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Local interactions and the dynamics of rational deliberation

Alexander, J. McKenzie (2010) Local interactions and the dynamics of rational deliberation. Philosophical Studies, 147 (1). pp. 103-121. ISSN 0031-8116

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11098-009-9455-x


Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting deliberative equilibria may fail to agree with any of the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, (b) deliberative dynamics which converged to the same deliberative outcome in The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation may lead to different deliberative outcomes here, and (c) Bayesian deliberation seems to be more likely to avoid nonstandard deliberative outcomes, contrary to the result reported in The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, which argued in favour of the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2010 Springer
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 09 Feb 2010 15:18
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 01:00

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