Coen, David and Thatcher, Mark (2008) Network governance and multi-level delegation: European networks of regulatory agencies. Journal of Public Policy, 28 (1). pp. 49-71. ISSN 0143-814X
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Abstract
European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications, securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been limited.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna... |
| Additional Information: | © 2008 Cambridge University Press |
| Divisions: | Government Public Policy Group Centre for Analysis of Risk & Regulation |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Nov 2008 14:35 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Apr 2024 22:27 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/21588 |
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