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Tourism and Marginalisation

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Abstract
The social (as opposed to environmental) harms of tourism are not yet much discussed in the philosophical literature. Nonetheless, residents in hyper-touristed areas commonly express sentiments of marginalisation and estrangement from the social practices present in their place of dwelling. In this paper, we argue that indeed, as common pre-theoretical ideas suggest, residents in a touristic neighbourhood can be marginalised in their relationship with tourists in a morally objectionable way, similarly to how longstanding residents may be marginalised with respect to gentrifiers in a gentrifying neighbourhood. An important difference, however, between the gentrification and tourism cases, is that while in the former residents and gentrifiers have a more-or-less stable relationship with each other, residents and tourists typically interact only in quite fleeting ways. This might seem to suggest that residents and tourists do not have the right kind of ongoing relationship that would make marginalisation possible in the first place. Here we contend that this is not the case, and in doing so we make two contributions to the literature. First, we present a refined conception of marginalisation, differentiate it from other relational wrongs, and explain how, though marginalisation does depend on an ongoing relationship, a relationship of the right kind is possible in spite of the transience of some of its members. Second, we explain how excessive tourism in particular might generate marginalisation in the spatially defined relationship among fellow users of a shared physical space. Thereby, we contribute to the assessment of the harms of overtourism, identifying a specific moral wrong that residents are likely to experience in certain touristic cities.

Keywords Tourism · Gentrification · Relational egalitarianism · Marginalisation · Urban justice

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1 Introduction

'I'm a stranger in my own city' reads the headline of a news article published a few years ago about a city initiative in Prague to limit short-term apartment rentals (on Airbnb and similar platforms) (Tait 2020). The quote is attributed to Apolena Rychliková, a Prague resident and campaigner, but the article belongs to a now familiar genre concerned with the fightback against social harms of excessive tourism. From Venice to Thailand, similar sentiments have been expressed by many.[1] On one reading of this complaint (and many others like it) it raises a concern with *marginalisation*, with being rendered in some sense a marginal or peripheral participant in the social relationships associated with one's neighbourhood or local area.[2] We will argue in this paper that this, indeed, is one valid complaint that residents in heavily touristed areas may have.

There has been relatively little discussion of tourism in normative philosophy, and most has tended to focus on wrongs involved in particular kinds of tourist activity, rather than macro-level injustices produced by influxes of large numbers of tourists into a neighbourhood or area (e.g. Selinger 2009; Selinger and Outterson 2010; Scarbrough 2018; Kukla 2021: 76−9; Lopez-Cantero and Robb 2023).[3] We are interested in theorising injustices of this latter sort, but it is important to clarify that this paper is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the evaluative or normative assessment of tourism (nor of its macro-level implications). The paper's claim is not that marginalisation is the only, or primary, injustice associated with tourism. There are plenty of other morally relevant aspects of tourism besides what we discuss here, and our conclusion is perfectly consistent with the significance of these, even with their being as or more important than the marginalisation we discuss.[4]

Though a full theoretical conception of marginalisation has not, to our knowledge, been developed in the philosophical literature, the notion is widely used in discus-

[1] Cities that have already passed measures to tackle over-tourism include Amsterdam, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, New York and New Orleans (see, for instance, Florio 2018; Henley 2019; Lowrey 2019; Matthews 2019; Martin 2020; Williams 2023). The kind of concern we are interested in here is not, by any means, the only thing that such measures are aimed at addressing.

[2] This is not the only reading available, and we cannot attribute with any certainty the precise complaint that we will go on to flesh out to Rychliková, but this is at least one plausible interpretation. More importantly, we think, it is one defensible complaint that residents of highly touristic areas can (and do) make, as we will argue through the conception of spatial marginalisation we put forward. Another concern suggested by the language of estrangement is with a sense of unfamiliarity (of the formerly familiar). As will become clear, we think such a sense of unfamiliarity can be connected to a person's or group's *marginalisation* in their area, so such a reading is not entirely at odds with the one we propose.

[3] There has, though, been discussion of the latter kind of question in tourism studies (e.g. Smith and Duffy 2003; Fennell 2009; Jamal and Menzel 2009; Smith 2009): we seek to build on this interest in ethical tourism to develop a philosophical account of one form of macro-level injustice that heavy tourism in an area might produce.

[4] These may include commodification (e.g. Smith and Duffy 2003; Urry and Larsen 2011; Scarbrough 2018), exploitation (Whyte et al. 2011; Scarbrough 2018), and many of those that have been associated with gentrification, including notably harms associated with physical displacement such as domination (Putnam 2021; Jenkins 2022), disruption of located life plans (Huber and Wolkenstein 2018), disruption of community (Moore and Krishnamurthy 2024) or social attachments (van Leeuwen 2025).

sions of injustice and oppression (academic and otherwise).[5] And more specifically, the idea that residents in a neighbourhood or area might be, in some sense, *marginalised* in the place where they live is also familiar from, and plausible for, the case of urban gentrification.[6] The social dynamics in the gentrification and tourism cases appear often to be much the same, with the relatively advantaged incomers in the one case being short-term tourists, in the other comparatively well-off professionals relocating from elsewhere. The term 'touristification' has been coined in the social science literature to describe precisely this scenario, where social consequences broadly associated with gentrification are produced instead by the development, and increasing dominance, of tourism in a neighbourhood (Picard 2003; see also Gotham 2005; Gravari-Barbas and Guinand 2017; Cócola-Gant 2018; Hayes and Zaban 2020).[7] But the case of tourism, where those who become the 'central' (i.e. non-marginalised) participants in the neighbourhood relationship (the tourists) are typically only very briefly involved in it, poses a distinctive problem. While residents and *gentrifiers* ordinarily have a more-or-less stable relationship with each other, residents and *tourists* typically interact only in quite fleeting ways. How then can residents be marginalised in the relationship among users of an area relative to tourists if the latter are not ongoing participants in that relationship at all? By answering this question, we aim to contribute both to the moral assessment of mass tourism as well as to the general theoretical understanding of marginalisation, as a distinctive form of injustice.

Marginalisation, as we propose to think about it, is a distinctive form of relational inequality: a way in which the relations between people with real social ties to each other can be hierarchically structured (see, for instance, Anderson 1999; Kolodny 2023). One way, we want to say, in which the social relations between people may position them unequally, or establish hierarchies between them, is through the marginalisation of some relative to others. To be marginalised in a relationship is to be a part of that relationship but to be involuntarily confined to its edges, to be denied 'centrality' in that relationship (in a sense to be fleshed out below). One may be marginal in virtue either of lacking opportunities to participate in the core social life of the relationship or of lacking the ability to influence the relationship on equal footing with other participants. Being marginalised in either of these ways is pro tanto unjust, we claim, when the relationship is one that matters for important interests of yours.

This paper will defend the application of the notion of marginality in the relation between residents and tourists by presenting an account of what it is to be marginalised in a relationship and providing grounds to think that in some cases heavy tourism can, and does, result in the marginalisation of residents. To this end, we will show that the relevant kind of ongoing relationship can exist even when the relationship's most central (least marginal) members are only transient participants in it.

[5] Marginalisation, notably, is one of Iris Marion Young's (1990) 'five faces of oppression'.

[6] This is argued for explicitly by Zimmer (2017), while Hyra (2015), for instance, documents feelings of 'alienation, resentment and withdrawal' among longer-term, lower-income black residents of the Shaw/U Street neighbourhood in Washington D.C., which can plausibly be read, at least partly, in terms of marginalisation. (In addition, see Zukin 2010 and Shaw and Hagemans 2015.)

[7] The point here, though, is certainly *not* to suggest that touristification is *the same as* classic processes of gentrification (cf. Sequera and Nofre 2018). Rather, we wish only to pay attention to obvious parallels and to investigate in particular the idea that marginalisation of the same kind can arise in both cases.

More precisely, we argue that a group of people engages in such a relationship when their interactions are structured by a shared web of social practices and concerned with the production and distribution of valuable common resources. Some will be marginalised in this relationship when others are disproportionately able to participate in and/or influence the social interactions that make up the relationship, relative to their overall involvement in it.

In the first section of the paper we describe the concrete case we are interested in and set out in intuitive terms how relations among users of a heavily touristed area can come to be unequal or marginalising. In the second section, we set out our conception of marginalisation and argue that the kind of ongoing relationship it presupposes can be maintained in spite of the transience of its more central participants. This part of the paper presents an abstract analysis of the injustice of marginalisation in general and distinguishes it from other phenomena (i.e., exclusion and domination). In setting out a conception of marginalisation and the conditions for its arising, we wish to make plausible the suggestion that this kind of injustice is one that is present in some real cases of tourism. The final section returns to the concrete case, and draws on the conception of marginalisation now presented to suggest that the phenomena detailed in the first section in fact exemplify the kind of marginalisation we describe. Fully vindicating that suggestion, though, would take empirical work, which has to remain outside the scope of this paper. We conclude with some clarifications on the limits of our findings.

2 Tourism and Inequality

In this paper we are interested in the relationship between residents and tourists in touristic cities and focus on one particular injustice that might arise in this relationship: the marginalisation of residents. The aim will be to provide an account of the distinctive normative phenomenon and to describe how it might be produced by tourism. In this section we want to draw on existing research and documentation to give a rough initial picture of the inequalities in touristic cities that we think are relevant for the occurrence of marginalisation between residents and tourists, and of some of the complaints made by the former that we think can be understood in terms of marginalisation. It will be the task of the next section to present our conception of marginalisation before we link it back to the existing cases presented here.

The tourist industry is vast: the institutions and branches of the economy that orbit around it, i.e., the "tourist production system" and its satellite industries (e.g., transport, port aeronautics, construction), are extensive (Britton 1991: 455; d'Eramo 2022: 11–13). Accordingly, boosting tourism has been and still is a popular strategy used to recover from economic downturns and improve GDP growth (Kristo 2014; Sequera and Nofre 2018: 843; Ramaj-Desku and Ukaj 2020; Thullah and Jalloh 2021; OECD 2024: 17).[8] In addition, the tourist sector is important in terms of employment, and especially the employment opportunities of those who are most prone to unemployment: women, young, low-skilled and migrant-background workers (OECD 2024:

[8] See Hall (2007) for a critical analysis of the actual impact of tourism in poverty reduction.

48).[9] Thus, it comes as no surprise that there has been a lot of interest both in public and private investment in the tourist industry.

Tourism, though, frequently also comes with great costs for local communities in terms of, for example, environmental depletion and housing affordability and liveability, and generates concerns about the unequal distribution of benefits from the economic growth that it seems to boost (Deery et al. 2012; Thullah and Jalloh 2021; Wray 2023; Di Donfrancesco 2024; OECD 2024: 24). Concerns of inequality within the tourist industry itself, and in particular between investors and workers are especially significant in developing countries where international investors, who can cater to the rich international tourist class, can benefit from lower costs (including in terms of labour) in situ (González 2021). Significant costs and inequalities arising from tourism are thus many and diverse.

It is important to note, though, that not all touristic cities face the same kinds or degrees of problems. Consider, as an extreme case, Venice. The impact of tourism in Venice is plausibly far more significant than in, for instance, large metropolitan cities like London, Paris or New York City. Contrary to them, Venice is a small, historic city with a fragile ecosystem and a population that has been dwindling for decades. The hegemony of the tourist sector and the constant influx of tourists that outnumber residents is straining the city's infrastructure and disrupting residents' daily life (Visentin and Bertocchi 2019; Cristiano and Gonella 2020). There are numerous factors that are relevant to explaining why, as the example above suggests, tourism affects different areas and the various actors within them differently, one of them being the scale and economic diversity of a city (Cristiano and Gonella 2020). Also relevant will be a city's economic dependence on tourism, the quality of its infrastructure, and broader characteristics such as geographical location and political stability. Additionally, local policies, regulations on private property and business permits, and existing social inequalities — both among residents and between residents and incomers (tourists and business owners) — all shape the extent and nature of tourism-related harms (e.g. Kalandides 2020). The impact of tourism is also influenced by shifts within the industry itself and changes in tourism demand, including traveler demographics and preferences (Papathanassis 2020).

In this paper, we do not aspire to make any claim about the precise causal link between the tourist industry, urban, economic or institutional practices, and the wrong we identify.[10] The relationship we are interested in, between residents and tourists in touristic cities, may be shaped and influenced by various forces and pre-existing background inequalities. Thus, any unjust inequalities that arise in this relationship may be present to quite differing degrees in different contexts. The kind of wrong we identify is most likely to emerge when background inequalities are present and disproportionately disadvantage residents, as will become clear.[11]

[9] Notably, the working conditions of those employed in the tourism sector are frequently poor (Costa et al. 2017; González 2021).

[10] There is disagreement about identifying clear causal links between various urban phenomena in the empirical literature itself (Kalandides 2020: 252; Koens and Milano 2024).

[11] We do *not* suggest that this distinctive form of inequality (marginalisation) is a universal product of intensive tourism.

It is on the relationship among users of a shared area, and in particular between residents and tourists, that we will now focus.[12] This relationship is one that is centred around the use of, and negotiation over, a common space (neighbourhood/city) for varying purposes, including the satisfaction of basic needs and the pursuit of plans and projects. Tourism in practice depends on a local population of service providers, and consequently there will always be members of the two groups who must interact and negotiate the use of city space.

The spatial interactions that form this relationship are facilitated by the social practices and norms that prevail in a particular region of space. These help solve coordination problems and enable richer forms of social activity by establishing expectations about the behaviour of others. While these practices and norms necessarily exhibit a certain degree of stability over time, they arise out of the combined behaviour of individual actors. Residents and tourists, then, as users of a shared space, are both constrained by a common set of practices, while also participating in their creation and evolution to varying degrees. Negotiation of the use of a common space, and thus of the practices that enable this, is essential. It is within this web of practices that residents can and do become marginal with respect to tourists, or so we will argue. There is thus an important sense in which the marginalisation we describe is essentially a form of *spatial* marginalisation: it is marginalisation in a relationship concerned with the practice-governed negotiation of access to, and use of, *space*.

Where practices around the use of space differ, conflict among residents and tourists can arise. Take, as an example, pedestrian practices in Venice: residents and workers in Venice typically walk fast, keep to the right while moving and hardly ever stop in the middle of bridges or 'calli' (streets) to facilitate traffic in narrow streets (walking is the primary mode of transportation in the island). Conversely, tourists tend to have conflicting practices for navigating the city: they wish to stop often to take photos and slowly wander around. In order to cope with these contrasting social practices, Venetians have started adopting new strategies, using whistles and shouting to announce their arrival.[13] Whilst such conflicts might seem trivial, they heavily impact residents, who need to deal with them daily (Pichler 2012). A space that matters to them, in terms of being central for their livelihood, and that they need to use for their simple everyday needs (e.g., going to work), is used according to a set of practices imported by tourists. These practices make it difficult for residents to use (or prevent them from using) such central spaces, or they overwhelmingly determine the ways in which shared spaces change (which is one potential mechanism for spatial marginalisation). Tourists' impact on the negotiation over the use of city space

[12] It is important to note that there are other relationships in which residents in touristic areas might be marginalised, and within this relationship it is not only tourists relative to whom residents are likely to be marginalised. They are quite likely to be marginalised also in their relationship with city (or state) governments, corporate developers and actors in the tourism industry, for instance. We focus, though, for the purposes of this paper, on marginalisation between residents and tourists, because, first, this relationship is of special importance to residents, as will be discussed below, and second, because in the tourism case this instance of marginalisation is distinctive in a way that the above are not.

[13] Residents and workers in Amsterdam face similar struggles in interacting with tourists when biking. While they tend to bike fast, keep to the right, and only stop outside of the cycle paths, tourists tend to wander around the streets more, keep a slow pace and use biking as a sightseeing strategy.

can predominate not only because tourists sometimes outnumber residents, but also because they disproportionately influence change in social, commercial and cultural activities.[14]

It is around the feeling of being marginal in this spatial relationship and the determination of how space is used that some of the tourism-related complaints raised by residents are focused. Consider, for instance, the *We Live Here* community-led campaign in Amsterdam (We Live Here Amsterdam n.d.). The participants in the campaign are residents of the Red-Light District, where tourist nightlife is centred around the sex-work industry, as well as cannabis and alcohol consumption. The goal of the residents is to make their presence more salient to tourists, and demand that their behaviours, and the use they make of the neighbourhood and its facilities, consider the needs and wishes of residents as well. Tellingly, the organisation does not put forth claims about the preservation of a certain state of affairs that they have lost, but rather focuses on the marginality of residents in neighbourhood life and in the practices that shape it.[15] They want to be more considered, central and seen: part of the campaign involves displaying large-scale posters portraying the residents themselves to make them (and their day-to-day practices) visible with slogans like ”Enjoy it like you would in your own neighbourhood“. The demand expressed by this slogan can reasonably be read as a request for the adoption of practices more compatible with residential life (as opposed to tourism), and so, perhaps, that allow for the more central (non-marginal) involvement of residents in neighbourhood life.

Empirical study of tourism has documented a number of patterns likely to contribute to this sort of spatial marginalisation and the kind of felt grievances just described. Several of these are exemplified, to take one example, in the case of San Miguel de Allende, an attractive colonial town and tourist destination in central Mexico (Navarrete Escobedo 2020). The town's wealth was originally generated by silver extraction, but by the mid 20th century it had become a popular destination for American tourists, and earned a reputation as a hub for “expatriate” artistic production (Navarrete Escobedo 2020: 3158). Tourism is now a key industry. Luxury hotels and businesses (restaurants, boutiques, art galleries) cluster in the historic town centre, catering primarily to international visitors. Meanwhile, the municipal government works to ‘cleanse’ the historic centre of informal vending, primarily the preserve of indigenous and low-income groups (Navarrete Escobedo 2020: 3163). Housing in the area has shifted toward short-term rental use (Navarrete Escobedo 2020: 3159). House prices have increased beyond the reach of most Mexican buyers, and working-class residents have largely relocated to the peripheries of the town (Navarrete Escobedo 2020: 3162).

This case exemplifies three forms of tourism-induced displacement that are distinguished by Agustin Cócola-Gant, all of which are well documented in the empirical literature (Cócola-Gant 2018: 287–9). There are good reasons to expect each of these

[14] This disproportionality results perhaps most often from greater economic power in the context, which need not reflect greater economic power overall, but simply the fact that catering to tourist activities and interests is frequently more profitable than catering to the needs of everyday residential life.

[15] This is not to say that residents never make such claims, but rather that there seems to be also another, different, kind of claim at stake here, one that we propose to cash out in terms of marginality.

to be marginalising in the relationship among residents and tourists. First, growth in tourism causes *residential displacement*, the physical displacement of residents from their homes, typically priced out by rising rents and land values, in this case caused in turn by increased demand for tourist infrastructure (short-term accommodation and commercial premises) (Fainstein and Gladstone 1999; Gotham 2005; Gladstone and Préau 2008; Vives Miró 2011; Wortman et al. 2016; Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018; Navarrete Escobedo 2020; Sigler and Wachsmuth 2020; Shabrina et al. 2022). Sometimes, this might result in exclusion from the spatial relationship altogether, but often, residents will simply be forced to relocate to more distant homes on the periphery of the city (or area). Insofar as these residents remain dependent on, for instance, employment in the touristic city centre, they will still participate in the same urban relationship but will be forced to commute longer distances and will likely become less present physically: their participation in the shared relationship will become more *marginal*.

Second, tourism development causes 'commercial displacement', change in commercial activities through similar processes (Fainstein and Gladstone 1999; Gotham 2005; Bromley and Mackie 2009; Cócola-Gant 2015, 2018: 288; Navarrete Escobedo 2020). The replacement of businesses geared towards the needs and interests of residents with tourist-focused businesses makes it harder for residents both to meet their basic needs and to maintain community relationships in the centre of a touristic city, and hence to participate centrally in neighbourhood life. Finally, Cócola-Gant describes what he calls 'place-based displacement', involving a 'sense of dispossession' or 'loss of place', the 'domination of space by visitors' (Cócola-Gant 2018: 288–9, drawing on Davidson 2008; 2009; Davidson and Lees 2010). This can be produced by, for instance, the loss of meeting spaces, a loss of quality of life that disproportionately affects residents, and the development of clear social, cultural and status differentiation between residents and tourists (Hayes 2015; Wortman et al. 2016). Independent of the subjective reactions and feelings of loss these dynamics might generate in residents, it is clear that these are changes with differential, or unequal, impact and, we will suggest below, are plausibly *marginalising*.

The conception of marginalisation that we will develop in the following section offers one plausible way to make sense of, or vindicate, complaints made in cases like those of Venice, Amsterdam and San Miguel de Allende as well as many others. What is at stake in the complaints of marginality is not as such the maintenance of a certain city character or community in touristed cities and neighbourhoods, but rather the marginality that some agents suffer within the relations that come to shape their city and neighbourhood, including in their relation to tourists.

3 Marginalisation and Transience

Having described the kind of relations arising in heavily touristed areas and motivated intuitively the kind of complaint we want to focus on, we now provide a general account of marginalisation as a distinctive form of relational inequality, which we think can make sense of a kind of complaint voiced by some residents in touristic areas. We then address the question how residents in an area can be marginalised in

the relationship they share with tourists, despite being the only enduring participants in it.

Marginalisation (unlike exclusion and certain other forms of relational inequality, such as domination, which we discuss below), presupposes an ongoing relationship in which you (the marginalised party) are a participant. You are marginalised in this relationship when you are excluded from its core, pushed to its fringes. This only makes sense if there is a broader pattern of interactions into which your individual interactions fit, and might fit more or less centrally.[16] To be pushed to the fringes in this sense is to lack the opportunity to participate in, or contribute to, the shared life of the relationship on an equal footing with other participants. We think there are two basic kinds of marginalisation:

- *Participation marginalisation*: relative lack of opportunities to participate in the forms of social interaction and shared life central to the relationship in question.
- *Control/significance marginalisation*: at a minimum, lack of ability, on an equal footing with other participants, to have one's interests influence, or be reflected in, the course the relationship takes, and perhaps, additionally, lack of equal ability to exercise counterfactual control over the course of the relationship.[17]

To illustrate with reference to a relatively simple relationship in which marginalisation is possible, consider a friendship group. A member of a friendship group is marginalised in the participation sense if they are only peripherally involved in the group's activities and are prevented from joining in the group's most important interactions. Imagine a friendship group whose shared identity is closely bound up with support for a sports team, which the group sees play every Saturday night. If you are a member of the group, but routinely excluded from this Saturday night gathering, it is natural to suppose (all else being equal) that you are marginalised in this participation sense. Very roughly, how *central* a shared interaction or activity is to a relationship is some function of how many participants are involved, how much influence it has

[16] For tourists and residents to be in a relationship in which marginalisation is possible, it is not enough that they interact with each other as occupants of persisting *social roles* or *positions* (though that may be enough to enable tourists and residents who only briefly interact to be in relations of e.g. domination). The complaint of residents must be that the social position they occupy puts them in a real relationship (in which they are marginal) with others who occupy a different social position. This is obviously only possible if there are some others in the relevant social position (that of 'tourist') with whom they do share the relevant kind of social relationship. Since the kind of relationship in which marginalisation is possible must be broader than a single brief interaction, some explanation is needed of how that is possible in spite of the transience of tourists. Very often, social roles or positions only get their meaning and allocation *within* a real ongoing relationship of this sort, but still, it is the common relationship and not *merely* the existence of social roles or positions that is presupposed by the idea of marginalisation. As we will explain in the next subsection, where there is a power differential between you and me created by social roles that we each occupy in *completely independent* social relationships we may be able to talk of relations of *domination* if we momentarily come into contact, but not of *marginalisation*.

[17] This account of marginalisation was originally developed in joint (as yet unpublished) work by Tyler Zimmer and Daniel Guillery. It draws inspiration from Young's (1990: 56) classic discussion of marginalisation, which focuses on what we call 'participation marginalisation'. Nonetheless, her focus is only on one particular (economic) instance of participation marginalisation, and there is another possible kind of marginalisation ('control/significance marginalisation') that she does not consider.

over the organisation of the relationship more widely, the role (if any) it plays in the group's shared understanding of the identity or function of the relationship and so on. On the other hand, a member of a friendship group is marginalised in the *control/significance* sense if, for example, they are able to participate in all of the group's activities, but the form and content of those activities is determined in a way that pays no attention to their interests or voice. Imagine, for instance, always being invited to a friendship group's regular gatherings to watch their favourite sports team play but being routinely ignored or overridden in your attempts to contribute to, or influence, deliberation over what these gatherings will involve.

We should note that *equal* participation and control/influence must be considered relative to individuals' participation in the relationship as a whole. We observed above that marginalisation depends on participation in an ongoing relationship, and it is only relative to a given relationship in which you are a member that you may be marginalised or not. We only have marginalisation (rather than exclusion) so long as the marginalised party continues to take part in the wider relationship, even if excluded from some of its most important constituent interactions. But you might be a member of a particular relationship for a period of your life and then cease to be involved, or you might take part in a relationship occasionally. Thus, individuals cannot be divided, in a simple binary fashion, into members and non-members. It would, of course, not be surprising if individual A, who was involved in a friendship group for a year and then left, and individual B, who was involved in the same friendship group over the course of a long life, had very different levels of participation and control/influence in that friendship group considered overall, at the level of their whole lives. And there would be no basis for considering A marginalised in this friendship group if their total participation or control/influence in it was correspondingly less than B's. What matters is whether your degree of central participation and control/influence in a relationship *relative to your involvement in that relationship as a whole* are equal to others'.[18]

This is, so far, a purely descriptive account of a set of phenomena that can sensibly be described as 'marginalisation'. We have said, though, that we take marginalisation to be a failure of relational equality, and we take this to be a *normative* ideal. But we only want to claim that marginalisation (as characterised descriptively so far) violates this ideal (and so is pro tanto objectionable) when two further conditions are met. First, it is necessary that the relationship in which they suffer participation or control/significance marginalisation is one that *matters* for them (and, plausibly, the *extent* to which marginalisation is pro tanto objectionable will also vary with the extent to which the relationship matters for the marginalised participant). For a relationship to matter for a participant in the relevant sense is for it to play an important role in meeting significant interests of theirs (for instance, for it to contribute to significant plans or projects of theirs, or be a relationship they care about intrinsically, or to have

[18] Of course, some ways in which you might be treated by other participants in a relationship will have the effect of marginalising you *in* that relationship, while others will have the effect of excluding you *from* it. In practice, in some cases the distinction between these might be relatively subtle, especially if exclusion is periodic, rather than permanent. And one might have valid complaints against either. But the two things are conceptually distinct and worth keeping apart, at least in theory.

a significant impact on their access to resources and opportunities that they need or desire) and for it to be not easily replaceable with respect to these functions.

Second, an instance of descriptive marginalisation may not constitute a violation of the relational egalitarian ideal if it serves a valuable function of sufficient importance, i.e. if the asymmetric structure of the relationship itself is necessary for something of significant value. Consider, for instance, the case of a well organised orchestra, in which the conductor wields substantially asymmetric influence over the relationship for good artistic reason (Berlin 1956: 313). Though the players are descriptively marginalised in this relationship, it need not be the case that there is any relational inequality in the normative sense. We should note here, as well, that the relational egalitarian ideal is one among several, and we do not take a stand on what exactly its weight is or what exactly the relationship is between it and all-things-considered justice. We do not mean to claim that when marginalisation of the kind we have described occurs, and these two conditions are met, this must necessarily be unjust all things considered. Where an instance of marginalisation meets the above conditions, there is at least a pro tanto reason to object to it, but other conflicting considerations might need to be taken into account before the question of all-things-considered justifiability can be settled.

3.1 Marginalisation, Exclusion, and Domination

With the above rough account of marginalisation in hand, it is worth distinguishing marginalisation from some nearby phenomena. We have said that marginalisation presupposes membership in an ongoing relationship in a way that some other forms of relational inequality (notably domination) and exclusion do not. We are now in a position to explain a little more carefully what differentiates marginalisation from these other phenomena.

First, take *exclusion*. We are not here focused on the *exclusion* of residents from social relationships in their neighbourhoods (though this *might* be a consequence of heavy tourism, and one that is likely to involve injustices of other sorts). To be part of a social relationship yet confined to its margins is a distinctive kind of relational inequality. It is a way in which a hierarchy of social status can be established *within* a social relationship. This is quite different from the denial of social interaction altogether, which need not involve any relational inequality. Exclusion from a social relationship *may* be a way of establishing differences in social status between those included and those excluded, where there are other wider social relationships in which both groups *are* involved. For instance, a private member's club that excludes prospective members on grounds of gender identity might contribute to gender-based hierarchy in the wider society if membership is prestigious or has implications for further social opportunities. But there is not *necessarily* any wrong (or social hierarchy) involved in a failure to engage in social interaction with particular others (though we may have an obligation to do so if these others are dependent on interaction with us, or, as above, if the denial of interaction would have further unjust effects on background social relationships). On the other hand, where social relationships with others *are* established, we think there *is* a defeasible presumption against structuring these relationships in a hierarchical fashion (including in ways that *marginalise*).

Next, consider *domination*. Domination (unlike exclusion) is *itself* an important form of relational inequality. But while it is closely related to marginalisation, the two are distinct; neither is reducible to the other. First, domination is possible without marginalisation. Domination (unlike marginalisation) does not depend on any wider relationship between the related individuals. Obviously, domination does depend on the individuals (dominator and dominated) having a relationship with each other in the thinner sense that is presupposed by the idea of relational inequality quite generally. Two individuals on causally independent planets could not be in relations of domination with each other. But you could dominate me without us having any substantial or ongoing relationship. Imagine, for example, that you and I, two strangers passing by, are both hungry and happen to turn up at the same time to a fruit bush (the only source of food in the area). If we are roughly equal in physical power (and symmetrically positioned otherwise), then we can proceed to help ourselves to fruit without any domination. But if instead you turn up with a gun and I do not, you dominate me (and can, if you choose, use your dominating power to claim all the fruit, though you need not).

In this case nobody is marginalised, because there is nothing within which it would make sense to say I have been pushed to the edges, i.e. been made a marginal participant. This is particularly clear with respect to *participation* marginalisation: there are no forms of interaction or shared life more or less central to our relationship. We should stipulate in addition that the inequalities of control/significance that are relevant to *marginalisation* are those over an ongoing relationship, not a single interaction. This is not an ad hoc restriction: inequality of control/significance only constitutes *marginalisation*, in our proposed understanding of the concept, when it renders members of a relationship peripheral in it.

Nothing is changed about the above when we consider structural domination. On Vrousalis's account of structural domination, for example, an instance of domination is structural where the dyadic domination relation is 'regulated' (co-constituted in the right sort of way) by a background (set of) agent(s) or role(s) external to the power-dyad (Vrousalis 2023: 98−9). We can now change the previous example so that your domination of me is the result of power relations created by a background 'regulator'. Instead of bringing a gun, you have the backing of a powerful agency (a state, say) that will intervene to punish me if I do not do as you say, and I know this to be true. Nothing relevant changes: you dominate me in the same sense. Nobody is any more marginalised than in the first case. But this time the domination is structural.

On the other side, marginalisation does not entail domination either. It is easy enough to imagine a relationship among a number of individuals, none of whom has significant power over other members, but where external forces structure the relationship such that some members are able to participate centrally, while others are not. Assume here for the sake of simplicity that there is only participation, not control/significance, marginalisation.[19] Greater participation does not mean greater influence over the shape of the relationship, just that the activities that have most significance for members of the relationship are reserved for a subset of the group,

[19] Showing that at least one aspect of marginalisation does not entail domination is sufficient to show that the former is not reducible to the latter.

not necessarily because of their own choices, but also possibly because of external forces. Some are marginalised in this relationship, though there is no domination. The marginalised participants need not even be dominated by someone external to this relationship who is responsible for structuring it in this way: this marginalising structure could be the responsibility of non-agential forces. We will return later to the case of tourism, but let us just note here that it seems plausible that a major part of the marginalisation in cases of tourism is somewhat like this.[20]

Importantly, although we claim that marginalisation is best understood as a form of relational inequality *distinct from* domination, we do not deny that the latter may also be importantly present in cases of excessive tourism. Rather, we maintain that to ignore potential unjust marginalisation would be to miss something that domination, like other injustices, do not capture.[21]

3.2 The Problem of Transience

As we suggested in the first section, prior to philosophical reflection, the idea that residents in an area could be marginalised in their relationship with tourists in that area seems a plausible one, and complaints expressed by residents in heavily visited areas can often be read in this way. But, as we have also noted, there appears to be a challenge for that idea. Marginalisation, as a distinctive form of relational inequality, depends on an ongoing relationship between individuals, in which the marginalised parties are participants. However, tourists' individual presence in the area they visit is by definition transitory and typically fleeting, and often involves very little substantial interaction with residents in the area. Take, for instance, one paradigmatic and much-bemoaned instance of heavy tourism: cruise ships. Cruise-ship tourists typically dock in the port of a city, spend a few hours in it and leave for the next destination. Cruises aside, tourists in touristic cities frequently spend very little time in it and rarely engage in activities or projects that have any significant duration in the city they visit (e.g., volunteering or cultural association-centred tourism) (UNWTO 2024). It could be that, although many residents in a touristic area have regular interactions with some tourists, no particular tourists have ongoing interactions with any residents. It might thus seem that there can be no enduring relationship (of the kind in which marginalisation is possible) in which both residents and tourists are involved.

What, then, does it take for two or more people to be engaged in an ongoing relationship of the sort in which it makes sense to talk of being more or less marginal? One natural thought is that to count as a participant in such a relationship, you must have repeated interactions with other participants. If that is the case, it would seem to imply that most tourists are *not* engaged in any ongoing relationship with residents of the areas they visit, and so that residents cannot be marginalised in their relationship with these tourists. In this section, we will present a rough account of what it is to be

[20] Importantly, though, there are unquestionably *also* relations of domination between various actors in these cases.

[21] It is noteworthy that other kinds of injustice, and relational inequality specifically, need not presuppose an ongoing relationship in the way that marginalisation does. Thus, the distinctive challenge raised by relations between tourists and residents is not a challenge for an account of unjust tourism *in general*, but one that must be met to vindicate our suggestion that these relations can be *marginalising*.

involved in an ongoing relationship of the relevant sort that shows how it is possible to be engaged in such a relationship (and even to be a comparatively central participant in it) despite *not* having repeated interactions with other participants.

A relationship of the kind in which marginalisation is possible is a structured series of interactions between a number of individuals (connected by these structured interactions in a variety of overlapping ways), where these interactions:

a. are continuously structured by a shared web of ongoing social practices. i.e., mutually reinforcing patterns of behaviour shaped by shared values, beliefs, structures of meaning, patterns of expectations, conventions and so on (see Haslanger 2018); and.
b. determine production of, use of, and/or access to, determinate valuable resources, where these include, but are not limited to, *social* resources (such as the ability to draw or rely on the time and efforts of others).

What does it mean for a series of interactions to be continuously structured by a shared web of ongoing social practices? First, we will appeal to an intuitive understanding of how social practices structure actions and interactions. As a rough and illustrative list, practices can plausibly structure interactions by solving coordination problems, creating expectations (both predictive and normative) that affect individual preferences (including by constituting forms of social activity that create options and impose sanctions), establishing templates or scripts for action that can contribute to the former processes or even short-circuit deliberation, or by contributing to a process of socialisation or enculturation that inculcates certain preferences or dispositions. A set of social practices constitutes a 'shared web' in the relevant sense if there is a series of social interactions where the sets of practices that play a structuring role for each interaction in the series overlap with each other, sharing sufficient common elements with some other sets in the series, united by a family resemblance (in the Wittgensteinian sense). Further, a series of interactions are *continuously* structured by such a shared web if there is causal continuity between these interactions and the practices that structure them: that an interaction in the series is structured by a particular set of practices is partly explained by its causal relation to other interactions in the series.

In our case, diverse users of a reasonably populated space (a neighbourhood, say, or a touristic village) will need to negotiate the use of this space with each other (for purposes as banal as, for instance, the coordination of pavement traffic as well as more substantial interactions involving things like the distribution of food and shelter or even richer shared activities, such as collective entertainment or companionship). As mentioned above, almost inevitably, the various interactions through which they negotiate this space will draw on a common language of social practices, i.e., heavily overlapping sets of social practices that enable agents to make sense of each other's behaviour (norms about, for instance, how to walk through streets, how to communicate, what kinds of interaction with strangers are permissible, and so on). Temporary visitors will not get very far if they do not attempt to structure their interactions with others in the space according to prevalent practices (though in large numbers they may significantly alter over time the practices that are prevalent). Insofar as the

interactions of various users of an area are structured by such an overlapping web of practices, the first condition for a common relationship is satisfied.

These ongoing social relationships can be individuated with reference to their 'subject' or 'function', that is, the resource(s) that they allocate or produce, so long as there is a causally-interconnected web of practices structuring interactions around this subject. Thus, for instance, there will be a relationship between those involved in negotiating the use of space in a particular geographical area, so long as interactions around this subject are connected to each other in the right way. That means that there will be many overlapping (and nested) relationships, since there will be indefinitely many ways of drawing lines around resources delivered or allocated by interlocking structured interactions. But those that will be of interest, or that have moral significance, are only those that *matter* to people in the sense discussed above. At whatever levels of granularity participation in a relationship matters to people, their being marginalised in the relationship so defined will be pro tanto objectionable. It is not a problem if there are still multiple overlapping relationships around the same resources, since the aim is not to *count* relationships in which people are marginalised, but simply to identify marginalisation about which we have reason to be concerned. Where a group of people are involved in a relationship of this kind (drawing on a common web of practices and negotiating the production or distribution of a common resource or set of resources), they relate in a pro tanto objectionably hierarchical way if some of those for whom the relationship matters are proportionally marginal in it.

The existence of an ongoing social relationship, understood in this way, does *not* require continued engagement from all those who count as participants in the relationship. To be a member of the right kind of relationship is simply to be a participant in such a structured series of social interactions. One can then, of course, participate fleetingly. So long as there are some continued participants maintaining the relationship in existence, it is perfectly possible to dip in for a fleeting interaction that is nevertheless part of such a continuous practice-structured web of interactions concerned with the same resource(s) and structured by the same web of social practices. In such a case, one effectively piggy-backs on a social infrastructure maintained by others. One can also potentially exercise significant influence over the development of such a relationship through a brief engagement with it. If you bring to these interactions some external source of power (e.g. money), you may be able to leverage it to have a lasting impact on others' incentives for action within the relationship even without continuing to participate in it afterwards. Further, it is easy to see that where there is a *group* of positionally similar individuals all of whom are comparatively powerful in some way, practices may be set up in a way that reflects or tracks their interests, and so may end up giving each of them disproportionate centrality or influence (relative to the extent of their overall involvement), even if each of them engages with that relationship only fleetingly. Thus, it is quite possible for the repeat participants in a relationship to be the marginal ones (in either respect) relative to the short-term participants.

Now, then, with this conception of marginalisation and the kind of relationship it necessitates in hand, let us return to the case we are interested in to make more

precise the suggestion made at the start that residents in touristic cities can become marginal in their relation to tourists.

4 The Marginality of Residents

As noted above, the social relationship that is our focus is the relationship among users of a common space (a local area). The suggestion we made was that significant development of tourism in an area may produce *marginalisation* of (some) residents in that relationship. We are now in a position to explain how this is possible even where those relative to whom they are marginalised (i.e. those who become comparatively 'non-marginal', or 'central') are only fleetingly involved in the area at all. While tourists may relate only fleetingly to residents, they do so via (a) a stable web of practices that shapes their interaction, and (b) their interactions are centred around the use and negotiation of a common resource: city space. Thus, they are in the right kind of relationship for marginalisation to obtain.

Granting this theoretical possibility, it still might look surprising that it will in fact turn out to be the case that those with ongoing, consistent and comparatively deep engagement with that relationship (i.e. the residents) end up marginalised in it, when compared with others whose involvement is momentary and shallow. It is important, then, to recall that, as mentioned above, a concern with marginalisation must be understood as a concern with *proportional* (not total) opportunities for participation and control/influence. No doubt, it will rarely be the case that any individual tourist has the capacity to participate more centrally or to influence more significantly the relevant spatial relationship in a given place *overall*, *over the course of their lifetime*, than most individual residents in that place. But what determines whether residents are marginalised in this relationship in the normatively interesting sense is not this, but whether their opportunities for central participation and control/influence are equal *relative to their overall involvement* in the relationship (and overall involvement will, of course, almost always be much greater for a resident than a tourist).

In Sect. 1 above, we detailed a number of concerns raised by residents in certain heavily touristed locations and changes that have been found to be produced by the development of tourism to seemingly marginalising effect. To conclude our argument, let us employ the conception of marginalisation sketched above to make a prima facie case that at least some of the developments observed in real cases in fact are marginalising. In many cases, further empirical work would be needed to fully substantiate that claim, but there is a good initial case for concern.

4.1 A Relationship that Matters

First, we noted that marginalisation only constitutes an objectionable relational inequality when it arises in a relationship that *matters* (to some sufficient degree) to those marginalised in it. Unsurprisingly, the relationship among users of a common space is one that very plausibly will often *matter* significantly to at least some of its participants. Where the city is the broader context of one's place of residence, the ability to use it in certain ways and to move around it is likely to be importantly

connected to meeting certain basic and weighty human interests. It is likely often to be the place in which one's most central 'located life plans' are situated (Stilz 2013, 2019), and the place whose regularities have the greatest influence on one's understanding of the social and physical environment (Guillery 2023; see also Huber and Wolkenstein 2018; who apply Stilz's idea to the topic of gentrification). It is also often the place in which one's most important social connections are formed, and various goods associated with social interaction are dependent on being able to interact in close proximity in physical space. So, insofar as one has an interest in maintaining established social relationships and pursuing socially dependent plans and projects, this will often require access to, and use of, the local space (Zimmer and Guillery, unpublished manuscript). In addition, other scholars have highlighted the fact that our interaction with space matters because it shapes our embodied experiences, identities and agency. For instance, Kukla contends that spaces and their dwellers form *ecological ontologies*, i.e. space and the agents that dwell in it mutually constitute each other (Kukla 2021).

None of the foregoing connections are necessary ones, and they will generally hold to differing degrees for different people. It seems quite likely, though, that those for whom the city-space relationship will matter *most* will typically be those *residing* in the area (and, among those, especially those with less economic or other power). Someone who is resident in an area, works in the same area, and has relationship- and project-based ties to the area, while having limited prospects for relocating these elsewhere, will very likely be thereby more dependent on the relationship they have with other users of that area (that is, it will matter more for them). This means that, even before we consider background (economic, power, social) inequalities between tourists and residents, there is likely to be a substantial asymmetry between them. And this will only be accentuated when residents are relatively disadvantaged by social and class hierarchies that make relocation and movement especially costly.

4.2 Participation Marginalisation

The neighbourhood relationship, that among users of a shared area, then, is both one in which marginalisation is possible and one in which, if it occurs, it is likely to be morally concerning, particularly for residents of the neighbourhood. Recall now, then, the two forms of marginalisation we distinguished ('participation' and 'control/significance' marginalisation). We think there is good reason to expect certain patterns of development in heavily visited areas to be marginalising in both respects. Let us take each in turn. Participation marginalisation, first, is about the relative lack of opportunities for participation in the forms of social interaction most central to the relationship. We have not presented a full account of 'centrality' in a relationship, but noted that the impact of a particular shared activity on the wider relationship (and its participants' conception of it) will be relevant. In the spatial relationship that is our focus, impact on the use of space, and on the norms and practices that set the terms for such use, will be key. Interactions that simply take up a substantial amount of space, or space that is particularly desirable among users of the wider area, or central to movement between desirable spaces, are thereby more significant.

Several of the kinds of change described in Sect. 1 look likely to have the effect of making central forms of social interaction unavailable, or more difficult to access, for residents. First, and perhaps most basically, the displacement of housing for residents means that the latter find themselves more distant physically from the social activities that are most economically and politically impactful and otherwise central in the urban relationship, since these tend to be more centrally located. Next, what Cócola-Gant labels 'commercial displacement' looks similarly likely to generate *participation* marginalisation. Insofar as tourism-oriented businesses come to dominate an area, those that cater to the basic needs of residents will be forced to the fringes. And where the dominant form of tourism-oriented social activity involves paid activities and expensive forms of commerce, it becomes likely that these increasingly central forms of social interaction will be out of reach for residents, who must instead meet their basic needs through social interactions (predominantly commercial interactions) forced to the peripheries of the area. Similarly, where tourist activities take up the vast majority of spaces available, residents will find it harder to maintain other social activities (notably those involved in maintaining communal relationships and non-commercial forms of social cooperation), which may end up forced out of the area altogether. In addition, changes in employers in an area will bring changes in the kind of employment opportunities available, and in some cases (though not always) employers will prefer to import a workforce better suited (in their eyes) to these new forms of employment than local residents. For instance, consider the removal of informal vendors from the touristic centre of San Miguel de Allende: they are relatively unlikely to find formal employment in the luxury businesses becoming dominant in the area. Where that happens, residents will be marginalised in terms of economic participation as well.

Finally, as discussed above, heavy tourism may bring with it changes in the social practices and norms that prevail in an area. Tourists may import practices around the use of public space that are unfamiliar to residents in the area. Where these become dominant, residents may find it hard to navigate and make sense of these new prevailing practices. For instance, we discussed above practices around movement through space, or, for another relatively clear-cut example, think about a case where the prevailing language of communication becomes English in place of the traditional local language. Such changes will obviously make it harder for residents to participate centrally in social life in the area.

4.3 Control/significance Marginalisation

Next, control/significance marginalisation, we said, arises when some members of a relationship lack the equal ability (compared to other members) to have their interests or voice influence the course of the relationship. It is harder to establish with confidence that tourism produces this kind of marginalisation, but there are certainly mechanisms through which it seems plausible that it may. The most obvious *formal* channels through which influence or control over the spatial relationship can be had (local, or national, *political* channels) are not typically ones in which tourists contribute directly. It is likely that residents *are* often marginalised in these channels relative to powerful tourism lobbies, though it is not clear this can be put down to the devel-

opment of *tourism* per se, since this kind of marginalisation by powerful economic actors seems to be a much more widespread feature of capitalist politics (of which the dominance of the tourism industry in some places is just one instance).

But one simple mechanism through which tourists can come to exert disproportionate influence arises from the simple fact that the social role of tourist is usually one a person occupies no more than occasionally, while the role of resident is continuous and long lasting. For that reason, tourists are likely to spend more during their trips than they typically would in their daily lives, aiming to make the most of their holiday experience. That gives the individual tourist greater economic influence within this particular narrow context than their overall income or wealth would suggest. The disparity that arises by comparison to residents is obviously exacerbated when there is already a background of economic inequality (i.e. where tourists are wealthier than residents). This fact provides an economic incentive for private actors and public institutions (concerned with revenue) to cater disproportionately to the interests of tourists. As an infrastructure develops, this can become locked in: it becomes easier and a more salient option to respond to the interests of tourists to an extent even beyond the marginal profitability of doing so. As the area turns into a 'tourist hotspot', the interests that are paid attention to in making economic planning decisions are by default those of tourists. The kind of 'commercial displacement' mentioned above is an unsurprising consequence of this phenomenon, and the complaints raised by residents of the Amsterdam Red Light district mentioned above look plausibly to be driven at least in part by this kind of disparity.

Additionally, though subtler and more difficult to pin down, the informal social and cultural mechanisms through which influence or control can be exerted are also significant. The character of a relationship is in important part determined by the social practices and norms that govern interaction within it. These in turn are constituted and produced by the combined behaviour of the various individuals who participate in these practices. The processes through which individuals' behaviour combines to create and alter norms and practices are highly complex, but it is clear that influence is not evenly distributed. Superior social standing of certain kinds translates into greater influence over wider social practices. To give one example, epistemic injustices that discount the testimony or experiences of a marginalised social group will reduce the influence members of that group are capable of having over *epistemic* norms in their wider society.

If, then, tourism produces cultural or status differentiation between tourists and residents, as empirical researchers have suggested it does in some cases, it may have the effect of reducing the ability of residents to influence these processes of social change where they become positioned as a group of inferior social status (Hayes 2015; Wortman et al. 2016). Further, where there is clear differentiation or fragmentation between the two groups, there may be something of a disconnect, such that the behaviour of residents is unable to influence or contribute to the practices or norms that prevail among tourists, or vice versa (because interaction is just insufficient, or overly shallow). But where numbers of tourists are simply overwhelming (as is the case in somewhere like Venice), there may be little option for members of the smaller

group (residents) to take heed in some ways of the practices and norms of the larger group, while the contrary is not true.[22]

5 Conclusion

We have set out a conception of marginalisation as a relational inequality and suggested that heavy tourism in an area against a background of inequality is a plausible generator of such marginalisation, in spite of the transience of the advantaged parties. We described two forms that marginalisation might take, and have suggested that tourism might give rise to both of these. Tourism is not by any means the only generator of spatial marginalisation, but the aim of the paper has been to provide one basis for concern about excessive and concentrated tourism, as well as to develop a conception of marginalisation that can make sense of relational inequalities in relationships partly characterised by transience and high turnover in participation.

The suggestion that excessive tourism can produce unjust marginalisation does not rule out there also being *non*-egalitarian moral claims that tourism can violate, such as claims grounded in the importance of social attachments or located life plans. It is worth noting, though, that while an argument based in such claims is focused on an interest set back simply by certain sorts of change (for instance, by loss of familiarity or of certain social attachments or practices), the notion of marginality focuses on inequality in how that unfamiliarity (for instance) comes about, or in the consequences it brings. This focus, we think, allows us to formulate a criticism of an aspect of over-tourism that is not at risk of supporting the kind of conservatism that could threaten a social-attachment or plan-based argument (see e.g. Sundstrom 2024: 96–100; Hofmann 2020). In addition, whilst residents might suffer, and in significant ways, from a loss of something shared that they had, it is not obvious that their complaints against such loss are legitimate ones. A defence, or criticism, of their legitimacy is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we note that, to respond to possible charges of conservatism, proponents of such non-egalitarian arguments will need an account of the duty-generating force of these interests (see Van Leeuwen 2007; 2025). We suggest that social-attachment or plan-based complaints have force *at least* when changes to social attachments, familiarity or background environment cause, or are caused by wrongful acts (e.g., undemocratic imposition, discrimination), or wrongful relational nexi (including domination, or, as we argued, marginalisation).

Finally, we should also clarify that our contribution is not concerned with the personal morality of individual tourists or the question whether individual tourists bear moral responsibility for any injustices that might arise as a result of heavy tourism. That is an important question, but one we leave others to address. If some are marginalised in a social relationship, that is a feature of the *shape* the *relationship* takes and is unlikely to be attributable to the actions of any one member of it. How responsibil-

[22] It is worth noting that in a different kind of case, where there are very small numbers of tourists, something like the reverse could hold, and *tourists* could in principle end up socially marginalised. But it is unlikely that there will be a comparable reason to be morally concerned about this, since it is far less likely that the relationship will *matter* to the tourists to any significant degree.

ity for structural injustices is distributed among participants in the relevant structures is a complex philosophical (and empirical) question, but it certainly does not follow from our conclusion that *tourists* do wrong when residents are unjustly marginalised. (More significant culprits, it seems likely to us, will be powerful actors in the tourist industry, diffuse economic forces, and perhaps government actors.[23])

To conclude, it would take further work to justify concrete policy responses, but if it is the case that tourism in a particular context produces marginalisation of the kind we describe, that provides, we think, at least pro tanto reason to object to it. While we do not have space to assess all potential countervailing considerations, it seems plausible that marginalisation of residents in the context of over tourism is a weighty moral consideration, one difficult to override in designing tourism policies. Marginalisation might be addressed, for instance, through disincentives for (or bans of) short-term rentals and changes in land-ownership practices, increased involvement for residents in the management of local space and economic development in their city, incentives for non-touristic businesses, and restrictions on cruise ships. Proper consideration of this policy question, though, must be left for further work.

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[23] It seems plausible that when tourism produces gentrification-like effects (including marginalisation) this will be the result of a complex interplay between the actions of various actors, both international and local (cf. Gravari-Barbas and Guinand 2017: 4–5).

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