

# **A Historical Transformation from Feudalism to 'Capitalism'**

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## Abstract

'Where feudalism ends, the capitalist regime commences.' This familiar and *prima facie* self-evident statement is the proposition which I want to examine in this paper. I would argue as follows: Even given the uniformity of feudalism everywhere in the world (i.e. if it has always appeared in its purest form with no deviation from the logically constructed ideal type), it must have appeared in combination with many other elements such as, for example, whether a country has an oceanic or continental climate, the types of weapons available in a society, the type of religion most influential in the lives of the people there, and so forth. These additional elements must also play significant roles; so where combinations vary, different types of economy (or society) must be obtained after any transition from feudalism to a more developed mode of production. It may thus be conjectured that even if feudalism were unique, capitalism as a result of the transition would not be unique. The present paper aims to confirm this conjecture by comparing aspects of the history of Japan with that of England.

**Keywords:** Japan, England, feudalism, capitalism, history.

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## I. Introduction

'Where feudalism ends, the capitalist regime commences.' This familiar and prima facie self-evident statement is the proposition which I want to examine in this paper. I would argue as follows. Even given the uniformity of feudalism everywhere in the world (i.e. if it had always appeared in its purest form with no deviation from the logically constructed ideal type), it must have appeared in combination with many other elements such as, for example, whether a country has an oceanic or continental climate, the types of weapons available in a society, the type of religion most influential in the lives of the people there, and so forth. These additional elements must also play significant roles; so where combinations vary, different types of economy (or society) must be obtained after any transition from feudalism to a more developed mode of production. It may thus be conjectured that even if feudalism were unique, capitalism as a result of the transition would not be unique. The present paper aims to confirm this conjecture by comparing aspects of the history of Japan with that of England.

Let us begin by pointing out some remarkable similarities and dissimilarities which can be observed in the two histories. First, after the Norman conquest was completed, a strong form of feudalism was imported from France and established in England. It was a firmly centralized system at the beginning, but as time progressed it

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became very decentralized. As the central power weakened, the feudal nobles began to act as a class against the Crown, aiming at collective control of the state. In addition the power of the merchants of the towns was growing; their complaints against the King often had common ground with the baronial opposition to the regime. The two blended and united; and finally, in the 'Model Parliament' which King Edward I summoned at the end of the 13th century, not only feudal nobles and bishops, but also such democratic elements as the representatives of knights from the counties and the citizens of towns were included.

The early emergence of Parliament cannot be independent of the fact that Magna Carta was granted as early as 1215. When the barons were strong enough to obtain the merchant's support, they dominated the Crown and the feudal system became more decentralized. On the other hand, while the feudal nobility was weak and the merchants supported the Crown, the latter revived its power and the king could behave, as he did especially after the Wars of the Roses, as an absolute monarch. The epoch of absolutism and mercantilism thus initiated began to collapse when, after the defeat the Armada, the merchants who were financing the war became aware of their strength and started to challenge the power of the Crown.<sup>1</sup> In this way they finally succeeded in establishing a democratic political regime, i.e. the system of parliamentary monarchism. The shifting of the society from the feudal economic stage to the capitalist stage took place in England in parallel with this political transformation; capitalism flourished under the parliamentary monarchy, which in England was the political superstructure most appropriate to the free enterprise system.

In contrast to this democratic trend in England, however, history developed differently in Japan.<sup>2</sup> A system similar to the English manor system started in Japan in the eleventh century. In 1192 Minamoto Yoritomo established a military government (known as the bakufu) at Kamakura on the basis of the principle that the shogun (the head of the bakufu) could grant rights over land to his followers in return for their military and other services. The Kamakura bakufu<sup>4</sup> lasted until 1333 and was replaced by the Muromachi bakufu of the Ashikaga family which was, in turn, replaced by the

Nobunaga-Hideyoshi government in the second half of the 16th century. Finally, the Hideyoshi government was overthrown by the Tokugawa family which formed a bakufu in 1603 and survived until the Meiji revolution (1867-68). Apart from the Nobunaga-Hideyoshi government which was shortlived and, therefore, whose character is difficult to assess, the remaining three regimes were essentially the same in their fundamental characteristics. No tendency towards democracy was observed throughout the 675 years from the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu to the final collapse of the Tokugawa family, but a system similar to the European feudalism prevailed throughout. Each bakufu established, at its commencement, a centralized system but the system degenerated into a decentralized, anarchic state of disorder in the last decades of the era. Among them, the Tokugawa regime was the strongest and the shogun virtually behaved as an absolutist.<sup>3</sup> In fact, there was no limitation on what the bakufu could legally do. Moreover, it kept important cities such as Osaka and Kyoto, as well as ports for international trade such as Nagasaki and Sakai under its direct control. In addition it monopolized almost all important mines and international trade. As, in England, the breakaway from the Papacy was a necessary step in the development of an absolute monarchy, the bakufu suppressed Christianity and finally prohibited the entry of all Westerners (excluding Dutch merchants). Of course, the feudal lords were strictly controlled by the central government. Although it improved the administration of justice and developed a permanent bureaucracy which carried out the work of central and local government, it did not establish any organisation which could be considered as the forerunner of a parliament.

It was in the Five-Article Charter Oath proclaimed in 1868 that a certain kind of council system was at last hinted at. Except for Shotoku Taishi's Seventeen-Article Constitution of 604, there had been no other expression of recognition of the importance of democratic arrangements. This was especially so during the three major bakufu periods. In these periods Japan had, as a major national ideology, Confucianism, which is a philosophy of feudalism justifying the feudal stratification of the society. Its view of individual is entirely opposite to Christianity's, according to which individuals are equal in front of God. To the latter the ideas of

civil society and fair competition among individuals would be perfectly congenial, while because of the former, little demand for democracy had traditionally been created in Japan.

In view of this lack of demand for democracy it is not surprising that Japan underwent a transformation along lines which are totally different from those we observed above for England, where such a demand was widespread and longstanding. Under the constitution authorized by Imperial order and promulgated in 1889, only rich men, whose total number slightly exceeded one percent of the whole population, were awarded the franchise - the corresponding figure for Britain was six percent in 1832 - and reflecting this, in the parliament opening the following year more than one third of the seats were occupied by ex-samurai, the ruling class in the Tokugawa era. Moreover, as the power of the Diet was limited, the essential character of the new Meiji state was not substantially different from that of the Tokugawa regime and farmers were exploited as severely as they had been hitherto. From this point of view, the Meiji state can be considered as a semi-feudal state which is a natural continuation of the Tokugawa regime; it is not surprising at all to see that the type of economy established after the Meiji Revolution was very far from that type of capitalism towards which England started to advance after her Glorious Revolution vigorously. As will be seen below, it was a reinforcement of the Tokugawa absolutist economy, anything but a free enterprise system.

Throughout the Tokugawa era, the central and various local (or clan) governments operated productive and commercial businesses, either directly (i.e. by using their own samurai for management or work force) or indirectly (i.e. by leaving the businesses in the hands of their chartered merchants). Also, throughout the era, independent private businesses were growing. Government (or government connected) businesses prospered in the capitals of central and local governments (or castle towns) especially in the first part of the era (1600-1700), while independent businesses spontaneously developed in villages and local towns particularly in the second part (1700-1867). These two kinds of businesses and industries came into conflict with each other in the last decades of the era. The second, independent businesses, encroached upon the markets of the first,

chartered ones, since the central and local governments were becoming very weak financially.<sup>4</sup> The Meiji Revolution can thus be considered as a financial propping-up of the economy by introducing new Western techniques and drastically modernizing the regime, while its basic socio-economic structure was kept unchanged; after the revolution, in fact, the inherited ethos was reinforced and promoted, so that an absolutist-nationalist economy was firmly rebuilt.<sup>5</sup>

Newly established was a dual-structured economy having government or government-connected enterprises as its upper tier and independent firms as the lower tier. We may trace the respective origins of these to castle-town and village industries in the Tokugawa period.<sup>6</sup> For example, Mitsubishi zaibatsu, one of the largest businesses in the upper-tier group, succeeded to the shipping business of the of the Kaisei Trading Company belonging to Tosa clan, as well as to bakufu enterprises (Sado gold mine and Nagasaki dockyard) and the Saga clan's Takashima coal mine. Mitsui zaibatsu too, whose trading ties with the bakufu were traditionally strong, owed its coal mining section to the Miike mine of the Yanagawa-Miike clan; similarly Furukawa zaibatsu inherited the Ani and Innai mines of the Akita clan, while Tanaka Chobee had the Kamaishi mine of the Nanbu clan which is now operated by Nippon Steel Corporation. Even, in the spinning industry which is regarded as highly independent from the government, the history of the Nippon Spinning Company (now Unitika) can be traced back to the Sakai spinning factory of the Satsuma clan.

The new economy may be regarded as a dual-structured, Keynesian-type economy. The scale of the industries in the upper-tier which produced arms, ships, machines etc. was determined ultimately by the government's effective demand for them. In order to finance this demand, the Meiji government imposed heavy taxes upon landlords and farmers, who in turn transferred the burden to peasants or agricultural labourers by raising the rent for tenancy to a maximum or by reducing wages to a minimum. Since the agricultural income per man became an indicator of the standard of living of workers in independent businesses it is natural that a very low wage rate prevailed in these businesses in parallel with a low agricultural income, whilst wages were set high by the government for the employees of government enterprises. Accordingly, big income

disparities obtained between government and private sections of the economy. Moreover, later a life-time commitment system began to prevail in the upper-level sector of the economy, especially for white collar employees, within which wages were paid according to the seniority system. Although the lower-tier sector was competitive, it was very difficult for people to move from the lower to the upper tier. The economy was modern on the surface but still authoritative, discriminatory and even predatory underneath.

Such a system will not last for long provided the rate of growth of the nation's population is small. However, if total population growth exceeds the rate of growth of the number working in the industries of the upper-tier sector, those unable to find jobs in that sector have to be accommodated in the lower-tier sector. In Japan, the businesses of this sector, especially agriculture, could be more labour-intensive in the Meiji period, and, therefore, had the capacity to absorb an enormous amount of excess labour. Moreover, after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) in which Japan gained a costly victory, the Japanese military became arrogant, overconfident and, hence, uncontrollable. This resembles the process England passed through after the defeat of Spain's Armada; as had been said before, the English bourgeoisie which contributed greatly to the victory became more and more confident and finally forced the monarch to accept a system of parliamentary monarchy. In the case of Japan, the military started their long years of aggression against China and other countries; apart from the devastating blows which Japan inflicted on the Asian countries she attacked, she also let her own people, especially those belonging to the lower-tier sector of the economy, fall into misery and distress; throughout the course towards final defeat, the dualism of the Japanese economy became more and more marked, and ordinary people in Japan were finally pushed to the verge of starvation.

In order to clarify the historical transformation of the economy experienced in Japan, I explain in Section II below how feudalism developed in the Tokugawa era, and in Section III how the economy was reconstructed after the Meiji Revolution. While we are not here concerned with the cause and progress of the revolution<sup>8</sup>, we believe these sections will be sufficient evidence for a conclusion that he



transformation in Japan is so different from the one experienced in England that Japanese 'capitalism' cannot be dealt with by the use of the same model as that which was formulated, on the basis of the English experience, for an analysis of England.

## II Under the Tokugawa Regime

Throughout the Tokugawa period (1603-1867) Japan was divided into nearly 300 feudal clans of various sizes. The domains were rated in terms of the amount of rice they could produce. The Tokugawa family itself had territories which, though scattered all over Japan, altogether yielded more than 4 million koku of rice (one koku equalling approximately five bushels). There were about twenty other large clans occupying territories ranging from 200,000 to 1 million koku, but the sixty smallest clans produced only around 10 thousand koku. Each clan, big or small, had only one castle town, since the Tokugawa central government prohibited any clan from having more than one castle within its domain. The castle town which was originally was built as a fortress, became, as peace reigned for a long period, capital of the domain. Each domain was ruled by its local clan government (han seifu), while the Tokugawa central government (bakufu) tightly controlled the clan governments. The political system thus established is referred to by Japanese historians as a 'centralised feudal system'.

Most (say, two-thirds) of Japan's contemporary big towns were castle towns, with the notable exceptions of Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, Nagasaki, and Hyogo (Kobe). Kyoto had been the seat of the Imperial Court and remained so throughout the Tokugawa era. Osaka was once the capital of the Hideyoshi government which preceded the Tokugawa; the latter disarmed the city and held it under direct control. The other three towns mentioned above were domestic and international trading ports.

Castle towns were constructed in such a way that the central castle was surrounded by an inner moat, then, in order, by residential areas for samurai (warriors), residential and business areas for merchants and craftsmen, temples and shrines, and finally by an outer moat. In most clans with a few exceptions, the samurai were completely unproductive because they were prohibited from working in the fields or in business and therefore their necessities of life had to be provided by the farmers, merchants and craftsmen. The number of townspeople was determined more or less in proportion to the number of samurai who lived in the town, so that its ultimate determinant was the number of koku which were allocated to the head of the clan by the central government.

Most castle towns were founded in the late 16th or the early 17th century. Their populations peaked at around the end of the 17th century, with two notable exceptions, Edo (now Tokyo) and Osaka, whose populations reached their maximum levels in the 1750s and 1760s, respectively. Edo, like Nagoya which was ruled by one of the three family branches of the Tokugawa house, increased its population again in the middle of the 19th century (see Table 1). These statistics do not include those people who belonged to the samurai households in the towns (i.e., the samurai, their family members and their servants). If they were included, the proportion of people who lived in towns with a population of 20,000 or more at around the end of the 17th century would be estimated at around 11-12 per cent of the total population of the nation.<sup>9</sup> This is comparable with a similar estimate for the UK in 1801 of 11.6 per cent, calculated from the Table of Population of the Principle Towns of the United Kingdom, 1801-1951.<sup>10</sup> One may say that in 1700, Japan was already at much the same stage of urbanisation as the UK was in 1801, while in 1886 when Japan was going to start her industrial revolution, only 9 per cent of her population lived in towns (with a population of 20,000 or more) because she had experienced gradual and continuous de-urbanisation throughout the 160 years following the beginning of the 18th century. Thus the Tokugawa era may be divided into two periods: the first a period of urbanisation (1603 - c.1700) and the second, of de-urbanisation (c.1700 - 1867). As will become evident later, these two periods may be referred to as 'the age of the

samurai-managed clan economy' and 'the age of competitive commercial agriculture'.

Why did Japan have such a long period of de-urbanisation? Japanese historians appear to have been generally unconcerned with this problem. One may note that there have been some who have argued that, since in the Tokugawa era the birth rates in towns, like European towns in 15th-17th centuries, tended to be generally lower than the respective death rates, while the opposite was true in villages, the population tended to decrease in towns and increase in villages. Others have ascribed the secular decrease in population observed in villages in the north-eastern part of Japan in the later Tokugawa period to the severe famines that frequently hit them in that period. They have also partly ascribed the population increase in the western part of Japan in the same period to the particularly comfortable weather conditions which these regions enjoy. It is impossible, however, to apply this sort of argument in order to explain why the two largest cities, Edo and Osaka, lagged behind other smaller towns in the turning point of their population growth; they should in fact have experienced a decline in the birth rate first, before smaller towns became a victim of the same mechanism.

It is said that more than half a million samurai, their relatives and their servants inhabited Edo at any one time during this era. If this number is added to the resident population of Edo, it would mean that the city had over one million inhabitants and therefore could be compared with London, then the most populous city in the world.

There was however an imbalance in the sex composition of Edo's population as illustrated by Table 2. Its samurai sector was dominated numerically by males, for according to "the alternate attendance system" (sankin kotai seido) which the Tokugawa introduced in 1635, the heads of the clans were required to maintain their residences in Edo and when they returned to their domains, they were prohibited from taking their wives and their children with them. Furthermore, they had to defend their residences and accordingly, many samurai remained in Edo to maintain protection.<sup>11</sup> In addition to this, the downtown sector was also predominantly male, on account of the carpenters, masons and builders who had migrated to Edo

unaccompanied by their families, to work on the many bridges and buildings which were under construction. Lastly, the large merchant houses preferred male to female store-keepers, particularly in the early years of the era, so that a tremendous number of male employees were called to Edo to work in their shops, especially from those areas from which these houses originated.

However, as Table 2 shows, the sex composition of the city drastically changed after 1700; for the female population increased in comparison to the male. Any natural theory of demography which disregards migration cannot explain this change in the sex composition of the Edo population, even if the phenomena of mabiki - which is the custom of killing unwanted babies - was taken into consideration, since female rather than male babies were usually the victims of mabiki. Without a careful examination of the geographical movements of people from smaller castle towns to big cities and from towns to villages and vice versa, the urbanisation and de-urbanisation in Tokugawa Japan cannot be explained satisfactorily.

It appears to be a commonly held view even today amongst educated Japanese, including historians, that the population of Tokugawa Japan tended generally to be immobile, which implies that society was calm, quiet and stagnant. The Japanese believe that they were eventually aroused by Commodore Perry's four black ships. We can, however, point out a number of facts which are well accepted and provide enough evidence to suggest that the society was remarkably dynamic.

First of all, the Tokugawa government was careful and scrupulous in the allocation of the clans in hereditary vassalage and gave to those traditionally outside of the Tokugawa group various domains of different sizes, according to their services and achievements. They were often transferred, especially in the early years of the regime, to a bigger or smaller domain when they were found to have done either meritorious or impeachable deeds. Many clans were abolished or demoted simply because their heads were "mad" - those who were disliked by the central government may well have been diagnosed as "mad". Like modern government officials, clan chiefs moved from one domain to another by the order of the central government, but unlike them; they were accompanied by hundreds of

their own samurai and their families.<sup>12</sup>

A small clan (defined as having domains of 10,000 - 50,000 koku each) had on average about 380 samurai in its hierarchy. In comparison, a medium sized clan (with domains of 50,000 - 200,000 koku) had an average of 1,670 samurai in its ranks, while large clans (with 200,000 koku or more) had as many as 10,000 samurai each.<sup>13</sup> The total number of transfers of rulers between the fiefs during the Tokugawa period reached 238 for small clans, 195 for the medium-sized clans and 14 for the largest clans.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, it is estimated that more than 550,000 samurai (and therefore more than 2 million people, if their family members are included) moved in this way. When the head of a clan moved, it happened sometimes that the people from the town who liked and respected him would also move to his new territory, although they need not (and legally speaking, should not) have done so. For example, when Todo Takatora was transferred from Iyo to Ise in 1608, many townspeople followed him in spite of the distance and formed Iyo-machi quarter in the midst of his new castle town.<sup>15</sup>

Secondly, "the alternate attendance system" forced the heads of the clans to visit Edo frequently. Although the length and the frequency of the visits depended on such factors as the distance of the fief from Edo and the status of the clan - whether it was one of the loyal hereditary vassalages or not - a typical head of a clan was obliged to go and spend every alternate year in Edo. The system worked, in its strict form, for more than two hundred years until it was relaxed in 1852. It produced every year, nearly 300 processions consisting of several hundred samurai arriving at or leaving Edo. These were regular annual events throughout the era. There was also an additional factor that servants preferred merchants to samurai as masters, hence servants for samurai were in short supply in the latter half of the 17th century. The long-term servants who could have been found in the first half of that century almost disappeared from the samurai sections in the latter half. It became more and more difficult to replace servants once they had returned to the villages. The shortage of servants created an increase in their wages, which resulted in general inflation. Moreover, when the samurai sections of towns contracted in this way, the business

sectors were affected more or less proportionately, because the scale of business in the towns very much depended on the samurai's demand for those goods which were produced by the merchant sector. Since inflation weakened their purchasing power, the towns declined in prosperity and therefore in population.

Thirdly, merchants in the early years of the era were essentially transporters. Merchants from the Omi district in particular, known as Omi merchants, moved into the various castle towns and used them as a basis for a nationwide sales network. Prosperous agricultural areas, of which the Omi district was one, were located in the western region of Japan, while the centre of consumption, Edo, was in the Eastern region. Thus the transportation of goods between towns was a major industry. Another prosperous business was the dispatch of the revenue earned from selling the clans' own products to their Edo residences to cover their expenses there.

After having succeeded in selling goods in Edo, many merchants such as Mitsui and Konoike became money-brokers and developed an exchange system. They were then involved in reconstructing the financial position of various clans which were in a very poor state as a result of excessive borrowing. In this way, even when Tokugawa society was still enjoying a prosperous urban life, the foundations of the regime had become unstable. As merchants became more active and prosperous power began to slip into their hands from those of samurai. It was indeed to be expected that the administrators of many clans as well as those of the central government felt a growing sense of crisis.

At that time, like Britain, Japan had the custom of primogeniture. The second and third sons of samurai and farmers left their villages to work in towns as servants, constructors, or day labourers. When the construction work in a particular town was completed, they moved to another town. Although this type of movement was prohibited by law, the clan government tacitly approved it. These men finally gravitated towards Edo, a city notorious for its frequent fires. Thanks to a large fire in 1658, followed by those in 1682, 1695, 1698, 1703, 1717 and many others, there was a constant need for construction work in Edo.

Osaka was also prosperous because it had become a major trading centre where most clans sold their wares in order to improve their financial positions. Clans were no longer groups of warriors but had been transformed into economic organisations which were very similar to the present-day Japanese general trading houses. Although certain kinds of businesses were relegated to the established merchants, the lower ranks of the samurai managed and operated their clan's business affairs. As the permanent employment of samurai was taken for granted, the clans could not decrease the number of samurai by dismissing them without reason, so they had to improve their financial positions by exploiting every opportunity for increasing the production of goods.

At first, they simply tried to promote the actual production of rice, but later they expended a great deal of effort on improving the conditions of production; for example, many clans reclaimed marshy land and expanded the area under cultivation. They also tried to increase the productivity of the land per acre by providing irrigation reservoirs and transportation facilities such as ports and canals. To complete these works, specialists were invited, if necessary, from other clans - even from very remote areas. After Osaka was established as a market and proved itself to be working well, the clans searched for other production possibilities. Each clan developed the production of goods which were indigenous to its domain; for example cotton, silk, paper, tobacco, sugar and salt were produced by particular clans and exchanged in Osaka. Innovations planned by clan governments led to the inauguration of many new industries. Moreover, by the end of the 17th century, it had become increasingly the case that the taxes imposed on the farmers were paid not in kind, but in the form of money. Farmers and peasants could, therefore, concentrate their effort on the production of those goods which were highest in productivity. Thus the producer's choice contributed to increasing the production of goods in each clan.<sup>16</sup>

Evidently, a system of taxation collected not in money but in the form of particular goods is an irrational one. Nevertheless, clan and central governments kept it for a long time because they were obsessed with the idea that they would not be able to survive unless they had enough rice in reserve. This belief was not totally

irrational because they could not import a large quantity of rice from foreign countries, for foreign trade was prohibited (or put under strict restriction) by the central government. This system of taxation in kind was finally challenged by commercial farmers who paid cash to merchants to fulfill their rice tax quota. The merchants used this cash to buy rice from other farmers who could produce rice more profitably than other goods, while the original farmers now freed from the cultivation of rice could concentrate upon the production of a more profitable commodity, say, cotton. This method of production and payment of tax is far more efficient than the simple system of direct payment in kind; both the farmer and the merchant are able to make some gain without the government losing any revenue and in this way, a Pareto optimum will be established. Such a system was adopted, for example, in the advanced agricultural area near Okayama where cotton and rushes could be profitably produced.<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless, there were a few clans who misjudged their circumstances and undertook inappropriate and regressive policies. The Matsuyama clan in the Iyo district was one of them. Iyo was a small district which was divided into eight fiefs which were ruled by different clans. Climatically, therefore, there was little difference between them. If one industry suited one fief, then it would have been appropriate for any of the other fiefs in the district. However, the Matsuyama government did nothing but make "improvements" in the method of taxation, advocating saving and extolling the virtues of a frugal life. It drastically cut the scale of samurai salaries for the sake of saving and approved only a small amount of money for the merchants as subsidies for the proposed improvements in the production of Iyo-kasuri cloth. This contrasted greatly with the policies undertaken by the Uwajima, who held a neighbouring fief to the Matsuyama. The Uwajima clan promoted the production of goods such as wax, paper, tea, indigo, dried fish, seaweed and copper, although the clan did make a large reduction in the salaries of the samurai as well. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that in Table 3, the population decreased in the depressed domain of Matsuyama, while it increased in other places in Iyo.<sup>18</sup> Although Uwajima is now only a minor town in Japan, it was held by a powerful clan in the Tokugawa period which accumulated enormous



wealth in this way. Thus it can be seen that the de-urbanisation in the second phase of the Tokugawa period cannot entirely be explained by natural forces such as birth and death, as is illustrated by the case of Matsuyama. Indeed, as Marx wrote, 'an abstract law of population exists for plants and animals only, and only in so far as man has not interfered with them.'<sup>19</sup>

Once producers were able to make a choice, agriculture became commercialised. Many agricultural products were used as raw materials for manufactured products - for example, cotton was woven into cotton cloth. Castle towns were not suitable places in those days for the production of cotton cloth; it could be produced more cheaply in villages by farmers' wives and daughters in the intervals between agricultural work. In this way village or cottage industries were set up in many places, and as villages became richer they attracted and accommodated more people. There was a steady exodus from castle towns into villages but individual movements were not of a sufficient magnitude to be recorded; in fact, as villages were so numerous, they were able to absorb the newcomers and still retain the qualities of the village. The Tokugawa government also supported this "return-to-village" movement and issued regulations to that effect in 1790 and 1843.

The establishment of systematic coastal shipping services - the Kitamae ships - in 1672 gave the coastal districts a connection with Osaka via the western cape of Honshu. It had a great economic impact upon these districts for it not only enabled many ports on the Japan Sea coast such as Sakata, Niigata, Tsuruga, Yonago to flourish, but it also stimulated various places along the Inland Sea coast-line to improve their harbours. Compared with the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea, the Japanese Inland Sea had been too limited in scale to be a trading centre for heterogenous goods.<sup>20</sup> Now its sphere was expanded to include the northern regions which enjoyed a different climate, so that the variety of goods that could be brought to the market in Osaka was greatly increased. Osaka was thus praised as "the mess hall" for the whole nation. Commodities produced in the warmer regions along the coast-line of the Inland Sea were bought at Osaka and taken by Kitamae ships back to the northern regions, while the products from the north coast sold at Osaka were sent on further

to Edo by Higaki ships for final consumption. The whole or part of the proceeds of the sale of a clan's produce were collected by its officials who were stationed in Osaka and then sent to the clan's Edo residence to cover expenses there. In this way, trade between the clans flourished, creating transactions between Edo and Osaka pari passu and also local industries in the western part of Japan were invigorated.

Japan had two types of merchants, the first in castle towns and the other in villages. The former received a number of privileges from the clan government; for example, they were exempted from paying taxes to it. They were allowed to form guilds (kabu-nakama) which gave them a monopoly of the right to trade in a town. As has been mentioned before, some of them had enough wealth to lend money to the clans<sup>21</sup> and by virtue of this involvement in a clan's financial affairs, they were given appointments as financial advisers to particular clans. Therefore they were allied with the samurai and were often confronted by the village merchants who served the village industries as capitalists, providing the farmers with money for their industrial work.

In many respects, the town merchants dominated the village merchants. However, the village merchants were themselves capitalists and in some ways they were in a more advantageous position than the merchants in the castle towns, because they were able to control the industries to earn for themselves profits from production. These two distinct types of merchants began to coexist in the period around 1685-1735; prior to this, the economy was greatly dominated by the guild merchants. A clear trend can be seen throughout the rest of the Tokugawa period whereby local merchants were becoming more powerful than the town merchants since guilds formed by the latter were disbanded in some clans and the foundations for a competitive market were created. If the Meiji Revolution had taken place 50 years later, it is likely that the economy which would have been established after the revolution would have been of a completely different character. Fortunately or unfortunately, however, the revolt took place in the middle of the transition period and resulted in an economy of a unique character - a 'dual' economy.

The local historiography of various districts of Japan shows that the economy after 1700 was quite different in character from that of the 17th century. For example, in 1738, a weaver travelling from Nishijin in Kyoto to Kiryu (beyond Edo) transmitted the skill of weaving Nishijin brocade to the eastern parts of Japan. Afterwards, the Kiryu cloth became popular and was brought back to Kyoto because it was cheaper than the product from Nishijin. The demand thus created for the Kiryu cloth stimulated greatly the traditional weaving industries in the neighbourhood of Kiryu. In the 18th century, Ashikaga, Sano and other towns in the area were known as significant suppliers of cotton and silk cloths to Edo. The merchants in the castle towns as well as those in Edo exploited these suppliers as much as possible. Between them various trade disputes arose concerning, for example, the violation of the distribution routes by village merchants. A peasant uprising clearly insisted that the monopolistic regime of the privileged town merchants should be removed and that complete freedom of the trade should be given to both merchants and farmers. Similarly, in Wakayama near Osaka, the town merchants complained to the clan government in 1738 that the trade in the towns was declining because of the rapid economic growth in the villages. In fact, the production of soya bean sauce in Yuasa, vinegar in Kokawa and lacquer-ware in Kuroe were all expanded greatly from the middle of the 18th century onwards, although their origins can be traced back to much earlier periods.

For such reasons many in the central government felt that the regime would collapse financially sooner or later. The Tokugawa regime had been founded on the basis of a balance of power between a multitude of mutually mistrusting feudal lords who spent too much on defence. Although weapons were primitive, the manpower that they had in reserve was huge. There was no economic rationale for the samurai's high salaries; they were paid well only because they ranked higher than any one else in the caste system which had been initiated under Hideyoshi and was continued by the Tokugawa.

In the three major reforms which were proclaimed in the Kyoho (1716 - 1735), Kansei (1789 - 1800) and Tenpo (1830 - 1843) periods by the central government, frugal life-styles were emphasised for the general populace as well as the samurai and strict discipline was enforced upon officialdom. The government reorganised the administrative system for tax collection and these efforts produced some noticeable improvements in the financial position of the government. The clan governments of the various domains followed a more or less similar line. As merchants in the castle towns, who had been exempted from taxes for a long time, began to lose their privileges from around the year 1721, taxes from them grew at a considerable rate, so that they lost some of the benefits from living in a castle town and were thus given an incentive to return to the villages. Also the number of peasant revolts increased sharply (see Table 4) from around the time when the Kyoho reform was carried out.

### III. After the Meiji Revolution

Towards the end of the Tokugawa era, various clans as well as the central governments established new western style workshops. The Saga clan, which was asked by the Tokugawa to be responsible for Nagasaki - giving it an advantage, compared with other clans, of easier access to western technology - was able to produce about 300 cannons in the last two decades of the Tokugawa shogunate. Productivity was developed to a level where 39 cannons were produced in 1866. The same clan had a unit to produce steam engines, and in 1865 it succeeded in launching steamships. It also, together with an Englishman, T.B. Glover, ran Takashima colliery using imported methods. Similarly, the Satsuma clan started a wool-spinning workshop in 1819, and produced cannons, guns, medicines and glass in 1846. The methods of production of these goods were greatly improved in 1851. In addition, the clan had numerous manufactories which produced such consumption goods as sugar, pepper, vegetable oil, fur, glue and paper. It established shipyards and modern cotton mills in Kagoshima. Other clans such as Mito, Choshu and Tosa also managed modern shipyards and other production facilities.<sup>22</sup> Of course, the central government was not behind with this kind of entrepreneurship.

After the revolution, the new central government abolished the clans and the caste system within a few years. Although most samurai lost all feudal privileges and many were unemployed, many others became officials of the new government. Moreover, most of the feudal lords remained as the governors of the newly established prefectures. Many of the factories and other organisations such as schools which had been owned by clans were taken over by the the new government, whilst others which were found inefficient went down with the clans. Those productive units which survived the revolution played an important role, as state owned factories, in the early days of the Meiji era. For example, the Sakai cotton mill established by the Satsuma clan just after the revolution was a modern factory equipped with completely western style machines. It was taken over by the new government and played an important role in promoting the new western method of production. It was later privatised during a governmental financial crisis. A private company which bought it later developed into one of the major producers of the Japanese textile industry when Japan became dominant in the world market. Similarly, the Osaka Ordnance Works, a major state factory in prewar Japan, originated from a Tokugawa arsenal; in the same way, other munitions, factories and shipyards of the Imperial Army and Navy were originally established as Tokugawa or feudal clan government factories.

The state-industry sector thus established by the Meiji government was superior to independent factories (i.e. those of private enterprises) in productivity and in the methods of production utilised. Throughout the Meiji period there was a substantial disparity in the average horse power per worker between state and independent factories. Because the state sector was regarded by the government as the core of Japanese industry, it was often given favourable treatment in the course of its development. Of course, many of the state factories were subsequently sold into private hands, but the government was successful in modifying and adapting the concept of 'state-industry' to the new environment. Then those zaibatsu (i.e. big financial combines) which bought state-factories collaborated with the government, and, therefore, the national interest was always secured. In this way, the spirit of state-industry survived the financial crisis. A new concept of

'state-guided industry' i.e. a strong private industrial sector backed-up by the political power of the state was formed so as to act as an industrial arm of the government, in the new environment.

The new alliance implicitly formed by the Meiji statesmen and the zaibatsu businessmen (the latter being often called seisho, i.e. businessmen with political interests) was nothing other than a revival of the combination of the feudal lords and the privileged merchants who had been dominant throughout the first 100 years of the Tokugawa era. Moreover, Meiji statesmen and business elite were, as will be seen below, recruited from the same group of men. The alliance occupied the upper tier of the nation's dual economy. Apart from such infrastructural sectors as railway, telegraph and lighthouse management, the government was concerned with operating various mines, developing the textile industries and establishing the glass, brick, cement and steel industries. By leaving such important sections of the nation's economy to the state-industry sector, the local merchants who had been increasing their significance in the second period of the Tokugawa era, while remaining highly significant at local or provincial level, mostly failed to achieve national prestige.

Meiji Japan was a samurai state, despite the fact that the class which was treated most unfavourably by the Meiji government was the samurai class. In fact, samurai lost everything, not only feudal status but also the honour of being a samurai. However, because of this, they acquired a freedom which they had not been provided with before. As they were dismissed from feudal service, they had to find a place where they could work. Therefore, they could occupy the strategically important positions in the new social and economic machinery, while the local merchants adhered to running their own businesses in a conventional way using the traditional methods of production. Innovations occurred mainly in the spheres of production where the state-industry sector was dominant, whereas there was scarcely a significant improvement in productivity in the local-industry sector. Naturally, a big productivity gap developed between the two sectors and never vanished. The dual structure persisted, and the local sector was destined to serve as the lower tier of the economy. Thus the revolution was a kind of 'restoration'

which brought the economy of 1870 back to the stage of 1680-90 at which since the samurai sector still held hegemony, the castle town economy was as prosperous as ever.

Some of the state factories were, however, not profitable. They might have been too ambitious and too large; they might have spread their interests too widely; they might have pursued the 'national interest', rather than their own profit; or they might have been too loose in management and the level of wages might have been ridiculously high. In any case a number of state factories were sold to private enterprises in the period 1874-96,<sup>23</sup> but because of the lack of relevant statistics, the average wage rate of the state-factories cannot be compared numerically with that of the private factories for these years. It is only between 1905 and 1918 that the necessary statistics are obtainable. For these years, taking the average wage rate of the state factories of each year as the base, i.e. 100, the wage rates of the private factories for the years 1905-18 are shown in Table 5. From the table it is easily seen (a) that the wage disparities were generally smaller for female workers than those for male workers, (b) that they were rapidly diminishing during the period, and (c) that they completely disappeared for both male and female workers at the end of the period.

By this period, the state-factory sector had already seen its best years and was about to be replaced by the private big-factory sector. In 1909 the private factories, large, medium-sized and small, did not differ much in the wages they paid to workers; in the same year the average wages of male (or female) workers of private large factories (defined as factories with over 500 employees) were as high as 76 per cent (or 90 per cent) of the corresponding wages of the state factories, whilst the small factories with 5-49 workers paid wages at the rate of 66 per cent (73 per cent for female) of the state factories. Therefore, these male and female wages were as high as 87 per cent and 81 per cent of the corresponding wages of the private large factories. In 1914, the private large factories almost caught up with the state factories; that is to say, the former paid 98 per cent of the latter's wages to male workers and 111 per cent to female workers. Furthermore, the figures presented in the Kōgyo

Tōkei Hyo (Statistical Tables of Factories) confirm that wage disparities were widening within the private sector in the period 1909-1914. This was indeed the period when the state-factory sector in the strict sense was being transformed in to a new 'state-guided' sector, that is a sector composed of large factories under the influence of the state, regardless of whether they were in the hands of the state or of private persons.

These observations are very much consistent with Japanese economists' general view that wage disparities between large and small factories greatly increased after 1920. There are also reasons which enable us to believe that during the best years of the state factories, which were long before 1909, such wage disparities were not remarkable between large and small factories within the private sector, though satisfactory statistics to support this are difficult to find. In those days the major division of the Japanese economy was between the state and private sectors. By selling a considerable number of state factories, the government established a connection with influential private businessmen and thenceforth nurtured them; most of them later grew up to form zaibatsu. When this cooperation between the state and the 'people' had developed sufficiently, the dualism of the large and small factories became an important characteristic of the Japanese economy. It was nothing other than a revival or reproduction of the state (or zaibatsu)/private-small-sector dualism whose origin can be traced back to the privileged/local-merchant dualism in Tokugawa Japan.

In the Kōjo Tōkei Hyo for 1909 and 1914, manufacturing industry is sub-divided into five groups: (1) food and drink, (2) paper, ceramics and chemicals, (3) machinery and tools, (4) dyeing and weaving, and (5) miscellaneous. Each of them can be subdivided into the small, medium-sized and large factory sectors according to whether the number of workers of the factory was between 5 and 49, between 50 and 499, or more than 500, respectively. The large and medium sized factory sectors of the 'machinery and tools' and 'dyeing and weaving' industries were already of the modern type but the small factory sectors of these industries were still very traditional. In the other industries even medium-sized factories were of the traditional type and large factories were in the minority. In the



modern sector the machinery and tools industry and the dyeing and weaving industry contrasted with each other in the sex composition of their employees; the former was an industry where male workers overwhelmingly outnumbered female workers, while the latter was a typically female industry.

Taking this into account, let us now analyse the process of widening wage disparities between the large and small (and between the large and medium-sized) factory sectors in the transition period, 1909-1914. We shall first be concern ourselves with the machinery and tools industry which was composed of four subsectors: (1) machinery, (2) ships and vehicles, (3) tools, and (4) metal goods, respectively. As Table 6 shows, in 1909 and 1914 male workers were distributed among these four sectors in each of the small, medium-sized and large factory sectors of the machinery and tools industry. Table 7 gives the relative wages per man in terms of the average wages per man in the large factories of the industry. By comparing the figure for 1914 with the corresponding one for 1909, we find that as far as the small and medium-sized factory sectors are concerned, the figure diminished for each of the four sectors of the industry. Let  $w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4$ , be the relative wages of the four small-factory sectors in 1909, and  $w'_1, w'_2, w'_3, w'_4$  those of the medium-sized factory sectors. The average relative wages of the industry are then given by

$$\bar{w} = w_1 n_1 + \dots + w_4 n_4 \quad \text{for the small-factory sector}$$

$$\bar{w}' = w'_1 n'_1 + \dots + w'_4 n'_4 \quad \text{for the medium-sized factory sector,}$$

where  $n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4$  are proportions of the male workers to be distributed among the four small-factory sectors in 1909 and  $n'_1, n'_2, n'_3, n'_4$  those for the medium-sized factory sectors in the same year. Similarly, denoting the 1914 value of the relative wages of sector  $i$  of the small factory sector and the 1914 value of the proportion of the male workers to be distributed to the same sector by  $v_i, m_i$ , respectively, and those of the medium-sized factory sector by  $v'_i, m'_i$ , the average relative wages for 1914 are obtained as

$$\bar{v} = v_1 m_1 + \dots + v_4 m_4 \quad \text{for the small factory sector}$$

$$\bar{v}' = v'_1 m'_1 + \dots + v'_4 m'_4 \quad \text{for the medium-sized factory}$$

sector.

Therefore, we at once have

$$v - \bar{w} = \sum (v_i - \bar{w}_i)n_i + \sum (v_i - \bar{w})(m_i - n_i)$$

$$v' - \bar{w}' = \sum (v_i' - \bar{w}_i')n_i' + \sum (v_i' - \bar{w}')(m_i' - n_i')$$

because  $\sum n_i = \sum m_i = 1$ , and similarly for  $n_i'$  and  $m_i'$ . In these formulae, the first terms on the right-hand side represent the changes in the average relative wages caused by changes in sectoral real wages,  $v_i - \bar{w}_i$  or  $v_i' - \bar{w}_i'$ . The second terms, on the other hand, represent the changes in the average relative wages caused by changes in the distribution of workers among the four sectors. If the proportion of workers is decreased ( $m_i < n_i$ ) in a small factory subsector  $i$  where  $v_i$  is greater than  $\bar{w}$ , the decrease will tend to diminish the average relative wages, i.e.  $v < \bar{w}$ . Conversely, if the proportion of workers is increased ( $m_i > n_i$ ) in a sector with  $v_i$  being less than  $\bar{w}$ , this would also contribute to a decrease in the average relative wages. The effects which the first and second terms stand for are called absolute-change and relative-change effects, respectively. From Tables 6 and 7 the absolute-change effects are calculated at -2.9 for the small factor and -5.4 for the medium-sized sector; similarly, we obtain the relative-change effects of -0.3 and -0.4 and, therefore, the total effects of -3.2 and -5.8, for the small and medium-sized sectors, respectively.

Although the relative-change effects are small in this particular case, they are a very useful concept for tackling the problem of the working class's becoming more and more destitute through the Meiji-Taisho-early Showa period; previously Japanese economists (especially Marxists) have been concerned with it without having any rigorous formalisation. In our relative change analysis the sectors are classified into two groups: those whose 1914 wages,  $v_i$ , are greater than the 1909 average relative wages  $\bar{w}$  are said to be on the better side. In the case of the small-factory section of the machinery and tools industry, the machinery subsector and the ships and vehicles subsector are on the better side, whereas the tools and metal goods subsectors are on the worse side.

Since the proportions of male workers working in a 'better side' sector, the ships and vehicles sector, and a 'worse side' sector, the tools sector, increased and decreased, respectively, two positive relative-change effects were created. However, their magnitude is so

small as to be dominated by the negative effects which were caused by a decrease in the proportion of the workers working in the machinery sector on the better side, and by an increase in the proportion of the workers in the metals sector on the worse side. In the case of the medium-sized factory section, as far as male workers were concerned, the ships and vehicles section was the only sector on the better side; all the others were on the wrong side. Average relative wages decreased because the proportion of workers in the ships and vehicles sector diminished and the proportion of workers was greatly increased in one of the sectors on the worse side, while the working population was not sufficiently withdrawn from the remaining sectors on the worse side.

Most female factory workers (nearly 85 per cent) worked in the dyeing and weaving industry in 1909 and 1914. In the early years after the Revolution workers in this industry were not badly paid, and many samurai sent their daughters to the industry as workers. Especially those in some of the state-factories were proud of having been selected and employed by the factories and thus their morale was high. The rosy life described by Hide Yokota (a mill girl at a 'model factory', Tomioka silk mill) in her Tomioka Diary is probably also true of other factories such as Rokko-sha at Matsushiro.<sup>24</sup> It only lasted for several years. Circumstances changed greatly around 1881 and worsened after the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95); the dyeing and weaving industry became the greatest export sector of the country, and thus it was considerably expanded. Competing with cheap labour abroad, the workers had to work longer and harder and were badly treated even when labour was in shortage. They had to live in the factories' very poor boarding houses where they were fed an extremely coarse diet, living almost on the verge of starvation. They had to work like slaves and many of them suffered from tuberculosis, pneumonia, and other such diseases.<sup>25</sup> Such a miserable life, however, was not an exception for workers working in the 'lower-tier' industries. As statistics show, <sup>26</sup> it was a general fate for all of them.

In the following analysis we disaggregate the dyeing and weaving industry into five sectors: (1) silk-reeling, (2) cotton-spinning, (3) cotton-fabrics, (4) silk-fabrics and (5) miscellaneous processes. In distributing the female workers into these five, those under age 14 working in the first four sectors are all included in the final sector, 'miscellaneous processes', so as to distinguish child labour from adult. For 1909 and 1914 we obtain, from the Kojoyo Tōkei Hyo, the distribution of female workers between the subsectors of the dyeing and weaving industry and the sectoral relative wages in terms of the average wages of the large-factories of the same industry, as are listed in Tables 8 and 9. We can now see that except for those in the silk-reeling sector of the small-factory section, all workers became worse off with respect to their relative wages, between the two years, 1909 and 1914. Therefore, the absolute-change effect was definitely negative and sizeable in its absolute value for the medium-sized factory sector; it was, in fact, calculated at -7.9. For the small-factory section, however, although the relative wages of the silk-reeling sector improved between 1909 and 1914, the magnitude of the improvement was so small so that it was negated by the disimprovement in the other sectors. It had, therefore, a negative aggregate absolute-change effect calculated at -1.8.

The average relative wages  $w$  and  $w'$  for 1909 were calculated at 78.7 per cent for the small-factory sector and 96.9 per cent for the medium-sized factory sector. Comparing the sectoral relative wages with them, it is seen that the silk-reeling and silk-fabrics sectors were on the 'better-side' and all three other sectors on the 'worse side' as far as the small factories were concerned, while among the five medium-sized factory sectors there was only one sector (cotton-spinning) which was on the better side in 1914. It can also be seen that the proportions of workers working in the small-factory sectors on the better side decreased and those on the worse side increased, except for the cotton-spinning sector which was very small in both 1909 and 1914. Thus the female workers in the dyeing and weaving industry were more concentrated in the worse-side sectors in 1914 than they were in 1909, by moving out from the better side to the worse-side sectors. The relative-change effect should, therefore, take on a negative value and, in fact, it is calculated at

-1.9. As for the medium-sized factories, although the proportion of workers was increased in the sole better-side sector (the cotton-spinning sector) and decreased in two worse side sectors (the silk-reeling and silk-fabrics), these improvements in the wage disparities were not big enough to offset the negative effects due to an increase in the proportion of workers in the cotton-fabric and the 'miscellaneous processes' sector where the female workers were worse off in 1914 than in 1909. The total relative-change effect was small but negative (-0.1). While this was negligible (only 1 per cent of the total effect upon the medium-sized factories), the relative-change effect was large in the case of the small factories, as it amounted to 51 per cent of the total effect.

Needless to say, the same analysis can be made for the whole industry which is divided in the Kōjyo Tōkei Hyō into five groups, as I have already said. Each group is also subdivided into three, small, medium-sized and large factory, sectors. The distribution of the workers and their relative wages are shown in Tables 10 and 11. From the latter it can be observed that in the first two of these three sectors the relative wages of male workers decreased in each of the five groups, between 1909 and 1914. Therefore, the absolute-change effects were negative, and great in absolute value; in fact, they were calculated at -9.6 for the small factory sector and -9.8 for the medium-sized factory sector. Concerning the relative-change effects, it can be noted that all the industries other than the machinery and tools industry are on the worse side. However, because the proportion of workers decreased in the three worse-side industries except for the miscellaneous one, the aggregate relative-change effect was positive (0.7) for the small factories. But in the case of the medium-sized factories, it became negative but very small (-0.1) since the proportion of workers increased in a worse-side industry, 'dyeing and weaving' and remained unchanged in a better-side industry, 'machinery and tools'.

Concerning female workers, although relative wages were improved in the small factories in the paper, ceramics and chemicals industries and the medium-sized factories in the miscellaneous manufacturing industry as well as both small and medium-sized factories of the food and drink industry, these industries employed

only a small proportion of the female workforce. (See Tables 12 and 13). The absolute-change effect upon the wage disparities was decided exclusively by the movement of the relative wages of the dominant group, the dyeing and weaving industry. It amounted to -2.8 for the small factory sector and -4.4 for the medium-sized. Finally, the relative-change effect was positive for the former but negative for the latter. This pattern was exactly the same for male and female workers. But the magnitudes of the effects were very small, 0.1 and -0.02, respectively, for the female workers.

From these we may conclude that in the period 1909-1914, an increase in wage disparities between the small, medium-sized and large factory sectors of the industry was mainly caused by absolute-change effects. Except in the case of female workers in the small factory sector of the dyeing and weaving industry it has been found that relative change effects were small, both at the sectoral level and at a more elementary subsector level. After this period, wage disparities became more and more serious, and the dual wage structure became a chronic disease of the Japanese economy.

As I have said above, the first important achievement of the Meiji government after the revolution was the abolition of the clans and the caste system. To accomplish this the central government issued bonds to samurai in exchange for their feudal stipends. Because of this, those who had received a high stipend in the Tokugawa period, such as clan lords, all became moneyed men. Combining their funds some of them established banks and some others textile, railway and insurance companies. Although they were not entirely successful in their new businesses, it is true that they (ex-clan lords) and the central government itself played the role of major suppliers of financial capital in the early stage of the Meiji economy. Other lower-class samurai also received bonds; they too started enterprises with these as capital though most of them failed in their ventures.

Apart from ex-clan lords who were raised to the newly established peerage, other samurai had to find new jobs for themselves. It was very natural that many of them became army or navy officers or soldiers, or policemen, but many others found a place in the central or local governments. Because they were relatively well educated

they had a comparative advantage over those who came from farmer or merchant stock in managing a modern-style company. In fact, H. Mannari estimates that the proportion of ex-samurai in the business elite during the 1880s was around 23 per cent, while K. Ishikawa found that 48 per cent of 422 very successful Meiji businessmen born before 1869 claimed samurai origins.<sup>27</sup> In view of the fact that only 5.5 per cent of the total population in 1872 were ex-samurai, these figures, both Mannari's and Ishikawa's, must be regarded as very high. Thus we may consider that the samurai class was a major source of entrepreneurship in the Meiji period. Below we report the results of two investigations which seem not only to confirm the Mannari-Ishikawa observations but also bring to notice certain new aspects of the structure of the Meiji business world.

The first investigation is based on a book entitled Nippon Zaikai Jirubutsu Retsuden (A Series of Biographies of Great Figures in the Japanese Business World), Tokyo, Aoshio Publishers, Vol.1, 1963, and Vol.2, 1964, which contains the biographies of 200 successful entrepreneurs. Excluding the 23 who were too young to establish themselves as reputable entrepreneurs during the Meiji-Taisho period, 1868-1926, the remaining 177 are grouped into 8 groups: Group A consists of those who were already known as businessmen before the Meiji Revolution, 1867-68; group B includes those who stood out, for the first time, as pre-eminent businessmen during the period 1868-82; similarly those of the vintage of 1883-90 are grouped as C and those of 1891-97, 1898-1905, 1906-12, 1913-20 and 1921-26 as D, E, F, G and H respectively. The numbers of the members of these eight groups A-H are 11, 12, 9, 21, 18, 37, 24, 25 respectively.

Each group is divided into two subgroups: the first includes those members of the group who came from Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa or Hizen (SCTH) regions which had joined forces in the Meiji Revolution, and the second comprises those who came from elsewhere. Each subgroup is then further divided first according to whether they were samurai, or quasi-samurai, or non-samurai and secondly, according to whether they had received higher, secondary or only primary education. At the time of the Meiji Revolution there were many

young men who had not obtained samurai status by birth but had the same samurai spirit; they joined the revolution and were regarded as quasi-samurai by their comrades. Others of quasi-samurai status included rōnin (masterless samurai), goshi (rural samurai), doctors and scholars. All these are classified as quasi-samurai; it was an important category at a critical period of time - the Meiji Revolution - but faded away quickly after peace had been restored again. It has to be noted that classifications into higher, secondary and primary education were arbitrary and vague, especially in the early years of the Meiji period. In those days the formal education system had not yet been established and we classify those who studied Western or Chinese disciplines privately as having received higher or secondary education, respectively. Also, irrespective of whether a university graduate or not, all those who claimed to have studied abroad are listed as having received higher education if they were educated before the modern higher education system was established in Japan. For later years the classification is much easier and more rigorous; graduates from agricultural, engineering and commercial colleges as well as those from state and private universities are all listed as having received higher education, while those graduated from middle and high schools are categorized as only having secondary education.

Table 14 gives the results of these classifications. We may assume that all the persons of group A were fully active until the end of the fifth period, 1898-1905; but that only half of them worked in the sixth period, 1906-12 and that they were all retired from business afterwards. Group A, therefore, appears with only half their weighting in the sixth period, whereas it has the full weight 1 until the sixth and zero weighting in the seventh and afterwards. Similarly we assume that the group B has weight 1 from its appearance until the seventh period, half weighting in the seventh and 0 afterwards. In the same way, group C keeps weight 1 from the third period until it has only half weighting in the eighth period. All other groups D, E, ..., H have full weighting in every remaining period from their first appearance to the end (i.e. the eighth). Hence the number of the sample leading businessmen for each period is as follows:



11 for period I (1860-67), 23 for period II (1868-82),  
32 for period III (1883-90), 54 for period IV (1891-97),  
72 for period V (1895-1905), 103.5 for period VI (1906-12),  
115 for period VII (1913-20), 149.5 for period VIII (1921-26).

Therefore, we obtain from Table 14 Table 15, which shows periodwise (1) the number of businessmen who came from the Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa-Hizen regions, (2) the total number of samurai-businessmen regardless of their birthplaces and (3) the number of businessmen who received higher education. These results are shown as percentages too in the same table. Selecting only those who were born before 1869 from the names collected in Nippon Zaikai Jinbutsu Retsuden, we find that 44 per cent of them had a pedigree of samurai origin; this is comparable with Ishikawa's 48 per cent. If we add quasi-samurai to these, our figure would easily reach 60 per cent. We find from the same NZJR that most of the samurai business-elite (about 84 per cent of them) worked in the investment-goods sector or the banking sector. The proportion of samurai in these two sectors was found to be 52 per cent and 48 per cent respectively, while that of the consumption-goods sector was only 21 per cent.

Table 15 shows that people from the Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen clans - which were the main forces of the Meiji Revolution - got advantages and privileges under the new government. It is not surprising that they were given a big share in the business world. All figures over 30 per cent must be said to be fairly high, because the population of the SETH area was, in the Meiji period, about 18 per cent of the total population and these areas are very far from Tokyo and Osaka, particularly from Tokyo. It can be seen that their share reached a maximum in the second period, 1868-82, and quickly diminished afterwards. This means that the SETH group could not have been powerful in the business world through the second half of the Meiji period and in the Taisho period, despite the voices accusing the SETH group of forming a clique in the political world, officialdom and, especially, in the army and navy. The increase in the percentage of samurai in the business-elite is more remarkable. Before the revolution, although there were many samurai who were involved in business and trade as officials of their clans, there were no samurai

who were classified as businessmen; also there were a number of quasi-samurai who were not full-time businessmen but were actively involved in entrepreneurial activities.<sup>28</sup> In the first period after the revolution (i.e. our period II), however, the percentage of samurai in the business-elite had already grown to 26 per cent, which is very close to Mannari's estimate of 23 per cent. It reached a maximum of 42 per cent in period V, which is a very high figure in view of the fact that only a small percentage, 5 or 6 per cent, of the total population could claim themselves to be samurai. The number stayed above 40 per cent until 1920, but diminished rapidly afterwards.

There was, however, a third group, the group of elite businessmen with higher education. Its percentage among the total business-elite was very much lower than the samurai's up to period V, but overtook it in period VI. Its proportion has increased constantly since then, so that it would now be very near to 100 per cent. Thus membership of the elite of Japan's business world was transferred from samurai to university graduates, and people in Japan began to consider the latter as their new samurai. This status was not given by birth, unlike the genuine samurai of the Tokugawa era, but was obtained by effort and ability. The 'new samurai' group was more powerful than the old, which was ranked according to pedigree. Therefore, it has been able to monopolize almost all of the important positions of the financial and business world throughout the Showa period (1927~). Within the group there has been a shift from the graduates of private universities to those of state (or imperial) universities, but there has not been any other group which could challenge the university graduates.

The second investigation was made by using Jinji Kōshin Roku (Who's who in Japan)<sup>29</sup>. It listed the names of notables of various circles in the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area as well as for Tokyo-Yokohama. From the book we extracted 1447 businessmen's names from the TY area and 407 from the KOK area. We excluded those names working for small shops but included auditors of companies and those persons who held minor management positions in big companies and factories. The proportion of samurai among these selected businessmen was 36 per cent for the TY area and 23 per cent for the KOK. These figures may be increased to 38 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively, if the auditors were excluded. It can be noted that there is a substantial discrepancy between these figures

for the two areas. This fact would explain the tendency of scholars like Takao Tsuchiya, who is inclined to emphasize the importance of the Tokyo business world in the Japanese economy, to insist that the business world of Meiji Japan was very much dominated by samurai, whilst others, such as Mataji Miyamoto, lay stress on the significance of Osaka merchants as they have mainly worked on historical materials from the Osaka area. Also we find from using this book that if figures from both the Tokyo-Yokohama and Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe areas are consolidated, the proportion of samurai is 77 per cent for statesman and government officials, 86 per cent for leaders and senior management of state enterprises, 41 per cent for Diet members, 75 per cent for scholars in science, technology and agriculture, and 50 per cent for scholars in social studies, humanities and other disciplines. From this evidence we can conclude that Meiji Japan was a samurai-state. Although 94-95 per cent of the total population were non-samurai they had only a disproportionately small share in every sector of the society. It was very far from a fair society.

Finally, using the same book, Jinji Kōshin Roku, an investigation of mixed marriages between samurai and non-samurai was carried out. The results are given in Table 16. The men who were born in the years 1838-42 were at least 25-26 years old at the time of the Meiji Revolution, so that almost all of them would have been married before 1868. The figures for the husbands born in 1838-42 show that mixed marriages were already achieving high rates at the end of the Tokugawa period. At least one out of four samurai husbands had non-samurai wives. The figure 14 per cent as the rate of mixed marriages for the non-samurai husbands can be considered to be very high because as those of samurai pedigree accounted for only 5 or 6 per cent of the total population, so the percentage of samurai daughters was similarly as low as 5-6 per cent. The table shows that there was a considerable upward trend in the rate of mixed marriage for both samurai and non-samurai husbands. Furthermore the figures for periods 1843-47 and 1848-52 suggest that there was a mixed marriage boom for samurai husbands just before and after the Meiji Revolution. The caste-system which rigorously prevailed throughout most of the Tokugawa era started to collapse at its end and was quickly brought to an end in the Meiji period.

#### IV. Conclusion

It has been seen in Section II that village industries were emerging and developing in the second period of the Tokugawa era and the people responded to this economic growth by moving from castle towns to villages. The traditional Tokugawa economy based on commercial and industrial activities in the castle towns for the samurai was in danger when faced by competition from new challengers, village industries. The Meiji revolutionaries were the saviours of the samurai class in the sense that they revived, reconstructed and modernized the dying economy into a new dual-structured one with the government and private sectors in the upper and lower tiers, respectively. Also, as has been seen in Section III, organizations belonging to the upper sector were dominated by samurai or 'new samurai', and those working in the lower sector were segregated from those in the upper sector by the wage disparities between them continuing to expand after Meiji. Except for the unsuccessful military coups which happened in the 1930s, no resistance, not to mention revolution, was attempted against the regime, either by the bourgeoisie or by socialists, until its final collapse in 1945.

After the 1945 surrender to the Allies this regime was entirely destroyed by the G.H.Q. of the Allied Forces which occupied Japan. The defeated Imperial Army and Navy were completely disbanded and Japan was prohibited from building up any new military forces. The zaibatsu, which were considered as the economic weapons of fanatical militarism and ultranationalism in the invasion of China and other Asian countries, were broken up into their constituent parts and a heavy property tax was levied on rich men as well as the Imperial family. A thorough going land reform was carried out and workers were encouraged to form trade unions. Moreover, the Emperor denied his divinity in which people had believed until the end of the war. He became a symbol of the nation, and the new constitution confirmed that sovereignty resided in the people, rather than the Emperor. These reforms were honestly and strictly carried out under the supervision of the G.H.Q.; the surrender brought about the same effects as might be produced by a genuine bourgeois revolution.

It has to be remembered that this was a 'revolution' procured by an army of occupation, and not by the people of the nation. As time elapsed the attitude of the United States was reversed; she soon preferred a strong Japan to a peaceful Japan. When this was observed, Japan quickly responded and swung to the right. Although the zaibatsu families could not restore the position they had held before the war, the zaibatsu enterprises themselves rebuilt many of their links and huge monetary and industrial combines have grown up again. Furthermore these enterprises spoilt the results of the land reform by buying up many plots of land on the market and becoming huge landowners. By the 1970s and afterwards trade unions had become almost toothless and powerless again. There is evidence that many Japanese people would probably prefer a more sacred, heavenly Imperial monarch. Much of the pre-war dualism still prevails and will continue to do so. Even now, as late as 1986, Japanese society and economy have not yet been fully democratized to the extent hoped for in 1945.

We can expect that the speed of westernization in Japan will be substantially reduced in the future, while her national economy will continue to be among the few which have the highest physical productivity. Thus we at last obtain a developed non-occidental national economy which, although broadly classified as a 'capitalist' economy, varies greatly from the stylized free enterprise system yet is still easily compared with the western economies, at least in physical productivity. We have here one example of the transformation from feudalism into 'capitalism'. The possibility of many different types of transformation, depending on the combination of various historical factors, suggests the existence of a variety of capitalist economies. Plural types of transformation must result in the economics of 'capitalism' also being of a plural nature.

There have been a few attempts to develop a non-occidental economics, one of which is the famous Marxist analysis of the Asiatic model of production. It is, however, evident that the concept of Asiatic production does not fit contemporary Japan and other Far Eastern NICs at all. It is also obvious that what is needed is a multi-disciplinary approach. Not only economic analysis in the strict sense has to be made, but also historical, institutional,

juristic, and even socio-religious analyses must be carried out.

Although Russia, China, India and Japan are often compared with each other, no difference in ethos is taken into account.<sup>30</sup> They are compared on the inadequate assumption that the same type of people has settled these four areas. To develop a non-occidental economics we must have for this new field an encyclopaedic inductive observer, and then a pure deductive theorist, just as Adam Smith and David Ricardo in fact actually appeared in the history of occidental economics.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Concerning this long-run effect of the decisive victory over the war with Spain that ultimately led to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in England see, for example, A. L. Morton, A People's History of England, Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., London, 1945, pp. 201-3.
2. For a concise history of Japan refer to my Why Has Japan 'Succeeded'? (WHJS), Cambridge University Press, 1982.
3. As I wrote in WHJS, I oppose the view that Japan, like England, shifted to a period of absolutism (i.e. the Meiji period, according to this view) directly from feudalism (i.e. the Tokugawa period). I would rather consider that feudalism and absolutism coexisted under the Tokugawa period. In fact, the bakufu was mercantilistic in spite of the fact that its foreign-trade activity was very sluggish due to the isolation policy.
4. Many powerful merchants were appointed as financial advisors of various clans.
5. See WHJS, pp.542-87. There was no way in which the Meiji Revolution could be thoroughgoing. Apart from the fact that the demand for individualism, as well as for democracy, was still very feeble in Japan, it is, in view of the international circumstances then facing Japan, that it was extremely dangerous and, therefore, almost impossible for the Japanese to implement a revolution achieving total freedom. They had to be satisfied with a series of reforms aimed at strengthening national unity and catching up with the western countries in technology. By comparison England found herself in a much more favourable international position at the time of the English Revolution.
6. Each clan had its own enterprises. In addition to the bakufu, such clan names as Satsuma, Hizen, Tosa, Choshu, Fukui, Nanbu, Akita and Uwajima may be mentioned as the most successful clans in commercial and industrial businesses.
7. Sakai spinning factory was one of the most advanced factories Japan had at the very beginning of the Meiji period. It was established at Sakai by the Satsuma clan using machines and equipment which had been imported from England and initially installed at the clan's Kagoshima spinning factory.
8. For these, see WHJS, Chapter 2.
9. For selected ten years between 1721 and 1846 the bakufu compiled and kept statistics of the total population. These aggregate data have been examined by various writers. See, for example, N. Sekiyama, Kinsei Nippon no Jinko Kozo (The Structure of Population of Premodern Japan), Yoshikawa-Kobunkan, 1958, and S.B. Hanley and K. Yamamura, Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868, Princeton University Press, 1977, pp.38-68. All these writers pointed out that there were reasons for believing that these statistics officially collected by the

bakufu generally underestimate the true figure. In view of the figure we have for 1872, 33 million, which is more reliable, those for 1721 and 1846, 26 and 27 millions respectively, may be too small. However, the 1872 figure includes some classes of people excluded from the 1721 and 1846 figures. After taking this change in the concept of the 'population' into account, the official data would still underestimate the actual population, perhaps by 10 per cent.

10. B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge University Press, 1962, pp.24-26.
11. The Tokugawa bakufu was extremely suspicious of the feudal lords and, therefore, devised a very expensive and paranoid ruling system.
12. During latter part of the regime, however, reallocation declined drastically.
13. These figures have all been calculated from Hanshi Soran (Historical Survey of Feudal Clans) ed. T. Kodama and M. Kitajima, Shin-Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1977, pp. 425-31.
14. Also obtained from Hanshi Soran.
15. H. Nishigaki and H. Matsushima, Mie-ken no Rekishi (History of Mie Prefecture), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1974, p.121.
16. Various local histories confirm these facts.
17. See S. Taniguchi, Okayama-ken no Rekishi (History of Okayama Prefecture), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1970, pp.122-25.
18. See T. Tanaka, Ehime-ken no Rekishi (History of Ehime Prefecture), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1973, pp.101-16.
19. K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, Moscow, 1967, pp.632.
20. This has been pointed out by John Hicks. See his A Theory of Economic History, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.39.
21. For example, the number of clans to which the Konoike family lent money reached 111. See M. Miyamoto, Konoike Zenzaemon, in Edo-ki Shonin no Kakushinteki Kodo (Innovative Behaviour of Merchants in the Edo period) ed. Y. Sakudo, Yuhikaku, 1978, p.75.
22. E. Honjo, Bakumatsu no Shinseisaku, (New Policies at the End of the Bakufu Era), Yuhikaku, 1935, pp.120-33.
23. For a more detailed analysis of the sale of state factories, see A. Kobayashi, "Kindai Sangyo no Keisei to Kango Haraisage" (Formation of Modern Industries and the Sale of State Factories) in M. Kajinishi (ed.) Nippon Keizaiishi Taikei (An Outline of the Japanese Economic History), Vol. V, Tokyo University Press, 1965, pp.291-355. Although most state factories were sold because they were unprofitable, some other such as those of the silk



industries which had been built as model factories were sold since they had fulfilled their purpose.

24. See Nippon Rōdo Kumiai Monogatari (A Narrative History of Trade Unions in Japan), ed. K. Okochi and H. Matsuo, Chikuma-shobo, 1965, pp.18-21 and M. Tsukada, Nagano-ken no Rekishi (History of Nagano Prefecture),
25. See Noshomu-sho, Shoko-kyoku, Shokko Jijo (Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Commerce and Manufacturing Bureau, A Survey of Factory Workers) vol. I, Seikatsu-sha, 1903.
26. See Meiji-Taishō Kokusei Soran (General Survey of the State of Affairs in Meiji-Taishō Japan), Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, Tokyo, 1927, pp.584-86.
27. H. Mannari, Bizinesu Eriito (Business Elite), Chuokoron-sha, 1965, p.61; K. Ishikawa, "Meiji-ki ni okeru Kigyosha Katsudo no Tokeiteki Kansatsu" (A Statistical Investigation of Entrepreneurship in Meiji), Osaka Daigaku Keizaigaku, 1974, Vol. 23, No. 4, p.86.
28. Y. Hattori, Kurofune Zengo; Shishi to Keizai (Before and After the Visit of Black Ships; Royalists and Economic Activity) Iwanami Library, 1981, pp.148-66.
29. Jinji Kōshin Roku, Jinji Kōshin sha, 2nd ed., 1908.
30. See, for example, A.S. Guha, An Evolutionary View of Economic Growth, Oxford University Press, 1981.

TABLE 1a : POPULATION OF SELECTED TOWNS IN JAPAN, 1590-1869

(in thousands)

	Edo* (now Tokyo)	Osaka	Kyoto	Nagoya*	Kanazawa*	Okayama*
1590-99		200				
1600- 9		.				
10-19		.				
20-29		.				28
30-39		.	410			.
40-49		.	.			.
50-59		.	.	55		.
60-69		269	357	55	57	29
70-79		288	.	57	.	.
80-89		330	.	58	.	30
90-99	354	355	.	64	69	.
1700- 9	.	352	.	.	.	31
10-19	.	374	347	.	65	28
20-29	487	385	374	50	.	30
30-39	494	404	.	.	.	.
40-49	460	404	.	.	.	.
50-59	508	414	.	.	.	28
60-69	505	422	.	.	.	24
70-79	483	407	.	.	.	23
80-89	473	379	.	.	.	.
90-99	487	381	.	.	56	.
1800- 9	492	385	.	.	.	21
10-19	499	381	.	.	.	.
20-29	524	379	.	.	.	.
30-39	523	367	.	.	.	20
40-49	553	341	.	76	.	.
50-59	568	319	270 <sup>a</sup>	.	.	20
60-69	550	281	244 <sup>a</sup>	74	62 <sup>b</sup>	21

TABLE 1b : POPULATION OF SELECTED TOWNS IN JAPAN, 1590-1869  
(in thousands)

	Fukyama*	Hiroshima*	Tottori*	Matsuyama	Kochi*
1590-99					
1600- 9					
10-19					
20-29					
30-39					
40-49					
50-59					
60-69					17
70-79		31			.
80-89	12.9	.			.
90-99	13.0	.			.
1700- 9	12.5	.		17	.
10-19	.	37		.	.
20-29	.	.		.	.
30-39	.	.		.	.
40-49	.	.		.	.
50-59	.	.	13	.	.
60-69	.	28	.	.	.
70-79	12.7	.	.	.	.
80-89	.	27	.	12	.
90-99	.	.	.	.	.
1800- 9	.	.	.	.	.
10-19	.	.	10	.	.
20-29	.	25	.	12	14
30-39	.	.	.	.	.
40-49	.	.	11	.	15
50-59	.	.	.	.	16
60-69	.	.	.	.	.

TABLE 1c : POPULATION OF SELECTED TOWNS IN JAPAN, 1590-1869

(in thousands)

	Bungo -Fudai	Kofu*	Matsumato*	Sakai	Nagasaki
1590-99					
1600- 9					
10-19					25
20-29					.
30-39					.
40-49					.
50-59					41
60-69				69	41
70-79		12.8		61	40
80-89		14.3		61	53
90-99		.		64	65
1700- 9		12.7		57	.
10-19	5.1	.		51	42
20-29	.	14.1		.	.
30-39	.	13.3		52	.
40-49	3.9	13.0		48	.
50-59	.	.		47	.
60-69	.	.		.	.
70-79	.	11.3		46	.
80-89	4.0	.	8.5	.	32
90-99	3.7	10.6	8.8	.	.
1800- 9	3.7	.	9.4	.	.
10-19	.	.	10.0	45	.
20-29	.	.	9.9	44	.
30-39	.	.	9.8	.	27
40-49	.	.	9.3	40	.
50-59	.	.	9.8	37	27
60-69	3.4	11.1	.	.	.

Source: N. Sekiyama, Kinsei Nihon no Jinko Kōzo (The Structure of Population of Modern Japan), Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1958; T. Toyota Nihon no Hoken-toshi (Feudal Towns of Japan), Iwanami-shoten, 1952; T. Harada, Nihon Hoken Toshin Kenkyu (Studies in Feudal Towns of Japan), Tokyo University Press, 1981; History of Prefectures, 47 volumes. (ed. by K. Kodama, in Japanese), Yamakawa Publishers; Town history ed., by various city offices; and others.

- \* indicates that the town was a castle town. In the case of Kofu it was a castle town until 1724 but was thereafter ruled directly by the central government. Where more than one figure was available for two years or more belonging to the same decade, they were simply averaged.
- a indicates that the figure was estimated from the population of the Yamashiro province which Kyoto belonged to. The two estimated figures are comparable with Kyoto's population, 233, in 1878.
- b indicates that the figure was obtained by deducting an estimated number of samurai from Kanazawa's population, 130, in 1871.

TABLE 2

The Population Composition of Edo, 1721-1867: by Sex and Birth Place  
(in thousands)

Year	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Born in Edo	(4) Born elsewhere	(1)+(2)-(3)-(4) Error
1721	323	178	-	-	-
1734	338	196	-	-	-
1736	340	193	-	-	-
1743	316	185	-	-	-
1832	298	248	-	-	-
1843	291	269	386	162	12
1844	-	-	401	157	-
1854	294	280	430	141	3
1855	-	-	427	137	-
1860	-	-	425	137	-
1867	273	267	421	117	2

TABLE 3

Population of Iyo Clans, 1721-1846 ( in thousands)

Year	1721	1750	1756	1786	1798	1804	1822	1828	1834	1846
Matsuyama	172	159	161	160	162	158	166	169	169	169
The other Iyo Clans	332	341	348	355	369	372	398	406	417	431

TABLE 4

## Peasant Uprisings

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Period	Total number	Number per year
1590-1740	734	4.86
1741-1840	1459	14.59
1841-1867	493	18.26

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Source: Y. Ando (ed.) Kindai Nippon Keizai-shi Yoran (Handbook of Economic History of Modern Japan), p. 33, Tokyo University Press, 1975.



TABLE 5

State/private-sector Wage Disparities (wage per worker  
in the private-factory sector in terms of the wage per  
worker in the state-factory sector of the corresponding year - 100)\*

Year	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
male	75	77	79	81	72	69	70	74	82	84	80*	80*	86*	103*
female	87	87	92	92	80	92	89	90	93	93	84*	88*	97*	123*

Source: Meiji-Taishō Kokusei Soran (General survey of the state of affairs in  
Meiji-Taishō Japan), Tōyō Keizai Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1927, Tables 593  
and 594.

\*Indicates the workers of 14 years old are excluded. Otherwise they are  
included in calculating the wage rate of private factories.

TABLE 6

Distribution of male workers in the 'machine and tools' industry(%)

Sector		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Factory		machinery	ships and vehicles	tools	metal goods	total
1909	small	31.5	8.3	23.3	36.9	100
	medium-sized	24.4	25.5	20.0	30.0	99.9
	large	5.4	87.2	7.3	-	99.9
1914	small	28.1	8.6	22.1	41.1	99.9
	medium-sized	36.1	19.0	19.7	25.1	99.9
	large	30.5	58.2	3.1	8.1	99.9

Source: Kōjō Tōkei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 7

Wage disparities for male workers in the  
'machinery and tools' industry

(the average wages of the large factories in the industry - 100)

Sector Factory		(1) machinery	(2) ships and vehicles	(3) tools	(4) metal goods	(5) average
1909	small	87.4	95.7	80.0	79.0	83.3
	medium-sized	97.6	97.7	93.3	87.4	93.7
	large	109.2	101.0	81.7	-	100
1914	small	85.3	93.9	76.4	75.7	80.1
	medium-sized	87.0	97.3	88.2	81.9	87.9
	large	97.2	101.4	85.8	106.2	100

Source: Kōjō Tokei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 8

Distribution of female workers in the 'dyeing and weaving' industry (%)

Sector		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Factory		silk-reeling	cotton-spinning	cotton-fabrics	silk-fabrics	miscellaneous processes	Total
1909	small	32.4	0.2	24.0	26.1	17.2	99.9
	medium-sized	70.9	2.8	8.2	5.8	12.2	99.9
	large	14.4	51.4	7.6	0.5	26.1	100
1914	small	27.8	0.1	27.2	19.5	25.4	100
	medium-sized	68.5	3.4	10.2	5.0	12.9	100
	large	19.0	51.9	8.8	0.4	19.9	100

Source: Kōjō Tōkei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 9

Wage disparities for female workers in the 'dyeing and weaving' industry  
(the average wages of the large factories in the industry = 100)

Sector		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Factory		silk-reeling	cotton-spinning	cotton-fabrics	silk-fabrics	miscellaneous processes	average
1909	small	81.9	74.8	72.0	87.7	68.3	78.7
	medium-sized	100.8	105.1	88.4	100.7	76.0	96.9
	large	114.9	99.3	105.8	153.2	90.4	100
1914	small	82.2	62.2	69.8	84.6	65.4	75.0
	medium-sized	90.4	102.6	87.5	95.1	75.7	88.9
	large	100.9	97.5	115.5	113.0	98.3	100

Source: Kōjō Tōkei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 10

## Distribution of male workers in manufacturing industry (%)

Sector		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Factory		food & drinks	paper, ceramics & chemicals	machinery & tools	dyeing & weaving	miscellaneous	Total
1909	small	15.0	21.9	14.4	18.4	30.3	100
	medium-sized	28.5	16.7	23.5	18.8	12.5	100
	large	2.7	4.0	35.0	53.7	4.6	100
1914	small	14.3	25.6	16.3	15.5	28.3	100
	medium-sized	27.9	19.7	23.5	20.0	8.9	100
	large	2.2	9.9	47.1	37.5	3.2	100

Source: Kōjō Tōkei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 11

Wage disparities for male workers in manufacturing industry  
(the average wages of the large factories in the industry - 100)

Factory		Sector	(1) food & drinks	(2) paper, ceramics & chemicals	(3) machinery & Tools	(4) dyeing & weaving	(5) miscella- neous	(6) average
1909	small		85.9	88.0	103.5	70.8	87.7	83.3
	medium- sized		96.1	91.4	116.4	79.0	93.4	93.7
	large		109.3	84.1	124.2	84.7	103.2	100.0
1914	small		77.3	77.8	94.1	63.0	75.3	77.4
	medium- sized		82.1	84.1	103.3	70.8	85.0	86.0
	large		74.4	85.4	117.5	79.5	82.2	100

Source: Kōjō Tōkei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 12

## Distribution of female workers in manufacturing industry (%)

Sector		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Factory		food & drinks	paper, ceramics & chemicals	machinery & tools	dyeing & weaving	miscellaneous	Total
1909	small	4.3	5.6	0.5	82.4	7.2	100
	medium-sized	7.3	8.0	1.0	78.7	4.9	99.9
	large	2.0	0.6	0.0	94.7	2.6	99.9
1914	small	5.3	5.5	0.8	79.4	8.9	99.9
	medium-sized	1.2	7.7	0.9	84.7	5.5	100
	large	0.6	1.6	0.6	95.9	1.3	100

Source: Kōjo Tōkei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.



Table 13

Wage disparities for female workers in manufacturing industry  
(the average wages of the large factories in the industry = 100)

Sector		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Factory		food & drinks	paper, ceramics & chemicals	machinery & tools	dyeing & weaving	miscellaneous	average
1909	small	88.8	76.2	86.6	78.9	75.3	79.0
	medium-sized	67.3	80.7	97.4	97.2	83.4	93.0
	large	91.7	77.5	79.5	100.3	101.2	100.0
1914	small	91.2	77.4	84.9	75.5	73.0	76.3
	medium-sized	90.2	77.6	96.4	89.4	88.8	88.6
	large	73.1	87.1	91.5	100.6	86.4	100.0

Source: Kōjo Tokei Hyō (Statistical tables of factories) for 1909 and 1914.

Table 14

## Classification of selected businessmen in Meiji-Taisho Japan

Group	Subgroup	Classification by status			Classification by education			Total
		samurai	quasi-samurai	non-samurai	higher	secondary	primary	
A	A1	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
	A2	0	2	9	0	1	10	
B	B1	4	3	0	2	2	3	12
	B2	2	2	1	1	3	1	
C	C1	1	0	0	0	1	0	9
	C2	4	1	3	2	2	4	
D	D1	4	1	0	4	1	0	21
	D2	7	4	5	4	7	5	
E	E1	4	0	0	3	1	0	19
	E2	5	4	6	7	4	4	
F	F1	2	0	2	2	2	0	36
	F2	11	6	15	22	4	6	
G	G1	1	1	1	1	1	1	24
	G2	6	3	12	16	3	2	
H	H1	2	0	1	2	0	1	45
	H2	9	5	28	30	7	5	

Source: Nippon Zaikai Jinbutsu Retsuden (A Series of Biographies of Great Figures in the Japanese Business World), Tokyo, Aoshio Publishers, Vol. 1, 1963, and Vol. 2, 1964.

Subgroups with numerals 1 and 2 consist of those members of the group who were born in Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen and those who were born elsewhere, respectively.

The members of group A were already known as businessmen before 1868. For the remaining seven groups the periods during which the members, for the first time, stood out as pre-eminent businessmen are 1868-82 for B, 1883-90 for C, 1891-97 for D, 1898-1905 for E, 1906-12 for F, 1913-20 for G and 1921-26 for H.

Table 15

## The business elite of Meiji-Taisho Japan

Period	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
The number of businessmen	1860-67	1868-82	1883-90	1891-97	1898-1905	1906-12	1913-20	1921-26
who came from the Satsuma-Choshu-Tosa-Hizen area	0	7(30)	8(25)	13(24)	17(24)	21(20)	22.5(20)	21.5(14)
who had samurai origin	0	6(26)	10(31)	22(41)	31(43)	44(43)	48(42)	53.5(36)
who had received higher education	0	3(13)	5(16)	13(24)	23(32)	47(45)	62.5(54)	92(62)
Total number	11	23	32	54	72	103.5	115	149.5

Source: Table 14 above

The figures within brackets represent, in percentage terms, the ratio of the figure preceding it to the total number of businessmen at the bottom of the table.

Table 16

## Mixed marriages between samurai and non-samurai\*

Husband's year of birth	1838	1843	1848	1853	1858	1863	1868	1873	Total number of husbands
The percentage of	1842	1847	1852	1857	1862	1867	1872	1877	
samurai husbands having non- samurai wives	28	35	33	24	28	32	35	37	1,558
non-samurai husbands having samurai wives	14	13	20	22	25	27	26	21	1,585

\*The Tokyo-Yokohama region only

Source: Jinji Kōshin Roku (Who's who in Japan)