Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2005) Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation. PEPP, 13. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op- posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2005 the authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
|Sets:||Departments > Government
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
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