Reyniers, Diane J. and Tapiero, Charles S. (1995) Contract design and the control of quality in a conflictual environment. European Journal of Operational Research, 82 (2). pp. 373-382. ISSN 0377-2217
This paper provides an approach to quality supply by a supplier and quality inspection by a producer, which explicitly recognizes the inherently opposing interests these two parties may have. The supplier and the producer are modeled as players in a nonzero sum game, where the supplier can control the effort invested in the delivery of quality and the producer may or may not inspect incoming materials. We study the effect of contract design (e.g. stipulation of penalties for defective units) on equilibrium behavior and identify conditions on the contract parameters which will result in the implementation of a cooperative solution.
|Additional Information:||© 1995 Elsevier Science B.V.|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management|
|Sets:||Departments > Management|
|Date Deposited:||02 Dec 2009 10:11|
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