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What I explore in this paper is how we can address the question of difference within the research relationship. In the first part of the paper I explore the consequences of difference in one particularly compelling research encounter of my own where accusations of racism damaged the research relationship. I argue that we need to examine the researcher-researched relationship in detail and investigate the recognition of difference that structures this relationship in order to analyse material drawn from research. In the second part of the paper I show how this may be done within a particular social psychological perspective – that of the theory of social representations. This enables an exploration into the relationship between what is said, who said it and to whom, or, in other words, an analysis of the relationship between representations emerging and identities being played out in the research context. I illustrate the value of this approach by analysing the example from my own research previously discussed. In the final part of the paper I demonstrate that difference in the researcher-researched relationship is not simply a problem of methodology but needs to be analysed as a feature of human relations. An understanding of the relationship between social representations and identities, I argue, illuminates the question of difference in qualitative research and demonstrates the value of difference.

Key words: difference, researcher identity, racism, social representations.

Using the theory of social representations to explore difference in the research relationship

In the context of research, the old feminist slogan 'the personal is the political' means that we must start from the personal and indicate the ways in which our locations and identities as researchers inform and shape the research process. (Ristock and Pennell, 1996, p.66).

Within any research setting there are always questions of difference. How far do differences between researched and researcher stimulate or inhibit understanding? How far can we recognise difference? How far can we bridge it? How far can one "write the Other's culture?" (Corbey and Leerssen, 1991, p.ix). What impact do the identities of researchers have on the researched as well as the material produced in research? If that fact that I am a white woman affects the answers my respondents give me, are these answers valid, reliable or simply 'true'? And if not, why not?

There has been considerable debate about how far researchers can penetrate cultures and settings other than their own. There is little agreement on whether or not "researchers should be members of the groups we study, in order to have the subjective knowledge necessary to truly understand their life experiences" (Miller and Glassner, 1997, p.105). In the sociology of 'race', for example, there has been fierce argument as to how far white researchers can understand and empathise with black experiences of racism (e.g. Lawrence, 1981). Similarly, feminist researchers sometimes claim that male researchers cannot relate to issues that concern women (e.g. Stanley and Wise, 1993). In these cases

there is the concern that “as a result of social distances, interviewees may not trust us, they may not understand our questions, or they may purposely mislead us in their responses” (Miller and Glassner, 1997, p.101). Whitehead (1986), for example, has revealed how his ‘brownness’ initially inhibited full acceptance into the black gang which he was studying.

By contrast, other researchers embrace difference in the research relationship as a catalyst to rich and insightful narratives. They also claim that studying one’s own familiar environment produces superficial accounts that fail to penetrate the taken-for-granted relationships that are routine and mundane for the insider. For example, Finnegan (1989) has expressed concern that she may be “*too much of an insider*” in studying her own village community (p.343, italics in the original). Failing to establish distance may lead to the problem of ‘over-rapport’ as participants’ views merge with the researcher’s analysis. The risk, here, is failing to understand that one has *not* understood (Ichheiser, 1949). A more serious danger, as other qualitative researchers have recognised, is that “invoking insider status can result in intellectuals and ethnographers claiming a privileged right to speak for ‘the people’” (Back, 1996, p. 23). Ideally, social research projects should combine different perspectives of researcher-as-insider and researcher-as-outsider, as Crow and Allan suggest (1994). The lone researcher, however, can only strive “to be intellectually poised between familiarity and strangeness” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p.112).

Suggestions that we can study only those similar to ourselves may bolster essentialistic assumptions that we fit into particular categories of others with the same intrinsic traits and concrete experiences. Because I am a woman, for example, I am better able to recognise the authenticity of women’s experiences and so build a sympathetic and

trusting relationship with female participants as we share the same “voice” (Gilligan, 1993). I fundamentally disagree with this line of reasoning. To assume shared knowledge and experiences on the basis of common social identifications is patronising and essentialistic, as other feminists have recognised (e.g. Butler, 1989). A serious consequence can be that the researcher’s perspective overrides the perspectives of others, and that the richness and diversity of identity is lost. If the experiences of the researcher and of the researched are too close there is little possibility of enlightenment.

Just as commonality may cause a barrier to understanding, social distance may too inhibit understanding. While difference may lead to explanation and illustration, it may also encourage distrust, suspicion and even, as I discuss below, hostility. There is no easy answer to this dilemma. It is an enormously complex issue that forces researchers to engage with a strenuous philosophical debate on the social construction of knowledge and claims to truth, as well as to examine the impact of their own subjectivities on their research. It is not an issue that can be easily dealt with in one journal article. However, what I shall demonstrate in this paper is that a theory that forges a link between what we say, who we are and where we are located, provides valuable inroads into the debate. This theory examines social and ideological constructions of knowledge, highlights the dynamics between representation, location and identity and acknowledges the role of power in shaping social recognition and claims to truth. This is the theory of social representations (SR) - first proposed by Moscovici in 1961 and extensively developed within many fields of social psychology (see, for example, Duveen and Moscovici, 2001; Farr, 1987; Jodelet, 1991; Moscovici, 1972, 1984, 1993).

Some of the critical discussion around theory has centred on issues of validity, reliability and otherness. Potter and Edwards (1999), for example, has suggested that the 'findings'¹ reported in a SR study may say more about the social representations of the researcher than the researched. The argument is that the researcher cannot disengage from their own culturally defined ways of sense making and hence impose these on to the analysis. Another criticism they make is that the representation 'uncovered' in the research context may in fact be an artefact of the research process and tell us little about what happens in more naturalistic settings. Hence, the reliability and validity of any study of social representations has been contested.

Clearly there is a need to address these criticisms of SR research. However, the questions of reliability and validity are not of our making. They belong within a competing paradigm within social research that rests on positivism and behaviourism (Farr, 1993) and which models itself on natural science (Kvale, 1996). Therefore, I would argue, a SR researcher needs to tread carefully in these debates in order not to trip up on versions of realism and objectivity that they may not share. We need to develop alternative ways of approaching concerns about the consequences of difference. Before we can do this, I suggest, we need to explore the researcher-researched relationship and its impact on the narratives constructed in research. In this paper I do just this, using one compelling research experience, to illustrate and develop my argument. This is, simply, that SR theory provides a conceptual methodology to examine the impact of researchers' identities in the process of doing research and so allows an exploration into the question of difference in the research relationship.

¹ The language of research is so imbued with positivism that it is hard to hold on to the belief that the material produced in a research project is collectively constructed by all research participants (including researchers) and also is a product of its time and context. The material is not 'found', therefore, it is constructed and reconstructed within the research process.

Learning from difference

In considering the consequences of difference there has been one particular research encounter that stands out for me. In 1995-96 I was collecting narratives about a so-labelled 'riot' that happened in Britain, in a part of South London, Brixton.² I interviewed lawyers, bar managers, teachers, journalists, police officers, shop keepers, political activists and residents. I also carried out a focus group with four black boys, all around 16 - 17 years old, who had witnessed the event. What started as a deeply revealing and constructive group discussion broke down into a hostile scene of accusations and suspicions. While this was partly due to my relative inexperience and oversights in the research planning³, there are important lessons worth sharing. After describing what happened, I shall illustrate how SR theory can be deployed to reveal important insights into what was a difficult but revealing research experience.

At the beginning of the focus group, I briefly explained the research project and asked if there were any questions or concerns they had. One of them asked why I did not have a list of questions for them and so I explained that this wasn't necessary as I wanted them to share with me what they witnessed on the night of the protest/riot. They quickly took this up and we had a rich and lively discussion. Their sharp insights can be seen as the outcome of the differences between us. They were experienced and knowledgeable

² For many living in the area this was not in fact a riot; it was more of a political protest where perceived over-policing led to violence. The police and media were seen by many to blow the event out of proportion by linking it to the disturbances of 1980's.

³ I made two crucial mistakes. I arranged the running of the focus group and the £5 payment for participants with a youth worker on behalf of the boys. The first mistake was not to confirm with the participants at the start of the group discussion that they themselves were happy to be involved for a fee of £5. The second mistake was not to ask the boys to sign consent forms. In my defence, I can say that the youth worker told me that the boys had volunteered for the research. Rightly or wrongly I assumed that they were informed that they would receive £5 payment for their time.

about life in Brixton; I was new to Brixton and indeed to London as a whole. They were black teenage boys disillusioned with an excluding education system and dismal employment opportunities; I was a white female adult embarking on a research career in a prestigious London University. They were British born but felt excluded from mainstream society; I am not British born, ambivalent about 'being' British, but am generally included as such. In emphasising how valuable their knowledge and experiences were to me, I tried to balance the inequalities between us by positioning myself as novice and so making the position of skilled expert available to them. In attempting to show me the world as they experienced it, they acted out scenes and experiences of racism and hostility that pervaded their lives. In putting me in their shoes, they saw their experiences from the outside. This encouraged reflexivity and critical engagement with issues around representation, identity and otherness. They bridged gaps between us, explaining to me what happened, why it happened and how they felt about it. I felt they enjoyed sharing their experiences and knowledge with me, and felt privileged that they chose to do this.

As we were finishing the discussion the black youth leader returned into the room. He asked that he too could be interviewed. While I was exhausted and concerned about the time (it now being late evening and having a long journey ahead of me), I didn't want to lose the opportunity. I turned the tape recorder back on and began to listen. Two of the boys stayed in the room, the other two wandered in and out. Another adult, a black woman, came into the room and joined in the discussion, for the most part, to agree with the youth worker. He discussed the riot/protest and what he saw as the police's racist treatment of Brixton. He spoke at length, moving on to more general issues - institutionalised racism in schools, unequal employment patterns, and de-masculinising treatment in prisons, to racism in the media, to his views on homosexuality. When the

conversation moved away from the research questions, I drew things to a close. This was when the atmosphere began to change.

Needing to catch my last train home, I quickly packed up the tape recorder and took out the money to pay the boys. At this the youth worker slammed his hand down on the desk and accused me of racism and exploitation. I was bewildered. He told me that I was "taking the piss" and left the room. Immediately the two boys remaining took up the accusation that I was exploiting them and that if they had been white I would have paid them more. The other two boys returned and added their voices to the developing argument. I explained that I had agreed the £5 sum with their youth worker, but they did not believe me. I suggested that they contact the head of my department who would explain that this was normal practice and that they were not being treated unfairly. I felt increasing upset and angry and, I think, so did they. Emotions were running high and a bitter, angry argument developed.

What started as a misunderstanding developed into an argument revealing our prejudices, fears and guilt. It seemed as if we were all acting out our culturally shared stereotypes: aggressive, angry black men intimidating the frightened and vulnerable white woman / a member of the white elite criminalising innocent young black boys. A picture that remains in my mind is of the boys blocking my exit from the door fuming "Are you afraid we won't let you go?". They said that I was racist in treating them, in their view, as black aggressors. In brandishing me as a racist I felt that they were reacting to the colour of my skin, ironically, and did not see me as I see myself. In feeling intimidated, I felt sick that I was being drawn into racist stereotypes.

I found this very upsetting as I recognised that there may be some truth in what they said. I felt uneasy about the inequalities in the research relationship and the potential to exploit participants. I worried about my legitimacy as a white woman working in contexts and relationships permeated with racism. At first, these feelings caused me to doubt both my ability as a researcher and the transformative potential of any social research; later, I came to value the experience as my most enlightening and so most challenging research encounter.⁴ After considerable reflection, I realised that this focus group had taught me more about interpersonal dynamics in social research than had any methods textbook. The power of the researcher to construct the identities of the researched, the destructive nature of the gaze of the other and the consequences of difference in the research relationship had all become very real for me.

Examining difference from a SR perspective

Using insights from SR theory we can explore what lead to such a breakdown in communication and trust. Because the theory tackles the dialectics of cohesion and diversification, and of collectivity and individuality, it is well equipped to analyse the consequences of difference in the research relationship. First, however, what are social representations?

Social representations are systems of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history. (Moscovici, 1973, p.xiii).

⁴ I owe Marie-Claude Gervais and Rob Farr many thanks for their invaluable support and advice in this.

SR theory demands this dual focus - on self and on society. Its gaze is centred on the inter-subjective, on the bonds that sustain mutual understanding while establishing difference. This allows for a conceptual methodology that highlights the importance of recognising difference in research practice. The theory establishes the simultaneously shared and individual aspects of social knowledge, the intertwined cultural and psychological aspects of identity and of the impossibility of replication in social research. Interviewing someone, or even better, inviting them to explore their views with others in a focus group, reveals how they draw on social and cultural knowledge systems to construct their own understanding of realities around them.⁵ In particular, the SR researcher will examine how the subjective understandings of research participants confirm and contest wider social and cultural knowledge systems. This tells you how they take on social representations around them and re-interpret, re-work and so re-present them to themselves (Duveen, 2000). Re-presentations are, therefore, intimately tied to establishing and defending a view on the world and one's position within it. As Jovchelovitch (1996) has pointed out, "there is no possibility of identity without the work of representation" (p.126). Difference, therefore, highlights the subjective and the cultural aspects of representations and the construction of identity.

Social representations are not mirror images of the world: "when social subjects construct and organise their representational fields", Jovchelovitch (1996) has observed, "they do so to make sense of reality, to appropriate it and interpret it" (p.125). Thus, social representations both reflect and inform reality. They are born in a real, concrete world and they are embedded within the social construction of this world. Reality,

⁵ While there has been little research that has directly compared the value of one-to-one interviews with focus groups (Gervais, 1997), there is some agreement in the SR field that focus groups are particularly adept in reaching the intersubjective level of knowledge (Farr *et al*, 1996).

Thomas (1918) informs us, is what we define as reality. Moscovici (1993) has argued that we define reality through the negotiation of social representations. Social representations thus comprise the interface between re-presentation and reality; they bridge our objective and subjective realities. As Jovchelovitch (1996) has explained:

The interplay between subjective and objective, and between agency and reproduction, which constitutes the social fabric is at the very heart of how social representations are formed. (p.123)

Asking the boys in the focus group to tell me about the protest/riot lead to them talking about how those outside of Brixton construct Brixton, what we would call social representations of Brixton. They drew on cultural knowledge about Brixton and applied it to their own experiences. In other words, they took on dominant representations of Brixton and so made them their own by asserting them, challenging them and/or renegotiating them. They argued that these representations stigmatise and otherise their community and so themselves, and are maintained by an ideology of racism. They described daily encounters of fear and hostility from white strangers in the street, particularly from white women and the police. They explained how they felt objectified, or “looked on”, by white others drawing on a stigmatising representation of Brixton as threatening, violent and dangerous. Depictions of Brixton, they described, draw on an ideology of racism where black men are aggressive, criminal and other. In asking them to explain this further, they acted out a scene. These are my notes:

I had asked them to explain what it meant to say “look on you”. Three boys act this out for me. Two of them act out walking down the street. The third, as a “white lady”, walks towards them and hesitates, unsure of where to hold her handbag as the two boys will probably walk on either side of her. What this showed is that slight movements and hesitations like this can reveal the deep-seated fears and prejudices of others. What the boys were trying to explain to me, I think, is how subtle racism can be, and yet how devastating it is to your self-image when a victim of it. Incidents like this which criminalise the boys reveal the racist representations that pervade their daily lives.

One of the functions of social representations is to make the unfamiliar familiar (Moscovici, 1984). In explaining their experiences to me and so revealing their representations, these boys make their familiar worlds unfamiliar to themselves. In presenting this story to a white stranger they re-view it through the eyes of a stranger and feel the injustice of the experience. Reacting appropriately to the narrative, with no pretence of researcher neutrality or objectivity, may enable the boys to feel heard and recognised as they see themselves. Through reacting to participants and to the injustice in their stories, we open the doors to collaborative critical reflection on the significance and the consequences of representations. Hence, we invite the question of power and the role of representations in maintaining, defending or challenging social inequalities.

In the context of the focus group, the boys told me how others outside of Brixton represented Brixton and so treated them, as boys living in the neighbourhood. Walking down the street, going into a shop, meeting a police officer were all encounters pervaded with such stigmatising representations which left them ultimately as 'other'. The boys rejected such representations of themselves, and so used the representation as something to define themselves against. The world that they described to me was one where racist white people located them as different and dangerous.

Ironically their audience was a white woman. In sharing their experience with me, in trying to show me how the world 'is' for them, they would have considered what the world is like for me. I am obviously one of the strangers who may otherise and stigmatise their lives and their communities. In fact, is not doing research an overt form of otherising? It makes a claim that the researched are a distinct community and so different to other communities. In emphasising this difference, did I removal the

possibility of aligning myself with Brixton and so position myself as the exploiting, potentially racist, dominant other?

Initially, for the focus group discussion at least, I don't think this to be the case. Before the confrontation over payment developed, the dialogue we had seemed to be friendly and respectful of difference. Indeed, in many focus groups since this one, I have used difference as a valuable research tool with which to prise open deeper levels of understanding than would have otherwise been possible. In the example given above, the interventions of the youth worker invited destructive accusations of exploitation and racism. After having extensively explored the power of the white gaze to objectify, to otherise and to fear black masculinity, we all knew what this meant. In many ways, it seemed that we had already constructed our roles, and now, with trust and rapport eroded in the ensuing argument, positions and scripts were ready for us to take up. As Goffman would have predicted (1959/1971), 'selves' were constructed in this encounter. As the boys were struggling with their anger at the situation and the assumed betrayal, I was struggling with my anxiety and my horror of being seen a racist. In the argument, one of the boys repeatedly shouted 'don't make me switch!'. The representations that they had described to me were becoming a reality. In the emotion of the situation, it was hard to distance ourselves from them. The representations had almost taken a life of their own.

As you can see my positioning as a young white woman had a dramatic effect on how these boys saw me. This would have influenced what they said to me, how they interpreted my questions and how I, too, reacted to them. As the dynamics of the group changed - from open and respectful, to suspicious and hostile, their manner towards me changed dramatically. To understand this, I have shown, we need to examine the social

representations that informed the research relationship. We also need to examine how different representations maintain and defend different identities and different symbolic resources. Recognising difference can mean recognising inequalities between the researched and the researcher and so can reveal the representations that maintain such inequalities. While this example illustrates this dramatically, I argue that all social research is constructed through the recognition of difference.

What are the consequences of difference on the research relationship?

For many researchers the debate about difference relates to the quest for replication. Farr (1993) has examined this notion and explained “it should be possible for others, who may be critical of your findings, to replicate your study in their own laboratories” (p.21). If the results of a study are not replicable, how do we know they haven’t arisen from “haphazard subjectivity” (Kvale, 1996, p.236)? For this reason, “every attempt is made to eliminate the effect of the observer by developing an explicit, standardised set of data elicitation procedures” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p.5). As historian of social psychology, Farr (1996) explains that this preoccupation stems from a positivistic philosophy and the ideology of behaviourism. Within these paradigms there is the assumption that, if others cannot replicate my findings, then my research and its conclusions stem more from my subjectivity and my imposed assumptions than from the object of study itself (Willis, 1996).

For many qualitative researchers these criticisms may seem naïve. The outcome of a research project always emerges from the relationship between researcher and researched (Silverstone, 1997). To replace the researcher would inevitably alter the dynamics of a focus group and lead to different conclusions (Riessman, 1993). These differences are not ‘biases and prejudices’: they are the essence of human self-

consciousness. Unlike natural sciences, where plants and minerals are oblivious to the gaze of the researcher, people respond in conscious and unconscious ways to the experience of being studied (Orne, 1962).

People label me as white and will make certain attributions from this. If I were black they would make different attributions. We know this from Rosenthal's (1966) study of researcher effects. This is not a problem of methodology: it is part of our social psychology. Heider's (1958) work on the perception of people as a particular class of object highlights how we use social knowledge to make sense of both material and social objects. The boys in the focus group were obviously conscious of the differences between us, as I was. The fact that I am a white female researcher had a clear effect on the dynamics of the group. This does not invalidate the material produced. Identity and location cannot be blanked out in an attempt to 'clean up' the data. From a SR perspective this is because representations are intimately tied up with identity construction and defence. A black researcher, an older researcher, a teenage researcher would all have had a different experience and elicited different responses from a focus group with the same boys. This is because there would have been different interconnections and distances on which to build dialogue and explanation. However all researchers would find a way of drawing out and relating to the representations of Brixton presented by the boys. Researcher identities and locations will influence the representations in different ways, as a SR analysis of the consequences of difference in the research relationship would highlight.

From a SR perspective all researcher-researched relationships need to be investigated in depth. This is not so that the reader may 'test' my findings as a natural scientist can verify the experimental findings of a colleague. Social science requires a different

approach to the problems of reliability and validity from that of natural science (Kirk and Miller, 1986). Indeed, "rather than engaging in futile attempts to eliminate the effects of the researcher completely, we should set about understanding them" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p.18). A research project presents a 'story' of the researcher's relationship with the subject of study and her participants. "What matters", as Miller and Glassner (1997) have argued, "is to understand how and where stories are produced, which sort of stories they are, and how we can put them to honest and intelligent use in theorising about social life" (p.111). We need to examine how the relationship between researcher and researched brings out representations salient to the researched in different ways. This is precisely that I hope this paper has achieved.

It is not a matter, therefore, of establishing neutrality and distance in moderating a focus group, for example. It is rather a matter of addressing the subjectivity of social research, recognising differences between participants and developing a means of bridging such difference. From here we can establish how to connect and communicate with others. Difference exists only in so far as there is a common basis on which to differ. Commonality without difference melts into sameness. Commonality enables communication; difference gives us something to communicate about (Arendt, 1958). Different researchers establish different social relationships, bring out different social representations and shift the dynamics of any research relationship.

Conclusion

The colour of my skin, my heritage, my gender, my age and my accent will continue to impact on the research that I do, as it does for all of us. This is not simply a methodological problem. Difference is the fabric of day-to-day life in today's hybrid societies. The misunderstanding, the anger, the pain, and the guilt that one's positioning

brings forth are the substance of contemporary self-other relationships. In beginning to understand this I realised that the distrust and hostility that these four teenagers displayed should not be seen as a barrier to research. In fact, the event revealed the very heart of the problem: the recognition of difference and inequality in social research.

SR theory has given me the tools to analyse this encounter through examining the relationship between what was said, who said it and to whom. That is, it enabled an exploration into the interconnections between the emerging representations and the maintenance and defence of identities within the research relationship, looking particularly at the impact of difference. Highlighting these differences meant recognising the inequalities within the research context and the researcher's potential to exploit and to otherise the research participants, particularly in a racialised context. This analysis demonstrates the researcher's power to construct the identities of the researched, the destructive nature of the gaze of the other and the consequences of difference. Investigating the interrelationships between representations and identities in the research context in this way is deeply challenging. It requires a commitment to transparency and reflexivity from the researcher that can provoke feelings of vulnerability and over-exposure. However, if we are to research how and why participants tell us the things they do, we need to examine the impact of difference on the emerging representations. That is, we have to see ourselves as research tools, as catalysts to further understanding and debate. Difference, from a SR perspective, is an inevitable and a highly creative aspect to all research encounters. Even when difference is not bridged, as in my example, there is still the possibility of enlightenment.

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