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The decline and resurgence of the Spanish Socialist Party during the Franco regime

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In view of the importance of the PSOE before 1939 and since 1976, and given the wealth of historical literature about the party before and after Franco, it is remarkable that there exists no substantial work on Spanish Socialism during the period of the dictatorship. Curiously, with the exception of Enrique Tierno Galván, no significant figure of the movement within Spain or in the exile has written of his experiences. Without memoirs by Ramón Rubial or Antonio Amat, by Rodolfo Llopis, Indalecio Prieto or Arsenio Jimeno, the silent resistance of the Socialists in the interior and the full extent of the internecine struggles of the exiles are difficult to reconstruct. The historiographical situation of the PSOE stands in sharp contrast to that of the Communist Party. The writings of both PCE propagandists and dissidents has virtually established a Communist monopoly of the history of the anti-Franco opposition. This is a reflection of a reality which cannot be denied - the continuity and pre-eminence of the Communist presence in the struggle against Franco.

However, this cannot be taken as justifying the Communist slur that during the Franco period, the Socialists were de vacaciones. For a number of reasons, several of them related to Communist tactics both before and during the Civil War, the PSOE was to find itself irretrievably divided in the years following 1939. This goes some way to explaining the lack of concerted Socialist opposition against Franco. The individual heroism of rank-and-file militants has been forgotten in large part because of the lack of a united party ready or able to give it publicity, in the way that the Communist Party, was able to do for its role in the opposition. In this the PCE was amply assisted by the propaganda services of a dictatorship anxious, with an eye on world opinion, to brand all opposition as Communist rather than democratic. At the same time, it has to be remembered that, given their history as a mass parliamentary party and a large legal trade union organization, the PSOE and the UGT were hardly fitted for clandestine struggle. The unity and discipline imposed by rigid hierarchy, democratic centralism and the cell structure together with the existence of help from Moscow gave advantages to the Communist opposition that had no equivalent in the Socialist movement.

The periods of Socialist opposition to the dictatorship can be broadly defined as follows. The first period, 1939-1950, was characterized by defeat, great confusion and an already discernible tension between the interior and the exiles. In Spain, small groups of militants
struggled to keep the PSOE alive. Ramón Rubial attempted to reorganize the party in prison; Socrates Gómez created the first executive in the interior. The party was re-established in Europe by a follower of Largo Caballero from Aragon, Arsenio Jimeno, only after the liberation of Toulouse by the Allies in 1944. The attention of Socialists in exile was absorbed by the world war, by polemics arising from the Civil War and by optimistic speculation about the imminent fall of Franco. For those in the interior, opposition had the more limited but also more realistic aim of survival until assistance from outside might arrive. In general, there was altogether less interest inside Spain in sterile debate over issues like the Junta de Casado. None the less, although Besteiro was dead and Largo Caballero in Mathausen, militants in the interior still looked to the surviving famous leaders of the Republican period. In exile, the energies of these historic leaders were devoted less to the real situation in Spain than to internal polemic and negotiations with representatives of the Western powers in the hope of securing their intervention against General Franco. Within Spain, sporadic guerrilla activities were carried out, especially in Asturias, despite the fact that party policy was not committed to violent opposition. Indeed, guerrilla action was dominated by the Communists. The expected outside aid was never to come largely because of the attitude of the Allies and the PSOE leadership in exile must bear some responsibility for not perceiving the reality of the international situation earlier than it did.

The period 1951 to 1962 was marked both by a rigid determination of PSOE headquarters at the rue du Taur, Toulouse, to keep control of the interior and, at the same time, by a decline in the real importance of the aging exiled leadership. Small but ultimately important new groups of Socialists formally unaffiliated to the PSOE began to emerge in Madrid and elsewhere in Spain in opposition to Toulouse. At the same time, even the traditional Socialist strongholds of Asturias and Bilbao began to show signs of discontent with the dictatorial rule of Toulouse. It was a period closed by the symbolic meeting of internal and exiled opposition at the Congress of Munich. In the period 1962 to 1974, the PSOE was to suffer from possessing an exiled leadership whose narrow views and inability to adjust to the dramatic social changes consequent on economic development were to be a serious obstacle to the rebuilding of the party. Accordingly, these twelve years were marked by the increasing isolation of the Toulouse leadership in sharp contrast to the spontaneous emergence all over Spain of new, and often unconnected, groups of Socialists responsive to the changes in Spanish society. A new labour-
orientated PSOE in Seville and Bilbao, an important group of Socialist intellectuals growing around the journal Cuadernos para el Diálogo, an influential group in Barcelona, the Moviment Socialista de Catalunyà, smaller regional groups such as the Partit Socialista Valencià and the Partido Socialista Galego were all symptoms of change. The PSOE itself was to be transformed when links were established between some of these groups and important and responsive sections of the exiled party, thereby creating the basis for the strong renovated party of the post-1974 period.

During all three periods, there have been two major characteristics: the PSOE has consistently taken part in efforts to unite the democratic opposition, but to exclude the Communists - the Junta Española de Liberación of 1944, the Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas of 1961 and the Conferencia (later Coordinación) Democrática of 1974. This reflected an understandable under-current of anti-Communism, a hang-over from the Communist poaching of the FJS in 1936 and of much of the UGT in the war years as well as of the ruthless activities of the Communists in eliminating first Largo Caballero and then Indalecio Prieto from the war-time government of the Republic. Anti-Communism was also a reflection of the tendency under Indalecio Prieto, and to a certain extent under Rodolfo Llopis too, to look outside Spain for a solution to the problem of the dictatorship. In consequence, the PSOE tended to assume that anti-Communism was a pre-requisite of help from the USA, Britain or France. The united fronts were also a defensive response to the efforts of the Communists to by-pass the PSOE, and indeed CNT, leadership and to take over their rank-and-file from above.

Substantial difficulties inevitably arose from the fact that the Socialist Party, like the Communists, the anarchists and the Republicans, with its pre-existing regional and ideological sub-divisions, was divided between the exile and the interior. Under the pressures of absence from Spain, splits occurred which often did not correspond to splits in the interior. Broadly speaking, however, the sector of the PSOE which remained loyal to the pro-Communist government of Juan Negrín was led by Ramón Lamoneda aided by Julio Alvarez del Vayo, while the corresponding sector of the UGT was led by Ramón González Peña, José Vega Rodriguez and Amaro del Rosal. Expelled from the party in 1946, the pro-Negrinista sector briefly became Unión Socialista Española and some of its leaders, like Amaro del Rosal, passed to the
The Negrinista faction of the PSOE was to fade away in part because of the success of Indalecio Prieto in gaining control of the funds sent by Negrín from Republican Spain to Mexico in the yacht *Vita*. Accordingly, the institutional continuity of the PSOE remained with the sector reorganized by Prieto around the Círculo Pablo Iglesias in Mexico and by Arsenio Jimeno Velilla in France. Fully restructured at the I Congress in exile held in Toulouse on 24 and 25 September 1944, when Enrique de Francisco became president and Rodolfo Llopis secretary general, this was the section ultimately recognized on 7 February 1948 by the Socialist International. Inside Spain, clandestinity and constant police persecution, with imprisonment, torture and execution the daily bread of the PSOE in the 1940s, made the elaboration of consistent policies and the establishment of stable leadership virtually impossible.

It is remarkable that there was any opposition to Franco at all given the scale of deaths and casualties in the war, the subsequent exile and the intensity of the repression within Spain. In Asturias, there was a concerted effort by the Civil Guard to smash the remnants of the Sindicato Minero. Regular arrests and torture culminated in May 1947 in the horrendous massacre of Socialist miners in the Pozo Funeres. The PSOE lost six entire executive committees in the interior: in February 1945, the first led by Juan Gómez Egido and including Vicente Valls, Antonio San Miguel, Francisco de Toro, Sócrates Gómez, Mario Fernández, José Díaz Méndez and Enrique Melero; in May 1946 the second led by Eduardo Villegas and including Vicente Orche and Leopoldo Mejorada; in December 1948 the third under Miguel Martínez; in July 1949, the fourth under Antonio Trigo Mairal; in March 1952, the fifth under Vizcaíno; in February 1953, the sixth under Tomas Centeno Sierra who was brutally murdered in the Dirección General de Seguridad. The Socialists in the interior had a much more realistic and harsh view of the realities of Franco's Spain.

They were bitter about the minimal economic aid which reached them from the exile. In France, the exiles too faced considerable hardship. However, there was considerable resentment inside Spain about the relative comfort allegedly enjoyed by those in Mexico. In fact, the exiled rank-and-file in Mexico and other parts of Latin America could do little, neutralized by distance. Others nearer Spain often found themselves forced into the French Foreign Legion, German Labour Brigades or concentration camps. The need to learn new languages and find work in
hostile environments meant that they had little time to devote to Spain. After all, the PSOE, unlike the PCE, had been quick to link the world war to the Spanish conflict. In consequence, the more active members of the party were as likely to be fighting in the French resistance or the British forces as thinking about Spain.  

The problems of exile aside, the greatest single factor contributing to the failure of the opposition was the persistence of the ideological divisions of the Civil War, widened by geographical diffusion after 1939 and by embittered recriminations about the reasons for defeat. The most bitter divisions were between the PSOE and the PCE, and between the pro- and anti-Communist factions within the PSOE. The Socialist movement had been divided before the war and, although the theoretical issues had changed somewhat, personal animosities remained to be exacerbated by recriminations over collaboration with the Communists. Socialists both inside and outside Spain were divided on this issue which effectively condemned the party to impotence. Many in the PSOE were appalled by the Communists' behaviour at the beginning of the world war. The PCE denounced the war, which the Socialists saw as their war in defence of democracy, as an imperialist squabble and continued to blame the PSOE for defeat in the war. Accordingly, the PCE project of national union was rejected with scorn. A minority led by Negrín and Alvarez del Vayo favoured continued collaboration with the Communists while the majority looked to the Allies for deliverance as a result of which they were denounced by the Communists as 'capituladores y traidores'. The bitterness and sterility of Socialist division is best illustrated by the sordid wranglings over the Vita and the use to be made of the funds taken out of Spain. The Negrínistas had organized the Servicio de Emigración de los Republicanos Españoles, while Prieto organized the Junta de Auxilio a los Refugiados Españoles and managed to seize the treasure of the Vita in Mexico. Eventually these funds were used to support Republican governments in exile.

The anti-Communist sections of the PSOE were anxious to reunite the democratic forces. Projects for unity were to suffer from two major weaknesses: their determined anti-Communism and their faith in the Allies. The internal squabbles had already provoked the fatal error of not setting up a government in exile in London. On 25 November 1943, the Socialists and the various Republican groups (Izquierda Republicana, Unión Republicana, Esquerra Republicana
de Catalunya and Acció Republicana de Catalunya) set up the Junta Española de Liberación in Mexico. In August 1944, after the liberation of France, the same groups plus the CNT joined together in Toulouse and established a JEL in Europe. There then followed a depressing polemic between the JEL and the Unión Nacional in the course of which it was claimed that several PSOE militants were murdered by Communist agents. The Socialist-dominated JEL saw its task as to prepare the way for the entry of the Allied armies into Spain. The Socialists and the Republicans were to take a long time to perceive that their insistence on their democratic credentials could never be as attractive to the West as Franco's unflinching authoritarianism.

As an indication of the crucial difference in the ambience between the exile and the interior, the problems of the JEL were briefly overcome inside Spain by the creation in October 1944 of the Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas. Linking the PSOE, the CNT-MLE and various Republican groups, the ANFD was the most significant initiative towards the unification of the anti-Franco opposition until 1975. It represented a spontaneous effort to overcome the continuous bickering of the exiles and to take advantage of Franco's impending isolation. Nevertheless, the ANFD needed help from outside and so, in September 1945, when the Republican government in exile under José Giral was constituted, the ANFD recognized it and became its instrument within Spain. When the government failed, the ANFD failed with it. However, at the time, the link with the government seemed to be the obvious step to take.

Having fought Hitler and Mussolini in Spain, most Socialists and Republicans saw the world war as a natural continuation of their own struggle. For that reason, over 20,000 Spaniards, many of them members of the PSOE and the UGT, died during the Second World War fighting against the Axis. It was widely and understandably assumed within the Socialist movement that when the Axis was defeated, the Allies would finish the task that had been begun in 1936 by turning against Franco. That this did not happen is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, the incompetence of the exiled leaders did not improve matters. Giral's government was not formed until the Allies were already war-weary and the Cold War was on the horizon. If a responsible Republican government (other than the isolated Negrín government which was not dissolved until 1944) had been formed in 1941 or 1942 when the Allies were desperate for any aid that they could get, it is possible that it might have been recognized and perhaps subsequently installed in Madrid.
As it was, in 1945, the intention of the Giral government was to get recognition as a prelude to intervention and the re-establishment of the Second Republic. To both the British and the Americans, united in a growing anti-Communism and assuming the war-time Republican cause to be tainted by communism, this seemed mere sectarianism. Even leaving aside the lack of Allied sympathy and the generally hostile context, the various governments in exile did not handle the situation well. There was certainly a failure of will. One exiled government after another stuck to the notion of reestablishing the Republic when it was clear that the only hope of securing Allied aid was to create a government of concentration which was also what many in the interior wanted. This was quickly perceived by Prieto. In March 1946, Britain, France and the USA issued a tripartite note calling on the Spanish people to remove Franco by pacific means and to create government of transition which could call elections. This clearly showed that Allied aid depended on the creation of a broad non-sectarian front including at least the monarchists from among the Francoist forces. Monarchists, in anticipation of Allied action, had already been in touch with the ANFD. The rank-and-file favoured a government of concentration yet Giral rejected overtures which might have cleared the way for agreement among all anti-Franco groups in Spain.

The exiled government's excessive optimism regarding the reestablishment of the Republic was to destroy the opposition's best chance of overthrowing Franco. When the failure of Giral's insistence on the exclusive legitimacy of the Republic became apparent, he was replaced by the Socialist Rodolfo Llopis who tried to make agreement with the monarchists. Because of the inclusion of Uribe in the government and because they now felt stronger, with the danger from the Allies passed, the followers of Don Juan de Borbon rejected the government's offer and stated that they would deal with the PSOE alone. In July 1947, only five months after its formation, the Socialists left the government. There was little reason to suppose that the Monarchists were really sincere. They were probably just making sure that Franco knew that their loyalty could not just be taken for granted. Don Juan never broke off relations with Franco and disavowed the agreements made. When they finally made the Pacto de San Juan de Luz with Indalecio Prieto, Trifon Gómez, Luis Jiménez de Asua and Antonio Pérez for the PSOE on 30 August 1948, Franco had already made an agreement with Don Juan on the yacht Azor. The Socialists had been taken in by an elaborate exercise in duplicity, but they virtually had no
choice since collaboration was the pre-requisite of the Allied aid they so anxiously wanted.\textsuperscript{17} Prieto felt obliged to resign as both president of the PSOE and vice-president of the UGT, demoralized and discredited by the negotiations on which he had staked so much.\textsuperscript{18} The scale of discontent within the party surfaced at the Congreso Extraordinario held on 31 March and 1 April 1951 at which Trifon Gómez replaced Prieto as PSOE president. Significantly, the main opposition to the executive was voiced by Arsenio Jimeno now leader of the Paris section of the party.\textsuperscript{19}

In the 1950s, the Socialist movement was divided against itself by a mixture of misplaced moral intransigence about alliances and petty jealousies within the leadership. Moral intransigence represented the desperate attempt of an atrophying leadership to reassert itself over a dying movement whose membership had reputedly sunk to only 3,000. The increasingly narrow attitude of the PSOE was one of the main reasons for lack of recruitment. Moreover, the PSOE was becoming a party of old men for there were no middle cadres since the Socialist Youth Movement had passed to the PCE in 1936. The backward-looking and egoistical approach of the Toulouse leadership was demonstrated as early as 1952 where a decision was made at the V Congress held from 15 to 18 August to inform those in the interior that they could make agreements with other groups only for the most specific short-term objectives. The V Congress saw long and embittered debate on the question of alliances with Arsenio Jimeno again taking up the cudgels on behalf of the interior against Prieto who defended the positions of the executive.\textsuperscript{20} Many Socialists in the interior were more aware of the realities of the situation. After the death of Centeno, Toulouse had assumed full leadership of the party. However, with the emergence of student opposition in the mid-1950s and the revival of the workers movement especially in Asturias, those in Spain began to argue that they should make policy since only they could accurately calculate the risks and benefits involved. The effective leadership of the interior was taken up by the Basque Antonio Amat Maiz, sometimes known as 'El Ciclista' or 'Guridi'. A man of great courage and determination, he linked up many of the disparate groups in the party and liaised with Toulouse, often making dangerous frontier crossings.

Realizing that the PSOE was in no position to maintain exclusivist positions, the Socialists of the interior pushed for agreement with other groups. In 1956, one of them,
Professor Enrique Tierno Galván, leader of a growing number of Socialists in the universities, produced a document on the possible transition to another regime. Amongst other possibilities, the document suggested that if those in the interior did not cooperate with the liberal monarchists for the implantation of a democratic monarchy, then Franco might well establish a reactionary monarchy. The reaction of the Toulouse leadership revealed just how out of touch they were. The document was denounced as treachery to Republican legitimacy. As if Tierno was the arbiter of Spain's future, the PSOE leadership convened a meeting with the CNT and the Republicans in Paris in February 1957 to insist that the regime to follow Franco be neither monarchy nor republic until the issue was decided by a plebisicite. At one point, Tierno solicited the support of Gil Robles to sign 'con nosotros un documento dirigido a los socialistas del exterior para que saliesen de su atonía y se uniesen con los socialistas que estabamos luchando dentro, para iniciar una accion en comun, ponderada y no violenta'. Llopis's reply, urging caution and setting out the limits within which alliances could be made had a profound effect on Tierno: 'a mi me hizo reflexionar y fue quizá el momento en que empece a ver claro que poco o nada se podia esperar de fuera'.

Thereafter, the interior Socialists continued to press for cooperation with other groups including the Communists. Tierno in particular established important links with liberal monarchists like Joaquín Satrústegui, with the social democrat followers of Dionisio Ridruejo and with his one-time colleague from the University of Salamanca, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez. From his office at Marqués de Cubas 6, in Madrid, aided by the support of the Le Monde correspondent, José Antonio Novais, Tierno was able to generate foreign interest in a revived Socialism of the interior. He was far from alone. At the VII Congress, held in Toulouse in August 1958, Amat called for the interior to have its own decision-making powers and was eloquently defended by Luis Araquistain. Llopis refused to go so far, granting the interior only two seats on the executive and declaring the need for a national anti-Franco committee excluding the PCE. A parallel initiative to that of Amat, emanating from the Agrupación Socialista Universitaria under Francisco Bustelo, Luis Gómez Llorente and Vicente Girbau called for the ASU to become an autonomous section of the PSOE. Llopis also rejected their request.

Toulouse continued in its quest for an anti-Communist unity and in June 1960 helped to
found the Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas, a doomed attempt to revive the old ANFD. The UFD was fundamentally an agreement between the PSOE, the Izquierda Demócrata-Cristiana of Manuel Giménez Fernández, various Republican groups and some monarchists from the interior. The pact signed on 24 June 1960 was fundamentally weakened by its exclusion of the Communist Party. Despite its optimistic tone, with a preamble that declared the signatories to be 'conscientes de que una accion comun de los distintos grupos puede precipitar la caida de la dictadura totalitaria que padece España', the irrelevance of such initiatives was underlined by the continuing police attacks on the PSOE in the interior.

In November 1958, Antonio Amat was arrested as part of a great police round-up in Madrid, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Vitoria, Asturias and Andalucía, in which the PSOE lost its files, its propaganda networks and its funds. In August 1960, an equally devastating blow was struck by the police against the PSOE in northern Spain. The distribution of pamphlets and newspapers, the maintainance of morale, were immense tasks given the strength of the forces of repression. The Toulouse Socialists continued to think more in terms of tightly limited agreement with the Monarchists than with the Communists. However, as American support for Franco increased, the Monarchists were fading as an opposition force. The new generation of radical students formed in the university struggles of the mid-fifties thus looked not to the PSOE nor even to the PCE, but to the progressive Catholic and Castroista FLP (Frente de Liberación Popular or 'Felipe') and FOC (Front Obrer de Catalunya). Many individuals who took part in the FLP/FOC were later to find their way into the revived PSOE (among others, Narcis Serra, Pasqual Maragall, Joaquin Leguina, Carlos Zayas, José María Maravall). In Catalonia the FOC was to be crucial landmark in the construction of the Moviment Socialista de Catalunya.

The growing importance of the internal opposition in relation to the exile was symbolized by the meeting in June 1962 of 80 interior and 38 exiled figures who met at the IV Congress of the European Movement in Munich. They agreed on a common declaration on the conditions that the EEC should demand for Spanish entry: representative elected government, guarantee of basic human rights, national minorities, syndical liberties, right to strike. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the Munich meeting. In fact, Munich was little more than the culmination of the Socialist-Monarchist alliance whose greatest importance probably lay in the presence of
right-wing figures including Gil Robles and Satrústegui. However, in that sense, it was a symbol of reconciliation which pointed the way to a future democratic transition based on cooperation between the left and conservative figures who had abandoned the Francoist camp.  

Some Socialists from the interior were distressed by the extent to which Llopis seemed prepared to conciliate the Monarchists while blindly refusing any cooperation with the Communists. In consequence, subsequent efforts at renovation tended to be directed towards bypassing Toulouse and appealing directly to the Socialist International and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. A more significant event in 1962 than what the Francoists called the 'contubernio de Munich' was the strike wave which began in Asturias. It indicated a qualitative change in the economic circumstances of the regime and underlined the emergence of a new proletariat to whose needs the Communists were to be more responsive than the PSOE.

From 1962 on, the fascistic or extreme authoritarian forms of Francoism were increasingly seen by the ruling classes to have served their purpose. The economic surge consequent on the capital accumulation of the early years of Francoism and on foreign investment coincided with the recuperation of the working class. Thus there began a move towards a gradual opening up of the system. Along with a move to economic laissez faire, there were indications of slightly more flexibility regarding strikes and censorship. Interior leaders like Amat and Ramón Rubial in the Basque Country were backed by exiles such as Arsenio Jimeno and the Asturian José Barreiro both of whom who perceived the changing situation in Spain as a result of their contacts with emigrant workers and so pushed for change in Toulouse.

As far as Socialist intellectuals inside Spain were concerned, two things happened, both of which are difficult to separate from the influence of Joaquín Ruiz Giménez. Like Ruiz Giménez himself, many Socialists in the interior acted as lawyers for working class leaders on trial. At the same time, they began to write in Ruiz Giménez's journal Cuadernos para el Diálogo. This was to lay the basis for a future cooperation between the PSOE and the Christian Democrats which was to be of crucial importance during the period 1975-1977. In the sort of Spain which the economic development was creating, the need for a democratic Socialist movement was of tremendous urgency. The PSOE did not play a great part, institutionally
speaking, in the 1960s. Nonetheless, it was undergoing changes of great importance for the future. Under the heavy hand of Llopis's exiled bureaucracy, the movement had been in steady decline with the exception of Asturias, the Basque Country and the University Socialist group. Yet there were many, albeit separate efforts to revitalize the Socialist movement, some of which would contribute directly to the renovation of 1972-1974 and others of which were eventually to be incorporated into the reborn PSOE only after 1977. In the early sixties, a one-time assistant of Largo Caballero, José Calviño Ozores, together with the Basque Josefina Arrillaga, tried, with the aid of German trade unions, to rebuild a Socialist working class movement through the Alianza Sindical Obrera. The exiled leaders of the UGT were furious. Tierno Galván's group was growing in importance. Through Tierno's defence of the Communist leader José Sandoval Moris, who was put on trial by the regime in 1964, and through contacts made within the orbit of *Cuadernos para el Dialogo*, the Marqués de Cubas group established warm relations with both the PCE and the Workers Commissions. In Catalonia, a similar process of revival linked to both the university and the labour movement, first ASO and later Comisiones Obreras, led by Joan Raventos, Ramón Obiols, Jordi Estivill and Andrés Garcia de la Riva culminated in the 1967 Congress of the Moviment Socialista de Catalunya held at Montserrat. These various efforts from the interior to revitalizethe PSOE were skilfully deflected at the Toulouse Congresses by packed committees. By the end of the decade, it was obvious that the exiles were out of touch with conditions in Spain and would have to be overthrown if the PSOE was to be revived.

With that in mind, on 21 January 1968, Professor Tierno Galván and about twenty five of his followers including Raul Morodo, Jorge Enjuto, Pedro de Vega, Elias Díaz and Donato Fuejo met in a house in the Sierra de Guadarrama. After long debate, they decided to form the Socialist Party of the Interior, with one vote against, that of Elias Díaz. Of little numerical importance, the PSI nevertheless was a reflection of the growth of various currents which together and separately were to contribute to the rebirth of Spanish Socialism. Tierno's idea was 'dotar a las agrupaciones existentes de una determinada coherencia organica que posibilitase un funcionamiento mas eficaz'. Such 'eficacia' could only be in relation to Toulouse. However, the tactical error of choosing to form a separate party, perhaps in the hope of being able to negotiate with Llopis from a position of strength, led to Tierno Galván isolating himself from the
ultimately successful movement to renovate the party. The fact that the PSI had some support within the Comisiones Obreras was to drive a wedge between it and other groups who focused their efforts on the renovation of the PSOE.

The Toulouse leadership was outraged by Tierno Galván's claim that the PSI was necessary because of 'la inexistencia en el interior del pais de una organización con ideario socialista que canalizase las aspiraciones de la clase trabajadora y de un amplio sector profesional en sus deseo de democracia y defensa de sus intereses'. However, together with the growing importance of the groups from Bilbao and Seville, the evidence of rebellion within Spain disturbed the exiles sufficiently to impel them to concede a superficial autonomy to the interior militants at the XI Congress held in August 1970. This was considered insufficient. Indeed, so great was the discontent among the Socialists inside Spain, that a concerted anti-Toulouse movement began to take shape through a series of important meetings held in Madrid between November 1970 and July 1971. At these meetings, Antonio Amat, Ramón Rubial, Enrique Múgica, Luis Yañez, Miguel Peydro Caro and delegates from all over Spain effectively created a PSOE leadership independent of Toulouse. The conflict came to a head in May 1972 when El Socialista published in the interior carried on its front page an article entitled 'Los enfoques de la praxis'. Its conclusion was that 'los socialistas tienen pues una doble tarea que desarrollar: la lucha contra el sistema capitalista que los opone y la lucha contra ciertas estructuras de su propia organización que amenazan con la esterilización de sus acciones'.

Faced with this open challenge, Llopis was furious at what he denounced as a 'grave injuria colectiva'. The Toulouse executive demanded 'una rectificacion' under threat of declaring the 'incompatibilidad' of the interior executive. So deep was the split between the two executives that a united convocatoria for the next congress due in August 1972 was impossible. The Llopis leadership 'acordaron la no celebración del Congreso en el mes de agosto teniendo en cuenta que en el ambiente de crisis, de ruptura y de escision existente celebrar el Congreso equivale a querer que haya ruptura y escision... Si a pesar de lo que acabamos de escribir, se celebre el Congreso, convocado por una parte del Partido, nos veriamos en el caso de declarar faccioso dicho congreso. Y advertimos a quienes asistan que, por el hecho de asistir a ese congreso, se colocan fuera de la disciplina del Partido y procederemos en consecuencia'. Despite these threats, the
interior executive went ahead with the convocatoria of the Congress. At that point, older leaders like Arsenio Jimeno and José Barreiro, who had both resigned from the Toulouse executive in 1969, joined with the renovated executive from the interior to prepare the XII PSOE for August 1972. There were important interventions from Felipe González (Isidoro), Nicolás Redondo (Juan), Enrique Múgica (Goizalde) and Pablo Castellano (Hervás). To the chagrin of Llopis, delegates from Spain and from the emigrant workers overthrew his leadership and decided that the PSOE executive should be led from the interior.

This left both Tierno and Llopis isolated. Llopis denounced the Congress as 'convocado de forma ilegal y antiestatutaria'. When Llopis tried to fight back at a mini-congress in December 1972, Tierno and some of his followers were present. Tierno spoke of ‘este Congreso que de verdad es el único Congreso autentico del PSOE y por tal lo reconozco’. The Tiernistas had backed the wrong horse. A special commission of the Socialist International composed of representatives of the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, the Chilean Radical Party and the Italian Socialist and Social Democrat Parties received representatives of both sections of the PSOE in Paris on 12 and 13 January 1973. After further meetings in London on 16 and 17 March and 28 August 1973, the International finally decided in favour of the PSOE-renovado on 6 January 1974. Tierno Galván had rejected earlier overtures from the Bilbao-Seville group because he believed in the institutional legitimacy of the party apparatus in Toulouse. As a result of Tierno Galván's tactical error, the question of a future unification of the PSOE with the Partido Socialista del Interior, by then converted into the Partido Socialista Popular, was not to be resolved until 1978 and only then at the cost of some discontent on both sides.

The conclusion of the XII Congress left the PSOE in good condition for the surge for unity after the death of Carrero Blanco. Events in Italy, France, Portugal and Greece provided a propitious climate and persuaded many moderate Francoists that they should secure their future by dialogue. The renovation begun in Toulouse in 1972 was consolidated at the XIII Congress held on 11, 12 and 13 October 1974 at Suresnes. Although the PSOE had only 3,500 militants inside and outside Spain, the switch of weight to the inside came at exactly the right moment. Felipe González became primer secretario; Nicolás Redondo, secretario de organización; Enrique Múgica, secretario de coordinación; Pablo Castellano, secretario internacional; José
Maria Benegas, secretario de juventudes. With Francoism crumbling, there was a need for the flexible democratic Socialist party now being created. The fact that the renovated PSOE was more in tune with Spanish society was reflected in the spectacular growth that the party was to experience after 1976 and in its electoral success in 1977, 1979 and ultimately 1982. After the parenthesis of Francoism, the PSOE was able to resume its rightful place in Spanish politics.


10. *El Socialista* (Mexico, Negrinista), December 1943; *El Socialista* (interior, cyclostyled), February, May 1944, December 1945; *El Socialista* (Toulouse), October, 30 November 1944, 11, 18 January 1945. See also Actas de la Comision Ejecutiva del PSOE en Francia, Africa, Belgica e Inglaterra (Fundación Pablo Iglesias), 22 October 1944.

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25. Fernández, 'Las formaciones políticas del exilio' in Abellán et al., El exilio español de 1939,
26. *El Socialista* (Toulouse), 18 December 1958; *The Times*, 1 January 1959. For a full list of those arrested and an attempt by the regime to justify the arrests to world opinion, see ¿*Qué pasa en España? el problema del socialismo español* (Madrid, 1959) pp.115-27.


31. On the revival of Catalan socialism, see *Debat* Nos 4 & 5, July 1978, *passim* and especially Jose Luis Martín Ramos, 'La trayectoria del MSC' and Jordi Estivill, 'El Congres de Montserrat: una fita en la evolució política del MSC' in no.5.


34. *Le Socialiste*, 21 September 1972. See also *Congresos del PSOE en el exilio*, II, pp.175-211.
