Ioannides, Yannis M and Pissarides, Christopher (1983) Wages and employment with firm-specific seniority. Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (2). pp. 573-580. ISSN 0741-6261
Abstract
We examine wages and employment for junior and senior workers when seniority is firm-specific. We show that if workers are risk averse, the firm chooses both the junior and senior wage independently of the wage offers received by its workers from other firms. Junior workers are paid less than the value of their marginal product and senior workers are paid more. If the firm can monitor its workers' outside offers, it will choose to lay off workers with good offers, but which, nevertheless, may not be so good as its own senior wage.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journa... |
| Additional Information: | © 1983 The RAND Corporation |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc. |
| Sets: | Departments > Economics Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Apr 2007 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/1655/ |
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