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The Origins of Japanese Planning Culture: Building a Nation–State, 1868-1945

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Abstract

Regional and urban planning is a common policy concern among modern nation-states. It largely defines the quality of life as well as the wealth creation in contemporary society. However, the concept of planning varies among nation-states. In particular, non-Western nation-states, planning was initiated under the influence of the imperialist order. To advance ‘planning theory’, there is a need to understand how the concept of planning is constructed in different culture. This paper shows why planning for late developed states had to aim for nation-state building and how this affected ‘planning culture’ by examining the development of early planning in Japan. The analysis shows that origins of planning and relevant institutions still continue to have pervasive influence on planning policy development even in contemporary Japan.

Keywords: planning culture; planning history; nationalism

Introduction

Although mainstream planning theorists tend to debate as if planning is a universal concept (Campbell and Fainstein 1996; Faludi 1973; Mandelbaum, Mazza, and Burchell 1996), the suggestion of planning culture challenged this West-centred convention (Sanyal 2005; 2007). Because planning systems in Western liberal economies evolved as a response to the ill effects of industrialisation and urbanisation (Cherry 1972; Hall 1996a; Sutcliffe 1980), planning policy in the West developed to solve ‘urban problems’ such as environmental degradation, housing and poverty in industrial cities. This process made Western planning mitigate the externalities of the market economy, and eventually serve the needs of the urban working classes. On the other hand, planning systems in non-Western world emerged in the process of nation-state building to defy the Western hegemony and promote national independence through industrialisation (Chatterjee 1993: Ch.10; Madanipour 2006). This origin inevitably affected the development of planning
culture in non-Western world and led to associate planning with nationalism and economic development.

Japan, who emerged as an economic superpower in the late twentieth century, is a good example to study this making of planning culture outside the West because the country escaped colonisation in the late nineteenth century and created its statutory planning system in 1919. The study of planning history in Japan shows how planning cannot exist just in the domain of local politics, but rather should be understood in the context of national as well as global political economy. This paper explains the development of Japan’s modern state and its planning system in the period between 1868 and 1945: from Meiji Restoration to the end of the Second World War. The Meiji Restoration is crucial to understand what triggered the regime change and why the new Japanese government had to force modern planning with such an impetus. An emergence of Japan’s modern state defined objectives of its planning policy, by which has shaped contemporary Japan’s built environment and economy.

Section 1 explains the unique origins of the Japanese modern state and its impacts on planning development by giving a detailed account of the motivation behind the Meiji Restoration and Japan’s strategies for modernisation. Section 2 describes the inception of Japan’s planning system and social problems arising from rapid urbanisation. Section 3 examines the characteristics of Japan’s planning system in the pre-war period, and explores why these characteristics emerged. Section 4 summarises how the nature of Japan’s modernisation affected the objectives and development of Japanese planning policy.
Early nation-state building

Meiji Restoration against the Imperialist Order

In 1853, four fleets from the United States appeared off the coast of Uraga, near Tokyo. The Japanese called them ‘the black ships’ with surprise and fear. Commodore Matthew Perry, on a mission from the US president, asked the Japanese government\(^1\) to comply with a request to sign a treaty with the US. For over 215 years, Bakufu (shogunal government) had no trade partnerships with foreign countries except for the Netherlands and China in Nagasaki\(^2\) to avoid influences of Christian liberalism, which might have endangered the legitimacy of the exploitative feudal administration in Japan. However, faced with the obvious superiority of the US’s military power, Bakufu did not have any choice but to accept the demands from the US and agreed on a peace treaty in the following year. Japan also settled the same treaties with the UK (1854) and Russia (1857). In 1858, Bakufu finally signed commercial trade treaties with the US, the Netherlands, the UK, Russia and France. In these commercial treaties, Japan was not treated as an equal partner to the Western nation-states but was forced to accept disadvantageous trade terms. This was legitimised by Japan’s lack of modern institutions which complied with international laws. Japan had again to agree to this disadvantageous position in the face of well-equipped modern armies of these Western countries.

At the time of Perry’s visit, the power of Bakufu had been already weakened after 250 years of Shogun regime. Having suppressed progressive intellectuals who had

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\(^1\) The administration of Tokugawa Bakufu (1600-1868) at the time of Perry’s visit. It was led by Shogun (the emperor’s a military deputy, but a de facto ruler of Japan). Tokugawa Sieyes’s descendants successively held Shogun’s positions.

\(^2\) Nagasaki is the prefecture of southern periphery of Japan. Foreign trade under the Tokugawa Bakufu was limited to a small island called Decimal in Nagasaki in order to control commoners’ contacts with foreigners.
information about foreign countries, *Bakufu* was entirely powerless against Western modernised armies. Although the purported interest of these Western countries was trade with Japan, their real ambition was obvious given their activities in Asia in the nineteenth century. Alleging to protect foreign residents in their settlements in Japan from anti-foreign terrorism, the UK and France posted soldiers in Yokohama (a port near Tokyo) since 1863, which exceeded more than 1,200 troops at one stage (Inoue 1965). Furthermore, they demanded that *Bakufu* should finance and build the necessary accommodations and other facilities for their soldiers (ibid). Under threat of colonisation by Western nations, Japan’s domestic governance came into further volatility.

This situation provoked fierce protests among the feudal establishment (*samurai* and aristocrats) in Japan, which was captured in the slogan ‘sonnō jyōi (Honour the emperor, expel the barbarians)’ (Tipton 2001). At the beginning, the hostility was focused on foreign residents in Japan, but later the strong discontent was directed towards the incompetence of Tokugawa regime to manage national security. The anti-foreign movement was then transformed into a movement of political discontent, aiming to replace *Bakufu* with a new regime (Ikegami 1996).

However, unlike the bourgeois revolutions in Europe, the regime change in Japan was not initiated by suppressed peasants or strengthened merchants. Although continuous peasants’ riots and the development of a quasi-capitalist economic system in the late Tokugawa period had severely shaken the political order of the feudal system in Japan, neither peasants nor rich merchants had sufficient power to organise their resources to initiate a popular revolution (Beasley 1995). Instead, the Tokugawa *Bakufu* was overthrown by the lower class *samurai* together with a coalition of the wealthiest city merchants in the form of a non-violent coup d’état in 1868 (Norman and Dower 1975).
During this period, the UK predicted the inevitable downfall of the Japanese old order (Alcock 1863). Judging that a revolution from above would least threaten its imperial capitalist order in Asia, the UK chose to support these revolutionists and offered financial and military help in exchange for concessions in Japan (Inoue 1965). However, well informed about the puppet government in China under the British control, the Japanese revolutionists did not accept this offer (ibid.). Here, the new political regime started to build Japan as a modern nation-state against Western imperialism.

**Creating the capitalist economy**

The fate of modern Japan was significantly affected by the unique characteristics of the Meiji revolution. Thrown into the international arena at the height of Western imperialism, the primary objective of the new government was to preserve national security and economic independence. The first step for the new government was to create a modern public administration, in particular a modern army, and to establish a capitalist economy to finance it. The urgency of the task was keenly felt by the new political leaders in Japan, who had witnessed other Asian countries falling under the control of Western imperialism. In order to create national wealth and establish a modern army in the shortest period of time, there were not many options available to new leaders other than importing Western technologies and incubating modern industries.

However, Japan faced serious impediments in reaching these objectives. First, it did not have any modern technologies due to the prolonged seclusion period. Second, it did not have rich natural resources to create industrial products. Third, it also lacked capital and skilled labour, which were essential to establish a capitalist production mode. Finally, Japan was seriously handicapped to accumulate national wealth due to the unequal trade
treaties inherited from the Tokugawa rule (Beasley 1995). For instance, the lack of autonomous tariffs gave foreign firms substantial profits while preventing the Japanese export industry from gaining decent returns (ibid). Furthermore, the Western nations’ extraterritorial rights in Japan shadowed the nation’s sovereignty (Spaulding and University of Michigan. Center for Japanese Studies 1967). Therefore, the ultimate objectives of the new Japan converged into two slogans: ‘fukoku kyōhei (Enrich the country, strengthen the military)’ to preserve national security, and ‘bunmei kaika (Civilisation and enlightenment)’ to revise the unequal treaties. The Japanese leaders believed that by accomplishing these tasks, they would lead Japan to become a modern strong state.

In the project of modern nation-state building, the Meiji government implemented a series of reforms to enhance the process. Taxation was one of them. In order to initiate a modern capitalist economy, the Meiji government funded primary capital for entrepreneurs through heavy taxes on farmland, through the implementation of the 1873 Land Tax Revision (Chiso Kaisei). The land tax represented more than 80 percent of government revenues in 1875-1879 (Norman and Woods 2000: p.77). While the Meiji Restoration freed peasants from feudal restrictions on mobility, finding other jobs was not a real option for most peasants in the early Meiji era, as the industrial revolution had not yet started in Japan (Dore 1984). This in effect meant that the social condition of peasants was more or less the same as before the Restoration.

In fact, the tax levy on farmers was much heavier than in the pre-Restoration period. The Meiji government levied monetary taxes on land instead of crops as in the past, based on taxation on the value of the land. The taxation rate was three percent of the land price.

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3 Before the Restoration, peasants as a hereditary class were neither allowed to leave their farmland nor sell and subdivide their properties to others under the strict class system. The new government abolished the existing class system and gave property right to those who could claim land ownership.

4 The taxation rate was three percent of the land price.
on the price of land (Dore 1984). This was quite a burden on tenant farmers and small-scale farmers who did not have a ready access to the market to make decent profits (Yazaki 1968: p.279). In contrast, the former feudal lords and the land gentry benefited from this revision by collecting high farm rents from their tenants (Dore 1984; Norman and Woods 2000; Smethurst 1986). Some of the gentry class used the surplus profits to set up small- to medium-sized businesses (Yazaki 1968: p.279). Unlike in England, these landowners did not seek profits from large-scale farming but preferred to remain as land gentry because of the excessive profits from farm rents (Norman and Woods 2000). The exploitation of tenant farmers and their persistent poverty was considered to be a major cause for the social and economic crisis in later years (Brown 1955: Ch.9; Dore 1984: Ch.5; Smethurst and University of California. Center for Japanese and Korean Studies 1974).

As seen above, the way the initial producer capital was created was very different from that of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Moreover, the manner in which capital was accumulated in the hands of producers was a key issue in interpreting the governance of contemporary Japan. This unusual beginning of capitalism in Japan has shadowed the development of the pre-war economy. Although the government supported conglomerates to enlarge the capacity of industrial production, genuine entrepreneurship did not develop much in pre-war Japan. Lucrative income was guaranteed by high farm rents, and the wealthy land gentry were not willing to take risks by setting up modern firms; instead, they kept relying on profits produced from farmland (Norman and Dower 1975). This system created the idea that land itself creates substantial profits in Japanese society.

In addition to the plight of farmers in the pre-war period, environmental pollution under the state’s industrial policy was already an issue in the Meiji era. The Ashio Copper Mine contamination, for example, became a serious pollution problem in the 1890s
(Notehelfer 1998). Nonetheless, the Ashio contamination along with the *Minamata Disease* (organic mercury poisoning) and the *Itai-Itai Disease* (cadmium poisoning), both originating in pre-war times, did not attract much attention until in the 1970s. In the case of the Ashio contamination, the company did not take the responsibility for the real damage caused by pollution until in 1974 when a settlement was reached outside the court (Ui and United Nations University 1992). These cases tell that Japan’s economic growth as a prime national interest was achieved at the sacrifice of its people. The history of the Japanese planning system has to be understood within this context of Japan’s industrialisation process.

**The origins of Japanese planning**

**Enlightenment for survival**

Being as a developmental state, Meiji leaders eagerly promoted two things: political/economic reforms and cultural borrowing from the West. The Meiji oligarchy regarded those reforms, represented by the slogan ‘Civilisation and enlightenment’, as essential in order to repeal the unequal treaties and protect the nation (Beasley 1995; Tipton 2001). However, the phrase ‘*wakon yōsai* (Japanese spirit, Western technology)’ represents the ambivalent attitude of the Meiji authorities towards modernisation (Nakayama 1984). While the Meiji government aggressively imported Western technologies, it did tailor these new imports to their needs. This rhetoric was also seen in the import of modern planning system to Japan from the West.

In order to demonstrate ‘modernity’ to the Great Power, one of the prime purposes of Japanese planning became remodelling feudal cities, especially the capital city of Japan, into a ‘modern’ one. The members of the Iwakura Mission (1871-3) were impressed by the civilisation of the Western cities which they had visited, and were convinced that those
cities were the vehicle of industrialisation as well as the materialisation of their national wealth. In England, they saw a forest of factory chimneys emitting smoke in big cities and regarded them as proof of England’s economic prosperity (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002). In France, they were impressed by the beauty of Paris, which Georges-Eugène Haussmann⁵ had remodelled from a crowded medieval city into a city with wide streets, broad vistas, parks, and avenues radiating from focal points (ibid). On the other hand, they were also aware that the prosperity of European nations had started after 1800 and that the current wealth was only realised in the last forty years or so (ibid). Therefore, the Japanese new leaders assumed that if they followed the right path, Japan could catch up with the Western level of civilisation in the not so long future.

In this context, the ‘Civilisation and enlightenment’ slogan was enormously influential in forming the values and objectives of planning. The visual image and technology of the Western enlightenment determined the path of Japanese planning development. The ultimate objectives of city planning in Japan became twofold: (1) building industrial infrastructures and (2) making well-designed city centres consisting of boulevards, parks, theatres and public and commercial facilities built by bricks and stone. The Japanese officials believed that they could materialise Western-style cities as well as its wealth if Japan learnt Western-style architecture and civil engineering.

The government first introduced this remodelling of cities towards modernisation in Tokyo, the new capital city of Japan. The first railway line opened between Tokyo (Shinbashi) and Yokohama in 1872. Then, the Ginza Brick Quarter (1872-1877), a commercial and residential area consisting of 1,400 two-story Western-style brick

⁵ French civic official and city planner, 1809-1891
buildings, was constructed by the central government (Tokyo Metropolitan Government: p.24). There was also a grand plan for the centralization of the Government Office District in Hibiya (1885-1890) with a new National Diet Building under the initiative of the Foreign Minister, Inoue Kaoru (1835-1915) (Tokyo Metropolitan Government: pp.8-9). However, the plan was abandoned in 1890 and only a couple of buildings were constructed based on this plan. Mitsubishi Company also planned Mitsubishi Red-Brick Street, known as First Street, London (today’s Marunouchi business area) in 1890 (Tokyo Metropolitan Government: pp.10-11). It was a new office district with British-style four-story red brick buildings and gas-lit streets in an area adjacent to what is now Tokyo Station (built in 1914) (Cybriwsky 1998). The plan was almost completed around 1915 and became one of the most thriving business districts in Japan. Through these experiences, constructing new blocks of town and infrastructures became synonymous to city planning in Japan.

While these development plans were the authority’s vision for a modern capital city, there was an obstacle to materialise this plan. In addition to some technological problems, Meiji officials considered the presence of a large number of the urban poor in the immediate vicinity of the wealthy areas in Tokyo as undesirable; thus, they believed it necessary to remove the urban poor to the outskirt of the city (Ishida 1987a; McCormack 2002). The elite, as well as the commoners who saw themselves as ‘decent citizens’, supported this opinion in the early Meiji era (McCormack 2002). When a fire destroyed more than 2,000 buildings in a slum in the vicinity of the Ginza Brick Quarter in 1881, the then Tokyo governor, Matsuda Michiyuki (1839-1889), claimed that the destroyed area should be redeveloped to prevent the ‘filthy and unsightly’ people from re-inhabiting (McCormack 2002: p.259). McCormack expressed this as follows:

‘The aim [of the redevelopment], in the words of a Tokyo prefecture official named Ito Masanobu, was to rid the city of the ‘doss-houses’ (kichinyado) inhabited by ‘little people’
(shomin) and, by building ‘regular houses’ (jinjyō no kaoku) that ‘good people’ (ryōmin) would inhabit, to transform the area and render it a ‘regular town’ (ippan no machinami). As for the former low class residents, the future head of the Mainichi Shinbun [newspaper], Numa Morikazu (1843-1890), declared that laws were necessary to force them to move to the city outskirts, where it was normal for poor people to reside (McCormack 2002: p.259).

Against this background, the remodelling of Tokyo’s city centre was wholly dedicated to the upper class. Although the Japanese government was zealous to realise their vision of a modern Tokyo in the early Meiji era, its ambition was only partially materialised due to financial constraints as well as the physical limitations of the designated areas which were quickly built up.

On the other hand, compared with other latecomers of modernisation, Japan was successful in the construction of infrastructures, especially for industrial use. By 1877, the rail networks linking Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto were connected with their nearest ports, Yokohama and Kobe (Beasley 1995: p.104). The construction of the main trunk routes connecting these three important cities were also completed by 1889 (ibid). There are two main factors which aided this swift transition from feudal society. First, the government formed a national infrastructure development plan according to the identified geographical strategy devised for economic development (core and periphery), now often called kokudo keikaku (national land planning) (Hanes 1997: pp.491-495). The origin of kokudo keikaku can be traced back to the period immediately after the Restoration, when the Meiji government conducted many geographical surveys to build railways and ports (Hanes 1997: p.491).

Second, the state set aside special financial resources for building industrial infrastructures as a national priority. The Japanese postal savings system was set up in 1875, channelling household savings to governmental funds in order to finance large-scale
infrastructure development projects (Cargill and Yoshino 2002). Later, resources from public pensions and life insurance reserves were also added to these funds. This special financial source from zaisei tōyūshi (The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, FLIP) worked advantageously to the state, as the government was able to pool large amounts of capital without much constraint from the national budget. This hidden national budget enabled Japan to construct many necessary infrastructures for industrial production without raising tax burdens.

**Industrialisation and urban growth**

Although modern planning in Japan started as the construction of Western-style monumental city centres, it became apparent that the nation needed a land-use control system along with its industrialisation, as was the case in Western countries. Japan’s rapid industrialisation was accompanied with unprecedented urban growth. While state-led industrialisation was a pull-factor toward urban industrial jobs which flourished from the mid Meiji era, there was also a push-factor that made the working class population migrate from villages to cities. The 1873 Land Tax Revision had an impact on agricultural land-use similar to the impact of the enclosure movement in England. While the new government relied on tax revenues from farmland, agricultural products were not highly priced and the crops were unstable (Dore 1984). Furthermore, the new government denied the rights of farmers to communal land which had previously been used for fertilisers’ fodder and fuels (Dore 1984; Yazaki 1968). As a consequence, some small farmland owners could not keep up with tax payments in the form of cash. Thus, an increasing number of farmers sold their land, and then became tenant farmers for large landlords (Dore 1984; Norman and Dower 1975; Yazaki 1968). Then, rents for tenant farmers leapt to approximately 50 percent of
crop yields (Yazaki 1968). This drove some members of the impoverished farmers’ households to cities to supplement household incomes.

In fact, the urbanisation during this period in Japan was much faster than in Western countries (Norman and Dower 1975; Wilkinson 1965; Yazaki 1968). As a latecomer to industrialisation, it was easier for Japan to copy technologies such as transport which enhanced the formation of industries and enabled the migrant population to reside outside city centres (Wilkinson 1965). The population growth was concentrated in the Tōkai Pacific Belt (Tōkaidō) region, a coastal area between Tokyo and Osaka. Having been an established travel route even before the Meiji Restoration, this area had already possessed adequate infrastructures such as highways and post stations so that the region was suitable for the agglomerations of the urban population (Traganou 2003: p.173). The Tōkai Pacific Belt extended to the south of Japan, Kyūshū, as the government created steel and mining firms in this region. Industrialisation brought factories, labour and houses to cities along the Tōkai Pacific Belt, in particular to the capital city of Tokyo. For example, while the population in Tokyo was estimated between 600,000 and 700,000 around 1868, it reached some seven million in 1940 (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: p.14).

Whilst the urban population was concentrated in relatively small areas of central cities during the first three decades of the Meiji era, the available land quickly disappeared as industrialisation proceeded. Between 1897 and 1920, the suburban population increased by 183 percent, whereas the central and inner urban population grew by 94 percent (Yazaki 1968: p.451). To accommodate the growing population, urban areas had to expand outwards. The introduction of electric trains and streetcars to Japan together with the swift expansion of their networks to suburbs enabled the rapid urbanisation. The development of the public transport network, which was implemented by both public and private sectors,
became feasible by the Tokyo City-Ward Reform Ordinance (TCRO, *Tokyo Shiku Kaisei Jōrei*) in 1888, and similar ordinances enacted in other cities.

TCRO is the first formal planning initiative to provide public goods in Meiji Japan. A water work survey in 1876 preceded a port construction project in 1880 and the TCRO (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1993: p.24) The major achievements of the TCRO were the construction of 32 parks, seven canals, waterworks and sewage systems as well as the improvement of 123 roadways up to 1919 (ibid). The widening of roads was largely implemented by collecting development charges from railway companies (Koshizawa 1991). Although public authorities constructed some mass transit infrastructures, many private companies also built rail and tram routes in Japanese cities during this time.

However, during this period of fast urbanisation⁶, both housing construction and infrastructure developments were completely unregulated. This means that the quality of housing as well as the provision of physical and social infrastructures necessary for urban life was grossly neglected by the government. Housing shortage became especially acute around 1920 (Honma 1987). A newspaper in 1921 reported a survey by the Home Ministry, showing that the shortage of housing in large cities had reached to 122,821 units (Honma 1987: p.35).

Most major railway companies took advantage of this situation, and initiated a large-scale housing development (Honma 1987; Ishida 1987a). When the companies planned a new railway line, they bought large plots of land nearby hub stations. Then, they built new suburb communities for mainly middle- and upper-class citizens with retail stores

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⁶ The populations of the six large cities in Japan increased by more than 250 percent between 1897 and 1920 as the following figures show (Yazaki 1968: 391):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tokyo</th>
<th>Osaka</th>
<th>Kyoto</th>
<th>Kobe</th>
<th>Yokohama</th>
<th>Nagoya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1,330,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3,350,000</td>
<td>1,760,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>640,000</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>610,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and even amusement parks (Hirano 1999; Sand 2003). Some of the suburb communities built during this period, which imitated the Garden Suburbs in England, were fairly well designed and are now regarded as high profile residential areas in Japan (Koshizawa 1991).

However, in most cases, small-sized developers built cheap, tiny and low-quality wooden detached houses and row houses in suburbs (Honma 1987; Mosk 2001; Yazaki 1968). The majority of these houses were not very different from the wooden row houses built in the Edo period (Feaver, Webb, and Webb 1992; Yazaki 1968). Moreover, many of these developments were undertaken without any consideration of basic infrastructures, such as roads and sewage (Ishida 1987a). In the worst cases, houses were built in the middle of farmland without access to any proper roads, making the developed areas in this manner resemble labyrinths (Ishida 1987a: pp.110-111).

Not only was housing constructed without adequate infrastructures, but also house prices skyrocketed in big cities. For example, the neighbourhood of Hiratsuka/Ebara, located about six kilometres from the city centre of Tokyo, experienced an increase in land value of 498.5 percent during the 1910s (Bestor 1989: pp.56-58). Between 1900 and 1940, the land value of this area increased by 2,673 percent (ibid). In contrast, during the same period, the value of paddy fields dropped to 75 percent of their 1900 value in the same areas (ibid). The ratio of residential land area in the same communities increased from 8.8 percent in 1900 to 40.9 percent in 1930, and reached 96.4 percent in 1940 (ibid). Although the government tried to make this land conversion more streamlined by introducing the Cultivable Land Reorganisation Act (Kōchi Seiri Hō) in 1909, it soon became apparent that Japan needed more comprehensive planning laws to control urban growth.
Emergence of urban problems

In addition to these land-use defects that resulted from rapid urbanisation, there were also rising social problems that were common to industrial economies. In Tokyo, while a small number of newly emerged middle-class residents were able to move to relatively well-built houses in the hilly suburbs of the Western part of the city (Honma 1987; Sand 2003), the majority of the working class population was forced to live in the poor quality tenement houses in the inner city areas, which were close to factories built along a river in the Eastern Tokyo area (Yazaki 1968). In fact, the working classes ended up inhabiting shanties whose individual unit size was only 7.5 square metres, and 15 to 20 households had to share a toilet (Yokoyama 1949). The living condition like this was also observed in other major cities. In Osaka, about 34.9 percent of the housing stock in 1920-24 consisted of dark tenement houses (Mosk 2001: pp.226-228). According to Sydney and Beatrice Webb (English socialist activists and the founders of the London School of Economics, 1859-1947; 1858-1943), who visited Osaka in 1911, the conditions of the slums in the city were as bad as in London (Feaver, Webb, and Webb 1992: pp.72-74).

Nonetheless, an improvement of living condition for the urban poor in pre-war Japan was not as a pressing issue to the government as it was in the West. First, slums in Japan had relatively better hygiene levels compared to Western counterparts. For example, human waste in Japanese cities was systematically collected for the use of a fertiliser for farming since the Edo period (Hanley 1997). Bathing in hot tubs was a common practice for the Japanese, and neighbours shared the cleaning of streets (ibid). In addition, Japanese wooden houses had more ventilation than Western brick houses. The Webbs wrote about the less offensive smells in Osaka’s slums, claiming the better hygienic practices of Japanese commoners (Feaver, Webb, and Webb 1992: p.72). While the government had to
rebuild the water supply systems in the aftermath of the cholera epidemic brought by Westerners, which killed 105,000 people across Japan in 1879, and nearly 110,000 in 1886 (McCormack 2002: p.260), apart from this, strong planning initiatives for public health improvement never materialised in pre-war Japanese cities.

Second, landlords and zaibatsu owners, who held the most powerful positions in pre-war Japan, did not easily give concessions to the government in planning initiatives (e.g. contributing their land and money to common facilities for new developments) in the absence of any immediate threats or benefits to them. In 1906, 0.5 percent of the residential landowners in Tokyo’s 15 wards owned more than 23 percent of residential land in the area (Hatate 1992: p.109). The largest plots were owned by Mitsubishi Company and its founder (the Iwasaki family), Mitsui Company and its owners (the Yasuda family), and some ex-feudal land lords (ibid). Those landowners who possessed the land adjacent to urban fringes benefited most from rapid urban expansion. In this scenario, any planning regulation would have resulted in their losing vast sums of profit.

Third, there was relatively less social disorder among the Japanese urban poor in the early Meiji period than in Western industrial society. Prior to the prominence of urban violence, the British upper and middle classes tried to reform the working class for ‘acceptable’ behaviour through charity, poor relief and moral education (Addams 1893; Bosanquet 1984; Hill 1883). While these attempts failed in England, the moral education of the poor was very successful in Japan (Garon 1997; Gluck 1985; Goodman 1998).

Learning from the precedent in West, the Japanese government fully took advantage of the remaining feudal order and even reinvented tradition in order to control its commoners (Tu 1996; Vlastos 1998). Paternalism was transplanted into industrial relations. The ideas of self-help, hard work, thrift and saving were strongly taught at ethics
courses in elementary schools (Garon 1997; Gluck 1985). As a consequence, people were very ashamed to apply for the state assistance. The Webbs were surprised to learn that the number of welfare applications was extremely small in Osaka; the expenditure was only 50 yen (£5) per day, which fed some 500 families (Feaver, Webb, and Webb 1992: p.73). In this situation, if someone failed economically, it was considered that the person did not act in accordance with the moral conduct of Japanese society (Garon 1997; Pyle 1973; 1974).

The most important task of the government regarding welfare was how officials or volunteers could persuade the lower class to give up their reliance on welfare assistance and to rehabilitate the morals of those who had failed (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998). The value of family and mutual help in the community were emphasised in times of economic hardship (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998). The government acted strongly to coordinate efforts from the rich to help the poor in order to minimise state relief for the impoverished (Garon 1997). Submission to the authority and the perseverance of a vertical order in human relationships greatly hindered the development of social citizenship in pre-war Japan.

Fourth, industrial workers, who were potential political actors toward the improvement of their social conditions, were still a minority in Japan. In 1919, 58 percent of the households in Japan were engaged in agriculture only (Norman and Woods 2000: p.158). Furthermore, in time of recession, industrial workers went back to the countryside as cheap labourers because agriculture was still labour intensive in Japan (Norman and Woods 2000; Totten 1966). Besides, more than half of the industrial workforce of pre-war Japan was young women, who worked for the textile industry and were locked up in the companies’ dormitories (Hunter 1992; Tipton 2001: p.96). Those female factory workers could hardly join labour movements, so that overall union membership never reached more
than 8 percent of the industrial labour force (Tipton 2001: p.101). Therefore, the
government did not have to make significant concession to control recurrent social
disorders which could have been caused by the unemployed urban masses, as was the case
in Western industrial cities (Totten 1966).

Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, the Japanese government could not
resist the rising demands for political and social citizenship of the working classes, as
skilled male workers of heavy industries joined urban protests (Tipton 2001: p.101). These
movements were also fuelled by the rise of socialism and communism ideas against the
backdrop of deepening worldwide depressions. The period between 1905 and 1940 has
been termed as the age of ‘imperial democracy’ by Andrew Gordon (Gordon 1991), when
Japanese commoners vigorously demanded the government for citizenship rights.

The 1905 Hibiya Riots started as a mass rally around Hibiya Park in Tokyo to
express the public’s discontent about the conditions of Russia’s surrender in the Russio-
Japanese War (1905). Despite the victory at the cost of mobilising a million men and
100,000 deaths in the war (Pyle 1973: p.56), the economic gains were limited and the living
conditions of commoners did not improve after the war. The political rally turned into a
riot, and urban crowds violently attacked government institutions, street cars, offices and
newspaper companies (Gordon 1991). 300 buildings were burnt down during this incident
(Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: p.13). Another major disruption was the Rice
Riots of 1918, which were provoked by a sharp increase in rice prices, spread all over
Japan, involving thousands of commoners. During this period, tenant [farmers’] movements also intensified in the countryside (Dore 1984; Hane 2003; Smethurst 1986).

However, suppressive regulations and brutal police power curbed the public
discontent. First, Article 17 of the Public Peace Police Law (Chian Keisatsu Hō) of 1900
in effect banned labour organisations and strike activities (Totten 1966: p.22). In 1901, the government dissolved the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshutō), which was calling for more egalitarian society by the abolition of classes, private capital and land ownership (Yazaki 1968: p.406). When labour disputes still continued and the movements for universal suffrage grew, the state finally introduced universal male suffrage in 1925. However, there was a serious setback to this achievement. In the same year, the parliament passed the Peace Preservation Act (Chian Iji Hō) to outlaw organising associations against kokutai (national polity) and the idea of private properties (Tipton 2001: p.97). A 1928 revision of the Act even introduced capital punishment against those who dared to attack kokutai (ibid). These thought controls escalated to the expansion of the Special Higher Police (Tokkō). From that time onwards, ultra nationalism in Japan became the backbone of its totalitarian regime as well as the drive to build Japan’s Empire in Asia to overcome economic problems at home (Maruyama 1963). The strong police power for controlling violence and social democracy in cities could be counted as the fifth reason for the underdevelopment of citizenship rights in Japan’s planning policy.

Creating the statutory planning system

Facing physical and social problems caused by the rapid urban growth, the central government had to enact the City Planning Act and the Urban Building Standard Act in 1919. During this period, the government was concerned about how to provide necessary facilities along with the rapid suburbanisation. In the early Meiji era, the government could supply necessary public goods for remodelling Japan’s feudal cities into modern ones using assets from the Edo period (Koshizawa 1991). For example, many large parks were the conversion of private gardens of former feudal lords (ibid). The existing roads were
widened by the TCRO. However, suburbanisation required more roads, open spaces, water, sewage and other infrastructures. The Home Ministry, which was solely in charge of planning in pre-war Japan, also raised issues of building controls and affordable housing (Honma 1987; Ishida 1987a; Koshizawa 1991).

Japanese planners in the early twentieth century were as equally alarmed as British planners by the consequences of uncontrolled urban growth. Nonetheless, Japan lacked strong drive to solve these urban problems. Mori Ōgai, who had studied public health in Germany in the nineteenth century, attempted to incorporate health concerns into the building regulation code for the TCRO (Ishida 1987b). However, his recommendations to improve public health by regulating housing and urban environment were never incorporated into any planning regulations in the pre-war era while the reason why his proposal was rejected is not clear. While urban health problems were the impetus for the development of early town planning in England (Hawtree 1981), attempts to remedy these problems played a very minor part in Japan’s planning history.

There was also no sense of urgency among Japanese planners to take rigorous policy measures for social housing concerns. The Home Ministry also planned to set up cooperative building societies and housing associations, modelled on European versions, in an effort to increase affordable housing through subsidies to these organisations (Honma 1987). The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake in Tokyo provided an opportunity for such experiments. The earthquake directly destroyed 128,000 houses and damaged another 126,000 units (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1993: p.32). Furthermore, the fire caused by the earthquake destroyed another 447,000 houses (ibid). The total number of causalities reached 3.4 million (ibid). Dōjunkai (1924-1941), the first housing association in Japan
under the umbrella of the Home Ministry\(^7\), planned to build 8,545 model houses for the victims (Honma 1987: p.77). In particular, learnt from emerging modern architecture styles in the West, it constructed 2,501 housing units of concrete apartment blocks, which were the first of this type of modern housing developments in Japan (Ishida 1987a: p.167). However, other social housing plans during this period failed due to a lack of finance (Honma 1987).

Despite the enactment of the City Planning Act and the Urban Building Standard Act, the regulations were far too weak to control undesirable land-use. The City Planning Act only designated three zoning areas: residential, industrial and commercial areas. While the zoning regulations listed types of buildings that could be built in a designated zoning area, any types of buildings could be built within an industrial zoning area while the Act designated this zoning area for large-scale, dangerous and sanitary problematic factories (Ishida 1987a). Another problem was that the City Planning Act and the Urban Building Standard Act did not regulate all land areas in terms of zoning controls (ibid). Non-regulated areas were called *shiraji chiiki* (blank zoning area). In 1925, as a result, the combined amount of industrial zoning areas and *shiraji chiiki* occupied 40.7 percent of Tokyo’s city planning areas and 54.9 percent of Osaka’s (Ishida 1987a: p.135). In short, the large amount of land that remained unaffected by the zoning laws seriously limited the effectiveness of zoning controls in pre-war Japan.

**Characteristics of the pre-war planning system**

The peculiar conditions of Japan’s modernisation shaped three distinctive characteristics of Japanese planning. This section will explain each of them in detail.

\(^7\) The financial resource came from citizens’ donation to earthquake victims (Ishida 1987a: 166).
Planning as technology

The most salient feature of Japanese planning since modernisation was the dominance of technology. On their visit to Europe and the USA, Meiji leaders were struck by grand urban design and solid structures of brick and stone buildings in nineteenth century Western cities (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002). They were also overwhelmed by these nations’ industrial infrastructures, especially by transport and communication such as railways, roads, bridges and ports (ibid). A detailed description of these infrastructures can be found in the diary of the ambassadors of the Iwakura Mission (ibid). The Japanese leaders readily understood the importance of industrial infrastructures as a major vehicle for industrialisation so that they were determined to implant necessary technologies to Japan. While urban planning, as a tool of comprehensive control of land use, was slow to emerge in pre-war Japan, the construction of industrial infrastructures was immediately implemented by the state without hesitation.

In the process of building modern cities, civil engineers and architects, who created powerful symbols of Japan’s modernisation, took a crucial position among Japanese planning professionals (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001b). They established professional bodies and passed on their skills to the next generations through education at universities (ibid). Thus they shaped Japan’s planning culture and safeguarded their influence on planning decision-making. Furthermore, these two types of professionals, many of whom have been hired by the Japanese government and large firms (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001a), have acted as a strong interest group to promote the construction of new buildings and infrastructures. This is an important reason
why technologies and architecture designs have had a central position in Japanese planning policy.

Although Japan is now known as an economy in which the development of science and technology plays a central role, the Japanese concept of modern science and technology is not similar to that of the West. This conceptual discrepancy between Japan and the West can partly explain the unique nature of Japanese planning. In Meiji Japan, there was no distinction between science and technology (Bartholomew 1989; Maruyama 1996; Nakayama 1984). In nineteenth century Europe, science and technology was distinguished as ideas and practice (Maruyama 1996; Nakayama 1984). In contrast, at the initial stage of modernisation in Japan, both science and technology was imported from the West and was regarded equally as a tool for economic growth (Nakayama 1984). However, the most striking aspect of the way in which Japan learnt modern Western science was that it did not experience the paradigm shift from the old to the new (Barshay 1988; Maruyama 1996; Nakayama 1984). The emergence of new science in the West in the modern age was usually accompanied by the notion of ‘creative destruction’. The Enlightenment broke up the feudal and often Christian dominated tradition in science (Hall and Gieben 1992). Subsequently, science transformed Western society into one wherein an individual could make free decisions based on his (but generally not her) own rationality. Japan completely lacked this process.

In Japan, new science was built following the tradition of wakon yōsai (Japanese spirit, Western technology) watchword. Modern science and technology was brought to Japan without its original ideologies and philosophies (Nakayama 1984). Furthermore, not only did the government exclusively own and control modern science and technology, but also its advocates were the traditional ruling class, samurai, who had lost their occupations
after the Meiji Restoration, but not their political power (Burks 1985; Nakayama 1984; Spaulding and University of Michigan. Center for Japanese Studies 1967). Whereas individuals or private enterprises in the West largely developed modern science and technology (Nakayama 1984), the selected borrowing by which modern science and technology was transplanted to Japan determined the path of modern science in this country.

By cutting off philosophy from science, the development of science in Japan was seriously conditioned. The Japanese government concentrated on the development of technologies and practical sciences, which were not related to values, morals and ideas (Maruyama 1996). The government’s monopoly in new science and technology resulted in the tendency of a lack of democracy and even suppression of freedom in research and development in science in Japan (Bartholomew 1989). This feudalistic tradition has still continued in the contemporary Japanese academia, wherein the strong seniority system, pervading factionalism and persisting apprenticeship has obstructed new research and development (Bartholomew 1989; Castells 1998). Moreover, as technicians or scientists were supervised by bureaucracy, which was predominantly consisted of graduates from the Department of Law of the Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo), the status of scientists and technicians was subordinated within the hierarchy of Japanese government (Bartholomew 1989). Therefore, science as a tool to bring fairness based on reasons was significantly ignored in policy decision-making in Japan.

On the whole, while technology was an integral part of the Japanese planning system, the status of engineers was low in the Meiji social hierarchy. The inferior position of planners as engineers in the Japanese government can explain why the Home Ministry failed to make substantial achievements in pre-war planning policy-making, despite their
extensive knowledge about the development of Western planning systems. Most proposals from the Home Ministry were rejected by the Ministry of Finance (Fujimori 1990; Ishida 1987a; Koshizawa 1991).

Strong preference for hardware technology in planning is still prevalent in contemporary Japan. Research of the institutional context of Japanese planning reveals that planning education at Japanese universities still has strong orientation towards architecture and engineering and only a few social science-based courses exist (Masser and Yorisaki 1994; Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001b). Moreover, there is a tendency among social science courses on planning to put an emphasis on mathematical rational models in planning decision-making. The lack of planning courses that deal with the political and administrative context reflects the tradition of Japanese planning, where politics and ideologies are separated from its planning policy-making. Accordingly, planning in Japan came to be considered as mere strategies that a small number of professionals have solely decided.

The monopoly of ‘rational’ science and technology, owned by the Japanese authority and firms, also meant the exclusion of the general public from planning decision-making processes. Not only were citizens prevented from participating in planning processes, but also they lacked any practical knowledge about what was going on and how their localities would be affected by planning policies, because there were few planning professionals outside the central government or firms. Therefore, planning outcomes were inevitably authoritative and capitalistic in the pre-war period.
Planning for capitalist development

While the Japanese authority made efforts to create Western-like urban design in city centres in order to demonstrate its modernity, the objectives of planning were absolutely focused on creating industrial infrastructures (Mosk 2001: pp.231-241). The city planning documents prepared by Osaka City Council show that the financial resources of Osaka’s city planning were thoroughly dedicated to construction projects, in particular that of road building in the pre-war time (Mosk 2001: p.240). The plan was divided into piecemeal projects and was spectacularly lacking in ‘grand design, overriding vision and rationale, articulation of a set of ethical or aesthetic concerns’ (Mosk 2001: p.239).

This same aspect could be found in the introduction of the TCRO (Ishida 1987a). Although slum clearance and the regulation of fireproof buildings were discussed in the committee of the TCRO, the main issues were the construction of roads and the Tokyo port. The TCRO did not include any development controls (Fujimori 1990; Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994). The origin of Japanese city planning exists in how the government can introduce modern infrastructures such as motorways into former castle towns like Tokyo and Osaka (Ishida 1987a; Koshizawa 1991; Mosk 2001).

The manner in which land-ownership was identified under the new regime is another important legacy of Meiji planning policy to post-war Japan. Landlords had an incentive to increase land value by converting their land-use to more profitable ones as there were virtually no restrictions on land-use conversions from farm to residential use and residential to factory/office use in pre-war Japan. When the urgent task of the government was to promote capitalism, there seemed to be no encouragement for the government to tighten land-use controls. Furthermore, these landlords, who often turned to be small business owners, came to acquire greater political power as major supporters of the newly
formed Liberal Party (Norman and Dower 1975). Therefore, the Japanese Liberal Party, while calling for democracy, had agrarian and feudal tradition in its inception (ibid). While these landowners made up the mainstream of Japan’s politics in the pre-war time in the still largely agrarian society, the urban working class was marginalised in the political arena. Accordingly, policy measures stimulating redistribution of individual gains through planning remained very weak in pre-war Japan.

Planning under absolutism

The last unique feature of modern Japanese planning in the pre-war time was that planning was conducted under harsh absolutism. In the early nineteenth century, European cities experienced a number of urban protests, which were brutally suppressed by the use of police and military powers (Benevolo 1967; Jones 1976). When European establishments realised that they could no longer oppress the continuous uprisings of the urban masses by means of force, the elite started to take initiatives of improving urban slum conditions as a way of reconciliation with the urban poor (Ashworth 1954; Hall 1996a; Jones 1976). Thus, the development of planning policies in Western liberal economies has been strongly connected with the formation of social/urban policy. Because many top bureaucrats studied in Europe, the Japanese government was fully aware of the effects of industrialisation on society (Burks 1985; Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002; Pyle 1974). Accordingly, after the opening of the parliament, the Japanese government banned freedom of assembly and intervened in the freedom of speech by means of censorship (Mitchell 1998).

However, what the establishment was most concerned with was the development of the consciousness of deprivation among the working class (Pyle 1974). Kanai Noburu (Professor of Law at the Imperial University, 1865-1933) and Kuwata Kumazo (1868-
1932) were the pioneers of Japanese social policy which was distinctive from the Western ones (Pyle 1974: p.139). During his study in Europe, Kanai judged that British and German’s social protests did not happen because of the severity of material deprivation of the working class, but instead resulted from the working class’s political consciousness of being exploited by capitalists (Pyle 1974: p.143).

Based on this understanding, although the Japanese government took some welfare measures to combat rising urban problems in later years, the nature of Japanese social policy was very different from its German equivalent. While the Japanese authority introduced the similar ideology of the ‘paternalistic welfare state’ to that in Germany, it practically conducted alternative social policy which emphasised the prevention of social rebellion (Garon 1997; Pyle 1973;1974). In fact, the Nihon Shakai Seisaku Gakkai (Japanese Social Policy Association) was the first professional organisation for Japanese economists to promote economic development, and their research very much influenced the bureaucracy between the late 1890s and the 1930 (Marshall 1977: p.82-85; Pyle 1974: p.141).

Considering that Japanese industrialisation had just started, Kanai judged that Japan did not need a generous social policy like in Germany where social unrest was rooted in industrialisation and the rise of social democracy movements (Pyle 1973; 1974). Instead, Kanai initiated preventive actions towards social unrest and labour movements in Japan (Pyle 1974). He urged that the authority should make the working class focus on pursuing their own interests, introduce thought guidance and education not to let the urban poor being aware of class consciousness, and simultaneously promote nationalism to encourage the sense of unity among people (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998; Pyle 1973; 1974). Thus, it is not surprising that the first labour organisation in Japan, Yūaikai (Friendship Society)
was formed in 1912 as a mutual aid society among workers (Totten 1966). Influenced by the government’s social policy, it never had the character of a real labour union (ibid).

As the evolution of this social and urban policy significantly affected the nature of Japanese industrial and social relations, the path of modern urban planning was certainly influenced. Social and urban policy in pre-war Japan was not oriented towards the improvement of living standards for humanitarian and ethical reasons. It was solely dedicated to suppress the sense of deprivation among the poor (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998; Pyle 1974). Under the strong government control of ideologies, if there existed some welfare measures in planning and housing policy, they were treated as benevolence from the above (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998; Pyle 1974). This had important ramifications for the development of Japanese planning, as to why the poor housing standard and urban environment was neglected in the pre-war time.

Furthermore, planning decisions were exclusively in the hands of the central government of Japan under the 1919 City Planning Act (Ishida 1987a). Before the enforcement of this act, there were a number of local initiatives to improve environments, in particular in established cities like Osaka (Hanes 2002; Sorensen 2001). However, as the Meiji oligarchy worried that local autonomy under increasing social problems would result in obstructing ‘the national interest’, the state authority strictly controlled municipal affairs through finance, election system and the local administration (Hane 2003; Pyle 1973). For example, the state appointed a prefectural governor from the Home Ministry. Furthermore, the central bureaucracy strengthened the link with the local establishments (notably businesses and landlords) as executives of local assemblies and then controlled the local population through patron-client relationships (e.g. landlords and tenant farmers) in the pre-war Japanese society (Garon 1994; 1997; Gluck 1985; Pyle 1973). The clientelism between
the central government and the local elite resulted in weakening local democracy (Tokyo.
Metropolitan Government 1993).

Related to this development, another significant characteristic of modern Japanese
planning is the lack of recognition of social life in space. In Western liberal economies,
public spaces as well as urban design increasingly came to be identified as the (democratic)
public realm (Brain 1997; Madanipour 1996; 2003; Worpole 2000). In the absolute state
era, prominent architectures and public spaces had been considered to represent a
monarch’s power and wealth (Brain 1997). However, as democracy progressed, the
political power was delegated to the bourgeois class, and then diffused to the working class
population (Brain 1997; Worpole 2000). The reinterpretation of public spaces and urban
designs in Western nation-states reflected this conceptual development of democracy and
society (Gehl 1996a; Gehl and Gemzæe 1996b; Mitchell 2003; Worpole 2000). This
transformation was typically illustrated by the development of open spaces in Europe (Van
Rooijen 2000; Worpole 2000).

In Meiji Japan however, the imported Western-style architecture was seen as mere
technology to demonstrate ‘modern Japan’ (Coaldrake 1996; Tokyo. Metropolitan
Government 1993; 1994). This modernity was also to demonstrate the power of the
absolute state with ‘enlightened monarchy’ (Coaldrake 1996). Furthermore, Meiji
architects did not learn how individual architectures had to coexist with their surrounding
environments. Japan’s existing built environments were something which architects
rejected as being pre-modern (Coaldrake 1996; Fujimori 1990).

Nonetheless, the idea of modernisation contradicted national tradition in modern
Japan so that the Japanese elite relentlessly worked to create Japanese imagery that fitted
their ideal. First, the Japanese authority gave a new status to a number of historic sites to
worship or commemorate ‘the nation’s ancient tradition’ (Fujitani 1993). The representation of those sites was in fact often reinvented to enhance the myth of the Imperial Family and Shintō after the Meiji Restoration (ibid). Second, the Japanese authorities campaigned for the values of Japanese tradition and its ‘unique’ culture in everyday life. For example, Shiga Shigetaka, Japan’s naturalist (1863-1927) boasted the Japanese ‘distinctive’ nature and geography as a part of Japan’s nationalism in his *Nihon Fūkeiron* (Japanese Landscape, 1894) (Gavin 2000). Shiga’s argument of Japanese people’s ‘love of nature’, in particular of rural Japan later developed by Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962, the founder of Japanese Folklore Studies) which idealised the virtue of communitarian village life in Japan (Hashimoto 1998). The Japanese authorities took full advantage of these intellectuals’ thoughts to promote nationalism and to preserve pre-modern values of agrarian life in the Japanese mind, against emerging liberalism in urban Japan (Gavin 2000; Hashimoto 1998; Robertson 1998; Scheiner 1998).

Although the meaning of ‘public’ as a nation was materialised in individual pieces of pre-war architecture (Coaldrake 1996; Fujimori 1990), the public realm as social life was not truly represented either by new public spaces or urban design (Fujimori 1990; Schulz 2003; Seidensticker 1983). On the other hand, Japan’s rural landscape was increasingly used to advance the authority’s vision of social life although the government in fact did not protect them through planning. Simultaneously in modern Japanese cities, vibrant social space quickly disappeared and became being marginalised as the new authority’s spatial development took over those spaces (Cybriwsky 1998; Jinnai 1994; Seidensticker 1983; Waley 1991).
Conclusion

The early history of Japan’s planning shows that ‘planning’ represents an entirely different concept from that developed in the West even though Japanese technocrats imported planning tools from Europe. The experience of Japan also suggests that planning in non-Western nation-states was adopted primarily to enable industrialisation which was necessitated by the Imperialist Order. This paper also argues that planning technology represented by Western-style architecture and civil engineering was used to demonstrate the power of the national elite towards the world as well as Japanese people. Although state-led economic development was a step towards ‘modernisation’ in Japan, its modernisation represented in planning did not involve the expansion of political community and social life which paralleled the development of planning policy in the West.

Japanese planning – the creation of the new built environment – was in effect used by the elite to manipulate the imagery of the national landscape. Its urban policy aimed to oppress the discontent of its population. All planning objectives in Japan were in the end equated with nation-building. Nationalism facilitated aspiration of building a rich ‘national community’ through planning. In reality, however, planning in Japan enhanced the elite domination and mass subordination within the nation as well as its overseas territories. It served the elite benefits against the cost of the poorest until Japan’s capitulation in 1945.

Although the US-led post-war reforms transformed Japan into a modern democracy, planning culture for nation-building still lingers in contemporary Japan. Its post-war economic success was only achieved at the cost of the environment and the quality of life for its people. While Japan’s planners now aim to protect amenity and cultural heritage as
well as enhance the quality of life, its legacy of early planning still holds back its transformation.

**Usage for Japanese names**

Japanese names are given in the text in their normal Japanese order, surname first. However, all names in references appear in first name-surname sequence.

**References**


