Performance Measurement and Evaluation

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Performance Measurement and Evaluation

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Abstract

We consider performance measurement and evaluation for managed funds. Similarities and differences—both in econometric practice and in interpretation of outcomes of empirical tests—between performance measurement and conventional asset pricing models are analyzed. We also discuss how inference on ‘skill’ is affected when fund managers have market timing information. Performance testing based on portfolio weights is also covered as is recent developments in Bayesian models of performance measurement that can accommodate errors in the benchmark asset pricing model.

1 Introduction

Mutual funds are managed portfolios that putatively offer investors a number of benefits. Some of them fall under the rubric of economies of scale such as the amortization of transactions and other costs across numerous investors. The most controversial potential benefit, however, remains the possibility that some funds can “beat the market.” The lure of active management is the modern equivalent of alchemy, with the transformation of lead into gold replaced by hope that the combination of specialized insights and superior information can result in portfolios that can outperform the market. Hence, mutual fund performance evaluation — and, more generally, the evaluation of the performance of managed portfolios — is all about measuring performance to differentiate those managers who truly add value through active management from those who do not.

How would a financial economist naturally address this question? The answer lies in a basic fact that can be easily overlooked amid the hyperbole associated with the alleged benefits of active
management: mutual funds simply represent a potential increase in the menu of assets available to investors. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear which tools of modern finance should be brought to bear on performance evaluation: (1) the theory of portfolio choice and, to a lesser extent, the equilibrium asset pricing theory that follows, in part, from it and (2) the no-arbitrage approach to valuation.

Indeed, there are many similarities between the econometrics of performance measurement and that of conventional asset pricing. Jensen’s alpha in performance measurement is just mispricing in asset pricing models, we test for their joint significance using mean-variance efficiency or Euler equation tests, using benchmark portfolios that are the (conditionally) mean-variance efficient portfolios implied by such models or, almost equivalently, via their associated stochastic discount factors. Similarly, the distinction between predictability in performance and its converse of no persistence must often be handled with care in both settings.

The mechanical difference between the two settings lies in the asset universe: managed portfolios with given weights in the performance literature as opposed to individual securities or portfolios chosen by financial econometricians, not by portfolio managers, in the asset pricing literature. This mechanical difference is of paramount economic importance: it is the fact that regularities observed in the moments of the returns of managed portfolios are the direct consequence of explicit choices made by the portfolio manager that makes the setting so different. To be sure, corporate officers, research analysts, investors, traders, and speculators all make choices that affect the stochastic properties of individual asset and aggregate passive portfolio returns. However, they do not do so in the frequent, routine, and direct way that is the norm in the high turnover world of active portfolio management. These pages have been literally littered with examples of ways in which the direct impact of investment choices makes concerns like stochastic betas and the measurement of biases in alphas first order concerns.

Managed portfolios are therefore not generic assets, which makes performance evaluation distinct from generic applications of modern portfolio theory in some dimensions. Chief among these is the question of whether active managers add value, making one natural null hypothesis that active managers do not add value or, in other words, that their funds do not represent an increase in the menu of assets available to investors. Another difference is in the kind of abilities we imagine that those active managers who do add value possess: market timing ability as opposed to skill in security selection. In contrast, rejections of the null in asset pricing theory tests are
typically attributed to failures of the model. Others include the economic environment — that is, the industrial organization of the portfolio management industry — confronting managers, the need for performance measures that are objective and, thus, not investor specific, and differences in the stochastic properties of managed portfolio returns as compared with individual assets and generic passive portfolios.

The fact that managed portfolios’ performance is the outcome of the explicit choices of fund managers also opens up the possibility of studying these choice variables explicitly when data is available on portfolio composition. Tests for the optimality of a fund manager’s choice of portfolio weights are available in these circumstances, although it is difficult to use this type of data in a meaningful way unless the manager’s objective function is known. This is a problem, for example, when assessing the asset/liability management skill of pension funds when data is available on asset holdings but not on liabilities.

Our paper focuses on the methodological themes in the literature on performance measurement and evaluation and only references the empirical literature sparingly, chiefly to support arguments about problems with existing methods. We present a unified framework for understanding existing methods and offer some new results as well. We do not aim to provide a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature, which would call for a different paper altogether. We refer readers to Cuthbertson et al (2007) for a recent survey of the empirical evidence of mutual funds.

The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 establishes theoretical benchmarks for performance benchmarks in the context of investors’ marginal investment decisions, discusses sources of benchmarks, and introduces some performance measures in common use. Section 3 provides an analysis of performance measurement in the presence of market timing and time-variations in the fund manager’s risk exposures. As part of our analysis, we cover a range of market timing specifications that involve different sorts of market timing information signals. Section 4 looks at performance measures in the presence of data on portfolio weights. Section 5 falls under the broad title of the cross-section of managed portfolio returns. It covers standard econometric approaches and test statistics for detecting abnormal performance both at the level of individual funds and also for the cross-section of funds or sub-groups of (ranked) funds. Finally, Section 6 discusses recent Bayesian contributions to the literature and Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Benchmarks

Our analysis of the measurement of the performance of managed portfolios begins with generic investors with common information and beliefs who equate the expected marginal cost of investing (in utility terms) with expected marginal benefits. Without being specific about where it comes from, assume that an arbitrary investor’s indirect utility of wealth, $W_t$, is given by $V(W_t, x_t)$, where $x_t$ is a generic state vector that might include other variables (including choice variables) that impinge on the investor’s asset allocation decision, permitting utility to be state dependent and nonseparable. Let $p_{it}$ and $d_{it}$ be the price and dividend on the $i$th asset (or mutual fund), respectively, making the corresponding gross rate of return $R_{it+1} = (p_{it+1} + d_{it+1})/p_{it}$. The marginal conditions for this investor are given by

$$E \left[ \frac{V'(W_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{V'(W_{t}, x_{t})} R_{it+1} | I_t \right] \equiv E[m_{t+1} R_{it+1} | I_t] = 1,$$

where $I_t$ is information available to the investor at time $t$ and $m_{t+1}$ is the stochastic discount factor.

We assume that there is a riskless asset with return $R_{ft+1}$ (known at time $t$) and so $E[m_{t+1} | I_t] = R_{ft+1}^{-1}$.

The investment decisions of any investor who maximizes expected utility can be characterized by a marginal decision of this form. The denominator is given by $V'(W_{t}, x_{t}) p_{it}$ — the \textit{ex post} cost in utility terms of investing a little more in asset $i$ — and the numerator is given by $V'(W_{t+1}, x_{t+1})(p_{it+1} + d_{it+1})$, the \textit{ex post} marginal benefit from making this incremental investment. Setting their expected ratio to one ensures that the marginal benefits and costs of investing are equated. Note that nothing in this analysis relies on special assumptions about investor preferences or about market completeness.

Now consider the conditional population projection of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of this investor $m_{t+1} = V'(W_{t+1}, x_{t+1})/V'(W_{t}, x_{t})$ on the $N$–vector of returns $R_{t+1}$ of risky assets with returns that are not perfectly correlated:

$$m_{t+1} = \delta_0 t + \delta_t R_{t+1} + \varepsilon_{mt+1}$$

$$= R_{ft+1}^{-1} + \delta_t (R_{t+1} - E[R_{t+1} | I_t]) + \varepsilon_{mt+1}$$

$$= R_{ft+1}^{-1} + Cov(R_{t+1}, m_{t+1} | I_t) Var(R_{t+1} | I_t)^{-1} (R_{t+1} - E[R_{t+1} | I_t]) + \varepsilon_{mt+1}$$
where, letting \( \mathbf{e} \) denote an \( N \times 1 \) vector of ones,

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta_t &= Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}Cov(\mathbf{R}_t, m_{t+1}|I_t) \\
&= Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}(E[\mathbf{R}_t^2|I_t] - E[\mathbf{R}_t|I_t]E[m_{t+1}|I_t]) \\
&= Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}(\mathbf{e}^{-1} - E[\mathbf{R}_t|I_t]R_{ft+1}^{-1}). \\
\end{align*}
\]

(3)

It is convenient to transform \( \delta_t \) into portfolio weights via \( \omega_{\delta t} = \delta_t \mathbf{e} \), which yields the associated portfolio returns \( R_{\delta t+1} = \omega_{\delta t} \mathbf{R}_{t+1} \). In terms of the (conditional) mean/variance efficient set, the weights of portfolio \( \delta \) are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
\omega_{\delta t} &= Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}(\mathbf{e}^{-1} - E[\mathbf{R}_t|I_t]R_{ft+1}^{-1}) \\
&= Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}(\mathbf{e}^{-1} - E[\mathbf{R}_t|I_t]R_{ft+1}^{-1}) \\
&= (c_t - bR_{ft+1}) \\
&= \frac{R_{ft+1}}{R_{ft+1} - E[R_{0t+1}|I_t]}\omega_{st} - \frac{E[R_{0t+1}|I_t]}{R_{ft+1} - E[R_{0t+1}|I_t]}\omega_{st} \\
&= \omega_{st} + \frac{E[R_{0t+1}|I_t]}{E[R_{0t+1}|I_t] - R_{ft+1}}(\omega_{st} - \omega_{st}), \\
\end{align*}
\]

(4)

where \( \omega_{st} = Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}\mathbf{e} \) is the vector of portfolio weights of the conditional minimum variance portfolio, \( R_{0t+1} \) is the corresponding minimum variance portfolio return, \( c_t = \mathbf{t}^\prime Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}\mathbf{t} \), \( b_t = \mathbf{t}^\prime Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}E(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)R_{ft+1}^{-1} \) and \( \omega_{st} = Var(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)^{-1}E(\mathbf{R}_t|I_t)/b_t \) is the weight vector for the maximum squared Sharpe ratio portfolio.

None of the variables in this expression for the conditional regression coefficients \( \delta_t \) are investor specific. All investors who share common beliefs about the conditional mean vector and covariance matrix of the \( N \) asset returns and who are on the margin with respect to these \( N \) assets will agree on the values of the elements of \( \delta_t \), irrespective of their preferences, other traded and nontraded asset holdings, or any other aspect of their economic environment. Put differently, portfolio \( \delta \) is the optimal portfolio of these \( N \) assets for hedging fluctuations in the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of any marginal investor. Similarly, all investors who are marginal with respect to these \( N \) assets will perceive that expected returns satisfy

\[
E[\mathbf{R}_{t+1} - \mathbf{t}R_{ft+1}|I_t] = \beta_{\delta t}E[\mathbf{R}_{\delta t+1} - \mathbf{t}R_{ft+1}|I_t],
\]

(5)

since \( \delta \) is a conditionally mean-variance efficient portfolio.\(^1\)

---

\(^1\)What is lost in the passage from the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to portfolio \( \delta \)? The answer
There is another way to arrive at the same benchmark portfolios: the application of the no-arbitrage approach to the valuation of risky assets. Once again, begin with \( N \) risky assets with imperfectly correlated returns. Asset pricing based on the absence of arbitrage typically involves three assumptions in addition to the definition of an arbitrage opportunity:\(^2\) (1) investors perceive a deterministic mapping between end-of-period asset payoffs and underlying states of nature \( s \); (2) agreement on the possible; and (3) the perfect markets assumption. The first condition is met almost by construction if investors identify states with the array of all possible payoff patterns. The second asserts that no investor thinks any state is impossible since such an investor would be willing to sell an infinite number of claims that pay off in that state. The perfect markets assumption—that is, the absence of taxes, transactions costs, indivisibilities, short sales restrictions, or other impediments to free trade—is problematic since it is obviously impossible to sell managed portfolios short to create zero net investment portfolios.

Fortunately, there is an alternative to the absence of short sale constraints that eliminates this concern. Any change in the weights of a portfolio that leaves its cost unchanged is a zero net investment portfolio. Hence, arbitrage reasoning can be used when there are investors who are long the assets under consideration. All that is required to implement the no-arbitrage approach to valuation is the existence of investors with long positions in each asset who can costlessly make marginal changes in existing positions. In unfettered markets, the substitution possibilities of a few investors can replace the marginal decisions of many when the few actively seek arbitrage profits in this asset menu.

It is now a simple matter to get from these assumptions to portfolio \( \delta \). The absence of arbitrage coupled with some mild regularity conditions (such as investors prefer more to less) when there is a continuum of possible states implies the existence of strictly positive state prices, not necessarily unique, that price the \( N \) assets under consideration as in:

\[
p_{it} = \int \psi_{t+1}(s) \left[ p_{it+1}(s) + d_{it+1}(s) \right] ds
\]

is simple: while the realizations of \( m_{t+1} \) are strictly positive since it is a ratio of marginal utilities, the returns of portfolio \( \delta \) need not be strictly positive since its weights need not be positive (i.e., portfolio \( \delta \) might have short positions). As a practical matter, the benchmark portfolios used in practice seldom have short positions.

\(^2\)We have ignored the technical requirement that there be at least one asset with positive value in each state because managed portfolios and, for that matter, most traded securities are limited liability assets.
where $s$ indexes states and $\psi_{t+1}(s)$ is the (not necessarily unique) price at time $t$ of a claim that pays one dollar if state $s$ occurs at time $t+1$ and zero otherwise. Letting $\pi_{t+1}(s)$ denote the (conditional) probability at time $t$ that state $s$ will occur at time $t+1$, this expression may be rewritten as:

$$p_{it} = \int \pi(s) \psi_{t+1}(s) \left[ p_{it+1}(s) + d_{it+1}(s) \right] ds$$

$$\equiv \int \pi_{t+1}(s) m_{t+1}(s) \left[ p_{it+1}(s) + d_{it+1}(s) \right] ds$$

$$\equiv E \left[ m_{t+1}(p_{it+1} + d_{it+1}) | I_t \right], \quad (7)$$

where $m_{t+1}(s) = \psi(s)/\pi(s)$ is a strictly positive random variable — that is, both state prices and probabilities are strictly positive — with realizations given by state prices per unit probability, which is termed a stochastic discount factor in the literature. All that remains is to project any stochastic discount factor $m_{t+1}$ that reflect common beliefs $\pi_{t+1}(s)$ — where the word “any” reflects the fact that state prices need not be unique — onto the returns of the $N$ assets to recover portfolio $\delta$.

As was noted above, there is at least one reason for taking this route: to make it clear that the existence of portfolio $\delta$ does not require all investors to be on the margin with respect to these $N$ assets. Many, even most, investors may be inframarginal but some investors must be (implicitly) making marginal decisions in these assets for this reasoning to apply. Chen and Knez (1996) reach the same conclusion in their analysis of arbitrage-free performance measures.$^3$

These considerations make portfolio $\delta$ a natural candidate for being the benchmark portfolio against which investment performance should be measured for investors who are skeptical regarding the prospects for active management. It is appropriate for skeptics precisely because managed portfolios are given zero weight in portfolio $\delta$. Put differently, this portfolio can be used to answer

$^3$More precisely, they search for performance measures that satisfy four desiderata: (1) the performance of any portfolio that can be replicated by a passively managed portfolio with weights based only on public information should be zero, (2) the measure should be linear (i.e., the performance of a linear combination of portfolios should be the linear combination of the individual portfolio measures), (3) it should be continuous (i.e., portfolios with similar returns state by state should have similar performance measures), and (4) it should be nontrivial and assign a non-zero value — that is, a positive price — to any traded security. They show that these four conditions are equivalent to the absence of arbitrage and the concomitant existence of state prices or, equivalently, strictly stochastic discount factors.
the question of whether such investors should take small positions in a given managed portfolio.\footnote{This point is not quite right as stated because investors can only make marginal changes in one direction when they cannot sell managed portfolios short. The statement is correct once one factors in the existence of an investor who is long the fund in question and can make marginal changes in both directions.} As noted above, it is an objective measure in that investors with common beliefs about the conditional mean vector and covariance matrix will agree on the composition of $\delta$. Thus, we have identified a reasonable candidate benchmark portfolio for performance measurement.

What benchmark portfolio is appropriate for investors who are not skeptical about the existence of superior managers? One answer lies in an observation made earlier: such investors would naturally think that managed portfolios represent a nontrivial enlargement of the asset menu. That is, portfolio $\delta$ would change in its composition as it would place nonzero weight on managed portfolios if they truly added value by improving investors’ ability to hedge against fluctuations in their intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Like the managed-portfolio-free version of $\delta$, it is an objective measure for investors who share common beliefs about conditional means, variances, and covariances of returns in this enlarged asset menu.

2.1 Sources of Benchmarks

There is an apparent logical conundrum here: it would seem obvious that managed portfolios either do or do not improve the investment opportunities available to investors. The answer, of course, is that it is difficult to estimate the weights of portfolio $\delta$ with any precision in practice. The required inputs are the conditional mean vector $E[R_{t+1}|I_t]$ and the conditional covariance matrix $\text{Var}(R_{t+1}|I_t)$ of these $N$ assets. Unconditional mean stock returns cannot be estimated with precision due to the volatility of long-lived asset returns and the estimation of conditional means adds further complications. Unconditional return variances and covariances are measured with greater precision but the curse of dimensionality associated with the estimation of the inverse of the conditional covariance matrix limits asset menus to ten or twenty assets at most — a number far fewer than the number of securities in typical managed portfolios.

This is one reason why benchmark portfolios are frequently specified in advance according to an asset pricing theory. In particular, most asset pricing theories imply that intertemporal marginal rates of substitution are linear combinations of particular portfolios. The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM implies that $m_{t+1}$ is linear in the return of the market portfolio of all risky assets.
In the consumption CAPM, the single index is the portfolio with returns that are maximally correlated with aggregate consumption growth, sometimes raised to some power. Other asset pricing models imply that $m_{t+1}$ is linear in the returns of other portfolios. In the CAPM with nontraded assets, the market portfolio is augmented with the portfolio of traded assets with returns that are maximally correlated with nontraded asset returns. The indices in the intertemporal CAPM are the market portfolio plus portfolios with returns that are maximally correlated with the state variables presumed to drive changes in the investment opportunity set. The APT also specifies that $m_{t+1}$ is (approximately) linear in the returns of several portfolios, well-diversified portfolios that are presumed to account for the bulk of the (perhaps conditional) covariation among asset returns.

In practice, chosen benchmarks typically reflect the empirical state of asset pricing theory and constraints on available data. For example, we do not observe the returns of “all risky assets” — that is, aggregate wealth — but stock market wealth in the form of the S&P 500 and the CRSP value-weighted index is observable and, at one time, appeared to price most assets pretty well. Before that, the single index market model was used to justify using the CRSP equally-weighted index as a market proxy while the APT motivates the use of multiple well-diversified portfolios. The empirical success of models like the three-factor Fama-French model — a market proxy along with size and market-to-book portfolios as benchmarks — and, more recently, the putatively anomalous returns to momentum portfolios, have been added to the mix as a fourth factor.

Irrespective of the formal justification, such benchmarks take the form of a weighted average of returns on a set of factors, $f_{kt+1}$:

$$m_{t+1} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \omega_{kt} f_{kt+1},$$

where this relation differs from the projection (2) in having no error term. That is, the stochastic discount factor is assumed to be an exact linear combination of observables. In the case of the multifactor benchmarks, the weights are usually treated as unknowns to be estimated, as is the case with portfolio $\delta$ save for the fact that there are only $K$ weights to be estimated in this case. This circumstance arises because most multifactor models, both the APT and the ad hoc models like the Fama-French model, do not specify the values of risk premiums, which are intimately related to the weights $\omega_{kt}$. In contrast, equilibrium models do typically specify the relevant risk premiums and, implicitly, the weights $\omega_{kt}$. For example, letting $R_{mt+1}$ be the return on the market portfolio,
the stochastic discount factor in the CAPM is given by:

\[ m_{t+1} = \frac{1 - E[R_{mt+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t]|R_{mt+1} - E(R_{mt+1}|I_t)]}{R_{ft+1}} \]  

(9)

As noted by Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982), the CAPM implicitly places constraints on the sample space of market returns \( R_{mt+1} \): the stochastic discount factor must be positive and so \( E[R_{mt+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t]|R_{mt+1} - E(R_{mt+1}|I_t) < 1 \) must hold for all dates and states.

Another source of benchmark portfolios arises from specification of determinants of the betas computed with respect to portfolio \( \delta \). At various times, security characteristics like firm value, the ratio of market to book equity, price-earnings and price-dividend ratios, momentum variables, alternative leverage ratios and such have been thought of as cross-sectional determinants of expected stock returns. To see how \textit{a priori} specification of the determinants of betas facilitates the identification of benchmark portfolios, let \( Z_t \) denote an \( N \times M \) matrix, the rows of which consist of vectors \( z_{it} \) comprised of attributes of the \( i \)th security. Consider the population projection of \( \beta_{\delta t} \) on \( Z_t \) in the cross-section

\[ \beta_{\delta t} = Z_t \Pi_{\delta t} + \eta_{\delta t}, \]  

(10)

and substitute this projection into the return equation

\[ R_{t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1} = \beta_{\delta t}(R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{\delta t+1} \]

\[ = (Z_t \Pi_{\delta t} + \eta_{\delta t})(R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{\delta t+1} \]

\[ = Z_t \lambda_{zt+1} + \upsilon_{t+1}, \]  

(11)

where \( \lambda_{zt+1} = \Pi_{\delta t}(R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) \) and \( \upsilon_{t+1} = \eta_{\delta t}(R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{\delta t+1} \). Since \( Z_t \) is orthogonal to \( \eta_{\delta t} \) by construction, \( Z_t \) will be orthogonal to \( \eta_{\delta t}(R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) \) if the elements of \( \eta_{\delta t} \) are uncorrelated with the risk premium \( E[R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}|I_t] \). Hence, the returns of portfolio \( \delta \) are a linear combination of returns to security characteristics that can be estimated via cross-sectional regression of \( R_{t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1} \) on \( Z_t \) when the risk premium of portfolio \( \delta \) is uncorrelated with the unmodeled changes in betas computed with respect to it.

2.2 A First Pass at Performance Measurement

What does all of this have to do with portfolio performance measurement? To answer this, consider a portfolio manager who manages a portfolio called \( p \) that is comprised of these \( N \) assets. The
manager uses information $I_{pt}$ to choose the weights $\omega_{pt}$. Suppose that the information available to the manager is contained in the investor’s information set $I_t$ (i.e., $I_{pt} \subseteq I_t$). Would an investor whose portfolio holdings have been chosen to satisfy the marginal conditions $E[m_{t+1}R_{t+1}|I_t] = 1$ find it desirable to divert some of the investment in the original $N$ assets to this managed portfolio? The answer is clearly no: the investor could have chosen $\omega_{pt}$ as part of the original portfolio since $\omega_{pt} \in I_{pt} \subseteq I_t$, since

$$E[m_{t+1}R_{pt+1}|I_t] = E[m_{t+1}\omega_{pt}R_{t+1}|I_t] = \omega_{pt}E[m_{t+1}R_{t+1}|I_t] = 1.$$  \hfill (12)

Now consider the case in which the manager has access to information not available to the investor so that $w_{pt} \notin I_{pt} \subseteq I_t$. In this case, the Euler equation need not hold — that is, $E[m_{t+1}R_{pt+1}|I_t]$ need not equal one — if the information is available to investors only through the managed portfolio $p$.

In particular, consider the (conditional) population projection of $R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}$ on $R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}$ and a constant:

$$R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{pt+1},$$  \hfill (13)

where $\alpha_{pt}$ and $\beta_{pt}$ are conditioned on $I_t$, the information available to the investor and not the potentially richer information in the hands of the portfolio manager. Now consider the Euler equation for $p$ evaluated at the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (or, equivalently, the stochastic discount factor) after $p$ has been added to the asset menu:

$$0 = E[m_{t+1}(R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1})|I_t] = E[m_{t+1}(\alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{pt+1})|I_t]$$

$$= R_{ft+1}^{-1}\alpha_{pt} + E[m_{t+1}\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t]$$  \hfill (14)

which implies that

$$\alpha_{pt} = -R_{ft+1}E[m_{t+1}\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t]$$  \hfill (15)

Large values of $\alpha_{pt}$ imply correspondingly large values of $E[m_{t+1}\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t]$, suggesting correspondingly large gains from adding $p$ to the asset menu in terms of hedging fluctuations in marginal utilities. Put differently, $\delta_{pt}$, the coefficient on $R_{pt+1}$ from the (conditional) population regression of $m_{t+1}$ on $R_{t+1}$ and $R_{pt+1}$, is given by:

$$\delta_{pt} = \frac{E[\varepsilon_{mt+1}\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t]}{Var(\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t)} = \frac{E[m_{t+1}\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t]}{Var(\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t)} = -\frac{\alpha_{pt}}{R_{ft+1}Var(\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t)}$$  \hfill (16)
from the usual omitted variables formula. Large values of $\delta_{pt}$ also imply better marginal utility hedging and $\delta_{pt}$ will be nonzero if and only if $\alpha_{pt}$ is nonzero.

The regression intercept $\alpha_{pt}$ is called the conditional Jensen measure in the performance evaluation literature, the unconditional version of which was introduced in Jensen (1968, 1969). It has a simple interpretation as the return on a particular zero net investment portfolio: that obtained by purchasing one dollar of portfolio $p$ and financing this acquisition by borrowing $1 - \beta_{pt}$ dollars at the riskless rate and by selling $\beta_{pt}$ dollars of portfolio $\delta$ short. The Sharpe ratio of this portfolio is

$$\frac{\alpha_{pt}}{\sqrt{\text{Var}(\varepsilon_{pt+1}|I_t)}}$$

which is proportional to the $t-$statistic for the difference of $\alpha_{pt}$ from zero (the Sharpe ratio of any zero net investment portfolio is its expected payoff scaled by the standard deviation of its payoff). This Sharpe ratio is called the Treynor-Black (1973) appraisal ratio.

This role for the regression intercept also suggests that performance evaluation via Jensen measures is fraught with hazard. A nonzero value of $\alpha_{pt}$ could also reflect benchmark error. That is, $\alpha_{pt}$ would typically be nonzero if portfolio $\delta$ is not (conditionally) mean-variance efficient even if the portfolio manager has no superior information and skill. Hence, it is often difficult to tell if one is learning about the quality of the manager or the quality of the benchmark when examining Jensen regressions. This is why the strictly correct interpretation of nonzero intercepts is that the mean-variance trade-off based on portfolio $\delta$ and the riskless asset can be improved by augmenting the asset menu to include portfolio $p$ as well, not that the managed portfolio outperforms the benchmark.

As noted earlier, portfolio $\delta$ might include or exclude portfolio $p$. The exclusion of portfolio $p$ from the asset menu corresponds to a thought experiment in which hypothetical investors with no investment in this portfolio are using portfolio $\delta$ to evaluate the consequences of adding a small amount of portfolio $p$ to the asset menu. Similarly, the inclusion of portfolio $p$ in the asset menu used to construct portfolio $\delta$ corresponds to a thought experiment in which hypothetical investors who have a position in portfolio $p$ are assessing whether they have invested the correct amount in

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5Interestingly, Jensen did not motivate the use of the CRSP equally-weighted portfolio solely by reference to the CAPM. He coupled this justification with the observation that its returns would well approximate the returns on aggregate wealth if returns follow a single factor model, implicitly making his reasoning a progenitor of one factor versions of the equilibrium APT.
it. In the language of hypothesis testing, the former approach corresponds to a Lagrange multiplier
test of the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance while the latter corresponds to a Wald test
when testing the hypothesis that the weight on \( p \) should be zero. The pervasive adoption of the
former approach in the performance evaluation literature probably reflects general skepticism in
the profession on the economic value of active management. It is as though we believe that asset
prices are set in an efficient market but that the market for active managers who earn abnormal
fees is inefficient.

Finally, the Sharpe ratio to which we referred above represents a non-benchmark-based approach
to performance measurement. In its conditional form, the Sharpe ratio of portfolio \( p \) is given by:

\[
\frac{E[R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t]}{\sqrt{\text{Var}[R_{pt+1}|I_t]}}
\]

which is the conditional mean return divided by its standard deviation of a dollar invested in
portfolio \( p \) that is financed by borrowing a dollar at the riskless rate. The Sharpe ratio got its
start in Sharpe (1966) as a simple and intuitive measure of how far a given portfolio was from the
mean/variance efficient frontier.

Over time, it has become clear that the measurement of the distance between a given portfolio
and the mean/variance efficient frontier is quite a bit more subtle, involving Jensen’s alpha in an
unexpected way (see, for example, Jobson and Korkie (1982) and Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989)). We noted earlier that \( \alpha_{pt} \) is the expected return of a portfolio that is long one dollar of
portfolio \( p \) and short \( \beta_{pt} \) dollars of portfolio \( \delta \) and \( 1 - \beta_{pt} \) dollars of the riskless asset, which makes
it a costless and zero beta portfolio. As such, it is a means to get to the mean/variance efficient
frontier through a suitable combination of the \( N \) given assets, the riskless asset, and this costless
zero beta portfolio. This reasoning extends to \( M \) additional managed portfolios in a straightforward
way.

This has left the Sharpe ratio in a sort of intellectual limbo. The simple intuition has survived
and the practitioner literature and, perhaps more importantly, performance measurement in prac-
tice often refers to the Sharpe ratio. It has fallen out of fashion in the academic literature since we
now understand its deficiencies much better. It is simply not the case that managed portfolio \( A \) is
better than \( B \) if its Sharpe ratio is higher because the distance to the frontier depends on portfolio
alphas and residual variances and covariances, not on the mean and variance of overall portfolio
returns. Benchmark-based performance measurement is the focus of the academic literature and practitioners who use Sharpe ratios generally do so in conjunction with Jensen alphas, often under the rubric of tracking error.

3 Performance Measurement and Market Timing

The conditional Jensen regression (13) differs from the original in Jensen (1968, 1969) in only two details: the Jensen alpha $\alpha_{pt}$ and portfolio beta $\beta_{pt}$ are conditional and not unconditional moments and the benchmark portfolio is $\delta$ and not "the market portfolio of all risky assets" underlying the CAPM. There is an important commonality with the original since it is natural to decompose returns into two components, that related to benchmark or market returns — that is, $\beta_{pt}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})$ — and that unrelated to them — that is, $\alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1}$. By analogy with the older parlance, we can term the first component the return to market timing and, under this interpretation, the second component must reflect the rewards to security selection. The distinction between market timing and security selection permeates both the academic and practitioner literatures on performance attribution and evaluation.

The impact of real or imagined market timing ability on performance measurement depends on whether the return generating process experiences time variation. That is, the benchmark beta $\beta_{pt}$ might change because of time-variation in individual security betas and not because the manager is attempting to time the market. Similarly, the expected returns of portfolio $p$ might also change if $E[R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t]$ varied over time. Moreover, the manager might choose to make portfolio betas shift along with changes in benchmark portfolio volatility or other higher moments. Accordingly, we must distinguish between the case in which excess benchmark returns are serially independent from the perspective of uninformed portfolio managers from those in which there is serial dependence (predictability) based on public information.

Accordingly, consider first the case in which the manager of portfolio $p$ does not attempt to time the market and the conditional benchmark risk premium is time invariant — that is, $E[R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t] = E[R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}]$. Since the fund has a constant target beta $\beta_{p}$, the original unconditional Jensen regression:

$$R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + \beta_{p}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

is related to that from the conditional Jensen regression (13) via:
\[ \epsilon_{pt+1} = \alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p + \epsilon_{pt+1} \]  
(18)

where \( \alpha_p \equiv E[\alpha_{pt}] \) is the unconditional Jensen performance measure. This is a perfectly well-posed regression with potentially serially correlated and heteroskedastic disturbances, although there are economic settings in which market efficiency requires \( \alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p \) to be unpredictable. Hence, one can estimate \( \alpha_p \) and \( \beta_p \) consistently in these circumstances and so the Jensen measure correctly measures the rewards to security selection.

Unsuccessful market timing efforts complicate performance attribution, but not performance measurement per se, when expected excess benchmark returns are constant. If the manager shifts betas but has no market timing ability, the composite error \( \epsilon_{pt+1} \) in the population is now given by:

\[ \epsilon_{pt+1} = \alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p + (\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1} \]  
(19)

which has unconditional mean zero because:

\[
E[\epsilon_{pt+1}] = E[\alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p + (\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}]
= E[(\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})]
= Cov[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}]
\]
(20)

is equal to zero unless the manager has market timing ability. Once again, the unconditional Jensen regression will yield consistent estimates of the unconditional beta \( \beta_p \) and Jensen measure \( \alpha_p \). The residual, however, is no longer solely a reflection of the security selection component of returns.

Problems crop up when managers engage in efforts to time the market and they are successful (on average) in doing so. Once again, the unconditional Jensen measure is given by (17):

\[
\alpha_p = E[R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} - \beta_p(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})]
= E[\alpha_{pt} + (\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}]
= E[\alpha_{pt}] + Cov[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}]
\]

\[ \text{is conditionally heteroskedastic and, perhaps, serially correlated due to the } \alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p \text{ and } (\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \text{ terms suggests that some structure might be placed on their stochastic properties to draw inferences about their behavior. An example of this sort is presented in the next section.} \]
so that the sign and magnitude of the unconditional alpha depends on the way in which the manager exploits market timing ability. The coefficient $\alpha_p$ will measure the reward to security selection only if the manager uses this skill to give the portfolio a constant beta, in which case $\epsilon_{pt+1}$ correctly measures the return to security selection.

Otherwise, the Jensen measure will reflect both market timing and security selection ability when managers are successful market timers, thus breaking the clean decomposition of returns into security selection and market timing. The Jensen alpha will be positive if the manager uses market timing to improve portfolio performance — that is, to have a higher expected return than that which can be gained solely from security selection ability — by setting $\text{Cov}[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}] > 0$ but the Jensen measure alone cannot be used to decompose performance into market timing and security selection components. Similarly, market timing efforts can yield a negative Jensen alpha when the manager tries to make the fund countercyclical by setting $\text{Cov}[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}] < 0$. This last possibility is not a pathological special case: managers with market timing ability who minimize portfolio variance for a given level of unconditional expected excess returns will tend to have portfolio betas that are negatively correlated with benchmark risk premiums. The observation that a negative estimate of Jensen’s alpha can result from market timing skills has been made by, *inter alia*, Jensen (1972), Admati and Ross (1985) and Dybvig and Ross (1985).

Performance measurement and attribution is even more complicated when there is serial dependence in returns from the perspective of managers without market timing ability. The reason is obvious: such managers can make their betas dependent on conditional expected excess benchmark returns. That is, managed portfolios can have time-varying expected returns and betas conditional on public information, not just private information. In particular, $\text{Cov}[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}]$ need not be zero even in the absence of market timing ability since:

$$
\text{Cov}[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}] = E[(\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) - E(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t)]]
+ E[(\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)[E(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t) - E(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})]] \\
= \text{Cov}[\beta_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t] + \text{Cov}[\beta_{pt}, E(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t)]
$$

(21)

can be nonzero both in the presence of market timing ability, which makes the first term nonzero, and of portfolio betas that are correlated with shifts in the benchmark risk premium, which makes the second term nonzero. Once again, there is no simple decomposition of portfolio returns into security selection and market timing components based on managed portfolio returns alone when
returns are predictable on the basis of public information.

Successful market timing and, to a lesser extent, serial dependence in returns engenders more than just problems with the measurement of security selection and market timing ability per se. First, the distinction between conditional and unconditional moments is a subtle and important one. Successful market timers may produce portfolios with superior conditional risk/reward ratios that appear to be inferior when viewed unconditionally. After all, an informed manager will of necessity substantially alter the composition of their portfolios when their information warrants doing so while their uninformed counterparts are staying the course, giving the return of the actively managed portfolio appear to be more volatile to the uninformed eye. Reaction to public information that changes the conditional mean and covariance structure of returns can do so as well. Second, this volatility created by successful active management makes for decidedly non-normal returns. The beta of a successful market timer will be correlated with the subsequent benchmark return. Even if benchmark returns are normally distributed, the product of the benchmark return and the beta with which it is correlated will not be normally distributed. In some of the models in the next section, benchmark returns are normally distributed and betas are linear in benchmark returns, resulting in managed portfolio returns that are the sum of normally distributed and chi-squared distributed terms. The latter are skewed to the right and bounded from below. For both kinds of reasons, portfolio means and variances are not "sufficient statistics" for the return distributions produced by the portfolio manager.

3.1 Alternative Models of Market Timing

Since market timing complicates performance measurement and attribution, it is perhaps unsurprising that methods for dealing with it have been one of the main preoccupations of the literature. These come in two basic flavors: simple modifications of the Jensen regression to deal with successful market timing and the time-varying expected returns and models in which signals to informed managers are drawn from analytically convenient distributions. We discuss these issues in turn.

As it happens, it is possible to improve on the Jensen regression in a very simple way. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) pointed to an adjustment to deal with potential market timing ability by asking a simple question: when will market timing be most profitable relative to a benchmark? Their answer was equally simple: market timers will profit both when returns are large and positive and when they are large and negative if they increase betas when they expect the market to rise and
shrink or choose negative betas when they expect the market to fall. Since squared returns will be large in both circumstances, modifying the Jensen regression to include squared benchmark returns can facilitate the measurement of both market timing and security selection ability.

Accordingly, consider the Treynor-Mazuy quadratic regression:

\[
R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = a_p + b_0 p(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}) + b_1 p(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 + \zeta_{pt+1}
\]

and suppose that the manager has a constant unconditional beta \( \beta_p \), so that \( \beta_{pt} = \beta_p + \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \) is a choice variable for the manager and not the conditional beta based on public information as in (13). Substitution of this variant of the conditional Jensen regression into the normal equations for the quadratic regression reveals that the unconditional projection coefficients \( b_0 p \) and \( b_1 p \) are given by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  b_0 p \\
  b_1 p \\
\end{pmatrix} = 
\begin{pmatrix}
  Var\left(\frac{R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2}\right) \quad Cov\left(\frac{R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2}, \sigma_{3\delta} - \sigma_{4\delta} \right)
\end{pmatrix}^{-1}
\begin{pmatrix}
  Cov\left[R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}, \sigma_{3\delta} - \sigma_{4\delta}\right] \\
  Cov\left[\alpha_{pt}, \sigma_{3\delta} - \sigma_{4\delta}\right] \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
  \beta_p \\
  0 \\
\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}
  1 \\
  \sigma_{3\delta}^2 \sigma_{4\delta} - \sigma_{4\delta}^2 \\
  -\sigma_{4\delta} \sigma_{4\delta} \\
  \sigma_{4\delta}^2 \\
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
  Cov[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2] + Cov[\alpha_{pt}, R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}] \\
  Cov[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^3] + Cov[\alpha_{pt}, (R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2] \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
\equiv \begin{pmatrix}
  \beta_p \\
  0 \\
\end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix}
  \gamma_{0p} \\
  \gamma_{1p} \\
\end{pmatrix},
\tag{22}
\]

where \( \sigma_{3\delta} \) and \( \sigma_{4\delta} \) are the unconditional skewness and kurtosis of excess benchmark returns, respectively. Similarly, the quadratic regression intercept \( a_p \) is given by:

\[
a_p = \alpha_p + Cov[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}] - \gamma_{0p} E[R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}] - \gamma_{1p} E[(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2].
\tag{23}
\]

As was the case earlier, it is convenient to separate the analysis into two cases: that in which excess benchmark returns are serially independent and that in which they are serially dependent. We discuss these cases in turn.

Before doing so, however, we must address the role of \( \alpha_{pt} \) in understanding market timing skills. To the best of our knowledge, no paper in the performance evaluation literature has contemplated the possibility that the conditional Jensen measure \( \alpha_{pt} \) is correlated with the conditional moments

\footnote{The target beta could be time-varying as long as its value is known by uninformed investors.}
of future excess benchmark returns, probably because selection skills have been thought to deliver, at best, constant expected returns and not because there are economic reasons for thinking that security selection prospects are not correlated with fluctuations in benchmark volatility and skewness. A better reason for assuming that these correlations are zero is implicit in the observation that security selection is a zero beta trading activity, suggesting that active managers would probably control the portfolio beta so as to make it so. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suppose the covariance terms involving $\alpha_{pt}$ are equal to zero in what follows.

That said, these relations conceal a somewhat surprising result when excess benchmark returns are serially independent. In this case, the two bias terms are given by:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\gamma_{0p} \\
\gamma_{1p}
\end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{\sigma_5 \sigma_{45} - \sigma_{35} \sigma_{43}} \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma_{45} & -\sigma_{35} \\
-\sigma_{35} & \sigma_3^2
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{ft+1} - R_{ft+1})^2] \\
\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{ft+1} - R_{ft+1})^3]
\end{pmatrix}
$$

which will be nonzero only if $\xi_{\beta_{pt}}$ is correlated with next period’s square and/or cubed excess returns, except for singularities in these equations. That is, only a manager who possesses market timing ability can shift portfolio betas in this fashion. Unfortunately, this ability to detect market timing does not translate into clean measures of market timing ability because the beta shifts cannot be inferred from returns alone without further assumptions. One simply cannot separately identify the three moments related to systematic risk exposure — that is, $\bar{p}_p$, $\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{ft+1} - R_{ft+1})^2]$, and $\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{ft+1} - R_{ft+1})^3]$ — from $b_{0p}$ and $b_{1p}$ alone without additional restrictions.

### 3.1.1 Gaussian Signals and Returns

Admati et al. (1986) put additional structure on the problem to measure market timing ability within this framework. They assume that the manager observes excess benchmark returns with error and that both the signal and benchmark returns are normally distributed. They show that $b_{1p}$ equals the ratio of the risk aversion parameter to the variance of the noise of the market timing signal under these assumptions. They then observe that the residual from the Treynor-Mazuy regression has conditional heteroskedasticity related to excess benchmark returns. They show that the coefficient from the regression of $\zeta_{pt+1}^2$ on $(R_{ft+1} - R_{ft+1})^2$ is equal to the ratio of the squared risk
aversion parameter to the variance of the noise of the market timing signal, which they can use in conjunction with $b_{1p}$ to disentangle the two. Finally, they note that a nonzero intercept will correctly indicate the presence of security selection ability under their assumptions but that its quality cannot be determined since it can only be used to measure the sum $\alpha_p + \text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_p}, R_{st+1} - R_{ft+1}]$ and not its components.

One can gain additional insight into the Treynor-Mazuy regression by reparameterizing the problem slightly. In particular, substitute the unconditional projection of excess benchmark returns on $\xi_{\beta_p}$:

$$R_{st+1} - R_{ft+1} = \mu_\delta + \pi_p \xi_{\beta_p} + v_{st+1}$$  \hfill{(24)}

into the bias terms:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \gamma_{0p} \\ \gamma_{1p} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta^2} \left( \begin{array}{cc} \sigma_\delta \quad -\sigma_3 \\ -\sigma_3 \quad \sigma_\delta^2 \end{array} \right) \left( \begin{array}{c} \pi_p^3 \sigma_\delta \xi + \pi_p \mu_\delta \sigma_\delta^2 + E[\xi_{\beta_p} v_{st+1}^2] \\ \pi_p^3 \sigma_\delta \xi + \mu_\delta \pi_p^2 \sigma_\delta \xi + \pi_p \text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_p}^2, v_{st+1}^2] + 2\pi_p E[\xi_{\beta_p}^2 v_{st+1}^2] + \mu_\delta \text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_p}^2, v_{st+1}^2] \end{array} \right).$$  \hfill{(25)}

As is readily apparent, one determinant of the complexity of the inference problem is the possibility of conditional heteroskedasticity in the projection relating \textit{ex post} excess benchmark returns to beta shifts. In the absence of such dependence, the bias terms reduce to:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \gamma_{0p} \\ \gamma_{1p} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta^2} \left( \begin{array}{cc} \sigma_\delta \quad -\sigma_3 \\ -\sigma_3 \quad \sigma_\delta^2 \end{array} \right) \left( \begin{array}{c} \pi_p^3 \sigma_\delta \xi + \pi_p \mu_\delta \sigma_\delta^2 \\ \pi_p^3 \sigma_\delta \xi + \mu_\delta \pi_p^2 \sigma_\delta \xi + 2\pi_p \sigma_\delta \sigma_\xi^2 \end{array} \right).$$

This is further simplified if normality of $\xi_{\beta_p}$ and $v_{st+1}$ is assumed along the lines of Admati et al (1986). Normality simplifies matters considerably, the resulting symmetry implying that $\sigma_3 = \sigma_\xi = 0$ and the absence of excess kurtosis leading to $\sigma_\delta = 3\sigma_\delta^4$ and $\sigma_\xi = 3\sigma_\xi^4$. Under these conditions, the bias terms are given by:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \gamma_{0p} \\ \gamma_{1p} \end{pmatrix} = \left( \begin{array}{c} \mu_\delta \pi_p^2 \sigma_\delta^4 \\ \pi_p^3 \sigma_\delta^2 \end{array} \right) = \left( \begin{array}{c} \mu_\delta \pi_p^2 \sigma_\delta^4 \\ \pi_p \frac{\sigma_\xi^4}{\sigma_\delta^4} + \frac{2\pi_p^2 \sigma_\xi^2}{3 \sigma_\delta^4} \end{array} \right),$$

where $\theta_p = \pi_p \sigma_\xi^2 = \text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_p}, R_{st+1} - R_{ft+1}]$ is the bias term preventing estimation of Jensen’s alpha in the Jensen regression. The Treynor-Mazuy intercept is biased as well: while $\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_p}, R_{st+1} - R_{ft+1}]$ is positive in this model, so are $\gamma_{0p}$ and $\gamma_{1p}$ and, hence, $\alpha_p$ is of unknown sign.
Next we exploit the conditional heteroskedasticity in the quadratic regression residual. In our notation, the residual is given by:

\[ \zeta_{pt+1} = (\xi_{\beta pt} - \gamma_0)(\pi_p \xi_{\beta pt} + \nu_{\delta t+1}) - \pi_p \sigma_\xi^2 + \mu_\delta \xi_{\beta pt} - b_{1p}[(\pi_p \xi_{\beta pt} + \nu_{\delta t+1})^2 - \sigma_\beta^2] + \epsilon_{pt+1}, \]  

when \( \alpha_{pt} = \alpha_p \) and there is conditional heteroskedasticity in the Treynor-Mazuy regression related to excess benchmark returns as was observed by Admati et al. (1986). Consider the population value of the squared quadratic regression residual on excess benchmark returns and their squares:

\[ \zeta_{pt+1}^2 = \kappa_0 + \tau_{0p}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \tau_{1p}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 + \eta_{pt+1} \]

which differs from Admati et al. (1986) in the inclusion of \( R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} \) on the right hand side. An exceptionally tedious calculation reveals that \( \tau_{1p} \) and \( \tau_{2p} \) are given by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\tau_{0p} \\
\tau_{1p}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
2\mu_\delta \sigma_\xi^2 - 2\mu_\delta \frac{\pi_p^2 \sigma_\xi^4}{\sigma_\beta^2} \\
\frac{2}{3}[4\gamma_{1p}^2 \sigma_\delta^2 - 8\gamma_{1p} \pi_p \sigma_\xi^2 + \sigma_\xi^2 + 3 \frac{\pi_p^2 \sigma_\xi^4}{\sigma_\beta^2}]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where \( \tau_{0p} \) is also given by \( 2\mu_\delta \sigma_\xi^2 (1 - R_\delta^2) \) where \( R_\delta^2 \) is the coefficient from the projection of \( R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} \) on \( \xi_{\beta pt} \) (i.e., equation (24)). These quadratic equations can be solved for \( \sigma_\xi^2 \) and \( \theta_p \) in yet another tedious calculation. The two solutions are given by:

\[
\theta_p = \gamma_{1p}^2 \sigma_\xi^2 \pm \frac{\sqrt{\gamma_{1p}^2 \sigma_\xi^2 \mu_\delta^3 (3\mu_\delta \tau_{1p} - \tau_{0p})}}{2\sqrt{2}\mu_\delta}
\]

\[
\sigma_\xi^2 = \gamma_{1p}^2 \sigma_\delta^2 + \frac{3}{8\mu_\delta} (\mu_\delta \tau_{1p} + \tau_{0p}) \pm \frac{\sqrt{\gamma_{1p}^2 \sigma_\xi^2 \mu_\delta^3 (3\mu_\delta \tau_{1p} - \tau_{0p})}}{2\sqrt{2}\mu_\delta}
\]

The remaining parameters are now easily obtained by noting that \( \pi_p = \frac{\theta_p}{\sigma_\xi} \) and obtaining \( \beta_p \) and \( \alpha_p \) substituting \( \theta_p \) into (26). In addition, \( \gamma_{1p} \) is completely determined by \( \pi_p \) and \( \theta_p \) and so there is a cross-equation restriction relating \( b_{1p}, \tau_{0p}, \) and \( \tau_{1p} \) that can be tested using the appropriate \( \chi^2 \) statistic.

Despite the need for making strong assumptions to arrive at these results, it is remarkable that we can infer a range of economically interesting parameters from a set of simple, conditionally heteroskedastic regressions.
Matters are more complicated still when returns are serially dependent. The first point echoes one made in the previous section: time variation in expected returns can make a portfolio manager without skill look like a successful market timer. That is, the covariance terms:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2] \\
\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^3]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2|I_t]] + \text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2|I_t] \\
\text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^3|I_t]] + \text{Cov}[\xi_{\beta_{pt}}, (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^3|I_t]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

can be nonzero in the absence of true market timing ability when there is serial dependence in excess returns since $\xi_{\beta_{pt}}$ can be chosen by the manager to move with $E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2|I_t]$ and $E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^3|I_t]$.

Hence, it is no longer the case that $b_{1p} ≠ 0$ only if the manager possesses market timing ability.

Little can be done about this problem without a priori information on time variation in the distribution of excess benchmark returns. Suppose we know both the conditional mean and variance of excess benchmark returns, perhaps in the form of models of the form $\mu_{\delta t} = E[R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}|I_t] = f(z_t, \theta)$ and $\sigma^2_{\delta t} = E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^2|I_t] = g(z_t, \theta)$ where $z_t ∈ I_t$ and $\theta$ is a vector of unknown parameters. Rewrite the Treynor-Mazuy quadratic regression with the linear and quadratic terms in deviations from conditional means:

\[
R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = E_p + b_{0p}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t}) + b_{1p}[E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^2 - \sigma^2_{\delta t}] + \zeta_{pt+1}
\]

where $E_p$ is the unconditional mean return of the managed portfolio. Similarly, rewrite the unconditional projection (24) in terms of $R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t}$:

\[
R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} = \mu_{\delta t} + \pi^*_p(\xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu^*_{\delta t+1}
\]

where the projection coefficient $\pi^*_p$ generally being different from $\pi_p$ since $\mu_{\delta}$ is replaced by $\mu_{\delta t}$ in this projection. In these circumstances, managed portfolio returns are given by:

\[
R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{pt+1}
\]

\[
= \alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(\mu_{\delta} + \pi^*_p(\xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu^*_{\delta t+1}) + [\beta_{pt}(\mu_{\delta} - \mu_{\delta t})] + \varepsilon_{pt+1},
\]

where the term in square brackets – that is, $\beta_{pt}(\mu_{\delta} - \mu_{\delta t})$ – is the additional variable present in this conditional Jensen regression over that in the independently distributed case. Hence, the additional, a manager with true selection skill can appear to be a market timer as well since $\text{Cov}(\alpha_{pt}, E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2|I_t])$ and $\text{Cov}(\alpha_{pt}, E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^3|I_t])$ can be nonzero as well. Our earlier argument suggests that we should not be so concerned about spurious market timing measures from this source.

---

9: In addition, a manager with true selection skill can appear to be a market timer as well since $\text{Cov}(\alpha_{pt}, E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2|I_t])$ and $\text{Cov}(\alpha_{pt}, E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^3|I_t])$ can be nonzero as well. Our earlier argument suggests that we should not be so concerned about spurious market timing measures from this source.
quadratic regression coefficients are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\begin{pmatrix} b_{0p}^* \\ b_{1p}^* \end{pmatrix} &= \left( \text{Var} \left( \frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2} \right) \right)^{-1} \text{Cov} \left[ R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}, \frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^2 - \sigma_{\delta t}^2} \right] \\
&= \left( \text{Var} \left( \frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2} \right) \right)^{-1} \times \\
E [\alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(\mu_{\delta t} + \pi_p^{*} \xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu_{\delta t+1}^*) + \varepsilon_{pt+1}] \left( \frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^2 - \sigma_{\delta t}^2} \right) \\
&+ \left( \text{Var} \left( \frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2} \right) \right)^{-1} \times \\
E \left[ \beta_{pt}(\mu_{\delta t} - \mu_{\delta}) \left( \frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^2 - \sigma_{\delta t}^2} \right) \right] \\
&= \left( \beta_p \right) + \frac{1}{\sigma^2_{\delta} \sigma^2_{\delta t} - \sigma_{\delta t}^2 \sigma_{\delta}^2} \begin{pmatrix} \bar{\sigma}_{\delta} & -\bar{\sigma}_{\delta t} \\ -\bar{\sigma}_{\delta t} & \bar{\sigma}_{\delta}^2 \end{pmatrix} \times \\
E \left[ \xi_{\beta_{pt}}(\mu_{\delta t} + \pi_p^{*} \xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu_{\delta t+1}^*) \left( \frac{\pi_p^{*} \xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu_{\delta t+1}^*}{(\pi_p^{*} \xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu_{\delta t+1}^*)^2 - \sigma_{\delta t}^2} \right) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

where the bars over the variance and covariance terms represents the unconditional expectation of the corresponding time-varying conditional moments. While this expression bears a formal resemblance to (22), it is still potentially corrupted with spurious market timing both because \( \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \) is uncorrelated with \( \nu_{\delta t+1}^* \) but need not be independent of it and because \( \xi_{\beta_{pt}}^2 \) and \( \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \nu_{\delta t+1}^* \) can be correlated with \( \mu_{\delta t} \) as well. Accounting for the serial dependence in excess benchmark returns alone is insufficient to solve the problem posed by spurious market timing.

One way out of this conundrum is to break the beta shift terms \( \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \) into two components, one that reflects the expected portfolio beta given public information and another that represents the manager’s market timing efforts beyond that which can be accounted for with public information. Put differently, we took the target beta to be constant earlier but we could just as easily have made it time-varying as in:

\[
\beta_{pt} = \bar{\beta}_p + \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \equiv \bar{\beta}_p + \varsigma_{\beta_{pt}} + \xi_{\beta_{pt}}
\]

(30)

where \( \varsigma_{\beta_{pt}} \) has mean zero conditional on public information \( I_t \). As was the case with \( \mu_{\delta t} \) and \( \sigma_{\delta t}^2 \), we will treat \( \varsigma_{\beta_{pt}} \) as an observable even though it is modeled, usually as a projection on time \( t \) information, in actual practice. Measurement of this component of beta fluctuations eliminates
spurious market timing biases in the simple Jensen measure since:

\[ R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \beta_{\beta_{pt}}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{pt+1} \]  

(31)

and \( \alpha_p = E[\alpha_{pt}] \) and \( \beta_{pt} \) can be estimated without bias when the manager does not possess market timing ability and \( \beta_{\beta_{pt}}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \) is observed. The words "without bias" are replaced by "consistently" when \( \beta_{\beta_{pt}} \) is not observed but can be estimated consistently. Ferson and Schadt (1996) assume that both \( \beta_{pt} \) and \( \beta_{\beta_{pt}} \) are linear projections on conditioning information and study a version of the Treynor-Mazuy quadratic regression that takes the form:

\[ R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \beta_{\beta_{pt}}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + b^*_1 p(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 + \varepsilon_{pt+1} \]  

(32)

Similarly, we can refine the Treynor-Mazuy regressions while simultaneously weakening the assumption regarding the observability of replacing observation of \( \beta_{\beta_{pt}} \). In particular, augmenting the quadratic regression with the assumption that \( Cov[\beta_{\beta_{pt}}, \sigma^2_{\delta t}] = Cov[\beta_{\beta_{pt}}, \sigma_{3\delta t}] = 0 \) solves the market timing problem in that, since \( \beta_{\beta_{pt}} \) is in the time \( t \) public information set,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
    b^*_{0p} \\
    b^*_{1p}
\end{pmatrix} = \left[
\begin{array}{c}
    \text{Var}\left(\frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2}\right)
\end{array}\right]^{-1} \left[
\begin{array}{c}
    E\left[\beta_{\beta_{pt}}\right]E\left[\frac{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^2}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})^3}\right] | I_t \right]
\right.
\]

\[
\left. + \left[
\begin{array}{c}
    \text{Var}\left(\frac{R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}}{(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2}\right)
\end{array}\right]^{-1} \left[
\begin{array}{c}
    E\left[\xi_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}}\left(\mu_{\delta t} + \pi^p_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} + v_{\delta t+1}^*\right)\right] \left(\pi^p_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} + v_{\delta t+1}^*\right) \left(\pi^p_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} + v_{\delta t+1}^*\right)^2 - \sigma^2_{\delta t}\right]
\right]
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
    \beta_{pt} & 0 \\
    0 & \frac{1}{\sigma^2_{\delta t} - \sigma^2_{\delta t}} \left(\frac{\sigma_{4\delta}}{\sigma_{3\delta}} - \sigma_{3\delta}^2\right) \times \left[
    E\left[\xi_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}}\left(\mu_{\delta t} + \pi^p_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} + v_{\delta t+1}^*\right)\right] \left(\pi^p_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} + v_{\delta t+1}^*\right) \left(\pi^p_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} + v_{\delta t+1}^*\right)^2 - \sigma^2_{\delta t}\right]
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix}
    \beta_{pt} & 0 \\
    0 & \left(\frac{\gamma^*_{0p}}{\gamma^*_{1p}}\right)
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

In so doing, we have recovered the earlier result that \( b^*_{1p} = \gamma^*_{1p} \) will be nonzero if and only if the manager possesses market timing ability.

A few additional moment conditions will permit us to recover the results we obtained earlier for the case of serially independent returns. If the lack of correlation between \( \xi_{p,\beta_{\beta_{pt}}} \) and \( v_{\delta t+1}^* \) is
strengthened to independence, the bias terms reduce to:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\gamma_{0p}^* \\
\gamma_{1p}^*
\end{pmatrix} = \frac{1}{\bar{\sigma}^3_\delta - \bar{\sigma}^2_\delta} \begin{pmatrix}
\bar{\sigma}^4_\delta & -\bar{\sigma}^3_\delta \\
-\bar{\sigma}^3_\delta & \bar{\sigma}^2_\delta
\end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix}
\pi_p^2 \bar{\sigma}^3_\xi + \pi_p E[\mu_\delta \bar{\sigma}^2_\xi] \\
\pi_p^3 \bar{\sigma}^4_\xi + \pi_p^2 E[\mu_\delta \bar{\sigma}^3_\xi] + 2\pi_p E[\pi_p^2 \sigma^2_\omega \sigma^2_\upsilon]
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(33)

and so the bias terms are structurally identical to \(\gamma_{0p}\) and \(\gamma_{1p}\) if \(\mu_\delta\) is uncorrelated with \(\sigma^2_\xi\) and \(\sigma^2_\upsilon\) and if \(\sigma^2_\xi\) is uncorrelated with \(\sigma^2_\upsilon\). Similarly, normality of \(\xi_\beta_p\) and \(\upsilon_\delta t + 1\) further simplifies the bias terms to:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\gamma_{0p}^* \\
\gamma_{1p}^*
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
\bar{\mu}_\delta & \bar{\sigma}_p^2 \bar{\theta}_p \\
\pi_p^2 \bar{\sigma}^4_\xi & \pi_p^3 \bar{\sigma}^4_\xi + \pi_p^2 \bar{\sigma}^3_\xi + 2\pi_p \bar{\sigma}^2_\xi \bar{\theta}_p
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(34)

where \(\bar{\theta}_p = \pi_p \bar{\sigma}^2_\xi = Cov[\xi_\beta_p, R_\delta t + 1 - R_\upsilon t + 1]\) is the average bias term preventing consistent estimation of Jensen’s alpha. The conditional heteroskedasticity analysis goes through as written with starred and barred quantities once again replacing their unadorned counterparts.

### 3.1.2 Period Weighting Measures

Returning to the case of time invariant risk exposures and risk premiums, Grinblatt and Titman (1989) point to circumstances in which Jensen-like alphas will correctly signal the presence of managerial skill in a model with the same basic structure as Admati et al. (1986). A good starting point is the Jensen regression with time invariant alphas and betas. As is well known, the least squares estimator of the Jensen alpha is a linear combination of managed portfolio returns:

\[
\hat{\alpha}_p = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{\alpha t}(R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1})
\]

with weights that satisfy:

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{\alpha t} = 1
\]

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{\alpha t}(R_{\delta t + 1} - R_{\upsilon t + 1}) = 0.
\]

Grinblatt and Titman (1989) point out that the least squares weights are only one linear combination with these features: any intercept estimator based on weights that satisfy these constraints will provide an unbiased estimate of the regression intercept (which will generally not be equal to the Jensen alpha in the presence of market timing ability) as long as it has weights of order \(\frac{1}{T}\). They termed the estimators in this class period weighting measures because each of the weights...
\( \omega_{ct} \) gives potentially different weight to each observation and they searched for estimators that improve on the Jensen alpha under the normality assumptions made in Admati et al. (1986).

Period weighting measures are given by:

\[
\hat{\alpha}_p^{GT} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{ct} (R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{ct} [\alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{pt+1}]
\]

and their associated expectations \( \alpha_p^{GT} = E[\hat{\alpha}_p^{GT}] \) are given by:

\[
\alpha_p^{GT} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\omega_{ct} (\alpha_{pt} + \beta_{pt} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{pt+1})]
\]

Now suppose that the weights are chosen to be functions of the normally distributed excess benchmark returns alone. Uncorrelated random variables are independent under joint normality, so the first term is an unbiased estimate of the expected alpha as before because:

\[
\alpha_p^{GT} = \alpha_p + \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\omega_{ct} (\beta_{pt} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}))]
\]

as was the case for the Jensen measure. In this model, the bias term can be rewritten as:

\[
\alpha_p^{GT} = \alpha_p + \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\omega_{ct} \xi_{\beta pt} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})]
\]

because \( \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{ct} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) = 0 \). If, in addition, the weights \( \omega_{ct} \) are strictly positive, this bias term is positive as well since the substitution of the projection:

\[
\xi_{\beta pt} = \pi_\beta (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_\delta) + v_{\beta t+1}
\]
into (36) yields:

\[
\alpha_p^{GT} = \alpha_p + \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\omega_{at}[\pi_{\beta}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta}) + v_{\beta t+1}](R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})]
\]

\[
= \alpha_p + \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\omega_{at}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})E[\pi_{\beta}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta}) + v_{\beta t+1}](R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})]
\]

\[
= \alpha_p + \sum_{t=1}^{T} E[\omega_{at}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})\pi_{\beta}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta})]
\]

\[
= \alpha_p + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \pi_{\beta}E[\omega_{at}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2] > 0
\]

where the transition from the penultimate to the last line follows from the constraint \(\sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{at}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) = 0\) and where \(\alpha_p^{GT} > 0\) because \(\omega_{at} > 0\) implies \(\omega_{at}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 > 0\). Once again, \(\hat{\alpha}_p^{GT}\) does not measure the degree of ability or whether it is of the market timing or security selection variety. Grinblatt and Titman’s insight was that positive period weighting measures are positive in the presence of skill in this setting.

### 3.1.3 Directional Information

Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) provide a framework for testing market timing skills when forecasters make directional forecasts that produces another variant of the Treynor-Mazuy regression. That is, they study market timers who may have information on whether excess benchmark returns \(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}\) are expected to be positive or negative and not their magnitudes. The market timing strategies assumed by them are particularly simple: the portfolio beta is set to the high value \(\beta_h\) when the benchmark is predicted to exceed the riskless rate and to the low value \(\beta_l\) when the expected excess benchmark return is negative.

This structure makes it easy to analyze the impact of market timing on performance measurement. There are four states of the world \(hu, hd, lu, ld\) where \(u\) denotes states in which \(R_{\delta t+1} \geq R_{ft+1}\) and where \(d\) denotes states in which \(R_{\delta t+1} < R_{ft+1}\). Beta choices are concordant with realized benchmark returns in states \(hu\) and \(ld\) — that is, a high beta when the benchmark return exceeds the riskless rate and a low beta when the expected excess benchmark return is negative — and discordant in states \(hd\) and \(lu\) since the betas move in the opposite direction from benchmark returns in these states. To facilitate the analysis, let \(\pi_{hu}, \pi_{hd}, \pi_{lu}, \text{ and } \pi_{ld}\) denote the probabilities of the corresponding states and let \(\pi_{u} = \pi_{hu} + \pi_{lu}\) and \(\pi_{d} = \pi_{hd} + \pi_{ld}\) so that
\[ \pi_u + \pi_d = 1. \]

The managed portfolio return is still described by the conditional Jensen regression but the model for portfolio betas takes a particularly simple form in this case. The conditional beta in up markets is equal to \( \beta_h \) with probability \( \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} \) and equals \( \beta_\ell \) with probability \( \frac{\pi_{lu}}{\pi_u} \) while the down market beta is equal to \( \beta_h \) with probability \( \frac{\pi_{hd}}{\pi_d} \) and equals \( \beta_\ell \) with probability \( \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} \). Now consider the regression of portfolio returns on both the up market excess benchmark return \((R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^+\) and the down market excess benchmark return \((R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^-\):

\[
R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + \beta_p^+ (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^+ + \beta_p^- (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^- + \varepsilon_{pt+1}, \tag{37}
\]

where \( \beta_p^+ \) and \( \beta_p^- \) are the up and down market portfolio betas, respectively. As is readily apparent, the up and down market betas as well as the average beta are given by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\beta_p^+ &= \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} \beta_h + \frac{\pi_{lu}}{\pi_u} \beta_\ell \\
\beta_p^- &= \frac{\pi_{hd}}{\pi_d} \beta_h + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} \beta_\ell \\
\overline{\beta}_p &= (\pi_{hu} + \pi_{hd}) \beta_h + (\pi_{lu} + \pi_{ld}) \beta_\ell.
\end{align*}
\tag{38}
\]

Moreover, the conditions under which the manager has market timing ability takes a particularly simple form since:

\[
\beta_p^+ - \overline{\beta}_p = \left[ \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} - (\pi_{hu} + \pi_{hd}) \right] \beta_h + \left[ \frac{\pi_{lu}}{\pi_u} - (\pi_{lu} + \pi_{ld}) \right] \beta_\ell = (1 - \pi_u) \left[ \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} - 1 \right] (\beta_h - \beta_\ell) \tag{39}
\]

is positive if and only if \( \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} > 1 \) or, equivalently, if \( \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} > \frac{\pi_{hd}}{\pi_d} \). Since \( \beta_p^- - \overline{\beta}_p \) must be negative if \( \beta_p^+ - \overline{\beta}_p \) is positive, the covariance between betas and subsequent excess benchmark returns is positive as well in this case and so only managers whose information and behavior is such that \( \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} > 1 \) possess market timing ability. This makes intuitive sense: the concordant probabilities have to be larger than the discordant ones or betting on the up and down market betas is a losing proposition. Note also that \( \alpha_p \) is the expected return to selection because the covariance between betas and subsequent excess benchmark returns is embedded in the fitted part of the regression.

This first version of this regression in Merton (1981) looks more like Treynor-Mazuy regression. Instead of having up and down market excess benchmark returns on the right hand side
as in (37), the regressors in the original model are $R_{d+1} - R_{f+1}$ and $-(R_{d+1} - R_{f+1})^-$. This reparameterization of (37) is given by:

$$R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + b_1 p (R_{d+1} - R_{f+1}) - b_2 p (R_{d+1} - R_{f+1})^- + \varepsilon_{pt+1}$$

which is related to (37) via:

$$R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + \beta^+_p (R_{d+1} - R_{f+1})^+ + \beta^-_p (R_{d+1} - R_{f+1})^- + \varepsilon_{pt+1}$$

The expressions for $\beta^+_p$ and $\beta^-_p$ in (41) imply that $b_1 p$ and $b_2 p$ are given by:

$$b_1 p = \beta^+_p = \frac{\pi^u}{\pi^u} \beta_h + \frac{\pi^d}{\pi^u} \beta_{\ell}$$

$$b_2 p = \beta^+_p - \beta^-_p = \left[ \frac{\pi^u}{\pi^u} + \frac{\pi^d}{\pi^d} - 1 \right] (\beta_h - \beta_{\ell})$$

and so $b_2 p \neq 0$ if and only if the manager possesses market timing ability. Merton (1981) provided an elegant economic interpretation of $b_1 p$ and $b_2 p$: $b_1 p$ is the hedge ratio for replicating the option with returns that are perfectly correlated with the returns to market timing and $b_2 p$ is the implicit number of free put options on the benchmark struck at the riskless rate that is generated by the market timing ability of the manager.

### 3.2 Observable Information Signals

In the analysis so far the key variable is the timing signal, the variable that causes the manager to bet on market direction. If we observed the signals themselves, we could separate the question of whether the manager has forecasting ability — that is, whether $\frac{\pi^u}{\pi^u} + \frac{\pi^d}{\pi^d} > 1$ — from that of how it informs the manager’s trading strategy — that is, the uses to which the forecast is put. It could be that some managers are good forecasters but are poor at executing appropriate trading strategies or have other unknown motives for trade. Irrespective of the reason, studying the signals or forecasts observed by the manager can be an interesting exercise. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer
discuss conditions (including symmetry of the underlying conditional payoff distribution) under which a principal can elicit the agent’s (fund manager’s) true information.

Henriksson and Merton (1981) propose a simple nonparametric method for evaluating prediction signals. The states of the world are the same as outlined above — that is, $hu$, $hd$, $lu$, and $ld$ — but $h$ and $l$ refer to positive and negative market timing signals, respectively, not high and low betas. For the concordant pairs $hu$ and $ld$, $\frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} = 1$ if and only if the signal is of no value and $\frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} > 1$ if it has positive value; as noted by Henriksson and Merton (1981) $\frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} + \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d} < 1$ also has positive value in the perhaps unlikely event that one recognizes that the forecasts are perverse.

The adding up restrictions for up and down probabilities — that is, $\pi_u + \pi_d = 1$ — under the null hypothesis of no market timing ability imply that $\frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} = \frac{\pi_{hd}}{\pi_d}$ and $\frac{\pi_{lu}}{\pi_u} = \frac{\pi_{ld}}{\pi_d}$ or, in other words, that the high and low signals are independent of whether ex post excess benchmark returns are positive or negative.

Now consider a sample based on this implicit experiment: the 1’s and 0’s corresponding to positive $h$ signals and negative $l$ signals and those corresponding to whether the observed excess benchmark returns are positive or negative. A sample of size $T$ will then have $T_{hu}$, $T_{hd}$, $T_{lu}$, and $T_{ld}$ observations in the cells corresponding to each state of the world with $T = T_{hu} + T_{hd} + T_{lu} + T_{ld}$ and with $T_u = T_{hu} + T_{lu}$ and $T_d = T_{hd} + T_{ld}$ observations in the up and down cells, respectively. Suppose that returns are independently and identically distributed under the null hypothesis, a condition that is a bit stronger than is necessary, so that the up and down probabilities are constant over time. If the null is true, independent of the up and down probabilities, the sample proportions respect:

$$\frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u} = E\left[\frac{T_{hu}}{T_{hu} + T_{lu}}\right] = E\left[\frac{T_{hd}}{T_{hd} + T_{ld}}\right] = \frac{\pi_{hd}}{\pi_d}$$

$$= E\left[\frac{T_{hu} + T_{hd}}{T}\right] = \pi_h.$$

Henriksson and Merton (1981) used this independence — that is, $\pi_{hu} = \pi_h \pi_u$ and $\pi_{hd} = \pi_h \pi_d$ — to calculate the conditional probability of receiving one cell count from the other three. This computation is facilitated by partitioning the sample into $T_{hu}$, $T_h$, $T_u$, and $T_d$. Then the probability

30
of receiving $T_{hu}$ concordant up market pairs given the other three cell counts is given by:

$$
Pr[T_{hu}] = \frac{Pr[T_{hu} = N_{hu}, T_h = N_h | T_{u}, T_d]}{Pr[T_h = N_h | T]}
$$

$$
= \frac{Pr[T_{hu} = N_{hu}, T_{hd} = N_h - N_{hu} | T_{u}, T_d]}{Pr[T_h = N_h | T]}
$$

$$
= \frac{Pr[T_{hu} = N_{hu} | T_{u}] Pr[T_{hd} = N_h - N_{hu} | T_d]}{Pr[T_h = N_h | T]}
$$

This holds because the high/low split is independent of the up/down split in the absence of market timing ability. The reason for repartitioning the sample in this fashion is now obvious: each probability is that of a binomial random variable with the same probability $\pi_h$. Hence, the probability is given by:

$$
Pr[T_{hu}] = \frac{Pr[T_{hu} = N_{hu} | T_{u}, T_d, T_h, \pi_h]}{Pr[T_h = N_h | T, \pi_h]}
$$

$$
= \frac{(T_u \pi_h)^{T_{hu}} (1 - \pi_h)^{T_{hd}}}{\pi_h^{T_h}} \frac{(T_d - T_{hu})^T}{\pi_h^{T_h}}
$$

$$
= \frac{(T_u \pi_h)^{T_{hu}} (T_d - T_{hd})^T}{\pi_h^{T_h}}
$$

independent of the high signal probability $\pi_h$. The test is therefore distribution-free under the null hypothesis so long as the up probability $\pi_u$ is constant. Henriksson and Merton (1981) point out that this ratio follows a hypergeometric distribution, which makes sense because this distribution is appropriate for experiments that differ in one detail for binomial experiments: a sample is first drawn at random from some overall population without replacement and is then randomly sorted into successes and failures. In this application, $T$ is the size of the population, $T_h$ is the size of the random sample, $T_{hu}$ is the number of successes, and $T_{hd}$ is the number of failures. Cumby and Modest (1987) noted that the Henriksson/Merton test statistic is identical to Fisher’s exact test for 2x2 contingency tables since:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>prediction</th>
<th>realization</th>
<th>sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up</td>
<td>Down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>$T_{hu}$</td>
<td>$T_{hd}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>$T_{lu}$</td>
<td>$T_{ld}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum</td>
<td>$T_u$</td>
<td>$T_d$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They also noted that there is a convenient normal approximation to the test of the moment condition.
\[ E\left[ \frac{T_{hu} - T_{h} T_{u}}{T_{h} T_{u} T_{d} T_{d}} \right] = 0 \]

which is given by:

\[
\frac{T_{hu} - T_{h} T_{u}}{\sqrt{T_{h} T_{u} T_{d} T_{d}}} \sim N(0, 1)
\]  

(44)

Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) show how to extend the analysis to more than two outcomes.

4 Performance Measurement and Attribution with Observable Portfolio Weights

This state of affairs is somewhat unsatisfying and reflects the fact that returns are being asked to do a lot of work. The theory is straightforward and beautiful: all marginal investors agree that performance should be judged relative to portfolio \( \delta \), a specific conditionally mean-variance efficient portfolio. Unfortunately, the identification of an empirical analogue of this portfolio is problematic and it is likely that much of the evidence on fund performance reflects the inadequacy of benchmarks and not the abilities of fund managers. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, fund returns are being asked to tell us both the fund’s normal performance — that is, the appropriate expected return given its normal exposure to risk — as well as any abnormal performance due to security selection skill or market timing ability. In addition, the role played by parametric assumptions such as normality in dealing with this problem is worrisome. In the absence of \textit{a priori} information about time-variation in expected benchmark returns and fund risk exposures, performance evaluation based solely on fund and benchmark returns is simply not feasible. Performance evaluation is somewhat less problematic when it is plausible to assume that risk exposures are constant \textit{a priori}, leaving benchmark error as the principle source of difficulty.

Of course, simplest of all is the case in which managers are judged on the basis of excess returns over an explicit benchmark. It is noteworthy that compensation contracts are increasingly taking this form and that managed portfolio performance is now routinely reported relative to an explicit benchmark irrespective of the nature of the manager’s compensation. This change in best practice is a very real measure of the considerable impact that the academic performance evaluation literature has had on the portfolio management industry.

In fact, performance evaluation via the difference between the managed portfolio and benchmark returns contains an implicit model of the division of labor between two hypothetical (and, often,
real) active portfolio managers: a market timer and a stock picker.\footnote{Obviously, the more correct term here is ”asset picker” or ”security selector.” Both seem awkward and the phrase stock picker is the term of art in the profession.} The stock picker chooses a portfolio of these $N$ assets called $\delta^S$ which is structured to have a beta of one on $\delta$ because its performance is measured relative to $\delta$. That is, its return is given by:

$$R^S_{\delta t+1} = R_{\delta t+1} + \alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1}$$ (45)

where $\alpha_{pt} = E[R^S_{\delta t+1} - R_{\delta t+1}|I_t]$ correctly measures the conditional expected excess return produced by the stock picker. The quantity $R^S_{\delta t+1} - R_{\delta t+1} = \alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1}$ is called the tracking error in portfolio $\delta^S$ (with respect to its benchmark $\delta$). The market timer takes this portfolio as given and determines the fraction $\omega_{pt}$ of the overall portfolio $p$ that is allocated to portfolio $\delta^S$ at time $t$ and the fraction $1 - \omega_{pt}$ that is allocated to the riskless asset. Hence, the overall return on $p$ is given by:

$$R_{pt+1} = (1 - \omega_{pt})R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}R^S_{\delta t+1}$$ (46)

We have a division of labor and a benchmark for evaluating the performance of one of the laborers. What is missing is a benchmark for the market timer, a measure of normal performance for the asset allocation choice. For simplicity, suppose that the normal or strategic asset allocation — the passive portfolio that would be chosen by the manager of the overall portfolio in the absence of attempts to time the market — is an allocation of $\omega^n_{pt}$ to portfolio $\delta^S$ and $1 - \omega^n_{pt}$ to the riskless asset. Clearly any measure of the performance of the market timer should involve $\omega_{pt} - \omega^n_{pt}$, the market timer’s policy tool, and how it moves with benchmark returns.

Armed with this additional datum, the overall return to $p$ can be rewritten as:

$$R_{pt+1} = (1 - \omega_{pt})R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}R^S_{\delta t+1} = R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}(R^S_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) = R_{ft+1} + \omega^n_{pt}(R^S_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + (\omega_{pt} - \omega^n_{pt})(R^S_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})$$ (47)

which is almost, but not quite, in a form suitable for assessing the performance of the market timer. The missing element is the substitution of the return of the security selection portfolio $\delta^S$ into this
expression which yields:

\[
R_{pt+1} = R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}^n (R_{\delta t+1} + \alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}) \\
+ (\omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n)(R_{\delta t+1} + \alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1}) \\
= [R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}^n (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})] + \omega_{pt}^n [\alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1}] \\
+ [(\omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})] + [(\omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n)(\alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1})] \\
\]

(48)

Note this expression is perfectly compatible with the conditional Jensen regression with \( \beta_{pt} = \omega_{pt} \), \( \omega_{pt} \alpha_{pt} \) equal to the conditional Jensen alpha, and \( \omega_{pt} \varepsilon_{pt+1} \) equal to the residual return. Note also that observation of the portfolio weights \( \omega_{pt} \) and \( \omega_{pt}^n \) are equivalent to observation of the conditional and target betas, respectively, in these circumstances.

This simple portfolio arithmetic was introduced in Brinson et al. (1986) and provides a nearly perfect decomposition of returns into economically relevant components. The first term in square brackets is the normal portfolio return, the return on the portfolio in the absence of active management. The second term in square brackets is the return to security selection which is given by the portfolio tracking error since the stock picker is measured relative to the benchmark portfolio \( \delta \). The third term in square brackets is a natural measure of the performance of the market timer: the product of \( \omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n \), the deviation from the normal weight that is chosen by the manager, and the excess return on the benchmark portfolio. The choice of the benchmark portfolio makes sense: the use of \( \delta^S \) would mix market timing ability with the security selection skill of the stock picker. Of course, this ambiguity is merely pushed into the fourth term in square brackets: the product of the asset allocation choice of the market timer \( \omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n \) and the tracking error of the stock picker \( \alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1} \).

This residual component \( (\omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n)(\alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1}) \) cannot be clearly assigned to either active manager, which is why we termed this decomposition "nearly perfect." This circumstance arises because the market timing portfolio is the stock picker’s portfolio \( \delta^S \), not the benchmark portfolio. In fact, the residual would vanish if the tools of active management were modified so that the market timer used the benchmark portfolio since the decomposition would be given by:

\[
R_{pt+1} = (1 - \omega_{pt})R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}^n R_{\delta t+1} + (\omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \\
= [R_{ft+1} + \omega_{pt}^n (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})] + \omega_{pt}^n [\alpha_{pt} + \varepsilon_{pt+1}] \\
+ [(\omega_{pt} - \omega_{pt}^n)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})] \\
\]

(49)
which cleanly allocates overall return to strategic or normal asset allocation, security selection, and market timing. Actual managed portfolios can use this decomposition when their market timers use index futures markets to make market timing bets and the allocations to their stock pickers are permitted to drift away from normal weights with infrequent reallocations when the cumulative deviation grows sufficiently large. Of course, the residual will be small when the allowable deviations from strategic asset allocations as well as the returns to security selection are small, conditions that frequently obtain in actual practice.

Of course, the universe of assets is seldom broken down into only two asset classes or sectors. The decomposition into $J$ asset classes is straightforward:

$$R_{pt+1} = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_{pjt} R_{jt} \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_{pj}^n R_{njt} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_{pj}^n (R_{jt} - R_{njt}) +$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J} (\omega_{pjt} - \omega_{pj}^n) R_{njt} + \sum_{j=1}^{J} (\omega_{pjt} - \omega_{pj}^n) (R_{jt} - R_{njt})$$

(50)

where $\omega_{pjt}$ and $\omega_{pj}^n$ are the actual and normal or strategic asset allocations of portfolio $p$, respectively, and $R_{jt}$ and $R_{njt}$ the corresponding actual and benchmark asset class returns. This relation can be rewritten in the excess return form when the riskless asset, often termed cash in common parlance, is one of the asset classes.

This decomposition of the performance of active managers into market timing and security selection components across asset classes or sectors is called performance attribution and it is now widely used in actual practice. This division of labor also roughly reflects the management structure at many, if not most, large pension funds, although the market timing or tactical asset allocation is often done passively. Their investment policy statements typically carve up the asset menu into a number of asset classes and choose explicit benchmarks against which asset class returns are measured with no beta adjustment, corresponding to a structure in which asset class managers are hired and instructed to remain fully invested in the asset class since their performance will be measured against the asset-class-specific benchmark. Moreover, they often specify both the normal or strategic asset allocation weights and the permissible amounts by which the actual asset allocations are allowed to deviate from the normal ones, which corresponds to a short run or tactical asset allocation manager (or managers) who choose asset class exposures and who sit one level above the asset class managers. In addition, it is now common for fiduciaries to read performance attribution reports that make routine reference to tracking errors and risk exposures.
It is fair to say that performance measurement and attribution along these lines is one of the many
dimensions in which financial economics has had an effect, and a beneficial one at that, on real
world investment practice.

Note that there is an implicit assumption about the investment opportunity set in this man-
gement structure. Asset class managers can look at correlations within asset classes and market
timers can consider comovements across benchmarks but neither has the incentive to consider
the covariances between each asset class benchmark and individual security returns in other asset
classes. In fact, they have a disincentive to do so because they are typically rewarded according
to benchmarks that make no provision for such correlations. Hence, it is imperative that the asset
class definitions be narrow enough so that the fund does not unintentionally overlook valuable
diversification opportunities. Put differently, carving up the asset menu into asset classes with
specific benchmarks creates another potential source of benchmark error when:

$$R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} \neq \sum_{j=1}^{J} \omega_{pjt} R_{njt}$$

While we are unaware of any empirical evidence on this question, a cursory examination of the
investment policy statements of large public US pension funds suggests that such breakdowns are
quite refined and probably do not result in materially inferior diversification.

The extent to which performance attribution can be usefully employed depends on whether one
is viewing the portfolio from inside the fund or from the outside. Clearly, this method cannot
be used without information on actual and normal or strategic asset allocations along with actual
and benchmark asset class returns. Data on all of these quantities can be obtained within the
fund when it has an explicit investment policy governing asset allocation and benchmarks. The
academic perspective, however, is typically external to the fund and so which of these data are
available hinges on what has been reported to the data source. Actual and benchmark asset class
returns along with the actual allocation were available in the two main academic applications of
these tools, Brinson et al. (1986, 1991), who studied US pension funds, and Blake, Lehmann and
Timmermann (1999), who examined UK pension funds. Neither study had data on normal or
strategic asset allocations.

While our emphasis is on methods and not on empirical evidence, there are two results that are
both quite striking and of great relevance for performance measurement and attribution. The first
concerns the extent to which performance measurement based on tracking error results in managers
actually setting betas equal to one. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) found sample equity
betas to be tightly clustered about one — raw beta estimates and not betas significantly different
from one at some significance level — in a sample of US pension fund stock portfolios and Blake
et al. (1999) found similar results for their sample of UK pension funds. That is, managers
typically have the incentive to set betas to one and the evidence suggests that they are good at
doing so. The second broad result concerns market timing. Brinson et al. (1986) found that only
one out of the 96 U. S. pension funds they studied had positive — not statistically significant at
some confidence level but simply positive — market timing measures. Similarly, Blake et al (1999)
found that roughly 80 per cent of the 306 UK pension funds they examined had negative market
timing measures with the average return from market timing (at -34 basis points per annum) was
statistically significant. Put differently, pension fund managers have typically attempted to time
the overall market or individual asset class returns but they have been unsuccessful in doing so.

This last observation has had a profound impact on beliefs about the extent to which managed
portfolios benefit from market timing. Many pension funds now follow the passive market timing
strategy based on mechanical rebalancing rules, letting their asset class managers — that is, those
engaged in security selection — implicitly choose increased pension fund exposure to asset classes
when they outperform their benchmarks and lower exposures after underperformance. Other
pension funds manage their "traditional" assets this way but buy explicit market timing services
from hedge funds, with performance being measured against Treasury bills. That is, a generation
of pension fund investment consultants have used this evidence to persuade their clients to forego
market timing or to treat it as an asset class with a strict performance standard.

In any event, external performance measurement and attribution with data on actual asset
allocations along with actual and benchmark asset class returns requires a model for the strategic
or normal asset allocation. Brinson et al. (1986) use sample averages of portfolio weights as the
normal portfolio weights:

\[ \omega_{njt}^n = \omega_{nj} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{pjt} / T \]  

(52)

which is a reasonable definition if the fund has a stable de facto asset allocation. However, asset
allocations that drift in a particular direction as was the case in the UK pension funds by Blake et
al. (1999) makes this assumption untenable. The models they explored include a linear trend in
normal portfolio weights:

$$\omega^n_{pt} = \omega^n_{pj1} + (t/T)(\omega^n_{pjT} - \omega^n_{pj1}),$$  \hspace{1cm} (53)

identical strategic asset allocations across funds at a point in time:

$$\omega^n_{pjt} = \sum_{p=1}^{P} \omega^n_{pjt},$$  \hspace{1cm} (54)

where \(P\) is the number of pension funds in the sample, which implicitly assumes zero timing ability for the funds as a whole.\(^{11}\)

Returning for simplicity to the case of two assets, recall that the portfolio weights \(w_{pt}\) and \(w^n_{pt}\) are equal to the conditional and target betas, respectively, of a portfolio managed in this fashion. This observation suggests that tests for the presence of market timing ability can be based on the conditional and unconditional projections (24) and (28). Consider first the baseline case in which both \(\omega_{pt}\) and \(\omega^n_{pt}\) are observed for a particular asset class so that \(\xi_{\beta_{pt}} = \beta_{pt} - \overline{\beta}_{pt} = \omega_{pt} - \omega^n_{pt}\). Since \(\xi_{\beta_{pt}}\) is the innovation in the conditional portfolio beta given publicly available information (i.e., \(E[\xi_{\beta_{pt}} | I_t] = 0\)), the projection of benchmark returns on \(\xi_{\beta_{pt}}\) is given by:

$$R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} = \pi_0 + \pi_p \xi_{\beta_{pt}} + \nu_{\delta t+1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (55)

\(\pi_p \neq 0\) if and only if the manager possesses market timing ability in great generality. In particular, benchmark excess returns can have arbitrary serial dependence so long as it does not affect the ability of least squares to estimate \(\pi_p\) consistently.\(^{12}\) This is an obvious consequence of the assumption that both \(\beta_{pt}\) and \(\overline{\beta}_{pt}\) are observed via \(\omega_{pt}\) and \(\omega^n_{pt}\).

Of course, we typically observe \(\omega_{pt}\) but not \(\omega^n_{pt}\) which corresponds to observations on \(\beta_{pt}\) but not on \(\overline{\beta}_{pt}\) and, hence, not on \(\xi_{\beta_{pt}}\). The unobservability of \(\omega^n_{pt}\) is a subtle problem because its

\(^{11}\)Other alternatives are the error components model used to summarize the stochastic properties of asset class weights in Blake et al. (1999) and the asset allocation guidelines of the funds with public investment policy statements. Neither approach has been tried in the literature to the best of our knowledge.

\(^{12}\)The residual in this projection inherits the serial correlation properties of excess benchmark returns. That is:

$$E[\nu_{\delta t+1} | I_t] = E[R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} | I_t] - \pi_0 = \mu_{\delta t} - \mu_{\delta}$$

which would typically be assumed to be well-behaved. Typical bounds on higher order dependence would then yield consistency of least squares in this application.
strategic nature suggests that most of its fluctuations occur at low frequencies. That is, \( \pi_p \) in (55) is given by:

\[
\pi_p = \frac{\text{Cov}(\mu_{\delta t}, \beta_{pt}) + \xi_{\beta_{pt}}}{\text{Var}[\beta_{pt}]} + \frac{E[(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \mu_{\delta t})(\beta_{pt} + \xi_{\beta_{pt}})]}{\text{Var}[\beta_{pt}]} - \frac{\text{Cov}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}, \xi_{\beta_{pt}})}{\text{Var}[\beta_{pt}]} + \frac{E[(R_{\delta t+1} + 1 - R_{ft+1} + 1 - \mu_{\delta t})(\beta_{pt} + \xi_{\beta_{pt}})]}{\text{Var}[\beta_{pt}]} - \frac{\text{Cov}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}, \xi_{\beta_{pt}})}{\text{Var}[\beta_{pt}]}(56)
\]

The first term is the bias due to predictability of benchmark returns and the absence of observations on \( \beta_{pt} \) while the second term is nonzero if and only if market timing is present. Note that only the conditional first moment of excess benchmark returns (and not higher moments) is relevant here, one of the benefits of the observability of \( \beta_{pt} \) under these assumptions.

As in our earlier discussion of the Treynor-Mazuy regressions, there are three approaches to dealing with the bias term in this regression. The first is to assume it away via constancy of \( \mu_{\delta t} \) and/or \( \beta_{pt} \) or \( \text{Cov}[\mu_{\delta t}, \beta_{pt}] = 0 \). Alternatively, one can postulate a model for \( \hat{\mu}_{\delta t} \) and rewrite (55) in terms of \( R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \hat{\mu}_{\delta t} \), which requires model errors — that is, nonzero values of \( E[R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \hat{\mu}_{\delta t}|I_t] \) — to be uncorrelated with \( \beta_{pt} \). Finally, one can postulate a model for the target beta \( \beta_{pt} = f(z_t, \theta) \), where \( z_t \in I_t \) is publicly available conditioning information and \( \theta \) is a vector of unknown parameters that can be estimated consistently since consistent estimation of \( \beta_{pt} \) implies consistent estimation of \( \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \).\(^{13}\)

Graham and Harvey (1996) adopt a variant of this last approach which works instead with changes in actual asset allocations and \( z_t \) as additional regressors as in:

\[
R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} = \pi_z^* z_t + \pi_{vt}^* \omega_{pt} + \nu_{\delta t+1}^*
\]

where a test of the hypothesis \( \pi_{vt}^* = 0 \) is a test of the hypothesis that portfolio weight changes Granger-cause (i.e., predict) benchmark excess returns. This projection is conveniently analyzed by considering the two unconditional population projections:

\[
\mu_{\delta t} = \phi_{\delta t} z_t + e_{\delta t},
\]

\[
\beta_{pt} - \beta_{pt-1} - \xi_{\beta_{pt-1}} = \phi_{\beta_{pt}} z_t + e_{\beta_{pt}}
\]

\(^{13}\)Note that this last approach requires that \( f(z_t, \theta) \) be incorporated in (55) in the restricted fashion:

\[
R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} = \pi_0 + \pi_p[\omega_{pt} - f(z_t, \theta)] + \nu_{\delta t+1}
\]

if the goal is to mimic (55) exactly because the required regressor is \( \xi_{\beta_{pt}} \). However, the natural desire to correct for serial correlation in \( \nu_{\delta t+1} \) would normally militate in favor of including \( z_t \) or suitable functions of \( z_t \) as regressors.
since:

$$\pi^*_p = \frac{Cov(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} - \phi'_t \Delta \omega_{pt} - \phi'_u z_t)}{Var[\Delta \omega_{pt} - \phi'_u z_t]}$$

$$= \frac{Cov[\mu_{\delta t} - \phi'_t z_t, \Delta \beta_{pt} - \xi_{\beta_{pt-1}} - \phi'_u z_t] + Cov(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}, \xi_{\beta_{pt}})}{Var[\xi_{\beta_{pt}} + e_{wt}]}$$

$$= \frac{Cov[e_{\delta t}, e_{wt}] + Cov(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}, \xi_{\beta_{pt}})}{\sigma^2_e + \sigma^2_{ew}}, \quad (57)$$

where the bias term depends on the correlation of the projection errors. A priori confidence in the merits of this specification involves a belief that the bias is small and that $\Delta \beta_{pt}$ is close to an innovation sequence, thus mitigating the main source of serial correlation in this specification.

Another test of market timing when portfolio weights are observed is suggested by the Henriksson and Merton (1981) analysis of the fidelity between signals and outcomes given at the end of the previous section. An interesting special case is that of tactical asset allocation in which the manager allocates 100% to the benchmark portfolio when placing an up market bet and 100% to the riskless asset when placing a down market bet. This corresponds to setting $\beta_h = 1$ and $\beta_d = 0$ and with up, down, and expected betas of $\beta^+_p = \frac{\pi_{hu}}{\pi_u}$, $\beta^-_p = \frac{\pi_{hd}}{\pi_d}$, and $\bar{\beta}_p = \pi_h$, respectively. Accordingly, evaluating the performance of tactical asset allocation with observable portfolio weights that only take on the values one and zero is equivalent to the evaluation of prediction signals given in the previous section. Hence, inference for the hypothesis $\pi_{hu} + \pi_{ld} = 1 \iff \pi_{hu} = \pi_{hd}$ can proceed based on the hypergeometric distribution while that for the hypothesis $\pi_{hu} = \pi_{h} \pi_u$ can be based on the asymptotic normal approximation.

More generally, we can use observed portfolio weights to implicitly evaluate the fidelity of market timing signals using the Henriksson-Merton approach. If we assume that up and down markets have constant probabilities and that the manager has a constant target beta, $\omega_{pt} - \omega_p$ will be perfectly correlated with the signal since the manager will have a beta above the mean — that is, $\beta_{pt} > \bar{\beta}_p$ — in the high signal state and one below the mean in the low market state. When the strategic asset allocation and, hence, the target beta is observed, which is possible in some cases through examination of investment policy statements, the cell counts can be based on the sign of $\omega_{pt} - \omega_p$ and inference can be based on can be the hypergeometric distribution (43). If it is not, the cell counts can be based on the sign of $\omega_{pt} - \bar{\omega}_p$, where $\bar{\omega}_p = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \omega_{pt}$, and inference can be based on the normal approximation (44) since $\bar{\omega}_p \to \omega_p$ in probability in great generality.

Grinblatt and Titman (1993) implement period weighting measures when portfolio weights are
observed under the assumption that uninformed investors perceive expected asset returns to be constant over time and returns to be independently and identically distributed. In this circumstance, changes in portfolio weights should not be correlated with future returns. In contrast, informed investors will adjust portfolio weights in anticipation of future returns and, if their information is valid, portfolio weight changes should be correlated with future returns. The exact form of the relation will depend on the way in which the informed investor’s information and preferences interact to produce a portfolio decision rule. That said, the unconditional covariance between portfolio weights and future returns should be positive under the weak assumption that portfolio weights are increasing in each asset’s conditionally expected return. A simple test for the presence of performance ability can be based on the sum of the covariances between portfolio weights and asset returns across all assets in the universe:

\[
\text{cov} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} (E[\omega_j R_j] - E[\omega_j] E[R_j]).
\]

(58)

This is equal to the expected return of the investor’s actual portfolio minus the expected return if portfolio weights and returns were uncorrelated. The second term also acts as a risk-adjustment since it gives the expected return on a portfolio with the same average risk as the actual portfolio.

Equation (58) can equivalently be rewritten in two ways:

\[
\text{cov} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} E[\omega_j (R_j - E[R_j])]
\]

(59)

or

\[
\text{cov} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} E[(\omega_j - E[\omega_j]) R_j].
\]

(60)

Since \(\omega_j\) and \(R_j\) are observed, these expressions point to two types of additional information that can be used to produce period weighting measure estimates described in the previous section.

The first of these expressions (59) requires an estimate of the (unconditional) expected return, \(E[R_j]\). Given the assumption that returns are identically and independently distributed, a natural way to proceed is to use average future returns on these assets, making this approach much like an event study in that returns from outside the event window – the performance measurement period in this case – measure normal performance. Abnormal performance arises when these assets earn higher returns when they are in the investor’s portfolio than at other times.

The second expression (60) requires instead an estimate of the expected portfolio weight \(\omega_j\). This formulation is more problematic because serial dependence in weights – such as that produced,
for example, by momentum or contrarian investment strategies — causes sample period weighting measures to be biased. If the serial dependence in momentum or contrarian portfolio weights is short-lived, such biases can be mitigated or eliminated by introducing a lag between return and expected portfolio weight measurement. For example, if weights are covariance stationary, each observed weight is an unbiased estimate of expected portfolio weights. If weights and returns are \( K \) dependent — that is, if they are independent when \( K \) periods separate their measurement — there is no such bias. Hence, Grinblatt and Titman (1993) recommend setting \( E[\omega_j] = \omega_{jt-K} \), resulting in period weighting estimates of the form:

\[
\hat{c_\text{cov}}_{\omega} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{t=K}^{T} (\omega_{jt} - \omega_{jt-K}) R_{jt},
\]

and they use the same idea for expected returns by setting \( E[R_j] = R_{jt+K} \) in the revised estimate:

\[
\hat{c_\text{cov}}_{R} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{t=1}^{T-K} \omega_{jt} (R_{jt} - R_{jt+K}).
\]

Each of these measures will converge to zero provided fund managers use no information with predictive content regarding future returns when setting their portfolio weights and returns are not predictable for uninformed investors. That said, \( \hat{c_\text{cov}}_{\omega} \) makes for simpler inference than \( \hat{c_\text{cov}}_{R} \), since its returns are serially uncorrelated when individual asset returns are serially uncorrelated as well. In contradistinction, the overlapping returns implicit in \( \hat{c_\text{cov}}_{R} \) make its returns \( K - 1 \) dependent when individual asset returns are serially uncorrelated. Hence, the test statistic based on \( \hat{c_\text{cov}}_{\omega} \) is a simple test of the null hypothesis that a mean is zero.

4.1 Should investors hold mutual funds?

A key question from an investor’s point of view is whether—and how much—to invest in one or more mutual funds. Suppose that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that a particular fund’s alpha equals zero although its point estimate indicates a sizeable skill level. This is a likely empirical outcome due to the weak power of these tests. Does this mean that the investor should not invest in this mutual fund? Clearly this is not implied by the outcome of the statistical test, which is typically based on a discrete loss function that is typically very different from the underlying utility function. Statistical tests do not in general trade off the cost of wrongly including an investment
in a mutual fund versus wrongly excluding it. Conversely, suppose we reject the null that the portfolio weight on the mutual fund(s) equals zero, then how much should be invested in such funds?

The investor’s decision of whether to hold mutual funds at all is naturally set up as a test on the portfolio weights when data on these are available. When investors have mean-variance preferences, constructing such a test and deriving its properties is quite straightforward and can be based on a simple regression approach to portfolio selection that minimizes the squared deviations between the excess returns on a constructed portfolio and the excess returns implicit in the unity vector, \( \mathbf{1} \), cf. Britten-Jones (1999). This minimization can be implemented through a projection of \( \mathbf{1} \) on excess returns on the risky assets and mutual funds, excluding an intercept term. To this end, define the \( N + P \)-vector of period-\( t + 1 \) excess return on all risky assets extended to include a set of \( P \) mutual funds as \( \mathbf{\tilde{r}}_{t+1} = (\mathbf{R}'_{t+1} \mathbf{R}'_{pt+1})' - \mathbf{t}_{} \mathbf{R}_{ft+1} \), and let \( \mathbf{\tilde{r}} = (\mathbf{r}_1 \mathbf{r}_2 \cdots \mathbf{r}_T)' \) be the \( T \times (N + P) \) matrix of stacked returns, where the ‘tilde’ on top of the vector of excess returns indicates that we are referring to the original set of assets extended to include returns on the mutual funds. The projection proposed by Britten-Jones is

\[
\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{\tilde{r}} \beta + \mathbf{u}. \tag{61}
\]

The resulting vector of estimated coefficients,

\[
\mathbf{\hat{b}} = (\mathbf{\tilde{r}}\mathbf{\tilde{r}})^{-1}\mathbf{\tilde{r}}'\mathbf{t}, \tag{62}
\]

gives up to a proportionality factor the weights of the mean-variance efficient portfolio of risky assets. Using the scaling \( \mathbf{\hat{b}} / \mathbf{t} \mathbf{\hat{b}} \), we get the maximum Sharpe ratio (tangency) portfolio:

\[
\frac{\mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1/2}}{1' \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1/2} \mathbf{\tilde{r}}}
\]

where \( \mathbf{\tilde{r}} = \mathbf{\tilde{r}}' / T \) is the sample mean while the (maximum likelihood) sample covariance matrix is \( \mathbf{\hat{\Sigma}} = (\mathbf{\tilde{r}} - 1' \mathbf{\tilde{r}})'(\mathbf{\tilde{r}} - 1' \mathbf{\tilde{r}}) / T \).

Suppose that there are \( P \) mutual funds under consideration (the last \( P \) assets in the vector of excess returns, \( \mathbf{\tilde{r}} \)). Then the restriction that the investor should entirely exclude mutual funds from

\[14\] Although in principle one could make the critical level used to define the nominal size of the statistical test a function of the relative cost of type I and type II errors, this does not resolve the problem that the hypothesis testing uses a discrete decision, whereas the investor’s utility function is generally assumed to be continuous.
the portfolio takes the form
\[ \Gamma b = 0, \]
where the \( P \times (N + P) \) matrix of restrictions, \( \Gamma \), is given by
\[ \Gamma = \left( \begin{array}{c} 0_{P \times N} \end{array} \right). \]
Assuming that returns are joint normally distributed and independently and identically distributed, this restriction can be tested through the \( F \)-statistic
\[ \frac{(SSR_p - SSR_u)/P}{SSR_u/(T - N - P)}, \tag{63} \]
where \( SSR_u \) is the sum of squared residuals implied by the unrestricted regression underlying the coefficient estimates in (62), \( SSR_r \) is the sum of squared residuals from estimation of regression (62) subject to the restriction that \( \Gamma b = 0 \). This test statistic has an exact central \( F \) distribution with \( P \) and \( T - N - P \) degrees of freedom. Under less restrictive distributional assumptions, a method of moments type test can be used instead.

This framework lends itself to testing other economically interesting hypotheses. In particular it can be used to testing whether a portfolio of the managed funds spans the asset menu by testing if the weights on the non-mutual funds are jointly zero. We are unaware of any research in which this role for managed portfolios has been examined.

4.2 Determining the optimal holdings in mutual funds

When preferences outside the mean-variance class are considered and we are also interested in answering the second question – namely how much to invest in mutual funds – a more general approach is called for. We illustrate a simple method valid in a single-period setting where dynamic programming concerns can be ignored. Let \( W_t, W_{t+1} \) be an investor’s current and future wealth and suppose that the investor evaluates utility from future wealth through the function \( U(W_{t+1}) \). Returns on traded risky assets and mutual funds are again given by \( \tilde{R}_{t+1} = (R'_{t+1}, R'_p) \), while \( \tilde{\omega}_t = (\omega'_t, \omega'_p) \) is the associated vector of portfolio holdings. Future wealth associated with a given set of portfolio holdings is simply
\[ W_{t+1} = W_t(\tilde{\omega}'_t \tilde{R}_{t+1}), \]
while the investor’s optimization problem is to maximize expected utility conditional on current information, $I_t$:

$$\max_{\omega_t} E[U(W_t(\tilde{\omega}_t^t \tilde{R}_t+1))|I_t].$$

The portfolio weights on the mutual funds can be obtained from the last $P$ elements of $\tilde{\omega}_t$ corresponding to the mutual fund returns.

For example, in the earlier example with mean-variance preferences,

$$E[U(W_{t+1})|I_t] = E[W_{t+1}|I_t] - \frac{\gamma}{2} \operatorname{Var}(W_{t+1}|I_t),$$

where $\gamma$ is the absolute risk aversion. This gives a closed-form solution (cf. Ait-Sahalia and Brandt (2001)):

$$\tilde{\omega}_t = \sum_{t}^{-1} t \frac{\gamma W_t - t' \sum_{t}^{-1} \mu_t}{\gamma W_t' \sum_{t}^{-1} t} + \sum_{t}^{-1} \mu_t,$$

where $\sum_t = \operatorname{Var}(\tilde{R}_{t+1}|I_t)$ and $\mu_t = E(\tilde{R}_{t+1}|I_t)$. Since (conditional) population moments are unknown, in practice sample estimates of these moments, $\hat{\Sigma}$ and $\hat{\mu}$, are typically plugged in to get estimated weights as follows:

$$\hat{\omega}_t = \hat{\sum}_{t}^{-1} t \frac{\gamma W_t - t' \hat{\sum}_{t}^{-1} \hat{\mu}_t}{\gamma W_t' \hat{\sum}_{t}^{-1} t} + \hat{\sum}_{t}^{-1} \hat{\mu}_t.$$

This of course ignores the sampling errors in the moment estimates. Furthermore, due to the nonlinearity in the mapping from $\hat{\Sigma}$ and $\hat{\mu}$ to $\hat{\omega}_t$, it is not possible to identify which predictors $z_t \in I_t$ are important to portfolio holdings by inspecting the predictability of the mean and variance of returns.

Rather than adopting a two-stage approach that first estimates a model for the predictive distribution of returns and then plugs in the resulting parameter estimates in the equation for the optimal weight, one can directly model the portfolio weights as a function of the predictor (or state) variables, $z_t$. To this end let the portfolio policy function map $z_t$ into optimal asset holdings:

$$\tilde{\omega}_t = \omega(z_t).$$

Of course, in general both the functional form of the optimal portfolio policy $\omega(z_t)$ and the form of the predictability of returns are unknown. One way to deal with this that avoids the curse of dimensionality is to follow Ait-Sahalia and Brandt (2001) and assume that the portfolio policy only
depends on the state variables through a single index, $z_t' \beta$:

$$\max_{\omega_t} E[U(W_t(\tilde{\omega}_t' \tilde{R}_{t+1})) | z_t' \beta],$$

$$\tilde{\omega}_t = \omega(z_t' \beta; \beta)$$

This is a semiparametric approach that assumes a parametric (linear) index function but allows for a flexible (non-parametric) policy function.

Differentiating the optimization problem with respect to $\tilde{\omega}_t$ and using $\tilde{\omega}_t = \omega(X_t' \beta; \beta)$ gives the conditional moment condition

$$E[Q_{t+1}(\beta) | z_t] = E[U(W_t(\omega(z_t' \beta) \tilde{R}_{t+1})) \tilde{R}_{t+1} | z_t' \beta] = 0.$$ 

This can be estimated by GMM, using instruments $g(z_t)$ and the associated unconditional moment conditions arising from

$$\min_{\beta} E[Q_{t+1}(\beta) \otimes g(z_t)] | W E[Q_{t+1}(\beta) \otimes g(z_t)]$$

where $W = Cov(Q_{t+1} \otimes g(z_t))^{-1}$ is again some weighting matrix.

Alternatively, one can approximate the policy function, (64), using a series expansion such as

$$\tilde{\omega}_it = \tilde{\omega}_{0i} + \sum_{j=1}^{n_z} \tilde{\omega}_{1ij} z_{jt} + \sum_{j=1}^{n_z} \sum_{k=1}^{n_z} \tilde{\omega}_{2ijk} z_{jt} z_{kt}, \quad (65)$$

where $n_z$ is the number of $z-$variables. Again the parameters of the policy function can be estimated using GMM.

5 The Cross-Section of Managed Portfolio Returns

What makes the econometrics of performance measurement and its economic setting different from that of conventional asset pricing? As we noted earlier, Jensen’s alpha is just mispricing in asset pricing models and the two settings share many econometric issues. The answer we pointed to is the difference in the nature of the asset menu: individual securities or particular portfolios chosen by the econometrician in the asset pricing case and managed portfolios in performance measurement and attribution. These pages have been literally littered with examples of ways in which the direct impact of investment choices of portfolio managers makes concerns like stochastic betas and the measurement of biases in alphas first order concerns.
The other main difference is in the interpretation of rejections of the null hypothesis: researchers often interpret rejections of the null for managed portfolios as a reflection of managerial skill while rejections of the null in asset pricing theory tests are typically attributed to failures of the model. Most papers that evaluate the performance of managed portfolios simply do not treat the finding of economically and statistically significant alphas as an indication that the benchmark is not conditionally mean-variance efficient. Most papers that evaluate the performance of asset pricing models simply do not treat the finding of economically and statistically significant alphas as an indication that the test assets are underpriced or overpriced.

What makes the stochastic properties of this universe of test assets different from the passive – that is, unmanaged – portfolios typically employed in asset pricing theory tests? The answer probably lies in the commonalities among portfolio managers arising from the comparatively small range of investment styles and asset classes into which the universe of securities is partitioned. The portfolios used in asset pricing theory tests are formed according to different principles. In some cases, researchers seek dispersion across population conditional betas to facilitate more precise estimation of any risk premiums, which reflects a concern for inferences about the implications of the model under the null hypothesis that it is true. Many tests are based on portfolios formed on the basis of security characteristics that proved to be correlated with the alphas from earlier asset pricing models, reflecting a concern for inference when the null hypothesis is false. Others are based on portfolios chosen because the underlying test assets were thought to have low correlation conditional on the benchmark in question: industry and commodity portfolios have been chosen for this reason at different times.

The commonalities among the trading strategies of portfolio managers make for potential differences in each of these dimensions. The dispersion of conditional betas across funds is quite small, probably because performance is typically measured relative to similar explicit or implicit benchmarks which gives the managers strong incentives to maintain betas that are close to one. Management styles are often highly correlated with security attributes as well and so managers have to take bets that are different from the characteristics portfolios used by financial econometricians in order to justify management fees. Finally, the very commonalities among trading strategies suggest that residual correlations are likely to be higher in the managed portfolio setting than in asset pricing theory tests. Of these, the second observation is likely to be second order but the first and third are of first order importance.
5.1 Inference in the Absence of Performance Ability

Consider first the setting in which it is known \emph{a priori} that the excess returns of \( N \) securities are independently and identically distributed over time from the perspective of uninformed investors. As before, let portfolio \( \delta \) be the mean variance efficient portfolio based on these \( N \) assets. Portfolio \( \delta \) has constant weights under these assumptions and its excess returns are given by:

\[
R_{t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1} = \beta_\delta (R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \varepsilon_{\delta t+1}
\]

where \( E[\varepsilon_{\delta t+1} | I_t] = 0 \).

Managers, however, need not have portfolio weights that are constant and the extent and manner in which their weights vary over time depend on whether they believe they have skill at market timing or security selection. Managers who do not believe they have market timing ability but who think they possess skill at selection will tend to choose fixed weight portfolios if they believe there are constant expected returns to selection but will have portfolios with time-varying weights if they believe that the returns to selection varies across stocks over time.\(^{15}\) In terms of the conditional Jensen regression, these managers will choose time-invariant betas and will believe they have time-varying Jensen alphas. Managers who believe they have market timing ability will also generically vary their weights over time so that their betas and, if they have skill at selection, their alphas will vary over time as well.

Only tests of the skill of managers of the first kind — those with no timing ability and who know it but who falsely think they possess skill at security selection with constant expected returns — are completely straightforward in these circumstances. Such managers believe that their portfolios satisfy the Jensen regression with constant conditional betas:

\[
R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + \beta_p (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}
\]  

where the manager believes that \( \alpha_p = E[\omega'_p \varepsilon_{\delta t+1} | I_{pt}] = \omega'_p E[\varepsilon_{\delta t+1} | I_{pt}] \) and the residual \( \epsilon_{pt+1} = \omega'_p \varepsilon_{\delta t+1} \) is homoskedastic. Hence, the null hypothesis that the manager of portfolio \( p \) does not have skill at selection can be tested with the simple \( t \)-test, which goes by the name of the Treynor-Black appraisal ratio in the performance evaluation literature as was noted earlier.

\(^{15}\) As stated, this is somewhat of an oversimplification: constant expected returns to selection is not the same as constant alphas security by security which is implicitly assumed by the statement. Moreover, constant expected returns to selection will not lead to fixed weight portfolios if managers have implicit hedging demands, such as those that can arise from different compensation schemes.
Similarly, a joint test that $P$ such funds have skill at selection involves the $P$ regressions:

$$R_{pt+1} - \iota R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + \beta_p (R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}$$

where the natural null hypothesis is:

$$H_0 : \alpha_p = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (67)

If returns are normally distributed, this hypothesis can be tested via:

$$\frac{T(T-P-1)\hat{\alpha}_p'\hat{S}_p^{-1}\hat{\alpha}_p}{P(T-2)} \sim F(P, T-P-1).$$

where $\hat{\alpha}_p, \hat{S}_p$ is the sample covariance matrix of the residuals, and $\hat{\phi}_\delta$ is the sample squared Sharpe ratio of the benchmark portfolio that is given by $\hat{\phi}_\delta = \frac{R_\delta - R_f}{s_\delta}$ where $R_\delta - R_f = \sum_{t=1}^T (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})/T$ and $s_\delta^2 = \sum_{t=1}^T (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2/(T-1) - (\bar{R}_\delta - \bar{R}_f)^2$ are the sample mean and variance of benchmark returns, respectively. Jobson and Korkie (1982) and Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) showed that this statistic follows an exact $F$-distribution with $P$ numerator and $T-P-1$ denominator degrees of freedom. In large samples, we can dispense with normality since the statistic:

$$\frac{T\hat{\alpha}_p'\hat{S}_p^{-1}\hat{\alpha}_p}{1 + \hat{\phi}_\delta^2} \sim \chi^2(P),$$

is distributed as $\chi^2$ with $P$ degrees of freedom asymptotically, although it is common to use the associated $F$-statistic formulation as a sort of ad hoc small sample correction. This is a conventional mean variance efficiency test where the test assets are managed portfolios.

Managers might believe they do not have timing ability but that they possess time varying selection skill. Such managers will generically choose portfolios with time varying weights and they will believe that their returns satisfy:

$$R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \omega_p' (R_{t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) = \omega_p' \beta (R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \omega_p' \epsilon_{\delta t+1}$$

$$= \alpha_p + \beta_p (R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p + \epsilon_{pt+1}$$

$$= \alpha_p + \beta_p (R_{\delta t+1} - \iota R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}$$

where the manager believes $\alpha_{pt} = E[\omega_p' \epsilon_{\delta t+1}| I_{pt}] = \omega_p' E[\epsilon_{\delta t+1}| I_{pt}] \neq 0$. If the manager is right, $\alpha_{pt} > 0$, $\alpha_p = E[\alpha_{pt}] > 0$, and $\epsilon_{pt+1} = \omega_p \epsilon_{\delta t+1}$ is a heteroskedastic and serially correlated error term. If the manager is wrong, $\alpha_{pt} = \alpha_p = 0$ and $\epsilon_{pt+1} = \omega_p \epsilon_{\delta t+1}$ is generically a heteroskedastic and serially dependent, but not serially correlated, error term.
The principles governing hypothesis testing is a bit different under the null hypothesis of no skill at security selection. The least squares estimate \( \hat{\alpha}_p \) is given by:

\[
\hat{\alpha}_p = \alpha_p + \frac{1 + \phi_\delta^2}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \epsilon_{pt+1} - \frac{R_\delta - R_f}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \epsilon_{pt+1}
\]  

(69)

and, since \( \epsilon_{\delta t+1} \) is independently and identically distributed, its variance converges to:

\[
\text{Var}(\hat{\alpha}_p) \rightarrow \frac{1}{T} \left\{ (1 + \phi_\delta^2) E[\epsilon_{pt+1}^2] - 2(1 + \phi_\delta^2) R_\delta - R_f \left[ (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \epsilon_{pt+1}^2 \right] 
+ R_\delta - R_f \epsilon_{pt+1}^2 \left[ (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \epsilon_{pt+1}^2 \right] \right\} \]  

(70)

which obviously depends on the extent to which \( \epsilon_{pt+1}^2 = (\omega_p^t \epsilon_{\delta t+1})^2 \) is related to \( R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1} \) and \( (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 \). This is, of course, the familiar heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of the variance of \( \text{Var}(\hat{\alpha}_p) \). If the portfolio weights are independent of market conditions, the variance simplifies to:

\[
\text{Var}(\hat{\alpha}_p) \rightarrow \frac{(1 + \phi_\delta^2) \sigma_{\epsilon_p}^2}{T}
\]

just as it did in the conditionally homoskedastic case and so inference can be based on the large sample \( \chi^2 \)-statistic (68), since normality of asset returns does not deliver normally distributed managed portfolio returns when weights are time-varying.

As it happens, the case in which managers believe they have time-varying security selection skill is identical to that in which they believe they have market timing ability when they do not possess skill in either dimension. That is, the Jensen residual when managers feel they have both market timing and stock picking ability is given by:

\[
\epsilon_{pt+1} = \alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p + (\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}
\]

where \( E[\alpha_{pt} - \alpha_p] = E[(\beta_{pt} - \beta_p)(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})] = 0 \) under the null hypothesis. Hence, irrespective of whether conditional heteroskedasticity arises from attempts at selection that are dependent on market conditions or attempts at market timing, the joint hypothesis that \( P \) alphas are zero can be tested \( \chi^2 \) statistic:

\[
\frac{T \hat{\alpha}_p' \hat{S}_{\epsilon_p} \hat{\alpha}_p}{1 + \phi_\delta} \sim \chi^2(P)
\]  

(71)

where \( \hat{S}_{\epsilon_p} \) is given by:

\[
\hat{S}_{\epsilon_p} = \frac{1}{T} \left[ (1 + \phi_\delta^2) \hat{S}_{\epsilon_p} - 2(1 + \phi_\delta^2) R_\delta - R_f \hat{S}_{R_{\epsilon}} + R_\delta - R_f \hat{S}_{R_{\epsilon}^2} \right]
\]

\[
\hat{S}_{R_{\epsilon}} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \epsilon_{pt+1} \epsilon_{pt+1}' \quad \hat{S}_{R_{\epsilon}^2} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) \epsilon_{pt+1} \epsilon_{pt+1}'
\]
which makes $\hat{S}_{ep}^*$ the heteroskedasticity consistent equivalent of $\hat{S}_{ep}$.

Little is changed if we dispense with the assumption that returns are identically distributed over time while maintaining the assumption of serial independence. From the perspective of the Jensen regression, there is one more potential source of conditional heteroskedasticity related to market conditions if returns are not identically distributed unconditionally. For this reason, too, it would appear that conservative inference suggests the use of the heteroskedastic consistent $\chi^2$ statistic (71).

Serial dependence in returns from the perspective of uninformed investors can create additional complexities. It need not do so: changes in betas due to time-variation in expected returns do not bias Jensen alphas unless $Cov[\overline{\beta}_{pt}, R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}] = E[\overline{\beta}_{pt}\mu_{\delta t}] \neq 0$ where $\overline{\beta}_{pt} = \overline{\beta}_{p} + \overline{\beta}_{p\mu}$ is the conditional beta based on public information, not on market timing ability. Unfortunately, any beta change of the form $\overline{\beta}_{p\mu} = k(\mu_{\delta t} - \mu_{p})$ will cause this assumption to fail, biasing the Jensen alpha upward on the natural hypothesis $k > 0$.

One general strategy for dealing with this problem is to attempt to measure $\overline{\beta}_{p\mu}$ or, more precisely, that portion of $\overline{\beta}_{p\mu}$ that is correlated with expected benchmark returns $\mu_{\delta t}$. To this end, Ferson and Schadt (1996) propose modeling time variation in mutual fund betas as projections onto observed conditioning information as in:

$$\overline{\beta}_{pt} = \overline{\beta}_{p} + \pi_{p}(z_{pt} - \mu_{z}) + e_{\overline{\beta}t}$$

where the identifying assumption is that:

$$E[e_{\overline{\beta}t}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1})] = 0$$

and so the alpha from the revised Jensen regression:

$$E[R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \alpha_p + \overline{\beta}_{p}(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \pi_{p}(z_{pt} - \mu_{z})(R_{\delta t+1} - R_{ft+1}) + e_{pt+1}$$

is purged of the effects of time variation in conditional benchmark betas related to public information under these assumptions. Hence, this model can be estimated by ordinary least squares and the inference procedures identified above can be applied to them without modification.

The Treynor-Mazuy regression coupled with the same sorts of simplifying assumptions provides another avenue for dealing with serial dependence. As is obvious, this resolution can work here
because there is no timing ability under the null hypothesis. Accordingly, consider the Treynor-Mazuy quadratic regression:

\[ R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} = a_p + b_{0p}(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}) + b_{1p}(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 + \zeta_{pt+1} \]

along with the unconditional population projection:

\[ R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1} = \mu_\delta + \pi_\varsigma \varsigma_\beta_{pt} + v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma} \tag{72} \]

where the residual \( v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma} \) is purged of the correlation of \( \varsigma_\beta_{pt} \) with expected excess benchmark returns. Now assume that excess benchmark returns \( R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1} \) and beta innovations \( \varsigma_\beta_{pt} \) are jointly normally distributed and strengthen the lack of correlation between \( v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma} \) and \( \varsigma_\beta_{pt} \) to independence.\(^{16}\)

Substitution of (72) into the normal equations of this variant of the quadratic regression reveals that the unconditional projection coefficients \( b_{0p} \) and \( b_{1p} \) are given by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix} b_{0p} \\ b_{1p} \end{pmatrix} = \left[ \text{Var} \left( \begin{pmatrix} R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1} \\ (R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 \end{pmatrix} \right) \right]^{-1} \text{Cov} \left[ \begin{pmatrix} R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1} \\ (R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2 \end{pmatrix} \right] 
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_\delta^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 3\sigma_\delta^2 \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \text{Cov} \begin{pmatrix} (\beta_p + \varsigma_\beta_{pt})(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}) + \epsilon_{pt+1}, \\ (R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}) \end{pmatrix} 
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix} \beta_p \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} + E \begin{pmatrix} \varsigma_\beta_{pt}(\mu_\delta + \pi_\varsigma \varsigma_\beta_{pt} + v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma})(\pi_\varsigma \varsigma_\beta_{pt} + v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma}) \\ \varsigma_\beta_{pt}(\mu_\delta + \pi_\varsigma \varsigma_\beta_{pt} + v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma})[(\pi_\varsigma \varsigma_\beta_{pt} + v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma})^2 - \sigma_\delta^2] \end{pmatrix} 
\]

\[
= \begin{pmatrix} \beta_p + \frac{\pi_\varsigma \sigma_\delta^2 \mu_\delta}{\sigma_\delta^2} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \equiv \begin{pmatrix} \beta_p \\ \gamma_{0p} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \gamma_{1p} \end{pmatrix} \tag{73} 
\]

and the corresponding intercept \( a_p \) is, under the null hypothesis, given by:

\[
a_p = \text{Cov}[\varsigma_\beta_{pt}, R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}] - \gamma_{0p} E[R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1}] - \gamma_{1p} E[(R_{dt+1} - R_{ft+1})^2] 
\]

\[
= \pi_\varsigma \sigma_\xi^2 - \pi_\varsigma \sigma_\xi^2 \frac{\mu_\delta^2}{\sigma_\delta^2} - \pi_\varsigma \sigma_\xi^2 \frac{2 \mu_\delta^2 + \sigma_\delta^2}{3 \sigma_\delta^2} 
\]

\[
= \pi_\varsigma \sigma_\xi^2 \left[ \frac{1}{3} - \frac{5}{9} \phi_\delta^2 \right]. 
\]

Now \( b_{1p} \) can be used to solve for \( \pi_\varsigma \sigma_\xi^2 \) which can, in turn, be used to solve for \( \beta_p \) and the null hypothesis:

\[
H_0 : a_p = \pi_\varsigma \sigma_\xi^2 
\]

\(^{16}\)This assumption is not entirely innocuous because both \( v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma} \) and \( \varsigma_\beta_{pt} \) would typically be serially dependent in this setting. The role of this assumption is to eliminate any role for dependence between the possibly time-varying higher co-moments of \( v_{dt+1}^{\varsigma} \) and \( \varsigma_\beta_{pt} \).
can be tested using the delta method to calculate the standard error for \( \hat{a}_p - \hat{\pi} \hat{c} \). The extension to \( P \) funds is straightforward.

We have taken the benchmark portfolio as known when it is, in fact, a construct based on stochastic discount factors.\(^{17}\) We can adopt one of two variants of the stochastic discount factor approach, one based on the moment condition \((1)\) and the other based on the moment condition \((4)\) defining portfolio \( \delta \). We describe these methods in turn.

The first approach treats the identification of the stochastic discount factor as a modeling problem. That is, we can model the stochastic discount factor as being given by some functional form:

\[
m_{t+1} = g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m) + \varepsilon_m \]

where \( x_{t+1} \) is a set of state variables that help determine the realization of the family of stochastic discount factors defined by \( E[\varepsilon_m | R_{t+1}] = 0 \) and \( \theta_m \) is a set of unknown parameters. These parameters can be estimated by exploiting the conditional moment conditions:

\[
\tau = E[m_{t+1} R_{t+1} | I_t] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m) + \varepsilon_m | R_{t+1} | I_t] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m) R_{t+1} | I_t] \tag{74}
\]

by multiplying both sides of \((74)\) by \( z_t \in I_t \) and taking unconditional expectations yields:

\[
\tau z_t' = E[g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m) R_{t+1} z_t' | I_t] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m) R_{t+1} | I_t]
\]

\[
\Rightarrow E[\tau z_t'] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m) R_{t+1} z_t']
\]

and so the sample analogue of this moment condition can be used to estimate \( \theta_m \). The null hypothesis that the manager of portfolio \( p \) has no skill at security selection or market timing implies that:

\[
E[\tau_t] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \hat{\theta}_m) z_t R_{pt+1}]
\]

and this hypothesis can be tested using the delta method to calculate the standard error of the difference. Alternatively, the vector of asset returns can be augmented with \( R_{pt+1} \) via \( \mathbf{R}_t^* = (\mathbf{R}_t') \)

\(^{17}\)The case in which the stochastic discount factor is a portfolio of given portfolios can be handled by replacing the single index Jensen and Treynor-Mazuy regressions with multifactor ones in which there are separate betas on each given portfolio. The main complications are notational complexity coupled with the potential for the benchmark portfolio so constructed to have realizations that are not strictly positive.
$R_{pt+1}'$ and the model can be estimated via the unconditional moment condition:

$$E[\nu z_t'] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m)R^*_{t+1}z_t']$$

and the null hypothesis can be tested by examining the difference:

$$E[z_t] = E[g(x_{t+1}, \hat{\theta}^*_m)R_{pt+1}z_t]$$

using the delta method once again. Other GMM tests can be constructed in a similar fashion.

Alternatively, we can construct the empirical analogue of portfolio $\delta$ by using the sample analogues of the moment conditions (4). This approach seems more natural: one usually thinks of $m_{t+1}$ as being the stochastic discount factor implied by some asset pricing model whereas performance evaluation requires only the portfolio of these assets that is the best hedge for any $m_{t+1}$, which is portfolio $\delta$. Since it is convenient to use the variant of the moment conditions for portfolio $\delta$ that works with $m_{t+1}$ as opposed to $m_{t+1} - E[m_{t+1}|I_t] = m_{t+1} - R^{-1}_{ft+1}$, the defining moment conditions are given by:

$$\iota = E[R_{t+1}(R'_{t+1}\delta_t + \varepsilon_{mt+1})|I_t] = E[R_{t+1}R'_{t+1}|I_t]\delta_t$$

where $\delta_t$ is the vector of weights defining portfolio $\delta$ prior to normalizing them to sum to one. Here, too, we require a model for the time-varying weight vector $\delta_t$ of the form:

$$\delta_t = h(z_t, \theta_\delta)$$

where $\theta_\delta$ is a set of unknown parameters. Once again, the parameters of this model can be estimated via the unconditional moment conditions:

$$E[\nu] = E[R_{t+1}R'_{t+1}h(z_t, \theta_\delta)]$$

using GMM. For example, Chen and Knez (1996) examine the natural model:

$$\delta_t = h(z_t, \theta_\delta) = \omega^*z_t,$$

where $\omega^*$ is a suitably conformable matrix of constants. Tests of the null hypothesis can be based on (75) and (76) by substituting $R'_{t+1}h(z_t, \theta_\delta)$ for $g(x_{t+1}, \theta_m)$. 

54
5.2 Power of Statistical Tests for Individual Funds

There are good reasons to be concerned about power in performance evaluation. Economic reasoning suggests that superior performance should not be pervasive across the universe of fund managers. Statistical reasoning suggests that the substantial noise in long-lived asset returns makes it difficult to reliably measure performance in the best of circumstances. We discuss these issues in turn.

Long-lived asset returns can typically be decomposed into systematic risk that cannot be eliminated via diversification and unsystematic risk that can be diversified away. The decomposition of stock returns into common factors and idiosyncratic disturbances is the basis of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976, 1977). Two or three factors account for the bulk of time series and cross-sectional variation in bonds of different maturities. Similarly, currencies are essentially uncorrelated conditional on two or three currencies. Thus it is not an accident that market timing ability is distinguished from skill at security selection among practitioners, the former corresponds to systematic risk and the latter to diversifiable risk.

Security selection cannot pervade the asset universe. If a manager could successfully identify many assets with positive or negative alphas, a well-diversified portfolio which tilted toward the former and away from the latter (or sell them short if feasible) would systematically outperform the benchmark. Any manager with such ability would be able to charge a fee roughly equal to the amount of outperformance and we would routinely observe consistent positive differences between gross and net returns. We do not observe such behavior in the universe of managed portfolios.

Skill at security selection across segments of the asset universe cannot pervade the manager universe either. If there were many managers who could consistently identify assets with positive or negative alphas in different securities, investors would systematically outperform the benchmark by holding diversified portfolios of funds. That is, diversification across funds can replace diversification across assets in these circumstances. Once again, it would be easy to identify portfolios of managed portfolios with consistent positive differences between gross and net returns. We do not observe such behavior in the universe of portfolio managers.

Market timing ability cannot be pervasive because of the number of opportunities to time the market. Market volatility provides managers with many opportunities to profit by buying on average before the relevant benchmark portfolio appreciates and selling on average before its value
declines. Even if managerial skill were only slightly better than a coin toss, the sheer number of coin tosses would result in consistently positive performance on a quarterly or annual basis. Once again, we would observe consistently positive performance among market timers if this were the case. Managers might have "infrequent" market timing success but this would be hard to distinguish from good luck unless, of course, it was "frequent," which this argument says it cannot be.

What do we actually observe? Studies based on managed portfolios for which there is information on asset allocations along the lines of (48) consistently reveal two facts: measured market timing almost never contributes positively to portfolio performance and the distribution of measured security selection skill across portfolios appears to be roughly symmetric and centered around zero. That is, we seldom observe successful market timers and we cannot tell if the good performance of successful stock pickers represents good luck or good policy.

The appropriate null hypothesis may be "no abnormal performance" but this observation implies that "abnormal performance" is not the appropriate alternative hypothesis. Rather the natural alternative hypothesis is that $K$ out of $P$ funds can outperform the benchmark in a given fund universe with $K$ small relative to $P$. Devising powerful tests against such an alternative is challenging. By the same token, it is hard for investors to identify reliable decision rules that identify such managers as well.

The volatility of long-lived asset returns figure prominently in this reasoning. Covariances are measured well in high volatility environments but means are measured poorly. Market timing ability involves covariances and security selection skill is measured by means. The inability to find the former suggests that it is not a widespread skill and observed standard errors of alphas reflect the imprecision with which they are estimated. We can learn more about the latter through simulation.

Two features of long-lived asset returns have special relevance for the question at hand: their extraordinary volatility and the fact that they can be decomposed into systematic and unsystematic risk. We can assess the comparative difficulty of this problem by answering the following question: Suppose we are given the population Treynor-Black appraisal ratio of a managed portfolio along with the population Sharpe ratio of the benchmark. How long would we have to observe the fund in order to have a given probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that the fund exhibits abnormal performance? That is, what is the power of the t-test for the Jensen alpha evaluated at different
To answer this question, we follow the analysis of Blake and Timmermann (2002). As was noted earlier, the t-statistic for the Jensen alpha is given by:

$$t(\hat{\alpha}_p) = \frac{\sqrt{T}\hat{\alpha}_p}{(1 + \phi^2)\sigma_{ep}}$$

which is normally distributed when the returns are normally distributed and $\phi^2$ and $\sigma_{ep}$ are known.

If we are trying to assess the impact of volatility on tests for abnormal performance (i.e., that $\alpha_p \neq 0$ as would be appropriate if we were concerned with the prospect of significant underperformance, corruption of alpha due to market timing ability, or benchmark error), we would consider two-sided tests with critical values of $c/2$ and we would want to assess the probability of detection:

$$P_r \left[ \frac{\sqrt{T}\hat{\alpha}_p}{(1 + \phi^2)\sigma_{ep}} > z_{1-c/2} \right] = \Phi \left[ t(\hat{\alpha}_p) - z_{1-c/2} \right] + \Phi \left[ -t(\hat{\alpha}_p) - z_{1-c/2} \right]$$  (79)

as a function of the sample size $T$. Alternatively, we would seek a one-sided interval with critical value $c$ if we thought Jensen’s alpha is measured without bias and we were not concerned with underperformance, for which:

$$P_r \left[ \frac{\sqrt{T}\hat{\alpha}_p}{(1 + \phi^2)\sigma_{ep}} > z_{1-c} \right] = \Phi \left[ t(\hat{\alpha}_p) - z_{1-c} \right]$$

is the probability of detection.

To be concrete, suppose we are given a managed portfolio with a Treynor-Black appraisal ratio of 0.1 — which corresponds to an appraisal ratio of 0.1 or -0.1 for the two-sided test — and a benchmark Sharpe ratio of zero. These numbers could be generated by a growth stock fund with a beta of one on a passive growth stock index with a volatility of 4.5 percent per month, which, when coupled with an $R^2$ of 0.9, would imply that the portfolio has a residual standard deviation of 1.5 percent. Hence, this fund would have an alpha of 0.15 percent per month and or an annualized alpha of 1.8 percent. In this environment, a one-sided test is associated with the following trade-off between statistical power and sample size:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Required Sample Size (T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13 (1.085 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>94 (7.83 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>270 (22.5 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
while the corresponding two-sided test yields a trade-off of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power required sample size (T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% 43 (3.6 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25% 165 (13.8 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% 385 (30.1 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

between sample size and power. As these numbers clearly indicate, it takes many months to be able to detect positive or abnormal performance with any reliability.

Similarly, we can examine the somewhat higher signal-to-noise ratio environment with an appraisal ratio of 0.2 (and -0.2 for the two-sided test) which corresponds to an alpha of 3.6 per cent per year in the numerical example given above. In this case, the trade-off between power and sample size is given by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power required sample size (T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% 4 (0.3 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25% 24 (2.0 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% 68 (5.7 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

while the corresponding two-sided test yields a trade-off of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power required sample size (T)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% 12 (1.0 year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25% 42 (3.5 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% 96 (8.0 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the probability of detection is considerably higher in this case, it remains the case that it is remarkably difficult to be confident that a managed portfolio has a Treynor-Black appraisal ratio of 0.2, a number that most managers would be thrilled to attain. This problem is exacerbated if ability lies with the manager, not with the fund, since reliable detection of ability would likely occur late in the job tenure of a successful manager. This difficulty in detecting abnormal performance with any statistical precision is why we emphasized the significant benefits associated with the acquisition of other information such as portfolio weight data to supplement return data.
5.3 Inference for Multiple Funds

The presence of literally thousands of actively managed funds raises the natural question whether individual funds or (sub-) groups of funds can outperform their benchmarks. Given this large number of funds, whether outperformance is the result of skill or luck can be very difficult to detect. The Bonferroni bound can be used to establish an upper bound on the probability of superior performance of the very best fund among a large set of \( P \) funds. If we are examining the \( t \)-statistics of the Jensen measures of \( P \) funds, the Bonferroni bound computes the probability that at least one of these exceeds some critical value, \( t_{\text{max}} \) (in practice the largest value observed in the cross-section):

\[
\Pr(\text{at least one } t_i > t_{\text{max}}) = 1 - \Pr(\cap_{i=1}^{P} (t_i < t_{\text{max}})) \\
\leq 1 - (1 - \sum_{i=1}^{P} \Pr(t_i \geq t_{\text{max}})) \\
= \sum_{i=1}^{P} \Pr(t_i \geq t_{\text{max}}) \\
= P\Phi(t_{\text{max}}), \quad \text{or} \\
\Pr(\text{at least one } t_i \geq t_{\text{max}}) \leq \min(1, P\Phi(t_{\text{max}}))
\]

where \( \Phi(.) \) is the complementary cumulative distribution function of the individual student-\( t \) statistics (i.e. one minus the cumulative distribution function). Unfortunately, the Bonferroni bound is quite conservative and thus may fail in detecting genuine abnormal performance. The reason is that it is robust to any correlation patterns across the \( P \) performance statistics, including patterns for which inference is extremely difficult.

An alternative semi-parametric approach that accounts for the correlation structure in fund returns through their exposure to a set of common benchmark portfolios factors but does not require explicitly modeling the covariance structure in fund-specific residuals has been proposed by Kosowski et al. (2006). They argue that the skill versus luck question can be addressed in many different ways, depending on how large a fraction of funds one tests for abnormal performance. The hypothesis that the manager of the very best fund among a larger universe of \( P \) funds cannot
produce a positive alpha takes the form

\[ H_0 : \max_{p=1,\ldots,P} \alpha_p \leq 0, \text{ and} \]
\[ H_A : \max_{p=1,\ldots,P} \alpha_p > 0. \]

More broadly, one may want to rank a group of funds by their alpha estimates and ask whether the top 5%, say, of funds outperform. Let \( i^* \) be the rank of the fund corresponding to this percentile. When testing whether this fund manager can pick stocks, the null and alternative hypotheses are

\[ H_0 : \alpha_{p^*} \leq 0, \text{ and} \]
\[ H_A : \alpha_{p^*} > 0. \]

Since the alpha measure is not pivotal whereas the estimated t-statistic of \( \widehat{\alpha} \), \( \widehat{t}_{\alpha} \) is, a bootstrap test based on this statistic is likely to have lower coverage errors. \( \widehat{t}_{\alpha} \) has another attractive statistical property: Funds with a shorter history of monthly net returns will have an alpha estimated with less precision, and will tend to generate alphas that are outliers. The \( t \)-statistic provides a correction for these spurious outliers by normalizing the estimated alpha by the estimated precision of the alpha estimate – it is related to the well-known “information ratio” performance measure of Treynor and Black (1973).

Using this performance measure, the null and alternative hypotheses for the highest ranked fund are:

\[ H_0 : \max_{p=1,\ldots,P} t_p \leq 0, \text{ and} \]
\[ H_A : \max_{p=1,\ldots,P} t_p > 0. \]

The joint distribution of the alphas is difficult to characterize and compute. Even if it is known that returns are joint Gaussian, the above test statistics will still depend on the \( P \times P \) covariance matrix which is difficult to estimate with any degree of precision when – as is typically the case – \( P \) is large relative to the sample size, \( T \). Furthermore, many funds do not have overlapping return histories which renders estimation of the covariance matrix infeasible by means of standard methods. Kosowski et al. (2006) propose to use the following bootstrap procedure to test for abnormal performance of a group of funds. In the first step the individual funds’ alphas are estimated via OLS using a performance model of the form

\[ R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \hat{\alpha}_p + \hat{\beta}_p (R_{dt} - R_{ft}) + \hat{c}_{p,t}. \]
This generates coefficient estimates, \( \{\hat{\alpha}_p, \hat{\beta}_p\}_{p=1}^P \), time-series of residuals, \( \{\varepsilon_{p,t} , t = 1, T_p, p = 1, \ldots, P\} \) as well as the \( t \)-statistic of alpha, \( \hat{t}_\hat{\alpha} \). Bootstrapped residuals can be resampled by drawing a sample with replacement from the fund \( i \) residuals, thus creating a new time-series, \( \{\varepsilon^b_{p,t}, t = s^b_1, s^b_2, \ldots, s^b_{T_p}\} \). Each bootstrap sample has the same number of residuals (e.g., the same number of time periods, \( T_p \)) as the original sample for each fund \( p \). This resampling procedure is repeated for all bootstrap iterations, \( b = 1, \ldots, B \).

For each bootstrap iteration, \( b \), a time-series of (bootstrapped) net returns is constructed for each fund, imposing the null hypothesis of zero true performance (\( \alpha_p = 0 \), or, equivalently, \( \hat{t}_\hat{\alpha} = 0 \)), letting \( s^b_1, s^b_2, \ldots, s^b_{T_p} \) be the time reordering imposed by resampling the residuals in bootstrap iteration \( b \):

\[
\{R^b_{p,t} - R^b_{ft} = \hat{\beta}_i(R^{b}_{dt} - R^{b}_{ft}) + \varepsilon^b_{p,t} , t = s^b_1, s^b_2, \ldots, s^b_{T_p}\}.
\]

By construction, these artificially generated returns have a true alpha of zero since we have imposed alpha to be zero. Because a given bootstrap draw may have an unusually large number of positive draws of the residual term, however, this can lead to an unusually large estimate of alpha in the OLS regression of the returns in the \( b \)th bootstrap sample on an intercept and the benchmark portfolio returns.

Repeating these steps across funds, \( p = 1, \ldots, P \), and bootstrap iterations, \( b = 1, \ldots, B \), gives a cross-sectional distribution of the alpha estimates, \( \hat{\alpha}_p \), or their \( t \)-statistics, \( \hat{t}_{\hat{\alpha}_p} \), due to sampling variation, as we impose the null of no abnormal performance. Keeping \( b \) fixed and letting \( p \) vary from 1 to \( P \), we get one draw from the cross-sectional distribution of alpha estimates. These alpha estimates \( \{\hat{\alpha}^b_1, \hat{\alpha}^b_2, \ldots, \hat{\alpha}^b_P\} \) can be ranked to get an estimate of the maximum value of \( \hat{\alpha}_p \), \( \hat{\alpha}_{\max}^b \), the \( c \)th quantile, \( \hat{\alpha}_{(c)}^b \), and so forth. Repeating this across \( b = 1, \ldots, B \), produces a distribution of cross-sectional quantiles \( \{\hat{\alpha}_{(c)}^1, \ldots, \hat{\alpha}_{(c)}^B\} \). Comparing the corresponding quantile in the actual data generates a test of whether the top 100\( c \) percentage of funds can outperform, based on a statistic such as

\[
B^{-1} \sum_{b=1}^B I\{\hat{\alpha}^b_{(c)} < \hat{\alpha}_{(c)}\}.
\]

5.4 Empirical Specifications of Alpha Measures

Following the above discussion of performance benchmarks, we briefly discuss some benchmarks that have been used extensively in the empirical literature. The class of unconditional alpha
measures includes specifications proposed by Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The Carhart (1997) four-factor regression model is

$$R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_p + b_p (R_{mt} - R_{ft}) + s_p \cdot SMB_t + g_p \cdot HML_t + h_p \cdot PR1YR_t + \varepsilon_{pt},$$  

(81)

where $SMB_t$, $HML_t$, and $PR1YR_t$ equal the period-$t$ returns on value-weighted, zero net investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns, respectively. The Fama and French alpha is computed using the Carhart model of Equation (81), excluding the momentum factor ($PR1YR_t$), while the Jensen alpha is computed using the market excess return as the only benchmark:

$$R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_p + b_p \cdot (R_{mt} - R_{ft}) + \varepsilon_{pt}.$$  

(82)

Ferson and Schadt (1996) modify the Jensen regression of equation (82) to obtain a class of conditional performance measures that control for time-varying factor loadings as follows:

$$R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_p + b_p \cdot (R_{mt} - R_{ft}) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} B_{p,j} [z_{j,t-1} \cdot (R_{mt} - R_{ft})] + \varepsilon_{pt},$$  

(83)

where $z_{j,t-1}$ is the de-meaned period-$t-1$ public information variable $j$, and $B_{p,j}$ is the fund’s “beta response” to the value of $z_{j,t-1}$.\(^\text{18}\) Hence the Ferson and Schadt measure computes the alpha of a managed portfolio, controlling for investment strategies with weights that are linear functions of publicly available economic information that dynamically modify portfolio betas in response to predictable components of benchmark returns.

Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) expand this class of models by allowing fund alphas to vary over time as well. For example, their variant of the Jensen model of equation (82) is

$$R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_p + b_p \cdot (R_{mt} - R_{ft}) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} B_{p,j} [z_{j,t-1} \cdot (R_{mt} - R_{ft})] + \varepsilon_{pt}.$$  

(84)

Most studies have found that the typical fund does not outperform on a risk- and expense-adjusted basis, cf. Jensen (1968), Carhart (1997), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996) and Daniel et al. (1997).

\(^{18}\)Farnsworth et al (2001) find that a range of stochastic discount factor models have a mild negative bias when performance is neutral. See also Lynch et al. (2002) for an analysis of the relationship between performance measures and stochastic discount factor models.
5.4.1 Persistence in Performance

One of the implications of the absence of arbitrage is that we should not expect to find funds that persistently outperform the relevant benchmarks. To see this, note that the no-arbitrage condition \( E[(R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1})m_{t+1}|I_t] = 0 \) implies

\[
E[(R_{pt+1} - R_{ft+1})(R_{pt} - R_{ft} - (\bar{R}_p - \bar{R}_f))m_{t+1}] = 0,
\]

so that, on a risk-adjusted basis, returns are serially uncorrelated.


One way to model time-variations in alpha and beta, pursued by Kosowski (2002), is to assume that these depend on some underlying state (boom and bust, expansion and recession, volatile and calm markets) and treat this state as unobserved. Suppose that the state follows a Markov chain and the alpha, beta, and idiosyncratic risk are functions of a single, latent state variable \((s_t)\):\(^{19}\)

\[
R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_{s_t} + \beta_{s_t} (R_{\delta t} - R_{ft}) + \epsilon_t, \epsilon_t \sim (0, \sigma^2_{\epsilon_t}).
\]

Conditional on a vector of variables known at time \(t - 1\), \(z_{t-1}\), the state transition probabilities follow a first order Markov chain:

\[
\begin{align*}
p_t & = P(s_t = 1|s_{t-1} = 1, z_{t-1}) = p(z_{t-1}) \\
1 - p_t & = P(s_t = 2|s_{t-1} = 1, z_{t-1}) = 1 - p(z_{t-1}) \\
q_t & = P(s_t = 2|s_{t-1} = 2, z_{t-1}) = q(z_{t-1}) \\
1 - q_t & = P(s_t = 1|s_{t-1} = 2, z_{t-1}) = 1 - q(z_{t-1}).
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{19}\)This approach is the natural time series extension of the Henriksson-Merton analysis. Here the persistence in betas arises because of persistence in state variables whereas the persistence in betas in the analogue of Henriksson-Merton would arise from persistence in market timing signals.
Hence, conditional on being in state $s_t$, portfolio returns have a normal distribution with mean $\alpha_{s_t} + \beta_{s_t} (R_{s_t} - R_{ft})$ and variance $\sigma^2_{s_t}$. We assume a constant relationship between the market return and excess returns within each state, but allow this relation to vary between states. Hence, in certain states, beta is high and the sensitivity to market movements very significant. At other times beta is low and risk is smaller. Information about which state the portfolio is currently in is therefore important for assessing risk and portfolio performance.

6 Bayesian Approaches

A meaningful decision theoretical framework must use information on the uncertainty surrounding the parameters characterizing a funds’ abnormal performance. However, it can also use prior information as a way to account for the noise often dominating parameter estimates. Use of such prior information is akin to shrinkage, a technique that is known to be able to improve upon out-of-sample forecasting performance in areas such as construction of covariance matrix estimators, forecast combinations and portfolio formation.

As an example of this approach, Baks, Metrick and Wachter (2001) propose a Bayesian setting where investors with mean-variance preference decide whether or not to hold any of their wealth in a single actively managed mutual fund. Their setup is as follows. Suppose the common component of asset returns is captured through $K$ benchmark assets (passively managed index funds) with period-$t + 1$ returns $F_{t+1}$ and an actively managed fund with returns $r_{t+1}$ that are assumed to be generated by the model

$$r_{t+1} = \alpha + F_{t+1}^\prime \beta + \varepsilon_{t+1},$$

(85)

where $\varepsilon_{t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$. The parameters $\alpha, \beta$ are viewed as fixed attributes associated with the fund manager. The question is now how large a fraction of wealth, $\omega$, the investor is willing to allocate to the mutual fund. This question depends in part on the investor’s prior beliefs about the manager’s ability to generate a positive $\alpha$, in part on the fund manager’s track record. The latter is captured through a $T \times 1$ vector of excess returns, $r$, while $F$ is a $T \times K$ matrix of factor returns and $\varepsilon$ is a $T \times 1$ vector of residuals. Assuming that return shocks, $\varepsilon$, are independently and identically distributed and normally distributed, we have

$$p(r|\alpha, \beta, \sigma^2, F) = N(\alpha \iota_T + F \beta, \sigma^2 I_T),$$
where again \( \iota_T \) is a \( T \times 1 \) vector of ones and \( I_T \) is the \( T \times T \) identity matrix. Baks et al. (2001) capture prior beliefs concerning \( \alpha \) as follows. Let \( Z \) be a random indicator variable that captures whether the manager is skilled (\( Z = 1 \)) or unskilled (\( Z = 0 \)), the former having a prior probability of \( q \). Both \( \beta \) and \( \sigma \) are assumed to be independent of whether or not the manager is skilled so that any skills are defined with respect to security selection. This means that the prior for the joint distribution of \( (\alpha, \beta, \sigma^2) \) can be factored out as follows:

\[
p(\alpha, \beta, \sigma^2) = [p(\alpha|Z = 0)P(Z = 0) + p(\alpha|Z = 1)P(Z = 1)]p(\beta, \sigma^2) \tag{86}
\]

To get analytical results, Baks et al. (2001) assume a diffuse prior on \( \beta, \sigma^2 \), i.e. \( p(\beta, \sigma^2) \propto \sigma^{-2} \).

The prior for the manager’s stock selection skills is determined from the following set of equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
p(Z = 1) &= q \\
p(Z = 0) &= 1 - q, \\
p(\alpha|Z = 0, \sigma^2) &= \delta_{\alpha}, \\
p(\alpha|Z = 1, \sigma^2) &= 2N \left( \alpha, \sigma^2 \left( \sigma^2 \right) \right) I_{\alpha > 0},
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \delta_{\alpha} \) is the Dirac function that puts full mass at \( \alpha = \alpha \), and no mass anywhere else, while \( I_{\alpha > 0} \) is an indicator function that equals unity if \( \alpha > 0 \) and is zero otherwise. \( \alpha < 0 \) represents the return expected from an unskilled fund manager, while \( s^2 \) is a constant used in the elicitation of priors. Baks et al. (2001) set \( \alpha = -q\sigma \alpha \sqrt{2/\pi} - fee - cost \), where \( fee \) is the manager’s expected fee and \( cost \) is the fund’s expected transaction costs.

Under these assumptions the posterior distribution of \( \alpha, E[\alpha|r, F] \), denoted by \( \hat{\alpha} \), can be computed as the (posterior) expected value of \( \alpha \) conditional on the manager being skilled times the probability that the manager is skilled, plus the value of \( \alpha \) if the fund manager is unskilled, \( \overline{\alpha} \), times the probability that he is unskilled:

\[
\hat{\alpha} = \hat{q}E[\alpha|Z = 1, r, F] + (1 - \hat{q})\overline{\alpha},
\]

where \( \hat{q} = P(Z = 1|r, F) \) is the posterior probability that the fund manager is skilled. Both \( \hat{q} \) and \( E[\alpha|Z = 1, r, F] \) need to be computed to assess the value of fund management. Let \( X = (\iota_T \ F) \) so the least-squares estimates of \( (\hat{\alpha} \ \hat{\beta}) \) are given by

\[
(\hat{\alpha} \ \hat{\beta})' = (X'X)^{-1}X'r,
\]

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while the variance of the maximum likelihood for $\alpha$ conditional on a known residual variance, $\sigma^2$, is

$$\text{var}(\hat{\alpha}) = e_1'(XX)^{-1}e_1\sigma^2,$$

where $e_1 = (1 \ 0 \ \cdots \ 0)'$. For a skilled manager ($Z = 1$) the posterior distribution of $\alpha$ given the data and $\sigma^2$ is

$$P(\alpha|Z = 1, r, F, \sigma^2) \propto N(\alpha', \sigma'^2)1_{\alpha > \underline{\alpha}},$$

(88)

where the posterior parameters are

$$\alpha' = \lambda\hat{\alpha} + (1 - \lambda)\alpha,$$

$$\sigma'^2 = \left(\frac{1}{\text{var}(\hat{\alpha})} + \frac{1}{\sigma^2(\sigma^2)}\right)^{-1},$$

$$\lambda^2 = \frac{\sigma'^2}{\text{var}(\hat{\alpha})}.$$

Here $\alpha'$ is the mode of the skilled manager’s posterior distribution. This differs from the mean due to the truncation of the distribution of $\alpha$ at $\underline{\alpha}$. Under the assumed normality, the truncation causes the mode to be a weighted average of the least squares estimate, $\hat{\alpha}$, and truncation point, $\underline{\alpha}$, with weights that reflect the precision of the data relative to the precision of the prior, $\lambda$. Finally, the posterior precision, $\sigma'^{-2}$, is the sum of the precision of the prior and the precision of the data.

Integrating out $\beta$ and $\sigma^2$, the (marginal) posterior distribution for $\alpha$ is proportional to a truncated student-$t$:

$$p(\alpha|Z = 1, r, F) \propto t_v\left(\alpha', \frac{\lambda e_1'(XX)^{-1}e_1h}{T-K}\right) I_{\alpha > \underline{\alpha}},$$

where $h = (r - \hat{r})'(r - \hat{r}) + (1 - \lambda)(\hat{\alpha} - \underline{\alpha})^2(e_1'(XX)^{-1}e_1)$ and $\hat{r} = X(\hat{\alpha} \ \hat{\beta})$ are the fitted returns. This is all that is required to compute the posterior mean of $\alpha$, obtained by integrating over $p(\alpha|Z = 1, r, F)$ to the right of the truncation point, $\underline{\alpha}$:

$$E[\alpha|Z = 1, r, F] = \alpha' + \frac{\lambda e_1'(XX)^{-1}e_1h}{T-K-2} \frac{t_{T-K}(\alpha'; \alpha', \frac{\lambda e_1'(XX)^{-1}e_1h}{T-K-2})}{\int_{\underline{\alpha}} t_{T-K}(\alpha'; \alpha', \frac{\lambda e_1'(XX)^{-1}e_1h}{T-K-2})d\alpha}.$$

The posterior probability that the manager is skilled given the data is obtained from Bayes’ rule:

$$\tilde{q} = P(Z = 1|r, F) = \frac{qP(r|Z = 1, F)}{qP(r|Z = 1, F) + (1 - q)P(r|Z = 0, F)}$$

$$= \frac{q}{q + \frac{1-q}{P(r)}}$$

66
where $B = p(r|Z = 1, F)/p(r|Z = 0, F)$ is the odds ratio that a given return is generated by a skilled versus an unskilled manager. The more likely it is that a given return data is generated by a skilled manager than by an unskilled manager, the higher is $B$:

$$B = \frac{t_{T-K-1}(\alpha; \hat{\alpha}, \lambda e_1 h(r-\hat{r})/T - K)}{t_{T-K-1}(\alpha; \hat{\alpha}, \lambda e_1 h(r-\hat{r})/T - K)} \left( 2 \int_{\alpha}^{\alpha'} t_{T-K}(\alpha; \alpha', \lambda e_1 h(T-\hat{r})/T - K) d\alpha \right).$$

Hence $B$ is the likelihood ratio of two $t$-distributions multiplied by a term that accounts for the effect of truncation.

To account for the possibility of investing in multiple actively managed funds, Baks et al. (2001) assume that both the likelihood functions and the priors are independent across managers. In this case the posterior distributions are independent across managers so the computations with multiple active funds do not change.

Letting $(r_N F)$ be the return on $N$ actively managed funds and the $K$ passive index funds, under the assumption that $(r_N F) \sim N(\tilde{E}, \tilde{V})$, Baks et al. (2001) show that the weights on the actively managed and index funds, $\omega = (\omega_A \omega_F)'$ for an investor with mean-variance preferences $U = E[R_p] - (A/2)Var(R_p)$ over the mean and variance of portfolio returns, $E[R_p], Var(R_p)$ are given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} \omega_A \\ \omega_F \end{pmatrix} = (1/A) \tilde{V}^{-1} \tilde{E}. \quad (89)$$

Furthermore, holdings in the actively managed funds can be shown to be given by

$$\omega_A = (1/A) \Omega^{-1} \hat{\alpha}, \quad (90)$$

where $\Omega^{-1}$ is diagonal with exclusively positive elements. This means that an active fund is held if and only if the posterior mean of its alpha estimate is strictly positive.

In their empirical analysis, Baks et al (2001) find that a frequentist analysis of the performance of the best fund managers cannot reject the null that none of the fund managers is skilled (and hence that nothing should be invested in their funds). In contrast, the Bayesian analysis finds that even small prior probabilities of skill translate into some holdings in actively managed funds. The reason for this seemingly contradictory result is related to the weak power of statistical tests against small positive values of $\alpha$, that are nevertheless economically important.20

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20 It may also be a consequence of implicitly placing strong prior probabilities that some funds outperform the
6.1 Asset Mispricing and Investment in Mutual Funds

Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a, 2002b) extend this analysis to allow for the possibility of mispricing relative to a factor pricing benchmark such as a multifactor model. Hence investors view manager skill not just in relation to a set of benchmark portfolio returns but also with respect to a set of nonbenchmark assets’ returns that are tracked by a set of passive index funds. In this setting investors also are endowed with priors about possible mispricing. In the following we describe the Pastor-Stambaugh approach.

Common components in asset returns are captured through an $m \times 1$ vector of excess returns, $r_{Nt}$, on $m$ nonbenchmark passive assets and $k$ benchmark returns, $r_{Bt}$. Returns on the nonbenchmark assets are given by

$$r_{Nt} = \alpha_N + B_N r_{Bt} + \varepsilon_{Nt},$$  

(91)

where $E[\varepsilon_{Nt}\varepsilon_{Nt}^\prime] = \Sigma$.

Returns on any fund can now be regressed on the nonbenchmark and benchmark returns:

$$r_{At} = \delta_A + c_A' r_{Nt} + c_{AB}' r_{Bt} + u_{At},$$  

(92)

where $E[u_{At}^2] = \sigma_u^2$ and all innovations are assumed to be Gaussian.

The key difference between nonbenchmark and benchmark returns in Pastor and Stambaugh’s analysis lies in the assumption that only the latter are included as priced factors in asset pricing models. Hence, under the null that only the benchmark assets are priced, fund performance is naturally measured only with regard to $r_{Bt}$:

$$r_{At} = \alpha_A + \beta_A' r_{Bt} + \varepsilon_{At}.$$  

(93)

Notice that a fund manager with a positive alpha need not be skilled if the positive alpha is due to his holdings of passive assets with nonzero alphas. Thus, if there is a possibility that the benchmark assets do not price the nonbenchmark assets exactly, $\alpha_N \neq 0$, then $\delta_A$ in (92) defined with regard to the full set of passive assets becomes a better measure of skill than $\alpha_A$ in (93). Using (91) in benchmark. With many funds with parameters that are treated as independent a priori and a posteriori, it must be the case that the prior probability that a small number of funds outperform is overwhelming when there are many funds in the sample.
(92) gives the decomposition

\[ r_{At} = \delta_A + c'_AN\alpha_N + \left(c_{AN}B_N + c'_AB\right)r_{Bt} + c_{AN}\varepsilon_{Nt} + u_{At}, \]

so that

\[ \alpha_A = \delta_A + c'_AN\alpha_N, \]
\[ \beta_A = c_{AN}B_N + c'_AB. \]

The priors assumed by Pastor and Stambaugh are as follows. \( B_N \) has a diffuse prior while the prior for \( \Sigma \) is an inverted Wishart, \( \Sigma^{-1} \sim W(H^{-1}, v) \), the prior for \( \sigma_u^2 \) is an inverted gamma, i.e. \( \sigma_u^2 \sim v_0\sigma_0^2/\chi^2_{v_0} \), where \( \chi^2_{v_0} \) is a chi-square variate with \( v_0 \) degrees of freedom. Finally, given \( \sigma_u^2 \), the prior for \( c_A = (c'_{AN} c'_{AB})' \) is Gaussian. The specific values of the parameters assumed for these priors are derived using empirical Bayes methods.

Turning to the skill and mispricing priors, Pastor and Stambaugh assume that, conditional on \( \Sigma \), the prior for \( \alpha_N \) is

\[ \alpha_N|\Sigma \sim N\left(0, \sigma_{\alpha_N}^2 \Sigma \sigma_{\alpha_N}^2\right), \]

where \( E[\Sigma] = s^2I_m \) is a diagonal matrix. Here \( \sigma_{\alpha_N} \) is the (marginal) prior standard deviation of \( \alpha_N \) (assumed to be identical across all nonbenchmark assets). Clearly, if \( \sigma_{\alpha_N} = 0 \), \( \alpha_N = 0 \) and the investor has full confidence in the benchmark assets’ ability to price the nonbenchmark assets. The greater the value of \( \sigma_{\alpha_N} \), the higher the chance of mispricing of these assets, although since the prior distribution of \( \alpha_N \) is centered at zero, in expectation the investor always thinks that there is no bias in the pricing model.

Pastor and Stambaugh assume that investors’ prior beliefs about managers’ skills follow a similar distribution:

\[ \delta_A|\sigma_u^2 \sim N\left(\delta_0, \frac{\sigma_u^2}{E[\sigma_u^2]}\sigma^2_\delta\right). \]

The scaling by \( \sigma_u^2/E[\sigma_u^2] \) ensures that if \( \sigma_u^2 \) is high, so little of the variation in a fund’s returns is explained by the passive portfolios, then a larger value of abnormal performance, \( \delta_A \), becomes more likely. \( \delta_0 \), the mean of the residual performance adjusted for risk exposure to the benchmark and nonbenchmark assets, reflects the performance net of cost of a truly unskilled fund manager. Hence it is given by the monthly equivalent to the fund’s expense ratio and its turnover times a
round-trip cost of one percent:
\[
\delta_0 = -\frac{1}{12} (\text{expense} + 0.01 \times \text{turnover}).
\]

Letting \( \mathbf{R} = (\mathbf{R}_N \mathbf{R}_B) \) be the \( T \times (n+k) \) matrix of sample data on the passive index portfolios and \( \mathbf{r}_{T+1} \) be the vector of fund returns in the following period, the posterior predictive distribution is obtained as
\[
p(\mathbf{r}_{T+1} | \mathbf{R}) = \int p(\mathbf{r}_{T+1} | \mathbf{R}, \theta) p(\theta, \mathbf{R}) d\theta,
\]
where \( p(\theta | \mathbf{R}) \) is the posterior distribution of the parameters, \( \theta \).

In their empirical analysis, Pastor and Stambaugh (2002b) find that both prior beliefs about managers’ skills and prior beliefs about pricing models are important to investors’ decision of whether or not to invest in actively managed funds. An investor with complete confidence in the benchmark asset pricing model (CAPM) who is ruling out the possibility of a non-zero value of \( \alpha_A \) naturally only invests in market-index funds. If this investor admits the possibility that returns may be explained by \( p \) passive funds, even when believing with full confidence that \( \delta_A = 0 \), this investor is willing to hold some money in actively managed funds provided that it is not possible to invest directly in the passive funds. The logic is of course that when investors cannot directly hold the benchmark or nonbenchmark assets, actively managed funds can track the benchmark portfolios with smaller errors than passively managed funds. Hence even investors who are skeptical about the possibility of managerial skill may choose to invest in actively managed mutual funds.

7 Conclusion

In fits and starts, the finance profession has come a long way since the pioneering work of Jensen (1968, 1969, 1972), Sharpe (1966), and Treynor and Mazuy (1966). To be sure, many of the issues discovered in this early work remain: in particular, the twin problems of the identification and measurement of appropriate benchmarks and the biases in performance measures arising from market timing. Yet we have learned much about the precise form these problems take and we have developed new methods and new sources of information. And the markets have learned much as well: the pervasive use of benchmark-based performance measurement and attribution in the mutual fund and pension fund industries are a testament to the impact of academic research.
We know that the theoretically appropriate benchmark is a portfolio, $\delta$, which need not come from some equilibrium asset pricing model. It can come from the theory of portfolio choice: portfolio $\delta$ is the mean variance efficient portfolio that hedges the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of any investor who is on the margin with respect to each asset chosen by the performance evaluator even if the investors invest in many other assets not included in the analysis. It can come from the hypothesis that markets are arbitrage-free, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for optimal portfolio choice: after all, nobody would be a marginal investor in an asset menu that permitted investors to eliminate their budget constraints. We know this because the basic question of performance measurement turns out to be quite simple: are the managed portfolios under evaluation worth adding to the asset menu chosen by the evaluator? To be sure, the optimal benchmark remains the Holy Grail, if only because the moments – in particular, the conditional and unconditional first moments of asset returns – required for its identification are hard to measure with any precision. However, much progress has been made on identifying the asset menus that are hard for managed portfolios to beat.

We also know quite a bit about the problem of market timing, ignoring the benchmark identification issue. When asset returns are not predictable based on public information, market timing efforts cause problems for performance evaluation based on Jensen-type measures only when it is successful, modulo sampling error. Moreover, Treynor-Mazuy-type measures can detect the presence of successful market timing when present and, when returns and shifts in betas to exploit market timing opportunities are jointly normally distributed, it is possible to measure both Jensen-type alphas and the quality of market timing information. Matters are more complicated when returns are predictable based on public information but the same basic results obtain when it is possible to characterize the predictability of excess benchmark returns and betas from the perspective of an uninformed investor. To be sure, these developments are mostly of academic interest, in part because of an important empirical development: the availability of data beyond managed portfolio returns.

In particular, much recent research has exploited newly available data on asset allocations and individual security holdings. Asset allocation data make it reasonably straightforward to see whether managers are successful market timers by seeing whether they tilt toward an asset class before it does well and away before it does poorly. The empirical record for pension funds is clear

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21 For a comprehensive study making use of data on mutual funds’ securities holdings, see Wermers (2000).
on this score: successful market timers are rare, if not nonexistent. Individual portfolio holdings make it reasonably straightforward to see whether managers tilt toward individual securities before they go up in price and away before they decline, although there is no clear distinction between market timing and security selection in this case. Most importantly, these observations make it clear that the data are being overworked when managed portfolio returns are asked to reveal both normal performance and abnormal performance of both the security selection and market timing variety.

And it seems that the impact of academia on best practice in the industry would appear to have largely solved the problem of market timing as well. Managers are typically measured against explicit benchmarks, eliminating the problem of estimating betas when the target beta of a fund is unity by contract. Moreover, the gap between the practitioner and academic communities has narrowed considerably given the performance measurement and attribution procedures that now pervade industry. Future analyses of managed portfolio performance may well be largely free of the problem of market timing.

This suggests that future research will have more to say about the performance of managed portfolios than about the tools we use to measure it. To be sure, methodology will continue to be a focus of the academic literature as evidenced, for example, in the emergence of a Bayesian literature on performance evaluation. The main point remains that research over the last four decades has made it much easier to answer the central question of performance measurement: do managed portfolios add to the investment opportunities implicit in sensible benchmark portfolios?
References


