in the Maraba cell 7 Twa from among 63 accused by other inmates.⁵⁹ Both

⁵⁸ The manual follows the broad principle of the 1996 Genocide law that crimes against the person fall into categories I-III, while crimes against property fall into category IV. All the perpetrators I counted fall into categories I-III.

⁵⁹ These individuals have been accused by their fellow inmates but have not confessed to these crimes themselves. From among the 7 Twa, 2 still reside in the community, 1 is dead, and 4 are in prison. The Tutsi adolescent continues to reside in the community and has also not confessed to his crimes.

of these stories provide a very small amount of evidence that there was a multiplicity of motives, other than simply Hutu racism or the State's coercive power, behind participation in the genocide.

Conclusion

I have argued for an interaction of top-down and bottom-up factors in explaining mass mobilisation. Each was a necessary but insufficient condition. First, the authority of the State had to be committed to initially trigger and legitimise an anti-Tutsi programme of action in each community. There were local variations in how and when this commitment was reached and in how it was then implemented. These variations were a function of the differential impact of war and multi-party politics on the authority of the State and inter-ethnic relations in the years leading up to 1994 in each of these communities. However, for the involvement of the population, more was needed than simply an order or signal from above. Second, the population needed a particular mindset. I have argued this comprised of part-historical and part-ideological beliefs that allowed them to accept and participate in the anti-Tutsi programme. Once the programme was triggered, however, it degenerated through a complex interaction of forces independent of the State's power and authority into genocidal violence.

In making this argument I reject the pure statist, elitist position that the genocide was organised at the top and simply implemented locally.⁶⁰ This argument assumes an unquestioning obedience to superior authority that I did not find. There was already activity afoot at the grassroots level that interacted with this order from above. In the North it was deep ethnic prejudice, reinforced by the war, which facilitated the co-optation of the population into anti-Tutsi violence. In the South, it was the gap in the State's authority at the micro-level that allowed the pro-violence elements to come to the fore. However, I have not rejected the statist argument entirely, as I have argued that its authority was needed to initially legitimise these pro-violence elements from below before mass mobilisation was possible.

I have also rejected the purely instrumentalist argument of ethnicity. I do not accept that Hutu were simply manipulated into hating and fearing Tutsi by a media campaign of extremist rhetoric from above. For these messages to ring true I have argued that there had first to be a collective Hutu memory, deeply embedded, of historical, essentialist differences. However, this Hutu memory is not a racist or prejudicial one. I do not accept that Hutu were longstanding racists or ethnic chauvinists. Hutu and Tutsi could peacefully cohabit with these different collective memories, as the years of inter-marriage in the South confirm.

I have also argued, perhaps more intuitively than scientifically as I rely heavily on anecdotal evidence, that there are psychosocial explanations for what happened once the signal from above was given. The forces at work here cannot be explained simply by concepts such as prejudice and authority alone. They have something to do with group psychology and bear further investigation.

However, having argued this case I nonetheless feel that the units of analysis must be multiplied to different parts of Rwanda, in order to identify in a more systematic way the different means by which the state and population both came round to genocide. We need a more robust model of the genocide. One particularly opaque area that has yet to be properly understood is what happened precisely after the signal for violence was given. What I loosely

⁶⁰ The best example of this view is Des Forges *et al.* (1999), p.8.

termed a complex interaction of individual motives that degenerated into genocidal violence needs to be deconstructed. This will require more evidence and different methodologies. I believe scholars from subfields of psychology would be best placed to conduct fieldwork and use their research techniques to understand better both individual and collective thinking at this relatively un-researched stage of the genocide.

Appendix 1: Summary of Selected Results for 4 Communities

	Butare (<i>southern Rwanda</i>)		Ruhengeri (<i>northern Rwanda</i>)	
	Maraba cell	Shyanda cell	Kinigi cell	Nkuli cell
Demographics				
Total population (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa)	1497	803	969	785
Total resident Tutsi population	84 (5.6%)	72 (9.0%)	35 (3.6%)	60 (7.6%)
Victims				
Total number of resident Tutsi killed	58	61 ⁶¹ (84.7%)	8 (23%)	53 (88.3%)
Total number of Tutsi <i>resident</i> and killed <i>within</i> the cell	7 (8.3%)	41 (56.9%)	1 (2.8%)	46 (77%)
Total number of Tutsi resident but killed <i>outside</i> of the cell	51 (60.7%)	20 ⁶² (27.8%)	7 (20%)	7 (11.7%)
Total number of Tutsi from <i>outside</i> cell killed <i>within</i> cell	10	9 ⁶³	4	0
Total number of Tutsi survivors	26	11 ⁶⁴ (15.3%)	27 (77.1%)	7 (11.7%)
Total number of Hutu killed (not by RPF)	2	0	0	0
Perpetrators				
Number of perpetrators accused of committing crimes in categories I-III ⁶⁵ by <i>prison gacaca</i>	63 (16.8%) ⁶⁶	48 (24%)	2 (0.8%)	9 (4.6%)
Number of perpetrators accused of committing crimes in categories I-III by <i>hill gacaca</i>	Unknown	Unknown	1 (0.4%)	11 (5.6%)
Total number of people in cats. I-III from <i>outside</i> cell who committed crimes <i>within</i> cell	Unknown	Unknown	19	24
Genocide dynamics				
Number of days between Habyarimana's death and the day the first person killed	13	18	Attacks started in 1991. There were no Tutsi left in the Kinigi cell in April 1994	1 day, but attacks on <i>Bagogwe</i> Tutsi started as early as 1992 and continued in 1993
Genocide trigger(s)	Visit from the President of the Republic to Simbi parish where Tutsi gathered	Raid led by assistant burgomasters in neighbouring cells	Not applicable. No Tutsi resident in April 1994.	Habyarimana's death. <i>Conseiller</i> and soldiers mobilise immediately
Main leadership figure(s)	Ex-FAR who was	Racist butcher in the	Not applicable. No	<i>Conseiller</i> and

⁶¹ This is the prison *gacaca* figure. The hill *gacaca* figure was 59 victims.

⁶² This is the prison *gacaca* figure. The hill *gacaca* figure 18 victims.

⁶³ This is the hill *gacaca* figure. The prison *gacaca* figure is 7.

⁶⁴ This includes the 6 Tutsi wives of Hutu men.

⁶⁵ The 1996 Rwandan Genocide law established four categories of crime. For the purposes of this table I have placed together all the individuals who committed crimes against the person (categories I-III) to distinguish them from perpetrators of merely property crimes (category IV).

⁶⁶ The percentage is expressed as a proportion of adult Hutu male. To obtain the number of adult Hutu males in each community, I had to assume that it was one quarter of the community's overall population.

during the genocide at the cell/sector level	also MDR representative at the communal level	cell	Tutsi resident in April 1994.	businessman who was also Vice-president of CDR at the Prefectural level. Aided by FAR Captain of the military camp
Present situation of main leadership figure (s)	Imprisoned (though release pending as of July 2003)	Dead	Not applicable	<i>Conseiller</i> imprisoned. Also CDR leader believed to be in D.R.C.
Date of RPF arrival in community	July 4 th 1994	July 2 nd 1994	April 7 th 1994	July 15 th 1994

State Authorities

<i>Ethnicity of Responsable</i>	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu
<i>Responsable</i> accused of genocide-related crimes	Yes	No	No	No
Present situation of <i>responsible</i>	Imprisoned	Dead (natural causes)	At liberty in cell	Dead (natural causes)
<i>Conseiller</i> accused of genocide-related crimes	Contradictory evidence	Contradictory evidence	No	Yes
<i>Ethnicity of conseiller</i>	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu
Present situation of <i>conseiller</i>	At liberty. Believed to be in DRC.	Dead (suicide)	At liberty in Kinigi	Imprisoned
Burgomaster accused of genocide-related crimes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Ethnicity of burgomaster</i>	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu

Ethnic cohesion

<u>Interethnic marriages before genocide: Tutsi husband.</u>	7	1	0	0
<u>Interethnic marriages before genocide: Tutsi wife</u>	11	6	0	2 (but unknown when they married)
<u>Interethnic marriages continue after the war begins in October 1990?</u>	Yes	Yes	No	Unknown for cell but for commune as whole there is a decline
State-led anti-Tutsi activities before Habyarimana's death?	No	No	Yes	Yes

Multipartyism

Most popular political party before death of Habyarimana	MRND and MDR	MRND and PSD	MRND	MRND and CDR
<u>Political party associated with the enemy</u>	PL and PSD	PSD	MDR	MDR

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The aim of the Crisis States Programme (CSP) at DESTIN's Development Research Centre is to provide new understanding of the causes of crisis and breakdown in the developing world and the processes of avoiding or overcoming them. We want to know why some political systems and communities, in what can be called the "fragile states" found in many of the poor and middle income countries, have broken down even to the point of violent conflict while others have not. Our work asks whether processes of globalisation have precipitated or helped to avoid crisis and social breakdown.

Crisis States Programme collaborators

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Research Objectives

- We will assess how constellations of power at local, national and global levels drive processes of institutional change, collapse and reconstruction and in doing so will challenge simplistic paradigms about the beneficial effects of economic and political liberalisation.
- We will examine the effects of international interventions promoting democratic reform, human rights and market competition on the 'conflict management capacity' and production and distributional systems of existing polities.
- We will analyse how communities have responded to crisis, and the incentives and moral frameworks that have led either toward violent or non-violent outcomes.
- We will examine what kinds of formal and informal institutional arrangements poor communities have constructed to deal with economic survival and local order.



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