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Contested meanings of transparency in central banking

Begg, Iain (2007) Contested meanings of transparency in central banking. Comparative European Politics, 5 (1). pp. 36-52. ISSN 1472-4790

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Identification Number: 10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110100


Over the last two decades, there have been far-reaching transformations in the ways central banks operate, especially in regard to how openly they communicate with other actors. Transparency in central banking has two quite distinct motivations. The first is to provide a means of holding the central bankers to account, while the second is about the efficiency of their policy-making. These two motivations for transparency reflect contestable norms about the choices central banks make. The paper discusses how transparency in central banking functions and explores how the underlying norms might be open to contestation. A typology showing the rationale for, and effects of, different forms of transparency is constructed and its implications assessed.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2007 Palgrave Macmillan
Divisions: European Institute
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: B - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B20 - General
Date Deposited: 14 Jul 2008 15:56
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2023 13:25

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