Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service

Kelly, Frank and Steinberg, Richard ORCID: 0000-0001-9636-472X (2000) A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service. Management Science, 46 (4). pp. 586-596. ISSN 0025-1909

Full text not available from this repository.

Identification Number: 10.1287/mnsc.46.4.586.12054


We describe a discrete-time auction procedure called PAUSE (Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment) for use in assigning COLR (Carrier of Last Resort) responsibility for universal service. The auction incorporates synergies by permitting all combinatorial bids, is transparent to the bidders, allows for multiple winners, and minimizes the possibility of bidder collusion. The procedure is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and thus very efficient to run. The inherent computational complexity of combinatorial bidding cannot be eliminated. However, in this auction the computational burden of evaluating synergies rests with the bidders claiming those synergies, while the auctioneer simply checks that a bid is valid.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2000 INFORMS
Divisions: Management
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications
Date Deposited: 07 Apr 2009 16:03
Last Modified: 01 Jun 2024 03:28

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item