Zimbabwe’s Global Citizens in ‘Harare North’: Overview and Implications for Development

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Peri-NET Working Paper 14

The Urban and Peri-Urban Research Network (Peri-NET, Africa)
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Introduction
This paper arises from an ongoing exploratory study of Zimbabwean immigrants to the UK – dubbed “Harare North” by those in Zimbabwe. The study looks at those migrants who are part of the wave that “stormed” the UK from the late 1990s into the new millennium. The purpose of the study is to provide a sketch of this new group of migrants and compare their experiences with those of other groups. It is hoped that a more detailed analysis will eventually help to identify measures that may be taken to enhance the contribution of this new experience to the livelihoods of the migrants themselves, as well as their communities in Zimbabwe and the UK host communities.

The paper seeks to underscore a link between the unresolved Zimbabwean social, political and economic crisis, and the roles played by Zimbabwe’s global citizens during this crisis. Global citizens (the diaspora or so-called international brain drain) are currently the major providers of emergency and development aid to Zimbabwe. They can play, will play and should be given the space to play a constructive role in the revival of Zimbabwe, especially in areas of human capital development, skills, education, health, commerce, investment and international trade. Compared to the overvalued role of traditional donors and aid agencies, the role of global citizens is largely marginalised in development discourse. In the context of Zimbabwe, it needs to be located along an understanding of the “crisis” and the lived experiences of Zimbabwe’s global citizens. The Zimbabwean crisis has demonstrated that Zimbabwe’s social, economic and political spaces are not confined to the territorial or geographic space within Zimbabwean borders. In the present context, a global perspective is more helpful than a narrow outlook focusing only at Zimbabwe itself.

A consensus that “all is not well in Zimbabwe” emerged soon after the Parliamentary elections of 2000 leading to increased use of “crisis”, “anarchy”, “meltdown”, “chaos”, “point of no return” and other doomsday terminologies. However, there is less agreement on the nature of the crisis, its causes, starting point and what needs to be done to resolve it. Although experts such as the CDR (2002) are right when they say “the crisis is neither rooted in a single historical event nor is it simply about a single issue – land”, one has to reiterate that history matters and that historical injustices to do with land and identity are central to resolving the crisis. A programme of land reform is therefore crucial to a resolution of the problem.

The Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe (2003a, b, c) correctly depicts the Zimbabwe crisis as multi-layered. At the core of these layers are what one can see as fundamental structural dimensions of the crisis: the long-term obstacles with significant historical or global roots.

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2 The term “global citizen” is here used in an effort to imagine and bring into being a person whose social, economic and political life is not bound by the confines of a single country’s political boundaries. He/she can settle and contribute to the welfare of any place on the globe, and make a home anywhere without restrictions. In reality, legal and social prejudices often constrain the development of this kind of citizen, but the term is used here as a way of stressing the dignity and the positive contribution of displaced Zimbabweans, and in order to endow the paper with a forward-looking inflection. The term “diaspora” implies that those who have moved should return and do not have full citizenship in the places they have settled. The derogatory connotations of this term are made clearer if it is remembered that it is not commonly used to refer to Europeans who have settled in Australia, New Zealand, Southern Africa and North America.
historical injustices, and the constitution and global structural economic imbalances are the three stem roots of the Zimbabwe crisis. Other dimensions of the crisis (political and electoral violence, food security, fuel crisis, rule of law, “brain drain”, the media crisis) are symptoms of the core problems. However, in discussions of the international and humanitarian aspects of the crisis, little is said about those Zimbabweans who have left for other countries in the region and globally. While Southern Africa Migration Project has denoted much attention to migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa, there is little about migration to other countries and on lived experiences of Zimbabweans in the host communities. Abuse of their human rights at the hands of host communities and officials, for example, is a subject hardly discussed at international forums. There is an urgent need for intellectual analysis and reformulation of the crisis generally and the position of global citizens in particular. The paper contributes to an understanding of the lived experiences of contemporary Zimbabweans living outside Zimbabwe and the impact this is having on communities (in Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom in this case) and on the migrants themselves. Policy responses by governments and relations between migrants and authorities is another key area that needs understanding since these relations affect how migration and global citizens or Diaspora communities can contribute to development now and in the post crisis era.

Recently, there has been a shift in the Zimbabwe government’s perception of global citizens: from ridicule to encouragement. Speaking in South Africa on the occasion of celebrating ANC’s resounding election victory, President Mugabe called on Zimbabweans, “as loyal citizens”, to assist the country through remittances and to be “good citizens and residents here” (in South Africa). What role should be given to and can be played by Zimbabwe’s global citizens in the revival of the country? What programmes can they be engaged in that link with the needs of the home country? An adequate response to these questions will require us to capture the diverse experiences, perceptions and circumstances of those global citizens. In many respects, Zimbabwe’s global future is here, unfolding before us in the daily struggles and innovations of Zimbabweans wherever they are.

Conceptual and methodological frameworks
A contested process, migration is a sensitive topic to research. This paper is based on an ongoing, self-financed study undertaken by a group of Zimbabwean researchers based in the UK, co-ordinated by the present author. The study confirms the inappropriateness of survey methods that use postal and self-completion questionnaires. The researchers used snowball methods to identify potential respondents: contacts from everyday life (work, church, educational institutions and others) were used to identify migrant Zimbabweans and build a

3 See Southern Africa Migration project (SAMP at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/
4 Some of these can be gleaned at http://www.newzimbabwe.com for example regarding South Africa “Zimbabwe migrants abused in South Africa” last visited 08/12/05; Lindela horror revealed: 43 die in 4 moths” last visited 29/10/2005, and regarding the United Kingdom, “Wedding sting that ends with one way ticket to Zimbabwe”; last visited 24/06/2005; “Zimbabweans betrayed by UK Home Office” last visited 27/07/2005.


7 See “Clean-up will continue, says President” The Herald, Tuesday 27th April 2004. Online: http://www.herald.co.zw/
pool of potential respondents. When a degree of familiarity between researcher and potential respondent was established, the respondent was introduced to the research project and invited to participate by completing a questionnaire. Despite all these measures, only 20% of the questionnaires left for self completion or posted for completion were returned or completed. In contrast, it was possible to complete all questionnaires attempted through telephone and face-to-face interviews. Candidates who did not complete the questionnaire “felt uncomfortable” writing down responses, although during conversations they were prepared to talk about almost all of the issues on the questionnaire. This paper is based on a sample of 25 completed questionnaires complemented by field observations and key informant discussions.

These respondents had left Zimbabwe between 1998 and 2002 and had settled largely in London and the South East of England. 66% were female, aged between 28 and 40 at the time of the interviews; the male respondents were between 29 and 45. At the time when they left Zimbabwe, 80% of the respondents had a job there; 70% had a solid education base (a university degree, a College level diploma, or an ‘O’ level qualification). Once in the UK, 80% of the respondents had enrolled in an educational institution or a training course. Before leaving Zimbabwe, 40% of the respondents had no property there. At the time of the interview 13% of the respondents had purchased property in the UK.

Although the design of the questionnaire had a quantitative dimension, this paper does not use statistics and prefers to summarise life stories told by the respondents. These experiences and testimonies bring out the integrated nature of the migration experience which is often lost in reductive use of figures. Furthermore, a small sample is only useful as a source of suggestive insights rather than broad generalisations. Insights were also obtained through discussions where no questionnaires were completed as well as through participant observations.

Conceptually, this study relies on migration systems theory (see Harris, 1995). This concept takes migration as a micro-macro process rather than a single event. It recognises both national and international as well as community and individual linkages. At the macro level, economic and historical structures such as colonial influence, institutional harmony, languages, communication links and regulatory regimes are significant factors affecting migrant dynamics. Thus for Zimbabwe, its history as a former British colony partly explains why the UK has been a primary European destination for immigrants. At the micro level are the individual, family and community dynamics where cultural and social capital is deployed to support livelihoods. Households and families are seen as dynamic multi-located institutions that make short term-decisions in order to survive now and in the future: decisions made in one place influence and are influenced by processes in distant and diverse places.

Writing in a UNHCR refugee journal, Wilkinson (2003: 12-17) provides statistics on displaced people in Africa. Figures show that Africa’s contribution to the global refugee pool is the largest of any continent; the bulk of these refugees remain as internally displaced people within their own countries and in Africa. Although written in 2003, the article clearly misses out on migration within Zimbabwe (internally displaced) and to Southern Africa. This is largely to do with the legal status and terminology used to categorise migrants in which the focus is on “refugees and asylum seekers”; the result is that Zimbabwean crisis-related migrants in places such as South Africa and the UK remain outside official attention. As Wilkinson’s statistics show, Zimbabwe does not feature at all as a place where tens of

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thousands of people have been on the move both internally and internationally. For example in the Independent newspaper (UK), it was reported that up to 400 000 Zimbabweans were now living in the UK (half of them illegally) and that at least 300 were leaving Zimbabwe daily to join friends and relatives in the UK. This was before Zimbabwe was categorised as a visa country in November of the same year. Table 1 provides a summary of these estimates. At that rate, it means that over 100 000 Zimbabweans would have come to the UK annually. It is doubtful that the figure of 300 new arrivals a day could be sustained consistently over a long period. Not all travellers from the country would be coming to stay – many do go back – but there is no system in the UK to monitor this.

Table 1: **Global Zimbabweans - Estimated Distributions by Major World Destinations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Data</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Other SADC</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Australia and New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Independent Newspaper, UK (2002)</td>
<td><strong>400 000</strong> (half of them illegal immigrants)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP/SIRDC Study Report, 2002 (Assuming all recorded visitors did not come back to Zimbabwe for the 1990 – 2002 period)</td>
<td><strong>196 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 500</strong></td>
<td><strong>183 750</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>36 750</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 109</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC Online, 27th March 200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>2 million</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Home Office Official Figures (as quoted by New Zimbabwe.com, 09/02/2004)</td>
<td><strong>28 000</strong> (majority asylum seekers)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Block and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2003/04 (see Financial Gazette 07/05/04) Total given as 3.4 million</td>
<td><strong>&gt;1.1 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>&gt;1.2 million</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>450 000</strong> USA and Canada</td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>100 000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Herald, Harare 27/04/04</td>
<td><strong>1.2 million</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3 million</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geof Hill See Business Day, South Africa, 09/05/04</td>
<td><strong>500 000</strong> (skilled Zimbabweans)</td>
<td><strong>3 million</strong> (in SA, Botswana, Zambia &amp; Mozambique)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different sources used different spatial coverage. It is difficult to compare as these figures are drawn for divergent agendas. If we accept that 12.5 million is the resident census population of Zimbabwe (2003/4) and that 1 million was missed by the census given the level of internal displacement during the 2003 census and that 3.5 million are global, then the population of Zimbabwe is 17 million. This already accommodates the 3 000 who die of HIV/AIDS every week according to claims. The 3000 claim is from Geof Hill although most put it at 2500 or that 2million are HIV/AIDS infected.

**Source:** Compiled for this paper from various sources as indicated

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10 The Independent, 18th January 2003, UK.
In 2002, The United Nations Development Programme contracted SIRDC (Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre) to conduct an analysis of the cause and effect of the brain drain in Zimbabwe. They established that there were “479 348 Zimbabweans in the Diaspora …mainly in the United Kingdom, Botswana and South Africa”. The report (2003) admits that this figure is low and that it underestimates the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa. However, it also states that it cannot agree with the claims of phenomenal exodus made by newspapers (SIDRC, 2003: 42). The difficulty is that official statistics only report breadwinners and not dependents and, as noted earlier, there is no system to track return migration. Yet when considering all estimates and anecdotal evidence, it is highly probable that the population of Zimbabweans now in the United since 1996 will be at least a quarter of a million by end of 2006; a substantial population demanding scholarly and policy attention.

The lack of good UK official statistics on return migration extends to movement of dead bodies out of the UK. For such movement, notification and permission to the Coroner is given on Form 103. But there are no systems at the coroner’s offices nor anywhere else to consolidate and keep track of numbers of bodies moved from the UK to countries like Zimbabwe. Anecdotal evidence indicates that body counts of Zimbabweans moved have risen sharply since the late 1990s. In contrast to the Chinese where the deaths are due to old age, this is not the case with Zimbabweans dying in the UK.

Zimbabweans in Britain: some preliminary observations
What kind of Zimbabwean is in the UK? Zimbabwean community members are likely to have on average better academic qualifications than the host community and other African communities in the UK. This is largely to do with the general investment they put in to education as the route to progress as well as the higher level of literacy achieved by the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Coupled with this, migration to the UK is an expensive exercise afforded only by those from middle and upper class families who happen to be better educated as well. Thus prior to 2000, Zimbabweans were a favoured (and preferred) group with regards to UK employment. In addition to their higher education and perceived positive work ethics, until November 2002, Zimbabweans did not have visa restrictions that applied to most African nationals coming to the UK. Employers had fewer hurdles to deal with if they employed a Zimbabwean, compared to the situation with “visa nationals”.

As political and diplomatic tensions between Harare and London worsened, the numbers of Zimbabweans refused entry into the UK increased. Zimbabwean experiences at the hands of immigration officers have been described by respondents as “traumatic”, “demeaning” “frustrating” and “utter human rights abuse”. In the UK, one of the groups that made a lot of noise regarding ill-treatment of passengers was the Zimbabwe Association. However, as an asylum-focused organisation, it did not articulate broader human rights issues, for example conditions experienced in the workplace or in attempts to access services, but sought to highlight alleged dangers faced by refused asylum seekers forced to return to Zimbabwe.

Unlike some immigrant communities that are concentrated in specific regions and inner city areas of large cities, Zimbabweans appear in every corner of the UK. Settlement in a particular place appears to be dependent on a combination of factors such as Zimbabweans’

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11 Telephone discussion with Richard Allen, Home Office, National Statistics, 8th August, 2005. E-mail: [Richard.Allen2@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:Richard.Allen2@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk) plus telephone discussions e-mail correspondence with Southwark Council Coroner’s Office, attention Christine Martin (e-mail: Christine.Martin@southwark.gov.uk); e.g. e-mail of 4th August 2005.
13 Some colleagues from Nigeria and Ghana have voiced objections to this claim.
general perceptions of class, access to employment opportunities, access to services especially
education colleges, access to good schools for children and availability of affordable housing.

For most Zimbabweans, settlement in a low-density residential neighbourhood is considered
an ideal indicator of success (in colonial Zimbabwe, these were whites-only residential areas).
They have no qualms settling in places such as London's Eltham, Bromley, Bexley and Kent
which other African communities refer to as “those racist places” (interview with Nigerian
lawyer, New Cross). Health and care industry (old people's homes) and warehouses are major
sectors where Zimbabweans have found employment in the 1997-2004 period. Consequently,
they have ended up in locations where old people are concentrated or wherever care services
are needed. Southend-on-Sea (a former fishing industry node) is one such area with an ageing
British population in need of care, hence the presence of a thriving Zimbabwean community
there. Hull, Southampton and Brighton are settlements with similar communities. All over the
country in small and remote agricultural towns chances are that a black person one comes
across may be Zimbabwean. Cleaning toilets and care work (derogatorily labelled “BBC” –
“British Bottom Cleaners” - by Zimbabweans back home) is something most people would not
want to be identified with in Zimbabwe. So those doing such work initially sought
employment in remote places where there was a low risk of meeting travellers likely to report
this back home.

Industrial areas where “order pickers”, sorting and packing workers and bakery workers are
needed have also attracted Zimbabweans. Those who shun care work (mostly men) are
concentrated in these kinds of jobs. London's areas along the lower Thames, such as
Greenwich, Woolwich, Belvedere and Erith, have such employment opportunities and
Zimbabweans have settled within easy travelling distance to these areas.

The above patterns appear to be repeated in other metropolitan areas of the UK such as the
Birmingham-Coventry-Wolverhampton area, the Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Doncaster
areas as well as Glasgow. Zimbabweans are also concentrated in the Slough area (now
referred to as “kwaChirau” - an area in Mashonaland West province of Zimbabwe, whose
name rhymes with the pronunciation of “Slough”). Reading, Luton, Leicester and Bedford are
other areas with significant concentrations. After initially settling in London, Zimbabweans
with families have often opted to move to these smaller towns where house rentals are lower,
but which still allow them access to major cities and to London. There are emerging
settlements patterns with concentrations of individuals from regions in Zimbabwe reflected in
the UK with suggestions that Leeds and North Yorkshire is dominated by those from
Matabeleland while Luton is home to “maZezuru”14.

**Zimbabweans Taking the United Kingdom by Storm**

Earlier, reference was made to the wave of Zimbabweans that “stormed” the UK at the end of
the 1990s and the new millennium. While this may refer to the numbers, there are other ways
in which the presence of Zimbabweans was and is very noticeable in the everyday life of the
United Kingdom. As described in the preceding section, Zimbabweans have aided the
suburbanisation of Black Africans in the UK. In the job market, they have become visible in
almost every sector although the health sector has been mentioned the most. For example
according to the Economist, in 2001 Zimbabwean nurses and those from South Africa
obtained the “the most work permits” to work in the United Kingdom15. A later section will
expose that the ‘storming’ was not only about head count and geographical spread but also
about the kinds of activities and jobs they have taken up; such as in the social care industry.

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14 Comments from a businesswomen, Luton 20/08/05
15 The Economist, Friday 11th August, 2005
In the health and education sector, figures from Buckinghamshire University illustrate the patterns of growth in numbers of individuals from Zimbabwe (see Figure 1). In numerical terms women have dominated the migration of Zimbabweans to the UK with health and education providing a source of livelihood to a large proportion. In the post 2002 period when Zimbabwe became a visa nation, it is very likely that the number of new entrants has gone down affecting not only student numbers but all other categories such as asylum seekers, and work permit applications.

![Figure 1: Students Declaring Zimbabwe Nationality Registered For Diploma and First Degree Courses at Buckinghamshire University (BCUC)](source: Original figures from BCUC Head of Management Information Services, 25/06/04)

In the press (TV and newspapers) hardly a week passes in which there is no major item on Zimbabwe or Zimbabweans. Stories of Zimbabwean asylum seekers, HIV/AIDS among Zimbabwean groups such as nurses and crime stories, especially domestic violence and related murders have competed with those on the politics of the Zimbabwe crisis and the response (or lack of it) of the international community. In cardiac nurse Makosi Musambasi, Zimbabwe provided its own vibrant barn storming Big Brother contestant who amid controversy survived to the last day coming out at third place. This case is worth some further reflection in terms of its socio-cultural impacts on Zimbabweans and the British alike.

**Reality TV “Shock and Awe” with Makosi Musambasi and Big Brother 2005.** Reality TV and Big Brother has been very controversial especially among the supposedly morally decent Africans both in the UK and large parts of Africa. Thus many Zimbabweans were left “in shame” when Makosi started displaying her nudity on the live TV show. But for the British public, Makosi’s early weeks on the show were a breath of fresh air and an insight into lives and people they would normally not meet but who are present in their everyday environments. Trevor Phillips chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality was among those who took notice and concluded that Big Brother 2005 had done more for racial awareness than any other media creation in recent times. Making a pointed contribution to the public debate, Trevor Phillips observed:

16 [http://www.newzimbabwe.com](http://www.newzimbabwe.com) provided a running commentary and ‘shouts’ from Zimbabweans both against and in support of Makosi’s participation on the show.
I don’t suppose Big Brother is most people’s idea of any kind of reality. But in Kamal the bisexual Muslim, Derek the world’s poshest black man and Makosi the feminist Zimbabwean nurse, we have three people who would confound any stereotyping.

By this time, the tabloid newspapers echoed by NewZimbabwe.com had washed all of Makosi’s dirty linen in public – exposing her alleged serial sexual encounters in Buckinghamshire and most notably her steamy escapades with Zimbabwean tycoon Phillip Chiyangwa the married man who transformed her from a “girl into a woman” at the age of sixteen. While the British enjoyed every bit of it, it must have been painful to watch for many Zimbabweans especially her relatives and parents who have prayed for her to get married: her mother had allegedly posted a prayer request to this effect at church just weeks before Makosi went on Big Brother.

But even many among the British may not have expected the entertainment to climax in week five with reality sex on TV when Makosi and Anthony “did it” in the pool with millions watching. The responses ranged from outrage, anger, pity, admiration and chants for more. When the British are tested to these limits, they will always find ways to get their “pound of flesh”. NewZimbabwe.com accurately reminded Zimbabweans that the British may tolerate and enjoy public nudity but when it comes to ‘lies’ this is something they loathe and this is what hit Makosi. For a layperson, it is instructive to note that it was Makosi the (Black Zimbabwean female) and not Anthony (White English male) who was left to answer more of the question “Did they do it or not?” It may be suggested that Makosi’s ever changing stories and claims of being pregnant soon after this incident attracted attention to herself from the British public. The British public and the tabloids took what they saw as Makosi’s lies to begin a campaign to “de-campaign her” in the last weeks of the show with claims that she was an actor rather than a nurse and should not have been on the show in the first place.

As the British public and the tabloids went after Makosi with labels such as “duplicitous” and “the most repulsive beach ever”, she drew sympathy from the Zimbabweans and others who had loathed her previously. They now wanted her to win the contest. A columnist in the conservative and upper class broadsheet, The Times, noted that even with her many flaws, Makosi was a “a true diva …and would be … a worthy winner” whose chances were sunk by the tabloid claims two days from the end that she was an actor and not a nurse.

This case will run for a long time to come: Makosi will not show any remorse and will neither apologise nor retreat from her tabloid adventures. For this research paper, the issue is that not only did Zimbabwe have their own Big Brother contestant; it was one who put both the British public and Zimbabweans on an emotional and moral roller-coaster albeit for different reasons. When the British public booed her at the end of the show in which she was placed third, she remained defiant with no apologies to anyone (there are parallels in Zimbabwean politics). At the end of the show, Makosi’s third position showed that many (and including Zimbabweans) would have wanted her to win. In Big Brother 2005, Makosi becomes the mirror against

19 See NewZimbabwe.com ‘Mum desperate for Makosi to get Married’ 6th March 2005
20 One could say the reverse is true for Zimbabweans. See Mathuthu, M. “The PR disaster that sparked Makosi hate” NewZimbabwe.com, 19th July 2005.
which society reflects on its prejudices and relationships. Here was and is a Zimbabwean immigrant who (with only a year in the UK) demonstrates/ed that being a nurse was an act of survival to beat the immigration system when what she really wanted and still wants to be is “… a star … mixing in showbiz circles”\(^\text{23}\). She may have flaws but certainly she is on top of her game. Now that she has violated immigration rules on a “technicality” it will be interesting to see whether she will be deported; a very unlikely event given the financial backers that she now can marshal.

Significantly, Makosi’s case has stretched and tested our morals: partly reminding us that, as with the Zimbabwe crisis since the late 1990s, “right” and “wrong” are entirely relative. And as put across in The Observer, in life there is never any guarantee that society and the public will reward “good” behaviour\(^\text{24}\). With “Big Sister” Makosi, many Zimbabweans have been left exasperated but at the same time her adventures have led us to understand both ourselves and the British better.

**Exclusions and understanding the British**

Beyond the legal immigration conditions that plague many immigrants (a respondent has told us: “You have to prove legality at every stage”) economic and social survival is about overcoming multiple unexpected barriers. In particular, Zimbabweans in Britain often experience exclusionary forces that operate in the job market. These have to do with unwritten codes of practice, preferences and behaviours. A respondent captured this feeling using a combination of proverbs and emotional recollections:

> My life here has taught me that you have to understand the British…. To know what is happening to you, you have to understand their language. When I say language I do not mean English. I do not mean that you have to know how to speak English. Of course you do. What I mean is … that language which is not written, the signs and symbols, which they use to communicate among themselves. When they don’t want you to know, they will always find a way to exclude you. (Respondent, Thamesmead, 2005)

Even those with decent jobs often feel frustrated at work and consider moving elsewhere. A recently graduated nurse reflected:

> Frustration… maybe go to America? But then although there is good money there, there are problems as well. It is far from home but the most critical issue is the litigation culture. For a nurse you have to consider this seriously. Again, you are already settled here so moving may not be the best … greener pastures are not always green when you get there. (Respondent, Isle of Dogs, 2005).

Traditionally, migration within and from Zimbabwe was a male-led and male-dominated process whatever phase one looks at, be it migration to South Africa’s gold mines in the 1800s or colonial day migration to cities such as Bulawayo and the then Salisbury and to mining towns, plantation towns or South Africa in the 1970s. Recently, Dobson (1998) has confirmed that migration to South Africa is still male-dominated. However, the 1990s saw a transformation of industry in Europe: consolidating the move of labour away from extractive sectors such as agriculture towards less intensive labour sectors. Associated with this has been the rise of female labour coupled with the casualization of labour. Women now dominate in most service sectors while at the same time no job is permanent. In this environment, the rights and social support of workers, especially migrants, have been eroded. This in part, is the


\(^{24}\) ibid

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context within which female nurses and teachers were the favoured recruits to the service sector of the UK: sectors such as the health and care (what Zimbabweans colloquially call the British Bottom Cleaners or BBC) and teaching. Women whose incomes were much lower in the home country may thus find “emancipation” in the new economy.

For Zimbabwe, the exodus of nurses to the UK became significant around or soon after 1996 when the economy, salaries and working conditions of civil servants declined dramatically. Professionals dissatisfied with working conditions in Zimbabwe have also moved to neighbouring countries, especially Botswana and South Africa, as is well-documented for education and health professionals (see Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1996; Gaidzwana, 1999). As with teachers, the role of recruiting agencies was significant (although no agency-recruited nurses were interviewed for this study). Two broad trends can be identified: (a) school leavers and other non-health professionals who came to the UK to enrol on nursing courses and (b) qualified nurses who only needed to do a short “conversion” course that enabled them to work as full professionals in the NHS. There was also a large group of workers who came in to work as carers with training given on the job. Given the bias towards female recruitment into nursing in Zimbabwe as well as the female preference for jobs such as care assistants, the recruitment of nurses from Zimbabwe into the UK could be described as a process that further expanded “the feminisation of labour” and migration (Figure 1 highlights this as well).

Until 2002, unlike for other college courses, there were no fees to pay on nursing courses in the UK. In fact nursing students were paid a £500 monthly stipend and allowed to work. Given their status as trainee nurses, they received a higher hourly pay than other “unqualified workers” working as casual care assistants. But recent policy changes mean that nursing is no longer attractive although it remains the major route to a livelihood in the UK. In 2002, the no fee policy was abolished for non-EU citizens. The UK government argued that migrants misusing the system as a way to get work permits and to make money.

According to one respondent operating a Nursing Recruitment Agency, the second major change had to do with regulation of nursing homes and care agencies. Since 2002, hospitals have been restricted in their use of nursing agencies. Similar regulations have affected care homes. The impact has been a reduced demand for agency staff and closures of nursing homes. The regulations for nurses have also been changed for those with work permits (non-EU nationals): they can now only work for one hospital or institution i.e. the institution that supported their application for a work permit. In practice, they now can no longer offer their services to nursing agencies even during their free time. Thus, for Zimbabweans, the potential for raising money in a short time is now constrained. It has not yet disappeared, but as the respondent put it, "We are bonded into slavery".

The recent changes in the employment of nurses are already the norm for most workers who get work permits to work in the UK. They cannot change employment without the consent of the employer. Our respondents felt that this undermines their ability to assert employee rights in circumstances of perceived unfair treatment by the employer. Castles (2000: 11) reminds us that historical precedents to this “tied labour” include slavery, indentured labour and systems of control of foreign labour pioneered by Germany before WW1. In colonial Rhodesia and South Africa, there existed a similar system that tied an African worker to a particular “baas”. Thus, in a subtle way, “Harare North” workers find themselves bound by structures reminiscent of colonial Salisbury.

After a period of settlement and when most of the major home concerns are taken care of,
migrant labourers become aware that their position is one of abuse and exploitation. They become more aware of their confinement to the “3D” jobs (Castles, 2000: 11) – dirty, difficult and dangerous (eg. cleaning, factory and security guard work). "Tinokuvara nebasa" was how respondent Mudiki put it referring to “back-breaking” shift work he has to do in order to survive and meet remittance expectations back home. Another male respondent studying and working in London put it this way “…Shift work kills… I am now 34 and to continue like this to the age of 40 …I would be finished”. He left his wife and children in Zimbabwe and has not been able to bring them over due to his restrictive student visa status.

Relegation to “3Ds” is not a phenomenon exclusive to Zimbabwean workers. Elam and Chinouya (2000) and the Relief Line’s Croydon Study (2003) both affirm that this affects all African immigrant communities. The reports suggest that this affects even the more educated men including those with PhDs. These studies observe that the situation is traumatic and accelerates the increase in ailments such as depression, high blood pressure and stress among immigrant men – ailments proportionately lower in the home communities of these migrants. Literature from the Trade Union Congress (TUC) appears to acknowledge the lack of rights and decent work for migrant workers in the UK and has initiated awareness campaigns for those coming in from East European countries but nothing specific for those like Zimbabweans coming from outside the European Union.

**Alternative livelihoods**

Although the migration process has been portrayed as a “brain drain”, it appears to offer opportunities for potential “brain gain”. There is a growing range of entrepreneurs who are going into business and self-employment and creating opportunities to employ others in a range of sectors.

An example of this is ZIMNAT in Plumstead, South-East London. Located close to a railway station along a regional highway where public transport is abundant, and operating from 11:00 am to midnight every day, the “market” is known and patronised by many Zimbabweans. It sells music cassettes and disks, Zimbabwean food such as dry meat, matemba (a type of dried fish), cereals, and drinks such as Mazowe (a Zimbabwe-produced cordial). Sadza, the traditional staple Zimbabwean meal is prepared and sold at lunch times. The premises are very basic; a six by three-metre room on the ground floor with a separate outside door that leads to a flat used as accommodation by the proprietors. At least three adults – a man and two women - are involved in running the shop. Other examples of similar enterprises and vibrant food stores are the Mau Mau shop at Southend, East London, ZimEXPO and Zambezi Foods in Luton.

Other Zimbabweans are engaged in brokering money transfers and offering financial services. This requires few start up costs – a telephone, a fax machine, a bank account in the UK, and, on the Zimbabwe side, a similar set of inputs plus large sums of ready cash in Zimbabwe dollars. To send money to Zimbabwe, a client is requested to deposit cash into the UK account and show proof of deposit to the UK financial broker. An exchange rate is agreed prior to the deposit. Once the deposit is confirmed, the UK broker sends a fax, e-mail or telephones the Zimbabwe broker giving details of the amount deposited and the beneficiary of the transaction in Zimbabwe. Cash in Zimbabwe dollar equivalent is then transferred or deposited into the beneficiary account for collection. Depending on the urgency of the matter and social capital existing between the client and the brokers, the Zimbabwe-based beneficiary can receive cash within 12 hours.

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26 See “Working in the UK: Your rights” at http://www.tuc.org.uk/
27 Although patrons and respondents referred to it as a market, in fact it is a shop.
There also exist less formal financial service providers – what respondent Mudiki characterised as “maBureau de Change eChivhanu” - very elementary Bureau de Change. In this case an individual in the UK uses personal networks to identify a person with local currency cash in Zimbabwe. They agree an exchange rate after which the UK person deposits money in the UK account of the contact in Zimbabwe, who in turn deposits the local currency equivalent in the Zimbabwe Bank account of the person in the UK. In other circumstances the local currency is passed to a nominated person in Zimbabwe in order to pay bills or other commitments of the person in the UK. The transaction is based on trust and little or no paperwork is involved. There are no offices and few or no employees involved. As in the Hawala money transfer system used by Somalis, cash in Zimbabwe stays in Zimbabwe while the forex in the UK or elsewhere stays outside Zimbabwe. Clearly, the financial support goes where it is needed, quickly and effectively compared to the formal channels of aid. However, officials in the west have taken a dim view of these financial transactions, alleging that they are used to sponsor terrorist activities, drugs and money laundering.

Figure 2 is a summary of a more structured informal system of money transfer where some of the operators take a serious business outlook to broker transactions. The bulk of these transactions are of a Case A nature where a worker in the UK needs funds for family members or business in Zimbabwe but has no access to Zimbabwe dollars and would lose out if the funds were transferred through the formal banking system. That is where the brokers come in, collecting foreign currency in the UK and making sure that an agreed amount is delivered in Zimbabwe to the appointed recipient within the shortest time possible, often a matter of hours. A reverse process can also take place where a business in Zimbabwe or a family in need of foreign currency to pay for fees at a UK University or pay for costs to transport the body of a deceased relative in the UK for example, will give Zimbabwe dollars to a broker in Zimbabwe for pounds sterling to be made available in the UK. While some brokers have advertised on the internet, the bulk are advertised by word of mouth usually the more efficient they are the more potential customers get to know about them.

One place where financial services, brokers and agencies are concentrated is Sydenham, South London. We shall call these the “Sydenham syndicate”. At least four offices are allocated to Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. Each of these offices has a number of “desks”, each devoted to one service but all integrated so as to give clients a package. Money transfer, funeral insurance, property buying and mortgage services, travel agency and employment agency are key components of the package. The Sydenham Syndicate is significant in that it illustrates how some of the main UK business portfolios are extensions of Zimbabwean companies who, as a key informant remarked, have “followed money to the UK”. Some of them are Zimbabwe-registered companies that market their services in the UK but are not registered in the UK.

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28 Although no evidence could be made available, some respondents alleged that UK Bank accounts for some of those had been frozen pending clarification of their operations (Focus group discussion, Sheffield, 2004).
Case A: Transfer To Deal With Needs and Demands in Home Country

Start → Worker host country (UK) → Key → Family in home country, Zimbabwe

Informal Financial Broker Country A (Mr/Mrs/Miss X) → Remittance “Password or key” by telephone, fax or e-mail → Informal Broker or Partner of X in Home Country (Z)

Case B: Transfer To Deal With Needs and Demands in Foreign Country

Start → Family member or Business Partner foreign country UK → Key → Family/Parents, or business partner Home country Zim

Informal Financial Broker Y in foreign country, UK → Remittance “Password or key” by telephone, fax or e-mail → Informal broker or financial partner of Y in home country Zimbabwe

Figure 2: Semi-Informal International Money Transfers – UK and Zimbabwe
Source: Sketch developed from interviews with Zimbabwean immigrants.
The “Sydenham Syndicate” includes companies such as Intermaket Building Society that helps UK-based Zimbabweans to open bank accounts in Zimbabwe and processes mortgages for house purchase in Zimbabwe. In partnership with estate agencies and built environment firms, it can facilitate the purchase of land, construction of property and tenant management.

Another company, the MEC Consultancy, has a UK company registration number and works in conjunction with Moonlight Funeral Services to provide funeral insurance and services including “elite” graves through a Zimbabwean subsidiary Mashfords Funeral services that has “land banked” graves in cities such as Harare. UK subscribers with sufficient funds deposited with Moonlight Funeral Services can nominate beneficiaries in Zimbabwe who will be given access to burial service packages provided by some of Zimbabwe’s elite funeral parlours. The subscriptions can also be used to transport to Zimbabwe for burial the subscribers themselves or their nominee in the event of death in the UK. The minimum cost of such service is estimated at £1900 or more. In addition to business brochures, MEC produces and distributes a magazine Zimbabwe Connection in which many Zimbabwe-based companies advertise.

In search of security

Remittances from global citizens have become a major source of direct investment for developing countries in Asia, Latin America and, increasingly, Africa. In 2003 Mexicans sent home close to $13 billion. In the late 1990s, Eritrea was sustained by remittances of close to US$300 million per year (Koser et al. 2000). Such is the importance of remittances that the Eritrean government has put in place a range of schemes to capture as much as possible of this resource. These include land auctions to global citizens, three to ten-year bonds at a cost of US$300 to US$1000, one off payments of fixed sums as needs arise and agreed levies of 2% of annual income (Koser et al. 2000). Ghana and Nigeria also have similar schemes. As for Zimbabweans, only recently did the government realise the importance of remittances. Not surprisingly, this alternative development path has attracted the interest of the IMF, The World Bank and agencies such as UK’s DFID all of whom are seeking to investigate and understand this phenomenon.

Preliminary observations on remittances among global Zimbabweans indicate that those with insecure legal and economic status in the UK send proportionately more money back home than professionals with indefinite leave to remain and in stable economic positions. For those with legal insecurity ‘or those without stationary’29, investment in the UK is not an option, hence the urgency to do as much as possible back home before time runs out. Those with children or spouses still in Zimbabwe send proportionately more than those with complete nuclear family units in the UK. Also, women appear to be sending more money more frequently than their male counterparts. But the greatest deciding factor is perceived need.

Education and housing are the two main areas where Zimbabweans invest their hard-earned cash. Diaspora remittances to fund housing development have kept afloat the property market in Zimbabwe: while the rest of the economy has shrunk, the housing market has remained buoyant. Companies in Zimbabwe have teamed up to offer packages that help those outside to build, purchase or manage real estate back home.

Prior to coming to the UK, respondent Mudiki’s income as a sales person was too low to get him on the first rung of the property ladder. On moving to London in late 2001, he was helped

29 ‘Those without stationary’ is a colloquial term used by Zimbabweans to refer to those among them whose immigration status is not in order, also referred to as illegal or undocumented immigrants.
out by in-laws with initial accommodation and college fees for the first year. Working in the 
“3Ds”, he continues to study at Diploma level. Between January 2002 and December 2003, 
his remittances have enabled him to buy three properties in Zimbabwe - complete houses in 
secondary towns within 50 km of the capital Harare and then a vacant piece of land in a Harare 
suburb. Mudiki’s “task is now to build enough reserves so as to develop this piece of land”. 
In the last 12 months, he sent home remittances of between £3K and £4K: most of this went 
into the purchasing of the properties. Few would have managed this on a Zimbabwean salary 
even in the 1980s when the economy was at its peak. Thus, although the young man is a 
tenant who pays £300 per month rent in a shared two-bedroom flat and has “nothing to show” 
in the UK, back home he is now a person of substance.

It appears that the majority who have invested in property back home are those that had 
nothing at the time they left or those who feel that their UK employment is precarious. In 
Harare, as in other towns, distinct districts have been developed largely on remittance income. 
An area in the low density high income Mt. Pleasant suburb of Harare developed this way is 
now nicknamed “Machembere” on the assumption that the incomes used to develop it were 
earned by Zimbabweans (mainly former nurses) working as carers in UK's old people's homes. 
Machembere is the local equivalent of “old people”, in this instance used in a derogatory way 
by those seeking to devalue the progress made by their compatriots in the diaspora.

For many Zimbabweans, the major constraint to entry into the UK housing market is lack of 
the required 10% cash deposit. Key workers with government support are the ones who have 
managed to overcome this hurdle. Those coming out of universities have qualified for 100% 
mortgages. In both cases, the condition of a secure, well-paying job has been critical. 
However, with time, even those previously eligible for 100% mortgages have encountered 
difficulties, as some mortgage lenders have refused to lend to foreign nationals. The limited 
choice has meant purchasers have ended up taking the more expensive mortgages. Recent 
legal regimes demanding monitoring of foreign-national banking transactions appear to 
discourage mortgage lenders from dealing with foreigners.

However, the process of finding security can be easy at times. For respondent Venus and her 
sister key worker, mortgage support was easily available when they qualified as nurses. They 
opted for a joint mortgage and bought a cozy flat close to central London. With few 
commitments, they have enjoyed life and work, travelling abroad on holidays. Sending money 
home is not a regular chore for them since there are others senior to them who have to worry 
about that. Buying property in Zimbabwe is also not a priority as they feel secure where they 
are now in the UK. Yet like for Mudiki and others, their early years in the UK were years 
when they got financial support and accommodation from relatives.

Some conclusions and implications for development
This paper has set out to provide an outline of preliminary observations from an ongoing study 
on Zimbabwe’s global citizens. The themes covered are not exhaustive. For example, left out 
are important topics such as political participation and the cultural, social and civic activities 
of these citizens. It is through these associations and organisations rather than the individual 
citizens that development institutions such as DFID are able to engage. Hence the need not 
only to understand what is currently in place but also to build their capacity for enhanced 
policy development and investment in the home country. Our interrogation of concepts like 
the shifting “migration gender contracts” is just beginning to lead to an understanding of the 
social transformation of settlement in another country in an era of globalisation. This is an 
attempt to move away from restrictive concepts associated with refugees and asylum seekers, 
though these too are valid categories.
The paper has attempted to show that a migration sub-culture is emerging among Zimbabweans with its own rules, language, territory and vibrancy. Like most migrants, Zimbabweans desire to pursue a descent and honourable life through legal means. However, as the regime of controls and costs increases, it is not surprising to see an increase in the number of those involved in “illegal transactions”. Contributions from Zimbabweans to the host community are great. They have stretched the limits of social diversity into areas previously shunned by most black communities. They have invested in themselves, especially through education and training. They have also helped prop up the British National Health Service through quality professionals – nurses, doctors and care assistants. With experience gained in these sectors, Zimbabweans are slowly crafting their own institutions to create jobs. Zimbabweans also boost the British economy through tax contributions. In relative terms, few receive welfare benefits and those who work are not eligible for family tax credits, child care support or child benefits until such time they acquire indefinite leave to remain, or become British citizens. At the same time their remittances have helped to keep Zimbabwe’s economy afloat. Makosi’ adventures into Big Brother 6, 2005 are just an example of how Zimbabweans have penetrated every aspect of British society, challenging stereotypes, traditional perceptions and prejudices, refusing the refugee tag and demanding to be seen as part of the host society – ‘here to stay’!

There is still much that needs to be established regarding global Zimbabweans in the UK. In addition to numbers, a clearer demographic profile is needed; we need more research and publications on the role of remittances at a level that matches up to the importance and contribution they make to livelihoods of people in Africa. In Zimbabwe, impacts on real estate, health, education, business, democracy and culture need to be investigated further. The analysis of the experiences and roles of Zimbabwe’s white global citizens needs to be included in the ongoing work as well. The space for Zimbabwe’s future is now global and researchers need to make an effort to tap into it more fully. The contributions of global Zimbabweans to date have a message for the Zimbabwe government; that the policy for Zimbabwe’s future is neither ‘look east’ nor ‘look west’ but ‘look inside’ – the people have the answers to the crisis.

Post-Script - The Increasing Value of Global Citizens
Since the time this paper was first presented in Uppsala early 2004, debate, research and policy attention on global citizens has increased. This postscript seeks to signpost some of the continuities and changes taking place in the research and policy fields regarding the understanding and management of the diaspora.

The Zimbabwe government and in particular the Governor of the Research Bank of Zimbabwe Dr Gideon Gono has led a campaign to portray global Zimbabweans as partners in economic development and to tap into their intellectual wealth. Following trips and dialogue with Zimbabweans living in western nations, a Homelink programme is now up and running under which those outside Zimbabwe can invest in a number of products (such as real estate) with remittances channelled via formal institutions. Political opponents consider this programme inappropriate, and one can expect reports of scandals and allegations of misuse of funds to emerge in soon. In principle, such an approach is desirable and long over due; namely that governments in Africa and their leaders must have a dialogue with their citizens abroad and engage in policy issues affecting Africans. With support from DFID, Ghana, Sierra Leone and

31 See 27/06/05 article by Daniel Molokele who considers this an ‘abuse by opportunistic government initiatives”. “Diaspora holds the Key” http://www.newzimbabwe.com last visited 28th June 2005.
Nigeria have also moved in this direction very well – encouraging their global citizens to invest ‘back home’.

However, some of the investments in land and small enterprises have been affected by the recent destruction of ‘illegal’ or informal businesses and squatter settlements. For Zimbabwe, this 2005 programme of cleaning up cities has been received with condemnation from opposition stakeholders and their western partners. But in Zimbabwe, it seems the jury is out on this one, with some viewing it as a long overdue exercise to bring sanity to cities. While the impact of this social engineering on ‘Diaspora investments’ is yet to be assessed, for urban social scientists and policy makers there is now an urgent challenge to make a scholarly examination of what one has described as “Gushungo’s new paradigm of town planning and urban management”.

The interest in diaspora at global levels has seen several research projects by organisations such as The World Bank and The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and ILO. To support its evolving policy position on migration and development, DFID now supports a Development Research Centre (DRC) based at the University of Sussex. Their interests in this subject may be motivated by global security concerns and the need to control and to harness remittances and not necessarily to help the diaspora; for example are the attempts to entice the diaspora to use formal banking systems for financial remittances. The Diaspora are not fully in control of most of these initiatives and research. Research councils such as the ESRC have also realised the importance of this phenomenon and have supported exploratory research on Zimbabweans in the UK. Other works interested in the health and human rights conditions of Zimbabweans in the UK continue.

Another key process since early 2004 has been the Commission for Africa whose report was launched on 11 March 2005. In that process, attempts were made to engage with diaspora within and outside the UK. However, this engagement could not address the fundamental or structural relations in global labour. It adequately described the various ways in which human capacity in Africa is undermined by skilled labour migration to the west and reinforced the view of a ‘brain drain’ and failed to offer new policy thinking on how global Africans can begin to be a ‘brain gain for Africa’. Thus responses continue to be contradictory with some calling for drastic control measures that clearly show a weak understanding of the dynamics of global Africans. Clearly an honest dialogue is needed not only at national level but also between north and south; one in which the global citizens take a central role in policy formulation.

32 While the world took exception to the demolitions in Zimbabwe, this is a familiar policy in other African cities. For Ghana similar clearances are covered in the media see “Ejected hawkers will not be allowed back – Minister” pp. 1 The Daily Graphic, Thursday, 5th May 2005 Accra. The global economic and corruption dimensions of these activities are captured very well in the film “Property to Die For” produced by Christopher Mitchell and Clementine Cecil of MAPS for BBC2 (2005) set in the Russian context.

33 From an urban scholar based in the USA. Gushungo is the ‘totem’ of President Robert Mugabe. Refer to Shona customers for the deeper meaning and use of these terms in Zimbabwean society.


37 For such a call for drastic measures with regards to health, see “G8 must stop medic brain drain” BBC News Friday 17th June, 2005. Http://www.news.bbc.co.uk
Although in 1997 the UK government made a commitment to improve working engagements with the Diaspora, progress has been slow. DFID diaspora policy is in its infancy and characterised by a range of exploratory projects, commissioned studies and Diaspora consultations whose aim is implementation of programmes rather than policy formulation. Very little of this has involved Zimbabweans living in the UK largely because DFID works with governments and since 1996/97 there has been no working relationship between the UK and Zimbabwe governments. But DFID should not be scared to engage with the Zimbabweans in the UK. As with other Diaspora groups, Zimbabweans in the UK are a diverse community with their own internal divisions, tensions, politics and diverse links and investments in the home country. For DFID, the basic minimum it should do is to try and understand this diversity and how it unfolds and see new ways of tapping into it for development: development of the diaspora, development through the diaspora and development by the diaspora are all viable options that DFID has to seriously explore.

However, other things remain the same. For example despite the evidence on Africa’s global citizens (diaspora) contributing hugely to Africa’s development, the Western media (and to some extent NGOs) hardly says anything about this. The positive things that Africans do are subverted or ignored in search of those stories that reinforce pessimism and sympathy and false charity. Black Africans irrespective of their status are frequently ‘vilified as illegal aliens, as leeches sucking all the good out of a generous West’.

With regards to Zimbabweans in the United Kingdom, the climate of fear for those on the margins has increased as a result of deportations resumed in late 2004. But the UK policy remains embarrassingly contradictory. On one hand, the government has rejected results of the 31st March 2005 elections in Zimbabwe and continued to vilify the ZANU (PF) government, supported renewal and extension of “targeted sanctions” against ZANU (PF) leadership and more recently led condemnations of the mid-winter demolition of informal settlements and enterprises in urban Zimbabwe. Yet the very same government has continued to forcibly deport failed asylum seekers from Zimbabwe declaring that those deported would be safe in Zimbabwe. The Times newspaper among others, did a good job of exposing the hypocrisy in these policies.

Therefore, for Zimbabweans and Africans generally, one thing remains clear, namely that they need to not only agonise about their circumstances but to organise effectively as well. They need to mobilise and create space in the host communities, to build a better understanding of relations with home communities and engage in strategic dialogue leading to effective actions.

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39 see The Times, Wednesday 29th June, 2005
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Peri-NET Working Papers

Number 1. Introduction to Peri-NET: Origins, obstacles and options

Number 2. Contentious development: peri-urban studies in Sub-Sahara Africa

Number 3. The challenge of urban and peri-urban transformations in Kampala: Contradictions, conflicts and opportunities under globalisation conditions.


Number 5. The challenge of urban and peri-urban change in Nairobi: contradictions, conflicts and opportunities under globalisation.

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Number 7: The political economy of urban and peri-urban agriculture in Southern and Eastern Africa: Overview, settings and research agenda.

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Number 9: Not yet Uhuru: reflections on globalisation, democratisation and urban governance in East and southern Africa.

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Number 11: Death and the city in the context of HIV/AIDS: the case of Harare

Number 12: The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the culture and practices of urban burial in Gaborone, Botswana.

Number 13: Land management tensions in urban grave removals and relocation in Tanzania.
The Urban and Peri-Urban Research Network (Peri-NET)

Background
- The Urban and Peri-Urban Research Network (Peri-NET) was set up in 2000 with support from a Network grant from The British Academy.
- It is a network of institutions and researchers engaged in urban and peri-urban research and exchange of local, regional and global development experiences. The network seeks to link and enhance young scholars and practitioners who are committed to intellectual capacity building in African institutions and to produce knowledge for use by and in partnership with local authorities, central government departments and community groups.
- We wish to acknowledge and thank the support received from The British Academy as well as from each of the Universities and organizations in which the members are resident.

Associates and Recommended Links

http://www.ruaf.org
For information, activities, research outputs and networks on urban and peri-urban agriculture.

http://www.iied.org.uk
For information of urbanization and the environment and research outputs on rural-urban linkages.

http://www.idrc.ca
International Development Research Centre, Canada – will give links to activities, funding opportunities and research in urban and peri-urban areas at global levels.

http://www.afford-uk.org/
Africa Foundation for Development is a London based Non-Governmental organization that acts as “a gateway and connector to and between Africa and its Diaspora”

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/
International research, training and consultancy on issues on the peri-urban interface and development.

http://www.mdpesa.org
Municipal Development Programme (East and southern Africa) - activities include research and capacity building for sustainable urban and peri-urban management.

For further details:
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