Alpern, Steve and Fokkink, Robbert (2009) How to hide information for later use on networks. In: Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2009).
In an accumulation game a Hider secretly distributes his given total wealth h>1 among n locations while a Searcher picks r locations and confiscates the material placed there. The Hider wins if what is left at the remaining locations is at least 1 otherwise the Searcher wins. Accumulation games were originally introduced to study certain covert activities, but the game also relates to secret sharing and food caching. In this paper we introduce a network structure on the game, restricting the Searcher to pick locations that are near and show how this leads to combinatorial considerations.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2009 The authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Sets:||Departments > Mathematics
Collections > Economists Online
|Date Deposited:||09 Apr 2010 14:32|
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