

9. Labour markets and gender inequality

Oriana Bandiera and Barbara Petrongolo

Wide disparities persist in the wages and economic power of men and women in nearly all countries. Women still make different educational decisions to men, are under-represented in high-paying jobs, and suffer the majority of the financial penalty related to having children. Notably, the disproportionate role women play in unpaid work in the home or family businesses more than makes up for the gap in paid work in the labour market, usually leading to less leisure time and possibly lower social prestige. This chapter argues that both justice and efficiency considerations support the case for tackling gender inequalities in the labour market. The chapter reviews evidence on existing disparities, on the mechanisms underpinning them – including related to novel explanations based on group identity and social norms – and on the policies promising to close these persistent gaps.

I. Introduction

Over the course of the last century there has been enormous progress in equalising rights between men and women. Today, women have the same rights to property, credit, and schooling in every country but a few, mostly in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Most countries have also adopted laws against discrimination at work and domestic violence. Nearly every country has outlawed provisions that gave husbands control over household finances and that required women to obey their husbands. But equal rights have not closed gaps in labour market opportunities and outcomes. There is a wide disparity in the wages and economic power of men and women in nearly all countries. Women still make different educational decisions to men, are under-represented in high-paying jobs, and suffer the majority of the financial

How to cite this book chapter:

Bandiera, Oriana and Petrongolo, Barbara (2025) 'Labour markets and gender inequality', in: Besley, Tim, Bucelli, Irene and Velasco, Andrés (eds) *The London Consensus: Economic Principles for the 21st Century*, London: LSE Press, pp. 281–309 <https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.tlc.i>

penalty related to having children. Notably, the disproportionate role women play in unpaid work in the home or family businesses more than makes up for the gap in paid work in the labour market, usually leading to less leisure time and possibly lower life satisfaction. These differences raise concerns about social justice related to unequal access to labour market opportunities and life satisfaction, as well as concerns about efficiency that are related to the (mis)allocation of talents to jobs. Gender inequality in labour outcomes is too large to be a manifestation of gender differences in traits and essential preferences. This implies that gender disparity creates misallocation, and policies that encourage gender equality can enhance efficiency.

II. The case for gender equity at work

Gender equity at work is achieved when gender has no bearing on individual occupational choices and rewards. It requires men and women to have access to the same opportunities and have the freedom to choose whichever occupation suits their talents and preferences. At the time of writing, no country in the world has achieved gender equity, and most are quite far from it. In this section we argue that this clashes with basic principles of justice, as well as economic efficiency. In all human societies, the allocation of work inside and outside the home is gendered. This can be clearly seen in the next section in [Figure 9.1](#), which plots the gender gaps in the average daily hours that men and women spend on paid and unpaid work for a selection of OECD countries. Gaps are defined as the difference between male and female time spent on each type of work, relative to male time. Data are drawn from nationally representative time-use surveys and show that in all countries women do more unpaid work within the household than men. Differences in unpaid work range from 4.5 times as much in Japan to 20% more in Sweden. The UK is roughly at the median, with women devoting nearly twice the amount of time to unpaid housework than men do. The figure also shows that the allocation of domestic work is (far) more unequal than that of paid work, which implies that men can enjoy more leisure time than women.

Paid and unpaid work do not convey the same economic power and prestige, which is therefore in breach of distributive justice. In fact, work inside the home is not counted as ‘employment’, while the same activities would be filed under employment if performed outside the home – like educating children, keeping accounts, or cleaning, to name a few. This inconsistent classification of jobs, depending on whether they are performed inside or outside the home, puts women at a disadvantage by default.

The justice motive per se provides sufficient ground to argue for gender equality. In addition, in a world where resources are increasingly scarce, analysing the efficiency implication of gender inequality is also key to assess the cost of policies needed to foster equality. Indeed, economists are increasingly re-thinking equity-efficiency trade-offs and the zero-sum fallacies that are typically implicit in them. An argument frequently made

to support the link between gender equality and economic efficiency is that, by favouring women's work outside the home, labour supply increases and, together with it, output per person increases too. This argument is, however, based on the fallacious notion that women who perform work inside the home are in fact not working. Once one takes into account the fact that women perform several tasks that still need to be performed if a woman works outside the home, the above argument may not hold. If somebody else is hired to perform the tasks that the woman was performing before, then measured labour supply increases but the actual labour supply remains constant. Labour supply only increases if women do both the work inside the home as well as the work outside. However, in this case the increase in efficiency comes to the detriment of women's leisure and welfare.

There is, however, a more valid reason why gender equity can increase efficiency. Assuming that innate talent is equally distributed among men and women, eliminating any restrictions that limit the types of jobs women can do can increase efficiency by assigning the right skills to the right tasks. This redistribution of workers to different roles (both within the home and in the workplace) can have an effect on productivity, i.e., income and output per worker. Specifically, the match between skills and job requirements can be improved in three ways: women taking up work in the market sector; men working in the household instead; and household work being outsourced to the market. Unlike a model in which a woman remains at home and provides services that are not monetised, the market for domestic help has the added advantage of pricing household tasks and potentially improving their allocation.

III. The data


1. Gender, labour, and economic development

Gender gaps at work depend on the nature of work as well as economic, institutional, and cultural factors. The measure of female work that is most easily comparable across contexts, and most widely used, is participation in the labour force. The relationship between female participation and gross domestic product (GDP) per head is U-shaped: participation is relatively high at low levels of development, then drops at intermediate levels, before rising again at higher levels. This pattern – which may be observed both in the cross-section of countries and in within-country time series¹ – reflects substantial changes in the nature and the composition of female work.

In extremely poor countries, where most individuals are generally engaged in subsistence agriculture or production for home consumption, labour force participation does not have the same meaning as in high-income countries, where most people work for others and receive a wage in exchange for their labour services. The reason why female participation is especially high at low levels of development is that women are heavily engaged in small-scale agriculture, whether for own subsistence or the family farm.

With modernisation of agriculture and industrialisation, the main locus of production and exchange gradually shifts from the household to the market. Most men leave the home to sell their labour in the market, whereas most women remain at home, where the production of home services is not counted as labour.

Figure 9.1: Paid versus unpaid work by gender/Gender gaps in employment rates (%)



Source: Andrew et al. (2021)² Figure 2, reproduced with permission from the authors/IFS.

The process of industrialisation thus creates the first wedge between male and female work. The organisation of labour and capital in firms opens other margins, for example, via differences in the number of hours worked and the hourly wage rate. As development progresses, economies grow more complex and create a wider variety of jobs. Human capital gains and the

expansion of white collar jobs attract women into the labour force, due to higher opportunity costs of home making and comparative advantages in white collar occupations. An increasing portion of jobs in the labour market is taken by women, especially in the rising service sector.

2. Gender gaps in high-income countries


If we focus on countries that are relatively similar in terms of the organisation of work and production, we can decompose the differences between men and women at work in finer details.

The gender gap in earnings is defined as the difference between the average gross income of men and women, relative to men’s earnings. This is a key summary measure of gender differences in labour market outcomes that captures differences in all aspects of working life, including whether and how much men and women work, the types of jobs they do, their experiences and skills, the returns to these, and frictions in wage setting (including discrimination).

Gender gaps in earnings encompass three margins: gaps in participation; gaps in hours, conditional on participating; and gaps in hourly wages. Figure 9.2 shows the overall gap and – where available – its three components: paid employment (in dark blue), hours worked (in red), and hourly wages (in light blue). Gender earnings gaps are large across all OECD countries, from over 20% in Denmark and Sweden, to about 40% in the UK, and over 70% in Korea and Japan.

The first point to note is that, in most countries, all three margins contribute to overall inequality: women are under-represented in the labour force and,

Figure 9.2: The earnings gap and its components



Source: Figure 1 in Andrew et al. (2024)³, republished under CC BY Licence.

when they participate, they both work fewer hours on average and are paid less per hour. Two further points are noteworthy. First, the gap in hours tends to be larger where the gap in participation is smaller. One possible explanation is that in countries where most women work outside the home, jobs have adjusted to facilitate the combination of home and market work, and part-time work becomes widespread (as it is the case for the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the UK). Where fewer women work, most jobs are full time, and gaps in hours, conditional on participation, are smaller (as is the case, for example, in Italy and Greece). Second, the gender gap in participation is also negatively correlated with the wage gap. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) highlight that this pattern is consistent with selection on gains, namely in countries where women face high barriers to work outside the home, only those who are exceptionally talented will do so, and they will work similar hours and earn similar wages as men.⁴

IV. The economics of gender inequalities in the labour market

Seminal work on gender inequality in the labour market has emphasised the role of gaps in productivity, reflecting differential investments in human capital. But, by the late 1970s, gender differences in completed schooling or potential work experience already explained a small portion of the overall wage gap, with the bulk of the gap reflecting differences in returns to characteristics typically associated with pay discrimination.⁵ Job characteristics like occupation, industry, and part-time status were (and still are) important components of pay gaps, although it was hard to disentangle the roles played by differences in work preferences versus entry barriers in the allocation of men and women to jobs.

Rapid female advances in human capital accumulation, alongside the decline in pay discrimination for equal work, have gradually diverted economists' attention away from first-order factors like human capital differences and discrimination. Indeed, the evidence that remaining earnings gaps in high-income countries were associated with systematic differences in the work done by men and women has naturally steered the research focus towards reasons why men and women tend to specialise in different labour market segments.

Meanwhile, the growing influence of social psychology in economic research has provided economists with novel approaches and data to investigate gender differences in preferences and behavioural nuances, as well as novel explanations based on group identity and social norms.⁶ From this, new perspectives on gender have emerged. One strand of work emphasises the role of gender differences in preferences and psychological traits in setting limits to women's labour market involvement. Another strand gives prominence to the role of gender identity and norms in defining appropriate roles for men and women in the household and the labour market.

Work on gender differences in psychological traits has investigated the role of risk aversion, self-confidence, competitiveness, willingness to ask, as well as other-regarding preferences in driving male and female choices of education and career tracks.⁷ Recent analyses however show that differences in these essential traits tend to be context-dependent and they typically account for a modest proportion of the gender gap in labour market outcomes.⁸ Importantly, there remains an open question on the extent to which differences in traits and preferences are driven by innate gender differences or reflect socially constructed norms.

Most of the recent advances on gender inequalities research are coalescing around the study of differential barriers to labour market success, focusing in particular on the unequal role of family responsibilities and gendered social norms. Evidence on the household origins of gender inequality has contributed to the rekindling of early models of household specialisation and has given prominence to insights from the literature on household economics, which had mostly developed along different approaches without much cross-pollination with the labour literature.

V. Recent ideas

Evidence for several high-income countries has established that much of the remaining gender gaps can be explained by the differential impacts of children on maternal and paternal earnings. While childbirth is largely neutral to the careers of men, it drives a large and persistent drop in women's earnings. After having their first child, women have more intermittent workforce attachment, also associated to subsequent pregnancies and spells on parental leave. When in work, mothers tend to have higher demand for family-friendly working conditions, shorter commutes, remote work opportunities, and other job characteristics that may interfere with financially rewarding careers. Dynamic aspects of the motherhood penalty may also be relevant, including the formation of aspirations, differential job search behaviour, and changing attitudes and norms around birth.

Qualitative findings on the motherhood penalty are remarkably robust across countries, regardless of levels of development and institutional contexts.⁹ Importantly, while non-child-related aspects of gender gaps have steadily shrunk over recent decades – mostly via female gains in human capital accumulation and declining discrimination – the child-related component of gender gaps has remained large and persistent. As a consequence, the presence of children currently explains the bulk of remaining gender gaps in earnings.

In most contexts the motherhood penalty is rooted in gender identity and social conservatism. If gender roles within the household were equalised, parenthood would not be any more detrimental to female rather than male careers. While one may argue that different gender roles reflect at least in part gender differences in preferences, the influence of prescriptive norms on behaviour makes it hard to draw a clear distinction between preferences and

constraints. Preferences may mostly internalise prescriptive norms whenever group identities induce certain behaviours and choices.

VI. Towards a policy consensus

Consistent with the view that the bulk of remaining inequalities is driven by differential experiences of men and women upon childbirth, all high-income countries have in place targeted support for families as a way to alleviate the impacts of children on the careers of mothers. Job-protected parental leave is the most widespread family-oriented policy, followed – in both timing and diffusion – by public support for childcare. In several countries, firms complement public policies with an array of family friendly practices, including top-up of parental leave, support for childcare, and flexible work arrangements.

To date, there is little evidence of beneficial effects of longer or more generous parental leave on maternal labour supply and earnings, and early evidence on fathers' leave quotas suggests only limited leeway for replacing maternal childcare, mostly because complying fathers rarely take longer than the relatively short, reserved quotas. Existing evidence on childcare support is more encouraging. Policy evaluations for several countries has shown that more generous childcare funding tends to boost female participation whenever take-up is large and subsidised childcare effectively replaces maternal childcare.¹⁰ However, this may not be the case in contexts where conservative norms on gender roles effectively limit the substitutability of maternal childcare during the early childhood years. Moreover, public support tends to be far more limited beyond the early years, when the organisation of the school timetable is hardly compatible with full-time parental employment. In general, policy faces an uphill struggle whenever gendered beliefs and behaviour have deep roots in intrinsically held norms. Norms are hardly malleable and most forms of policy intervention have limited traction on their evolution, at least in the short run.

The outlook for policy is more optimistic in cases of pluralistic ignorance, in which most individuals personally reject a conservative norm, but may abide to it in the incorrect belief that their peers would socially sanction those who do not.¹¹ In this case, the education system and the media, as well as role models and peer influences, may be especially effective in eroding conformity to stereotypical beliefs and conservative behaviour. Intervention targeted at families may be both less effective and more costly, as shifting norms would require treating a large share of the compliers. Moreover, results from policy pilots would be misleading because policies that could break the norm if implemented at scale would be ineffective in small pilots.

Affirmative action is an additional form of intervention often invoked to encourage female participation in high-earnings careers and leadership roles, especially in politics and the corporate sector. The rationale for intervention in these sectors is to overcome entry barriers to male-dominated professions.

Moreover, by changing the gender composition of decision makers, the effects of quotas may percolate to lower layers of organisations and to general attitudes towards gender roles in society at large. However, the imposition of quotas in contexts in which the availability of specialised female expertise is scarce may distort the meritocratic allocation of talent and possibly entrench gender stereotypes. In this case, the prospect of quotas to be introduced in the future would give institutions a better opportunity to cultivate women's talent than unanticipated constraints on gender composition.

The available evidence on the impact of gender quotas is mixed. A study on India has found that the introduction of gender quotas in political representation has enhanced general perceptions about women's leadership abilities.¹² For Europe, there is instead no evidence of improved promotion prospects for female employees exposed to more gender-balanced company boards.¹³

Modern welfare states and labour regulations contain several instruments that, while not directly aimed at gender equality, would nonetheless have an impact on the relative earnings of women, who tend to be lower earners in their households and workplaces. For example, tax credit systems typically encourage women's employment and hours, especially among single mothers. Similarly, labour regulations that compress the wage distribution tend to result in lower gender differences in pay.¹⁴ Hence, the labour deregulation that OECD countries implemented since the 1980s with the erosion of union coverage and dismissal costs has caused higher wage dispersion overall and may have offset some of the gender convergence in wages. On the other hand, female under-representation in sectors that were highly unionised meant that the bulk of the de-unionisation process has mostly resulted in wider wage dispersion among men.

Finally, further insight is welcome into the political economy dimension of policy adoption, to relate the evolving support for political and economic equality between genders to economic development and societal changes. Throughout the world, there is a clear cross-country correlation between most indexes of gender equality in legal rights and GDP per person, and evidence suggests that changes in legal institutions are often fuelled by economic shocks. For example, Doepke and Tertilt argue that technological change and higher returns to education in 19th-century England and US eased women's economic empowerment thanks to their prominent role in the education of children.¹⁵ Alternatively, economic development may encourage the expansion of women's rights indirectly via cultural change.

But while economic development clearly eases gender convergence in legal rights, progressively higher living standards do not necessarily achieve gender convergence in labour market outcomes. Further steps towards gender equality need therefore to understand and embrace the role of policy in achieving equal labour market opportunities, feeding back into economic growth via the improved allocation of male and female talent to jobs where its value is the greatest.

Notes

- ¹ Ngai et al. (2022).
- ² Andrew et al. (2021).
- ³ Andrew et al. (2024).
- ⁴ Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008).
- ⁵ Altonji and Blank (1999).
- ⁶ Bertrand (2011).
- ⁷ Croson and Gneezy (2009).
- ⁸ Blau and Kahn (2016).
- ⁹ Kleven et al. (2019).
- ¹⁰ Albanesi et al. (2022).
- ¹¹ Bursztyn et al. (2020).
- ¹² Beaman et al. (2009).
- ¹³ Bertrand et al. (2018).
- ¹⁴ Blau and Kahn (2003).
- ¹⁵ Doepke and Tertilt (2009).

References

- Albanesi, S., Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2022) ‘Families, Labor Markets, and Policy’, in Lundberg, S. and Voena, A. (eds), *Handbook of the Economics of the Family*, North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers; 1(5): 255–326. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w30685>
- Altonji, J. G. and Blank, R. M. (1999) ‘Race and Gender in the Labor Market’, in Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds), *Handbook of Labor Economics*, North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers; 3(48): 3143–3259. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463\(99\)30039-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-4463(99)30039-0)
- Andrew, A., Bandiera, O., Costa-Dias, M. and Landaïs, C. (2021) ‘Women and Men at Work’, IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities. <https://ifs.org.uk/inequality/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/IFS-Inequality-Review-women-and-men-at-work.pdf>
- Andrew, A., Bandiera, O., Costa Dias, M. and Landaïs, C. (2024) ‘Women and Men at Work’, *Oxford Open Economics*, Volume 3, Issue Supplement_1, 2024, Pages i294–i322, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ooec/odad034>

- Beaman, L., Chattopadhyay, R., Duflo, E., Pande, R. and Topalova, P. (2009) 'Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?' *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4): 1497–1540. <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1497>
- Bertrand, M. (2011) 'New Perspectives on Gender', in Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds) *Handbook of Labor Economics*, North Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers; 4b(17): 1543–1590. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7218\(11\)02415-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7218(11)02415-4)
- Bertrand, M., Black, S. E., Jensen, S. and Lleras-Muney, A. (2018) 'Breaking the Glass Ceiling? The Effect of Board Quotas on Female Labour Market Outcomes in Norway', *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(1): 191–239. <https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy032>
- Blau, F. and Kahn, L. (2016) 'The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 55(3): 789–865. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20160995>
- Blau, F. D. and Kahn, L. M. (2003) 'Understanding International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap', *Journal of Labor Economics*, 21(1): 106–144. <https://doi.org/10.1086/344125>
- Bursztyn, L., Gonzalez, A. L. and Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2020) 'Misperceived Social Norms: Women Working Outside the Home in Saudi Arabia', *American Economic Review*, 110(10): 2997–3029. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180975>
- Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009) 'Gender Differences in Preferences', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 47(2): 448–74. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.2.448>
- Doepke, M. and Tertilt, M. (2009) 'Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4): 1541–1591. <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1541>
- Kleven, H., Landais, C., Posch, J., Steinhauer, A. and Zweimuller, J. (2019) 'Child Penalties across Countries: Evidence and Explanations', *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 109: 122–126. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w25524>
- Ngai, R., Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2022) 'Structural Transformation over 150 of Men's and Women's Work', Mimeo. <https://personal.lse.ac.uk/ngai/NgaiOlivettiPetrongolo.pdf>
- Olivetti, C. and Petrongolo, B. (2008) 'Unequal Pay or Unequal Employment? A Cross-Country Analysis of Gender Gaps', *Journal of Labor Economics*, 26(4): 621–654. <https://doi.org/10.1086/589458>

Response to Oriana Bandiera and Barbara Petrongolo by Ashwini Deshpande

Gender gaps in labour markets are rife, despite progress in several dimensions of women's rights. While gender gaps in many dimensions are persistent, there have been significant improvements in some, such as the average gap between male and female wages, a reduction in occupational segregation, and types of work contracts. These improvements are global, including in countries like India, where the issue of low and declining female labour force participation is under academic and media spotlights.


Gender equality is important because of equity and social justice, as well as efficiency reasons. Increasing participation of women in work and decision-making is key to ensuring that institutional structures facilitate the best use of individual talents and abilities.

The chapter raises the important issue of the role of gendered social norms in developed countries. This is a refreshing perspective, especially for readers from India and South Asia, where almost the entire onus of gender inequality is placed on adverse social norms by multilateral international agencies¹ and mainstream researchers. So much of the mainstream discussion in the South Asian context is dominated by the social norms discourse that one might think that, elsewhere in the world social norms are gender egalitarian; and that Indian people, and Indian women in particular, are fundamentally unable to respond to standard economic incentives. In other words, even if jobs are available in plenty, Indian women would not enter the labour market because of specific social norms. This chapter reminds us that social norms everywhere are discriminatory towards women.

The chapter shows the variation across countries in the time spent on paid work and on unpaid domestic work. We see that the former variation is far less significant than the latter. Though there has been progress towards gender equality in the arena of paid work, the progress in the arena of unpaid domestic work has been slow and uneven. [Figure 9.3](#) illustrates this in the context of the United States.

[Figure 9.3](#) shows that the gap between men and women in the hours spent on domestic and care narrowed between 1900–1980. The share of hours women spent on housework declined especially between 1950 and 1980, and the time spent doing domestic chores increased steadily from 1920 onwards. However, the narrowing of the gap over eight decades seems to have stalled after 1980. Thus, women continue to spend far more time in home production compared to men, in the US, and indeed, everywhere else in the world.

Figure 9.3: Weekly hours dedicated to home production, US, by gender, 1900–2005



Source: Ramey and Francis (2009) – processed by Our World in Data, reproduced under a CC BY licence.²

This inequality came to light during the COVID-19 pandemic when women dropped out of the labour force in the US and many other developed economies, not necessarily because they were retrenched, but because they were predominantly responsible for domestic chores and home schooling of children and found it very difficult to bear the double burden of paid work and domestic chores and childcare.

I. Insights from feminist economics

What economists call ‘home production’, feminist economists call reproductive labour. Reproductive labour does not refer simply to the physical act of childbearing, but to the whole gamut of domestic chores, including care work.

Here we see a clear difference between the developed and developing countries. In the latter, the quantum of reproductive labour is far higher: cooking, cleaning, house maintenance, buying items for daily food consumption, washing clothes, fetching water, fetching fuel for cooking, and taking care of children and the elderly. These activities are done every day, multiple times a day. For instance, in India, having three freshly cooked meals from scratch is the norm in most homes that can afford it. These tasks are predominantly, even almost exclusively, women’s responsibility. They are expected to either do it themselves, or for those who can afford it, get them done through paid help.

This immense pressure of reproductive labour is the real norm that prevents women from participating to their full potential in the arena of paid work.³ In this context, the argument of the authors about the positive two-way effect of economic growth on gender equality assumes significance. The

relationship between economic growth and women's labour is two-sided. Increasing participation of women in paid work will raise economic growth. Equally, economic growth has the potential to free women from the drudgery of everyday labour, as higher family incomes can increase access to labour-saving devices.

Feminist scholars have argued that the reproductive economy, which encompasses the entire gamut of domestic chores and unpaid care work, is essential for the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the 'productive economy'. First, society needs the next generation of workers to be born and nurtured for the economy to keep running. Second, those in paid work cannot continue to work uninterruptedly without unpaid or reproductive work being taken care of. While women's participation in the productive economy has increased, it has not necessarily reduced the burden of reproductive work substantially or evenly across the globe. This is often referred to as the 'double burden on women': women who are in the productive economy are not necessarily able to avoid the work in the reproductive economy.

This double burden also leads to a double whammy for women, where they are held to higher standards than men. At work, employers suspect them of having a low attachment to their jobs. Thus, they need to work doubly hard to prove they are just as good as their male counterparts. The expectations from them in their domestic roles include, over and above domestic chores, provision of emotional labour, including nurturing, being there as a supportive figure, organising social events, and so forth. Any slippage or suboptimal performance (real or imaginary) in these dimensions is looked down upon as prioritising career over family, or a case of 'wanting to have it all'. Men routinely prioritise career over family, but that is not seen as a negative trait.


II. The 'motherhood penalty' and the 'fatherhood bonus'

In the title of Nancy Folbre's 1994 book, she asked a very important question: 'Who Pays for the Kids?'⁴ Everywhere in the world, labour markets penalise women for their reproductive responsibilities. Take the motherhood penalty. [Figure 9.4](#) shows data for six countries including Scandinavian countries known for having the highest levels of gender equality: Denmark, Sweden, US, UK, Austria, and Germany.

Based on earnings data from couples, [Figure 9.4](#) shows that immediately after the birth of the first child, mothers' earnings dip, whereas fathers' earnings either stay the same or increase slightly. This is true even in countries like the UK and Germany, where mothers earned slightly more than fathers prior to the birth of their first child. Bertrand shows how the bulk of the gender wage gap in Denmark is due to the motherhood penalty.⁵

While [Figure 9.4](#) is an example from one paper, the motherhood penalty has been studied fairly widely in the literature on gender gaps. What is getting

Figure 9.4: Motherhood penalty in earnings in three sets of countries, 2015



Source: Figures 1, 2, and 3 in Kleven et al. (2019)⁶, reproduced with permission from the authors.

increasing attention is a phenomenon called the ‘fatherhood bonus’. There is evidence that fathers get actively rewarded after the birth of the first child.

Why might this happen? Studies have explored if this is due to the fact that fathers put in more hours at work due to an additional child, and women put in fewer hours due to the additional childcare responsibility. This is certainly a plausible mechanism and it partly explains the earnings gap that happens after the birth of the first child. However, there is evidence to show that employers see men as more responsible, committed, and stable after they become fathers.⁷ These qualities are rewarded through a wage premium to fathers.

Thus, the structure of rewards and penalties in labour markets, including in highly developed economies committed to gender equality, produce or reinforce gender norms that fix the mother in a caregiving or reproductive role and fathers in the more remunerative productive roles. This has led many women to make a choice between family and career, as pursuing both is very challenging.

III. The way forward: policy solutions

Since the burden of reproductive work keeps gender wage gaps persistent in both developed and developing countries, albeit to different degrees, a common solution for all economies to adopt can be summarised in a simple framework known as the ‘3 Rs’: Recognise, Redistribute, and Reduce women’s burden of reproductive work.⁸ This does not only relate to provision of affordable childcare but more substantially to shifting the norms around the gendered distribution of domestic tasks.

A recent paper analysing time use in the US shows how mothers are substantially more affected by the school year than are fathers. When school is in session, mothers sleep less, spend more time caring for family members and driving them around, and spend less time on eating, free time, and exercise.⁹ Therefore, the 3Rs framework needs to emphasise that unpaid domestic and care work is not a woman’s job alone. Some of the tasks need to be replaced by public provision, such as childcare; additionally, intra-family redistribution is essential. The latter, being in the private domain, is not directly amenable to policy intervention. However, a changed structure of labour market incentives has the potential to shift norms and practices inside the home.

Yet, policies can have perverse outcomes. Adopting policies that are supposed to be gender neutral can have perverse outcomes if they are not accompanied by shifts in norms around the division of reproductive and productive work. For example, Antecol et al. analysed data on the assistant professor hires at top-50 economics departments in the US between 1985 and 2004.¹⁰ They show that the adoption of gender-neutral tenure clock stopping policies, e.g., extension of the tenure clock for both parents, substantially reduced female tenure rates and substantially increased male tenure rates. This was because mothers used their maternity leave for childcare, while

fathers, on average, used the extension to work on their academic publication, leaving the bulk of the childcare to the mothers.

Finally, we need to note that in developing countries women do unpaid *economic* work as they support family-run income-generating enterprises, such as agriculture, horticulture, dairy farming, fisheries, production and sale of food items, artisanal products, such as mats, baskets, pottery, handwoven cloth, or running small shops. Yet, usually, their contribution is not formally recognised. They are not counted in labour force surveys, are unpaid, and often have no assets in their name, making them ineligible for, say, bank loans.

Thus, unpaid work in the context of developing countries refers to both unpaid economic work as well as unpaid domestic and care work. Here the challenge is to recognise women's unpaid contribution to family enterprises, as well as increase their participation in paid/remunerative work. Additionally, we need to adopt an intersectional lens and recognise the invisibility of the doubly marginalised. For instance, in the context of India, the standard story around why women's labour force participation rate (LFPR) is low and declining is inadequate. It does not sufficiently recognise important differences within the category of 'Indian' women, and is thus unable to capture and account for differential caste, religion, and regional norms. A focus on the intersection of caste and gender reveals that so-called lower-caste women have always had far higher LFPRs compared to their upper-caste counterparts, but have experienced a greater decline. This is indicative of declining work opportunities, rather than restrictive social norms, because the most marginalised caste groups have more egalitarian norms about women's participation in public spaces, compared to upper-caste women. Thus, the decline in their LFPR cannot solely be due to changing norms. The gap between male and female LFPRs is also not due to the lack of education, as education rates are not only converging, but female enrolment has surpassed male enrolment in higher education.

In conclusion, there are several policy responses that would have to be adopted to alter the gendered structure of labour markets and associated rewards and penalties. These policy changes are actively discussed in the context of developing countries. The chapter under review makes a strong case for policy changes in the context of developed countries, underlining an important global truth: when it comes to gender inequalities, countries at various income levels are more similar than different.

Notes

¹ Bussolo et al. (2024).

² 'Home production working hours per week in the US, by gender and demographic group (Ramey and Francis (2009))' [dataset]. Ramey and Francis (2009) [original data].

³ Deshpande and Kabeer (2024).

- ⁴ Folbre (1994).
- ⁵ Bertrand (2020).
- ⁶ Kleven et al. (2019).
- ⁷ Cain Miller (2014).
- ⁸ UN Women (2024).
- ⁹ Cowan et al. (2023).
- ¹⁰ Antecol et al. (2018).

References

- Antecol, H., Bedard, K. and Stearns, J. (2018) 'Equal but Inequitable: Who Benefits from Gender-Neutral Tenure Clock Stopping Policies?', *American Economic Review*, 108(9): 2420–41. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160613>
- Bertrand, M., (2020) 'Gender in the Twenty-First Century', *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 110: 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20201126>
- Bussolo, M. Amarachi Ezebuihe, J., Muñoz Boudet, A. M., Poupakis, S., Rahman, T. and Sarma, N. (2024) 'Social Norms and Gender Disparities with a Focus on Female Labor Force Participation in South Asia', *The World Bank Research Observer*, 39(1): 124–158 <https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkad010>
- Cain Miller, C. (2014) 'The Motherhood Penalty vs. the Fatherhood Bonus', *TheUpshot*, *New York Times* [6 September]. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/a-child-helps-your-career-if-youre-a-man.html>
- Cowan, B. W., Jones, T. R. and Swigert, J. M. (2023) 'Parental and Student Time Use Around the Academic Year', NBER Working Paper No. 31177. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w31177>
- Deshpande, A. and Kabeer, N. (2024) 'Norms Matter: Exploring the Distribution of Women's Work between Income Generation, Expenditure Saving and Unpaid Domestic Responsibilities in India', *World Development*, 174: 106435. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106435>
- Folbre, N. (1994) *Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and the Structures of Constraint*, New York, London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203168295>
- Kleven, H., Landais, C., Posch, J., Steinhauer, A. and Zweimüller, J. (2019) 'Child Penalties Across Countries: Evidence and Explanations', *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 109: 122–26. <https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20191078>

Ramey, V. A. and Francis, N. (2009) 'A Century of Work and Leisure', *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1(2), 189–224.
<https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.1.2.189>

UN Women (2024) 'Transformative Approaches to Recognize, Reduce and Redistribute Unpaid Care Work in Women's Economic Empowerment: Good practices, Lessons Learned and Recommendations from Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa', Economic Empowerment Section, UN WOMEN, New York. <https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2024/12/transformative-approaches-to-recognize-reduce-and-redistribute-unpaid-care-work-in-womens-economic-empowerment#:~:text=This%20document%20compiles%20the%20good,paid%20care%20and%20domestic%20work>

Response to Oriana Bandiera and Barbara Petrongolo by Almudena Sevilla

The chapter on gender inequality by Oriana Bandiera and Barbara Petrongolo gives a clear picture of the current consensus in terms of where we stand with respect to gender equality, why it is important, and what the general policy goal is as a result. The chapter recognises both the significant strides made towards gender equality and the substantial challenges that remain, such as persistent earnings disparities, with gaps ranging from 20–80% in different parts of the world. Failing to achieve gender equality has a significant opportunity cost in terms of economic growth, as it leads to the misallocation of female talent. The policy aim should be to reach a stage where gender does not influence individuals' decision-making processes. Here, I reflect on the policy implications and challenges emerging from four paradigm shifts that are relevant to future policymaking in the area of gender equality.

I. The complex and dynamic mechanisms behind the motherhood penalty

The first paradigm shift, as pointed out by Bandiera and Petrongolo, is the growing consensus among economists about the interaction between family life and labour market decisions. We now know that if women's occupations followed the male distribution, a third of the difference in earnings between men and women would be reduced.¹ The other two-thirds of the gender-based difference in earnings comes from factors *within* each occupation. Women's inability to combine work with family seems to account for the lion's share of the pay gap, partly because of women's greater relative demands at home. Data from decades confirms this effect, prompting policies like parental leave and childcare subsidies to address the issue. Yet, after years of policies, gender equality remains elusive. Here I argue that there are two limitations with the existing approach that limit the design of policy. First, the focus on childbirth as the starting point for the widening gender gap in the labour market needs to be reassessed. Second, the mechanisms underlying the dynamics of the so-called child penalty need to be further understood.

First, it is important to note that the establishment of a household, in addition to childbirth, plays a role in the gender disparities seen in household duties and labour market inequalities. Evidence for several countries shows that the formation of a couple leads to an increase in five-and-a-half hours per week for women, whereas the difference in total housework between

married men and single men is not statistically significant and amounts to less than a quarter-of-an-hour a week.² This finding holds for a wide variety of countries, even for couples that remain childless. Second, as Petrongolo and Bandiera acknowledge, there is still limited understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind the gender gap, which opens upon the arrival of children.

Work hours seem to be part of the explanation for the widening earnings gaps after household formation and childbirth. Goldin et al. show that the earnings penalty for mothers reduces as their children age, and mothers work longer hours, particularly for the less educated.³ Yet a question remains about why initial levels of employment and work hours are not recovered. One answer derives from 24-hours diary surveys. [Table 9.1](#) shows the hours per day in household-related activities. As has been widely documented, housework and childcare demands fall on mothers significantly more than fathers regardless of children's ages. These demands are also increasing because economic inequality and more competitive college admissions processes are driving parental (particularly maternal) time investments in childcare.⁴ Less well known is the fact that housework and childcare time demands remain high even when children enter school, and can be constraining for women who spend on average seven hours a day with children over the age of six, a load that only appears to ease up during the teenage years. A separate answer comes from the unpredictable nature of children's needs, especially as they mature and their lives become more complex, which requires parents to be mentally and emotionally available. Therefore, even if the time required to be with children decreases during teenage years, the need for mothers to remain constantly on-call persists. This expectation, whether self-imposed or external, can create a sense of responsibility and guilt that compels many mothers to maintain a constant readiness to respond to their children's needs.⁵ Similarly, grandmothers, like mothers, experience a drop in earnings and work hours upon the arrival of a grandchild, despite minimal childcare time, as they provide on-call support when needed.⁶

II. Gender roles and the technology of work

The insights on gender roles and household duties discussed in section II highlight the potential benefits of a more equitable distribution of domestic responsibilities, especially childcare. By sharing these tasks more evenly, women may have additional opportunities for labour market participation. Such changes might involve support from both men and public policies. Alternatively, reshaping a labour market that acknowledges and values caregivers can be beneficial. Claudia Goldin's research on 'Career and Family' delineates how, in a world where women remain the main caregivers, the tension between the asynchronous demands of the labour market (by greedy jobs) and household labour forms a dichotomy for women, leading to a reduction in labour supply for paid work.⁷ The key question arises: Are greedy jobs, characterised by little substitution between workers, inherently

Table 9.1: Hours per day devoted to activities

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)
	Housework		Primary childcare		In care of children		Time with children		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Females									
Age youngest child 0–5	3.199	(2.550)	2.518	(2.386)	6.339	(4.370)	9.562	(5.067)	24,473
Age youngest child 6–12	3.180	(2.717)	1.227	(1.623)	5.157	(4.520)	7.020	(4.895)	20,369
Age youngest child 13–17	2.696	(2.712)	0.377	(0.990)	0.232	(1.241)	2.564	(3.561)	12,650
Men									
Age youngest child 0–5	1.812	(2.253)	1.302	(1.815)	4.228	(4.333)	6.316	(4.907)	17,509
Age youngest child 6–12	1.771	(2.251)	0.630	(1.215)	3.686	(4.267)	4.927	(4.721)	14,704
Age youngest child 13–17	1.538	(2.166)	0.185	(0.668)	0.110	(0.926)	1.754	(3.123)	10,374

Notes: The sample used in this study consists of household heads who have at least one child under the age of 18 living in their homes. The data is derived from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) spanning the years 2003–2022. For the sub-sample selection, participants were chosen based on the age of the youngest child in their household. The study focuses on two main categories of activities: ‘Housework’ and ‘Childcare’. ‘Housework’ includes various tasks, such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, elder care, and other related activities. This definition follows the approach taken by Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla.⁸ ‘Primary childcare’ refers to the time spent engaging in childcare activities reported as the main or primary activity. ‘In care of children’ encompasses the time spent in activities where parents are responsible for any children, including ‘Primary childcare’ when parents report there is a child under their care. ‘Time with children’ accounts for the time devoted to activities that fall under ‘Primary childcare,’ ‘In care of children,’ and any other activity where a child is present (e.g., household child, grandchild, foster child, etc.). All the time measurements for these activities are reported in hours per day. The values presented in the study include both the mean and standard deviations (in parenthesis).

so because of the production technology function (as she argues) or because of entrenched gender roles?⁹ A new paradigm shift is needed that considers the influence of gender roles in the organisation of paid work.

In recent years we have witnessed a decline in self-employment across various high-end professions, attributed in part to reduced flexibility. Even prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a noticeable uptick in workplace flexibility, driven both by external factors such as the growing scale of operations, and internal shifts towards corporate ownership of businesses.¹⁰ These changes, occurring both from within the workforce and through broader economic trends, were already reshaping the landscape of employment. However, the unprecedented societal disruptions catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic have further accentuated these dynamics. As we witnessed, there was a swift transition to remote work enabled by rapid change in already quite advanced communication technologies, and we must interrogate why such adaptations were not instituted prior to the pandemic given that a significant portion of the labour force was technologically capable of operating remotely. Both, mothers and fathers worked more from home during the pandemic,¹¹ and fathers increased the amount of childcare done during this time as a result.¹² The resistance to remote work adaptation may have originated from entrenched norms in the workplace and gender roles rather than technological insufficiencies. In essence, the pandemic may have exposed the extent to which these societal norms and gender roles have been institutionalised in our managing practices and workplaces and have acted as barriers to progressive labour market restructuring.¹³

III. The unchangeable nature of gender roles

Another paradigm shift that has occurred since the 1989 Washington Consensus is the increasing acceptance among economists of the potential malleability and the responsiveness to policy of social norms and gender roles.¹⁴ A relatively recent line of enquiry looks at how long it takes for gender roles to change, under what conditions, and what the mechanisms are that explain the change, such as social contagion and learning.¹⁵ Bandiera and Petrongolo allude to some of this latest line of research that attempts to uncover how gender norms originate and evolve, such as classroom interventions, promoting women's work and control over income, and information programmes – all these interventions have been shown to have made traditional gender norms less entrenched.

Emerging findings underscore that change can be swift. Fernández et al. illuminate a previously underrepresented aspect in literature by highlighting how high-impact events, such as the AIDS epidemic, can lead to significant cultural shifts – in this case, changing views on homosexuality.¹⁶ Their research posits that if every US state had confronted high AIDS rates, we might have seen a surge in acceptance rates of gay individuals by an additional 50% between the 1970s and 1990s. This novel observation about the rapid shift of

gender roles in response to shocks offers invaluable insights for policymakers aiming to shape future interventions.

IV. Gender equality as a zero-sum game

The most important paradigm shift that has occurred since the Washington consensus is that the notion of gender equality as a zero-sum game is starting to be challenged actively. The discourse around gender equality is in the process of transcending its initial social justice underpinnings to be increasingly acknowledged as an economic efficiency issue. There is a wider acceptance among economists of the view that as gender equality progresses, it enhances resource allocation, leading towards economic growth and prosperity – potentially expanding the economic ‘pie’ rather than redistributing a fixed amount.

The journey towards gender equality, while instrumental in fuelling economic growth and enhancing efficiency, instigates important distributive disruption. Bandiera and Petrongolo’s work offers a pivotal perspective, yet there is an opportunity to delve deeper into these underlying disruptions. The unveiling of these disruptions has become evident thanks to recent development in the analysis of big data in various format types, such as video, images, text, and other forms of media. Consequently, issues like sexual harassment and violence, once considered anecdotal, are now being researched to uncover layers of systemic discrimination.¹⁷ In our own discipline, economics, a recent paper encompassed recordings from hundreds of research seminars revealing that women presenters faced more, often patronising or hostile, questions than their male counterparts.¹⁸ Recent evidence shows that more than 10% of posts on Economic Job Market Rumors (EJMR), a popular forum among economists, can be classified as potentially ‘toxic’.¹⁹ An example of such toxic discourse on EJMR is ‘Given women get free spots, blks and latins get free spots, it basically means you need to be far far right tail if u are a yt or azn homegrown American. (2022-12-27)’.²⁰ This data provides an unprecedented exploration into the dynamics of seminar culture within the field of economics, suggesting a more pervasive bias than initially assumed.

V. Policy implications

Grasping the nuances of household-related demands is crucial for shaping effective policies aimed at counteracting talent depletion, especially when mothers adjust working hours after childbirth and exhibit prolonged absences from the workforce as children age. It is vital for policies to extend beyond child-centric concerns, encompassing the overarching dynamics of household creation and its ramifications on gender equity. Traditional time diaries fall short of encapsulating the emotional readiness associated with child-rearing, signifying a notable void in the extant literature. Addressing

this data shortfall presents a valuable opportunity for social science research to steer the prioritisation of certain policy strategies, such as introducing flexible work arrangements, enhancing parental leave provisions for both parents, and promoting an equitable distribution in domestic chores.

It is also imperative to accept that job structures are influenced by beliefs about social norms and gender roles of those in managerial positions. Advancements in information-sharing technologies within the pharmaceutical sector have significantly impacted job structures. Such technologies facilitate seamless communication and coordination, enabling workers to cover for one another more effectively. As a result, the role of individual workers becomes more fluid, making it easier for employees to step in and out of tasks as needed without loss of productivity. This flexibility can reduce the career impact of taking time off for caregiving duties, thereby addressing one of the systemic causes behind gender pay disparities.²¹ While policy tools like job-sharing in the UK aim to promote such interchangeability, they face challenges in implementation due to technical constraints. Therefore, policies that encourage technological adoption to enhance worker substitutability in specific sectors might be a more effective approach.²²

The realisation that cultural values can swiftly adapt following a shock is reshaping policy priorities. In developing countries, gender norms are more likely to be explicitly targeted in policy measures than in wealthier nations, probably because policy is dominated by development agencies.²³ In developed countries, there's a shift from policies supporting gender equality that inadvertently reinforce traditional roles towards ones challenging these norms. While maternity leave and subsidised childcare maintain the status quo, paternity leave, especially promoted in Northern Europe, challenges established gender norms. Yet paternity leave policies remain low in uptake and their effects on changing social norms is mixed. Social contagion indicates young men are more inclined to take leave if influenced by older brothers or co-workers.²⁴ Farré and González, Patnaik, and Tamm show fathers' increased involvement post-leave, but the influence on gender norms remains mixed in the longer term.²⁵ The COVID-19 pandemic further highlights entrenched traditional roles in terms of the household division of housework and childcare.²⁶ Understanding the dynamics of these swift transformations can provide policymakers with valuable insights on how to craft impactful interventions.

The recent recognition that advancing gender equality can boost efficiency and growth, but can also disrupt traditional power structures akin to the effects of globalisation or technological progress, requires policymaking to balance these gains with measures that address the resulting societal disruptions, aiming for a more equitable society. The future focus lies on both promoting gender equality and managing its distributive challenges, preventing potential backlash through inclusive policy design, and fostering dialogue about evolving gender roles.

Acknowledgements

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this chapter and I want to thank the editors, colleagues Tim Besley and Andrés Velasco, and the authors of this chapter for giving me the opportunity to read and to respond to such an interesting piece of work.

Notes

¹ Goldin (2021).

² Borra et al. (2021).

³ Goldin et al. (2022).

⁴ Doepke and Zilibotti (2017); Ramey and Ramey (2010); Borra and Sevilla (2019).

⁵ Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla (2016).

⁶ Gørtz et al. (2020).

⁷ Goldin (2021).

⁸ Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla (2012).

⁹ The contrast between sectors like healthcare and banking raises questions about whether gendered social expectations, rather than work technology, drive the differences. Goldin notes that the belated discovery of the contraceptive pill resulted from systemic disinterest in women's issues and suggests that the persistence of greedy jobs may stem from deep-seated gender roles. Goldin underscores this by pointing out the accepted practice in the US and other developed countries where any on-shift ob-gyn can deliver a baby, contrasting this with sectors like law or consulting where clients insist on continuity with a particular professional.

¹⁰ Goldin and Katz (2011).

¹¹ Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2023).

¹² Gamage et al. (2020).

¹³ Sevilla and Giusta (2022).

¹⁴ See Sevilla (2020). Answers to attitudinal questions have been widely used in gender economics to assess cultural beliefs on the role of women in society, see Fortin (2005). A quick look at the World Values Survey reflects a substantial change in societal attitudes. In 1990, around 50% of US respondents agreed that 'when a mother works for pay, the children suffer'. By 2017, the agreement with this statement had dropped to just 17%. The malleability of gender roles is promising.

- ¹⁵ Giuliano (2020).
- ¹⁶ Fernández et al. (2019).
- ¹⁷ Folke and Rickne (2022).
- ¹⁸ Dupas et al. (2021).
- ¹⁹ Ederer et al. (2024).
- ²⁰ Ederer et al. (2024).
- ²¹ Goldin and Katz (2016).
- ²² Sevilla (2020).
- ²³ Lundberg (2022).
- ²⁴ Dahl et al. (2014).
- ²⁵ Farré and González (2019); Patnaik (2019); Tamm (2019).
- ²⁶ Sevilla and Smith (2020).

References

- Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Marcén, M., Morales, M. and Sevilla, A. (2023) 'Schooling and Parental Labor Supply: Evidence from COVID-19 School Closures in the United States', *Industrial & Labor Relations Review*, 76(1): 56–85. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00197939221099184>
- Borra, C., Browning, M. and Sevilla, A. (2021) 'Marriage and Housework', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 73(2): 479–508. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpaa026>
- Borra, C. and Sevilla, A. (2019) 'Competition for University Places and Parental Time Investments: Evidence from the United Kingdom', *Economic Inquiry*, 57(3): 1460–1479. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12761>
- Dahl, G. B., Løken, K. V. and Mogstad, M. (2014) 'Peer Effects in Program Participation', *American Economic Review*, 104(7): 2049–2074. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.7.2049>
- Doepke, M. and Zilibotti, F. (2017) 'Parenting with Style: Altruism and Paternalism in Intergenerational Preference Transmission', *Econometrica*, 85(5): 1331–1371. <https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14634>
- Dupas, P., Modestino, A. S., Niederle, M. and Wolfers, J. (2021) 'Gender and the Dynamics of Economics Seminars' (No. w28494). *National Bureau of Economic Research*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w28494>

- Ederer, F., Goldsmith-Pinkham, P. and Jensen, K. (2024) 'Anonymity and Identity Online', NBER Working Paper. <https://florianederer.github.io/ejmr.pdf>
- Farré, L. and González, L. (2019) 'Does Paternity Leave Reduce Fertility?', *Journal of Public Economics*, 122: 52–66. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.12.002>
- Fernández, R., Parsa, S. and Viarengo, M. (2019) 'Coming out in America: AIDS, Politics, and Cultural Change', (No. w25697). *National Bureau of Economic Research*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w25697>
- Folke, O. and Rickne, J. (2022) 'Sexual Harassment and Gender Inequality in the Labor Market', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 137(4): 2163–2212. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac018>
- Fortin, N. M. (2005) 'Gender Role Attitudes and the Labour-Market Outcomes of Women across OECD Countries', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 21(3): 416–438. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/gri024>
- Gamage, D. K., Sevilla, A. and Smith, S. (2020) 'Women in Economics: a UK Perspective', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(4): 962–982. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa048>
- Gimenez-Nadal, J. I. and Sevilla, A. (2012) 'Trends in Time Allocation: A Cross-Country Analysis', *European Economic Review*, 56(6): 1338–1359. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.02.011>
- Gimenez-Nadal, J. I. and Sevilla, A. (2016) 'Intensive Mothering and Well-being: The Role of Education and Child Care Activity (No. 10023)', IZA Discussion Papers. <https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/10023/intensive-mothering-and-well-being-the-role-of-education-and-child-care-activity>
- Giuliano, P. (2020) 'Gender and Culture', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(4): 944–961. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa044>
- Goldin, C. (2021) *Career and Family: Women's Century-Long Journey toward Equity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691226736>
- Goldin, C. and Katz, L. F. (2011) 'Cost of Workplace Flexibility for Highpowered Professionals', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 638(1): 45–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716211414398>
- Goldin, C. and Katz, L. F. (2016) 'A Most Egalitarian Profession: Pharmacy and the Evolution of a Family-Friendly Occupation', *Journal of Labor Economics*, 34(3): 705–746. <https://doi.org/10.1086/685505>

- Goldin, C., Kerr, S. P. and Olivetti, C. (2022) 'When the Kids Grow Up: Women's Employment and Earnings across the Family Cycle', (No. w30323) *National Bureau of Economic Research*. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w30323>
- Gørtz, M., Sander, S. and Sevilla, A. (2020) 'Does the Child Penalty Strike Twice', (No. 30/20). CEBI Working Paper Series. <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/258944/1/cebi-wp2030.pdf>
- Kleven, H., Landais, C., Posch, J., Steinhauer, A. and Zweimüller, J. (2024) 'Do Family Policies Reduce Gender Inequality? Evidence from 60 years of Policy Experimentation', *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 16 (2): 110–49. <https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210346>
- Lundberg, S. (2022) 'Gender Economics and the Meaning of Discrimination', *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 112: 588–91. <https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20221086>
- Patnaik, A. (2019) 'Reserving Time for Daddy: The Consequences of Fathers' Quotas', *Journal of Labor Economics*, 37(4): 1009–1059. <https://doi.org/10.1086/703115>
- Ramey, G. and Ramey, V. A. (2010) 'The Rug Rat Race', *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Spring: 129–176. <https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2010.0003>
- Sevilla, A. (2020) 'Gender Economics: An Assessment', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(4): 725–742. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa054>
- Sevilla, A. and Giusta, M. D. (2022) 'Career and Family: Women's Century-Long Journey Toward Equity: by Claudia Goldin', Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2021. 218 p. *Feminist Economics*, 29(1): 301–305. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2022.2108550>
- Sevilla, A. and Smith, S. (2020) 'Baby Steps: The Gender Division of Childcare during the COVID-19 Pandemic', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 36(Supplement_1): S169–S186. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa027>
- Tamm, M. (2019) 'Fathers' Parental Leave-Taking, Childcare Involvement and Labor Market Participation', *Journal of Labor Economics*, 59: 184–197. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2019.04.007>