Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions

Manning, Alan (2001) Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions. CEPDP (514). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK. ISBN 0753015439

Preview

PDF Download (81kB) | Preview

Abstract

Implicit in many discussions of labour market policy is the assumption that, in the absence of interventions, the operation of the labour market is well-approximated by the perfectly competitive model. The merits or demerits of particular policies is then seen as a trade-off between efficiency and equality. This paper analyses the impact of a variety of policies û the minimum wage, trade unions, unemployment insurance, progressive income taxation and restrictions on labour contracts û on efficiency when labour markets in the absence of intervention are monopsonistic and not perfectly competitive. A simple version of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model is used for this purpose.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2001 Alan Manning
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification:	J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J0 - General
Date Deposited:	29 Jul 2008 11:41
Last Modified:	08 May 2024 21:43
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20097

Actions (login required)

View Item