Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2007) The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation. Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. (Unpublished)
|
PDF
Download (263Kb) | Preview |
Abstract
Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agen- das of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or e¤ectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. Applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation repres- ented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is e¤ectively dictatorial.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://personal.lse.ac.uk/list/default.htm |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 Franz Dietrich and Christian List |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
| Sets: | Departments > Government Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Jul 2008 08:33 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20067/ |
Actions (login required)
 |
Record administration - authorised staff only |
Download statistics
Download statistics