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## From Tolstoyan to terrorist: the revolutionary career of Prince D.A. Khilkov, 1900-1905.

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From Tolstoyan to Terrorist:  
the Revolutionary Career of Prince D. A. Khilkov, 1900 - 1905

'I love the Russian revolution and have given up a great deal for it, but nevertheless as for my beard...I would not give it up for anything.'<sup>1</sup> These words were spoken by Prince Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Khilkov to Social Democrat L. S. Fedorchenko in Geneva around 1902, at a time when Khilkov was at a crossroads in his life. They reveal a genuine devotion to revolutionary change in Russia, but also a certain individuality, even eccentricity, which often perplexed his contemporaries. Only a year earlier he had turned from a long association and friendship with L. N. Tolstoi, decisively rejecting pacifism and non-violence, and strongly opposing the influence of Tolstoyan teaching among the people. Between 1900 and 1905 Khilkov became increasingly involved in the revolutionary movement in Switzerland, first with the Social Democrat organisation *Zhizn'*, and latterly with the Socialist Revolutionary Party, where for a short time at the height of the fervour of 1904-1905, he occupied a respected position on the Committee of the *Zagranichnaia organizatsiia*. There he was an outspoken advocate of mass terror as a means to overthrow autocracy. His five years of political activity were occupied above all with the publication and distribution of revolutionary literature, directed at the peasantry and, in particular, sectarians, with the aim of organising them in preparation for a popular uprising. The aim of this paper is to examine the remarkable and seemingly contradictory career of D. A. Khilkov, looking in particular at his publications of these years, and to assess his contribution to the cause of the revolution, to which he claimed to have given so much.

Born in 1857 into one of Russia's oldest princely families and educated at the elite Corps de Pages, Dmitrii Khilkov showed early promise of a brilliant military career. On the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, he volunteered for service in a Cossack regiment on the Caucasian front, where he was involved chiefly in reconnaissance and special operations, leading a small detachment of Cossacks in often highly dangerous missions. Before long, however, youthful idealism about war and military service was shattered by the harsh realities, which confronted him. On a personal level he suffered a profound spiritual crisis after killing a Turk in battle, which caused him thereafter to renounce violence. As an officer he was deeply disillusioned with the self-serving cynicism of his fellow officers and their appalling treatment of the troops. Once the War was over, while quartered for a time in a village of the Dukhobor sect, Khilkov for the first time encountered Russian sectarians, leading him to reject Orthodoxy in favour of 'spiritual Christianity'. At the same time the nature of the Russian military administration in territory recently taken from the Turks, in particular the treatment of native populations, only served to deepen a growing disquiet about the role of the military and State violence.

A second term of service in the Caucasus from 1881 to 1884 confirmed this further. Stationed in Kutais he stood out among fellow officers in the degree of his sympathy and concern for the common soldier. For this he was regarded as something of a crank, and a 'socialist', a reputation which was enhanced by a continuing interest in the sects,<sup>2</sup> of which there were many around Kutais, and by contact with political exiles. Naturally enough such associations were frowned upon, and his superiors recommended they should cease. Khilkov's refusal to comply moved the local police chief to place him under secret surveillance. In 1884, at the rank of lieutenant colonel, Dmitrii Khilkov retired from

service and returned to the family estate at Pavlovki, Sumy district, Kharkov province.

From 1884 to 1891 Khilkov's activities in and around Pavlovki proved a growing source of irritation and concern to the authorities. By 1886 he had distributed to his former peasants all but seven desiatins of land out of the 430 given him by his mother, Princess Iuliia Petrovna, and was living and working on the land. Having won the trust of local peasants, he was active in supporting them in disputes with local landowners, clergy and other representatives of authority. In 1887 he first made the acquaintance of Tolstoi, who was greatly impressed by his new friend's pragmatic Christianity. From that time Khilkov's home at Pavlovki became a focal point for sectarians, Tolstoyans and disaffected peasants. So great was the concern of the authorities that in November 1891 Pobedonostsev strongly urged the Tsar to deal with the troublemaker. In February 1892, therefore, Khilkov was sent into administrative exile to the remote village of Bashkichet in Georgia, where he again encountered the Dukhobors. Increased action against dissenters in Russia through the 1890's brought other Tolstoyan exiles to the area. Their activities in spreading Tolstoi's teaching among sectarians were viewed by the authorities as responsible for the growing militancy of Dukhobors, which climaxed with brutal repression in 1895. It was Dmitrii Khilkov who sent news of the Dukhobors' plight to Tolstoi and initiated their exodus from Russia three years later. As one of the ringleaders Khilkov was exiled once more to Weissenstein (Paide) in Estonia. Finally in 1898 he was permitted to leave Russia and acted as one of the chief agents in the settlement of the Dukhobors in Canada. Following a brief visit to England, to the Tolstoyan colony at Purleigh, where his family were living, he left for Canada at the end of August 1898. For the best part of a year, until the following July, Khilkov travelled extensively,

seeking out the best sites for settlement, liaising with government officials, and accompanying the immigrants to their new homes.<sup>3</sup>

With this background Khilkov arrived in Switzerland in July 1899 to join his family, who had moved there with Biriukov and others from Purleigh. His reputation and the tragic circumstances of his life were well known to the émigré community. Only the previous year Vladimir Chertkov had published Khilkov's autobiographical *Zapiski* in the Tolstoyan journal *Svobodnoe slovo*, while the dramatic seizure of his children in 1893, by order of the Tsar, had been a *cause célèbre* in Russia at the time.<sup>4</sup> He was known also for his ardent defence of victims of religious persecution in Russia, an issue which had been brought to the attention of the world by the exodus of the Dukhobors. In Switzerland in 1899 the intellectual and political life of the Russian émigré community was dominated by the Social Democrat group, Liberation of Labour, headed by Plekhanov, Akselrod and Zasulich; Lenin had not yet arrived from Russia. Opposition to the Social Democrats from agrarian socialists would not be organised for another year with the formation of the Agrarian Socialist League, whose leaders, Volkovskii and Shishko, were at that time located in London and Paris respectively. The Tolstoyans, led by Chertkov and Biriukov, were envied by all sides for their effective propaganda machine and organising ability, shown to great effect by the Dukhobor affair. At the same time, however, they were held in some disdain among Social Democrats for their non-violent, anti-revolutionary stance. On a personal level, perhaps only Biriukov held the general respect of all sides for his open mind and generosity of spirit. Khilkov was of course immediately identified with the Tolstoyans, but it was soon to become clear that his adherence to Tolstoyism was less than wholehearted.

For the present, however, he worked with Biriukov in the publication of a new Tolstoyan journal *Svobodnaia mysl*, which aimed to discuss current events in Russia and the world from a Christian point of view. Issues of freedom of conscience and religious persecution naturally received a high profile, and Khilkov's first major contribution was a two part article on Stundism in Russia, which appeared in November and December 1899.<sup>5</sup> Having started as an evangelical movement in the South of Russia in the mid-1860's, the term Stundism had come to embrace a wider sectarian movement holding a diversity of religious, social and political views. While in Pavlovki Khilkov had enjoyed close links with local Stundist leaders and had campaigned with some success against the fierce opposition of Amvrosii, Archbishop of Kharkov. In exile he continued to defend persecuted Stundists, who suffered increased persecution following a decree of 1894, which branded them as a 'particularly dangerous sect'.

The article in *Svobodnaia mysl'* aimed to better acquaint the readership with the nature of Stundism and the futility of government measures to combat it. Stundism, he argued, was not a religious sect or teaching, but a generic term in Russia 'for that spirit of investigation and criticism of old forms, which had awakened in the Russian peasantry in the seventies'. A Stundist might be an anarchist or a socialist, a sectarian, or even Orthodox. The one unifying factor was the use of scripture as a basis for criticising the existing order, whether religious, economic or political. For two reasons the government had cause for alarm, both for the intrinsic rejection of Orthodoxy, and for the 'surprising ability' of Stundism 'to organise and draw together the most varied and often completely theoretically different sects and persuasions'. This powerful force of protest might have been contained in a religious framework, had the authorities granted freedom of conscience at the outset. Now it was

too late. Stundists had suffered years of persecution, which had served only to reinforce their convictions, and their example of suffering and endurance had not been lost on their fellow peasants. In their zeal to combat Stundism police and clergy sometimes employed measures which actually transgressed the law. Khilkov now called on all educated Russians to come to the aid of persecuted Stundists by exposing all criminal acts against them and bringing the perpetrators before the courts. In many cases, he believed, the threat of legal action alone would be sufficient to curb such acts. He concluded with an appeal to the intelligentsia to end their alienation from sectarians, and not be blind to the educational and cultural work they were carrying out among the Russian people.

No doubt uppermost in Khilkov's mind was the persecution being endured by sectarians in his own village, Pavlovki, in Kharkov. Restrictions placed on them had become so severe that their condition was likened to solitary confinement.<sup>6</sup> In their desperation the only option it seemed was to emigrate like the Dukhobors. Having learnt from that experience, Khilkov was concerned that the Pavlovtsy should wait until conditions were more favourable for their departure. Tolstoi, on the other hand, was against their emigration, which he considered 'ill advised from a worldly point of view, and wrong from a Christian point of view'. He considered that it would be far better for them as Christians to continue to endure their difficulties.<sup>7</sup> The settlement of the Dukhobors and the plight of the Pavlovtsy are the major themes of Khilkov's correspondence with Tolstoi during 1899 and 1900. There is indication also of obvious strain in their relations, and Khilkov's departure from Tolstoyism can be dated from this period, as he called into question the doctrine of non-resistance. Involvement with the Dukhobor emigration had proved physically taxing and ultimately demoralising. At the outset he had quarrelled violently and

broken off relations with Chertkov, who refused to release funds for his passage to Canada, apparently on grounds of marital unfaithfulness while in exile in Estonia<sup>8</sup>. Then in Canada one of the Dukhobor leaders, Ivan Makhortov, took issue with Khilkov over the use of funds given to the settlers and the whole organisation of the settlement.<sup>9</sup> Finally in 1900 allegations of incompetence and mismanagement were made in two pamphlets by P. A. Demens (Tverskoi).<sup>10</sup> Unlike Tolstoi, Chertkov and others, Khilkov never entertained idealistic views about the Dukhobors - he had lived with them too closely - but his latest experience surely contributed further to his disillusionment. Furthermore, at the time of his return from Canada he had been reading Tolstoi's *Khristianskoe uchenie*, a work which the author himself acknowledged to be incomplete and unfinished.<sup>11</sup> This exposition of the fundamental tenets of Christianity as understood by Tolstoi contained much that was 'incomprehensible' to Khilkov.<sup>12</sup> Nor could Tolstoi comprehend his friend's perplexity or the argumentative tone of his letters, and subsequent correspondence reveals a growing estrangement between them.<sup>13</sup> The final break came at the beginning of 1901 when, in a letter of 30 January Dmitrii Aleksandrovich wrote to Tolstoi detailing his differences. Tolstoi's reply reveals that Khilkov now had serious doubts about non-resistance and the Tolstoyan world-view in general. Saddened by the loss of friendship, Tolstoi would not debate his long held convictions, believing Khilkov had become 'terribly muddled' in his thinking.<sup>14</sup>

Tolstoi was not alone in thinking this. G. B. Sandomirskii was introduced to Khilkov by a young relative in Geneva. The eighteen year old girl, a Social Democrat, was very taken by Khilkov, and would buy him the latest copies of *Iskra*, followed by lengthy discussions of its contents. She regarded him as 'a remarkable and selfless' person, even if his convictions were 'muddled'. Sandomirskii recalls that these 'muddled'



convictions were far from 'steadfast'. He writes of Khilkov: 'In immediate contact with life his Tolstoiism suffered a severe collapse, and Dmitrii Aleksandrovich at that time experienced a profound mental crisis'.<sup>15</sup> An indication of the depth of this crisis and its extraordinary outcome is recorded by Vladimir Posse. In mid 1900, at the time of the Russian military intervention in Manchuria, Dmitrii Khilkov 'offered his services to the Russian government to lead a war with China. He submitted a report, in which he promised to defeat China, if they would give him unlimited authority'. Further, we learn from A. S. Pankratov that the request was well received at Peterhof, where Khilkov was well known, but met opposition from Minister of War Kuropatkin, who believed that, because of his 'harmful errors, Dmitrii Khilkov could be a bad influence on his comrades'.<sup>16</sup> What lay behind this astonishing request we can only guess at, but it indicates the strength of his disillusionment with Tolstoiism, and a strong desire to return his homeland. Certainly Tolstoi himself had sought to facilitate this at the end of 1899, but without success.<sup>17</sup> Here was an opportunity to employ his recognised military skills in the service of Russia, an opportunity to return on an acceptable basis of loyal service to the Tsar. The door was firmly shut, however, and the longing to return to military service, if such it was, would remain unfulfilled until the outbreak of war in 1914.

With no immediate possibility of returning to Russia and the uncertain prospect of years in exile, Dmitrii Aleksandrovich entered a restless period of searching for a new direction in life. During this time we find that he was attracted to Nietzsche's concept of the *bermensch*, or Superman<sup>18</sup>, and gave attention also to the study of socialism. In January 1900 an article entitled *Ob ekonomicheskome materializme: pis'mo k drugu* was published in *Svobodnaia mysl'*, in which Khilkov presented a rather unusual critique of economic materialism as developed

by Engels in his *Development of socialism from utopia to science*. Written in the form of a letter the article set out his opinion of economic materialism from a religious point of view. His conclusion was that scientific socialism denies the possibility of escape from slavery until the right conditions develop, whereas the religious outlook assumes the existence of something, which liberates from all slavery. In the same issue a report on the Socialist Congress in Paris in December 1899 has also been attributed to Khilkov.<sup>19</sup>

Another contributor to *Svobodnaia mysl'* at this time was V. D. Bonch-Bruевич, a convinced Marxist, who, with his fiancée Vera Velichkina, also had close links with the Tolstoyans. Having come to Geneva in 1896 on behalf of the Moscow Workers' Union to make contact with Plekhanov and other leaders of the Liberation of Labour Group, Bonch occupied himself in learning about the organisation of printing and publishing illegal literature, and its transportation into Russia. At the same time he began to study the history of the revolutionary movement and was encouraged by Plekhanov to give special attention to the sects.<sup>20</sup> In 1897 he and Velichkina travelled to England both to renew old acquaintances with Chertkov and other Tolstoyans, and for Bonch to gain practical experience in Chertkov's publishing house, generally acknowledged to be among the most influential and successful of all the émigré presses. The Chertkovs also held an unrivalled collection of materials relating to sectarians and persecution in Russia. On two counts therefore Bonch drew great advantage from his association with the Tolstoyans, while at the same time developing another agenda - to use Chertkov's widespread distribution network in Russia for the dissemination of socialist literature.<sup>21</sup>

Having recently returned from assisting the Dukhobors in Canada, Bonch contributed two articles to *Svobodnaia mysl'*, entitled *The Labour Movement in Russia* and *The Peasant Movement in Russia*, in which he elaborated his concept of Russia's rationalistic sects as a progressive force, open to political activity.<sup>22</sup> The view that sectarians could prove valuable allies against the regime had been an important undercurrent of revolutionary thinking since the 1860's when the *narodnik* V. I. Kel'siev sought contacts with religious dissidents in Russia. At the end of the century, after decades of rapid expansion among the sects and persecution by the authorities, this conviction still remained strong in certain quarters of the revolutionary movement. In 1899, for example, E. A. Serebriakov wrote in the populist journal *Nakanune*: 'Following the well known history of the Dukhobors and the cruelty with the Stundists no one can doubt that all the newest sects will at least be moral allies and greet with joy the fall of the present regime'.<sup>23</sup>

In the Social Democrat camp the revolutionary potential of sectarians was recognised by old populists such as Plekhanov and Deich, but above all by Bonch-Bruevich. With their mutual acquaintances and a common interest in the sects he naturally drew close Dmitrii Khilkov, introducing him into Social Democrat and wider émigré circles, and participating with him in a number of projects, among them, the short lived *Russkii muzei*. Bonch's passion for collecting documentary materials inspired the idea of a 'museum' dedicated to Russian life and conditions. The outcome was the *Obshchestvo popecheniia po sozdaniuu Russkago muzeia v Zheneve*, founded on 30 July (12 August) 1901. This counted amongst its founders Biriukov, Khilkov, Plekhanov, Kropotkin and other leading members of the émigré community.<sup>24</sup> The activities of the Museum began to tail off towards 1903, as Bonch became more and more involved with Lenin and the RSDRP, and as the increasingly narrow

line pursued by the latter gave no room for cooperative ventures with other factions. The material collected for the Museum formed the basis for the establishment of the Library and Archive of the RSDRP in Geneva.

Between 1901 and 1902 Khilkov and Bonch also worked together on two publications, *Narodnye listki* and *Zhizn'*. In September 1901 the last issue of Biriukov's *Svobodnaia mysl'* appeared carrying a note from the editors that subscribers had also received copies of a new publication, *Narodnye listki*, with which they had nothing in common and bore no responsibility for its content.<sup>25</sup> Dmitrii Khilkov was the initiator of the new publication, along with Bonch, Velichkina, and K. A. Aleksander. At the beginning of September the editors announced the publication of the first nine issues of the *Listki* and two volumes of a companion series *Biblioteka narodnykh listkov*. The same announcement stated the aim of the editors: 'Recently among the mass of simple Russian people there is an increasing demand for books which will freely discuss the vital questions of the people's life, about which it is forbidden in Russia not only to print but to talk'. It was intended that this literature should be distributed free of charge and to this end an appeal was made for contributions. Most of the finance, however, appears to have come from Khilkov's personal resources.<sup>26</sup>

Some seventeen issues of *Narodnye listki* appeared between 1901 and 1903. The first issue, *Vse dlia dela*, was dedicated to the martyrs of the revolutionary fight for the people. This was followed by *O shtunde*, an address to Orthodox Christians, to the effect that Stundists were not their enemies. Subsequent issues included reprints of Tolstoi and the celebrated speech of peasant revolutionary, Petr Alekseev. The parallel series *Biblioteka narodnykh listkov* included works by the Christian Socialist Lamennais (*Slovo veruiushchago*) and the populist pamphlet,

*Nadgrobnoe slovo Aleksandra II.* The latter was published by Khilkov on the recommendation of Bonch and Velichkina; Lenin is said to have valued it highly. Also in the *Biblioteka* Khilkov published an updated and enlarged edition of his own *Uchenie dukhovnykh khrist'ian* (1903). Both *Narodnye listki* and *Biblioteka* enjoyed a very wide circulation among sectarians.<sup>27</sup> The initial involvement of Bonch and Velichkina ceased after the first seven issues, when they withdrew because of Khilkov's apparent inclination towards the Socialist Revolutionaries, which was incompatible with their own position as Social Democrats. Bonch was also critical of the religious tone of some issues, especially their appeal to the Bible as divine authority.<sup>28</sup> Following their withdrawal Khilkov continued to publish *Narodnye listki*. The eighth issue was his own *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh*.<sup>29</sup>

Bonch was actively involved in other publications, notably *Iskra*, taking every opportunity to further the cause of socialist propaganda among the masses, and to raise consciousness concerning the role of sectarians. While in England during 1901 he met V. A. Posse, editor of the journal *Zhizn'*, which had been suppressed by the censor in Russia. Bonch now encouraged Posse to revive the publication,<sup>30</sup> and with this in mind wrote to Khilkov in Geneva, requesting assistance. It was fortunate, therefore, that Khilkov had just been introduced by D. A. Klements to a wealthy Russian couple, G. A. and M. A. Kuklin, recently arrived from St. Petersburg. Informed of Posse's need for capital Khilkov advised the Kuklins to travel to England. *Zhizn'* was to be the organ of a new social democratic organisation of the same name. Its members were Posse, Bonch (Secretary), the Kuklins, V. Ia. Murinov, D. V. Soskis-Saturin, Khilkov, I. I. Sergeev; the Latvians Rozin, Vesman and Punga. Later they were joined by Velichkina and A. A. Sats. The first issue was published in April 1902. In a most significant article, *Znachenie sektantstva dlia*

*sovremennoi Rossii*, Bonch elaborated his conviction that sectarians were a fruitful field for socialist propaganda.<sup>31</sup> This was particularly true, he claimed, of the neo-stundists, but even the more conservative Baptists were having to come to terms with political realities. Bonch called on his fellow Social Democrats to give more attention to sectarians, and in particular to launch a propaganda campaign among them.

The urgency of this task was given a spur by an event, which deeply affected Dmitrii Khilkov and sent a shock wave of disbelief through liberals in Russia and the émigré community beyond. In September 1901 the tense situation in Pavlovki, Khilkov's village in Kharkov, erupted when around 300 sectarians in a state of religious excitement ransacked the Church school and moved on the Orthodox Church in the village. They were beaten off by police and Orthodox villagers. One sectarian was killed, and in the following days many others were severely beaten.<sup>32</sup> The immediate cause of the affair was the preaching in Pavlovki of Moisei Todosienko, a follower of the sectarian leader Kondrat Malevannyi, from Kiev province. Todosienko had preached the coming of a new order, when there would be no more masters and authorities, and the land would be taken from the landowners and given to the peasants. He declared also that the Church must be destroyed, so that the true faith would prevail. For all this he claimed the authority of the Tsar, who had been converted to the true faith.<sup>33</sup> In January 1902 sixty-eight sectarians were tried in Sumy, chiefly for criminal offences relating to abuse and violence against the Church. The trial, held in conditions of the strictest security, attracted wide attention.

The authorities clearly blamed the influence of Khilkov and Tolstoisim in Pavlovki; Pobedonostsev wrote to the Tsar to this effect on 12 October 1901.<sup>34</sup> Reports in the government press described Todosienko as an 'agent' of Khilkov. Others saw his work as an act of

officially sanctioned provocation. A report on these lines reached the editors of *Iskra* in Geneva between 18 (31) December and 1 (14) January 1902, and was prepared for publication by Lenin, under the title *Politseiskii provokator sredi sektantov*.<sup>35</sup> Other information received by *Iskra* named the Orthodox missionary leader Skvortsov as the hand behind Todosienko. Two further articles on the harsh sentence meted out on the Pavlovtsy appeared in *Iskra*. The first, *Novyi katorzhnyi prigovor*, on 1 April, the other, *K prigovoru po delu o pavlovskikh sektantakh*, one month later on 1 May. The author of the latter, writing under the pseudonym of 'Shtundist', was Dmitrii Khilkov, who sent the copy to Plekhanov in March 1902 in the hope that it could be published in *Iskra*.<sup>36</sup> Plekhanov strongly encouraged the editors to publish the article, believing that Khilkov's wide contacts could be useful to the Social Democrats.<sup>37</sup>

Further material about Khilkov and the Pavlovtsy was published by Bonch-Bruevich in *Zhizn'* in May 1902, and in a pamphlet devoted to the case, *Delo pavlovskikh krest'ian*, in the series *Biblioteka Zhizni*.<sup>38</sup> Bonch probed deeper into the causes of the Pavlovki affair and did not subscribe to the provocateur theory, rather he saw the influence of Khlyst teaching, which had infiltrated Pavlovki even at the beginning of the nineties. The uprising, he claimed, was symptomatic of deep seated aspirations among peasant sectarians for a new social order, awaiting only the appearance of charismatic leadership:

We can say with confidence that people like Todosienko will appear more and more frequently and the time is not far off when amongst the people, in the countryside, will arise a strong, active movement, which will not be stopped by any *uriadniki* or courts. At least, there exist many signs, which precisely foreshadow such a movement, a movement in the name of freedom, against the present autocratic tyranny.<sup>39</sup>

Writing in *Zhizn'*, Posse recognised the failure of social democrats to properly define their attitude to the peasant question, including the significant role of the sects in Russia.<sup>40</sup> Bonch-Bruevich was almost alone in pursuing this question, and during the short life of *Zhizn'* contributed a number of articles, some of which clearly used material supplied by Khilkov.

By mid 1902 it was becoming clear to the *Zhizn'* group that there were irreconcilable differences between them. Bonch and Velichkina were being wooed by Plekhanov and Lenin to join the *Iskra* group. The latter were both scornful of *Zhizn'* as a revolutionary organ; Lenin considered it a 'frivolous coquette' (*legkomyslennaia vertushka*), and Plekhanov complained of its overtly religious tone. The publication of Lenin's *Chto delat'* intensified the differences of opinion within *Zhizn'*. Bonch and Velichkina took the position of Lenin and *Iskra*. Posse, however, could not go along with the *iskrovtsy*, particularly Lenin, whom he regarded as 'an extreme individualist'. Other members were unable to define their position and at its final congress in December 1902 the group was disbanded. Personally and politically Khilkov had little in common with the Social Democrats, and according to Posse 'proletarian psychology was completely alien to him'.<sup>41</sup> Of them all he held Plekhanov in particularly high esteem, regarding him an 'aristocrat of the spirit and an aesthete'; if all Social Democrats were like Plekhanov, he once remarked, he would join them.<sup>42</sup> Plekhanov, however, did not return the compliment, having little time for anyone not of his own persuasion, particularly Tolstoyans. He once noted, for example: 'It is characteristic that all the Tolstoyans are terribly fond of talking about themselves. Khilkov reports even on his diarrhoea'.<sup>43</sup>

Khilkov's real sympathies, however, had for many years been directed towards the peasantry, and in this respect he had more in



common with the agrarian socialists and founders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Also his growing avowal of terrorism as a means of political action found more favour among members of that Party, which had reopened a campaign of political assassination in 1902, with the murder of Sipiagin. The radical departure from Tolstoyan non-violence, first seen in the offer to fight against China, took a step further with the publication of a pamphlet, entitled *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh: mysl'i voennago*, and published as *Narodnyi listkov*, No.8 around September 1901. Here Khilkov's military expertise, so recently rejected by the Russian government, was now turned against it, in a call for popular resistance to State violence. The authorities were beginning more and more to bring in troops, in addition to cossacks and police, to deal with demonstrations and disturbances. Khilkov proposed that workers should be grouped into armed units (*desiatki*) so as to be organised to retaliate in times of disturbance. Members of these units would be drawn from military reservists among the workers, grouped according to their area of experience, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery. The rest of the population should be united around them. It was essential to be well prepared in advance of any conflict. City plans should therefore be studied to locate barracks, and identify streets along which troops were likely to move. The location of arsenals and other weapon sources should also be known. In the event of an armed confrontation the first target of attack was not be the troops themselves, but the civil, police and military leadership, who should by all means be prevented from exercising their command. Telephones and other communications should be disabled; and wires stretched across streets to cause havoc to advancing cavalry and artillery. Drawing no doubt on his experience in special operations during the Russo-Turkish War, Khilkov was to further develop the idea of *boevye druzhiny* or fighting squads as a support for mass terrorism in the revolution of 1905.

The pamphlet was well received by *Iskra* and reviewed in January 1902, in an editorial by Plekhanov entitled *O demonstratsii* in which he recognised the need for ‘each demonstration to be able to oppose police excesses with organised opposition’. As to the organisation of opposition, he advised taking heed of practical instructions, such as given by the author of *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh*. It was probable, he continued, that when the time was right, revolutionary Social Democracy would adopt such tactics ‘to deliver the final mortal blow to expiring Tsarism’. Plekhanov concluded with a final word of commendation, ‘It all looks like the complete and extremely useful truth, and we are most sincerely grateful to the "Voennyi" for his "thoughts"’.<sup>44</sup> In 1905 the pamphlet was republished by the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and its tactical recommendations were put into practice in the conflicts of that year.<sup>45</sup>

By mid 1902 Khilkov had moved beyond armed resistance to become an advocate of mass terrorism. On 25 June he wrote to Posse, in the context of Balmashev’s assassination of Sipiagin, that the time for political murder had passed. No longer should terror be the domain of the few, but each revolutionary, whether from a worker or peasant background, must be a terrorist. The only way forward was ‘red terror’ and violent revolution.<sup>46</sup> Holding such a position it was inevitable that Dmitrii Khilkov should break his association with the Social Democrats. In 1903, therefore, he entered the Socialist Revolutionary Party through the influence of L. E. Shishko, who as a founder member of the Agrarian Socialist League, had particular concern for the provision of revolutionary literature to the peasants. The formation of the League in 1900 marked a step forward in the struggle for the minds of the peasantry, in which Khilkov’s *Narodnye listki* also played a significant part. Always in the mind of revolutionaries of all persuasions was the undeniable success of the Tolstoyans in reaching this audience with their

publications. Bonch-Bruevich, as we have seen, sought to tap into this success, utilising Chertkov's networks for his own ends. By including some of Tolstoi's work in *Narodnye listki* Khilkov also was party to this. By June 1902, however, the Tolstoyans' uneasy tolerance of Bonch and his work came to an end when Chertkov refused to cooperate any further. With Khilkov also, as he embraced revolutionary terror, former associates among the Tolstoyans moved to distance Tolstoi and his teaching from any association with the revolution. Ivan Tregubov had sent Tolstoi copies of *Narodnye listki*, very much concerned at the association of his name with the publication. Biriukov also had earlier (September 1901) issued a disclaimer denying any responsibility for *Narodnye listki* and its contents.

Tolstoi himself was less concerned than his followers: after all for more than 30 years he had made it clear that he considered violence to be a sin, and the violence of those who fight against violence to be madness. He regarded Khilkov's pamphlet, *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh*, as 'very poor....immoral, impractical and simply stupid'.<sup>47</sup> He believed also that no sincere person could associate him with violent revolutionaries, while an insincere person could impute anyone with whatever slander he liked. There were, however, within the highest circles of State and Church those who regarded Tolstoi's teaching as more dangerous than revolutionary socialism. For this reason Pobedonostsev, Archbishop Amvrosii and others had worked to pronounce anathema on the heretical Count. The penetration of his teaching among peasant sectarians and some workers was deeply worrying to them, particularly at a time of growing social unrest. The example of the Pavlovtsy, in their view, gave witness to the dangers of Tolstoyan 'anarchy' in league with sectarian fervour.

In this respect the potential of sectarians as a fertile field for unrest and rebellion was a subject which curiously united both authorities

and revolutionaries. The most significant difference between them lay in their attitude towards the Tolstoyans. For the one they were responsible for fuelling the fires of revolt, for the other the force most likely to obstruct the progress of the revolution. On the latter both Khilkov and Bonch-Bruevich were in agreement. In October 1902 Dmitrii Aleksandrovich wrote to Bonch expressing surprise at the short-sightedness of the government in persecuting Tolstoyans rather than taking advantage of their non-violence to act as a 'safety valve' against unrest. Tolstoyans, he claimed, were content to leave the people in slavery, considering spiritual freedom to be more important than physical.<sup>48</sup> As for the Tolstoyans themselves, they shunned the very idea that sectarians could entertain any thought of rebellion. It was Bonch-Bruevich who had brought this whole question to the fore with his article *Znachenie sektantstva dlia sovremennoi Rossii*. Having broken with Chertkov, he began to write openly in the pages of *Zhizn'* about the negative influence of the Tolstoyans on the social and political development of the Russian people, and their neglect of the people's real needs and aspirations.<sup>49</sup> What now ensued, over the course of 1903 and 1904, was a heated debate by pamphlet on the position of sectarians with regard to revolution in which the protagonists were Khilkov, Bonch-Bruevich and Chertkov. The catalyst was an open letter and questionnaire sent to dissenters by Chertkov and Tregubov in September 1902, in an attempt to disprove Bonch's claims, and to vindicate their own position. The letter read as follows:

Dear Brothers in Christ,

Many educated men who, no doubt, wish well to the Russian people, but advise the use of un-Christian means for the attainment of good - violence and murder, have lately begun to talk and write that our Russian sectarians are also prepared to wage a violent and revolutionary

struggle against the Russian Government and the Orthodox Church, that is to rebel, to rob landlords, to despoil churches, and if necessary, even to murder the rulers and oppressors of the people. The representatives of the established Orthodox Church say the same things, wishing by these means to increase the coercion of the sectarians.

We believe that this is not true, and is, on the one hand, a misunderstanding, and on the other a horrible calumny on our brethren, the sectarians, who profess, though with differences, each according to his own conceptions, but still one and the same teaching of Christ, who commanded us not to avenge ourselves and kill men, but to love and forgive those men, whoever they be, whether friends or enemies.

But to convince ourselves still more and to learn the truth in its fullness, we have decided to ask the sectarians themselves whether what is said and written about them by those educated people is true.<sup>50</sup>

The letter elicited an angry response from Bonch, writing in *Zhizn'*. He chided the authors for the cunning way they linked together the pronouncements of the revolutionaries with those of representatives of the Orthodox Church. This was calculated, he suggested, to prejudice the sectarians against the revolutionaries. Moreover, they were thoughtlessly setting sectarians at risk. Written replies to the questionnaire could easily fall into the hands of the police, leading to severe consequences for the authors. To support his own view of sectarian attitudes Bonch published a reply from a community of Southern Russian Stundists, who first of all indignantly challenged the Tolstoyans on their assertions about the revolutionaries, and in their answers to the questions made it clear that they believed it was right to resist oppression. Moreover, they continued, 'a revolutionary using violence, but laying down his life for others is close to Christ, far closer than the man who prates about Christian non-resistance.'<sup>51</sup>

The same material was also used by Khilkov in a pamphlet entitled *Otvet gruppy sektantov na obrashchenie redaktsii 'Svobodnago slova'*, in which he made an impassioned appeal to sectarians not to be deceived by Tolstoyans and others who seek to dissuade them from any dealings with revolutionaries, but to ally themselves with the cause of revolution. He drew also on the almost simultaneously prepared *Uchenie dukhovnykh khristian*.<sup>52</sup> Without mentioning the Tolstoyans or the word 'revolution' this work is an extremely subversive exposition of the doctrines of so the called Spiritual Christians.

No particular sect is referred to, but the work is a synthesis of the main doctrines of certain rationalistic sects, chiefly Dukhobors and Molokans. These sects shared the common characteristics of interpreting scripture allegorically and the conviction that human effort could and should work to change the existing social order, to bring in the Kingdom of God. Their God was the inner light of human reason, and Christ a man whose teaching laid down the principles for building the Kingdom. He was Christ the Liberator, who came to 'set free the captives' (Luke 4:18), overturning the existing evil social order. Spiritual Christians therefore had a duty to fight against oppression, to abolish private property, and to liberate the land, the common mother and provider of all. They recognised no Tsars or rulers. It was these Tsars and rulers who themselves had rebelled against divine law and established ungodly regimes; they should serve the people, not rob and oppress them. The clergy and the established churches must be removed also as upholders of these regimes. If necessary the use of force is permitted against these enemies of the people, and does not contradict Christ's teaching of nonresistance. If a man acts in accordance with the dictates of his reason, he may use violence if unavoidable; since human nature is essentially good, he commits no sin, especially if he acts for the good of others. By

being true to his reason and conscience, he is in fact obeying God. The true Christian is one who devotes all his efforts to the improvement of the social order, and is prepared to lay down his life for the truth. The clear but unstated suggestion here is that there is, in effect, little to distinguish the aims and aspirations of Spiritual Christians from those of the revolutionaries. The exposition concludes with the statement that Spiritual Christians know that the coming of the Kingdom of God, the kingdom of *liberty, equality, and fraternity*, depends on the efforts of the people themselves. The following words of Christ are given as a final encouragement and exhortation: ‘Fear not, little flock, it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the kingdom’.

On the Tolstoyan side the debate continued with an article by Chertkov in *Svobodnoe slovo* (April 1903), entitled *Po povodu nashego obrashcheniia k sektantam*, followed by *Nasil'stvennaia revoliutsiia ili khristianskoe osvobozhdenie: o revoliutsii*, published in parts over several months between May 1903 and April 1904. Shortly after it appeared as a separate pamphlet, *O revoliutsii*, with an introduction by Tolstoi.<sup>53</sup> Meanwhile Bonch-Bruевич had taken his case for active work amongst sectarians to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the RSDRP (July/August) 1903, with a background report, *Raskol i sektantstvo v Rossii*. With the support of Lenin and Plekhanov the Congress adopted a resolution, recognising the sectarian movement as one of the democratic trends, directed against the existing order, and calling on all members of the party to give attention to propaganda among sectarians, with a view to drawing them to social democracy. One of the first tasks, by way of a trial, was to be the publication of a newspaper aimed at sectarians, to be edited by Bonch. Entitled *Rassvet*, nine issues appeared between January and September 1904. The new publication was ‘openly designed to combat the “anti-revolutionary” influence of Tolstoyan Christian anarchists and persuade

sectarians of the necessity of transforming religious protest into organised revolutionary action under social-democratic leadership.’

Khilkov did not support Bonch’s idea of a journal for sectarians, arguing in a letter of 1904 that it was unnecessary either for sectarians, or for the intelligentsia who were alienated from them.<sup>54</sup> Later in the same year he produced a strongly worded rebuttal of Tolstoyan non-violence and a call to sectarians to resist government oppression in a pamphlet entitled *Revoliutsiia i sektanty*, published under the name of the Socialist Revolutionary Party.<sup>55</sup> In it he distinguishes between those sects which accept the use of force in the struggle, and those which reject it. Amongst the former he lists the Stundists and sects of the so called ‘peasant faith’ (*muzhikovskaia vera*), the Dukhobors, Malevantsy, and Khlysty; these tend towards salvation by works, display a strong social commitment in community, and generally reject the State. Amongst the latter he includes the Baptists and Pashkovites, evangelical sects who tend towards personal salvation by faith, and who, in his view, are prepared to accept State violence, and even participate in it by their obedience and passivity.

In earthy language directed at peasant readers Khilkov likened contemporary conditions in Russia to a cow shed. Some dissenters, such as the Baptists were satisfied with a change of bedding, gratefully received from the authorities, while those of ‘peasant faith’ sought nothing less than to get out of the cow shed. In this the Dukhobors were successful with their emigration, but this option was not open to all. There was therefore, he argued, no other choice than to change the present regime. The propagation of revolutionary literature among the peasants had shown sectarians of the ‘peasant faith’ that their beliefs in a just social order were not at odds with the aims of the revolutionaries. Many were in fact joining the revolutionaries and a closer union of these sects with the revolutionary cause was considered by Khilkov a likely



outcome of courageous adherence to their radical beliefs. He rebuked the Baptists for lacking the courage of their convictions in rejecting violence as a means of changing the social order, but it was the Tolstoyans who were the main target of his criticism. They condemned revolutionaries for using violence in the cause of good, refusing to admit that violence can remove those obstacles, which hinder the establishment of good in society. They forgot that before one can build it is first necessary to destroy, for 'the place where revolutionaries and socialists wish to raise the new building of human society is occupied by the stinking cow shed of autocracy'.

In common with many officials and clergy the Tolstoyans did not regard the people as sufficiently enlightened or politically developed to be ready for true freedom and feared the disasters, which, they believed, would result, 'if the people in their present darkness and incapacity for self-government overthrow autocracy and win their political freedom'. In his pamphlet *O revoliutsii* Chertkov claimed that the revolutions in Europe had only resulted in a new despotism. There the people had been liberated too quickly, without achieving 'spiritual freedom'. The same fate, he believed, awaited the Russian people, who 'would only fall under the power of another gang of political rascals'.<sup>56</sup> Khilkov countered this with a question: 'which conditions and arrangements of life better facilitate the development of true spiritual freedom: those which held sway in Europe before the revolution, or those which were established after and thanks to the revolution?' The European revolutions, he continued, by no means achieved all their aims, but had established fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of conscience, without which, for example, the Tolstoyans would not be able publish their works freely and openly.

Instead of violent revolution the Tolstoyans proposed 'Christian liberation', expressed by mass civil disobedience, which 'would serve as the most powerful means of destroying the government'. While condemning violence, however, they also condemned any attempt by the people to organise resistance in the form of labour unions and strikes. In other words they rejected the very thing which could give working people success in their struggle. In Tolstoi's teaching the personal life was of greater import than social or political life. For him to strive for personal spiritual and moral perfection was of greater consequence than to devote energy and effort to change society and the conditions under which men live. According to Tolstoi, therefore, 'The people should sit passively, perfecting itself, keeping itself more and more aloof from public and State affairs, and more and more eradicating in itself all interest or concern for them.'<sup>57</sup>

For Khilkov and the revolutionaries the development of personal and moral perfection was not aided by withdrawing from society, but by active participation and working to improve it. The pamphlet closes with an appeal to sectarians to actively participate in changing the regime. 'The only course of action', writes Khilkov, 'is a popular uprising. The threat of popular revolution is alone capable of dispersing the fumes and stench in which our motherland is suffocating.' His text here is full of scriptural allusions calculated to stir his readers: there is a time for all things, a time to build, a time to destroy; do not turn back from this course, remember Lot's wife; enlighten those in darkness, uphold the weak, strengthen the fainthearted. One of the most potent snares of the government was to sow enmity and distrust between people of different races and faiths. Sectarians should now work to destroy those snares, to show the Orthodox that they are not enemies. They should preach the union of those who struggle for freedom, declaring that there are neither

Jews nor Greeks, Orthodox or sectarians, but all are brothers, moved by one spirit, the spirit of freedom. They should seek contact with revolutionary committees, distribute revolutionary literature, read it to the illiterate, explain it to those who lack understanding. Together with the Orthodox they should create unions and squads (*druzhiny*), and with them also form groups and societies 'to discuss those means by which the path of future justice may be made smooth'. In this way they 'will not be taken unawares by the day of the great renewal of the Russian land.' Finally he calls on them to put their 'whole heart and mind into the work of liberating the people. Let our children and grandchildren speak well of you, when they remember those to whom they owe their liberty'.

To organise the people into armed units and take practical steps in preparation for a popular uprising are central themes of Khilkov's subsequent pamphlets published between 1904 and 1905, the brief period of his ascendancy in the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He had entered the Party in 1903 under the influence of L. E. Shishko, a veteran populist and one of the founders of the Agrarian Socialist League. In the summer of that year the Central Committee of the Party called a meeting in Geneva of the *Zagranichnaia organizatsiia*, an association of émigrés sympathetic to the social revolutionary cause, to establish a firm basis and clear direction for their support of the revolutionary movement in Russia. The outcome of the meeting was the issuing of a charter and election of a Committee (*Zagranichnyi komitet*) to organize the work. Within a year Dmitrii Khilkov was a member of this Committee, along with the Chernovs, Mikhail Gots, Leonid Shishko, and other leading names, and also served on a sub-committee for revolutionary literature with N. Chaikovskii and Gots.<sup>58</sup> Through 1904 we see him involved in a range of conspiratorial activities including the provision of false passports (preferably British) and dispatch of revolutionaries into Russia, as well as

giving practical training in the art of using a revolver.<sup>59</sup> Thoroughly trusted for his integrity he was given the task also of selling a *dacha*, which had been given to the party.<sup>60</sup> By the end of the year we learn that 'Khilkov manages the correspondence of the whole party, ciphers and preparation of transportation, suitcases with double bottoms, breastplates for conveying literature across the frontier, cardboard boxes, etc'.<sup>61</sup> All these activities were reported to the Okhrana by Evno Azef, its most notorious agent in the SR Party. Having penetrated the highest circles of the Party, Azef nonetheless had to report his failure to get close to Khilkov, who, because of his aristocratic upbringing, was 'polite, and that's all'.<sup>62</sup>

The summer of 1904 was dominated by the subject of terrorism, which brought the Party notable success, while at the same time causing division within its ranks. In July a terrorist bomb claimed the life of Plehve, the hated Minister of Internal Affairs, the most spectacular success to date in the campaign of political assassination directed by the party's Battle Organisation. News of the event reached Geneva the same evening, as the Second Congress of the *Zagranichnaia organizatsiia* was in session. As the significance of the news dawned on the delegates amid tears and general exultation, S. N. Sletov noted Khilkov's laconic comment as he pensively stroked his beard, 'Persistence pays off'. Sletov added, 'He was a great sceptic as regards the Battle Organisation'.<sup>63</sup> Back in 1902 Khilkov had written to Posse, 'Terror as political murder alone has not only outlived its time, but never even had a time - for the work of liberating the people'.<sup>64</sup> Only mass terror in the form of a popular uprising could achieve that goal. Khilkov now developed this theme in a pamphlet entitled *Terror i massovaia bor'ba*, published in late summer 1904.

Before the watershed of 1905 the role of terror was a major cause of contention between the revolutionary parties. The Social Democrats regarded individual acts of political terror as generally harmful to the revolutionary movement. Their emphasis was on developing the political consciousness of the working classes through agitation and propaganda, and on organising the masses for consolidated opposition, expressed in strikes and demonstrations. That such manifestations could then lead to mass revolutionary violence against the authorities was accepted. Thus Plekhanov, who condemned individual terror, was willing to embrace the ideas put forward by Khilkov in his *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh* of 1901, as potentially very useful when the revolutionary workers movement was sufficiently organised.<sup>65</sup>

The Socialist Revolutionary Party on the other hand had from the outset always recognised the usefulness of political terror, and following the assassination of Plehve debate on terrorist tactics intensified within Party. The view of the leadership was that terrorism would achieve most as an integral part of the whole revolutionary programme. In tension with this were the independent activities of the Battle Organisation, which effectively lay outside Party control, and which had grown in stature following its latest success. At the same time, as acts of rebellion among both workers and peasants in Russia were increasing, the leadership also desired to bring some organisation and direction to these spontaneous expressions of revolutionary energy, and to equip the people to fight back against ever increasing government violence. Within the party there were now calls to expand terrorist activity to embrace economic and agrarian terror. Among the foremost of these was Khilkov's pamphlet *Terror i massovaia bor'ba*, in which he made an uncompromising call for terrorism to form an integral part of party policy.<sup>66</sup> In the first place he argued against those who limited terrorism to political assassination as an

activity apart from other revolutionary work (e.g. the Battle Organisation); against those in leadership who were fearful of unleashing a mass revolt that they could not control; and against those who held that terrorism was of limited value, and may even harm the revolutionary movement (e.g. the Social Democrats). Secondly he urged the formation of armed terrorist groups and fighting squads. In this Khilkov was returning to the idea first put forward in his *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh* of 1901, that street demonstrations should be prepared and equipped to meet government violence with armed retaliation.

By rejecting terrorism, he maintained, some revolutionaries were failing the people and the cause of their liberation, by denying them the possibility to achieve real success in their struggle against autocracy. Terrorist acts should not be seen as isolated acts against prominent individuals, but as an integral part of the totality of revolutionary work - as the 'sharp end of the wedge, which the revolutionary minded masses should drive into our present Tsarist plutocratic regime, and do it so decisively and energetically, not only to smash autocracy irrevocably, but in addition to this, as far as becomes possible, to shatter absolutely the foundations of the bourgeoisie'.<sup>67</sup> Terrorism was a necessary prelude to the ultimate revolutionary goal - an all Russian popular uprising.

Recent events had shown how an ill prepared leadership had failed to seize the moment and take advantage of the developing revolutionary situation and mood of the people. In Rostov, for example, in November 1902 a massive general strike had taken place, which paralysed the city for days. Mass demonstrations at factories outside the city centre provided a platform for political speeches and the distribution of propaganda, while police and Cossacks were powerless to act. The local Social Democratic Committee was completely taken by surprise, and held back from seizing the opportunity to take the demonstration into

the city centre.<sup>68</sup> In Khilkov's eyes this was an error of judgement, for the mood of the people was such that significant political concessions could have been won, in addition to the workers' original economic demands. The essential missing factor, which could have transformed the event into a truly revolutionary situation was the existence of armed terrorist detachments. Without these there was no possibility of achieving any real victory against the authorities, such as, for example, 'seizing prisons and releasing prisoners; taking police stations and gendarme headquarters, destroying their papers and books; and finally implementing the people's demand for the removal of the murderers'.<sup>69</sup>

Khilkov firmly believed that the time for propaganda and political speeches was past. These things were fine in a parliamentary democracy, but useless in the conditions currently prevailing in Russia, where a situation of war already existed between the people and the government. That some revolutionaries were still preaching change by 'more gentle means' was, to Khilkov, to turn the revolution into 'tragicomedy'; that some opposed economic terrorism against the bourgeoisie was an indication to him of concern for their own class interests, rather than the true interests of the people; that some opposed terrorism for fear of greater and more deadly reprisals from the government, with bullets rather than Cossack whips, revealed a failure to read the mood of the people. Others rejected terror, regarding demonstrations as the 'embryo' of mass struggle, believing that as they grow in size so they will prepare the masses for an all Russian uprising. In the meantime, however, claimed Khilkov, demonstrators have nothing but words and slogans with which to confront the enemy. The people needed to be prepared and armed to fight violence with violence, and to inflict real damage on the government machine.<sup>70</sup>

The vicious circle of popular protest, government repression, followed by humiliation and greater servility had to be broken. Recalling the brutal and humiliating beatings meted out to rebellious peasants in Khar'kov and Poltava, Khilkov called on revolutionaries to ask themselves, what they would rather see - 'peasants openly and boldly fighting with their oppressors and being killed by bullets, or to see the same peasants meekly on their knees waiting to be flogged?' They must chose between these two inevitable consequences of revolutionary agitation, there is no third way. The people respond to agitation and propaganda according to their nature, wholeheartedly and straightforwardly, but revolutionary literature does not instruct them on how to face armed opposition. This question needed to be addressed urgently, for to leave it unanswered would completely alienate revolutionaries from the popular masses, when they see that those who call them to freedom and liberation, in fact continually lead them to beatings and shame.<sup>71</sup> The time had come, he argued, for a new type of revolutionary leadership, which would not confine itself to words, but embrace all practical means to enable the revolutionary movement to cross the boundary between expressions of popular indignation, such as mass demonstrations, and violent offensive action, and a leadership, which would take full responsibility for the inevitable consequences of such action.

The formation of armed fighting squads was for Khilkov the key to the advancement of the revolution. According to SR leader Viktor Chernov, it was Khilkov who first introduced the idea of forming fighting squads among the peasantry at a private meeting.<sup>72</sup> Certainly at the time of his joining the party in 1903 the formation of such squads was under discussion in the party. Breshkovskaia, for example, writing in *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* in September, refers to their formation as 'a



question now on the agenda'. Like Khilkov she believed that nothing held back the work of popular liberation more than the fear of all revolutionary parties at the prospect of drawing the people into direct struggle with its enemies. She too was convinced that both workers and peasants should know how to organise themselves into squads both for defence in times of urban and rural unrest, and, if need be, to attack government figures and institutions.<sup>73</sup> The question of fighting squads continued to be debated well into the following year, and in early July 1904 Azef reported to his superiors that the subject was to be considered at a Party Congress in Moscow or Smolensk at the beginning of August.<sup>74</sup>

By far the most vociferous supporters of fighting squads were a small youthful faction in Geneva that arose from the 'agrarian' group in the party. Led by Evgenii Lozinskii (Ustinov) and Mikhail Sokolov, they advocated a campaign of terror in the countryside, supporting and organising peasant violence against property, landowners, and the agents of tsarism. Initially close to Breshkovskaia, their proposals ran counter to the cautious approach of the party leadership towards agrarian terror, so that even their former mentor was compelled to distance herself from them. The only member of the older generation to offer support was Dmitrii Khilkov. In the autumn of 1904 Ustinov, Sokolov and others returned to Russia, having given an undertaking to the leadership that they would not propagate their beliefs among the peasants. They were accompanied by Stepan Sletov, a prominent party member. In his own words Sletov 'occupied a middle position between the "agrarians" and the editorship of *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*' and at the same time 'had many points in common with D. A. Khilkov'.<sup>75</sup> They shared, for example, a belief in the revolutionary potential of the rationalistic sects among the people.<sup>76</sup> Sletov also was at odds with the role and activity of the Battle Organisation, and on the strategic question of political terror versus

revolutionary work among the peasants was a firm supporter of the latter. Earlier in the year he had left the Central Committee of the party following a clash with Azef over this very question. He did not, however, share Khilkov's views on the formation of fighting squads and had earlier opposed him on that issue<sup>77</sup>. Sletov was now charged by the party with following the activities of Ustinov and Sokolov in Russia.<sup>78</sup> This mission was, however, curtailed by his arrest at the border following information supplied to the authorities by Azef. He was found to be carrying a list of peasant contacts supplied by Khilkov<sup>79</sup>. Others of the group, including Ustinov and Sokolov, reached their destinations and, to the dismay of the SR leadership, began to agitate among the peasants.

Dmitrii Khilkov was himself intending to return illegally to Russia at the end of the year, but while on a visit to his family in London, information was received by the party that his plans were known to the authorities, and his mission was called off. A secret circular addressed to provincial chiefs of police had fallen into the hands of the Bund, the Jewish Workers' Union, who promptly informed the SR leadership. Azef now complained to his superiors about this failure in security and wrote that the party in Geneva was highly suspicious of a *provocateur* in their midst.<sup>80</sup> The disclosed circular, dated 28 October / 11 November 1904, made clear the concern felt by the authorities about Khilkov's plans and his extensive contacts throughout Russia. Highlighting the division in the SR's between the 'old' and the 'young', the document continued:

The latter have resolved, without losing a moment, to dispatch envoys to Russia to organise in various localities of the Empire so called 'peasant fighting squads'. Serving as a starting point for the immediate implementation of this task are to be the extensive links of Prince Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Khilkov, former follower of Count Lev Tolstoi's false teaching, and now adherent of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, among

sectarians, who, according to his assurances, for so long under Government oppression have turned into active revolutionaries. Khilkov apparently has such links at his disposal in Rostov on Don, the Caucasus, and the following provinces: Kursk, Khar'kov, Poltava, Tambov, throughout the whole of Povolzh'e and in many other localities. Having left Russia Khilkov apparently has never broken links with these sectarians and has continually maintained relations through letters or through carriers, supplying them with appropriate literature, and now according to his conviction, they are ready for active revolutionary terrorism. The plan is this: the envoys immediately on arrival in Russia are accommodated in the regions indicated to them, posing as roofers, painters and other unskilled labourers, establishing relations with previously assigned peasants, and with their assistance form local squads, which should at once begin to seize land, kill landowners and stewards, plunder and burn estates, in order, having created a certain mood, to raise behind them the mass of peasantry and stir up widespread agrarian terror. Khilkov's first party of envoys is already appointed and consequently, one after another is setting off: [The document gives details here about the 'envoys': B. V. German (Neradov), M. I. Sokolov, and Grisha Chernov (Basnetsov)]. Within about two weeks Prince Dmitrii Khilkov is intending to make his way into the borders of the Empire with the aim of criminal propaganda; he is to be followed within about two months by M. A. Vedeniapin.<sup>81</sup>

Khilkov's plans were thus curtailed, but Sokolov and Grisha Chernov were already active in Russia by 18 December, according to Azef, and the alarm of the authorities appeared well justified by the work of Sokolov and others, who in a short time reached several locations in the south and west of Russia. Peasant organizations were formed, printing presses set up and proclamations published, while at the same time recruiting

supporters into Socialist Revolutionary groups.<sup>82</sup> Then in November Ustinov and the agrarian group in Geneva, in defiance of party policy, issued a resolution '*On fighting squads in the countryside in connection with agrarian terror*', urging party support for the immediate formation of local fighting squads and assistance to peasants for a campaign of agrarian terror. Among the 25 signatures in support of this resolution, which was rejected by the senior party leadership, was that of Dmitrii Khilkov. Well into the new year Okhrana agents continued to find evidence of his plans to raise rebellion in the countryside. Monitoring Khilkov's correspondence, police agent Rataev in Paris reported his links with a sectarian by the name of Ivanov, living in Romania:

Khilkov is sending for him to come to Geneva, where they will meet before sending him off to Russia to organise peasant fighting squads. In the opinion of Prince Khilkov, sectarians are so persuaded that to stir up rebellion among them will take no effort, if only an efficient person is found, who is capable of discussing plainly with peasants. Khilkov considers the above mentioned Ivanov such a man, on whom he can lay the preparatory work, and then depart himself. Now Khilkov is unable to leave.<sup>83</sup>

At the end of 1904 the outlook for Russia was one of increasing rural and urban unrest against a background of a disastrous war with Japan, which the Tsar insisted on prolonging. Before the revolutionary parties lay the continuing task of agitation and organisation of the masses. The Socialist Revolutionaries, as we have seen, were seriously divided over the issue of agrarian terror, while real concern remained over the presence of a *provocateur* in their midst.<sup>84</sup> Suspicion at this time was far from Azef who continued to direct the Fighting Organisation in planning further political assassinations. The actual course of events, however, in the first days of 1905 proved quite unforeseen by all sides. First, the brutal killing

of unarmed demonstrators in St. Petersburg on January 9, so called 'Bloody Sunday', sent a wave of anti-government feeling across the Empire and gave new and vital impetus to the revolutionary movement. Then on 4 February the Fighting Organisation scored another notable success with the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, uncle of the Tsar, and commander of the Moscow military region. The attack was planned by Boris Savinkov and the fatal bomb hurled by I. P. Kaliaev, but to Okhrana agent Rataev, responsibility for the outrage could be traced back to Khilkov's recent promulgation of terrorism. Three days after the event he reported:

Agents believe that the event in Moscow, i.e. particularly the means of its organisation is the first product of the zealous preaching in recent months of Prince Dmitrii Khilkov. Up to this time all previous terrorist acts have been committed on the mutual agreement of the Foreign and Central Committees. The perpetrators always came abroad and from here departed for Russia, with the consent of Party representatives here and only the actual situation of the attempt was organised by the efforts of the Russian Committees. Prince Khilkov calls such means of action 'bureaucratic' and vehemently argues not only the uselessness, but even the harm of a special 'Fighting Organisation'; in his opinion, each party Committee in Russia has the right, if it sees need, to organise this or that political murder, depending on the demand and local conditions. Prince Khilkov, as a man educated way beyond his other colleagues and, in addition, as a former soldier, enjoys an immense authority, which is growing daily. Recently in private company he expressed the view that only he could come forward as a worthy opponent of General Trepov, for it was nothing to him, like Trepov, to sacrifice thousands of heads to achieve a planned objective. That is how he characterises General

Trepov, whom he knew personally when serving in the Life Guard Hussar Regiment.<sup>85</sup>

Within a few weeks of Bloody Sunday Khilkov published a new edition of *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh: mysli voennago* and a new pamphlet, *O svobode i o tom, kak ona dobyvaetsia*.<sup>86</sup> The first was a restatement of the earlier publication with some supplementary material. It included, for example, details of the events in St. Petersburg, gleaned no doubt from Father Gapon himself, who had recently arrived in Geneva. The shooting of unarmed demonstrators clearly justified Khilkov's earlier calls for armed detachments, without which the people were utterly defenceless. The greatest significance of Bloody Sunday, however, was the decisive shattering of the peoples' confidence in the Tsar. Condemnation and revulsion at the atrocity were widespread and many, on all sides, would have agreed with Khilkov when he wrote:

The events in Peterburg are important because they have taken the veil from the eyes of the people. They have shown them with their own eyes the whole brutality of the government and the meanness of the last Russian Tsar, they have shown and proved to the Russian people, that they have nothing to hope for from the Tsar.....It seems to us that with each day, with each hour the possibility of concessions from the government becomes more and more improbable. And this is because with each day and hour for everyone - both for the Tsar and his ministers, and for the Russian people, it is becoming more and more evident that there can be no reconciliation or agreement between Tsar and people.....If the Russian people wants to live and live honestly, then it is impossible for it to tolerate in Russia Nikolai and all his house. The Tsar and his house are the disgrace of Russia."<sup>87</sup>

In the public outrage that immediately followed Bloody Sunday, with mass demonstrations, street barricades, and widespread strikes, Dmitrii

Khilkov saw the very first steps towards revolution and a popular uprising. In the cities, however, the success of such an uprising was limited by the concentrated presence of troops. What Khilkov looked for now were mass peasant disturbances, which would compel the government to dispatch troops to the countryside. This then would enable the workers to rise in the cities. The peasants, he hoped, would be able to win over their fellows in the army, some of whom might join the cause and 'take an active part in the task of liberating the motherland'. In the meantime it was necessary above all to organise fighting detachments to lead an offensive against government servants and institutions. This would keep the morale of the workers high and prepare them, when the peasants rose, to act with decisive violence and cast off the chains of the government and the wealthy.<sup>88</sup>

In the second pamphlet of this period, *O svobode i o tom, kak ona dobyvaetsia*, published in mid-February 1905, Khilkov addressed the aspirations for freedom of the working people. In it he attacked both Tolstoyans and Social Democrats with their limited concepts of freedom, and continued to urge the need to organise and form squads. Only the programme of the Socialist Revolutionaries, he claimed, could fully satisfy the people's aspirations. The charge against the Tolstoyans is that made earlier in *Revoliutsiia i sektanty*: that, while they may consider themselves to be the most serious threat to autocracy, as long as they believe the people are not ready for revolution, their views in fact contribute to supporting the regime. As for the Social Democrats, they see no possibility at present of removing the oppression of capitalism and the rich - to even try would be a waste of energy. The views therefore of the Tolstoyans on the political front are in fact no different to those of the Social Democrats on the economic front. Both in effect recommend the people to wait until conditions are right; the one looking to the working of

the laws of God, the other to the working of the laws of production. Both, in Khilkov's view, are responsible for prolonging the oppression of the people by the government and by capitalists and landowners.<sup>89</sup> The doctrines of both, he writes, are 'in essence profoundly un-revolutionary, if the word "revolution" is understood as a radical overthrow, accomplished by the most oppressed and enslaved'.<sup>90</sup> Neither recommends a direct violent revolutionary fight, but a fight that is indirect, reduced to an inner change in the outlook of the masses. While Tolstoyans reject revolutionary violence altogether, Social Democrats may admit it in the political field, but reject violence against economic oppression. Both parties, writes Khilkov, give no significance to the 'socialisation' or liberation of the land from its present owners and its equitable transfer to common use.

In contrast, he continues, the Socialist Revolutionaries view the revolution differently. They believe that only the strength of the working people can overthrow autocracy, and that the people would be acting foolishly, if they did not immediately take a revolutionary line against their class enemies to win both economic and political freedom. In this the socialisation of land must be the first decisive step. To wait for a *Zemskii Sobor* to undertake the distribution of the land, or to hold back for fear of alienating the bourgeoisie would not be in the interests of the people. The winning back of the land and its liberation is the only call to which the masses in the countryside will respond, and it is in the countryside that the uprising must begin. An uprising there, with the forcible seizure of private, government and monastery lands, and the expulsion of landowners and local officials would compel the government to dispatch troops from the cities to quell the rebellion. By way of preparation a network of peasant committees, brotherhoods, squads and unions should be formed and linked with workers and revolutionary



committees in the towns, who could assist with help and advice, and provide useful literature. Having established a network every effort should be made to gain the support of local communities.

Before elaborating on the work of the squads and other organisations, Khilkov characterises the present time as a time for urgent preparation, for which the conditions were ripe. The war with Japan had ‘revealed the rottenness of autocracy and the absence of any sort of link between the government and people’ and ‘the murder of Plehve had introduced turmoil into the ranks of the government and given boldness to its enemies, that is all conscientious Russian people.’ Throughout the Empire ‘unconcerned and modest Russians have suddenly started to take an interest in the fate of the Motherland and have begun to dare to have their own opinion.’ In the face of this ground-swell the government had trod cautiously in permitting the January strike in St. Petersburg and had been thoroughly shaken by the repercussions of Bloody Sunday. Plehve’s successor, Sviatopolk Mirskii, had resigned and been replaced by the ineffectual Bulygin, while real power was concentrated in the hands of D. F. Trepov, Governor General of St. Petersburg. To Khilkov Trepov represented all that was bad in the regime:

For him there exists neither the honour of the Motherland, nor good for the people - only the good of that vile association, known in Russia as the government. Trepov is a devoted servant of this association and for the sake of its preservation and security he will stop at nothing. This must not be forgotten. Bulygin was appointed because he would not hinder the activities of Trepov and his circle, which is now commissioned to treat the sores of a putrefying autocracy and in whatever way it can to prolong its existence.

The people could be sure that the government would respond with increased severity and therefore should be prepared to meet like with like,

aiming for nothing less than the expulsion of the Tsar and his house from Russia and the liberation of the land. They should understand that there could be no reconciliation with the Tsar or talk of concessions. The time for such things had long passed, rather it was a time for organisation and mobilisation, in which revolutionary detachments and squads should take the lead. At times of mass disturbance squad members should take out the army command, break telegraph and telephone lines, obstruct and hinder the passage of cavalry and troops by wires stretched across streets and pavements, and filtering one by one behind the enemy ranks unite in an unexpected attack from the rear. In the countryside one of their main tasks would be to bring cohesion to the peasant movement and understanding of the way forward. For the peasants, writes Khilkov, 'have little awareness that any improvement in their situation depends on the overthrow of autocracy and liberation of all the land'. The immediate aims of the squads should therefore be to awaken in the masses a consciousness of their strength, to render the countryside dangerous to police and other officials, and to seize privately held land and with this to make the working of estates impossible. At all times squads and other organisations should take care that their aims and activities are correctly understood by the local population. For this purpose they should make use not only of oral propaganda but also of fly sheets and proclamations, published both by the central institutions of the Socialist Revolutionaries and by the squads, brotherhoods, unions and committees themselves. In this one of the main tasks of both oral and printed propaganda, and agitation, should be an effort to explain to the population that the fight is not against individual landowners and officials, but against those vile regimes which they have introduced and uphold.

Khilkov's hopes for the success of the revolution were firmly set on organising and raising the peasants under the banner of land and

liberty. The urgency of the task demanded a massive input of resources in terms of literature, arms and above all personnel who shared the same vision. In mid April 1905, to further his plans in this direction, he left for Zurich to keep a long expected appointment with the sectarian E. E. Ivanov, who had arrived from Bulgaria and was to leave for Russia to form fighting detachments among the peasants.<sup>91</sup> At much the same time, however, police intelligence scored a major coup, which effectively smashed the work of agrarian terror in Russia. A raid on a Congress of the Peasant Union in Kursk resulted in the arrest of Sokolov and other leading agrarians. As we have seen the issue of agrarian terror continued to divide the Party and now, with the removal of its leading partisans, there were few supporters of such extremism, apart from Khilkov and Ekaterina Breshkovskaia. Support for their cause now came from an unexpected quarter - the revolutionary priest Georgii Gapon, who had arrived in Geneva in late January 1905. Initially both Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries had been eager to claim him as their own as 'a true leader of the people'.<sup>92</sup> The Social Democrats, however, soon tired of this 'hero of the hour', and Gapon went over to the Socialist Revolutionaries, who had engineered his escape from Russia. Unable to comprehend the theoretical differences between the parties, Gapon believed he had a mission to unify the revolutionary movement, and to this end called for a united conference of all parties, which took place between 3 and 10 April at the home of Leonid Shishko. The delegates, however, were not impressed by the priest's political na veté and the sought for unity failed to materialise. Gapon also talked of forming a 'Combat Committee' to direct centralised and mass terror, including the development of a terrorist movement among the peasantry. Savinkov recalls that this idea strongly appealed to many and particularly to Breshkovskaia and Dmitrii Khilkov, who were named with Gapon himself as members of the Committee.<sup>93</sup> Within days of the Conference

Azef reported that the Committee would soon begin its operations, that among the revolutionaries there was a general conviction of a peasant uprising in the spring, and that preparations were everywhere in hand for purchasing arms.<sup>94</sup> The Committee in fact came to nothing, finding no overall support. Breshkovskaia herself returned to Russia in May to promote the cause of terrorism in the countryside, while Gapon, sensing a growing coolness towards him, went initially to London and thereafter became involved with schemes to supply arms to the revolution, including the ill-fated John Grafton expedition.<sup>95</sup>

The progress of the revolution through the spring and summer 1905 brought a growing confidence to all opponents of the government that the Tsarist regime could be brought down. Revolutionary violence increased as workers and peasants seized the opportunity to strike at their oppressors. The weapon of terror was no longer confined to the hands of a few fanatical intellectuals, but the people were beginning to take their fate into their own hands. Preparation for armed insurrection became the urgent task of the day and among the revolutionaries the demands of the moment clouded former ideological differences over the use of terror and revolutionary violence. Thus on the local level in Russia it was not uncommon for members of all parties to work together for the common cause. Among the leaders also expediency called for cooperation. So even Plekhanov and Lenin, who had long argued against the usefulness of terrorist tactics, could not but recognise that the revolutionary situation and the mood of the people was ripe for armed struggle. Back in 1902, with reference to the first edition of *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh*, Plekhanov had conceded that the tactics proposed by Khilkov then might one day be adopted by Social Democrats ‘to deliver the final mortal blow to Tsarism’. That this day had now come was recognised by Plekhanov, writing in *Iskra* on 10 February 1905. Recalling Khilkov’s advice for the

people, at the very outset of their engagement with government forces, to ‘take out from circulation the civil, police and military leadership’, Plekhanov categorically affirmed the need for such activity to ‘disorganise’ the enemy.<sup>96</sup> Such ‘disorganising’ tactics, he admitted, were terrorist acts, and opened the way for Social Democrats to work with other groups engaged in terrorism. It was a major reversal of the Social Democrat position.

The unforeseen scale and momentum of revolutionary activity in Russia compelled Lenin also to urge the formation of fighting detachments. He had in September 1902 recognised the usefulness of such groups in certain situations, dealing with spies and *provocateurs*, for example.<sup>97</sup> Through 1905, however, he made repeated calls for the formation of armed units of workers both for offensive and defensive action. In preparing an article on this subject in October, entitled *Zadachi otriadov revoliutsionnoi armii*, it is of interest to note that he drew on Plekhanov’s earlier editorial.<sup>98</sup> The measures that Lenin now urged were in practice little different to what Khilkov had been proposing over the last four years: to give leadership to the crowd and to initiate attacks on spies, police, gendarmes, blowing up police stations, freeing prisoners, and seizing of government funds. Such operations were already taking place throughout the Empire and during 1905 combat detachments began to be formed in many areas. They were most active, however, in the following year, chiefly as a means of workers’ self defence against the anti-revolutionary Black Hundreds.<sup>99</sup>

By mid 1905 Dmitrii Khilkov was at the peak of his career, ironically, just as his influence and position within the Socialist Revolutionary party were waning. Sandomirskii, for example, recalls that: His popularity grew strongly in émigré revolutionary circles. Together with it also grew a universal respect for him, for his loyalty and

objectivity in all the innumerable ideological arguments, which tore apart the Geneva colony at that time. And it was no longer any rarity to see the portly figure of Dmitrii Aleksandrovich as chairman in the historic 'Salle Handwerk', at the different inter-party speeches and meetings of that time. His movements as usual were even and confident, his manners also without reproach, and only the long bushy beard was beginning to turn grey in places.<sup>100</sup>

Vladimir Zenzinov, who arrived in Geneva from Russia towards the end of July 1905, found the émigré community in ferment and in eager expectation of the imminent fall of autocracy. Speech followed speech and Dmitrii Khilkov is named alongside Lenin, Trotsky and others who were delivering speeches at this time.<sup>101</sup> His prominence at this time was conspicuous also to the Okhrana, as noted in the reports above, where alarm at his activities must surely have been accompanied by concern over his high connections in Russia. There was, after all, no other revolutionary who could boast one cousin as Governor of Moscow (V. F. Dzhunkovskii), another as Minister of Communications (M. I. Khilkov) and personal acquaintance with the Tsar.<sup>102</sup>

By the end of the summer, however, Khilkov's short-lived prominence was already waning. In July he published a short article in *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia* entitled 'The last gasp of autocracy' (*Samoderzhavie izdykhaet*). Its subject was the publication of a damning report of an official Commission of inquiry into corruption and embezzlement at the highest levels in government.<sup>103</sup> He likened this to a mortally stricken rabid dog frantically gnawing at its own body. It was to be one of his last contributions to the party press. Within months, by the end of the year, Khilkov had resigned from the *Zagranichnii komitet*, disillusioned by what he saw as ineffectual and indecisive leadership, and duplicity within the Party.

For all the popularity and respect he enjoyed beyond the Party, Dmitrii Khilkov was not totally at one with his fellow Socialist Revolutionaries, at odds with his individual and extreme position. He would not be tied to one ideological line and often expressed views that no doubt astonished and dismayed his colleagues. When asked, for instance, what kind of government he would introduce after the revolution he answered with conviction: 'a true autocracy, as, for example, the Dukhobors have. That is my ideal'.<sup>104</sup> According to Pankratov, he did not concur in even the basic understanding of the Russian revolution. His guiding rule was always: 'The will of the Russian people is my law'. Thus if the people were to indicate through freely elected representatives that they favoured absolutism, he declared he would renounce the revolution forever. Nor did he rule out the idea that the people might indeed make such a choice. Such views were naturally not well received by his fellows.<sup>105</sup> This individuality is born out by Victor Chernov, who wrote that Khilkov was an 'extreme revolutionary', but not a 'pure agrarian terrorist'; rather 'he occupied a somewhat peculiar middle position'. In general Chernov was dismissive of Khilkov's brief career in the Party, his abrupt and extreme swing from non-violence to terror, and his decision finally to leave the Party.<sup>106</sup> His extreme position on mass terrorism did not rest easily with the minimum programme favoured by the leadership, who struggled to maintain control on the terrorist tendency, which was to split from the party with the formation of the Maximalist union in 1906.

For his part Khilkov was deeply dissatisfied with the émigré party leaders. He had called for a new type of revolutionary leadership, which would not confine itself to words, but would take the revolutionary movement across the boundary between popular indignation, such as mass demonstrations, and violent offensive action; and a leadership,

which was prepared to take the inevitable consequences of such action.<sup>107</sup> Instead he found the leadership insipid and revolutionaries more interested in the pursuit of pleasure than the cause of the people's liberation, squandering party funds on gambling and entertainment. Moreover he found the leadership divided, with more and more power being concentrated in the hands of Azef. It was as if there was a struggle between two parties, in which Azef's party never failed to win. We have already noted Khilkov's coolness towards Azef, but there was still no suspicion on his part of the latter's duplicity. He was very much aware, however, of an alarming indifference to security within the party. On one occasion he suggested to the Committee a code for secret correspondence, which would be impossible for anyone to break. In spite of all its advantages it was rejected by several members of the Committee, which kept to the one, by which very many had been caught. 'It was then', Khilkov later told Novoselov, 'that I was finally convinced that here they betray and sell one another out.' It came to the point where all his directions and opinions were ignored, and he could no longer see any purpose in continuing as a member of the Committee.<sup>108</sup> Shortly after, Khilkov announced his resignation from the *Zagranichnyi komitet*, and, taking advantage of the general amnesty, returned to Russia at the end of November. While remaining a member of the Party until 1907, he ceased to play any prominent role.<sup>109</sup>

Khilkov's revolutionary career spanned no more than five years, during which he was active, to varying degrees, in both Social Democrat and Socialist Revolutionary circles, being acquainted with all the main émigré leaders. Any assessment of his contribution to the revolution must be considered on several levels. Firstly, on a purely material level Khilkov brought to the revolutionary movement considerable financial resources. According to E.D. Khiriakova, a close acquaintance in



emigration, he contributed 60,000 roubles to the work of revolution, much of it used to finance various publications.<sup>110</sup> On a personal level, in addition to a universally recognised integrity, he brought valuable organisational talent and practical skills. Thus he contributed much to the conspiratorial work of the SR *Zagranichnyi komitet*, in the use of codes and secret correspondence, in the provision of counterfeit travel documents and in the preparation of means for smuggling revolutionary literature. Above all, perhaps, his most significant work was in the preparation, publication and distribution of such literature. All this together with his extensive contacts throughout Russia, particularly among peasant sectarians, was well received by his fellow revolutionaries.

On an ideological level, however, they were less receptive and any lasting contribution in this area was complicated by his individual and extreme views, which could not easily fit the frame of any party. Nevertheless, his ardent message for the people to urgently prepare and organise for armed insurrection echoed the feelings of many as the revolutionary situation developed through 1905. We have seen, for example, how both Plekhanov and Lenin came to this position, taking note of Khilkov's proposals for armed resistance during demonstrations. Then among the SRs the formation of armed detachments was the subject of much discussion during 1904 and 1905. Thus a congress of the SR's Central Peasant Union, in July 1905, recommended a number of urgent measures to organise resistance in the countryside: along with defensive action, an increase in terrorist acts; fighting squads should be formed in villages and towns, both as a popular militia and as organisers and leaders of the armed uprising; they were to be responsible also for local acts of political terror and the appropriation of arms.<sup>111</sup> All this was in line with what Khilkov had urged in his pamphlets. Nevertheless, the path of mass

terror, as advocated by Khilkov, was in the end resisted by both the party leadership and the people itself.

Certainly, peasant brotherhoods, squads, committees, and unions were established in various parts of Russia, but nowhere on the scale Khilkov had envisaged. For all the efforts of revolutionaries abroad to promote and organise widespread rebellion, the task was essentially beyond their influence and resources. Where armed detachments were formed they were generally unprepared and ill equipped to resist the onslaught of government forces. The popular insurrection failed to materialise and Khilkov's ideal scenario, in which a mass peasant uprising would draw troops away from the urban centres also proved unrealistic. By the end of 1905 the revolt in the cities had been brought under control and, in the countryside, terrible reprisals taken against the rebels. Any immediate prospect of a mass peasant rebellion was curtailed when the All-Russian Peasant Union in November rejected a call for armed insurrection. By this time also Khilkov and his policies had been effectively sidelined within the *Zagranichnyi komitet*, and his extreme position had become increasingly isolated.

In the end Dmitrii Khilkov was too much of an individualist ever to be a dedicated party member. His allegiance was not to a party or an ideology but first and foremost to the Russian people and their wishes and aspirations. In this he stood closer perhaps to the populists of the 1870's and it is therefore not surprising that some of his closest links were with Breshkovskaia, Shishko and Chaikovskii. Moreover, his perception of the revolution was based on an essentially Christian world-view rather than Marxism, as demonstrated in his article *Ob ekonomicheskome materializme* of 1900. This inevitably alienated him from leaders and programmes of both parties. Convicted by the need for a spiritual dynamic in social reformation, he had initially found much in common

with Tolstoi. In the end, however, Khilkov was too much of a pragmatist to rest easily with the ideals of inaction and non-resistance. He was prepared, for example, to use established legal channels in defence of the oppressed and persecuted. Likewise he came also to accept that the use of force was both legitimate and necessary in the work of liberation. In the same Gospel that compelled Tolstoi to denounce violence in all circumstances, Dmitrii Khilkov found a divine mandate for violence and terror against the State in the pursuit of a just social order. Nor was this unique, for more than one terrorist in the Russian revolutionary movement would confess a similar inspiration. His essential difference with Tolstoi and the guiding principle of his revolutionary career may be summed up in the following, written to Tolstoi:

I admit that we all have to die, and that our work on earth should be to fulfil the will of God, as each of us understands that will. But why not admit that it is possible for men sincerely to believe that it is God's will that they should devote themselves to replacing the present Government of Russia by a better one?<sup>112</sup>

Since the mid 1880's Khilkov had dedicated himself to the service of the people and to lifting the burden of their oppression, and had indeed given much to the revolution at great personal cost. By 1902 he was convinced that nothing less than a violent popular uprising could transform Russia, for neither the Tolstoyan way of non-violence nor the Marxist way of social evolution offered any immediate prospect of relieving Russia's ills. His greatest hope was that the vision and vitality of Russia's radical sectarians could be harnessed to the revolutionary cause. All his work thereafter was to that end, until it became clear, towards the end of 1905, that neither the revolutionary leadership nor the people themselves had either the resources, the organisation or, for the most part, the will to take such a momentous step.



1. L. S. Fedorchenko, 'V shveitsarskoi emigratsii', *Katorga i ssylka*, No.14 (1925), p.233.
2. Khilkov's return to the Caucasus came at a time when sectarianism was beginning to receive attention in the Russian periodical press. Between 1880 and 1885 a number of articles written by populist journalists appeared in *Otechestvennye zapiski*, *Vestnik Evropy*, *Delo*, and elsewhere. Ia. V. Abramov (Fedoseevets), for example, contributed articles to *Otechestvennye zapiski*: 'Programma voprosov dlia sobiraniia svedenii o russkom sektantstve', Nos.4 and 5, 1881; 'Sekta shaloputy', Nos.9 and 10, 1882; 'Dukhobortsy', No.1, 1883; see also I. I. Kablits (Iuzov), 'Dukhovnye khrist'iane: ocherk', *Vestnik Evropy*, No.11, 1880. The first significant contact between intelligentsia and religious dissenters began at the very beginning of the 1860's through V. I. Kel'siev's links with Old Believers. See: Paul Call, *Vasily I. Kelsiev: An Encounter Between the Russian Revolutionaries and the Old Believers* (Belmont, Mass., 1979). During the 'going to the people' movement of the 1870's further contacts developed strengthening the view in populist circles that sectarians could be natural allies in the struggle for social and political change. See also n.20 below.
- 3.
3. For the Purleigh Colony, see: M. J. de K. Holman, 'The Purleigh Colony: Tolstoyan Togetherness in the Late 1890's' in *New Essays on Tolstoy*, edited by M. Jones (Cambridge, 1976); for Khilkov and the Dukhobors, see, for example: Aylmer Maude, *A Peculiar People* (London, 1905); James Mavor, *My Windows on the Street of the World*, Vol.2 (London, 1923).
4. 'Zapiski D. A. Khilkova', *Svobodnoe slovo*, No.1 (1898), pp.79-125.
5. D. A. Khilkov, 'Shtundizm v Rossii', *Svobodnaia mysl'*, Nos.4 and 5 (1899), pp.13-15, 13-16.
6. A. M. Bodianskii, Letter, *Svobodnaia mysl'*, No.2 (1899), p.15.
7. L. N. Tolstoi, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (hereafter *PSS*) (Moscow, 1928-58), Vol.LXXII, p.284-5; Kh. N. Abrikosov, 'Dvadtsat' let okolo Tolstogo', in *Letopisi Gosudarstvennogo literaturnogo muzeia*, Vol.XII (Moscow,

1948), pp. 407ff. Blocked by the authorities at every step, the emigration of the Pavlovtsy was finally frustrated when of the emigrants (over 200 people) all men eligible for military service were refused passports.

8. A. Maude, *Life of Tolstoi*, Vol.2: *Later years* (London, 1930), p. 382.
9. L. N. Tolstoi, *PSS*, Vol.LXXII, p.25.
10. Tverskoi questioned the motives and ability of the organisers, particularly the 'absolute incompetence of Prince D. Khilkov and his associates'. He claimed that funds of \$37,000 given by the government for the Dukhobors were wasted unnecessarily. See: P. A. Tverskoi, *Dukhoborcheskaia epopeia* (St. Petersburg, 1900), p.102, and *Novye glavy dukhoborcheskoi epopei* (St. Petersburg, 1901), p.57. These claims were refuted by Maude and Bonch-Bruevich.
11. See Chertkov's preface to the English translation in *The New Age*, July 14 (1898), p.217. Tolstoi's *Christian Teaching* was published here for the first time in weekly parts.
12. L. N. Tolstoi, *PSS*, Vol.LXXII, p.140, n.11.
13. L. N. Tolstoi, *PSS*, Vol.LXXII, p.535. Letter of 2 May 1900.
14. L. N. Tolstoi, *PSS*, Vol.LXXIII, p.159-160. Letter of 20 Feb. 1901.
15. G. Sandomirskii, 'Kazachii polkovnik Khilkov', *Ogonek*, No. 40 (1928), p.4.
16. A. S. Pankratov, '*Ishchushchie boga: ocherki sovremennykh religioznykh iskanii i nastroenii*', Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1911), p.88. The reason was given in a letter to Khilkov's relative, Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Khilkov, then Minister for Communications.
17. L. N. Tolstoi, *PSS*, Vol. LXXII, p.139, 568.
18. V. A. Posse, *Moi zhiznennyi put'* (Moscow, 1929), p.263.
19. *Svobodnaia mysl'*, No.1 (1900), pp.3-5, 12-15; See: t pan J. Kolafa, '*Styky rusk emigrace se Slov ky a echy v letech 1897-1900*' (Prague, 1977), p.124.

20. In London Plekhanov's contemporaries from the *narodnik* movement, Stepniak-Kravchinskii and Volkhovskii had also been giving attention to the sects in *Free Russia* and other publications of the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom. Their reports of Russia's persecuted dissenters proved highly successful in mobilising support for the Society and its aims among English non-conformists. Stepniak in particular wrote much about the sects before his untimely death in 1895. See, for example, his *Russian Peasantry* (London, 1888). For his work in this area, see: Maurice Comtet, 'S. M. Stepnjak-Kravchinskij et la Russie sectaire, 1851-1895', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 12/4 (1971), pp.422-38.
21. Letter to Plekhanov of 9 Oct. 1898, Komitet po uvekovecheniiu pamiati G. V. Plekhanova, '*Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie truda": iz arkhivov G. V. Plekhanova, V. I. Zasluch i L. G. Deich*', Sbornik No.6 (Moscow, 1928), pp.155-157.
22. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, 'Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii', *Svobodnaia mysl'*, No.8 (1900); 'Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii', *Svobodnaia mysl'*, Nos. 9-11 (1900).
23. E. A. Serebriakov, 'Nakanune', *Nakanune*, No. 1 (1899), p.2.
24. Bonch Bruevich, the secretary of the Society, records that Plekhanov was chosen as its president, (Letter to Plekhanov of 1 Dec. 1901, *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie truda"*, op.cit., p.163, n.3). O. N. Nedogarko, however, cites documentary sources, which name Khilkov in that position, 'On sotrudnil s leninskoi "Iskroi"', *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, Oct. 1990, p.140.
25. *Svobodnaia mysl'*, No.16 (1901), p.256.
26. O. N. Nedogarko, op.cit., p.140.
27. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, 'Sektanty i g. K. Pobedonostsev', *Izbrannye sochineniia*, Vol.1 (Moscow, 1959), p.147. This article was written for *Iskra* in 1903, but was not published. It appeared in shortened form in *Rassvet*, No.3, March 1904. In it Bonch writes of the harmful influence of Tolstoyan literature among the masses, and includes with it Khilkov's *Narodnye listki*.
28. Bonch-Bruevich, op.cit, p.147, note.

29. See Tolstoi's letter to Tregubov of 2 Dec. 1901, *PSS*, Vol.LXXIII, p.187. A second edition appeared in 1905, published by the SR's.
30. Posse, *op.cit.*, p.259.
31. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, 'Znachenie sektantstva dlia sovremennoi Rossii', *Zhizn'*, No.1 (1902), p.293-334.
32. G. P. Camfield, 'The Pavlovtsy of Khar'kov Province, 1886-1905: Harmless Sectarians or Dangerous Rebels?', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 68 (1990), p.708.
33. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich (ed.), *Delo pavlovskikh krest'ian: (ofitsial'nye dokumenty)* (London, 1902), p.45.
34. Pis'mo K. P. Pobedonostseva Nikolaiu II, 'Novye materialy ob otluchenii L. N. Tolstogo (k 150-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia)', *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, 24 (1979), p.272.
35. *Iskra*, No.14, 1 (14) Jan. (1902). See also: 'O rabote V. I. Lenina v redaksii gazety "Iskra"', *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No.6 (1955), pp.13-14.
36. V. I. Novikov, *Lenin i deiatel'nost' iskrovskikh grupp v Rossii, 1900-1903*, 2-oe izd., (Moscow, 1984), p.72. The copy was passed to *Iskra* by Bonch. See: O. N. Nedogarko, *op.cit.*, p.142; and *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1925), p.285, n.4. Authorship of the other articles is uncertain, Nedogarko suggests either the Tolstoyan Kh. N. Abrikosov or the sectarian Sil'vester Muzh.
37. Letter to Martov, 4 April 1902, *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol.3, p.291.; V. I. Novikov, *op.cit.*, p.74.
38. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, 'Sredi sektantov', *Zhizn'*, No.2 (1902), pp.295-304; *Delo pavlovskikh krest'ian*, *op.cit.*
39. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, 'Sredi sektantov', *Zhizn'*, *op.cit.*, p.300-301.
40. *Zhizn'*, No.2 (1902), p.326-7, 395.
41. Posse, *op.cit.*, p.322.
42. Fedorchenko, *op.cit.*, p.233.
43. *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, Sb.6 (Moscow, 1938), p.265.



44. *Iskra*, No.14, 1 Jan. 1902. See also: Plekhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol.12 (Moscow, 1924), pp.188-192.
45. Nedogarko, op.cit., p.141.
46. Posse, op. cit., p.264. See also Khilkov's pamphlet 'O revoliutsii i revoliutsionerakh', *Narodnye listki*, No. 11 (1902), p17ff.
47. Letter to Tregubov, 2 Dec.1901, L. N. Tolstoi, *PSS*, Vol.LXXIII, p.171.
48. Letter of 26 Oct.1901, quoted in S. V. Zhitomirskaia, et al., 'Arkhiv V. D. Bonch-Bruevicha', *Zapiski Otdela rukopisei*, 25 (1962), p.70.
49. V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, 'Sredi sektantov', *Zhizn'*, No.6 (1902), p.252.
50. 'Sectarians on Resistance or Non-Resistance', *Free Russia* (1903), Jan.1, p.3. See Bonch Bruevich in *Zhizn'*, No.6 (1902), pp.250-270.
51. 'Sredi sektantov', *Zhizn'*, op.cit., p.265.
52. *Narodnye listki*, No.16 (1902) and *Biblioteka narodnykh listkov*, No.3 (1903). The latter was a revision of an earlier work, '*Kratkoe ispovedovanie dukhovnykh khristian*', which first appeared in typescript in 1888 and was enlarged in 1890. It was very much based on Khilkov's first encounters with these sects in the Caucasus at the end of the 1870's, revised in the light of the developing revolutionary situation.
53. 'Nasil'stvennaia revoliutsiia ili khristianskoe osvobozhdenie: o revoliutsii', *Svobodnoe slovo*, No.5 (1903) - No.10 (1904). Published in 1904 as '*O revoliutsii*'; Tolstoi's introduction is dated July 1904.
54. Zhitomirskaia, op.cit., p.70.
55. D. A. Khilkov, *Revoliutsiia i sektanty* (Geneva, 1904).
56. V. G. Chertkov, *O revoliutsii: nasil'stvennaia revoliutsiia ili khristianskoe osvobozhdenie?* (Christchurch, 1904), p.38.
57. D. A. Khilkov, op. cit., p.32.

58. R. H. Eiter, *Organizational Growth and Revolutionary Tactics: Unity and Discord in the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1901-1907*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh (1978), p.59.
59. V. Zenzinov, *Perezhitoe* (New York, 1953), p.181.
60. 'Donesenie Evno Azefa: (perepiska Azefa s Rataevym v 1903-1905)', *Byloe*, No.1 (23) (1917), p.209.
61. Police report dated 6 Jan. 1905, Arkhiv Zagranichnoi Agentury Departamenta Politsii (Okhrana Collection, hereafter *Okhrana*), Hoover Institution Archives, XIa, folder 2B.
62. *Donesenie Evno Azefa*, op. cit., p.213.
63. A. Kubov, 'S. N. Sletov: (biograficheskii ocherk)', In: *Pamiaty Stepana Nikolaevicha Sletova* (Paris, 1916), p.14.
64. Posse, op.cit., p.264.
65. See n.42 above.
66. Later republished in March 1905 in *Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii*, No.4, pp. 225-261. References relate to this edition.
67. Ibid. p.257.
68. Ibid. p.238.
69. Ibid. p.243.
70. Ibid. p.253, 254. Lenin too had vehemently opposed the Socialist Revolutionaries for their defence of terrorism, but the eruption of antigovernment violence on an unforeseen scale in 1905, prompted him to urge the formation of armed combat detachments. In preparing an article on this subject, entitled 'Zadachi otriadov revoliutsionnoi armii' it is of some interest to note that he drew on Plekhanov's editorial 'O demonstratsiiakh', which, as we have seen, favourably reviewed Khilkov's suggestions. See *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol.5 (Moscow, 1929), p.460.
71. Ibid. p.245-247.
72. V.M. Chernov, 'K kharakteristike maksimalizma', *Sotsialist-revoliutsioner*, No.1 (1910), p.193.

73. E. Breshko-Breshkovskaia, 'Rabota sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov sredi krest'ian i voprosy vremeni', *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, No.31 (1903), p.4-7. See also 'Eshche o kritikakh terroristicheskoi taktiki', *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, No.26 (1903), which cites Plekhanov's '*O demonstratsii*', with its support for the formation of *boevye družhiny*, as an example of the weakness of the Social Democrat case against terrorism.
74. D. B. Pavlov (sost.), *Pis'ma Azefa 1893-1917* (Moscow,1994), p.103.
75. Kubov, op.cit., p.14.
76. S. Nechetnyi (Sletov), 'U zemli' *Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii*, No.2 (1902), p.64.
77. V. M. Chernov, op.cit., p.193.
78. A. I. Spiridovich, *Histoire du terrorisme russe, 1886-1917* (Paris, 1930), p.222.
79. 'Obvinitel'nyi akt ob otstavnom deistvitel'nom statskom sovetnike Aleksee Aleksandroviche Lopukhine, obviniaemom v gosudarstvennom prestuplenii', *Byloe*, No.9-10 (1909), p.220, 231-2.
80. Letters of 18 Dec.1904 and 28 Jan. 1905, *Pis'ma Azefa*, op. cit., p.112,115.
81. *Posledniia izvestiia*, No.203, 2 (15) Dec. 1904, p.7.
82. *Pis'ma Azefa*, op.cit., p.112; D. B. Pavlov, *Esery-maksimalisty v pervoi rossiiskoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1990), p.44.
83. Police report No. 27 dated 3 (16) Feb., 1905, *Okhrana*, XIIIb (1), Folder 1A. Khilkov was waiting to see Breshkovskaia on her return from America.
84. Pavlov, op.cit., p43. On 27 Dec. Leonid Shishko, with reference to the above circular, reported to the *Zagranichnaia organizatsiia*, that the split was 'the fruit of a spy's imagination', and reminded members of their moral obligation to give outsiders no cause to doubt party solidarity.
85. Police report No. 29 dated 7 (20) Feb., 1905, *Okhrana*, XIc (5), folder 1. General D. F. Trepov (1855-1906). Previously Chief of Police in Moscow (1896-1905), Trepov was appointed Governor General of St. Petersburg in Jan. 1905.
86. Police report No. 27, op.cit.

87. D. A. Khilkov, *Ob ulichnykh besporiadkakh* (Geneva, 1905), p.12, 21.
88. Ibid, p.22.
89. D. A. Khilkov, *O svobode i o tom, kak ona dobyvaetsia* (Geneva,1905), p.9.
90. Ibid, p.10.
91. Letters of 17 and 19 April, *Pis'ma Azefa*, op.cit., p.125, 126. Their meeting was the subject of 'special surveillance' by agents of the *Okhrana*, who scrupulously logged Ivanov's movements and his entry into Russia on 18 April for the purpose of 'buying fish' in Odessa, see police report No.56, 24 April (7 May), *Okhrana*, XXIVk, folder 1; and No. 64, 29 April (12 May) 1905, *Okhrana*, XIIIb (1), folder 1A. Ivanov had previously been active in the transport of illegal literature into Russia and it is likely that he took with him copies of Khilkov's pamphlets and other literature.
92. Khilkov, op. cit, p.37.
93. B. V. Savinkov, *Vospominaniia terrorista*, 2nd ed, (Khar'kov, 1926), p121, and V. M. Chernov, *Pered burei* (New York, 1953), p.234.
94. Azef, op.cit., p.125.
95. Posse recalls how Gapon directed him to Khilkov for the supply of travel documents to Romania with Matiushenko, leader of the Potemkin mutiny. From Khilkov he learned that Gapon had been neither honest about his relations with the SR's nor wise in his plans for Matiushenko. Posse, op.cit, p.358-9. See also Chernov, op.cit., p.235. Gapon had learnt of the enterprise from Breshkovskaia and Khilkov. For the John Grafton episode see Michael Futrell, *Northern Underground* (London, 1963).
96. 'Vroz' itti, vmeste bit'', *Iskra*, No.87, 10 Feb. 1905. Newell calls this article 'the first serious attempt to revise the Russian Marxist response to terrorism', D. A. Newell, *The Russian Marxist Response to terrorism, 1878-1917*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Stanford University (1981), p.383.
97. V. I. Lenin, 'Letter to a comrade on our organisational tasks', *Collected Works*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Vol.6 (London, 1961), p.238.
98. In notes for his 'K voprosu o zadachakh otriadov revoliutsionnoi armii' *Leninskii sbornik*, Vol.5 (Moscow, 1929), p.460. The shift in the attitude of

Lenin and the Social Democrats towards terrorism is treated at length in Newell, op.cit., Chapter 8.

99. The Social Democrat S. M. Pozner regarded 1905 as a year of combat training. S. M. Pozner, *1905. Boevaia gruppya pri TsK RSDRP (b) (1905-1907 g.g.): stat'i i vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1927), p.3.
100. Sandomirskii, op. cit., p.4.
101. Sandomirskii, ibid., p.4; Zenzinov, op.cit., p.177.
102. Dzhunkovskii was first Vice-Governor, from August, then Governor of the city from November 1905. His father Fedor Petrovich was cousin to Khilkov's mother. Mikhail Ivanovich Khilkov was also a second cousin.
103. *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, No. 71 (1905), p.10.
104. M. A. Novoselov's introduction to *Pis'ma Kniazia Dimitriia Aleksandrovicha Khilkova* (Sergiev Posad, 1915), p.7.
105. Pankratov, op.cit., p.107-8.
106. V. M. Chernov, *Pered burei* (New York,1953), p.234, and 'K kharakteristike maksimalizma', *Sotsialist-revoliutsioner*, No.1 (1910), p.193.
107. D. A. Khilkov, 'Terror i massovaia bor'ba', *Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii*, (1905) No.4, pp. 245.
108. Pankratov, op.cit., p.107; and Novoselov, op. cit., p.7.
109. On his return to Russia Khilkov lived in retirement at Pavlovki, engaged in horticulture and bee-keeping. By 1911 he had returned to the fold of the Orthodox Church, and on the outbreak of war in 1914, volunteered to serve in his former Cossack regiment. He was killed in action in Galicia in October 1914.
110. Nedogarko, op.cit., pp.140-142.
111. *Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia*, No.76 (1905), p.25.
112. A. Maude, *Life of Tolstoi*, Vol.2: *Later years* (London, 1930), p. 448.

