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Congestion pricing and noncooperative games in communication networks

Ganesh, Ayalvadi, Laevens, Koenraad and Steinberg, Richard ORCID: 0000-0001-9636-472X (2007) Congestion pricing and noncooperative games in communication networks. Operations Research, 55 (3). pp. 430-438. ISSN 0030-364X

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Identification Number: 10.1287/opre.1070.0400


We consider congestion pricing as a mechanism for sharing bandwidth in communication networks, and model the interaction among the users as a game. We propose a decentralized algorithm for the users that is based on the history of the price process, where user response to congestion prices is analogous to "fictitious play" in game theory, and show that this results in convergence to the unique Wardrop equilibrium. We further show that the Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the welfare-maximizing capacity allocation.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2007 INFORMS
Divisions: Management
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Date Deposited: 07 Apr 2009 15:57
Last Modified: 01 Jun 2024 03:30

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