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Consumption and savings with unemployment risk: implications for optimal employment contracts

Pissarides, Christopher (2002) Consumption and savings with unemployment risk: implications for optimal employment contracts. CEP discussion paper; CEPDP0542, 0542. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. ISBN 0-75-301563-3

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Identification Number: 0542

Abstract

This paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation to smooth consumption during employment without causing moral hazard. A preannounced delay in dismissal when the job becomes unproductive provides further insurance but because of moral hazard it does not fully smooth consumption. During the delay consumption falls and the worker searches for another job. No delays in dismissals are optimal if exogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2002 Christopher Pissarides
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Departments > Economics
Series: Working Papers > CEP Discussion Papers
Date Deposited: 27 Apr 2007
Last Modified: 14 Nov 2012 10:19
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/2211

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