

Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper
**International terrorism and the clash of
civilizations**

**Article (Accepted version)
(Refereed)**

Original citation:

Neumayer, Eric and Plümper, Thomas (2009) International terrorism and the clash of civilizations. [British journal of political science](#), 39 (4). pp. 711-734.

DOI: [10.1017/S0007123409000751](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123409000751)

© 2009 [Cambridge University Press](#)

This version available at: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20414/>

Available in LSE Research Online: October 2010

LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website.

This document is the author's final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.

International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations

SECOND REVISED VERSION

March 2008

Eric Neumayer^a and Thomas Plümper^b

^a Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London WC2A 2AE, UK and Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk

^b Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK, and Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), tpluem@essex.ac.uk

We thank Han Dorussen, Vera Troeger, Christina Schneider, Hugh Ward, Kristian Gleditsch and several referees for helpful comments. Previous versions were presented at the 2007 Midwest Political Science Association and American Political Science Association Conferences, and in seminars at the University of Oxford, Trinity College Dublin and the University of Exeter.

International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations

Abstract

An emerging “clash of civilizations” should reveal itself in patterns of international terrorism. Huntington himself explicitly refers to terrorism in the conflict between specific civilizations, and particularly so in the clash between the Islamic civilization and the West. We confront his hypotheses with ones derived from our theory of the strategic logic of international terrorism. We predict more terrorism against nationals from countries whose government supports the government of the terrorists’ home country. Similar to Huntington, we also predict excessive terrorism on Western targets, but because of the high strategic value of attacking Westerners, not because of inter-civilizational conflict per se. Contrary to Huntington, our theory does not suggest that groups from the Islamic civilization commit more terrorist acts against nationals from other civilizations in general. Nor do we expect a general increase in inter-civilizational terrorism after the end of the Cold War. Our empirical analysis – based on estimations in a directed dyadic country sample from 1969 to 2005 – finds broad support for our theory: foreign political support generates more terrorism against nationals of the supporting foreign country. Our results also suggest that the Rest-West and the Islam-West dyads indeed encounter significantly more terrorism, which is in line with Huntington, but not necessarily inconsistent with our own theory either. However, in contradiction to Huntington we do not find that there is generally more terrorism from the Islamic against other civilizations. Also, we find no evidence for a general structural break in the pattern of international terrorism after the end of the Cold War.

This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization.

George W. Bush 2006

Al Qaeda could not be happier than in a real clash among civilizations.

Giandomenico Picco 2005: 14

The current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations.

Joseph Nye 2004: 17

It is not ... in the interest of the West to view this as a clash of Western and Muslim civilizations.

Ahmed S. Hashim 2001: 29

This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.

Bernard Lewis 1990: 60.

1. Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, conflicts between civilizations struggling for influence on a new world order pose the greatest danger for international stability and peace. This, at least, is the central tenet of Samuel Huntington's famous and best-selling book *The Clash of Civilizations* (Huntington 1996) and his earlier *Foreign Affairs* article (Huntington 1993a).

Recently, events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the bombings in Bali, Madrid and London were interpreted by many as striking evidence for Huntington's paradigm. Yet, the wide attention Huntington's works has attracted in public discussion of international terrorism (Ahmed and Forst 2005; United Nations 2006) contrasts with its reception in the empirical academic debate in at least two respects. First, scholarly work that has tested Huntington's theoretical predictions has focused exclusively on

patterns of militarized inter-state dispute, inter-state and civil wars. To our knowledge, no test exists of hypotheses derived from Huntington's work on terrorism. And second, tests of Huntington's arguments have typically failed to find evidence for a clash of civilizations.¹

However, empirical tests of Huntington are hampered by the fact that the term "clash" is nowhere clearly defined in his work and that, depending on the pair of civilizations looked at, it means many different things to Huntington. Given the ambiguity of the term, tests that fail to find that inter-civilizational dyads in general are more likely to experience one particular type of conflict do not establish fully convincing evidence against Huntington. More importantly, existing scholarship has neglected that, for some civilizational dyads for which Huntington predicts a high level of conflict, he himself mentions terrorism, as in the clash of "Rest versus West", or even explicitly emphasizes the use of terrorism, as in the clash of "Islam versus Rest" and "Islam versus West". Our test of Huntington's predictions, then, provides additional insights as to the relevance of his paradigm.

Rather than merely testing predictions derived from Huntington's work, however, we also compare his paradigm to a strategic theory of international terrorism. Our theory argues that the leaders of terror groups are predominantly rational and act strategically to reach their goal of gaining political influence on the political system of their home country. We argue that terror group leaders from other civilizations have a general interest in attacking Western targets due to their high strategic value, and a specific interest in attacking targets from those foreign countries whose government lends support to the government of the terrorists' home country. We find broad support for our strategic theory as well as some limited support for Huntington's predictions in a directed country dyad sample over the period 1969 to 2005.

2. Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations Hypothesis

2.1 *A new Era in World Politics?*

Huntington's clash of civilizations hypothesis has many facets (Huntington 1993a, 1996). If there is, however, one central hypothesis in his work it is this: The dominant source of conflict will shift from the clash of ideologies during the Cold War period (liberal democracy vs. communism) to the clash between nations and groups of different civilizations after the end of the Cold War: "...conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization" (Huntington 1993a: 48).

He defines civilizations as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have", being "differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion" (ibid.: 25). Huntington distinguishes seven, or possibly eight civilizations – Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and, possibly, African. He posits that civilizational differences "are the product of centuries" and "far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes" and are therefore "less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones" (Huntington 1993a: 25 and 27). Moreover, such differences are not merely an abstract construction: "[that] civilizations are meaningful entities accords with the way in which people see and experience reality" (Huntington 1993b: 194).

He then goes on to argue that the Cold War had artificially plastered over and dampened inter-civilizational conflicts. The end of the Cold War allowed these conflicts to emerge and gain strength. They also draw strength from economic modernization, which tends to weaken the nation-state as a source of identity. This, in turn, leads to a revival of religion as an alternative source of identity. As Huntington (ibid.: 191f.) puts it: "In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people." Finally, the declining power of the Western civilization and the rising power of other civilizations allow the latter to challenge Western hegemony.

Throughout his work on inter-civilizational conflicts, Huntington remains reluctant to formulate testable predictions arising from his paradigm. This is ironic given he also states that “a crucial test of a paradigm’s validity and usefulness is the extent to which the predictions derived from it turn out to be more accurate than those from alternative paradigms” (Huntington 1996: 37). Consequently, critics have charged his work with being ambiguous, inconsistent and sometimes self-contradictory (Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). Due to space constraints, we cannot engage with these arguments in great detail. Instead, we concentrate on two aspects that are central to the focus of this paper: the conflict intensity of pairs of civilizations and the meaning of the term “clash”.

2.2 *Inter-civilizational Pairs and their Conflict Intensity*

On top of his hypothesis of a general clash of civilizations, Huntington regards certain civilizations and certain pairs of civilizations as more prone to conflict than others. Yet, Huntington’s argumentation with respect to the conflict intensity of inter-civilizational dyads is not fully specified. His book provides a network graphic, which distinguishes three degrees of conflict intensity (Huntington 1996: 245). Given that Huntington has identified eight different civilizations, this results in 28 civilization dyads. However, he provides information on the expected conflict intensity for only 17 out of these 28 dyads. Table 1 reproduces Huntington’s predictions:

Table 1 about here

We indicate the 11 civilization dyads for which Huntington does not provide an answer by a question mark – leaving open whether he means that these dyads are not conflictual (for reasons he does not discuss) and should therefore be coded 0 or whether his paradigm does not allow him to derive a prediction with respect to this dyad. Huntington provides full information on conflict intensity only for dyads that include the West. This seems to result from his judgment that – as non-Western civilizations become increasingly self-assertive and Western countries attempt to maintain their

economic, political and military dominance – there will be increasing conflict between “the West versus the Rest” (Huntington 1993a: 39). But Islam also stands out. He provides information for five out of seven relations to other civilizations, four of which are highly conflictual.

2.3 *What does Clash mean?*

Huntington’s theoretical imprecision is not limited to the matrix of inter-civilizational conflicts. He also remains unclear about his second most important term: clash. While he states that clashes between civilizations will become the greatest threat to world peace and that “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington 1993a: 22), the term is nowhere explicitly defined or thoroughly explained. Rather, Huntington subsumes very different things under the same umbrella, depending on specific civilization dyads looked at. For example, the clash between the West and Japan is mainly described in economic terms, the conflict between the Western and the Sinic civilization mainly in military terms.

For some civilizational combinations, Huntington mentions, almost in passing, the use of terrorism as one form of conflict. In the clash between the Rest against the West, he identifies terrorism (together with nuclear arms) as one of the two weapons of the “non-Western weak” (Huntington 1996: 188). He refers much more explicitly to terrorism in his analysis of the Islamic civilization. For the clash between Islam and other civilizations, Huntington (2002: 3) states that “while groups from all religions have engaged in various forms of violence and terrorism, the figures make it clear that in the past decade Muslims have been involved in far more of these activities than people of other religions”. To this he adds a cross-reference to his (in)famous phrase of “the bloody borders of Islam” from Huntington (1993a).² He particularly stresses the use of terrorism in relation to the asymmetric clash between Islam and the West. He (1996: 216) argues that “following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, an inter-civilizational quasi war developed between Islam and the West. (...) [I]t is a quasi war because, apart from the Gulf War of 1990-91, it has been fought with limited means: terrorism on one side and air power, covert action, and economic sanctions on the other.”

Huntington does not provide a systematic explanation of why terrorism is a favorite weapon employed in these clashes. The reason given for the use of terrorism by other civilizations against the West does not go beyond the observation that “terrorism historically is the weapon of the weak” (Huntington 1996: 187). His explanation of the extraordinary conflict intensity of Islam is not based on profound theoretical reasons either. He (1996: 263ff) perceives Islam as a “religion of the sword” with an absolutist ideology that makes co-habitation with other religions extremely difficult. However, many religions, not just Islam, can be and have historically been misused for the purpose of justifying terrorist violence (Rapoport 1984). Huntington also argues that geopolitically the Islamic civilization has no clear borders but overlaps with most other civilizations and is not dominated by a core state, causing conflict with both neighbors and within the Islamic world. However, this begs the question of why there is not excessive terrorism from other civilizations on victims of Islamic countries. Moreover, according to Huntington (1996: 135), the Latin American and African civilizations similarly miss a core state. Finally, and in Huntington’s view most importantly, the large number of unemployed males between the age of 15 and 30 is a natural source of violence both within the Islamic civilization and between it and other civilizations. Yet, many developing countries from other civilizations experience similar problems.

According to Huntington, one should expect a particularly strong clash between Islam and the West given a fourteen centuries old legacy of conflict. This conflict ultimately stems from similarities in the aspirations of the two civilizations, e.g. as universalistic and missionary (Huntington 1996: 211), with simultaneous fundamental differences in culture and religion. “The underlying problem for the West”, writes Huntington (1996: 217), “is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.” The Cold War period plastered over this conflict to some extent, but “the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived major threat to the other.” (Huntington 1996: 211).

3. The Strategic Logic of International Terrorism

In this section, we provide a competing account of international terrorism to Huntington. We follow Bueno de Mesquita's (2006: 637) suggestion of a "natural progression from macro-level accounts (...) to the specification of their micro-foundations". On the micro-level our theory makes a crucial distinction between the leaders of terror groups and their followers.³ We assume that terror leaders and followers come from the same population of ideologues and believers.⁴ What differentiates the two is their relative position within terror groups. On the macrolevel, our theory specified the conditions under which terror leaders of one country have a strategic interest in attacking targets from foreign nations, even though their ultimate goal is to gain influence on domestic political matters (see the next section). Our theory builds on the rational approach to identifying and explaining the causes of international terrorism in conflict over political influence (Crenshaw 1981, 1998, 2001; Pape 2003, 2005; Neumann and Smith 2005, Kydd and Walter 2006).

3.1. Terror Group Leaders

The leaders of terror groups are distinguished by having a crucial, decisive position in the terror organization. They are the leaders and therefore behave predominantly strategically. From their perspective, terrorism is a rational strategy in a political struggle to achieve an end, not an end in itself. In other words, terror leaders instrumentalize terror because they want to make the powerful respond – preferably in a way that changes the situation better to suit the interests of the terrorists. Terrorism is not simply violence, often against civilians, in order to create fear. Rather, terrorism aims at creating fear, because the induced fear will in turn lead somebody else to respond in a way that makes it more likely that the terrorists will achieve their goals (Fromkin 1975: 693).

What are the goals of terror leaders? The exact answer depends on the type of terror organization. However, practically all terror leaders want to achieve some fundamental change in policies, or even a change in the political regime of, their home country or the wider region.⁵ Terror group leaders thus strive to gain political influence and,

ultimately, control. This generic end-goal unites terror groups despite extreme differences in their ideologies.

Following Rapoport (2003) and Shugart (2006), we can distinguish three overlapping “waves of modern terrorism”:⁶ After the anti-colonial/ethno-nationalist and radical left waves, religious terrorism is now dominating, with Islam “at the heart of the wave” (Rapoport 2003: 61; similarly Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002: 146). The anti-colonial and ethno-nationalist groups wanted national independence from colonial occupiers or secession for their ethnic group, and they were often successful. The radical left groups wanted to overthrow capitalism, which failed spectacularly. The Islamic terror groups want to force governments in Islamic countries to adopt policies in line with their own radical interpretation of Islam. Some are more ambitious still and want to topple any government that prevents, often by violent means, the Islamists from increasing their influence and grip on political power (Sedqwick 2004).

If fundamental political change is the ultimate goal of terror leaders, why do they resort to terror rather than other forms of political action and why does terror represent a suitable instrument for achieving their goals? Terror leaders typically face one or more of three constraints. The first is the exclusion from the political process; the second is insufficient support among the wider population; while the third is the asymmetry in strength or power between the government and the terror group (Crenshaw 1981; Hoffman 2002).

Terrorism is also instrumental in achieving intermediate goals in the long struggle for the ultimate goal of violent political change. First, terror raises the costs of political stability. Terror attacks create a feeling of insecurity, which provokes the targeted government to invest more heavily in security policies. Second, terror attacks stimulate political responses that worsen the situation of the terror group’s actual and potential supporters (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004). As we will see in the next section, this can help in the recruitment of terrorists. And third, terror attacks generate media attention, which allows the terror leaders to gain voice and spread their ideology. Again, this will facilitate the recruitment of followers.

Thus, besides hitting the targeted enemy, terrorism serves terror leaders in their struggle to gather support and recruit followers. This is essential for the functioning and the success of the terror group (Siqueira and Sandler 2006). Terrorists not only need shelter, raise the financial means to buy weaponry and to run training camps, they also need individuals willing to serve as terrorists. The leaders of terror groups (while often toying with weapons in front of TV cameras) rarely fight their terror campaigns themselves. Rather, they usually act exclusively as terror group leaders. In other words, while they have ultimate strategic goals, perhaps the most important intermediate aim of terror attacks is to increase their support and recruit followers, to whom we turn now.

3.2. *Followers*

Terror followers are individuals who are attracted to the leaders' ideology, but are not in a decisive or crucial position within the terror organization. Rather, they are the soldiers of the leaders and follow specified or unspecified commands, which may include the command of self-sacrifice in a suicide terror mission (see Pape 2003). In contrast to the group leaders, terror followers need not behave predominantly strategically or rationally. They may be driven by several, complex and varied motivations that may also depend on contextual and sometimes very personal circumstances (Post 1998; Victoroff 2005). We suggest, however, that three factors are essential in the successful recruitment of terrorists: ideological appeal, peer acknowledgement and political grievances.

If individuals do not share the ideology of the terror leaders, they will not support the terror group to reach its strategic goals, because under such circumstances their utility will decline if the group reaches its ultimate goal. The more appealing the terror leaders' ideology and their strategic goals to parts of the population, the easier is recruitment. The radical left terror groups of the past failed not least because their ideology and goals did not appeal to the wider population and they therefore remained splinter groups.

Second, joining a terror group becomes more likely if potential followers receive some peer acknowledgement for doing so. While terrorists almost by definition are

outcasts, the greater the acknowledgement they receive among the small group of direct supporters and among the wider population, the more they can feel justified in perpetrating acts that are normally regarded as heinous (Moghadam 2003; Speckhard and Ahkmedova 2006). Targeting attacks against innocent civilians no matter what their personal circumstances and political attitudes is difficult to justify. Peer acknowledgement means that terrorists are not exclusively regarded as ruthless and ultra-violent criminals, but, by some at least, as heroic fighters for the righteous cause. The more peer acknowledgement terrorists receive, the more they will be able to overcome the scruples that might otherwise prevent them from joining terror groups. For these reasons, terror leaders invest in communication with their own peers, with the aim of raising their acknowledgement.⁷ Media attention is of utmost importance as it helps the terror leaders to spread their propaganda to potential new recruits (Rohner and Frey 2007).

Finally, political grievances again raise the ideological appeal of terror groups. Such grievances spur hatred and anger and the wish to revenge oneself on those who are perceived as being the cause of grievance (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Richardson 2006). According to Bueno de Mesquita (2005: 518) the ideological benefits that individuals derive from joining terror groups increase with reprisals from a regime “blamed for the loss of freedom, dignity and rights”. Interviews with terrorists reveal how grievances inflicted by counter-terrorist measures provide a powerful incentive to join terror groups (Stern 2003; Khosrokhavar 2005).

4. Differences between Huntington’s Paradigm and our Strategic Theory

In this section, we identify where Huntington’s paradigm and our theory make different predictions on patterns of inter-civilizational terrorism, which can be tested against each other. Based on Huntington, one would expect excessive terrorism from non-Western civilizations against Western targets, excessive terrorism emanating from the Islamic civilization and directed against non-Islamic civilizations, as well as excessive Islamic terrorism against Western targets.

As concerns our own theory, we focus on why terrorists can be drawn toward attacking foreign targets. Our theory posits that terror leaders aim for political influence in their country or wider region. Accordingly, one would expect that the victims of terrorism come mainly from the same country as the terrorists. This is indeed the case. While there is no dataset that comprehensively covers both international and purely domestic terrorism, estimates are that around 90 per cent of terrorism is in fact domestic, in the sense that the terrorists and their victims share the same nationality and no other aspect of the terror attack is international (Enders 2007: 832).

If terror leaders are focused on domestic political change, the question is why do they attack foreign targets as well and why do they attack victims from certain foreign countries much more than from others? Based on our strategic theory, we would expect, first, more terrorism directed against Western targets. With terror leaders dependent on media and public attention, attacking Western targets provides clear strategic benefits given that most of the media corporations have headquarters and their major customer base in Western countries. Attacking Western targets is certainly making it into the global news. It is also very difficult for the government of the terrorists' home country to ignore such attacks and, since terrorists want the government to respond to their terror, attacking Westerners has strategic value.

Second, our theory also predicts more terrorism directed against targets from other countries if the foreign government supports and stabilizes the government of the terrorists' home country. Such support can take the form of, among other things, military alliances, military intervention in civil wars, arms transfers and economic aid. Indeed, some governments only survive with foreign support. In such cases, it can be the strength of the foreign power rather than the strength of the domestic government that prevents terror leaders from reaching their aims. The more the home government depends on foreign support, the more important the foreign power becomes as an obstacle to the terror leaders. If the terrorist attacks on foreign powers force the foreign power to reduce its support for the government the terrorists seek to overthrow, then the terror leaders get closer to their strategic goal.

This prediction of our theory holds true independently of the civilizational belonging of either the terrorists or their victims. For example, our theory predicts that Russian support to Central Asian Republics who face a domestic conflict with Islamist terrorists will increase terror against Russian targets. Similarly, American support to Colombia will increase anti-American terrorism by Colombian terrorists. According to Huntington (1996: 245) the relationship between the Latin and the Western civilization should be relatively peaceful, yet patterns of international terrorism show very substantial terrorist activity directed from Latin American terror groups against Western targets (around 14 per cent of all international and around 26 per cent of all inter-civilizational terrorist incidents during the period 1969 to 2005 falls into this category). Our strategic theory predicts such patterns given the very large extent of Western and particularly US support to Latin American governments in conflict with domestic terror groups, whereas Huntington's Clash of Civilizations paradigm cannot adequately account for these patterns. The same goes for the relationship between the West on the one hand and the Hindu and Sinic civilizations on the other hand, which according to Huntington (1996: 245) are conflictual and very conflictual, respectively. Yet, the level of anti-Western terrorism originating from these civilizations is minuscule (around 0.4 and 1 per cent of all international terrorist incidents, respectively). Our strategic theory would predict such low terrorist activity given the relatively low extent of which governments of Hindu and Sinic states depend on Western foreign support.

Our strategic theory is, however, not necessarily inconsistent with all of Huntington's predictions. For example, it is not inconsistent with his prediction of excessive terrorist activity from non-Western terrorists against Western targets or by Islamic terrorists on Western targets, even though it provides very different reasons for such activity. For Huntington, such terrorism is rooted in a deep and long-running civilizational conflict. For us, terrorists do not attack foreigners simply because they are foreign or from a different civilization. Terror leaders are not drawn to violence for violence sake, even if directed against other civilizations. Inter-civilizational terrorism is thus not a priori distinguishable from international terrorism within one civilization.

Instead, anti-Western terrorism is the consequence of the high strategic value of attacking Westerners. Islamic terror leaders may face additional incentives to attack Western targets because of Western interference in countries of the Islamic civilization, whose support is often crucial in preventing Islamic terror groups' bid for political influence.⁸ Western aid, arms, military assistance, military personnel as well as economic and political support play a pivotal role in stabilizing the regimes in many Muslim countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and, nowadays, Afghanistan and Iraq, thus preventing Islamic terror leaders from reaching their goals. Terrorism targeted against the West as well as anyone co-operating with the West is supposed to provoke a military Western response that fosters anti-Western sentiments amongst the broader Muslim population. With anti-Western sentiments evolving on a large scale, radical Islamists hope that the West will come under pressure and will eventually withdraw its support, which would fulfill the strategic objective of the Islamic terror group leaders.

Huntington's paradigm also posits the existence of an important dynamic in inter-civilizational clashes. He predicts that the end of the Cold War triggers off conflicts between different civilizations. Huntington sees the post-Cold War world as one in which different religions and cultures shape people's values and interests, leading to dominant conflicts of a new type: the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996: 21). If he is right, then one would expect a structural break around the end of the Cold War, with increases in inter-civilizational terrorism against Western targets, inter-civilizational terrorism perpetrated by Islamic groups and, particularly, Islamic terrorism against the West.

The dynamics derived from our theory also differ from Huntington. In our theory, terrorist activity against victims of a specific nationality should go up if the strategic incentives for targeting these nationalities increase. This would be the case whenever the foreign support becomes more pivotal for the home country of the terror leaders. With respect to Islamic terrorism against Western targets, our theory suggests that dynamic changes in such terrorism do not depend on the prevalence of the Cold War as such, but on the strategic benefits Islamic terror leaders derive from targeting the West.

These benefits go up when the West increases its extent of interference in the Islamic civilization. International events of the first half of this decade should have made the West and the US in particular the single most important enemy of Islamic terror leaders. In particular, the Western invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 and the stabilization of embattled regimes in the Muslim world effectively serve as an obstacle to Islamic terror leaders, preventing them from reaching their goals.

Furthermore, because political grievances help terror leaders in recruiting new followers, the continuing presence of Western troops on the soil of Muslim countries and the seeming ease with which the coalition troops overthrew the Taliban regime and the government of Saddam Hussein are likely to have added to the feelings of powerlessness and humiliation among Muslim populations all around the world (Lewis 1990; Taarnby 2002; Fuller 2002; Richardson 2007; Riedel 2007). The US-led “war on terror” may or may not be successful in fighting the terror leaders; the odds are, however, that it renders recruiting Islamic terror followers easier still.⁹

5. Research Design

In the remainder of this article we will test the predictions of Huntington’s paradigm as well as of our strategic theory of international terrorism. Before we do so, however, we discuss the research design in some detail.

5.1. Variables

Our measures of terrorism are based on the “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (*Iterate*) dataset (Mickolus et al. 2003). It includes as acts of terror “the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims” (ibid.: 2). Terrorist violence includes incidents as diverse as, among others, assassinations, bombings and armed attacks, arson and fire, kidnapping, and skyjacking, unless they are acts of ordinary crime or the violence is for purposes other than political, e.g., for drug trafficking. Violence committed during international and civil wars are not coded as

terrorism. Consequently, guerrilla attacks by rebel groups are not counted either, unless they are targeted against civilians or the dependents of military personnel (Mickolus, Sandler and Murdock 1989: xii). Thus, *Iterate* excludes terror attacks against soldiers of the coalition forces in Iraq, but includes kidnappings of foreign civil workers (Enders and Sandler 2006: 372).

Importantly, *Iterate* excludes all terrorism that is purely domestic. To qualify as international, a terrorist act must “through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries” (Mickolus et al. 2003: 2). A terrorist act by groups fighting for independence (such as by the IRA) is counted as international if it takes place on the ruling country’s own soil, but if it is executed on the territory under dispute, then it is generally regarded as domestic. The exclusion of purely domestic terrorism is not a problem for our analysis. Neither Huntington’s clash of civilization’s paradigm nor our own strategic theory of international terrorism make predictions about the extent of domestic terrorism.

The dataset compiles a wealth of information on each terrorist incident. Most importantly for our purposes, it codes, where relevant, the three primary nationalities of terrorists and victims, as well as the number of people killed. Yet, *Iterate* is not without problems. It does not list the exact number of fatalities belonging to each nationality. It is also dependent on mainly Western news reports and can therefore fail to capture incidents that did not make it into the news (Sandler and Enders 2004: 6). This could bias the results toward finding Westerners as the main victims of international terrorism and could thus bias our analysis toward finding evidence for excessive anti-Western inter-civilizational terrorism. Unfortunately, there is nothing one can do to correct this potential bias since there is no way of knowing how much terrorism against non-Westerners fails to make it into Western news media and therefore into *Iterate*. Despite these and other shortcomings, *Iterate* represents by far the most detailed and complete existing dataset on international terrorism.

We code from the dataset two dependent variables: the annual sum of terrorist incidents and the annual sum of the number of people killed, which serves as a measure of intensity. The nationality information allows us to create directed country dyadic dependent variables. Thus, terrorism perpetrated by nationals of country x against nationals of country y are counted toward the $x \rightarrow y$ dyad, whether it takes place on the territory of country x , country y or some third country z . Using nationality information means that we lose terrorist acts for which *Iterate* does not provide information on the primary nationality of terrorists or victims, but these are few in number. More importantly, to be on the conservative side, we do not include the terrorism committed by “Indeterminate Arabs, Palestine” in the multivariate estimations. Our results are, however, robust to allocating each of these terror attacks to a randomly drawn Arab country.

An additional problem is that for the variable that measures the number of people killed, in a small number of cases (less than two per cent), *Iterate* indicates that people were killed, but states the number of people killed as unknown. Unfortunately, the 9/11 terror attacks suffer from a combination of the two problems: 245 victims are stated (those on the planes), but for those killed on the ground, *Iterate* does not state a number, probably because the 2992 people killed in total (including the terrorists), as listed in the official 9/11 report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 552), is not an exact figure. Less clear is why *Iterate* attributes the attacks to the group of “Indeterminate Arabs”, when 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabian. We discuss below what effect the inclusion of the full death toll of 9/11 and its allocation to Saudi Arabia as the origin country would have on the analysis of Islam versus West terrorism.

To avoid multiple counting, only the first nationality of the terrorists and the victims determines the origin and the target country of a terrorist act. This has the disadvantage that information on the second and third primary nationality of terrorists and victims is lost, but the vast majority of terrorist acts only involve one nationality of

both terrorists and victims.¹⁰ Our results are robust to attributing terrorist acts to all the first three main nationalities of terrorists and victims simultaneously.

Using nationality to determine the civilizational belonging of terrorists and victims can be misleading. For example, if British-born Muslims kill primarily British citizens (as happened in the London attacks of July 2005), this would erroneously be coded as an intra-British and therefore intra-Western act of terrorism, whereas it is really an attack of Islamic terrorists on the West. Since this would bias the results against finding evidence for both Huntington's and our hypotheses, we are not too concerned about such measurement error.

Our central explanatory variables are variables of foreign support for domestic governments, in line with our strategic theory, and inter-civilizational dummy variables to account for Huntington's predictions. A comprehensive test of our theory is hampered by the limited availability of data for a global sample on support rendered by the government of one country to that of another country. For example, we know of no comprehensive dataset of military aid by donors other than the United States. We include instead a measure of general economic aid, with data taken from OECD (2007). In addition, we have data on arms transfers from the major weapons exporters, both Western and non-Western, from SIPRI (2007), data on foreign intervention in domestic civil wars from Gleditsch et al. (2002) as well as data on military alliances between countries from Leeds (2005) and Sprecher and Krause (2006).¹¹ Foreign aid is measured relative to gross domestic product of the receiving country (World Bank 2006), whereas arms transfers are set in relation to domestic military expenditures (Correlates of War 2007 and World Bank 2006). In both cases, the idea is to measure foreign support relative to domestic capacity. For foreign intervention in civil wars, no data exist on the extent of foreign intervention. Instead, the variable accounts for the 3-scale ordinal intensity of the armed conflict itself (below 25 annual battle deaths; above 25, but below 1000; above 1000). Military alliance is a dummy variable that indicates whether two countries had entered into a formal alliance in the form of a defense pact with each other. There is the possibility that more support is rendered to countries from

which more terrorism against nationals of the supporting country's government (reverse causality). We mitigate this potential problem by lagging the foreign support variables by one year.¹²

In order to test Huntington's predictions we use three dummy variables for specific inter-civilizational pairs: *rest v west* for dyads in which the origin country is non-Western whereas the target country is Western, *islam v rest* for dyads in which the origin country belongs to the Islamic civilization whereas the target country does not and *islam v west* for dyads in which the origin country belongs to the Islamic and the target country to the Western civilization. Huntington is neither perfectly clear nor consistent on which country belongs to which civilization. We follow here Russett, Oneal and Cox's (2000) classification, but we stress that our results are robust to relying on Henderson and Tucker's (2001) interpretation of Huntington instead. We exclude terror attacks involving Israeli terrorists or Israeli victims from all estimations. This is because we do not want to artificially inflate our estimates of Islamic terrorism against the West by including this very peculiar conflict. Results are robust to including Israel in the estimations, either as a Western state as in Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000) or into the residual category of "other" states as in Henderson and Tucker (2001).

The inclusion of control variables is of great importance, because economic, political and geographical factors that are correlated with our foreign political support or with the civilizational dummy variables could determine international terrorism. Failure to include them would potentially lead to biased results. For example, some economists suggest that international terrorism is directed at wealthier Western countries (Abadie 2006: 50). Autocracies supposedly produce more terrorism (Krueger and Laitin 2003: 4; Li 2005), whereas democracies are extremely vulnerable as terrorist targets (Pape 2003; Enders and Sandler 2006). Size also matters: More populous countries will, *ceteris paribus*, generate more terrorism and suffer more from terrorism. Contiguous and geographically close countries should experience more terrorism. We control for all these factors – see the appendix for variable definitions and data sources. Our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables such as bilateral trade, as well as

the presence or intensity of armed conflict between countries or within the origin or target country. We can also remove intra-civilizational dyads from the sample or control for intra-civilizational terrorism via a dummy variable and the results still hold.

5.2. *Estimation Methods*

We are only interested in international terrorism, not in domestic terrorism, since neither Huntington nor our strategic theory make predictions about domestic terrorism. In our dataset, there are many incidents where the main nationality of the terrorists and the victims are the same. These cases do not constitute purely domestic terrorism since some other aspect of the incident or its resolution might transcend national boundaries. Otherwise they would not be included in *Iterate*. However, these are cases in which the distinction between international and domestic terrorism is often blurred. In other words, the *Iterate* data are noisy and there is some measurement error in what counts as international and domestic terrorism. One can employ three strategies for dealing with such error. First, the “do nothing” option simply ignores the error. Second, one can try to control for the measurement error. This is the strategy we have chosen in the reported estimates by including a dummy variable for identical dyads (i.e., where the main nationality of the terrorists and the victims are the same). In comparison to the first strategy, the efficiency of the estimates is likely to increase and any potential bias is likely to decline, but it does not necessarily disappear. Third, one can remove identical dyads from the analysis. This option may reduce the efficiency of the estimate, but possibly also the bias. While we report only the results from the second strategy, we have conducted all three types of analyses and found no substantial differences in the parameters of interest. Our results are therefore robust and this apparent source of bias does not seem to matter much.

Our dependent variables are count variables, which is why we use a negative binomial regression model with standard errors adjusted for clustering on civilizational dyads. Terrorism data are over-dispersed, so that the poisson model not only suffers from heteroskedasticity but also (and more importantly) from deflated standard errors (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, ch. 20). The negative binomial model we use here

accounts for over-dispersion by augmenting the Poisson distribution by a Gamma distribution. Unless the distribution is grossly mis-specified, the negative binomial model gives more reliable estimates. Our sample covers the period 1969 to 2005 and up to 148 countries. Depending on data availability on the explanatory variables not all possible country dyads are included over the entire period.

6. Testing the Clash of Civilizations Against the Strategic Logic of International Terrorism

We conduct three types of analyses. First, we present simple frequency tables of international terrorism within and across civilizations. In the second set of analyses we report results from multivariate regressions, estimating one parameter for the variables of interest to test the static version of our hypotheses. However, since Huntington's paradigm predicts a structural break in the coefficients of the inter-civilizational dummy variables, we also, thirdly, re-estimate these models allowing these coefficients to differ during and after the Cold War period.

6.1. The Static Perspective

Tables 2 and 3 present frequency tables of terrorist incidents and killings within and across civilizations. Despite the simplicity of such tables, the reported frequencies reveal an interesting pattern. The tables indicate that Westerners are the main target of international terrorism in general as well as of Islamic terrorists in particular. They also lend some provisional support to the hypothesis that the Islamic civilization is the most violent one in terms of international terrorism.

Tables 2 and 3 about here

Yet, frequency tables cannot control for other structural factors that may actually cause terrorism. We therefore now turn to multivariate analysis, for which table 4 presents negative binomial regression results:

Table 4 about here

We briefly discuss the results for the control variables before coming to our main results. We find that population sizes of both the origin and the target countries increase the number of incidents and killings. Significantly more terrorism is targeted against nationals of the same country than against those of other countries. Distance between terrorist and target country reduces terrorism. Contiguity is a weakly significantly positive factor for incidents, but insignificant for the number of people killed. Like others before us (e.g., Cornes and Sandler 2006), we find that terrorism increases in the wealth of the targeted country relative to the origin country. Moreover, our results show that combinations of political regime type do not differ systematically in their propensity to terrorism relative to the base category, the democratic origin–autocratic target dyad. Autocratic dyads seem to have fewer incidents, but not killings. Altogether, regime type does not seem to matter all that much.¹³

As concerns our variables of main interest, we find clear support for our strategic theory of international terrorism. More terrorist incidents and killings emanate from countries, which depend more on foreign economic aid and on arms imports against citizens of the foreign country sending aid and arms. More terrorism also is directed against foreigners from countries that have entered into a military alliance with the terrorists' home country and that intervene in civil conflicts in the terrorists' home country on the side of the government.

Turning to the inter-civilizational dummy variables, we find no significant effect with respect to terrorism from the Islamic civilization against nationals of all other civilizations in general. In other words, the Islamic civilization is not *per se* significantly more drawn to inter-civilizational terrorism if we control for the geographical and socio-political determinants of terrorist activity. However, we find significantly positive results for terrorism from other civilizations against the West and for Islamic

terrorism against the West, as predicted by Huntington. As explained previously, such a result is, however, not necessarily inconsistent with our theory.

6.2. *Inter-civilizational Terrorism During and After the End of the Cold War*

Huntington predicts that the end of the Cold War triggers off conflicts between different civilizations. If he is right, then one would expect a structural break around the end of the Cold War with an increase in anti-Western terrorism from other civilizations, terrorism perpetrated by Islamic groups against other civilizations, and, particularly, Islamic terrorism against the West. Our theory does not predict any such structural breaks for general Islamic or general anti-Western terrorist activities. For Islamic terrorism against the West, the strategic logic of international terrorism suggests that this type of terrorism is spurred by active Western military involvement for the stabilization of embattled regimes in the Muslim world.

Previous studies of Huntington's paradigm have typically been hampered by the fact that they could not or did not cover the post-Cold War period (Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Henderson 2004). This has allowed Huntington (2000: 609) to simply dismiss such studies as 'temporally irrelevant'. Where studies have covered the post-Cold War period, they have typically tested Huntington's predictions for variation over time by a Chow test (Chiozza 2002; Bolks and Stoll 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). We interact the inter-civilizational dummy variable of interest with a Cold War and a post-Cold War dummy variable. Both of these interacted terms enter the estimations and the Chow test functions via testing the hypothesis that the coefficients of the two interacted terms are equal to each other.¹⁴

In table 5 we report Chow-test results. Note that all the other explanatory variables were of course included in the estimations, but because their coefficients are practically identical to the ones shown in table 4 and to save space, we only report coefficients of the interaction terms between the relevant inter-civilizational dummy variables on the one hand and dummy variables for the Cold War and post-Cold War period on the other hand together with tests of coefficient equality.¹⁵

Table 5 about here

Starting with the clash between Islam and the remaining civilizations, the *islam v rest* dummy variables are statistically insignificant both in the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period for terrorist incidents, whereas for terrorist killings the variable is negative and significant in the Cold War period and insignificant in the post-Cold War period. The Wald tests fail to reject the hypotheses of equal coefficients for terrorist incidents, but not for terrorist killings. However, this is no evidence for Huntington because Islamic terrorists turn from generating below average inter-civilizational terrorism to merely average.

Both of the *islam v west* dummy variables are statistically significant with the expected positive sign for terrorist incidents. However, the Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients and, moreover, the dummy has a smaller coefficient during the post-Cold War period than before. As regards terrorist killings, the dyad between Islam and the West turns from one that generates significantly below average killings during the Cold War period to one with significantly above average killings.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, the test of equality of coefficients suggests much higher terrorist activity in the post-Cold War period. The result for *islam v west* on terrorist killings, but not on incidents, can thus be interpreted as evidence for Huntington.

Finally, while the *rest v west* dummy variables are statistically significantly positive in both periods for both incidents and killings, the Wald tests fail to reject the hypotheses of equal coefficients. For incidents, for which the test is close to statistical significance, the *rest v west* dummy variable is, contrary to predictions based on Huntington, higher rather than lower in the Cold War period. In sum, there is no evidence for Huntington's dynamic predictions with the exception of the clash between Islam and the West and even then only for terrorist killings as the dependent variable.

We now take a more detailed look at this particular case. To do so we have re-estimated model 6 of table 4 in "four-year moving average sub-period" models: we begin with a sample that covers only the years from 1969 to 1971, then include only the

years from 1970 to 1973, and so on and finally estimate the years from 2002 to 2005. This gives 34 coefficients for each included variable. These coefficients describe the influence of a regressor on the dependent variable over time. The change in a parameter from one estimate to the next estimate captures the parameter difference between the first year from the first estimate and the last year from the next estimate.

In order to explore the dynamics of Islam versus West terrorism, we regress the estimated *islam v west* coefficients from the moving average sub-period models on their lagged values, a general time trend and a post-Cold War dummy variable. To these we add, in separate estimations, two operationalizations of the time period of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars: The first operationalization is a simple dummy variable coded 1 for the years 2002 onwards, and the second ‘counts’ the wars so that it is coded 1 in 2002 and 2 from 2003 onwards. Table 6 reports the results. The post-Cold War dummy is insignificant throughout. This would suggest that the end of the Cold War as such does not matter to Islamic terrorism targeted against the West. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent stabilization of pro-Western regimes seem to spur Islamic anti-Western terrorism, however, as both the dummy war variable (column 2) and the categorical war variable are statistically significantly positive (column 3).

Table 6 about here

These dynamics of terrorism in the Islam-West dyad do not necessarily falsify Huntington’s paradigm. After all, one can regard the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as conventional military Huntington-type clashes between the West and Islam, to which the Islamic civilization responds with increasingly lethal terrorism (but not more terrorist incidents). However, the evidence fits better our strategic logic of international terrorism, which stresses the role that active Western military involvement in the Islamic civilization for the stabilization of embattled governments plays in promoting Islamic terrorism against Western targets.

7. Conclusion

The results reported in this article provide supportive evidence for our strategic theory of international terrorism: if foreign countries support the government of the terrorists' home country with economic aid, arms transfers, military alliances and intervention in civil wars, then domestic terror leaders have a strategic incentive to attack nationals from that foreign country. This is exactly what we find in our estimations of international terrorism in a directed country dyad sample over the period 1969 to 2005. These patterns of international terrorism are predicted by our strategic theory and are simply incompatible with a non-strategic account of international terrorism such as Huntington's paradigm of a clash of civilizations.

Our results also provide limited supportive evidence for some of the claims contained in Huntington's paradigm, however. In line with Huntington, we conclude that there is excessive terrorism from non-Western and from Islamic countries on Western targets. This result is not necessarily inconsistent with our theory since terror leaders derive strategic benefits from attacking Western targets, for which our variables of strategic interest cannot fully account. More importantly, our analysis does not fully support Huntington's predictions. The Islam versus Rest dummy variable is not statistically significantly different from zero. The characterization of Islam drawn in Huntington's work is thus exaggerated, at least with respect to international terrorism.

The dynamic perspective is also significantly at odds with Huntington. Most importantly, we do not find evidence for a simple structural break in the post-Cold War period. Terrorism originating from non-Western civilizations against Western targets and inter-civilizational terrorism originating from the Islamic civilization do not systematically increase after the end of the Cold War. The dynamics of Islamic terrorism against the West reveal an upward trend in the 1990s, but only for terrorist killings, not for incidents. Furthermore, this trend is also consistent with a strategic logic of international terrorism, which would suggest that Islamic terror on Western targets goes up when the West becomes more actively militarily involved in the Islamic civilization as part of the US-led "war on terror".

What does our analysis tell us about the likely future of international terrorism? If Huntington is right, then we will see more of anti-Western inter-civilizational terrorism, more of Islamic terrorism against other civilizations and, particularly, a further rise in Islamic terrorism against Western targets. The implications from our own theory of terrorism do not suggest any such upward trend. With respect to Islamic terror on Western targets, Western countries are in a no-win situation. If they retreat from the Muslim world, this will be celebrated as a victory by the terror leaders and a toppling of pro-Western regimes dependent on Western support might follow. However, with continuing Western military intervention in the Muslim world, Islamic terror leaders will maintain and possibly increase their attacks on Western targets. Unless the “war on terror” leads to the military defeat and destruction of terror groups, which seems unlikely based on what we have seen since 9/11, then it is likely to increase, rather than decrease, Islamic terrorism against the West. Not only does the “war on terror” raise the strategic benefits of perpetrating terrorist acts on Western targets, but, in addition, every Muslim hurt or killed in this war may facilitate the recruitment of new followers by Islamic terror leaders.

Notes

- 1 See Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Chiozza 2002; Bolks and Stoll 2003; Henderson 2004, 2005; Ellingsen, 2005; Fox 2005; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006.
- 2 No other single statement in his 1993 article attracted more criticism than this one (Huntington 1996: 258).
- 3 We call them terror entrepreneurs and terror agents in Neumayer and Plümper (2007) and Plümper and Neumayer (2007).
- 4 This is not to say that all members of one terrorist organization have identical preferences. Rather, terror groups typically consist of “heterogeneous cells, factions, and individuals” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005b: 146).
- 5 Kydd and Walter (2006: 52) mention five goals: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance. We summarize these goals under the term political change.
- 6 Four if one includes the anarchist wave dominating the period before the First World War.
- 7 This is consistent with Torres et al.’s (2006) analysis of the propaganda from extremist Islamic movements. They find that almost all of it is in Arabic and addressed at Muslims.
- 8 The military strength of the West also implies a power asymmetry that renders terror tactically opportune. This becomes nowhere clearer than in Al Qaeda’s 1996 “Declaration of War on America”: “[I]t must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted. (...) And as you know, it is wise, in the present circumstances, for the armed military forces not to be engaged in a conventional fighting with the forces of the crusader enemy.” (Al Qaeda 2006: 283).
- 9 The 2004 Strategic Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies came to the sobering conclusion that the American presence in Iraq “provided a potent global recruitment pretext for al-Qaeda, had galvanized the transnational Islamic terrorist movement and probably increased terrorist activity worldwide” (IISS 2004: 169). Similarly, Pape (2005: 103) finds that ‘the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide terrorists is stronger than

Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become al-Qaeda suicide terrorists’.

- 10 About 3 and 22 per cent of terror attacks involve terrorists and victims with more than one nationality, respectively.
- 11 We extend the 2003 value of this variable to the year 2004. Military alliances are very persistent over time, which should minimize any bias this may introduce into the estimations. The results are fully robust to constraining the estimations to the period 1969 to 2004.
- 12 It seems impossible to us to find valid instruments, which means that we cannot use this theoretically superior alternative.
- 13 This result seems to be at odds with the findings of Li (2005), who reports that more terrorist attacks occur in countries with lower levels of political participation. One has to keep in mind, however, that his and our results are hardly comparable since we are analyzing directed dyads and Li a monadic dataset.
- 14 A Chow-test can be problematic because it can find spurious evidence for a structural break if there is a general upward-sloping trend in the dependent variable. Alternative tests are available from the authors on request.
- 15 We let the post-Cold War period start in 1990, but results are very similar for letting it start in 1989 or 1991 instead.
- 16 Note that this is true despite the fact that the full death toll of 9/11 is not included in the dependent variable, as pointed out in section 5.1.

References

- Abadie, Alberto. 2006. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism." *American Economic Review* 96 (2): 50-56.
- Ahmed, Akbar and Brian Forst (eds). 2005. *After Terror: Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Al Qaeda 2006. Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. In *Terrorism – Critical Concepts in Political Science*. Volume IV, ed. David C. Rapoport. London and New York: Routledge: 271-297. Also online at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html
- Bolks, Sean and Richard Stoll. 2003. "Examining Conflict Escalation Within the Civilizations Context." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20 (2): 85-110.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2006. "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace." *American Political Science Review* 100: 637-642.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005a. "The Quality of Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 515-530.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005b. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence." *International Organization* 59: 145-176.
- Bush, George W. 2006. President's Address to the Nation on the Fifth Anniversary of 9/11. Online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060911-3.html>
- Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2005. *Microeconometrics. Methods and Applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chiozza, Giacomo. 2002. "Is there a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (6): 711-734.
- Correlates of War. 2007. *National Material Capabilities v3.02*.
<http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>
- Crenshaw, M. 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism." *Comparative Politics* 13: 379-399.

- Crenshaw, M. 1998. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." in: Walter Reich (ed.): *Origins of Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pp. 7-24.
- Crenshaw, M. 2001. "Why America? The Globalization of Civil War" *Current History* 100: 425-432.
- Ellingsen, Tanja. 2005. "Toward A Revival of Religion and Religious Clashes?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17: 305-322.
- Enders, Walter. 2007. "Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis." in Todd Sandler and Keith Hardley (eds.): *Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 2*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 815-866.
- Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. 2006. *The Political Economy of Terrorism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2005. "Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century." *International Politics* 42: 428-457.
- Fromkin, David. 1975. "The Strategy of Terrorism." *Foreign Affairs* 53: 683-698.
- Fuller, Graham E. 2002. "The Future of Political Islam." *Foreign Affairs* 81: 48-60.
- Gartzke, Erik and Kristian Gleditsch. 2006. "Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide." *European Journal of International Relations* 12(1): 53-87.
- Gleditsch, N.P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-37.
- Henderson, Errol A. 2004. "Mistaken Identity: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis in Light of Democratic Peace Claims." *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 539-563.
- Henderson, Errol A. 2005. "Not Letting Evidence Get in the Way of Assumptions: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis with More Recent Data." *International Politics* 42: 458-469.

- Henderson, Errol A. and Richard Tucker. 2001. "Clear and present strangers: the clash of civilizations and international conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 45: 317-338.
- Hoffman, Stanley. 2002. "Clash of Globalizations" *Foreign Affairs* 81(4): 104-115.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1993a. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22-49.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1993b. "If Not Civilizations, What?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(4): 186-194.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Huntington, Samuel. 2000. "Try Again: A Reply to Russett, Oneal & Cox" *Journal of Peace Research* 37(5): 609-610.
- Huntington, Samuel. 2002. "Religion, Culture and International Conflict After September 11" *Center Conversations* 14: 1-16. Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center.
- IISS. 2004. *Strategic Survey 2004*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Khosrokhavar, Farhad. 2005. *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*. London: Pluto Press.
- Krueger, Alan and David Laitin. 2003. Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism. Mimeo. Princeton University and Stanford University.
- Kydd, Andrew H. and Barbara F. Walter 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31 (1): 49-80.
- Leeds, B.A. 2005. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook. Houston: Rice University, Department of Political Science.
- Lewis, Bernhard. 1990. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *Atlantic Monthly* 266: 47 - 60.
- Li, Quan 2005. "Does Democracy promote or reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 278-297.
- Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler and Jean M. Murdock. 1989. *International Terrorism in the 1980s*. Volume I 1980-1983. Ames: Iowa State University Press.

- Mickolus, Edward F., Todd Sandler, Jean M. Murdock and Peter A. Flemming. 2003. *International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE)*. Data Codebook.
- Moghadam, Assaf. 2003. "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26: 65-92.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Washington, DC.
- Neumann, P.R. and M.L.R. Smith. 2005. "Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and its Fallacies." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28 (4): 571-595.
- Neumayer, E. and T. Plümper. 2007. Foreign Terror on Americans. Working Paper. LSE, Department of Geography and University of Essex: Department of Government.
- OECD. 2007. *International Development Statistics*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. <http://www.sourceoecd.org/>
- Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review* 97 (3): 343-361.
- Pape, Robert A. 2005. *Dying to win – the strategic logic of suicide terrorism*. New York: Random House.
- Pedahzur, Ami, William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg. 2002. "The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14 (3): 141-147.
- Piazza, James A. 2007. "Draining the Swamp. Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, 521-539.
- Plümper, T. and E. Neumayer. 2007. *The Friend of my Enemy is my Enemy: International Alliances and International Terrorism*. University of Essex, Department of Government and LSE, Department of Geography.

- Post, J.M. 1998. "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces." in: Walter Reich (ed.): *Origins of Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, pp. 25-40.
- Rapoport, David C. 1984. "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions." *American Political Science Review* 78: 655-677.
- Rapoport, David C. 2003. *The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism*. In *Attacking Terrorism – Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Richardson, Louise. 2006. *What Terrorists Want*. New York: Random House.
- Richardson, Louise. 2007. "Terrorist Rivals." *Harvard International Review* Spring: 66-69.
- Riedel, Bruce. 2007. "Al Qaeda Strikes Back." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (3): 24-40.
- Rohner, Dominic and Bruno S. Frey. 2007. "Blood and Ink! The Common-interest-Game between Terrorists and the Media." *Public Choice* 133 (1-2): 129-145.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Todd Sandler. 2004. "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (5): 657-671.
- Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal and Michaelene Cox. 2000. "Clash of civilizations, or realism and liberalism déjà vu? Some evidence." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (5): 583-608.
- Sandler, Todd and Walter Enders. 2004. "An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism." *European Journal of Political Economy* 20 (2): 301-316.
- Sedqwick, Mark. 2004. "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(4): 795-814.
- Shughart II, William F. 2006. "An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000." *Public Choice* 128: 7-39.
- Siqueira, Kevin and Todd Sandler. 2006. "Terrorists versus the Government." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (6): 878-898.
- SIPRI. 2007. *Arms Transfers Database*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/>

- Speckhard, Anne. 2006. "The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29: 429-492.
- Sprecher, C. and V. Krause. 2006. "Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Peace Research* 43: 363-369.
- Stern, Jessica. 2003. *Terror in the Name of God – Why Religious Militants Kill*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Taarnby, Michael. 2002. Motivational Parameters in Islamic Terrorism. Mimeo. University of Aarhus Center for Cultural Research.
- Torres, Manuel R., Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh. 2006. "Analysis and Evolution of the Global Jihadist Movement Propaganda." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (3): 399-421.
- United Nations. 2006. *Report of the High-level Group*. New York: United Nations Alliance of Civilizations.
- USAID. 2006. *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Online (Greenbook)*. Online at <http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>
- US Department of Defense. various years. *Military Personnel Statistics*. Online at <http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/MILITARY/Miltop.htm>
- US Department of State. various years. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*. Online at <http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/> and <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/>
- Victoroff, Jeff. 2005. "The Mind of the Terrorist." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: 3-42.
- World Bank. 2006. *World Development Indicators on CD-Rom*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Appendix. Inter-civilizational and Control Variable Definition and Data Sources.

* *rest v west*, *islam v rest* and *islam v west*: Dummy variables indicating civilizational identity of origin and target country. Data from Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000). ‘West’ includes all of Western Europe, plus Australia, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Czech Republic, Dominica, Grenada, Hungary, Jamaica, Malta, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, Trinidad, US, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. ‘Islam’ includes Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen People’s Democratic Republic. ‘Rest’ includes all non-Western countries for the *rest v west* dummy variable and all non-Islamic countries for the *islam v rest* dummy variable.

* *ln pop(origin)* and *ln pop(target)*: The natural log of population size of origin and target country. Source: World Bank (2006).

* *GDPpc target share*: The per capita GDP of the target country divided by the sum of per capita GDPs of target and origin country. Source: World Bank (2006).

* *dem-dem*, *autoc-autoc* and *autoc-dem*: Dummy variables indicating whether origin and target countries are pairs of democracies, autocracies or an autocracy-democracy combination. The omitted category is that of a democratic origin and autocratic target country. To be counted a democracy, the Polity value must be 6 or above. Source: Polity IV project at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/polreg.htm>.

* *identical dyad*: A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the origin and target country are identical.

* *ln distance*: The natural log of the distance between the capital cities of origin and target country. Source: <http://www.eugenesoftware.org/>.

* *contiguity*: This dummy is set to 1 if the two countries are contiguous by land or separated by less than 150 miles of sea water. Source: <http://www.eugenesoftware.org/>.

Table 1: Reproduction of Huntington's Prediction of Conflict Intensity
(based on Huntington 1996: 245)

	West	Islam	Japan	Latin	Ortho.	Sinic	Hindu	African
West	–							
Islam	3	–						
Japan	2	?	–					
Latin	1	?	?	–				
Orthodox	2	3	3	?	–			
Sinic	3	1	1	?	2	–		
Hindu	2	3	?	?	1	3	–	
African	1	3	?	?	?	?	?	–

Table 2: Sum of Terrorist Incidents in Directed Dyads of Civilizations

Terror origin:	Target:									Sum	Row %
	African	Hindu	Islamic	Japanese	Latin	Orthodox	Other	Sinic	Western		
African	146	12	24	12	5	17	0	1	289	506	7.2
Hindu	0	40	5	2	0	4	1	0	28	80	1.1
Islamic	15	19	893	13	15	115	5	11	1239	2325	33.0
Japanese	1	1	8	31	15	4	0	10	209	279	4.0
Latin	3	3	4	32	517	23	0	7	973	1562	22.2
Orthodox	0	0	22	0	2	114	0	2	202	342	4.9
Other	0	13	8	3	2	15	27	22	45	135	1.9
Sinic	1	1	0	4	0	1	0	24	66	97	1.4
Western	28	7	82	22	32	69	1	12	1497	1750	24.9
Sum	194	96	1046	119	588	362	34	89	4548	7042	
Column %	2.8	1.4	14.9	1.7	8.3	5.1	0.5	1.3	64.6		

Note: "Other" is the category for two "lone states" (Haiti and Ethiopia) and those small countries not classified in Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000).

Table 3: Sum of Terrorist Killings in Directed Dyads of Civilizations.

Terror origin:	Target:									Sum	Row %
	African	Hindu	Islamic	Japanese	Latin	Orthodox	Other	Sinic	Western		
African	546	30	29	13	276	53	0	0	357	1304	14.0
Hindu	0	26	0	2	0	0	25	0	362	415	4.5
Islamic	31	68	1396	71	102	126	3	1	2509	4307	46.3
Japanese	0	1	104	15	3	0	0	2	184	309	3.3
Latin	0	3	3	25	662	6	0	0	335	1034	11.1
Orthodox	0	0	22	0	1	312	0	6	28	369	4.0
Other	0	16	6	21	0	54	130	145	188	560	6.0
Sinic	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	265	2	269	2.9
Western	2	2	34	4	6	2	0	2	683	735	7.9
Sum	579	146	1594	151	1050	555	158	421	4648	9302	
Column %	6.2	1.6	17.1	1.6	11.3	6.0	1.7	4.5	50.0		

Note: "Other" is the category for two "lone states" (Haiti and Ethiopia) and those small countries not classified in Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000).

Table 4: Negative Binomial Estimation Results

	incidents			killings		
	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 4	model 5	model 6
ln pop(target)	0.6805 (0.0799) ***	0.6840 (0.0805) ***	0.7019 (0.0875) ***	0.9433 (0.1249) ***	0.9431 (0.1254) ***	0.9700 (0.1338) ***
ln pop(origin)	0.4513 (0.0670) ***	0.4383 (0.0657) ***	0.4661 (0.0754) ***	0.8007 (0.1563) ***	0.7826 (0.1454) ***	0.7769 (0.1431) ***
democratic dyad	0.2823 (0.3209)	0.2735 (0.3140)	0.0520 (0.3560)	-1.2085 (0.7409)	-1.1317 (0.7652)	-1.3748 (0.7558) *
autocratic dyad	-0.5891 (0.2824) *	-0.5329 (0.2754) *	-0.4600 (0.2565) *	-0.1029 (0.5958)	-0.1244 (0.6271)	0.0340 (0.6061)
autoc origin – dem target	0.3779 (0.2645)	0.2594 (0.2588)	0.0764 (0.2928)	0.1311 (0.6377)	0.0513 (0.6712)	-0.2109 (0.7063)
GDPpc share of target	2.4222 (0.3362) ***	2.2392 (0.3654) ***	1.4867 (0.3194) ***	3.1174 (0.5450) ***	3.0724 (0.5593) ***	2.6132 (0.5940) ***
identical dyad	3.7899 (0.5999) ***	3.8088 (0.6021) ***	3.7940 (0.5688) ***	3.8974 (0.9120) ***	3.8062 (0.9463) ***	4.0048 (1.0712) ***
log distance	-0.1954 (0.0721) **	-0.1870 (0.0722) *	-0.2196 (0.0656) **	-0.3815 (0.0912) ***	-0.3907 (0.1050) ***	-0.3997 (0.1081) ***
contiguity	0.7354 (0.3572) *	0.7551 (0.3613) *	0.7722 (0.3444) *	0.4340 (0.6746)	0.2643 (0.7578)	0.2900 (0.7582)
target intervention for government in civil war alliance	0.9537 (0.1002) ***	1.0104 (0.1003) ***	1.0635 (0.1036) ***	1.3198 (0.2948) ***	1.3608 (0.2846) ***	1.3461 (0.2569) ***
arms exports	1.8450 (0.2248) ***	1.8770 (0.2259) ***	1.8952 (0.2158) ***	0.8348 (0.4786) *	0.8787 (0.4691) *	0.9853 (0.4517) **
official development aid	0.4472 (0.1399) **	0.4343 (0.1439) **	0.3080 (0.0994) **	0.5430 (0.2244) *	0.4459 (0.1883) *	0.3619 (0.1948) *
islam v rest	1.0936 (0.3682) **	1.1278 (0.3725) **	0.7160 (0.2498) **	1.6373 (0.7246) *	1.6995 (0.7661) *	0.9031 (0.4922) *
islam v west	0.4406 (0.3766)	1.1036 (0.2520) ***		-0.0062 (0.3552)	0.4974 (0.2386) *	
rest v west			1.4134 (0.3421) ***			1.0422 (0.2712) ***
intercept	-22.6206 (1.6885) ***	-22.6081 (1.6812) ***	-23.6641 (1.9967) ***	-30.5469 (3.1434) ***	-30.1808 (3.0415) ***	-30.8362 (3.2009) ***
lnalpha	3.0260 (0.1391) ***	2.9748 (0.1204) ***	2.9364 (0.1401) ***	6.4247 (0.3575) ***	6.4171 (0.3567) ***	6.3868 (0.3631) ***
N obs	575,876	575,876	575,876	575,876	575,876	575,876
- log pseudo-likelihood	14253.43	14174.25	14055.09	6718.39	6715.66	6677.56
pseudo-R ²	0.239	0.243	0.250	0.114	0.115	0.120

* p(z)<0.1 ** p(z)<0.01 *** p(z)<0.001

Standard errors clustered on civilizational pairs in brackets.

Table 5: Tests for Structural Break in Inter-civilizational Dummy Variable Coefficients

	incidents			killings		
	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 4	model 5	model 6
islam v rest	0.444			-1.038		
• Cold War	(0.407)			(0.583)*		
islam v rest	0.438			0.373		
• Post-Cold War	(0.360)			(0.352)		
islam v west		1.117			-0.875	
• Cold War		(0.246)***			(0.237)***	
islam v west		1.093			0.969	
• Post-Cold War		(0.257)***			(0.250)***	
rest v west			1.64			1.009
• Cold War			(0.371)***			(0.442)**
rest v west			1.22			1.067
• Post-Cold War			(0.352)***			(0.275)***
Chi-square test of coefficient equality	0.00	0.79	2.49	8.01***	72.83***	0.02

Standard errors clustered on civilizational pairs in brackets.

* $p(z) < 0.1$ ** $p(z) < 0.01$ *** $p(z) < 0.001$; • \equiv interacted with

Table 6: Determinants of variation over time in *islam v west* coefficients on killings.

	Islam West killings		
lagged value of coefficient (ldv)	0.6391 (0.1515) ***	0.4883 (0.1428) ***	0.5539 (0.1347) ***
linear trend	0.0360 (0.2600)	-0.0074 (0.0271)	-0.0075 (0.0264)
post-Cold War dummy	0.1156 (0.5311)	0.6955 (0.5068)	0.6013 (0.4870)
Afghanistan and Iraq war dummy			1.3520 (0.4230) **
Afghanistan and Iraq war categorial intercept		0.7450 (0.2462) **	
	-0.5866 (0.3199) *	-0.2243 (0.3070)	-0.1929 (0.3047)
N obs	33	33	33
F	19.01 ***	20.56 ***	21.34 ***
adj. R ²	0.711	0.710	0.718

* p(z)<0.1 ** p(z)<0.01 *** p(z)<0.001