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Heuristics and biases in a purported counter-example to the acyclicity of "better than"

Voorhoeve, Alex (2008) Heuristics and biases in a purported counter-example to the acyclicity of "better than". Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 7 (3). pp. 285-299. ISSN 1470-594X

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Identification Number: 10.1177/1470594X08092104


Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have offered a purported counter-example to the acyclicity of the relationship 'all things considered better than'. This example invokes our intuitive preferences over pairs of alternatives involving a single person's painful experiences of varying intensity and duration. These preferences, Rachels and Temkin claim, are confidently held, entirely reasonable, and cyclical. They conclude that we should drop acyclicity as a requirement of rationality. I argue that, together with the findings of recent research on the way people evaluate episodes of pain, the use of a heuristic known as similarity-based decision-making explains why our intuitive preferences may violate acyclicity in this example. I argue that this explanation should lead us to regard these preferences with suspicion, because it indicates that they may be the result of one or more biases. I conclude that Rachels' and Temkin's example does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting acyclicity.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2008 SAGE
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 08 Jan 2009 20:01
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 00:42

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