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Propositionwise judgment aggregation

Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2009) Propositionwise judgment aggregation. LSE Choice Group working paper series (vol. 5, no. 2). The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics, London, UK.

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Abstract

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, nondictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006) and Dietrich and List (2007a).

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/Home.aspx
Additional Information: © 2009 The authors
Divisions: Government
CPNSS
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2010 09:37
Last Modified: 13 Sep 2024 20:11
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/26999

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