Financial Development, Agency and the Pace of Adoption of New Techniques

By

Ronald W. Anderson
and
Kjell G. Nyborg

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Abstract

We study the relation of financial development and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires firing old management and hiring new with skills appropriate for the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in this game can be of two types. In “entrenchment” equilibrium once the new technique has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout sufficiently to preempt the innovation. In “maximum rent extraction” equilibrium managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure. We show that both equilibria involve several types of inefficiencies and can result in underinvestment in positive NPV projects. We discuss the role of financial innovation in reducing the inefficiencies identified.
1 Introduction

This paper is an exploration of how financial contracting can determine the pace of technical change in modern, developed economies. An important characteristic of such economies is that most economic activity takes place within large, complex organizations where the interests of the individuals who make them up are very often in conflict with one another. One of the most important of such misalignments of interests results from the separation of ownership and control, identified long ago by Berle and Means [1932] and subsequently extensively studied in corporate finance following the seminal paper on agency cost by Jensen and Meckling [1976].

In this paper we adopt a dynamic, agency theoretic model to examine the pace of technological advance when firms are owned by outside investors but are run by professional managers. Because perfect monitoring is difficult to achieve, once a manager is in charge he has some latitude to make decisions that favor his interests in opposition to those of outside shareholders. There are limits to how much an incumbent manager can exploit his advantage as a firm insider because he faces the threat of being replaced with another outside manager with similar skills. However, if it is anticipated that the potential replacement manager would also exploit his advantage as insider to some degree, the incumbent’s rent extraction will be curbed but not eliminated altogether. Thus owners of firms will tend to tolerate some degree of organizational slack in the operation of assets under the prevailing technology.

The interests of shareholders and managers may come into conflict as well when it comes to the issue of whether or not to adopt a new technique that has become available. Often incumbent management has a vested interest in seeing the firm keep the existing technology. New technologies may require new skills which incumbents do not have. Thus if the new technique is adopted incumbents may be forced to retrain themselves, may find that they are less productive relative to potential rivals, and could face the loss of their jobs. The way that organizations deal with this potential opposition by insiders will be an important determinant of both their profitability and their ability to grow.

\footnote{For a recent survey emphasizing the incomplete contracts approach to modeling corporate finance see Oliver Hart’s monograph [1996]. We adopt the incomplete contracts approach in the model presented here.}
We argue that the structure of the firm’s financial contracts can be an important determinant of the performance of the firm and of the economy as a whole. In particular, we show that they can affect the speed with which technological advances are adopted once they are available, the degree to which productive investment opportunities are foregone, and the incentives to create future growth opportunities (R&D). We will discuss how financial development which allows for a wider array of financial contracts permits these inefficiencies to be reduced and therefore for the firm to grow.

The theme of growth and financial development is taken up in a long and illustrious literature including classic contributions by Schumpeter [1942] and Gershenkron [1962]. An important line of study has been the empirical research on the relation of measures of financial development and the rate of economic growth. In this area Goldsmith [1969] is the seminal contribution and the works of King and Levine [1993] are prominent recent contributions. These contributions document a positive correlation between financial development and growth. More recently, Rajan and Zingales [1998] find evidence supporting the hypothesis that financial development stimulates growth.

There have been a number of attempts to give theoretical account of how financial development can promote growth. Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990] make the case for two-way causality. That is, financial development fosters growth by increasing the return on capital, and growth in turn provides the funds to invest in financial institutions. Another line of theory explore dual growth models where some agents are financially constrained (Banerjee and Newman [1991] and Aghion and Bolton [1992]). Financial dualism is also at the heart of the credit cycles theory of Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] which has been seen as highly relevant to recent financial crises affecting emerging markets.

Neither the empirical nor the theoretical literature just surveyed explicitly addresses the source of imperfection in the financial sector. Our paper is an attempt to do so. Specifically we argue that the dynamic agency framework is a natural setting for providing a micro foundation of the interaction between finance and growth. The specific focus here is how finance can affect the pace of adoption of a process innovation which becomes available as the result of a fortuitous discovery. Another aspect of the issue is the impact of financial contracting on the incentive to create growth opportunities by R&D or otherwise. That issue is studied by Anderson and Nyborg [2001] in a different version of the dynamic agency framework.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and basic results. It describes two possible reactions of incum- 
bents confronted by a potential technological improvement, each of which 
engenders a specific sort of inefficiency. One, “entrenchment” will delay the 
adoption of the new technique, possibly forever. The other, “maximum rent 
extraction”, may temporarily reduce shareholders’ earnings in advance of im-
plementing the new technique, but it may also lead to liquidation. If this 
is anticipated, it can be the source of underinvestment, either in bricks and 
mortar or in ideas, at an earlier stage. Section 3 considers the implications of 
the model for the behavior of equity prices. Section 4 discusses how financial 
development which permits alternative forms of financial contracting can al-
leviate some of the agency problems highlighted in the basic model. Section 
5 concludes.

2 The Model

The model is adapted from the two-stage model of firm growth introduced by 
Anderson and Nyborg [2001]. The firm is owned by outside shareholders and 
has access to an existing technology (the “old technique”) which generates 
an infinite stream of cash flows in the future. The firm must be operated 
by a manager who is hired from an infinitely deep pool of managers with 
identical skills. Once appointed, a manager is able to divert some or all 
of the current period’s cash flows for his own consumption of perquisites. 
Since cash flows are non-contractible\footnote{As with other incomplete contracts models we assume that the non-contractible vari-
able (here taken to be cash “ows) is \textquoteleft observable but not verifiable”. This means that it 
would be impossible or extremely costly to enforce a contract contingent on this variable 
in a court of law.}, shareholders are unable to prevent 
this from occurring, but they are aware that it has occurred. If they are 
unwilling to tolerate this rent extraction by the incumbent manager they 
may replace him. Alternatively, they may liquidate the firm and obtain its 
value as scrap. While the firm operates under the old technique, there is 
the possibility that a discovery will be made that will make available a new, 

improved technology (the “new technique”) which will generate a higher level 
of operating cash flows if it is adopted instead of the old technique. There 
is a waiting/transition period (the “minimal time to adoption”) between the 
time the new technique is announced and its earliest possible adoption date. 
However, the effective time to adoption will exceed this if shareholders find 

it advantageous to delay its introduction. The new technique requires new skills so that its adoption would require replacing the old management with a new manager also recruited from an infinitely deep pool of identical managers but with different skills than the old vintage of managers.

We use the following notation.

- \( \frac{1}{4} \), the cash flow per period under the old technique (non-contractible);
- \( \frac{2}{4} \), the cash flow per period under the new technique (non-contractible);
- \( y_{it} \), the payout ratio at date \( t \); i.e., the fraction of cash flow that a manager of type \( i \) reports to investors (\( i = 1 \) for “old managers” and \( i = 2 \) for “new managers”);
- \( L \), the liquidation value of the firm;
- \( r \), the discount rate per period;
- \( p \), the probability that a new technology will be announced given that none has been announced previously;
- \( N \), the length of the transition period, i.e., the number of periods between the announcement of a new technology and its earliest possible introduction.

At each date \( t \), the following stage game is repeated until the firm is liquidated (which may be never): First, shareholders choose whether to retain the incumbent manager, replace the incumbent manager and continue with a new manager, or liquidate the firm. In case of liquidation, the game ends, shareholders receive the liquidation value \( L \), and managers receive nothing. Second, if the firm is kept alive, the cash flow \( \frac{1}{4} \) is produced with \( i = 1 \) if the manager is of the old type and \( i = 2 \) if he is of the new type, \( \frac{2}{4} > \frac{1}{4} \). The manager who is in charge decides the payout ratio, \( y_{it} \in [0; 1] \). Shareholders receive a total dividend of \( y_{it} \frac{1}{4} \) and the current manager receives \( (1 - y_{it}) \frac{1}{4} \). Finally, between periods, a new technique will be announced (assuming it has not been announced before) with probability \( p \).

For simplicity, we assume that managers are not paid a salary, perhaps because their reservation wage is zero. Their compensation is therefore completely determined by the portion of the cash flows they retain for themselves. Managers are assumed to have no money initially so that shareholders cannot
require newly engaged managers to buy shares of the firm. Since we assume that the managerial labor pool is infinitely deep, once a manager has been fired, he is re-hired with probability zero.

Formally the model is an infinitely repeated game. As a result we know from the Folk Theorem there are likely to be infinitely many Nash Equilibria in the game. As is common in these settings we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Subgame perfection means that agents are assumed to behave rationally in all possible situations, even in those which do not occur in equilibrium. The analysis of the game proceeds recursively from the subgame where the firm has adopted the new technique and is being operated by a new style manager.

2.1 A new technique has been adopted

As mentioned above, we focus on stationary equilibria where the new style manager uses the same payout rate every period, i.e., \( y_{2t} = y_2 \forall t \). We start by taking this payout rate as given and ask what is the best response for shareholders. Since any other outside manager would pay identical dividends, shareholders have no reason to replace the current manager as long as he sticks to his strategy. However, shareholders may do better by liquidating the firm. If they never fire the current outside manager, shareholders receive dividends of \( y_2^{\frac{1}{2}} \) every period forever. Therefore, at any date, the shareholders will not liquidate if and only if

\[
y_2^{\frac{1}{2}} \frac{1 + r}{r} \geq L:
\]

This can be rearranged as

\[
\frac{rL}{(1 + r)^{\frac{1}{2}}} \leq y_2^{\frac{1}{2}};
\] (1)

which shows that the investors’ incentive compatibility constraint (not to liquidate) imposes a lower bound on \( y_2 \).

To get the current management to pay out \( y_2^{\frac{1}{2}} \) at every date, as has been assumed in (1), there must be a credible threat of punishment if he pays less. Since outside managers are indistinguishable from each other, it is credible for shareholders to replace the current manager whenever he pays
out less than $y^2_{2+1}$. Therefore, a best reply for shareholders is to choose

$$s_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 
\text{retain} & \text{if } y_{2t} \geq y_2 \text{ and } y_2 \geq rL = (1 + r)^{1/2} \\
\text{replace} & \text{if } y_{2t} < y_2 \text{ and } y_2 \geq rL = (1 + r)^{1/2} \\
\text{liquidate} & \text{if } y_2 < rL = (1 + r)^{1/2}.
\end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Given that investors use (2), the best response of the current manager depends on $y_2$. If investors’ incentive compatibility constraint (1) is not satisfied, the best the manager can do is to divert the entire current cash flow to himself, i.e., set $y_{2t} = 0$, since shareholders will liquidate no matter what he does. More interestingly when investors’ incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied, the current manager knows that he will be retained as long as he pays a dividend of $y_2^{1/2}$. If so, he will receive a constant consumption stream of $(1 - y_2)^{1/2}$ every period forever. His best alternative is to divert the entire current cash flow to himself, which will lead to him being fired. Thus the manager pays out $y_2^{1/2}$ if and only if

$$(1 - y_2)^{1/2} \frac{1 + r}{r} \geq \frac{1}{r};$$

This can be written as

$$y_2 \leq \frac{1}{1 + r}; \quad (3)$$

which establishes that the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (to pay dividends) imposes an upper bound on $y_2$.

The LHS of the investors’ incentive compatibility constraint (1) is increasing in $r$, whereas the RHS of the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (3) is decreasing in $r$. For small discount rates, there are multiple payout ratios that simultaneously satisfy both incentive compatibility constraints. However, for sufficiently high $r$, there is no incentive compatible payout ratio. By equating the two expressions (1) and (3), we find that there is an incentive compatible payout ratio if and only if $r \leq r^*$, where

$$r^* \equiv \frac{1}{L}; \quad (4)$$

These results are depicted graphically in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Investors’ (dashed line) and New-Style Managers’ (solid line)
Incentive Compatibility Constraints: Parameters; \( L = 100 \) and
\( r^* = 20\% \), implying \( r^* = 20\% \).

From this figure we see two important points. First, for interest rates less than 20\%, there are multiple stationary going concern equilibria. That is, there is a range of payout rates, \( y_2 \), all consistent with investors’ and manager’s incentive compatibility. Second, for interest rates in excess of 20\%, there is no positive payout rate that simultaneously satisfies both the investors’ and manager’s incentive compatibility constraints. Hence, for these high interest rates, the only equilibrium is liquidation. Finally, for any \( r \) it is also possible to have a liquidation equilibrium (i.e., \( y_2 = 0 \)).

Recalling that \( y_2 \) is the rate of payout that shareholders would expect from a new manager, \textit{we can interpret} \( y_2 \) \textit{as an index of managerial moral hazard prevailing in the firm’s operating environment.} When \( y_2 \) is relatively high, prevailing moral hazard is relatively low. The potential replacement managers serve as a relatively severe discipline on incumbents. In contrast, when \( y_2 \) is relatively low, the incumbents face little pressure to curb their tendency for consuming perquisites. Prevailing moral hazard is relatively high, and the potential replacement managers serve as a relatively lax discipline on incumbents. Nothing in the structure of our very stylized model allows us to say with great confidence which equilibria will emerge. In reality there may be may be features of accounting rules, corporate law, exchange rules, public regulations, or even general social mores which determine the behavior of the group of managers as a whole and which pin down the equilibrium to a narrower range of possibilities. We will return to this issue in Section 4 below. However, at this stage, we should emphasize that there is nothing that automatically leads to efficient outcomes. Indeed, as we have
seen, for positive interest rates there is always some irreducible amount of moral hazard \( y_2 << 1 \) so that investors never capture the full rents created by the firm. This will mean that there will always be the possibility of underinvestment, i.e., positive NPV projects may be foregone by investors.

For future reference, it is useful to record the payoffs to shareholders and managers once the new technique has been adopted and the firm has settled into a going concern equilibrium. The value of equity is

\[
E_2 = y_2 y_2 \frac{1 + r}{r}:
\]

The corresponding value of manager’s present and future perquisite consumption is

\[
M_2 = (1 - y_2) y_2 \frac{1 + r}{r}:
\]

We now consider the prior issue of whether an available new technique will be adopted by shareholders.

### 2.2 A new technique has been announced

A critical stage in the life of an enterprise is when it is operating under an existing technology and a new improved technology becomes available. Will the improvement be adopted? To do so will often require changing management. However, incumbents may take steps to impede the change and to secure their positions.

In our framework where shareholders can hire and fire the managers, the adoption of the new technique is equivalent to replacing the old-style management with new. Therefore we study the decision of whether or not to replace existing old management. We do so in the context of a stationary equilibrium where, before the new technique is announced, shareholders retain the incumbent as long as he uses a payout rate of \( y_1 \) or larger.\(^3\) An interesting aspect of our analysis is the extent to which an incumbent manager may change the payout rate upon the announcement of a new technique.

Suppose the first date at which the new technology can be implemented is \( t = T \). At that date, investors will implement the change only if they expect the firm to be more valuable under the new management operating the new technique. This will depend upon the equilibrium \( y_2 y_2 \) that is anticipated

\(^3\)Constraints on \( y_1 \) are studied below.
and how it compares to the dividend payout of incumbents. Let $y_{IT-i}$ be the payout rate adopted by old style incumbents in the transition period $i$ dates before $T$.

Consider the decision one period before the new technique can be implemented ($t = T - 1$). If the firm would not be viable as a going concern under new managers ($y_2 = 0$), the incumbent faces no additional disciplinary threat by the new technique. The only discipline he faces is that exerted by other managers similar to himself or the threat of liquidation. The analysis in this case would be the same as in the previous subsection, but with old style managers’ payout rate, $y_1$, substituting for new style managers’ payout rate, $y_2$. Another case where the imminent arrival of new style managers has no impact is where the equilibrium dividend under new-style management is less than that which would be paid by alternative old-style management ($y_2 < y_1$). In sum, if moral hazard among the new vintage of managers would be extremely high, in equilibrium, the firm will continue operating the old technique with the incumbent manager.

Consider now the more interesting case where the new technique would be viable and $y_2 > y_1$ so that it serves as a new threat to incumbent, old-style managers. Under what conditions will the incumbent retain control of the firm?

Shareholders will be willing to retain incumbent management if they will pay at least as much in dividends as would the new management operating the new technique. Thus if the incumbent seeks to retain control he must match dividends, i.e.,

$$y_{IT-i} = y_2 \quad \forall i \leq N$$

At date $T - 1$, the alternative to matching dividends is to consume all the present periods cash flow and be replaced. Thus, assuming it is feasible to do so ($\frac{1}{T} \leq y_2$), the old-style incumbent will match dividends at date $T - 1$ and remain in control if and only if

$$\left(\frac{1}{T} - y_2 \right) \frac{1 + r}{r} \geq \frac{1}{T};$$

or, equivalently,

$$y_2 \leq \frac{\frac{1}{T} \cdot 1}{\frac{1}{T} + r}; \quad (5)$$

Thus only if the new style management’s payout rate would not be too high compared to the relative productivity of the old technique will the old-style incumbent attempt to retain control of the firm.
Let us now assume that the incumbent’s incentive compatibility constraint at date $T - 1$, (5), holds and consider his decision one period earlier ($T - 2$). What must an incumbent do in order to satisfy shareholders? The shareholders’ alternative to retaining incumbent management is to replace him with an equivalent old-style manager. This manager would produce $\frac{y}{4}$ at $T - 1$ and would choose to match new technique managers’ dividends if it is optimal to do so, which is our working assumption. Thus at $T - 2$ the incumbent manager would need to set $y_{T-2} = y_{T-2}$ in order to retain control. Since the alternative is to consume the entire current cash flow $\frac{y}{4}$, we see that the incentive compatibility condition for incumbent managers at $T - 2$ is also given by (5). Hence, the incumbent would choose to match at $T - 2$ if he expects to do so at $T - 1$.

The same analysis can be repeated for earlier periods. Consequently, if the incumbent manager would choose at $T - 1$ to match the new technique’s dividend, then he would choose to do so at all earlier times in the transition period. Hence, in this case, once the new technique is announced, the dividend would immediately jump to the new (matching) level. As a result, shareholders would get the full benefit of the announced technique, even before the new technique would become viable. This is particularly interesting because under entrenchment, the new technique will actually never be implemented.

Consider next the case that (5) is not satisfied. In this case, at $T - 1$ the incumbent manager would anticipate being replaced by a new-style manager and would therefore consume maximum perquisites, i.e., set $y_{T-1} = 0$. What happens one period earlier? At $T - 2$, the incumbent manager has no credible means of committing to paying out next period. Therefore, at $T - 2$, the incumbent also chooses to divert all cash flows to himself, i.e., set $y_{T-2} = 0$. In response to this, shareholders may choose to fire the incumbent and temporarily replace him with another old-style manager. This analysis can be repeated for earlier dates in the transition period. The implication is that if (5) does not hold, then $y_{T-i} = 0$ during the transition period.

This shows that if (5) does not hold, shareholders will go $N$ periods without a dividend before they can implement the new technique and receive dividends. Instead of waiting these $N$ periods before receiving any cash, shareholders may instead decide to liquidate as soon as the new technique is announced. They choose to liquidate if and only if (5) does not hold and

$$\frac{y_{T-1}^{1/4}}{r(1 + r)^{N-1}} \leq L.$$  

(6)
This shows that unless $y_2$ is sufficiently high, the announcement of a new and improved technique may actually lead to the foreclosure of the business. What happens is that old-style incumbents, who see that they soon will be replaced by new-style managers, accelerate their perquisite consumption and, in the process, reduce dividends to such an extent that shareholders are better off closing the firm down because the period of transition is too long. The following proposition summarizes the discussion so far.

**Proposition 1** Suppose at date $T - N$ that a new technique is announced which can be implemented at time $T$ and which will generate cash flows of $Y_2$ in perpetuity if operated by new-style managers with appropriate skills. (a) If the equilibrium dividend payout rate of new-style managers satisfies, $y_2 \leq \frac{y_1}{1+r}$, then incumbent old-style managers will set $y_{1T-i} = y_2 Y_2 \forall i \leq N$. Old-style incumbent management will be retained and the new technique will not be implemented. (b) If $y_2 > \frac{y_1}{1+r}$ old-style managers will set $y_{1T-i} = 0 \forall i \leq N$. If (6) does not hold, then at time $T$ old-style managers will be replaced and the new technique will be implemented. Otherwise, shareholders liquidate the firm when the new technique is announced at date $T - N$.

The proposition merits some comments. First, the reaction of old-style management to the announcement of an improved technique has a knife-edge property. In an *entrenchment equilibrium* (part a of the proposition) the announced improvement is minor or will be subject to considerable moral hazard. The result is that old-style management takes measures to secure their positions. In a *maximum rent-extraction equilibrium* (part b of the proposition where the firm is viable after the new technique is implemented) the improvement is major or moral hazard would not be too great. Old-style incumbents will react to the announcement by consuming maximum perquisites during the time that they remain on the job.

Second, in entrenchment equilibria the new technique is not implemented which is socially inefficient. Nevertheless, shareholders experience an increase in dividends as incumbents are forced to pay out a higher fraction of the cash flows. Thus *measured productivity* of the firm may increase even though there has been no improvement in real productivity. It is simply that rent extraction by management has decreased. There has been a redistribution of rents from managers to shareholders.

Third, in the maximum rent-extraction equilibrium, the new technique is implemented at the earliest possible date, which is *ex post* socially efficient.
Nevertheless, the shareholders experience a precipitous drop in earnings upon
the announcement of the new technique. Only later, when the new technique
is implemented will earnings improve. The distribution of the benefits of the
new technique is complicated. The clear beneficiaries are the new managers
with the skills adapted to the new technique who will capture a share of the
rents once it is adopted. Shareholders may gain because the dividend paid
under the new technique may be higher than under the old, but they certainly
lose during the transitional time of \( N \) periods when earnings are negligible.
Old managers lose out on the benefit of being able to extract a fraction of the
rents on the old technique indefinitely into the future. However, they gain
because, as a group, they capture all the rents during the \( N \) transitional
periods. Finally, we should not forget that if the transition period is too
long, shareholders may prefer to liquidate the firm instead of going through
the entire transition period without receiving dividends.

Notice that the last three points imply that shareholders may have a bias
against lines of business that are susceptible to major advances. For if the
incumbent management perceives that it will one day be made redundant,
it will be difficult to convince them to abstain from short-term rent extrac-
tion. In contrast, when the firm is exposed to less radical improvements,
incumbents can be induced to strive harder even if they are not under the
immediate threat of replacement by the new technique.

For future reference we note the value of equity during the transition
period between the time the new technique has been announced and the
time it can be first implemented. If there is an entrenchment equilibrium,

\[
E_{1T-i} = y_2 \gamma \frac{1+r}{r} \forall i \leq N:
\]

If in contrast, if there is a maximum rent-extraction equilibrium,

\[
E_{1T-i} = \frac{1}{r(1+r)^{i-1}} y_2 \gamma \forall i \leq N:
\]

The fact that a large-scale improvement may be preceded by a period of rent
extraction will potentially be an impediment to certain investments in the
first place. We now complete the analysis of the problem by considering the
initial period before the new technique has been announced.
2.3 An old technique is in place and a new technique has not been announced

At an earlier stage when the firm is operating the old technique and a new technique has yet to be announced, both investors and old-style managers are aware that a new technique may be announced at any time. Players will evaluate the situation under certain assumptions about the stochastic process governing the arrival of new technique announcements. Very little will be lost from our analysis if we assume this process to be of a very simple sort. In particular, we assume that with probability $p$ there is an announcement of a new technique of known size, $\gamma_0$ (given that a new technique has not been announced previously). Furthermore, this distribution is common knowledge among all agents involved.

Given this assumption the model is time-homogenous, and we will characterize stationary subgame perfect equilibria. The analysis follows along the same lines as the case studied above where a new style manager has been hired to run the firm under the new technique.

Each period investors decide whether or not to liquidate the firm, to continue the firm under a replacement manager, or to continue the firm under the incumbent manager. Given that potential replacement managers are playing a stationary strategy where $y_{1t} = y_1$, shareholders will be willing to retain the incumbent if his payout ratio is at least as great as this level and if the current dividend plus the continuation value of equity is at least as great as the liquidation value. Let $E_1$ be the value of equity as a going concern under the old technique and let $E_1^*$ be the value equity announced at the end of the period. Given the stationary nature of the problem we have,

$$E_1 = y_1 \gamma_0 + \frac{1}{1 + r} [(1 - p)E_1 + pE_1^*];$$

which can be rearranged as

$$E_1 = \frac{y_1 \gamma_0 + y_1 \gamma_0 + pE_1^*}{r + p}.$$

Hence, investors will not liquidate if and only if

$$y_1 \geq \frac{L(r + p) - pE_1^*}{\gamma_0 (1 + r)}:$$

(7)

Incumbents will choose to pay out $y_1$ if the current consumption of perquisites plus the continuation value of staying in charge is at least as
great as one period’s cash flow. Let $M_1$ be the value of being an incumbent retained under the old technique and let $M_1^*$ be the value of being an incumbent old-style manager just after the announcement of the new technique. We have

$$M_1 = (1 - y_1)^{\frac{1}{4}} + \frac{1}{1+r}[(1 - p)M_1 + pM_1^*];$$

which can be solved as

$$M_1 = \frac{(1 - y_1)^{\frac{1}{4}}r + (1 - y_1)^{\frac{1}{4}} + pM_1^*}{r + p};$$

Thus the incumbent manager’s incentive compatibility condition, $M_1 \geq \frac{1}{4}$, can be written as

$$y_1 \leq \frac{1 - p}{1 + r} + \frac{pM_1^*}{\frac{1}{4}(1 + r)}; \quad (8)$$

Conditions (7) and (8) give the lower and upper bounds of payout ratios for incumbent old-style management that are compatible with maintaining the firm as a going concern under the old technique. As in the analysis of the going concern under the new technique, given $r$ there may be an interval of payout rates that are consistent with going concern equilibria. But it also may be that the firm will be liquidated in equilibrium. However, here the analysis is complicated by the probability of an announcement of a new technique and the values for the managers ($M_1^*$) and shareholders ($E_1^*$) after the announcement of a new technique. These in turn will depend upon the length of the transition phase and whether the transition would be one of entrenchment or of maximal rent-extraction. Next, we analyze these cases in turn.

### 2.3.1 Announced new technique induces entrenchment

Let us suppose that following the announcement of a new technique the optimal response of the old-style manager would be entrench himself by matching dividends (see Proposition 1). In this case the post-announcement values of equity and manager wealth are

$$E_1^* = y_2 \frac{1 + r}{r};$$

and

$$M_1^* = (\frac{1}{4} - y_2 \frac{1}{4}) \frac{1 + r}{r};$$
Using the first expression the incentive compatibility condition for shareholders can be written as

$$\gamma_1 \geq \frac{L(r + p)}{y_2(1 + r)} - p \frac{\gamma_2}{y_2}.$$ .......................... (9)

Similarly, the incentive compatibility condition for managers can be written as

$$\gamma_1 \leq \frac{1 - p}{1 + r} + \frac{\mu(1/4 - y_2/2)}{y_4 r}.$$ .......................... (10)

Notice that condition (9) is decreasing in $\gamma_2/2$. The interpretation is that the higher will be the dividends paid once the new technique is announced the lower the pre-announcement payout rate that would be tolerated by investors. Similarly, condition (10) is decreasing in $\gamma_2/2$. The interpretation is that the higher would be the payout required to retain his job after the announcement of a new technique, the less willing will be the old-style manager to forego perk consumption in the present.

### 2.3.2 Announced new technique induces maximum rent extraction

Here, we suppose that following the announcement of a new technique, the optimal response of the old-style manager would be divert all cash flows to himself while he is in charge (see Proposition 1). In this case the post-announcement value of equity is

$$E_1^* = \max \left[ \frac{1}{r(1 + r)^{N-1}} y_2 y_4; L \right] :$$ .......................... (11)

Suppose that investors choose not to liquidate during the transition period. Then, assuming that shareholders will adopt a policy of replacing the incumbents with alternative old-style managers until the new technique can be implemented, the value for incumbent management after an announcement is

$$M_1^* = \gamma_4 :$$

In this case, using (11), investors’ pre-announcement incentive compatibility condition (7) can be written as

$$\gamma_1 \geq \frac{L(r + p)}{y_4(1 + r)} - p \frac{\gamma_2}{y_4} - \frac{1}{r(1 + r)^N}.$$ .......................... (12)
Similarly, the pre-announcement incentive compatibility condition for old-style managers (8) can be written as

$$y_1 \leq \frac{1}{1 + r}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Notice that condition (12) is decreasing in $y_2^{1/2}$ for reasons similar to the case where announcements induce entrenchment. In short, the higher the new technique dividend the better news is its announcement and the more tolerant will be shareholders of old management’s rent extraction. Also, it should be noted that this expression is increasing in $N$. The interpretation is that the longer the delay between announcement of a new technique and its implementation, the longer the period that shareholders go without dividends and thus the less tolerant will shareholders be of current rent extraction by incumbent management. The old managers incentive compatibility condition (13) is identical to that of new managers once the new technique is implement.

### 2.4 The incentive to invest

So far we have studied a firm that is up and running. In this subsection, we address whether investors would advance equity capital to get the firm started in the first place. The analysis above shows that some fraction of the cash flows of the firm can be diverted by insiders. These take three specific forms: perquisite consumption by old managers under normal operations of the old technique, high perquisite consumption by old managers once they are lame ducks, and normal perquisite consumption by new managers once the new technique is in place. The relative sizes of these rent concessions to insiders depends upon the parameters of the model and the degree of moral hazard prevailing among the pool of prospective managers. Even in the circumstances most favorable for shareholders these concessions cannot be reduced to zero because the payout ratio, $y_2$, is strictly less than 1 for positive interest rates. Therefore there is inevitably the possibility of underinvestment in productive projects.

To make this explicit let $V$ be the first-best value of the project operating under the old technique with the prospect that a new technique will be announced and let $V^*$ be its value after the new technique is announced. These satisfy $V = \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{1 + r}[(1 - p)V + pV^*]$, so that

$$V = \frac{\frac{1}{4}(1 + r) + pV^*}{r + p}.$$
Once the new technique has been announced the first-best action is to implement the improvement as soon as possible. Consequently,

\[ V^* = \frac{\nu_4((1 + r)^N - 1)}{r(1 + r)^{N-1}} + \frac{\nu_4}{r(1 + r)^{N-1}}. \]

Combining the last two expressions, we find that the firm’s ex ante value is

\[ V = \frac{\nu_4(1 + r)}{r + p} + \frac{p\nu_4((1 + r)^N - 1)}{(r + p)r(1 + r)^{N-1}} + \frac{p\nu_4}{(r + p)r(1 + r)^{N-1}}. \] (14)

The first term on the RHS is the value of an annuity of \( \nu_4 \) which dies with a conditional probability of \( p \) each period. The second term is the value of an annuity of \( \nu_4 \) which is born with a conditional probability of \( p \) each period and which would last \( N \) periods. The third term is the value a perpetual claim of \( \nu_4 \) which would be announced with a probability of \( p \) each period and which would commence \( N \) periods after announcement.

Underinvestment occurs whenever the value of equity of the firm operating under the old technique would be less than \( V \). As we have seen, the value of equity depends upon whether a new technique announcement is expected to induce entrenchment, maximum rent-extraction, or liquidation. In the former case, the results above can be used to show that the initial value of equity is

\[ E_1 = \frac{\nu_1 \nu_4(1 + r)}{r + p} + \frac{p\nu_2 \nu_4(1 + r)}{(r + p)r(1 + r)^{N-1}}. \] (15)

Comparing this with (14) above we see that if new technique announcements induce entrenchment, we may have underinvestment ex ante because (a) old managers may pay out less than the cash flows the firm generates while they are in charge (\( \nu_1 < 1 \)), (b) dividends during transition may be less than available cash flows (\( \nu_4 > \nu_2 \nu_4 \)), and (c) payout of new-style managers will certainly be less than full (\( \nu_2 < 1 \), see equation 3).

Similarly, if new technique announcements will give rise to a period of maximum rent-extraction (but not liquidation), the initial value of equity is

\[ E_1 = \frac{\nu_1 \nu_4(1 + r)}{r + p} + \frac{p\nu_2 \nu_4}{(r + p)r(1 + r)^{N-1}}. \] (16)

Comparing this with (14) above we see that in this case we may have underinvestment ex ante because (a) old managers may pay out less than the
cash flows generated under them ($y_1 < 1$), (b) dividends during transition are totally absent, and (c) payout of new-style managers will be less than full ($y_2 < 1$).

Finally, if new technique announcements will give rise to the immediate liquidation of the firm, the initial value of equity is

$$E_1 = \frac{y_1^{\frac{1}{4}}(1 + r) + \frac{L}{r + p}}{r + p}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

In this case, underinvestment *ex ante* would arise because (a) old-style managers’ payout rate is $y_1 < 1$, (b) the firm is prematurely liquidated, and (c) the new technique is not implemented.

Given limited liability, underinvestment will certainly occur any time a positive NPV project cannot issue equity claims that cover the costs of initial investment. In fact, underinvestment problems may be more severe than this. For example, if initial investments require the participation of two or more parties with interests that cannot be perfectly well-aligned, contracting problems among these agents may also serve as an impediment to productive investment. This idea is develop at length by Anderson and Nyborg [2001] who study a firm whose original product idea is the result of an R&D project by an entrepreneur but which requires outside finance for capital investments. Other forms of possible, early-stage contracting inefficiency are studied in the literature on venture capital.

### 2.5 Examples

In order to make explicit some of the general properties of the model just discussed, we now consider a series of specific parametric examples. We suppose throughout that $\frac{1}{4} = 20; L = 100$, and $p = :1$. This means that as long as $r \leq 0.2$, there will be a payout rate $y_2$ such that the firm would be viable under the new technique. If $r = 0.2$ the only viable payout rate is $y_2 = 0.8333$. For lower interest rates there will be a range of viable payout rates. For the purposes of what follows, we assume $y_2 = 0.8333$.

When will the announcement of this new technique induce entrenchment? To investigate this, recall that our analysis has been carried out under the assumption that $y_1^{\frac{1}{4}} < y_2^{\frac{1}{4}}$, where $y_1$ denotes the payout rate of old-style manager before the new technique is announced. Supposing that $\frac{1}{4} = 18.334$, we see that our analysis is restricted to the case that $y_1 < 909$. Now, upon
the announcement of a new technique, the old-style manager will prefer to
entrench himself by matching dividends if \( \frac{1}{4} \geq 16.667(1+r) \) by Proposition 1. So entrenchment will happen for \( r \leq 0.1 \). In this case the post-announcement
value of equity is given by: \( E^* = 16.667 \frac{1+r}{r} \). Furthermore, the firm will be
viable before the announcement under old management under payout rates
satisfying (by equations 9 and 10),

\[
y_1 \geq \max \left[ \frac{100(r+1)}{18.334(1+r)} - 16.667 \frac{1+18.334}{18.334r}; 0 \right]
\]

and

\[
y_1 \leq \min \left[ \frac{9}{1+r} + \frac{18.334 - 16.667}{18.334r}; 1 \right]
\]

Figure 2 plots the RHS of these two expressions as functions of \( r \). If \( r = 0.1 \)
the firm is viable under old management for payout rates in the interval
\( y_1 \in (0.0826; 0.909) \). For lower interest rates there is a wider range of viable
payout rates. For \( r \approx 0.094 \) the lower bound of the payout rate reaches
\( y_1 = 0 \): This shows that if the discount rate is very low, investors may be
willing to forego dividends initially in the anticipation of very high dividends
once a new technique is announced.

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4In developing this example we take explicitly into account certain inequality restrictions which were left implicit in the general analysis above. In particular we require \( 0 \leq y_1 \leq 1 \).
To examine maximum rent extraction equilibria let us assume that it is not feasible for an old-style manager to match the dividends that would be paid by a new-style manager. This will be the case for example if $\frac{1}{4} = 15$. Applying this assumption (rather than $\frac{1}{4} = 18.334$ as was assumed in Figure 2), the post-announcement value of equity is,

$$E_1^* = \max \left[ \frac{16.667}{r(1+r)^N}; 100 \right].$$

Figure 3 plots $E_1^*$ as a function of $N$ for $r = .10$.

This illustrates that equity value will be extremely sensitive to the length of the transition period, $N$. In what follows let us fix this at $N = 5$. Under what conditions will the firm be viable under the old management before the announcement of the new technique? We are interested in an answer to this question under the maximum rent extraction scenario, which in particular means that the firm will not be liquidated upon the announcement. In other words, upon the announcement, the continuation equity value must be above 100. Given the parameter values we are working with, this implies that $r \leq .10985$. Now, the payout rates that are viable before the announcement are those which simultaneously satisfy investors’ incentive compatibility constraint (9),

$$y_1 \geq \frac{100(r + :1)}{15(1+r)} - \frac{1 \times 16.667}{15} \frac{1}{r(1+r)^5};$$

and the old-style manager’s incentive compatibility constraint (10),

$$y_1 \leq \frac{1}{1+r};$$

20
The RHS of these two expressions plotted as function of $r$ are given in Figure 4.

![Figure 4: Investors’ and Old-Style Managers’ Incentive Compatibility Constraints Before Announcement of New Technique Under Maximum Rent Extraction During Transition Period](image-url)

At $r = .1$, the range of viable payout rates is, $y_1 \in (0.522; 0.909)$. At lower interest rates a wider range is viable. For $r \approx 0.072$ the lower bound of the payout rate reaches $y_1 = 0$:

### 3 The Behavior of Equity Prices Over Time

The model we have studied here has direct implications for the behavior of equity prices in the face of announcements of technological advances. The prediction is that an announcement will have one of two possible reactions depending upon the size of the improvement ($\frac{1}{4} - \frac{1}{4}$) and other parameters of the problem. When announced improvements are relatively small, equity prices will immediately increase to a level that fully anticipates the extent of the improvement. This is the pattern associated with “entrenchment equilibrium”. Despite the fact that the entrenched managers are effectively resisting the implementation of the new technique, this is a rational response for the stock market because reported earnings improve immediately upon the announcement.

In the case of relatively large improvements, the model predicts that there will be an immediate change in equity prices. This may be a price fall, but if so prices will eventually rise to a new level once the innovation is
implemented. However, the reaction could also be so extreme that the firm is liquidated.

These various patterns are depicted in the two next figures. In both figures the parameters are: \( p = 0.1; r = 0.1; y_2 = 16.667; L = 0; y_1 = 0.5; \) the announcement occurs at \( t = 20 \) and the earliest implementation date is \( T = 35 \). In Figure 5 we have assumed that \( \lambda_1 = 18.334 \), which implies that upon announcement of the new technique, old-style managers will entrench themselves.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5}
\caption{Equity Prices over time, entrenchment equilibrium; New technique announced at \( t = 20 \)}
\end{figure}

In this case, equity prices are 142.09 for periods 1 through 19, then they jump to 183.34 in period 20 and stay at that level thereafter. In contrast in Figure 6 we have assumed that \( \lambda_1 = 15 \) so that the announcement gives rise to maximum rent extraction equilibrium.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure6}
\caption{Equity Prices over time, maximum rent extraction equilibrium; New technique announced at \( t = 20 \)}
\end{figure}
Then equity prices are at 98:169 from periods 1 through 19. In period 20 they fall to 43:889 and rise subsequently reaching 183:34 in period 35.

These examples are very stylized because of the stationary nature of our model and the assumption that the only uncertainty concerns the arrival time of the new technique announcement. In more realistic settings one could capture other properties familiar in real world equity price movements. However, the basic price dynamics we have produced with our model for the core of the informal arguments that have been put forward to account for some of the behavior of equity prices in recent times. See Hobijn and Jovanovich [1999] for a strongly argued discussion of the empirical evidence that develops this line of reasoning.

4 Financial Development

4.1 Better monitoring of insiders

The model we have adopted makes the extreme assumption that no contract can be enforced which is contingent on paying out cash flows. This is meant to capture the fact that in almost all situations the agents who are on the inside of firms necessarily have some latitude to make decisions on behalf of the firm which are nevertheless motivated by considerations of their personal interest. The assumption of non-contractible cash flows should not be taken too literally. In reality, insiders are generally constrained in a variety of respects. They are obliged to account for their actions to outside investors, and the accounts they report must meet certain standards. Norms of accountability do vary considerably from one context to another. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of highly developed financial environments is that there are well-established standards for reporting information pertinent to investors that are required by accounting standards, exchange listing requirements, or securities regulation. When reporting standards are high outside investors are able to monitor insider decisions more effectively and can reduce the scope for the opportunistic personal use of company resources. In other words, investors need not rely solely on the threat of punishments if they perceive excessive or abusive diversions of company resources.

Financial development in this regard could be reflected in our model in a variety of ways. The simplest way would be to impose a monitoring constraint whereby a minimum payout rate could be enforced. If payout rates
fell below this minimum level, managers would immediately be punished by replacement and possibly other actions. Figure 7 depicts the combinations of $r$ and $y_2$ that are consistent with the continued operation of the firm if the monitoring constraint is set at 42%.

![Figure 7 Payout Rates with Monitoring Constraints: Solid line: New-Style Manager’s IC. Dotted line: Investors’ IC. Dashed: Monitoring constraint. Parameter values: $L = 100, \pi_2 = 20$.](image)

For interest rates less than about 10%, the effective lower bound on the manager’s payout rate is given by the monitoring constraint at 42%. This will reduce the range of possible equilibria for low interest rates. Consequently, in this range of interest rates, it will raise the lower bound of possible values of equity and therefore will tend to alleviate underinvestment problems.

This is quite straight-forward within the context of our model; however, it describes a real world phenomenon of considerable importance. Namely, financial development which permits more effective monitoring of firm insiders will expand considerably the use of equity markets in the financing of productive investments. Stated otherwise, one aspect of financial underdevelopment is that outside investors have few means of effectively monitoring insiders and therefore are exposed to a low level of managerial integrity that is the norm. In such an environment, only extremely productive investments will be viable as widely held, publicly quoted companies. Many productive investments whither on the vine because the benefits of the product idea would be hijacked by firm insiders so that outside investors are not willing to participate.
4.2 Alternative financial contracts

Finance from outside investors can be obtained from contracts other than common stock. The most obvious and wide-spread alternative to equity is of course debt, either in the form of bank loans or in a more arm’s length form such as bonds. In the context of a model with non-contractible cash flows similar to the one treated here, Anderson and Nyborg [2001] study both debt and equity in depth. It is shown that debt has both advantages and disadvantages relative to equity. As a result, there are some productive projects that will be viable under equity but not under debt, while there are other projects which are viable under debt but not under equity.

The advantage of debt is that it limits outside investors’ control rights; creditors get control only in case of default. Hence, outside investors’ incentive compatibility constraint is not part of the analysis as long as debt is being serviced. A disadvantage of debt is that the contingent control rights makes it relatively easy for incumbent management to entrench itself. So long as old management meets contractual debt service, investors cannot effect changes of management. To see this in the context of the model we have studied here, suppose that old-style managers are able to meet contractual debt service of \( d \) each period (\( \frac{y}{4} > d \)). Then when a new technique becomes available, incumbent management do not need to match potential dividends (\( y_2 \frac{1}{4} \)) in order to stay on the job; rather, they merely continue paying the debt service of \( d \). Consequently, there is less of a tendency to implement the improved technique once it becomes available. A second and more obvious difficulty is that if cash flows are stochastic (not the case studied here), solvent firms may nevertheless fall into costly financial distress.

Financial development expands the panoply of forms of financial contracting available. Consequently, inefficiencies that persist when agents are confined to combinations of equity and straight debt possibly can be eliminated or at least reduced through the use of more sophisticated financial structures. For example, given the announcement of a new technique which has induced old managers to entrench themselves, there is a potential efficiency gain to be realized if old-managers be induced to make way for the new technique by compensating them for future perquisites foregone. This could be done by a leveraged buy-out by new managers. In this they buy the entire equity of the firm and displaced old-style managers are compensated with debt. See Anderson and Nyborg [2001] for a fuller discussion of these techniques within the context of the two-stage model of firm growth.
4.3 Managerial incentive contracts

In the model considered here, the manager’s compensation has been limited to a fixed salary per period (which without loss of generality we normalized to zero) plus perquisites. This created an extreme divergence of interests between management and shareholders – every dollar of increased perquisite consumption by managers was a dollar less earnings for shareholders. This extreme assumption captures a generic feature of modern corporations; namely, few managers have sufficient initial wealth to buy 100 per cent of the equity of the firm, even if additional finance were obtained by issuing debt. In reality, however, certain forms of managerial compensation can be found that may better align the interests of managers and shareholders. In particular, compensating managers with shares or call options on shares is intended to achieve this end.

To study this in our model, suppose the new technique has been implemented and the current incumbent manager has been awarded a share \( b \) of the firm. Potential replacement managers have no shares. Suppose furthermore that investors’ strategy is to retain the incumbent as long as he uses the payout rate \( y_2 \) (which satisfies investors’ IC). The manager’s alternative is to divert all current cash flows to himself, be replaced, and receive \( b \) of all future earnings. Thus the incumbent manager’s incentive compatibility condition is

\[
(1 - y_2)\frac{1 + r}{r} + b y_2 \frac{1 + r}{r} \geq y_4 + b y_4 \frac{\gamma}{r};
\]

or

\[
y_2 \leq \frac{1}{1 + r(1 - b)}; \tag{18}
\]

The RHS of this expression is increasing in \( b \). In other words, the maximum incentive compatible payout rate is enhanced by giving the manager shares. This is because his interests are now more in line with those of outside investors. As a consequence, the maximum possible interest rate for which the firm can be kept alive is enhanced. This is illustrated in Figure 8.
5 Conclusions

We have studied the relation of financial development and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders, but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires firing old management and hiring new ones with skills appropriate for the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium in this game can be of two types. In “entrenchment” equilibrium once the new technique has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout sufficiently to preempt the innovation. This is inefficient socially but is beneficial to shareholders because measured profitability will increase at the time of the announcement of the new technique. In “maximum rent extraction” equilibrium managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure. This may lead to the immediate liquidation of the firm. But if not, it is ex post socially efficient because the new technique is eventually implement; however, it may be harmful for shareholders. We show that moral hazard associated with both equilibria may result in ex ante inefficiency, because the resulting loss in equity value means that investors may not be willing to advance the requisite funds to take all positive NPV projects.
Financial development can impact the model in several ways and can reduce inefficiencies brought on by agency problems. Improved reporting standards can reduce the scope for diversion of cash flows by insiders. More complicated financial contracts can alleviate underinvestment problems. Managerial incentive contracts can help as well. While improvements are possible we also point to certain difficulties in achieving them, suggesting that the process of financial development may indeed be a difficult one.

References


