Manning, Alan (1991) Pre-strike ballots and wage-employment bargaining. CEPDP, 19. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper attempts to construct a model of the economic effects of the introduction of pre-strike ballots in Britain in the Employment Act (1984). It argues that strike ballots tend to reduce union influence over issues which affect different workers in different ways (like plant closures) and will do little to alter union influence over issues which affect workers similarly (like wages). The effect is that compulsory ballots may reduce employment and do little to reduce wages. The robustness of this result is explored in a number of models. An alternative legal framework is also suggested.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1991 Alan Manning|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor|
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Departments > Economics
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