Kirchmaier, Thomas and Grant, Jeremy (2004) Who governs?: corporate ownership and control structures in Europe. SSRN working paper, Social Science Research Network.
Based on a unique and consistent dataset of firm ownership in Europe, we set out to systematically catalogue and categorise owners of European equities by type (i.e. family, institutional etc.), and show the importance of ownership coalitions to achieving control. We also highlight the increasing importance of institutional investors and conversely, their weakness in relation to prevailing ownership structures. Their influence is clearly limited where a single shareholder has legal control, and also where ownership coalitions rule. The legal ownership category accounts for over 50% of the top 100 public companies in the Continental European economies examined.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2004 The Authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Research centres and groups > Financial Markets Group (FMG)
Departments > Management
Collections > Economists Online
Collections > LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) Working Papers
|Date Deposited:||27 Nov 2008 11:01|
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