Rahi, Rohit and Zigrand, Jean-Pierre (2004) Strategic financial innovation in segmented markets. Discussion paper, 520. Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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We study an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs reap profits by exploiting mispricings across different trading locations. We edogonize the asset structure as the outcome of the security design game played by the arbitrageurs. The equilibrium asset structure depends realistically upon consideration such as depth, liquidity and gains from trade. It is not socially optimal in general; the degree of inefficiency depends upon the heterogeneity of investors. Finally we use this framework to formally analyse Shiller's conjecture of the optimality 'macro markets'.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2004 The Authors|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Security design, Arbitrage, Restricted participation|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General
G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG)
Collections > Economists Online
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