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After 1989: nationalism and the new global elite

Book section

Original citation:

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This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24183/

Available in LSE Research Online: August 2010

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After the events of June 1989, the credibility of the CCP’s claim to be a socialist organisation leading the nation to salvation was challenged not only by the social and ideological dislocation created by economic reform, but also by the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed by the G7 states and the European Union. Over the years that followed, the articulation of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ began to take on added significance as the Party had to achieve the tasks set for it by Deng Xiaoping in the context of unassailable American military predominance, the liberalisation of international trade and financial markets, and the challenge of the information revolution.

Yet the emerging post-Cold War order also presented opportunities. The demise of the Soviet Union removed the most serious military threat from China’s northern border, allowing a redeployment of forces to the South-eastern coast opposite Taiwan. Domestically, the poor condition of the Soviet successor states could also be held up as an example of what would happen if the CCP lost power. The defeat of Iraq in the first Gulf War could also be used by advocates of radical reform to underline the importance of linking technology with national defence if the task of opposing hegemonism was to be successful. The prospect of the transformation of the GATT into the WTO and the liberalisation of financial markets held out the possibility of greater access to FDI and foreign trade. The spread of the Internet and global media under commercialisation presented the promise of e-commerce and more efficient e-
governance by integrating China’s provincialised domestic society and linking its economy with world markets.

Deng Xiaoping thus drummed up confidence in the reform process by insisting that China should maintain the policies agreed by the Thirteenth Party Congress and proceed with opening up to the outside world, even establishing a number of new Hong Kongs to act as windows on the world. In order to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era, though, the post-Tiananmen CCP leadership had first of all to rebuild the fragile consensus over ideology among the political elite that had existed before 1989. In the process, the movement from socialism to patriotism was accelerated as many of the themes associated with globalization discourse were incorporated into the party line.

**JIANG ZEMIN’S PATRIOTIC TURN**

The crisis of June 1989 had seriously strained the fragile *modus vivendi* over the meaning of ‘socialism’ that had held among the Party elite over the previous ten years. With Deng Xiaoping never having satisfactorily defined ‘socialism’, senior figures now criticised the degree of attention that had been paid to the privatisation of the state-owned sector, the pursuit of material wealth and the neglect of ideological strengthening. Even articles in the Party-controlled Beijing press pointed out that there might be some truth in the dissident argument that the introduction of market mechanisms into the economy would undermine the rule of the Party and fuel ‘bourgeois liberalisation’. Deng’s proposition that it is hard to distinguish between socialism and capitalism was condemned for being a betrayal of Marxism, the CCP and the struggle of the masses to build socialism (Ma and Lin 1998: 183-4).
What the older generation of leaders feared most after the demonstrations of 1989 was a Cultural Revolution-style mass movement from below. Their criticisms of Zhao Ziyang did not amount to a complete rejection of Deng’s line but were more of a call for greater emphasis on its moralistic and disciplinary elements. Writers and critics of the older generation, (some of whom had been inactive since the Yan’an period), attacked leading figures of the liberal and avant-garde cultural movements that had flourished in the late 1980s. The cult of Mao Zedong as the model of selfless morality that had been presented in the 1981 Resolution on Party History was revived. Similarly, artists and writers were called on to serve the workers, peasants and soldiers according to the principles of Mao’s ‘Yan’an Forum Talks on Literature and Art’, drawn up during the war against Japan and promoted again by Deng Xiaoping himself when he had addressed the Congress of Writers and Artists in October 1979 (Barme: 20-37).

When the Central Committee met for a plenary session on 23-24 June, laments went up over the way in which values of arduous struggle, selflessness, and helping people in need, ‘which make up the exalted character of a Communist and are also the traditional virtues of the Chinese people’, were now regarded as out- of- date (Nathan: 433-6). When Jiang Zemin was appointed to the post of general secretary by the meeting, he sympathised with these anxieties by stating that it had been wrong to assume that a rise in living standards was enough to create social stability and the right conditions for political reform (1998i: 347). He also agreed that the growth of consumerism, short-termism, selfishness and the worship of foreign things was leading to a widespread trend of ‘looking to money in everything’ at the expense of
the state and the nation - a popular pun on the Chinese wording of the speech that marked Deng’s consolidation of power in December 1978 (Deng 1984b). Jiang also began to express his views about the political role of education, elaborating on the need for the young to be taught more about the ‘national condition’ (guo qing). By this he meant teaching the history of the last 100 years, the necessity of socialism, current economic conditions, economic resources and population, and the ‘excellent tradition of the Chinese nation’. He explained that this was necessary because, while the young supported ‘reform and opening’, many of them were still labouring under the illusion that Western material civilisation could be transferred to China over night (19981: 347).

In November that year, Jiang went on to tell newsworkers that they had a responsibility to stimulate a spirit of nationalist pride, self-confidence, and activism and to educate society in patriotism, socialism, collectivism, self-reliance, hard struggle, and nation-building (1998b: 354-5). The Education Commission accordingly sent out instructions (EC 1989) for patriotism to permeate the entire curriculum, being taught not only in special courses but also in subjects like language, history and geography. ‘Communism’ was still to be taught, but reduced to the stories of revolutionaries who illustrated the virtues of self-sacrifice for the interests of the collective and the need to always put the state before the individual. In an April 1990 report, the commission again stressed the anti-democratic and anti-Western aspects of this patriotic campaign by emphasising the need to defend education from foreign and domestic opponents of socialism, insisting that the battle against ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ and ‘peaceful evolution’ would continue for a long time and would get very heated. Schools would have to oppose these forces and learn from the experience
of 1989 by studying ideology, making moral and political education the priority, and shedding the idea that the only purpose of study is to get into university.

With 1990 celebrated as the 150th anniversary of the Opium War, the new leadership was presented with something of a golden opportunity to alert the population against the foreign plot of ‘peaceful evolution’ by teaching them about the poverty and backwardness of ‘semi-colonised’ and ‘feudal’ old China, and the glorious achievements that had been made since the founding of ‘New China’. In this way, the Education Commission explained, they would come to realise that ‘without the CCP there is no New China, only socialism can save China, only with socialism can a Chinese “way” (dao lì) be developed; to have faith that China can support socialism, and that China can sufficiently develop socialism’ (EC 1990: 387-8). In a July 1990 speech to mark the end of an exhibition on China’s revolutionary history, Jiang Zemin himself presented the Nanjing massacre as a valuable example that could be used to stir up popular anger, recommending the production of special text books for this purpose. In the same speech, he stressed how important it was to draw attention to negative examples of people who collaborated with foreign powers or worshipped foreign things and lacked all trace of ‘nationalist fibre’ (Jiang 1998c).

Just as Deng had responded to the 1979 Beijing Spring by asserting the need for the young to be made to understand that western material civilisation could not be transplanted onto Chinese soil overnight, in 1990 Jiang chose the anniversary of the patriotic May Fourth Movement to decry critics of the Party because: ‘They don’t even want a national character or individual character, so what qualifications do they
have for talking about patriotism, democracy and human rights!’ Faced by the problem of what socialism had come to mean, Jiang finally took Deng Xiaoping’s thinking to its logical conclusion, announcing that ‘socialism’ and ‘patriotism’ are ‘by nature the same’ (benzhi shang shi tongyi de) (1998a: 360-1).

FORGING THE NEW TECHNOCRATIC CONSENSUS

The challenge for Jiang Zemin was very much like that faced by Zhang Zhidong at the end of the Qing dynasty and Hu Yaobang in the early 1980s, namely to craft patriotism in a way that would both please those in the leadership who longed for a return to the values of the ‘days before and after Liberation’, while also appealing to those who were more interested in the pursuit of technological and economic modernisation. This latter constituency was likely to be alienated by the measures taken after Tiananmen to deal with the immediate causes of social unrest, such as slowing the rate of economic growth and investment in order to reduce inflation and freezing aspects of education reform that had begun in 1985. Yet it is something of a misnomer to describe the key figures in the post-Tiananmen leadership as ‘Leftist’. Their technocratic nature is exemplified by a figure like Ding Guan’gen, who was appointed head of the United Front Department and head of the Party’s propaganda work in 1990. Like Jiang Zemin, an alumnus of Shanghai’s Jiaotong University, Ding’s previous political career had been in the railway industry.

Even Premier Li Peng, while announcing a raft of measures for economic retrenchment in his 1990 work report to the National People’s Congress (1990), accepted the need to maintain ‘reform and opening’, albeit with a stress on the Four
Cardinal Principles and a protracted struggle against ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ (Li 1990: 16-17). This was in the context of his announcement of the closure or merging of 70,000 corporations (24.5 percent of the country’s total), the severing of links between corporations and Party and government organisations, and the preferential allocation of funds, materials and transportation services to large and medium sized SOEs that produced high quality, readily marketable goods (Li 1990: 25). Meanwhile, strategies like the ‘863 Plan’ and the ‘Torch Plan’ and efforts to transform the largest SOEs into very large business groups not only survived the downfall of the pre-Tiananmen leadership, but were expanded. In December 1991 some 55 burgeoning enterprise groups were selected for membership of what came to be called the ‘national team’, and by the mid-1990s this had grown to 120 large enterprises being prepared for competition in the global market (Sutherland: 67-139).

A number of ideological strategies could be adopted to shape patriotism in ways compatible with such policies. Li Ruihuan, for example, now a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, diverted the atavistic patriotism of the party elders towards the positive theme of a ‘Chinese rejuvenation’ (zhenxing zhonghua), a term originally coined by Sun Yatsen. Within the context of elite politics, Li Ruihuan’s promotion of ‘national culture’ (minzu wenhua) and ‘cultural flowering’ (fanrong wenyi) was more useful for restraining the purges that were being undertaken by the Ministry of Culture and the Department of Propaganda by focusing their work on a campaign against pornography that had already been in progress for some time. The mission to combat ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ could also be balanced with a call to oppose the ‘ossification’ (jianghua) of neo-Maoist dogmatism (Barme: 29). This strategy was similar to the way in which Hu Yaobang had moderated the meaning of
patriotism in order to deflate the anti-spiritual pollution campaign by limiting its scope to a rectification of Party work.

A similar strategy can be seen in the approach of Education Commissioner Li Tieying to education reform in the context of the patriotic education campaign. When Li (1990) addressed a conference on the implications of the outcome of the Fourth Plenum for higher education in 1990, he certainly repeated the reduction of socialism to patriotism, opposition to the worshipping of foreign influences and the need for Party leadership. But he also emphasised the importance of realising the Four Modernisations and creating a ‘Chinese rejuvenation’. He then went on to advocate a number of managerial reforms that were consistent with the original 1985 plans for education, reiterating the importance of staying open to the outside world and engaging in international student exchanges. Addressing the Education Commission’s national work conference the following year, Li (1991) again reminded his audience that China would not only have to oppose the western strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ in the last decade of the twentieth century, it would also have to deal with the challenge of the world technological revolution.

Whatever their various motives, the location of figures like Li Tieying and Li Ruihuan along with Ding Guan’gen and Li Peng at the top of the Party had an important impact on the way that themes such as the technological revolution and ‘cultural renaissance’ were deployed by Jiang Zemin to legitimate the new leadership. This can be seen quite clearly in the way that Jiang was careful to add that, ‘Of course, there cannot be the creation of a new “Left” atmosphere either’, when he explained his ideas on patriotic education to Li Tieying and Party Secretary of the Education
Commission, He Dongchang (1991), in an open letter in People’s Daily. Before the Central Committee had issued its ‘Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education’ in August 1994, patriotism had thus already been modified and described as the ‘great power pushing forwards our country’s social history’. Its basic principles were to establish Deng Xiaoping’s project of building ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and the facilitation of ‘reform and opening’ (CC 1994: 920).

Any initiatives taken by Deng himself would of course have a decisive impact on the interpretation of his legacy. Given his age and failing health, the views he promoted at this time have to be understood as shaped by a number of constituencies upon whom he relied, or who were close enough to influence him. High among these was the ‘imperial bodyguard’ under the Sichuanese brothers, Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, who held power over the Central Military Commission and the Central Party Secretariat (Nathan: 456). Aware of the technological backwardness of the armed forces following the spectacle of United States power in the Gulf War, such military personnel were sympathetic to the view that success in the reform process was essential if the PLA was ever to become a professional fighting force.

Then there was the Shanghai Party, the rival power base from where Deng could launch an ideological campaign in much the same way that Mao Zedong had launched the Cultural Revolution nearly three decades earlier. The mayor of the city, Zhu Rongji, an alumnus of the science and technology-based National Tsinghua University in Beijing, had served as deputy secretary of the Shanghai party under Jiang Zemin. His managerial outlook is summed up by the way he described Shanghai as the ‘model executive area’ for the planned economy. Although he had been
labelled a ‘Rightist’ in the 1950s, he had displayed unwavering loyalty to the Party, remarking that ‘If a mother beats her child by mistake, how can the child hate its mother’ (Gao, X.: 83-6). While Zhu’s appointment to the Standing Committee of the Politburo at the Fourteenth Party Congress, and to the Premiership in 1998, is often described as the formation of a ‘Shanghai faction’, such an alliance had to be acceptable to a broad section of the Party elite if it was to be effective.

While Zhu came to be known as an economic reformer, one of his sponsors was in fact Song Ping, then head of the Central Party Organisation Department and soon to be labelled by radical reformers as a ‘Leftist’. Song (b. 1928) was older than Zhu, but he too was a Tsinghua alumnus. Song is said to have been impressed by Zhu’s participation in the ‘red student movement’ and the two had worked together in the 1950s in the Northeast bureau of the Party and on economic planning. Given such personal relationships, Yuan Ming, a former deputy head of the theoretical research office of the Central Party School, has described members of the ‘Shanghai faction’ as forming a bridge between the extremes represented by the economic planner Chen Yun and the advocate of market mechanisms, Deng Xiaoping (Yuan, M).

Deng was also under the influence of his immediate family, and ultimately their control, as he increasingly relied on them for physical support. His daughter, Deng Nan, became one of the most powerful figures in the country because she could control access to Deng, and eventually even had the privilege of interpreting his increasingly unintelligible utterances. Her positions as director of the National Science and Technology Committee of the State Council and deputy director of the
Central Committee’s Social Development Science Research Committee, clearly identify Deng Nan with techno-nationalism. Being the descendant of a Party leader also makes Deng Nan representative of what has come to be called the ‘princeling party’ in Chinese discourse. Jiang Zemin’s son, Jiang Mianheng, similarly boasts a long list of directorships of Internet firms, and his appointment as vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was to make him something of a spokesman for the electronics industry.

Dropping any pretensions to communism, the ‘princelings’ have tended to be sympathetic to the idea of ‘neo-authoritarianism’, floated before Tiananmen by various academics and personal assistants of Zhao Ziyang. Drawing on the theories developed by Harvard political scientist, Samuel Huntington, from Latin American case studies, they could argue that China had to go through a period of economic modernisation under an authoritarian state before democracy is possible. Looking to societies like the Asian Tigers as the model for development, they claim that Confucian collectivism, the family, hard work, frugality and a hierarchical, patriarchal power structure are the values that underpin prosperity. Although ‘neo-authoritarianism’ had been proscribed, its central themes had been given a new degree of credibility by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and reappeared in September 1991 with the publication of an article under the auspices of China Youth Daily (Zhongguo qingnian bao). This urged the leadership to base its claim to power on nationalism and draw on traditional culture to develop its ideological vision to legitimate the state, given that Marxism-Leninism could no longer mobilise the population (Zhao, S. 1992: 733).
TOWARDS ‘DENG XIAOUPING THEORY’

The first step in the consolidation of a post-Tiananamen ideological consensus between these various constituencies took place when Deng Xiaoping retreated to Shanghai in the winter of 1990/91. While there he collaborated with the editorial team of the city’s Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) to produce a series of articles under the pen-name ‘Huang Puping’. These remarkable texts, which might be taken as the start of Shanghai’s remarkable rise to an icon of globalization, regretted that the city had not been made one of the first SEZs and urged the population to restore the city’s role as a financial centre and to take a more active role in regenerating the Yangtze delta. They sent shockwaves throughout the country when they directly addressed the debate on the nature of socialism by restating the view that market mechanisms should play a more important role in the economy and called on the people of the city to be more daring in creating an open environment suitable for an advanced international city, a ‘socialist Hong Kong’ (Ma and Li: 171-3).

Given the emphasis on patriotism in the ideological discourse of the time, the Huang Puping articles adopted an ingenious strategy for capturing the ideological high ground by combining modernising themes with the narrative of national salvation. This can be seen in the way that the first article in the series appeared under the title ‘Be the “Lead Ram” for Reform and Opening’. This is a reference to the traditional Chinese twelve-year cosmological cycle, according to which 1991 was the ‘Year of the Ram’. The last such year just happened to be 1979, which the article claimed to be the start of the era of ‘reform and opening’, described as ‘the only road for a strong state and wealthy people’ (qiăng guō fù mín). Just as convenient, though, was that the longer sixty-year cosmological cycle happened to have begun in 1931, the year that Japan
invaded northern China. The writers could thus neatly contrast the situation at that
time with expectations for the end of the next 60-year cycle in 2051, when ‘socialist
China will have reached the glorious period of a semi-advanced level. Our per-capita
income will have reached US$4,000, which will have put the ‘‘comprehensive
national power’ of our big country of over a billion people at the forefront of the
world’.

The use of nationalist themes to legitimate a radical reform agenda became fully
systemitised and took an authoritative form the following winter, when Deng
Xiaoping made his ‘Southern Tour’ of the cities of Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and
Shanghai in January and February 1992. This was a crucial event for political
developments, because the speeches made by Deng on these visits were used to sway
the outcome of the Fourteenth Party Congress in October, when Jiang Zemin
announced that the spirit of the Southern Tour was to be taken as the basic line of his
work report and to arm the whole party in carrying out its responsibilities under the
formula of ‘Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics’ (Jiang 1992: 1-2). The canonical status of the Southern Tour within
Deng’s ideological heritage was further consolidated when it became the final chapter
of the third volume of his selected works, published in October 1993 (Deng, 1993o).

The symbolic significance of using the ‘Southern Tour’ to settle the ongoing debate
over the nature of socialism lies partly in its similarities with the journeys that China’s
emperors used to make when they inspected conditions in the provinces in centuries
past. It also has a more recent historical resonance, though, in the way that it parallels
Deng’s termination of the campaign against ‘spiritual pollution’ by visiting the SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian in February 1984. In 1992 the Southern Tour was again used as an opportunity to articulate anew the themes that had been developed during the period of ‘reform and opening’, establishing new boundaries for the discussion of the relationship between socialism, nationalism and globalization. Within this discourse the aims of the Party remain the three tasks of economic development, national unification and opposing international hegemony that were established in 1980. Yet the spectre of the world technological revolution finally allows Deng to present his view that socialism means no more than raising national production as the final decision in the ongoing debate over how to distinguish whether a policy has a ‘socialist nature’ or a ‘capitalist nature’ that had raged since Tiananmen.

One crucial political implication of this development of ideology is that Deng created a new orthodoxy according to which the status of the rising professional classes could be established as ‘revolutionary’. This was because ‘revolution’ (*geming*) had become synonymous with ‘the liberation of productive forces’, and science and technology had become ‘the primary productive force’ (Deng 1993o: 377-8). Thanking workers in science and technology for the glory of their contributions to the nation, he called on everybody to remember the age when the physicists Qian Xuesen, Li Siguang and Qian Sanqiang had been able to produce the ‘two atomic bombs and one satellite’ (377-8).

The rationale presented in Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour text for faster growth and greater openness to outside influences is thus part of a political strategy to ensure the
continuation of the Party’s monopoly on power. Deng’s reduction of socialism to the
liberation of productive forces is the logical outcome of his view that Party rule would
not have survived Tiananmen if the population had not experienced a rising standard of
living throughout the 1980s. The alternative, he warns, would have been a civil war
similar to the conflict of the Cultural Revolution. Although the notion of
egalitarianism is not entirely absent from the speech, it is clear that the measure of
efficiency is to be the national interest rather than the interests of any particular class.
Even when Deng explains that socialism aims to prevent exploitation and polarisation
and eventually to build common prosperity, he claims that this is to avoid a
polarisation between the coastal and interior regions that could have a negative impact
on national unity rather than being due to an ethical commitment to egalitarianism
(373). Such caution is necessary because his vision of rapid development inevitably
means encouraging some areas of the country to develop more quickly than others.
Guangdong is thus to be allowed to catch up with the Four Tigers within twenty years,
while less developed areas will have to wait until the end of the century to reach such
a level through the transfer of technology and revenue from the more advanced
regions.

Rather than be concerned over Marxist orthodoxy, Deng thus admonishes the Party
not to behave like a ‘woman with bound feet’. If socialism is to achieve a comparative
advantage over capitalism, it should ‘boldly absorb and borrow all the fruits of
civilisation created by human society, absorb and borrow all the advanced ways of
enterprise and management that reflect the rules of production that modern society has
created in all the countries of the world including the advanced capitalist ones’. To
meet this challenge, he urges boldness in experimenting with measures such as the
introduction of stock markets and the expansion of foreign investment. So long as ‘our heads are clear’, he explains, there is no need to be timid, because state control can quickly be exerted again after a year or two.

This departure from socialist ideology should not, of course, be mistaken for a commitment to political liberalisation. Instead, the displacement of egalitarianism and the elevation of science are the conditions for formulating an ideology appropriate for an authoritarian developmental state. The models closest to hand are neighbouring economies like Japan, South Korea and ‘some in Southeast Asia’. Although, as Deng points out, the comparatively rapid development of these neighbours presents a bleak comparison with China’s own condition, their experiences show that it is possible to go through periods of over-heated growth without being overly concerned about social stability. The concentrated power of the one-party system is what will make it possible for China to go through its own rapid stage of rapid economic growth. Deng left little doubt that his formula had come closer to the thinking of Lee Kuan Yew than Karl Marx when he cited Singapore as a model to be emulated in the search for the right relationship between ideology and economic development (Deng, 1993c: 377-8).

That Deng’s openness to foreign ideas and practices should not be confused with political liberalisation is made clear by the way in which the first chapter of Deng’s selected works is his statement to the Twelfth Congress, in September 1982, where he warns that learning from abroad must not involve subordination to any foreign power or permit ‘rotten thinking’ to be imported and spread a bourgeois life-style (1993c: 1-
4). He explains further in May 1985 that succumbing to foreign cultural influences not only poses a threat to unification with Taiwan, but to the unity of the Chinese mainland itself. The reason for ‘reform and opening’, moreover, is not the promotion of the rights of individuals or minorities, which should be firmly subordinated to the rights of the majority and interpreted in China’s own context (1993p: 124).

The inclusion of Deng’s speech to the Second Plenum in 1983, in which he warns about the general lack of enthusiasm for socialism and the Party, the growing interest in individualism and Western ‘modernism’ (xiandai pai) and the commercialisation of culture, shows how these themes remained as relevant to the technocratic leadership that was moving towards a market-based economy in 1993, as they had been for ideological ‘conservatives’ ten years before. The same is true for the inclusion of Deng’s September 1986 call for the struggle against ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ to carry on for another 20 years. In the Southern Tour text, he could take this further by adding that the consolidation of the socialist system will require fighting bourgeois liberalisation through ‘our own few generations, more than ten generations, or even tens of generations’ (1993o: 383). The condition for success in this venture is that the CCP must hold political power and defend national integrity through a policy of ‘grabbing with two hands’, with ‘one hand reforming and opening, one hand striking hard at all kinds of criminal activities’. (1993o: 379).

This, then, is the formula according to which China can preserve its sovereignty while reaping the benefits of the international economic system. Indeed, the most pronounced difference between the third volume of Deng’s selected works and the
two that came before lies in the amount of material that is devoted to international affairs. No less than 97 of the 119 texts are concerned with diplomacy, international relations and changes in the global environment. The result is a complex narrative that characterises the emerging post-Cold War international situation as one of developed states encouraging small wars between developing states. In this situation China is the victim of two new cold wars, one between the North and the South and the other being the war against socialism while the G7 states are presented as the old imperial powers (Deng 1993q). Bent on replacing the superpowers as the international hegemon, they have imposed sanctions on China under the pretext of promoting democracy and human rights, but in reality to pursue their own interests under the pretext of putting ‘human rights’ (*ren quan*) above ‘state rights’ (Deng 1993r).

The overall effect of the ideology in the third volume of Deng’s selected works is thus to modernise the narrative of the CCP as the only organisation that can save China from the continuing aggression of the old imperialists, taking the nation forward into the global era under the protection of a strong state. Continuing this will only be possible if China becomes one of three or four poles of global power, as Cold War bipolarity gives way to a multipolar international order. The outcome to be avoided at all costs is the emergence of an unbalanced United States, at liberty to fight a ‘smokeless war’ against socialism in its determination to stop China developing to a level where it might become a rival. The neo-liberal belief that China can be transformed through market mechanisms is thus condemned as a policy of ‘peaceful evolution’, amounting to nothing more than a conspiracy to bring about chaos in the socialist states (1993t: 325). The result is an intensely state-centric vision of foreign policy. As Deng reminds a visiting Richard Nixon: if chaos is to be avoided,
international politics will have to be conducted according to the pursuit of national interests while refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of other states (Deng 1993u). Moreover, the imposition of sanctions can be transformed into a positive force to mobilise the population behind the Party as Deng insists that China cannot afford to appear soft when subjected to international pressure, and must be prepared to resist invaders (Deng 1993v).

The significance of this ideological formula in Deng’s Southern Tour can be seen in the way that all of its themes were deployed when Jiang Zemin took another step towards the creation of a market economy when he reported to the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992. Under the rather oxymoronic theory of the ‘socialist market economy’ (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji), the state was to withdraw from central planning and rely on macro-economic controls to regulate an economy that would increasingly be disciplined by market principles. There would be losers as well as winners, as enterprises would feel the pressure to become more efficient and active, with only the fittest surviving. On this road to ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, however, the ideological prescription was still to avoid copying foreign models. Moreover, although the end goal was still supposed to be socialism, it would be a long wait, because the ‘primary stage of socialism’ would last for at least another 100 years. To achieve this, international peace and an ‘independent and self-reliant’ foreign policy also had to be maintained, so that opening up to the outside would allow absorption of the advanced fruits of the civilisation of all countries, including the advanced capitalist ones, for developing socialism.
Jiang could also reiterate Deng’s principle that the criterion for judging policy was whether it was ‘good for socialist production and good or bad for increasing the comprehensive national power of the socialist state, good or bad for raising the standard of living of the people’. Science and technology had become the ‘primary productive force’, and reform had become ‘a kind of revolution and a kind of liberation of productive forces’. The political guarantee for building socialism remained adherence to the Four Cardinal Principles, yet these were to be ‘filled with new content’ from the process of reform and opening and modernisation. While he accepted that poverty was not socialism, it was not possible for everybody to become wealthy at the same time. So some areas and people should be allowed and encouraged to get wealthy first, pulling up others behind them. Opportunities to build socialism through bursts of rapid and efficient development should be ‘grasped’, with each spurt lasting a few years and leading to new stage of development. In the process, the life and death of the Party would be determined by its work style and its links with the masses. National unification remained an objective, through the cultivation of links with patriots and promoting the formula of ‘one country, two systems’.

Just as with Zhang Zhidong’s attempt to preserve Chinese ‘ti’ by using Western ‘yong’, many of the themes deployed in Jiang’s speech to the Fourteenth Congress appear to be contradictory from the perspective of theories that assume globalization will weaken nationalism and the authoritarian state. Yet the proliferation of dichotomies does make sense as an attempt to create the limits of a discourse that can accommodate a range of political constituencies within boundaries that do not permit any challenge to CCP rule. The concept of the ‘socialist market economic system’ is
such a dichotomy, which leaves space for the arguments of both those who advocate planning and public ownership and those who want more rapid introduction of market mechanisms.

Accepting that patriotism means loyalty to the CCP is the minimum requirement for participation in this debate. In his comments on the Southern Tour, Jiang could thus call on cadres to focus on Deng’s call for a policy of ‘grabbing with two hands’, in terms of constructing a flourishing spiritual civilisation based on academic freedom and work in the arts and media, while at the same time hardening the policy of eradicating all ‘evil phenomena’. In January 1993, after consolidation of the reform process, he places more emphasis on the propagation of traditional Chinese culture and modern and contemporary Chinese history, strengthening selfless morality to enable cadres to pass the test of ‘money, power and beautiful women’, strengthening education in Marxist dialectical materialist method, and strengthening education in unity (1998f: 393).

By the end of 1993, Jiang could describe Deng’s theory of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as the ‘continuation and development of Mao Zedong Thought, Marxism for the present age, the great banner for our socialist venture and the mighty spiritual pillar of the revival of the Chinese nation (minzu)’ (1993g: 411). Taken together, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, the Fourteenth Party Congress and the third volume of Deng’s selected works provide the core themes around which the post-Tiananmen CCP leadership has built its legitimacy. They present an interpretation of reality in which the CCP is presented as the party of national salvation, implementing a market-orientated economic reform process within a
multipolar post-Cold War international situation, harnessing the forces of technology to ensure the survival of the Chinese nation-state in a globalising world (Jiang, 1998: 408-9).

TEACHING THE NATION

In 1987 Fang Lizhi had been expelled from the CCP for claiming that ‘reform and opening’ had given intellectuals the highest political status because they represented the most advanced forces of production. The difference between Fang’s views and the treatment of ‘science and technology’ in Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, is that Fang had seen the prospect of a revival of nationalism as promising a return to ‘feudalism’ and he lauded science for the global community it created, approved of its integration into Western democratic societies and approved of internationalist minded scientists like Albert Einstein, even though he realised that their ideals were unlikely to be realised (Fang 1986: 32-3). Moreover, he did not think that economic development was the criterion of an advanced society, which had to be measured above all by its intellectual achievements.

Internationalism and democracy had become the antithesis of Deng’s thinking on science, however. Instead, the linkage between science and the nationalist narrative had become so strong for him that he could go so far as to explain that the defeat of imperialism and feudalism could only be described as ‘revolutionary’ because it liberated the productive forces of the Chinese people. Whether a policy is socialist or capitalist in nature had come to depend on not on the way in which it impacted on
class relationships, but on whether it measures up to the ‘Three Benefits’ (*san ge liyou*) of whether it is ‘good or bad for benefiting the development of social production in socialist society, good or bad for benefiting an increase in the comprehensive national power of the socialist country (*guojia*), good or bad for benefiting the rising living standards of the people’ (Deng 1993o: 372).

This political role of science and technology was reflected when the Central Committee and State Council issued a resolution on speeding up the development of science and technology soon after the passing of a new Election Law in 1995. From then on, the slogan ‘science and education rejuvenate the country’ (*ke jiao xing guo*) would be used to explain the party line of putting economic development first, that had been established back in 1978 (CC 1995: 1344-5). The way in which the forces of globalization had been appropriated within nationalist discourse is illustrated by the way in this resolution stated that ‘Strength in science and technology has already become an important factor in deciding the comprehensive national power and international status of the country’ (CC 1995: 1343-4).

That the articulation of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as a version of patriotism that can incorporate many of the themes of globalization more than just rhetoric, can be demonstrated by looking at how the patriotic education campaign was adapted to respond to the broader economic demands being made on education. As a member of the Education Commission explained, if each of the 200,000 village enterprises that had come to play a crucial structural role in the Chinese economy
were to be given just one trained manager and an engineer, an economist, and an accountant, then no less than 800,000 people would have to be trained. Some 100 million agricultural workers would have to find work in other sectors as farming became more efficient, yet some 35.9 percent of agricultural workers were either literate or semi-literate. Population increase alone meant that 20 million extra people per year would have to be educated. Meanwhile, demand for highly qualified personnel in manufacturing, law, medicine and the cultural field would grow, too. (Li, K. 1993).

The line that emerged from the Fourteenth Party Congress meant that in addressing these problems schools would have to make moral and ideological education compatible with an increasingly market-based socio-economic system, if Jiang Zemin’s vision of a ‘personnel great power’ (rencai qiangguo) was to become reality (Xu and Lin: 408). In practical terms, as Li Keming pointed out, the 22.3 percent (4.3 million) of children who did not even go into secondary education and the 60 percent of the remainder who did not graduate to high school were unlikely to stay on when the emphasis was on ‘cultural’ education rather than the kind of vocational training that was responsive to the needs of the local economy and society.

The broad guidelines for remedying these shortcomings in the education system in ways that would not erode the authority of the Party had already been set out in the Central Committee’s ‘Outline of the Reform and Development of China’s Education’ in February 1993. According to this document, the rationale for reforming education is to win the world competition for economic and national power, which has become a competition in science and technology and over national (minzu) quality. Having set
education policy in a global context, however, the targets established by the document are very pragmatic. In some respects the Outline was more ambitious than the 1985 education reforms, in terms of the aim to extend nine-years of compulsory education to all areas of the country and a strong emphasis on vocational education. Employers and work-based education, for example, would play a key role in raising the educational standards of those already in work. At the high-school level, there would be a movement away from ‘cultural education’. An expansion of places at technical colleges and vocational courses would take place. Higher education would also become more responsive to local social and economic needs, meeting the demands of local farms and enterprises.

At the highest level, around 100 key point universities and a group of key point technical colleges would be equipped to meet the challenges of world scientific and technological development by the beginning of the 21st century. World class research would be developed by establishing a group of key point laboratories and engineering research centres. Opening to the outside world was also to be increased through more academic exchanges, borrowing from the successful experiences in developing and managing education of other countries. Students who studied overseas would be encouraged to return, cooperation with foreign universities would be strengthened, and personnel would be trained and research carried out in collaboration with foreign institutions.

More politically significant is the degree of decentralisation proposed when the ‘Outline’ grapples with the problem of reforming management in step with the overall development of the ‘socialist market economy’. Central to this is the enduring
problem of how to strike a balance between achieving coordination at the national level while not stifling local initiative. The general thrust of the proposal is for a decentralisation of management, with the province, autonomous region or directly administered municipality having the power to decide on issues such as student numbers, teaching plans, the selection and compilation of teaching materials, the duties of teachers and individual salaries. Central government would maintain overall control of the curriculum, standards, staff qualifications and basic salaries at the macro level through instruments such as the law, finance, regulations and information services. It would also play a direct role in running parts of higher education deemed to be strategically important for national economic and social development. The role of the Party in schools would similarly be limited to decisions regarding major issues, while executive personnel would be left alone to carry out their daily duties. In junior and middle schools, the Party organisations would still provide core political leadership, but not be involved in management.

Ideological education is not absent from the ‘Outline’. Given the importance of the patriotic education campaign, though, it is significant that this is relegated to the fourth section of the report. Its content is largely familiar, including reminders for schools to raise socialists with the correct ideals, morals, culture and discipline for building ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. It is also significant that the ‘Outline’ calls for education in national defence to be strengthened, with a continuation of the system of students at high-school and above taking part in military training. (156) Yet it is also important to note that the ‘Outline’ puts just as much stress on the need to make the content of education relevant to social needs and the development of modern science and technology. Teaching materials should thus not
just reflect the civilisational achievements of China and the world, but also the latest
developments in science and culture. Localities should be encouraged to produce
materials suitable for the specific conditions of schools in their rural areas. Technical
and vocational schools should gradually produce materials compatible with they area
supposed to be teaching.

Ultimately, the use of the education system to disseminate the orthodoxies of party
ideology was being limited by the demands of economic modernisation and
professionalisation. Moreover, the role of the party and the state was being weakened
by the need to pay for an expansion of the system through the diversification of
sources of finance. As the ‘Outline’ explained, to date this had been woefully
inadequate. In future, schools would have to make up the difference by not just
looking to local and central government, but also by raising income from school
enterprises and seeking donations from enterprises, individuals, from Hong Kong,
Macao, Taiwan, the overseas Chinese, and even friendly foreign individuals and
organisations.

The Education Commission’s ‘Outline’ thus set out a bold reformist agenda for
education that encapsulates much about the endurance of the ti-yong dichotomy in
Chinese political discourse. As Li Tieying remarked on the ‘Outline’, what was being
called for was a ‘liberation of thought’ and a reform all ideas and systems not
appropriate for the demands of modernisation, an opening up to the outside world and
the bold absorption of and borrowing of the fruits of human society. Yet, while
speeding up reform and opening and building socialism with Chinese characteristics,
there also had to be a strengthening of party leadership, upholding the socialist
direction of education, and the strengthening and improvement of ideological work. As he reminded his audience, Deng Xiaoping had remarked at the time of Tiananmen that great mistakes had been made for a time in ideological education, and that this should never occur again (1993: 27).

The resulting 1995 Education Law thus makes clear that teachers are not only supposed to produce personnel who can contribute to economic development and ‘uphold the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ Balancing the old ‘ti-yong’ dichotomy of using foreign learning to preserve Chinese essence, these new personnel are supposed to continue ‘the excellent historical cultural tradition of the Chinese nation (minzu), [and] absorb all the excellent results of the development of human civilisation’. The mission of teachers and schools is to ‘develop education, raise the quality of the whole nation (minzu), and facilitate the building of socialist material and spiritual civilisation’ (NPC 1995: 1293-4).

To illustrate the kind of patriotic education that this entails, it is worth looking at the kind of teaching materials that have been produced since the passing of the Education Law. As recommended by the Education Commission, school textbooks across the entire curriculum and at all levels are used to deliver patriotic education. Language (Yuwen) textbooks produced in Beijing in 1997 for junior school classes, for example, teach Putonghua Mandarin through the use of vocabulary and phrases such as ‘I love Beijing, I love Tiananmen, I love the five star red flag’, ‘I am Chinese’, ‘I love the motherland’, ‘My motherland is China’ and ‘The five star red flag is our national
flag’. Social paradigms are presented by learning sentences such as ‘father is in the PLA’, ‘mother is a nurse’, ‘the workers work, the peasants plant the fields, the PLA defends the motherland’. National symbols illustrate these lessons, such as Mao Zedong’s portrait hanging over the Tiananmen Gate at the centre of which flies a national flag, a water colour showing young pioneers saluting the national flag, the national emblem, buildings and places of national significance such as the Great Wall, and PLA figures and political leaders from the past doing good deeds.

Stories from the civil war are also introduced as the Language course progresses. One tells of a fifteen-year-old girl communist fighter who is imprisoned in a temple, beaten and threatened with torture if she does not reveal her comrades when her village is occupied by the KMT in 1947. She prefers to impale herself on a knife rather than give away information, leading Chairman Mao to write the couplet, ‘A great life, a glorious death’. Among the new words that are conveyed by this story are ‘turncoat’ (pantu), ‘kill’ (sha) and ‘dagger’ (zha). The role of the CCP as saviour of the nation is also woven into the course material in the form of stories about heroic figures, such as the execution of CPC founder Li Dazhao, Zhou Enlai working overnight, the ‘poem of the revolutionary martyr’, the Long March, Chairman Mao announcing the founding of the PRC and the heroic exploits of a soldier in the Korean War.

Similar patriotic themes are also dispersed throughout ‘Thought and Value’ (sixiang pinde), a kind of civics course that promotes selfless virtues such as hard work, study, respect for parents and teachers, discipline and thrift. Here junior school pupils are presented with the story of a peasant boy who leads a children’s anti-Japanese
resistance unit and is executed by the Japanese along with the rest of his village rather than give away information. The association of the CCP with patriotism is also stressed right from the beginning, with the first lesson being on the subject of the ‘Beloved Leader’, telling the story of how an elderly man comes home with a portrait of Chairman Mao and explains to his grandson how grateful he is to the leader for having improved his standard of living. This is followed by a photograph of Mao, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De at an airport, an exercise of practising singing ‘The East is Red’, and simple lessons on national anniversaries used to mark the establishment of the CCP, the PLA and the PRC, and the special flags used to mark these occasions.

Such patriotic themes and icons are gradually combined with themes more closely associated with globalization discourse as the curriculum becomes more advanced. Exercises in the junior school textbook for ‘Thought and Values’, for example, begin to associate Mao, Zhou, Liu and Zhu with the development of technology. The focus is increasingly forward looking, with a general emphasis on the need to study for the sake of the motherland and building socialism in the 21st century. The technological achievements of the ‘motherland; are also hailed, such as the PRC’s first successful satellite launch in August 1992, and increases in industrial and agricultural production.

One lesson on ‘loving the socialist motherland’ uses the story of Deng Jiaxian, inventor of the PRC’s first atom bomb, as its subject matter.

Within the context of the concern over immunising the young against foreign influences under globalization, it is also important to note that special attention is given to maintaining patriotism when abroad. This is conveyed by stories such as
those of a young Chinese scientist who threatens to withdraw from an international conference if the PRC flag is not displayed. Another tells of a delegation of school children who get off their bus to salute the PRC flag when they see it being raised by a hotel worker in New York. A lesson under the title ‘Study for the Motherland’ tells how a Chinese woman reading engineering in Germany receives the highest merit for her thesis after studying without a break for seven days a week, and having chosen all her topics to fulfil the needs of her country. Perhaps most importantly, having achieved such success overseas, she still returns to China because all of her study was ‘not for myself, but for my motherland’.

As the discussion of the political system is introduced, nationalistic themes are again deployed. The nature of ‘democratic’ decision making is explained by the way in which Mao Zedong chose the national flag by having a conference on the matter, listening to dissenting opinions, discussing them, and making a final decision based on the whole body of opinions. The lesson is illustrated by a painting of Mao and Zhou looking at a design of the flag, surrounded by various dignitaries.

Other nationalistic themes that are introduced across the curriculum at junior level include the patriotism of the Chinese overseas, illustrated by the story of an ethnic-Chinese Singaporean returning to the motherland to establish a school in Xiamen. The issue of Taiwan is also introduced through the tale of Zheng Chenggong, the national hero who expelled the Dutch from the island, which has been ‘Chinese territory since ancient times’. Such themes are further developed and reinforced at middle-school level, where the textbook for ‘Thought and Politics’ (sixiang zhengzhi) starts by explaining that the first quality of a good Chinese citizen is ardent love of the
motherland. The first three sections of the first volume cover ‘The Interests of the Motherland Are Paramount’, ‘Ardently Love the Socialist Motherland’ and ‘Develop Thought that is for the Service of the People’. Again the subject is widened to greater China, the civil war, Taiwan and national humiliation by the United States. As an aside to the United Front, the paragon of virtue is presented here in the form of a KMT general who opposes Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-CCP policies and is sent into exile in the US. There he takes to wearing a placard on his chest saying ‘I am Chinese’, after he is snubbed at the post office for being just that.

The general narrative is one of China having moved from darkness to light under the PRC. Within this story, maintaining the tradition of opposing division and upholding the unity of the motherland that was established when Qin Shi Huangdi united China in 221BC is the duty of all Chinese. The fact that these territories include various non-Han nationalities is not a problem, because all those living in the territory of the motherland have been turned into a cohesive force through a common economic life and linked cultures. It is explained that, without unification, there would be no world-famous Chinese ancient civilisation and no long-term independent development of the Chinese nation, no 9.6 million square km of Chinese territory and no ‘great family’ of the 56 nationalities. History shows that when China is united, it is rich and powerful, which is why the constitution says that Chinese citizens are obliged to defend the unity of the motherland. Unification, moreover, is the historical trend and the common wish of the sons and daughters of China (zhonghua). In recent years, the common efforts of people on both sides of the Strait have has led to a situation in which all are looking forward eagerly to unification.
PERSONNEL POWER: FROM ‘DENG XIAOPING THEORY’ TO THE ‘THREE REPRESENTS’

A key function of this kind of patriotic education is to win loyalty to the Party from the growing number of professional personnel upon whom ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics depends’. By 1995, Jiang Zemin could claim that there were already 18 million personnel working in science and technology (1995a: 1392). Deng had given such personnel and their enterprises key role in his Southern Tour, during which he had marvelled at the speed of scientific and technological advance over the previous two decades and insisted that every business should establish a clear target that would help China to secure a world class position in high technology.

There followed a dramatic expansion of interfaces with foreign scientific and technological activity and know-how through mechanisms such as the creation of science parks in cooperation with Russia and Singapore, the establishment of special high technology industry zones, and the creation of R&D bases in China cooperation with foreign high-tech firms such as IBM and Microsoft. By 1997 the Torch Plan had approved 12,606 projects in the areas of new materials, microelectronics and information, energy, biotechnology, and electromagnetic devices (Segal: 31-2). Chinese scientists were also encouraged to collaborate in international initiatives, such as the human genome project, work on global climate change, and the Euratom project. By the start of the 21st century it could be claimed that since 1978 no less than 320,000 Chinese had gone abroad to study, more than twice the number who had done so in the 100 hundred years before that. Around 110,000 of these had come back to China, and the government was taking measures to attract more to return through local initiatives such as creating special industrial parks to act as ‘incubators’.

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While many young Chinese with a higher education had sought refuge abroad after the events of June 1989, the dependency of the Party on the new generation of scientists, technicians and managers was so great that a policy of encouraging them to freely enter and leave the country had been adopted and publicised. As Jiang Zemin told a meeting of ethnic Chinese experts at the third Symposium of China-America Engineering Technology: ‘There are Chinese people working and living in many countries in the world. They work hard and are richly creative, with their achievements in many areas gaining attention. This brings great pride to the Chinese nation’ (Xu and Lin: 408). By increasing the incentives for such people to move to China, along with foreign expertise, attracting some 440,000 foreign experts to China each year and sending 40,000 overseas, the aim is to create a ‘personnel great power’ (rencai qiangguo) (Xu and Lin: 408).

As Jiang Zemin explained, however, members of the new professional class being created by such exchanges had to be reminded that they were the key force for realising the aim of ‘national rejuvenation through science and education’. Their historical mission is to divert their entire strength to building socialist material and spiritual civilisation. While upholding the Party line, they should be imbued with the glorious patriotic tradition of China’s intellectuals. In the present stage of history, they will have to protect the leadership of the CCP and devote their ideals and expertise to the great task of the ‘socialist modernisation of the motherland’ (1995a: 1392-4).
Such rhetoric might appeal to senior managers who have risen to their positions under the Party’s tutelage, making their loyalty to the CCP more secure. As Peter Nolan points out, a figure like Zhou Guanwu, who spearheaded the attempt to transform Beijing’s Shougang steel corporation into the world’s largest steel producer, was once the leader of a guerrilla unit in the anti-Japanese struggle. Not surprisingly, members of his management team saw themselves as ‘commanders in the industrial battlefront of steel-making, and developed a ‘mobilizatory, quasi-military and highly disciplined style of getting things done (Nolan: 669-70). Yet this blurring of the lines between CCP organisation and industry is not only the case in heavy industry. Even a key sector of the new economy such as information technology is seen as having a strategic role in ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics’, both because China’s leaders believe it can help ‘leap frog’ industrialization and also due to fears over information security (Hughes 2003). A typical example might be Eastcom, a ‘private’ telecoms firm that grew out of the Equipment Supply Office of Zhejiang Posts and Telecommunications Bureau and went on to become a leading player in the mobile communications market. Seven of its directors are over 50 years of age, four over 45, and only two below the age of 35. The CEO and chairman of the board of directors, the 58-year old Mr Shijixing, has been distinguished with the Model Worker Medal for Zhejiang Province (www.eastcom.com).

Another good example is Legend, China’s largest PC manufacturer and a member of the ‘national team’ of enterprises that have been groomed for global competition. The founder of this firm, Liu Chuanzhi, is a graduate of Beijing University who received his original training at the Military Telecommunications Academy in 1961-67 and
was selected from the cadre section of CAS to establish the firm in 1984. Hosting the ambition of becoming the world’s biggest PC manufacturer, this firm has come a long way since it was established in 1984 with funding from the Chinese Academic of Sciences (CAS), allowing it to win a domestic monopoly on the technology for inputting and displaying Chinese characters and the credibility that allowed funds to be raised in Hong Kong to enter the international OEM market in 1988. In return, the firm has played a leading role in building the infrastructure that makes possible the state’s plans for e-government and e-commerce. When Legend launched its global Internet strategy in 1999, it chose the ancient capital city of Xian for the opening ceremony, indicating its commitment to project of linking the whole of China to the globalization project. Re-branded for global markets as ‘Lenovo’, Legend made world headlines when it spearheaded the emergence of Chinese multinationals onto the global stage with a US$1.75 bn. bid for IBM’s PC unit in December 2004, making reality out of Jiang Zemin’s December call for investors to follow a twin strategy of ‘welcoming in’ (yín jìnluài) and ‘going out’ (zǒu chúqu) (PDC 2002: 191), which became formal policy in 2000 to take full advantage of WTO membership.

By March 1998, Liu had been appointed to the National People’s Congress. His ‘Three Factors of Management’, namely ‘Organise the troops, fix the strategy, lead the team’ (zuzhi tuandui, ding zhanlue, dai duiwu), is characteristic of the language imposed on his generation by decades of political sloganeering. He also complains about the loss of the ideals of honesty, seeking glory, hard work, thrift and patriotism in his firm since it started to recruit personnel from sources other than the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 1988. He is not at all happy about the way in which members of the new generation of employees have become so interested in seeking
personal glory, are accustomed to good work conditions and are fully aware that they can take up other job opportunities if they are not satisfied with the treatment they receive (Song, H: 200). Given that Legend has entered into a partnership with AOL-Time Warner to provide Internet services in China, the national loyalties of its staff presents a real test of whether two decades of patriotic education have succeeded in inoculating the rising professional generation against ‘spiritual pollution’.

The need to articulate an outward and forward-looking patriotism has thus become stronger, reaching a turning point when the final vestige of the CCP’s commitment to public ownership was dropped in Jiang Zemin’s report to the Fifteenth Party Congress in September 1997. With Deng having passed away on 19 February, Jiang not only raised the newly christened ideology of ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’ to the same status as ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ at the Congress, he also explained that the definition of ‘public ownership’ could include collective ownership and share holding by members of the public. The acquisition of SOE stock by private shareholders thus became a form of ‘socialism’. While Jiang acknowledged that many workers would suffer as smaller and less efficient SOEs were sold off or dismantled, he insisted that ‘Basically, what is beneficial to economic development is good for the long-term interests of the working class’.

To strengthen the legitimacy of the leadership as he made this departure from the last vestige of socialist principles, Jiang presented this message within the full panoply of the CCP’s narrative of national salvation. Proclaiming that all the party congresses of the twentieth century had understood that ‘Our party shoulders a sacred historical
responsibility for the fate of the Chinese nation’, he made a favourable comparison of the present situation with that of China at the time of the Opium War and the near extinction of the Chinese nation at the hands of the Eight Armies, a coalition of imperial armies that had invaded China to suppress the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. After that crisis, the Chinese nation had two responsibilities: first, to achieve national independence and the liberation of the people, then to build a prosperous and strong country with common wealth for all the people. The conclusion to be drawn from the last hundred years was thus that: ‘Only the Chinese Communist Party can lead the Chinese people to national independence, the liberation of the people and the victory of socialism’.

UNIFICATION AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERRUPT

The development of a an outwardly orientated, elitist nationalism driven by the need to achieve the task of economic construction could only work, however, so long as the tasks of national unification and opposing ‘international hegemony’ did not impinge on domestic politics too much. As the sanctions imposed after Tiananmen crumbled, the transfer of Hong Kong approached in 1997, and Taiwan came to the negotiating table at Singapore in 1993, this was a feasible prospect. Yet the impact of events in both of these areas of policy-making in the late 1990s meant that more than the sweeping patriotic narrative of the leadership would be required to ensure the patriotic loyalties of the rising professional class to the CCP leadership.

The first challenge to the leadership’s patriotic credentials was presented by the crisis in the Taiwan Strait that began in the summer of 1995, when ROC president Lee Teng-hui was granted a visa to visit the United States, and culminated in a military stand-off with
the United States Navy in the run-up to the island’s presidential election in March the following year. While this triggered the first wave of popular nationalism in the 1990s, it is notable that Jiang Zemin attempted to keep the focus of ideological debate on domestic problems. At the end of 1995, he thus opened up discussion of the right way to address the social and political problems generated by the development of the ‘socialist market system’ by presenting a speech to the plenary session of the Central Committee in which he listed twelve major relationships that had to be properly managed by the party. These are the relationships between reform, development and stability; speed and efficiency; economic construction, population, natural resources and environment; between different levels of industry; the eastern and the western regions; the market and macroeconomic controls; public ownership and other forms of ownership; the distribution of income between the state, enterprises and individuals; opening to the outside and self-reliance; the centre and the provinces; national defense and economic construction; and building material and spiritual civilisation (Jiang 1995). The issue of Taiwan was not mentioned, even though the crisis was well under way by that time.

Despite the sanctions taken by Beijing against the United States around the time of the election in Taiwan and the strong anti-Americanism that was developing in popular books such as *China Can Say No* (Song et al., 1996), both Washington and Beijing made efforts to repair their relationship. In October 1997 Jiang Zemin thus made the first visit to the United States by a Chinese head of state since 1985, during which billions of dollars of new business was cleared for US companies, including a deal for the sale of 50 Boeing aircraft worth about US$3bn. When President Clinton returned Jiang’s visit with his own trip to China in June 1998, deals for some US$1.4bn worth
of US goods and services were signed. With Beijing holding the value of the
Renminbi Yuan during the Asian Financial Crisis and providing vital support for the
Hong Kong dollar, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had a strong case to
make when she urged Congress to renew China's MFN status in July 1998, putting
global economic stability before pressure on China to make political reforms. It is also
important to note that at the centre of these attempts to take nationalism out of PRC-US
relations was a major concession to China over Taiwan, when Clinton made a
significant shift in Washington’s policy towards Taiwan in the form of a verbal
announcement of a ‘Three No’ policy for Taiwan: ‘No one China, one Taiwan; no
Taiwan independence; no Taiwan membership in international organisations requiring
statehood’.

The patriotic rhetoric of the leadership was also called into question by a perceived
failure of the government to react to atrocities against ethnic Chinese Indonesians
during riots that swept Jakarta on 13-15 May 1998, in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis. Particular indignation was caused by reports that ethnic Chinese women of all
ages had been subjected to gang rape, often in front of their families. When Chinese
citizens showed their concern by holding demonstrations in various Southeast Asian
states, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and as far away as Australia and the United States,
mainland China was the stark exception. It was only after news filtered through to
mainland China that students began to use the new medium to organise a march to the
Indonesian embassy in Beijing (Hughes 2000).

Of particular importance for the formation of elite nationalism is the way in which the
Internet began to be used as the medium for such news to be disseminated. The
expansion of the Internet was driven largely by the government’s own drive to ‘leapfrog’ industrialisation by informatising the economy and administration (Dai 2003). Yet it was already showing less signs of leading to the kind of social liberalisation expected by many pundits outside China and more of a tendency to mirror and magnify existing nationalistic sentiments in the on-line population. The heated nature of the nationalist emotions that were spreading at the time is encapsulated by the message left by one correspondent, who asked:

My mother country, do you hear the crying? Your children abroad are crying out. Help them. I do not understand politics and do not dare talk about politics. I do not know what it means to say ‘we have no long-term friends or enemies, only long-term interests’, and I do not know what these interests are ... I only know that my own compatriots are being barbarously slaughtered, they need help, and not just moral expressions of understanding and concern. My motherland, they are your children. The blood that flows from their bodies is the blood of the Han race. Their sincerity and good will also comes from your nourishment. Help them ...

These nationalistic feelings encouraged numerous Internet users to call into question the CCP’s patriotism, ridiculing Beijing’s strong stance on non-intervention by asking how the Arab states would react if China started to kill its Muslim citizens, pointing out how France and the United States had intervened in Rwanda and describing how the British and Americans always stand together. The PRC, by contrast, had not even used its seat at the UN to promote sanctions against Indonesia and had actually taken part in securing IMF aid for that country, while straining under its own domestic
problems. Even Taiwan had taken a stronger stance towards Jakarta, responding to public outrage by suspending the supply of 200,000 tons of rice. Perhaps most significant for the evolution of nationalist politics inside mainland China, though, was the inevitable links that were drawn between Beijing’s conservative foreign policy, the patriotic rhetoric of Jiang Zemin and the CCP’s monopoly on power. ‘It is quite simple’, pointed out one correspondent, ‘You can demonstrate against the atrocities in Indonesia, but as soon as you demonstrate a bit about democracy, freedom, lack of human rights, government incompetence, official corruption, then how can the CCP and the “collective leadership around the core of Jiang Zemin” accept it?’

The largest foreign policy challenge for the leadership, however, was presented by the destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 8 May 1999 (Beijing Time), during which three embassy personnel died and more than 20 were injured. This took place as many in China were already seeing evidence of Washington’s conspiracy to fight Deng’s ‘smokeless war’ against the Chinese political system and way of life. The belief that anti-Chinese forces were on the rise in Washington had been reinforced by the trial of the Taiwanese-born scientist Wen Ho Lee on espionage charges. In January 1999, accusations that large numbers of Chinese visitors to the United States were engaged in the illicit transfer of militarily sensitive high technology to China were also made in a report by the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, under Congressman Christopher Cox. In foreign policy, Washington’s increasing practice of humanitarian intervention around the world seemed to be consolidating what Deng Xiaoping had condemned as the doctrine of ‘human rights above sovereignty’ and the use of force to spread Western values (Chu and Wang,
Such suspicions were further heightened when the Pentagon’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review presented a strategy in which Washington would use a window of opportunity before 2015 in which it would have unrivalled power to ‘shape’ the international strategic environment. The air raids launched against Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom under the Desert Fox campaign of December 1998, and opposed by France, Russia and China at the UN Security Council, confirmed the dangers posed by US unipolarity. NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia and its eastward expansion were seen as part of a grand strategy to control the Balkans and dominate Europe.

Closer to home, Washington was seen to be encouraging Japan to develop a more active defence policy and the signing of the Joint US-Japan Security Declaration in April 1996 was seen as an expansion of the scope of Japan’s security commitments to include the Taiwan Strait. Despite the efforts made by Beijing and Washington to restore stable relations after the Taiwan Strait crisis, by the end of 1998 reports were already spreading in the dissident overseas Chinese press that Jiang Zemin was coming under intense pressure from the military to take a stronger line against the United States and Japan. This criticism reached a new peak when Jiang became the first head of state to visit Japan in November 1998, only to suffer serious humiliation when he failed to satisfy expectations at home that he would secure a new apology for the invasion of China and Tokyo’s confirmation of Washington’s ‘Three Nos’ policy for Taiwan. In December 1998, the Hong Kong based journal Zhengming claimed that more than 50 retired generals had signed a petition demanding that the CCP Politburo review and explain its policy towards the United States and Japan and demanded that Jiang should lodge strong protests and take sanctions against Washington and Tokyo.
over their interference in the unification of China. The report claimed that a study session for high ranking cadres held by the CMC in November had turned into major criticism of Central Committee regarding policies towards the United States and Japan and weakness in Taiwan policy.

This situation was particularly sensitive for Premier Zhu Rongji, whose main priority in relations with Washington was to secure agreement on the terms of China’s accession to the WTO. Zhu responded to pressure from the military at a special briefing for high-ranking officers held by the CMC in November. He was reported to have received a standing ovation for interpreting Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy line as meaning that hegemonic politics have to be opposed and that normal relations with the US depend on America’s adherence to the principle of non-intervention, upholding the principle of independence. Compromises would not be entered into with the Western powers in exchange for temporary benefits. Zhu also insisted that the leadership would demand that Japan should amend portions of the US-Japan security agreement where it threatened to interfere with Chinese territory, would oppose the revival of Japanese militarism and its designs on Taiwan. Demands would continue to be made for Japan to admit to the destruction and damage it caused during its invasion of China, and to make a correct summation of such historical incidents. Zhu also insisted that the Central Committee was committed to accelerated development and enhancement of military readiness, high-tech defence and armaments, with the doctrine of preparing to fight against a high-tech partial encroachment in an anti-Chinese war remaining unchanged and being given top priority.
The nature of the legitimacy crisis that Zhu had to deal with is summed up by the claim made in Zhengming (December 1998: 9-11) that at a dinner with PLA leaders and retired generals after the CMC briefing, he assured his audience that:

Should the leadership one day stray from Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s theories and line toward the US and Japan - becoming an appendage of American hegemony, discarding the territory and sovereignty of the motherland - the entire population and the military are charged with the responsibility of defending national justice, to overturn and overthrow such a corrupt, reactionary ruling party and government!

Whether or not such reports are accurate, this was the context of opinion and perception within which Premier Zhu Rongji visited the United States on April 6-14, with the aim of signing an agreement on the terms of China’s WTO accession. That NATO had begun the bombardment of Serbia on 24 March, made the journey even more sensitive. On April 20, however, Zhu returned to China without President Clinton’s signature on the WTO agreement. It did not go without notice that there were no representatives from the National People’s Congress to meet him, as protocol demands. The NPC, under the chairmanship of the conservative and technocratic Li Peng then became a major source of the attacks on Zhu that ensued (Zhengming, June 1999: 10-11).

Zhu Rongji was thus in a vulnerable position due to the interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy even before the destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on. When that crisis broke out, hundreds of thousands of people protested in
cities across China, attacking the US embassy in Beijing with stones and eggs. U.S. Ambassador James Sasser was trapped in his embassy, guarded by U.S. Marines, as enraged students yelled ‘kill Americans’, hurled rocks and tried to storm the compound. Over the following days, students in Beijing shouted slogans like ‘get out American pigs’ and burned the American flag. In the central industrial city of Nanjing, they staged a sit-down protest outside a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant and plastered posters on windows saying ‘Strike The U.S. Economy’, and trade unions marching past the US consulate in the southern city of Guangzhou chanted ‘Stop American mad dogs from biting’.

THE POWERLESNESS OF THE POWERFUL

The most notable characteristic of the reaction of the leadership to this crisis is that the vital task of trying to maintain public order was given to the rising star of the Politburo, vice-president Hu Jintao. It was Hu that made a carefully balanced televised speech on 9 May, while Jiang Zemin did not respond in public until four more days had passed. Moreover, Hu’s speech on this occasion encapsulates how the ideological formula of Deng Xiaoping Theory could be applied by acknowledging on the one hand the right of the Chinese people to express their fury and ardent patriotism, while on the other insisting that the protests should be carried out within the law and that there should be vigilance against those who might take advantage of the opportunity to disrupt social order.

The only concrete actions that Hu could offer on behalf of the government, however, were official protests and the demand for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. Aside from saying that the government reserved the right to take further
unspecified measures, Hu’s message for the future of foreign policy was that the government would not be moved from its line of independence, self-sufficiency and peace, resolutely upholding national sovereignty and the dignity of the nation, opposing hegemony and power politics. In a note of reassurance for those who might doubt the continuation of the domestic reforms, Hu insisted that the basic line of ‘reform and opening’ would continue and that the rights of overseas Chinese and foreigners in China would be protected. The key political message was summed up in Hu’s last paragraph, where he appealed for the nation to unite around ‘the Party Centre with Jiang Zemin at its core’ and to ‘hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory, the spirit of struggle, united as one, taking the great project of building socialism with Chinese characteristics forward into the twenty-first century’.

The Belgrade Incident thus illustrates how difficult it had become for the Chinese leadership to match its patriotic rhetoric with rising domestic expectations for the country to ‘say no’ to the United States. The relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics had not only been complicated by factionalism in the Party, but also by the development of alternative channels for the formation of public opinion. Not only did books such as China Can Say No and the genre it established show the significance of a commercial publishing sector, but the Internet was also coming into its own as a venue for discussion. While American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War had encouraged the spread of the Internet to authoritarian states in the hope that it would bring about liberalisation, it was already clear in 1999 that public use of the new technology to air anti-American emotions was far more popular.
Faced by accusations of weakness, the Party organs could only go along with the tide of nationalistic anger. The *People's Daily* thus claimed that NATO had purposely ‘spilled Chinese blood’, and the Xinhua news agency quoted a prominent Chinese scientist who was sure that the attack had been elaborately planned. On May 6, as the crisis in Kosovo began to unfold, all of the large papers in Beijing published a long article entitled, ‘The Chinese Academy of Sciences and “Two Missiles, One Satellite”: A Remembrance’, by Zhang Jinfu, former party secretary of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. It gave a detailed recounting of the process that took place in the year that China developed the atomic bomb, a missile and a satellite. Discussing this article after the embassy attack, scientists at CAS expressed that they could quickly produce whatever national security required. On 10 May, as the demonstrations continued to grow, involving over a million people in the major cities, two satellites were launched on the Long March 4B rocket, the first of the year and reportedly arranged by the top leadership to demonstrate to the US China’s potential capacity to launch international missiles. The following day, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao announced that China had reached certain decisions according to the spirit of the Chinese government statement and in consideration of the current situation: to postpone high level military contacts between the armed forces of China and the US, postpone PRC consultations with the US in the fields of proliferation prevention, arms control and international security; suspend dialogue with the US on human rights.

Ultimately, however, despite these gestures of defiance, the crisis of 1999 showed the limits of China’s capabilities to oppose American power. With Hu Jintao having established the basic framework of expressing patriotism within the limits established by Deng Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin finally elaborated more on the nature of
nationalism when he gave an address to the nation on 13 May to mark the return of the dead embassy workers to China (Jiang 1999). Reiterating that the government had lodged the strongest possible protest with the United States and reserved the right to take further measures, Jiang acknowledged that the protests inside China were an expression of the ‘great patriotic spirit and solidarity’ of the Chinese nation and their determination to uphold peace and oppose hegemony, and that ‘The Great PRC could not be bullied!’ Having stressed the legitimacy of nationalistic emotions, Jiang then went on to describe how the post-Cold War international situation was still developing towards multipolarity, although the situation was still not peaceful as more countries were becoming alarmed over the way that the United States used its economic and technological power to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. Humanity was thus at a crucial point in establishing peace and development, so all peaceful nations should unite to oppose hegemony and struggle to build an ethical and rational international order. What China was supposed to do to further this, however, was confined to Jiang’s insistence that the path of taking economic development as the central task that was established by Deng Xiaoping should be followed. This meant that:

The whole Party and people of all nationalities in the country should take the great indignity and heated patriotism they feel towards the barbaric actions of NATO and turn it into a powerful motivating force, with one heart and one ethic and hard struggle to incessantly increase our country’s economic power, defence power and national solidarity.
Only socialism could guarantee the right conditions for this to take place, explained Jiang, because reform and opening is the ‘road to a great power’. While maintaining independence and self-sufficiency, continuing economic and technological exchanges on the basis of equality, ‘ceaselessly promoting modernisation by combining the best of Chinese tradition with the best of the world’s civilisations’. Naturally, in the process it was essential that all should be vigilant towards those inside the country who might take advantage of the situation to create social disorder. A peaceful foreign policy based on principles of independence and self-sufficiency and cooperation with all states would be developed according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and under the leadership of the CCP.

The correct interpretation of the speeches made by Jiang and Hu was explained in some detail in a *People’s Daily* article on 27 May 1999 under the title ‘Come Together Under the Great Banner of Patriotism’ (Huang 1999). This reiterated the stress on continuity with the reform programme and identified the leadership with the patriotic emotions of the public by agreeing that the bombing of the embassy had revealed that the doctrine of ‘human rights before sovereignty’ is nothing more than a new kind of imperialism, shattering any illusions that intellectuals might have held about the US. But its real message was to restate Deng’s view that ‘Only development is hard reason’. As the article explained, only the strong can avoid being humiliated by foreigners, so ‘we must transform our anger into strength, build the economy, this is the lasting guarantee of being able to hold the ground of not being defeated’. After all, went the argument, it is only economic power that enables the United States to punish those who do not bend to its will. Chinese history since 1840 has taught us that only the strong can avoid humiliation. What was important in the immediate present,
therefore, was to resolutely uphold social stability and the great unity of the nationalities, because ‘Without a solid Great Wall, where is there a secure home?’
The answer to the crisis, therefore, was to ‘resolutely take economic construction as the centre, comprehensively strengthen national defence and the armed forces’.
Technological education was to be used to ‘revive the country’, and technology would defend the country, but only a high point of scientific development could be reached in the coming century. The only way to achieve the strength to face this complex situation was to follow the party centre with Jiang Zemin at its core.

Maintaining this balance between patriotism and the priority of economic development became increasingly difficult, however, as foreign events continued to unfold. When, on 9 July, Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui announced in an interview on German Radio that from then on the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be considered a ‘special relationship between two states’, the nationalist fervour reached a new height. Reports began to appear in the overseas Chinese press indicating that the foreign policy line established by Deng Xiaoping was being tested by elements in the military. Zhang Wannian, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, was supposed to have stated on at least two occasions that China faced the possibility of a ‘New World War’, which would have represented a major departure from Deng’s principle that a world war was not likely in the near future. According to the reports, Zhang also argued that it was impossible to establish a strategic partnership with the United States while it was implementing hegemonism and gunboat diplomacy, and that the military considered US hegemonism to be the main enemy of the people. The attack had generated bitter hatred of the enemy and spurred the military to step up modernisation to fight a high-tech war against the
United States, predicated on fighting a war in the Taiwan Strait and opposing an offensive war mounted by United States and Japanese forces that would involve a war of resistance, attrition and destruction that would expand into a world war and with nuclear conflict hard to avoid. Given such sentiments, it is not surprising that when Lee Teng-hui was asked by the Voice of Germany whether Taiwan would share the fate of Hong Kong and Macau, he explained, ‘The crucial question is the Chinese mainland's overemphasis on nationalism and its failure to implement democracy’.

**FACING THE PAST-FACING THE FUTURE**

The numerous crises of 1999 had a special poignancy because this was also the year that marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The predicament that the sponsorship of nationalism had created for China’s leaders at the end of the millennium is symbolised by a front page editorial that appeared in the PLA newspaper, *Jiefangjun bao*, on 16 August, which denounced Lee Teng-hui and warned that 50 years ago an outmanned and outgunned PLA defeated the nationalist army. Taiwan could spend ‘mountains’ of US dollars modernizing its military, but its forces would never have the morale to fight for a ‘1000 year sinner’ and ‘splittist’ like Lee. The PLA, insisted the article, is ‘willing to lose thousands of troops, but will not lose a single inch of Chinese territory’. Meanwhile, American and Japanese defence officials were busy signing a memorandum of understanding on joint research into a ship-based theatre missile defence (TMD) system. The PLA staged a massive show of force in Beijing with a dress rehearsal for the 1 October National Day parade.

When Jiang Zemin delivered his National Day address to the nation (1999a), the ideological formula that Deng Xiaoping had put in place since the late 1970s was
reiterated. Jiang recalled how Mao Zedong had announced the birth of the New China 50 years before, after which the Chinese people had stood up, followed by Deng Xiaoping who had set China on the road of ‘reform and opening’. Practice had shown that only socialism could ‘save China’, establishing independence after a hundred years of bloody struggle. Looking ahead, Jiang laid out a vision of the Chinese people devoting their strength and bravery to standing up in the ‘world’s forest of nations’, showing again how they could use their intelligence and ability to contribute to world civilization. Deng’s three major tasks remained firmly in place, as he explained that all of China’s nationalities would work together to build a new stage in the development of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. At the same time, they would strive to achieve complete national unification, and adhere to an ‘independent and self-reliant’ foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to stand with friendly countries in opposing hegemony and promoting multipolarity and a fair and rational international economic system. Ultimately, under the ‘great banner’ of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, China ‘a wealthy, strong, democratic and civilised modernised socialist China must appear in the Orient’.

It is as part of this strengthening of the nationalistic rhetoric of the party leadership that Jiang Zemin finally made his own contribution to the party line in the form of the ‘Three Represents’, which proposes that the CCP represents the development of advanced productive forces, represents the taking forward of China’s advanced culture, and represents the fundamental interests of the great majority of the Chinese people. Based on a set of ideas that Jiang first unveiled in February 2000 during a tour of Guangdong province, it was installed alongside Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory
in his report to the Sixteenth Party Congress. It thus constitutes the ideological heritage within which China’s new generation of leaders has to articulate its policies. In this sense, its real significance is that it formalizes the status of the rising class of professional personnel as a revolutionary vanguard in the Leninist political hierarchy. The breadth of this new class can be seen in the way that Jiang told the Sixteenth Congress how the new ‘builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics’ that had emerged from the process of social change had come to include ‘entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by non-public scientific and technological enterprises, managerial and technical staff employed by overseas-funded enterprises, the self-employed, private entrepreneurs, employees in intermediaries, free-lance professionals and members of other social strata’.

The kind of dilemma faced by the founder of Lenovo when dealing with the self-interest of his younger professional employees had thus been resolved. As Jiang told the Sixteenth Congress, the CCP should unite with all people who ‘make the motherland prosperous and strong’. People should not be judged by how much property they own, but by their ‘political awareness, state of mind and performance, by how they have acquired and used their property, and by how they have contributed to the cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics through their work’. In the ‘primary stage of socialism’, it is no longer necessary to pay even lip-service to a class analysis of society, because ‘In building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the fundamental interests of the people of the whole country are identical, on the basis of which interest relations and internal contradictions can be adjusted’. While the world situation is thus moving towards ‘political multipolarization and economic
globalization’ amidst twists and turns, it is the representatives of the advanced forces of production that will work with the CCP to bring about ‘a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on its road to socialism with Chinese characteristics’.

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1 The author would like to express his gratitude to Father Dominique Tyl of the Socio-Cultural Research Center, Furen Catholic University, Taiwan, for allowing access to his collection of the PRC teaching materials used in this section. The texts referred to are collected together in the bibliography of this volume for ease of reference.