Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2005) Strategy-proof judgment aggregation. PEPP, 9. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
In the theory of judgment aggregation on logically connected propositions, an important question remains open: Which aggregation rules are manipulable and which are strategy-proof? We define manipulability and strategy-proofness in judgment aggregation, characterize all strategy-proof aggregation rules, and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Among other escape-routes from the impossibility, we discuss weakening strategy-proofness itself. Comparing two prominent aggregation rules, we show that conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof, but generates incomplete judgments, while premise-based voting is only strategy-proof for "reason-oriented" individuals. Surprisingly, for "outcome-oriented" individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 the authors |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Judgment aggregation, strategy-proofness, logic, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Sets: | Departments > Government Research centres and groups > LSE Choice Group Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| Identification Number: | 9 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19299/ |
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