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Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions

Manning, Alan ORCID: 0000-0002-7884-3580 (2001) Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions. CEPDP (514). Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. ISBN 0753015439

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Abstract

Implicit in many discussions of labour market policy is the assumption that, in the absence of interventions, the operation of the labour market is well-approximated by the perfectly competitive model. The merits or demerits of particular policies is then seen as a trade-off between efficiency and equality. This paper analyses the impact of a variety of policies û the minimum wage, trade unions, unemployment insurance, progressive income taxation and restrictions on labour contracts û on efficiency when labour markets in the absence of intervention are monopsonistic and not perfectly competitive. A simple version of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model is used for this purpose.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information: © 2001 Alan Manning
Divisions: Centre for Economic Performance
Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J0 - General
Date Deposited: 29 Jul 2008 11:41
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2021 11:49
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/20097

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