

## **Abstract**

Differences in preferences for unions between youths and adults in Canada are analysed based on a survey of approximately 1500 persons. The results indicate that the preferences of youth for unionisation are strongly influenced by social factors such as familial union status and the attitudes of close peers. Preferences for unionisation are also shaped by the perceived costs and benefits of unionisation to deal with a wide range of workplace issues such as merit pay, voice, fair treatment, opportunities for advancement, layoffs, seniority, and a lack of progressive HRM and legislative protection at the workplace. The different preferences of youths and adults are generally consistent with the divergent effects that unions would have on youths and adults with respect to these issues. Youths have a stronger preference than do adults for unions in general. Most of that stronger preference reflects the stronger desire of youths to have unions deal with workplace issues, than it reflects the exposure of youths to these issues. The fact that preferences of youths for unionisation are strongly shaped by social capital factors such as union membership in the family and the attitudes of family and friends towards unions, highlights the cumulative and inter-generational effects that are involved in the unionisation process. Possible substitutes for unionisation such as progressive HRM practices and legislative protection exert a powerful negative effect on preferences for unionisation, especially for youths. The implications of these and other findings for the future of unionisation are also discussed.

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# **From ‘Playstations’ to ‘Workstations’: Youth Preferences for Unionisation in Canada**

**Rafael Gomez, Morley Gunderson and Noah Meltz**

1. Introduction	1
2. Importance of Understanding Youth Preferences for Unionisation	2
3. Determinants of Youth-Adult Preferences for Unionisation	4
4. Youth-Adult Differences in Unionisation	10
5. Empirical Framework	11
6. Preferences for Unionisation Amongst Youths and Adults	14
7. Concluding Observations	20
Tables	22
Figure	25
Appendix	26
References	27

# From 'Playstations' to 'Workstations': Youth Preferences for Unionisation in Canada

Rafael Gomez, Morley Gunderson and Noah Meltz

September 2001

## Introduction

For unions, the phrase "The future belongs to the young" could be aptly modified to "The future of unionism belongs to young workers aged 15-24." In an era of general union decline and of dramatic demographic changes, understanding the preferences of youths for unionisation takes on increased importance. For unions, understanding whether there is unsatisfied demand for unionisation amongst young workers, is an essential component in the design and implementation of successful organising strategies. For employers, the presence of young workers with a latent desire for unionisation may signal the presence of a workplace 'representation gap', which may require 'bridging', perhaps through the adoption of appropriate high performance workplace practices.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to highlight youth preferences for union membership and to benchmark those attitudinal responses with a comparison of preferences for unionisation amongst adults. The paper begins by highlighting the importance of understanding the preferences of youth for unionisation. It then discusses how preferences for unionisation are initially shaped by the 'socialisation process' at work and by peer group effects prior to entering the workforce. The preferences of youth for unionisation are also discussed within the context of a cost-benefit framework, since the perceived costs and benefits of unionisation may differ for youths and adults. Descriptive information is then provided on the extent to which youths and adults are unionised in Canada. Logistic regressions are presented indicating the extent to which various factors influence the probability of preferring union membership. The empirical evidence enables us to analyse the extent to which youths, as compared to adults, possess *characteristics* that make them more or less prone to prefer unions (i.e. differences in the mean values of the independent variables) as well as the extent to which youths *respond differently* than do adults to those same characteristics and their impact on preferences for unionisation (i.e. differences in the coefficients or response parameters). The average difference between youths and adults in their probability of preferring to belong to a union is then decomposed into two component parts: (i) one part reflecting the differences in the characteristics that tend to influence preferences for unionisation; (ii) and the other reflecting differences in propensities, or how youths and adults respond to those same characteristics. The

paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for unions and employers.

## 2. Importance of Understanding Youth Preferences for Unionisation

Understanding the preferences of youths for unionisation is important for a wide range of reasons, two of which are highlighted below. First, if unions are to *sustain* their existing membership (as in countries like Canada where unionisation has been fairly constant) or *replenish* their lost membership (as in countries like the US and the UK where their decline has been dramatic)<sup>1</sup> then youths become a potential source of new membership. Second, since positive **attitudes** towards unions tend to lead to positive **actions** to vote for unions in representation elections (Montgomery, 1989) then attitudes become an important ingredient to sustain or replenish membership. Both of these issues are addressed in turn.

### New sources of membership growth

As is the case with almost every membership based institution, unions are in need of *revitalisation*, with youths obviously being a potential source of renewal and regeneration of ideas and energy. This is especially the case because of an otherwise ageing workforce across most western economies and especially in Canada, where the leading age of the ‘baby-boom’ (the generation born early after WWII) has now reached its mid 50s. Revitalisation can be particularly important not only because it can provide new ‘blood’, but it can also spawn new ideas for the new world of work, with its growing challenges and opportunities.

Challenges to unionisation are coming from a wide range of directions, many of which disproportionately affect youths. Industrial restructuring<sup>2</sup> involves a move away from traditional sources of union strength, such as manufacturing, and towards areas of union weakness such as services (both “high end” financial and professional services and “low end” personal services). This is exacerbated by the growth of small firms that are more difficult to organise. Even if the job creation that is emanating from small firms is offset by the job destruction associated with the fact that small firms disproportionately go out of business, this job churning or “exit” is not conducive to union growth. Unionism tends to be fostered by long-term employment relationships where “voice” can be utilised. Union organising is also difficult in the growing areas of non-standard employment such as part-time, limited term, self-employment and temporary help agencies (Lowe, 1998; Lowe

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<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of union density in various countries see Lipsig-Mummé (2001, p. 534).

<sup>2</sup> The implications of industrial restructuring for unionisation are emphasized, for example, in Gallagher (1999,

and Rastin, 1999). In all of these areas (i.e. the growth of services, small firms, and non-standard employment) youths are prominent *and* unionisation is difficult - hence exacerbating the challenges associated with organising youths.

Growing global competition and trade liberalisation also make it more difficult for firms to pass union cost increases to customers since prices are increasingly set in world markets. Legislative initiatives that are “union friendly” are also more difficult to establish or sustain given the greater mobility of financial and physical capital to countries or jurisdictions without such union friendly regulation. The growth of this credible exit threat gives capital more power at the political bargaining table, with jurisdictions increasingly competing for business investment and the jobs associated with that investment on the basis of social standards and labour legislation (Gomez and Gunderson, 2001). In such circumstances, governments are under more pressure to respond by restricting their labour regulations in areas that can directly affect unionisation (such as laws governing the establishment and conduct of collective bargaining)<sup>3</sup> as well as in areas that can indirectly benefit unions (such as with labour standards and wage fixing laws that raise costs and reduce competition from the non-union sector). Bolstered by many of these changes, effective management resistance to unions has increased (Logan, 2001). Given that structural changes are reducing the traditional base of unionisation, making it more difficult to organise, unions are seeking new ways to offset these pressures, with youths as well as women, part-time workers, immigrants and ethnic minorities being potential new sources of membership growth (Gallager, 1999, p. 236; Payne 1989, p. 111).

### **State dependence and intergenerational effects**

Tapping into new sources of membership growth is especially important since it is well known that “initial conditions matter” in establishing behavioural attitudes. Networks and norms can be self-perpetuating over time, especially in the case of the unionisation of youths<sup>4</sup>. Patterns of “state dependence” can be established whereby initially starting in a particular state has an independent effect throughout one’s life-course, fostering conditions that encourage remaining in that particular

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p. 252), Green (1992) and Spilsbury, Hoskins, Ashton and Maguire (1987).

<sup>3</sup> In Canada, this recent move away from supportive labour legislation has been manifest in various forms: certification through votes as opposed to the signing of cards; more flexibility in the use of strikebreakers; increased use of mandatory strike votes; limiting the categories of workers who fall within the scope of labour relations legislation; increased time requirements for subsequent application for certification after an earlier unsuccessful certification attempt; requirements for employers to provide information on decertifications; elimination of the ability of labour boards to reduce the requirements for certifications as a remedy for unfair labour practices; and reducing the ability of boards to issue reinstatement orders for employees wrongfully dismissed during an organizing campaign.

<sup>4</sup> The importance of initial exposures to unionisation for youths is emphasized in Freeman and Diamond (2000),

state. If youths are introduced to unionisation early on in their careers, they will be more likely to develop attitudes, networks and norms that foster continued unionisation. Put simply, unionism begets unionism. Conversely, if exposure to unionisation is bypassed early, then a worker may remain bypassed for their entire career. In such circumstances, unions have an added incentive for organising youths - it expands *current* membership and can sustain *future* membership. The cost of organising a young worker, which may appear unprofitable from a short-term time horizon, may be amortised over a lifetime.

Indeed, the cost may be amortised over more than one lifetime since parents who are union members or have positive attitudes towards unions are more likely to pass those attitudes and union status to their children<sup>5</sup>. In such circumstances, if unions decline and parents are less likely to be union members, or to have favourable views of unions, then this can be transmitted intergenerationally, and negative attitudes towards unions on the part of their children will prevail. Unions, therefore, have an even greater incentive to organise the young given the lifetime and intergenerational effects that can result. By yielding benefits over many lifetimes, the state dependent and intergenerational effects of unionisation diminish the costs of organising the young.

Clearly, at present, unions face challenges in organising and sustaining membership in general, and amongst youths in particular. Yet, meeting these challenges can yield dividends over many generations. As such, understanding the attitudes that youths have towards unions - the focus of this paper - becomes crucially important.

### **3. Determinants of Youth-Adult Preferences for Unionisation**

In order to understand whether there is a potential demand for unionisation amongst youth, we need to examine youth preferences for representation against some benchmark. This benchmark is provided by the responses of adult workers. Comparing the different preferences that youths and adults have towards unions, will first necessitate an understanding of how these preferences are shaped by the socialisation process prior to, and during, the initial stages of a working career. Second, once we understand how preferences are shaped, an analysis of preferences for unionisation based on a cost-benefit framework will be undertaken. It is important to note that it is the respective perceptions of youths and adults to the benefits and costs of unionisation that will be

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Fullagar and Barling (1989), Fullagar, Gallagher, Gordon and Clarke (1995), and Payne (1989).

<sup>5</sup> Evidence on the impact of family is given in Barling, Kelloway and Bremermann (1991), Kelloway, Barling and Agar (1996), Grayson (2000), Heshizer and Wilson (1995) and Kelloway and Watts (1994), with most finding that parents attitudes towards unions mattered more than their union status.

emphasised rather than actual costs and benefits *per se*. It is perceptions that influence preferences, and youths and adults may not only face differing costs and benefits associated with unionisation, but the process by which those preferences are shaped may be different as well.

### **Preferences for union membership and the socialisation process**

The question of why it is that some workers want unions to represent them while others do not, is one that labour economists have been dealing with for some time. Following the work of Farber (1983) and Riddell (1993), the conventional assumption is that workers have stable preferences for unionisation, and that these preferences form part of a utility function  $V(\cdot)$  where the expected utility of a union job  $E(V_i^u)$  can be compared to the expected utility of a non-union job  $E(V_i^n)$ . Only if  $Z_i > 0$ , where

$$(1) \quad Z_i = E(V_i^u) - E(V_i^n)$$

will individual  $i$  be willing to vote for unionisation. Whether one wants to join a union or not will under certain conditions, as shown by Farber (1983), be a function of the perceived difference in utility between a union job and a non-union job ( $V_i^u - V_i^n$ ). With this neo-classical choice framework in mind, one can begin to specify each individual's utility index as

$$(2) \quad V_i = f(W_i, J_i, M_i)$$

where  $W_i$  represents the expected union wage premium of individual  $i$  and  $J_i$  represents non-wage aspects of employment such as relationships with supervisors, chances for promotion or layoff, and attachment towards ones employer.  $M_i$  represents any unmeasured preferences or

tastes of individual  $i$ , either favorable or unfavorable towards union membership that are not captured by  $W$  and  $J$ . It is this latter inclination  $M$  to be either 'pro-union' or 'anti-union' that is of particular relevance in the context of youth-adult differences in preferences for unionisation.

Social psychologists model behavior and the determination of attitudes differently from economists. Rather than utilizing a utility function, social psychologists talk about the self and the process by which someone, a worker in this case, comes to adopt a self-concept.<sup>6</sup> In this paper we argue that young workers are essentially 'black boxes' with no well defined self-concept (hence

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<sup>6</sup> One could extend and marry the two approaches, by arguing that a well formed self-concept is akin to a well

their preferences are not as stable as implied in the utility maximization model). Their attitudes towards unionisation are influenced by both social background (i.e. such as whether a family member is a member of a union or not), by the attitudes of peers (i.e. such as whether family friends are generally supportive of unions) and chiefly by the nature of early workplace experiences (i.e. such as whether a worker is employed in a unionised or a non-unionised environment). Following Montgomery (1999), the socialization process for workers might be summarized as follows:




Figure 1: The Socialization Process of a Young Worker

The dynamics of such a feedback loop depend on the assumptions one makes about how well defined ‘a self-concept’ a worker is expected to possess before entering the labor market. One could argue that a young worker with little or no employment experience has a different dynamic than an adult worker with many years of labor market experience. The numbering above reflects the former case, with a young worker strongly influenced by background factors such as familial union status and prevailing social norms at a workplace. These social factors lead to certain individual actions which are then internalized through attributions, and it is through these attributions that a self-concept is initially formed.

To illustrate and to place this model in the context of how preferences for union membership may be formed, assume that we are talking about a young worker with little or no labor market experience and thus no well defined self-concept (she is neutral towards unions). Social norms are those that prevail at home or at a workplace which can either be pro-union or not. In this case let us assume that an individual is born into a non-union household but initially finds employment in a unionised environment (union-friendly workplace norms prevail). In a unionised environment co-workers are more prone to support a union (the action taken will be to keep a union in place). The attributions formed by a young worker will thus be more favorable towards union membership

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defined and stable set of preferences.



(unions must be good since there is no move to decertify) and hence her self-concept will be that of a union friendly individual (she perceives herself as a 'union friendly' worker).

Now, imagine that nothing has changed in the above illustration, except that the worker is middle aged with many more years of work experience. Here one could more accurately conceive of the feedback loop emanating from the self and then leading towards actions. Prevailing social norms will have less of an effect on this worker and it will take more time to dislodge a well formed self concept (which may or may not be pro-union).

The following model generates several interesting implications. The first is that, holding other things constant, prevailing social norms and social capital (i.e. the union status and attitudes of peers and of family members towards unions) will affect youth preferences for unionisation more strongly than for comparable adults. Second, the utility approach and associated cost-benefit framework is amenable to the social psychological understanding of self-concept formation. It is through the  $M$  term in our utility function - which denotes an individual's proclivity to support unions independent of the costs and benefits associated with union status - that allows one to reconcile expected utility comparisons and the social psychological approach. As workers mature and gain labor market experience, the proclivity to be for, or, against unionisation becomes increasingly fixed and is less susceptible to alteration from social forces and prevailing workplace norms. Put simply,  $M$  becomes a 'true' taste variable that is itself not a function of other variables (either observed or unobserved).

Having described how preferences for unionisation might be formed and how they can be incorporated into a standard utility framework for youth and adult workers, we now turn towards the specification of the costs and benefits associated with union membership, which is the subject of the following two subsections.

### **Perceived benefits of unionisation**

Returning to our utility framework  $V(\cdot)$  recall that one of the main benefits of unions to employees is the wage gain  $W_i$  that unions achieve for their membership - a gain that may be in the order of 15 percent, albeit possibly dissipating slightly over time. For younger workers, that gain may be amortised over a longer expected lifetime since they obviously have a longer expected stay in the workforce when compared to adults. While youths may have a longer expected worklife, they may not have a longer expected worklife with their initial employers. Their job search and mobility, as they search for their preferred job match, means that they may perceive fewer benefits from any union wage gain with their initial employers.

Arguably, the more important function of unions is not so much the wage gains, but rather

the provision of due process at the workplace through such mechanisms as the rules of the collective agreement and the grievance procedure that interprets those rules (Barbash, 1987; Meltz, 1989). To the extent that younger workers have not yet experienced the frustration of the lack of due process, this is a benefit that they may not fully appreciate or value (Willoughby and Barclay, 1986, p. 228). On the other hand, as Webber (1982, p. 111) points out, younger workers may be more likely to experience such frustration because “their job expectations are unrealistic; they find it difficult to change from school’s short-range perspective to work’s long-range view; many employers assign them boring tasks that don’t challenge them; and they may begin under an incompetent first supervisor.”

Unions are the institutional embodiment of “voice” at the workplace, with that voice mechanism largely reflecting the preferences of the median voter. The median voter in turn is likely to be an older worker with seniority. In such circumstances, union policy may be shaped towards providing benefits that are valued by older workers such as medical and dental plans, health and disability insurance, pensions and subsidised early retirement programs, and job security provisions and seniority rights - items that are not as valued by younger workers (Bain and Elias, 1985), especially if they have short-term time horizons. This “ageing” of union preferences is likely to increase in the near future as the demographic changes associated with the ageing workforce suggests that the preferences of the median union voter are also likely to “age”, with younger workers being increasingly “outnumbered” at least until the baby-boom retirements come to fruition.

In that vein, younger workers may not easily identify with the preferences of older workers, especially given the “inheritance” of unfunded liabilities that may be passed down to them through pay-as-you-go systems such as public pensions and workers’ compensation. These can be of increasing concern to younger workers given the demographics of an ageing population and the dwindling cohort of the working age population that pays taxes to sustain the social contract upon which such systems rely upon. This will be compounded by the fact that the retirement age population is growing even more by virtue of the fact that retirement is coming relatively earlier and life expectancy is increasing. In such circumstances, the unfunded liabilities of pay-as-you-go systems are compounded by increasing public health care expenditures and private eldercare obligations that younger workers will face. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand why younger workers may have a healthy mistrust that their collective preferences may be swamped by the collective preferences of an older workforce.

In contrast, to the “voice” mechanism of older workers, younger workers are more likely to rely on the external market mechanism of “exit” to deal with workplace issues – leaving situations they do not like, and going to ones that better match their preferences. For them, the exit option is

more viable and this reduces the use of the voice or unionisation mechanism. They are more mobile and not as tied to a particular employer because of family or community ties or a mortgage or children in a local school. As part of the school-to-work transition, they also engage in frequent job changing – essentially choosing the exit option as opposed to the voice mechanism when they dislike their working environment (Lowe and Rastin, 1999, p. 7). This job changing also means that younger workers may not plan to be with a particular employer for long, negating some of the benefits associated with the union wage gain or due process at a particular workplace.

Especially with the advent of the information and technology revolution and the growth of the dot.coms, youths may have more of an individualistic, entrepreneurial perspective. They may feel that they can innovate on a new software or IT product, start their own company in their garage or basement, build it up with a few friends and kindred spirits, go public and then have their next most difficult decision being whether to start over again on another idea or to retire to a world of BMWs and cell phones. The former “hoop dreams” of making it through professional sports has been replaced, or at least, supplemented by the “dot.com” dreams of the dot.compreneurs. For such persons, a union is more of a software programming command implying the intersection of two sets than a valid instrument to enshrine voice at the workplace .

Younger workers may have a different exposure than do adults to “progressive new HRM practices” such as through employee involvement programs that could be regarded as employer alternatives to the union voice mechanism. To the extent that these practices are a substitute for unions, this may affect the benefits that younger and older workers perceive from unionisation.

While many of these factors suggest that younger workers may not perceive or attach substantial benefits to unionisation for their own purposes, they do tend to have more idealistic attitudes<sup>7</sup>. These in turn may shape their perception of the broader social benefits of unions especially given the more egalitarian perspective of unions and emphasis on social issues and community coalitions.

### **Perceived costs of unionisation**

Youth attitudes towards unions will also be influenced by their perceptions of the costs of unions. In most circumstances, the direct costs in terms of dues and fees are likely to be small, albeit even a small amount may loom large given the low pay that youths may experience because they are at the low end of starting pay (and may experience many low pay “starts” given their job changing) and

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<sup>7</sup> The importance of idealism is emphasized, for example, in Barling, Kelloway and Bremermann (1991), Cregan (1991) and Cregan and Johnston (1990).

they are increasingly occupying low-wage service and non-standard jobs.<sup>8</sup> The direct costs associated with dues also depends on whether union dues are applied as a ‘flat-sum’ or as a percentage of pay. It would be less onerous if dues were applied progressively.<sup>9</sup>

Youths may also regard unions as imposing a cost to the extent that the egalitarian emphasis of unions “blunts” the economic returns to such factors as education and skills – factors that youths often disproportionately possess given the dramatic increase in education and “professionalisation” that is occurring. This blunting of returns often occurs through the union emphasis on seniority as opposed to what unions perceive as subjective and managerially determined merit or performance evaluations. As well, unions tend to negotiate equal absolute wage increases, which imply smaller relative gains for higher paid more skilled and educated workers.

The more indirect cost associated with unions is the cost of engaging in a strike or other form of labour dispute. Youths may regard such actions as costly especially if they are job shopping and frequently changing jobs. They may not perceive such costs as worthwhile to win future benefits in such forms as job security and pensions. They may even resent the strike as intruding on their ability to engage in job shopping. Working in the other direction, however, strikes may not be costly, to the extent that they do not have families and mortgages to sustain, and in fact may have the resources of their parents to fall back on. As well, because their opportunity cost of time is lower, youths may be more prone to engage in protests and other forms of social action in general, with strikes fitting into that pattern.

#### **4. Youth-Adult Differences in Unionisation**

Clearly, youths and adults can have different perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with unionisation and this will affect their preferences towards unionisation. Prior to analysing those different preferences, a brief descriptive picture is provided of the differences in the actual extent of unionisation of youths compared to adults in Canada.

Table 1 and Figure 2 give union density by age group for Canada for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000. Union density is lowest for youths relative to every adult age category. At 12.6 percent in 2000, the union density rate of youths is less than one-third of the density rate of adults 45-54, who have the highest rate. The rate, though generally falling for all age groups over the 1990s, is

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<sup>8</sup> This can also be exacerbated if they have student debts, as is increasingly the case.

<sup>9</sup> This may be a way that unions could begin to ‘customize’ their membership in a way that does not disadvantage the lowest paid (often the young) within a bargaining group.

slightly higher for youths in 2000 than it was in 1995. Table 2 illustrates that the low density rate for youths prevails across all regions of Canada.

Of course, the low density rate of youths reflects in large part the fact that they tend to occupy jobs that have low union coverage rates in general, such as in retail and services. In a Canadian context, membership and coverage tends to come with the job (Gallager, 1999, p. 239; Payne, 1989, p. 113). Nevertheless, preferences for unionisation can clearly influence the type of job that is chosen, especially for younger persons as they job shop early in their careers. As well, preferences for unionisation can also influence certifications and de-certifications that can obviously influence the extent of unionisation. It is to analysing those preferences, and how they differ between youths and adults, that we now turn.

## **5. Empirical Framework**

### **Data**

Our empirical analysis of the preferences for unionisation utilises data drawn from the Lipset and Meltz (1997) survey of Canadian and American worker attitudes toward work, social policy and unions. The survey generated a representative sample of Canadian and American workers. The purpose of the survey was to probe the views of the population in general and of employees in particular toward work, institutions and social policy. More specifically, information was provided on general values of workers, including views on individualism versus group or communitarian orientation, the role of governments, confidence in institutions, and perceptions of labour market outcomes such as whether they expected to be laid off in the near future.

The Angus Reid Group, one of Canada's leading public opinion survey firms, administered the survey through telephone calls – which averaged 20-26 minutes per respondent – in June and early July 1996. The survey was conducted in French in the province of Quebec to obtain a representative sample of respondents. In all cases the results in this paper are drawn from interviews with randomly generated samples of 1495 working age adults in Canada.

Both union and non-union respondents were asked a variety of questions about their attitudes towards unions and specifically whether they would prefer to belong to a union. Preferences for union membership differed across age groups, with youths aged 15-24 more interested in belonging to a union than adults aged 25-64 (57 versus 49 percent). It is this differential in preferences for union membership between youths and adults that we now analyse.

## Estimating preferences for union membership

Our measure of preferences for unionisation is based on the response to the survey question “All things considered, if you had a choice, would you personally prefer to belong to/ remain in a labour union or not?” More formally, to capture the probability of preferring to belong to a union we estimate a model of the following form for an individual  $i$ , as

$$(3) \quad \Pr(D_{ij} = 1) = \Phi(X_{ij} \beta + \epsilon_{ij}), j = a, y$$

where  $a$  and  $y$  refer to adult and youth workers respectively,  $\Phi$  is the normal cdf,  $\epsilon$  is the error term, and  $D$  is a dichotomous dependent variable coded 1 if respondents would prefer to belong to a union, and 0 if not<sup>10</sup>. Given the binary-coded nature of the dependent variable, logistic regressions are employed separately on our samples of youth and adult workers. Since the logistic regression coefficients by themselves do not give the changes in probability of preferring a union, such changes are calculated and evaluated at the mean probability of preferring to belong to a union<sup>11</sup>.

Our vector of independent variables ( $X$ ) used in the analysis, are drawn from survey responses that reflect many of the underlying factors discussed previously as affecting the *perceived* (the modifier *perceived* is used because some of the factors may capture perceptions as they are shaped by environmental conditions) costs and benefits of unionisation for youth and adult workers.

More specifically, the vector is composed of five general categories of factors that influence the demand for union membership. The five factors are: (i) individual characteristics which include easy to observe characteristics such as union status and gender as well as ‘hard-to-observe’ variables such as political orientation; (ii) social capital indicators such as whether a family member is a member of a union or not, or whether family and friends have positive attitudes towards unions; (iii) attitudes towards traditional union policies such as seniority based systems of promotion, a preference for collective solutions at work, positive views of voice and negative attitudes towards

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<sup>10</sup> The 12.8 percent of respondents who indicated “did not know” to the question on their preference for a union were omitted from the analysis since they could not logically be grouped as being closer to either the yes or the no category, and a separate analysis of the “did not know” category did not seem merited. The results are very similar if they are grouped with the respondents who indicated “no”.

<sup>11</sup> The logistic function is  $P = [1 + \exp(-x\beta)]^{-1}$ , where  $P=1$  if the respondent indicated that they preferred a union, 0 if not,  $x$  is the vector of explanatory variables, and  $\beta$  is the vector of logit coefficients. The changes in probabilities associated with a unit change in the explanatory variable is  $\delta P / \delta x = P(1-P)\beta$ ; that is, the logit coefficients can be converted to changes in probabilities by simply multiplying them by  $P(1-P)$  where  $P$  is the level of the probability. In this case, they were evaluated at the average probability of 0.567 for youths and 0.498 for adults, which implies  $P(1-P)$  respectively of 0.246 for youths and 0.250 for adults. This calculation of the change in probability is strictly true for small changes in  $x$ . For large changes in  $x$ , as is the case with discrete changes associated with categorical independent variables, the change in probability is calculated by evaluating the probability from the logistic function with the effect of the variable included, and then subtracting the

merit pay; (iv) perceptions about the employer and job which includes such things as whether a worker feels secure at work or fears job loss; (v) and finally union voice substitutes, which include the effect of substitutes for union enforced voice, such as progressive HRM practices and whether employees already feel protected by employment law.

In the probability estimates described above, both the *means* of the explanatory variables and the *effect* they have on the probability of having a preference for unionisation (i.e. the logit coefficients translated into changes in probability) are discussed and compared since they both provide interesting information on youth-adult differences in unionisation. The explanatory variables are also coded such that a positive coefficient is (generally) expected.

### **Decomposing differences in desired union membership**

In order to examine youth-adult differences more systematically, we may want to know how much of the adult-youth difference in desired union membership is due to differences in the distribution of characteristics, and how much is due to differences between the two groups in the likelihood of a worker with the same characteristics preferring unionisation? In order to address this question, the intergenerational gap in the probability of desired membership can be decomposed into two terms, one associated with inter age-group differences in characteristics, and the second due to differences in the effect of those characteristics on the probability of desiring unionisation.

The first step, as is appropriate for logistic regressions (Nielson, 1998), is to decompose the difference in probabilities of preferring membership into one part which is caused by differing propensities (*R*) and another part which is explained by differences in characteristics (*C*) between youths (*y*) and adults (*a*). Using adults as the standard, the average estimated probability of desired unionisation for both age groups is given by

$$(4) \quad \bar{P}_y = \sum_{i=1}^N F \left[ X_{yi} \hat{B} \right] / N_{yi}$$

$$(5) \quad \bar{P}_a = \sum_{i=1}^N F \left[ X_{ai} \hat{d} \right] / N_{ai}$$

where  $N_i$  is the number of observations for each age group  $j$ . Define

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probability with the effect of the variable excluded.

$$(6) \quad \bar{P}_a^y = \sum_{i=1}^N F[X_{ai}, \hat{B}] / N_{ai}$$

where (4) is the preferred rate of union membership amongst adults that would be predicted if each adult worker retained his or her ‘union-preferring’ individual and workplace characteristics, but the impacts of those characteristics on the probability of preferring to belong to a union were the same as those estimated for youths. The intergenerational union preference gap can then be decomposed using the following identity which defines  $R$  and  $C$ :

$$(7) \quad \left| \bar{P}_a - \bar{P}_y \right| = \underbrace{\bar{P}_a - \bar{P}_a^y}_R + \underbrace{\bar{P}_a^y - \bar{P}_y}_C$$

The term  $R$  is the average probability that  $D=1$  for adults minus the average probability that  $D=1$  if adults reacted like youth. The term  $C$  is the average probability that  $D=1$  for adults if they reacted like youth minus the average probability that  $D=1$  for youths.

## 6. Preferences for Unionisation Amongst Youths and Adults

As indicated in the first row of Table 3, 56.7 percent of youths and 49.8 percent of adults indicated that they would prefer to belong to or remain in a union (hereafter simply referred to as prefer a union).

### The effect of individual characteristics

The preference for unionisation is lower for male compared to female youths, and the opposite for male compared to female adults. This is one of the few variables that has a sign difference between youths and adults. The results suggest that for the older generations of workers, males prefer unions more than do females, while for the younger generation, females prefer unions more than do males (albeit the effects are not statistically significant). This is consistent with unions catering to male preferences for older generations, but shifting towards female preferences, as females become more prominent in the workforce and in unions.

The preference for unionisation is higher for both youths and adults who are currently union members compared to those who are not union members, and the magnitudes are substantial. Youths who are union members, for example, are 0.36 more likely to prefer unionisation than are youths who are not union members, and the effect is slightly larger for adults. The fact that union



members (for both youths and adults) prefer unionisation suggests that the number who want to remain unionised vastly outweighs the number of union members who would prefer to not be a member of a union. Alternatively stated, the desire to remain certified vastly exceeds any desire to decertify on the part of union members, and this is true for both youths and adults.

As indicated by the mean values, the political orientation of youths and adults in terms of left, right and centre on the political spectrum are remarkably similar. This is somewhat surprising given the perception that people become more conservative as they age, but it is consistent with the perspective that youths today are more conservative than youths of yesterday. As expected, persons at the centre and especially on the left in the political spectrum are more likely to prefer unions than are persons on the right of the spectrum, although the effects are statistically insignificant ( $P = 0.22$ ) for youths.

### **The effects of social capital and social norms**

Persons who have a union member in the family are themselves much more likely to prefer unionisation, with the effect being almost four times as strong for youths compared to adults. Specifically, the probability of preferring unions is 0.37 higher for youths from families with an existing union member, while it is 0.11 higher for adults in the same circumstances. As anticipated from the social psychological model of union preference formation, families are a more important influence in shaping the preferences of youths, including their preferences for unionisation, than is the case for adults.

A similar pattern prevails for the influence of family and friends and their support for unionisation. That is, the influence of family and friends is important for both youths and adults, but once again stronger for youths than for adults. Specifically, the probability of preferring unions is 0.41 higher for youths whose family and friends support unions, compared to being 0.29 higher for adults in the same circumstances. Clearly, and perhaps not surprisingly, the influence of family and friends is much stronger in influencing the preferences of youths than it is in influencing the preferences of adults.

The large effects of the variables reflecting “union member in the family” and the “family and friends support unions” were anticipated in our model of self-concept formation. This, perhaps, is one explanation for the cumulative “snowballing” effect that occurs when union decline seems to foster continued union decline, as in the US context over the last two decades. If unions begin to decline, then it is less likely that there will be a union member in the family, and less likely that family and friends will support unions (especially given the earlier positive effect of union status on

preferences for unionisation). In such circumstances, union decline begets further union decline. This is especially the case, given the much stronger effect of these variables on youths compared to adults, which implies that these impacts will persist as youths continue working in the labour force. Of course, the process can also work in the opposite direction. Effective union organising ‘today’ can have multiplier effects well into the future, as it leads to more union family members and more union friendly family and peers, both of which enhance preferences for unionisation, especially amongst youths upon which future unionisation is built.

### **The effects of traditional union policies**

The probability of preferring a union is higher amongst persons who have a negative attitude towards merit pay. This is understandable given that unions also generally oppose managerially determined merit/performance pay schemes. What is surprising, however, is that the effect is almost twice as large for youths (0.30) compared to adults (0.18). This is somewhat surprising since the alternative to merit pay is generally a seniority based pay system that unions tend to prefer, and that would seem to benefit adults more than youths. The mean values also indicate that approximately 20 percent of youths tend to have a negative attitude to merit pay, with a slightly higher figure for adults.

Since unions tend to be the institutional embodiment of voice at the workplace, it is not surprising that the probability of preferring unionisation is considerably higher for persons who take a positive view of voice at the workplace. The impact is especially large for youths (0.34) compared to adults (0.23). The mean values also indicate that proportionately more youths (77 percent) compared to adults (61 percent) take a positive view of voice at the workplace. In essence, while both youths and adults take a positive view of voice at the workplace, and both are prepared to act on that view through their preference for a union, those impacts are greater for youths compared to adults. An especially important finding for potential organisers in the labour movement, is the fact that youths have a more positive view of voice and that they are prepared to act on it by supporting unionisation.

The proportion of respondents who feel layoffs should be based on merit only was not much higher for youths (0.61) compared to adults (0.54) and conversely the proportion who feel layoffs should be based on seniority only was not much lower for youths (0.363) than for adults (0.419). This is somewhat surprising since layoffs based on seniority as opposed to merit would disproportionately benefit adults. While youths may idealistically believe in seniority over merit, those who state those beliefs do not seem prepared to translate them into reality by supporting unions which would emphasise seniority over merit (i.e. the coefficients on preferring unions are

insignificant for youths). Adults, however, are much more likely to act on their beliefs by supporting unions since unions would help translate those beliefs into reality by supporting the seniority principle (i.e. the coefficients on preferring unions are positive and significant for adults who support the seniority principle).

The proportion of youths and adults who believe that individual solutions to workplace problems are better than collective solutions (and vice versa) are fairly similar for youths and adults.<sup>12</sup> The fact that almost half of each group, however, did not have a view on this (not shown in the table since the “did not know” were not presented) highlights the substantial numbers who are uncertain in this area and hence who could be persuaded into individual solutions (e.g. progressive HRM practices) or collective solutions (e.g. unions). Even though similar proportions of youths and adults feel that collective solutions to workplace problems are better than individual solutions, adults seem more willing to act on their views through supporting unions (i.e. the adult coefficient is positive and significant,  $P = 0.02$ , while the youth coefficient is insignificant,  $P = 0.61$ ). This is one of the few areas where adults seemed more willing than youths to act on their beliefs by expressing a preference for unionisation when they had a belief that was conducive to unionisation (i.e. one of the few areas where the magnitude of the coefficient was greater for adults than for youths).

### **The effect of working conditions and job characteristics**

Adults who feel no loyalty to their employer are 0.16 more likely to prefer a union, compared to adults who feel loyalty to their employer (although this effect is significant only at the 0.12). For youths, the effect is statistically insignificant ( $P = 0.73$ ) likely reflecting the fact that the exit option for youths means that they are under less pressure to act on their lack of loyalty by preferring the voice option of unions.

The effect of the perception of employees being treated unfairly is more dramatic for youths compared to adults. Specifically, the probability of preferring unions is 0.42 greater for youths who perceive employees being treated unfairly, compared to youths who do not perceive employees as being treated unfairly. For adults, the impact of unfair treatment is small (0.07) and statistically insignificant. Importantly, the mean values indicate that 58 percent of youths compared to only 13 percent of adults perceive employees as being treated as unfairly. In essence, youths have a much stronger perception of unfair treatment at the workplace and they are more prepared to act on it in terms of support for unionisation.

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<sup>12</sup> There were several questions in Lipset and Meltz (1997) survey that covered aspects of the collectivist/individualistic preference ranking. These measures were included but since they were highly collinear we decided to keep the closest workplace oriented measure of individualism in the specification.

The mean values indicate that the same proportion of youths and adults (around 31 percent) tend to think they have poor opportunity for advancement. Interestingly, this has an opposite effect on youths compared to adults (although the effects are statistically insignificant). That is, adults who feel they have poor opportunity for advancement are more likely to prefer unions, while for youths the opposite is the case. This likely reflects the fact that the seniority principle followed by unions is apt to favour adult opportunities for advancement and reduce youth opportunities for advancement.

Only about 19 percent of youths, compared to 31.5 percent of adults, worry about layoffs. This likely reflects the lower cost of layoffs to youths and the fact that they expect to be laid off given the practice of “last-in, first-out”. The different impact that this concern for layoffs has on preferences for unionisation between youths and adults, however, is dramatic – increasing the probability of preferring a union by 42 percent for youths with zero impact for adults. This is surprising since unions would tend to foster the last-in, first-out phenomenon that tends to put youths at more risk of layoffs, compared to adults. Perhaps the youths who worry about layoffs feel that this would be offset by unions negotiating general job security provisions directly, or indirectly through such mechanisms as restrictions on subcontracting.

### **The effect of union voice substitutes**

Importantly, a lack of progressive HRM practices at work translates into a large preference for unions on the part of youths, while it has no effect on the preferences of adults. Specifically, youths working in establishments that do not have progressive HRM practices are 0.43 more likely to prefer a union than are youths that have progressive practices at work. This clearly highlights the extent to which progressive HRM practices can be a potential substitute for unionisation, especially in the minds of younger workers in the years when their preferences for the kind of working environment they expect to work in, are being shaped. It also highlights the understandable resistance that unions often have to such practices since they are a viable threat to unions, especially for the new generation of workers that have not been raised under a history of unionism.

Similar portions of adults and youths felt that they were protected by workplace law (51 percent) and not protected by such laws (17 percent). The fact that a substantial portion of both youths and adults (slightly over 30 percent) did not know if they felt protected, again highlights the substantial numbers who could be influenced by such protection, to the extent that it is a substitute for the protection provided by unions. This is especially the case for youths since those who felt they were not protected by workplace law were 0.35 more likely to prefer a union than were youths who felt they were protected by such laws. This also highlights the conventional dilemma that unions

face in this area. They may support economy-wide protective legislation for reasons of social justice and because it can raise the cost of non-union labour relative to union labour that already has that protection through the collective agreement. But such legislation can also be a substitute for unionisation to the extent that it reduces the need to provide the protection through unionisation.

### **What is the overall assessment?**

As an overall generalisation, preferences for unionisation on the part of both youths and adults are shaped by family and background factors and more importantly by their concerns about workplace issues such as merit pay, fair treatment, opportunity for advancement, layoffs, seniority and the absence of progressive HRM or legal protection at work. (This is illustrated by the preponderance of positive coefficients in Table 3, whereby the variables were generally ordered in such a way that a positive coefficient would be expected if the union could deal with the workplace issue). Importantly, youths tended to have a stronger response than did adults to prefer unionisation when faced with these issues (i.e. the coefficients for youths tended to be larger than the coefficients for adults). It is largely for these reasons that youths had a higher overall propensity to prefer unions in general – that is, the overall probability of preferring unions was 0.567 for youths compared to 0.498 for adults.

### **Decomposition analysis**

This later statement that the higher overall propensity of youths compared to adults to prefer unionisation to deal with workplace issues can be illustrated more formally by a conventional decomposition of the difference between youths and adults in their overall probability of preferring unions. That is, the overall probability of preferring unions was 0.567 for youths compared to 0.498 for adults, for a difference of 0.069 in favour of a higher preference of youths for unionisation. That difference of 0.069 can be decomposed into two component parts. One component is attributable to differences between youths and adults in their *characteristics* that can influence preferences for unionisation such as their views on merit pay, voice, fair treatment, opportunity for advancement, layoffs, seniority, and the existence of progressive HRM or legislative protection on the job. These are the independent or X variables on the logit analysis as given by the mean values of columns (1) and (3) in Table 3. The other component is attributable to differences in the *responses* of youths and adults to those characteristics in terms of their *propensity* to prefer unions to deal with these issues. These responses are the coefficients or changes in probabilities of preferring unions as given

in columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.

The decomposition analysis presented in Table 4 indicates that about two-thirds (62 percent) of the higher preference of youths for unionisation can be attributable to the greater response of youths to prefer unionisation to deal with these workplace issues, and about one third (38 percent) can be attributed to the fact that youths are more exposed to the workplace issues or attitudes that give rise to a greater preference for unionisation to deal with such issues in general. This has important implications for unions and their organisers, as it indicates that although youth make up only 1/5 of all union members, they are amenable to union membership.

## **7. Concluding Observations**

Our empirical analysis of the preferences for unionisation on the part of youths and adults gives rise to the following generalisations:

- Preferences for unionisation are shaped by the perceived costs and benefits of unionisation to deal with a wide range of workplace issues such as merit pay, voice, fair treatment, opportunities for advancement, layoffs, seniority, and the lack of progressive HRM and legislative protection at the workplace.
- The different preferences of youths and adults are generally consistent with the different effects that unions would have on youths and adults with respect to these issues.
- Youths have a stronger preference than do adults for unions in general. Most of that stronger preference reflects the stronger desire of youths to have unions deal with these workplace issues, than it reflects the exposure of youths to these issues. For example, youths are slightly more likely than are adults to be exposed to a lack of progressive HRM practices at their workplace, but they are much more responsive than are adults to prefer unions as a result of that lack of progressive practices.
- The one area where youths were less likely than adults to express a desire to unionise was in terms of preferences for individual or collective solutions at work. Even though similar proportions of youths and adults feel that collective solutions to workplace problems are better than individual solutions, adults who believe in collective solutions are more willing to act on their views by supporting unions.
- The fact that almost half of all respondents did not know whether collective or individual solutions were better, highlights the substantial numbers who are uncertain in this area and hence

who could be persuaded into individual solutions (e.g. progressive HRM practices) or collective solutions (e.g. unions).

- The preferences of youths for unionisation are strongly shaped by social capital and background factors such as union membership in their family and the attitudes of their family and friends towards unions, highlighting the cumulative and inter-generational effects that can be involved.
- Possible substitutes for unionisation such as progressive HRM practices and legislative protection have a powerful effect on preferences for unionisation, especially for youths.
- In many areas there were a substantial number of persons who responded “did not know” to questions on their views of workplace issues such as unfair treatment of employees, loyalty to their employer, the existence of progressive HRM and legislative protection at their workplace, and their view on the appropriateness of collective versus individual responses to workplace issues. This suggests substantial numbers who could be persuaded into unionisation if they felt unions could deal with these issues, or away from unionisation if they felt employers could more effectively deal with them.

In essence, the potential for unionisation or de-unionisation is prominent, especially for youths, given their preference for unions to deal with various workplace issues. The future of unionisation will be strongly influenced by the attitudes of youths towards various workplace issues and how those issues can be dealt with by employers or unions.

**Table 1: Union Density in Canada by Age Group: 1990-2000**

Age group	1990	1995	2000
	%	%	%
<b>Total: 15+</b>	35.6	31.1	30.4
<b>Youth: 15-24</b>	17.5	10.7	12.6
<b>Adult: 25+</b>	39.5	37.2	35.6
<b>25-44</b>	36.3	31.8	30.7
<b>45-54</b>	43.2	44.1	42.1
<sup>†</sup> <b>55+</b>	39.1	35.7	33.9

Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Canada and Perspectives on Labour and Income, Statistics Canada.

Note: † the 55+ age group is the category used in Statistics Canada union density data. In our multivariate analysis we employ 55-64 year olds, thereby restricting our analysis to non-retirees and therefore excluding those persons who could have re-entered the workforce past retirement.

**Table 2: Provincial Union Density Rates in Canada by Age Group: 1999**

	Canada	Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	B.C.
	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Total: 15+</b>	30.5	29.8	35.4	26.5	26.9	33.9
<b>Youth: 15-24</b>	11.3	6.5	17.3	9.4	10.9	12.7
<b>Adult: 25+</b>	34.3	34.5	39.1	29.5	30.8	37.9
<b>25-44</b>	31.0	30.6	35.9	26.6	28.4	33.9
<b>45-54</b>	42.5	43.5	46.9	36.9	37.5	47.6
<sup>†</sup> <b>55+</b>	35.1	34.3	36.9	32.3	31.7	40.5

Source: Akyeampong (2000).

Note: † the 55+ age group is the category used in Statistics Canada union density data. In our multivariate analysis we employ 55-64 year olds, thereby restricting our analysis to non-retirees and therefore excluding those persons who could have re-entered the workforce past retirement.



**Table 3: Factors Influencing Probability of Preferring to Belong to a Union, Youths - Adults, Canada, 1996**  
(From Logistic Regression, Logit Coefficients and significance levels given in Appendix)

	Youths <sup>±</sup>		Adults <sup>±</sup>	
	Means <sup>+</sup> (1)	) Probability (2)	Means <sup>+</sup> (3)	) Probability (4)
Overall mean of dependent variable	.567	n.a.	.498	n.a.
<b>Individual Characteristics</b>				
(Female)	.472		.498	
Male	.528	-.262	.502	.055
(Non-union respondent)	.790		.544	
Union respondent	.210	.355**	.456	.404**
(Politically right of centre)	.205		.197	
Politically at centre	.524	.254	.502	.170**
Politically left of centre	.188	.260	.183	.239**
<b>Social Capital</b>				
(No union member in family)	.343		.412	
Union member in family	.359	.368**	.319	.113**
(Family & friends oppose unions)	.384		.449	
Family & friends support unions	.542	.414**	.506	.290**
<b>Attitudes to Traditional Union Policies</b>				
(Positive attitude to merit pay)	.789		.772	
Negative attitude to merit pay	.203	.302*	.223	.179**
(Negative view of voice)	.213		.358	
Positive view of voice	.771	.336**	.614	.229*
(Prefer layoffs based on merit only)	.608		.537	
Prefer layoffs based on merit & seniority	.029	.235	.044	.219**
Prefer layoff based on seniority only	.363	.061	.419	.200**
(Individual solution to work problems best)	.337		.327	
Collective solution to work problems best	.233	.127	.193	.139**
<b>Perceptions of Working Conditions and Job</b>				
(Feels loyalty to employer)	.645		.641	
Feels no loyalty to employer or unknown	.355	-.123	.359	.157
(Employees treated fairly at work)	.213		.564	
Employees treated unfairly at work	.578	.419**	.133	.071
(Good or unknown opportunity to advance)	.686		.684	
Poor opportunity to advance at work	.314	-.246	.316	.063
(Not worried about layoffs or unknown)	.812		.685	
Worried about layoffs	.188	.416**	.315	.001
<b>Union Voice Substitutes</b>				
(Have progressive HRM at job)	.255		.387	
No progressive HRM at job	.407	.427**	.335	.036
(Feel protected by workplace law)	.510		.511	
Feel unprotected by workplace law	.169	.354*	.172	.030
Sample Size	147	-	1057	-

<sup>+</sup> The means indicate the proportion of respondents in each category. If they do not sum to 1, that difference reflects the "did not know" responses that were included in the regression although the results were not reported here.

P<.05\*\*; .10\*. <sup>±</sup>Youths are those workers aged 16-24. Adults are those workers aged 25-64.

**Table 4: Decomposing the Adult-Youth Difference in the Probability of Preferring to Belong to a Union**

Decomposition <sup>?</sup>	Percentage points
1. $\bar{P}_y$	56.7
2. $\bar{P}_a$	49.8
3. $\bar{P}_a^y$	54.1
4. $R = \left  \bar{P}_a - \bar{P}_a^y \right $	4.3 (62) <sup>?</sup>
5. $C = \left  \bar{P}_a^y - \bar{P}_y \right $	2.6 (38) <sup>?</sup>
6. $R + C = \left  \bar{P}_a - \bar{P}_y \right $	6.9 (100) <sup>?</sup>

<sup>?</sup> The numbers in brackets represent the proportion (expressed in percentages) of the total difference in adult-youth preferences.


<sup>?</sup> The probabilities (expressed as percentages) are calculated and defined as follows:

$$\bar{P}_y = \sum_{i=1}^{N_y} F \left[ X_y \hat{B} \right] / N_y : \text{Average youth probability of preferring union membership}$$

$$\bar{P}_a = \sum_{i=1}^{N_a} F \left[ X_a \hat{d} \right] / N_a : \text{Average adult probability of preferring union membership}$$

$$\bar{P}_a^y = \sum_{i=1}^{N_a} F \left[ X_a \hat{B} \right] / N_a : \text{Average adult probability of preferring union membership with youth propensities.}$$

$$\left| \bar{P}_a - \bar{P}_y \right| = \underbrace{\bar{P}_a - \bar{P}_a^y}_R + \underbrace{\bar{P}_a^y - \bar{P}_y}_C : \text{Total difference due to propensities (R) and to characteristics (C).}$$



Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Canada and Perspectives on Labour and Income, Statistics Canada.

## Appendix

**Table A: Factors Influencing Probability of Preferring to Belong to a Union, Youths - Adults, Canada, 1996: Logit Coefficients and Significance Levels**

	Youths <sup>±</sup>		Adults <sup>±</sup>	
	Logit (1)	Probability (2)	Logit (3)	Probability (4)
Overall mean of dependent variable	.567	n.a.	.498	n.a.
<b>Individual Characteristics</b>				
(Female)				
Male	-1.09	0.11	0.22	0.19
(Non-union respondent)				
Union respondent	2.19	0.03	2.22	0.00
(Politically right of centre)				
Politically at centre	1.25	0.22	0.71	0.00
Politically left of centre	1.29	0.22	1.04	0.00
<b>Social Capital</b>				
(No union member in family)				
Union member in family	2.39	0.02	0.46	0.00
(Family & friends oppose unions)				
Family & friends support unions	3.65	0.00	1.32	0.00
<b>Attitudes to Traditional Union Policies</b>				
(Positive attitude to merit pay)				
Negative attitude to merit pay	1.62	0.08	0.75	0.00
(Negative view of voice)				
Positive view of voice	1.96	0.02	0.99	0.00
(Prefer layoffs based on merit only)				
Prefer layoffs based on merit & seniority	1.13	0.47	0.95	0.01
Prefer layoff based on seniority only	0.26	0.72	0.85	0.00
(Individual solution to work problems best)				
Collective solution to work problems best	0.55	0.61	0.56	0.02
<b>Perceptions of Working Conditions and Job</b>				
(Feels loyalty to employer)				
Feels no loyalty to employer or unknown	-0.49	0.73	0.65	0.12
(Employees treated fairly at work)				
Employees treated unfairly at work	3.98	0.03	.133	.071
(Good or unknown opportunity to advance)				
Poor opportunity to advance at work	-1.02	0.27	0.25	0.24
(Not worried about layoffs or unknown)				
Worried about layoffs	3.80	0.02	0.00	0.98
<b>Union Voice Substitutes</b>				
(Have progressive HRM at job)				
No progressive HRM at job	4.92	0.00	0.15	0.49
(Feel protected by workplace law)				
Feel unprotected by workplace law	2.19	0.07	0.12	0.62
Sample Size	147	-	1057	-

<sup>±</sup>Youths are those workers aged 16-24. Adults are those workers aged 25-64.

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