Maskin, Eric and Moore, John (1998) Implementation and renegotiation. TE, 366. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1998 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation|
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG)
Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers
|Date Deposited:||14 Jul 2008 09:43|
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