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Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage model

Reyniers, Diane J. (1992) Information and rationality asymmetries in a simple high-low search wage model. Economics Letters, 38 (4). pp. 479-486. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

A simple model of wage bargaining is developed. The firm knows the worker's productivity but the worker has only probabilistic information about his value to the firm. The worker acquires information by making wage demands and observing the resulting hiring/firing decisions of the firm. The firm acts strategically and distorts the worker's learning process.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information: © 1992 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Management
Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 02 Dec 2009 10:10
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/25990/

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