Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring

Cerasi, Vittoria and Daltung, Sonja (2006) Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring. Discussion paper, 576. Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversification. These predictions find some support in the empirical literature.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://fmg.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2006 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:	M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M1 - Business Administration > M12 - Personnel Management G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
Sets:	Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG) Collections > Economists Online Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers
Identification Number:	576
Date Deposited:	29 Jul 2009 10:07
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24634/

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