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The political economy of fiscal policy coordination in EMU: from disciplinarian device to insurance arrangement

Schelkle, Waltraud (2005) The political economy of fiscal policy coordination in EMU: from disciplinarian device to insurance arrangement. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (2). pp. 371-391. ISSN 0021-9886

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Abstract

The fiscal policy framework of EMU and possible reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact have elicited much debate. The pact has been predicated on a conception of it as a device to discipline Member States. This gives rise to a paradox in which the credibility of policy-makers it is supposed to enhance is undermined. The article puts forward an alternative conception of policy co-ordination — collective insurance — designed to enhance the effectiveness of fiscal stabilization. The two approaches lead to different interpretations of how domestic interests affect policy-making. The insurance approach is shown to support various reform proposals by the Commission.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/JCMS
Additional Information: © 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Sets: Departments > European Institute
Collections > Economists Online
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 16 Sep 2008 14:29
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/16567/

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