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Epistemic democracy : generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem

List, Christian (2001) Epistemic democracy : generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (3). pp. 277-306. ISSN 0963-8016

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Identification Number: 10.1111/1467-9760.00128


This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any other. The present chapter shows, in the three-option case, that given suitably systematic, however slight, deviations from an impartial culture situation, the probability of a cycle converges either to zero (more typically) or to one (less typically) as the number of individuals increases.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2001 Blackwell Publishing
Divisions: Government
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited: 28 Jul 2008 09:05
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 03:10

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