Hart, Oliver and Moore, John (1999) On the design of hierarchies: coordination versus specialization. TE, 375. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplnes, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (3440Kb) | Preview
We develop a model of hierarchies based on the allocation of authority. A firm's owners have ultimate authority over a firm's decisions, but they have limited time or capacity to exercise this authority. Hence owners must delegate authority to subordinates. However, these subordinates also have limited time or capacity and so further delegation must occur. We analyze the optimal chain of command given that different agents have different tasks: some agents are engaged in coordination and others in specialization. Our theory throws light on the nature of hierarchy, the optimal degree of decentralization, and the boundaries of the firm.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 1999 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries
D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG)
Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers
|Date Deposited:||14 Jul 2008 08:49|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|