

Assessing public support for degrowth: survey-based experimental and predictive studies

Dario Krpan, Frédéric Basso, Jason E Hickel, Giorgos Kallis



Summary

Background Degrowth argues that high-income economies should reduce harmful production and prioritise well-being. Although degrowth is increasingly seen as essential to tackling climate change, the extent of public support for this economic approach remains unclear. In this study, we aimed to investigate public support for the full degrowth proposal in the UK and USA—high-income, growth-oriented nations with substantial climate responsibility and political resistance to degrowth. Our objectives were to distinguish support for the proposal itself from perceptions of the degrowth label and to examine the role of participants' individual differences.

Methods Our objectives were examined in two studies, Study 1 and Study 2, administered online via Qualtrics. For both studies, participants in the USA and UK were recruited via Prolific (an online pool of participants) to be representative of the respective populations in age, gender, and ethnicity. Participants had to pass several attention and quality checks to qualify for analyses. Study 1 used a within-subjects design whereby all participants rated their support for the full degrowth proposal (summarising the key ideas, practices, and goals of degrowth) without any label and for eight economic approaches presented by label only (ie, degrowth, ecomodernism, ecosocialism, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy, post growth, and wellbeing economy) on a 7-point scale (from 1 [strongly oppose] to 7 [strongly support]). Study 2 used a between-subjects design whereby participants were randomly assigned using the randomiser function in Qualtrics, to one of seven economic approaches (the full degrowth proposal; a label referring to either degrowth, ecosocialism, or wellbeing economy without a description; or a combination of the full degrowth proposal with one of these three labels), for which they rated their support on the same 7-point scale. Mean support for each approach was classified on the basis of 95% CIs, meaning that similar means could be classified differently across studies and samples due to variations in these intervals. To identify key predictors of support, we also measured 74 individual differences, including various psychological and socio-economic characteristics, and analysed them using an approach combining widely used machine learning models with multiple linear regression analyses; a variable was considered a key predictor only if it ranked among the most predictive in the machine learning models and was also statistically significant in the regression analyses.

Findings Data were collected from study participants between Oct 10, 2023, and Dec 1, 2023. 6228 participants from the UK and USA were initially recruited, of whom 5454 were eligible for analyses. When presented without a label, in the UK, the full degrowth proposal received support from 736 (81%) of 910 participants in Study 1 and 210 (82%) of 255 in Study 2. In the USA, it received support from 683 (73%) of 941 participants in Study 1 and 187 (72%) of 260 in Study 2. On the 7-point scale, in Study 1, support was 5.37 in the UK and 5.07 in the USA (both corresponding to somewhat support), whereas, in Study 2, support was 5.34 in the UK (corresponding to somewhat support to support) and 4.97 in the USA (corresponding to somewhat support). When degrowth was presented as a label alone, it received support from 237 (26%) of 910 participants in Study 1 and 50 (20%) of 250 participants in Study 2 in the UK and 266 (28%) of 941 participants in Study 1 and 34 (13%) of 270 participants in Study 2 in the USA. In Study 2, the degrowth label accompanied by the full proposal was supported by 184 (74%) of 248 participants in the UK and 177 (68%) of 260 participants in the USA. In addition, 188 (75%) of 250 participants in the UK and 176 (67%) of 264 participants in the USA supported the full degrowth proposal plus ecosocialism label, and 209 (84%) of 250 participants in the UK and 179 (72%) of 249 participants in the USA supported the full degrowth proposal plus wellbeing economy label. Key individual difference predictors of support were people's drive to address global challenges and belief in ecosystem integrity.

Interpretation Contrary to concerns from politicians and commentators that degrowth is broadly unpopular, the core degrowth proposal received substantial support from UK and US participants in this study, regardless of whether the full proposal was accompanied by the degrowth label. Therefore, negative perceptions of the degrowth label appear surmountable once people learn about the main principles behind degrowth. Fostering proactive engagement with global challenges and awareness of nature's fragility could further enhance the public's acceptance of degrowth.

Funding London School of Economics and Political Science.

Lancet Planet Health 2025

Published Online
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101326>

Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK (D Krpan PhD, F Basso PhD); Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK (D Krpan); Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain (Prof J E Hickel PhD, Prof G Kallis PhD); ICREA, Barcelona, Spain (Prof J E Hickel, Prof G Kallis); International Inequalities Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK (Prof J E Hickel); Department of Political Science and Public Law, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain (Prof J E Hickel)

Correspondence to:
 Dr Dario Krpan, Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK
d.krpan@lse.ac.uk

Copyright © 2025 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

Introduction

Degrowth—the notion that high-income economies should reduce non-essential production while prioritising wellbeing—has recently gained widespread traction in

academic and public discourse.¹ The call for degrowth stems from evidence that high-income economies far exceed their fair share of planetary boundaries^{2–4} and that gross domestic product is unlikely to decouple from

Research in context

Evidence before this study

Degrowth is increasingly viewed as crucial for addressing climate change, yet public support for this concept remains uncertain, and little research has explored the extent of this support or the factors that influence it. A search for peer-reviewed publications in Scopus from database inception to July 8, 2025, without language restrictions, with the keywords “degrowth” OR “de-growth” OR “postgrowth” OR “post-growth AND (study OR studies OR psychology OR experiment* OR survey)” in the article title, abstract, or keywords returned 1821 documents. After screening the publications for eligibility on the basis of the focus of our research—ie, lay evaluations of policy goals, proposals, messages, or labels interpreted or presented as degrowth-oriented or post-growth-oriented—we identified 21 research articles (appendix p 6). Several studies focused on specific populations or sectors—such as tourism, fashion, students, high-income earners, or rural populations. Another cluster of studies examined particular policy concepts (eg, wellbeing) and specific degrowth policies or evaluated how degrowth or post-growth measures compared with more conventional growth-focused policies. A third set of studies approached the growth-versus-environment debate, probing whether the public sided with growth at all costs, green growth, agrowth, or degrowth. Some of these articles offered a more detailed look at degrowth or post-growth messages themselves, and a few considered individual differences such as age, gender, or values. However, none of these articles conducted a comprehensive investigation of public support for degrowth by focusing on the full proposal of this economic approach (ie, a vision integrating the key ideas, practices, and goals that define degrowth; appendix pp 3–4) rather than on general, vague, or basic descriptions of degrowth or isolated practices. Additionally, no previous studies separated support for the degrowth label (or alternative labels) from support for the full degrowth proposal or examined a comprehensive range of individual differences that might shape support.

Added value of this study

Against this background, to our knowledge, this study is the first to provide a comprehensive, large-scale examination of public support for degrowth, focusing on representative samples from the UK and USA—two wealthy, growth-driven nations that bear considerable responsibility for climate change and show notable political opposition to degrowth. Specifically, we measure support for the full degrowth proposal; systematically distinguish between support for the degrowth label and the economic approach itself; examine the role of alternative labels linked to

other sustainability-oriented economic approaches (eg, wellbeing economy and ecosocialism); and assess a large set of individual differences, including psychological characteristics (personality, attitudes, values, and wellbeing) and socioeconomic indicators, to identify key predictors of support. By examining public support for a coherent vision that integrates degrowth’s key ideas, practices, and goals, this research addresses important gaps in previous knowledge on degrowth support to evaluate its political feasibility. This study also provides a crucial basis for policy makers and advocates to advance transformative societal change (eg, from using our full proposal to communicate about degrowth to the public to identifying which sectors of the population, reflected in psychological characteristics and sociodemographic variables, might be more receptive to it) and offers a foundation on which scientists can build to further investigate the feasibility of degrowth transitions. For example, future studies could extend our procedures and proposal to identify the specific formulations of the degrowth vision that attract the most support or could examine how to make degrowth more approachable to those individuals more likely to resist it.

Implications of all the available evidence

Our findings indicate strong public support and low opposition to the full degrowth proposal in both the UK and the USA. Support was notably lower when degrowth was presented solely as a label without explanation, but when the key ideas and goals of degrowth were detailed, support remained high regardless of whether the label was attached. This finding suggests that any negative connotations of the degrowth label do not undermine support when people engage with its substantive principles. Moreover, support for the full degrowth proposal was similarly high when it was combined with alternative labels such as ecosocialism and wellbeing economy, even though these labels received higher support than degrowth when presented alone. Importantly, we identified two key predictors of support: people’s drive to address global challenges with ideas and action (ie, a transformative utopian impulse) and their belief in the importance of ecosystem integrity (ie, a new ecological paradigm—balance). In contrast, socioeconomic indicators (eg, political orientation or income) were not consistent predictors. Overall, although degrowth is often criticised as lacking public support and being unlikely to gain traction in civil society, this research shows that the full proposal enjoys substantial backing, regardless of whether the degrowth label is included.

emissions and material use quickly enough to meet ecological targets.^{5–7} Degrowth scholarship argues that economies can sustain high wellbeing with much lower output and resource use and that targeted policies can help them function without growth.^{8,9} A comprehensive overview of such policy proposals, which are being increasingly discussed in policy-making circles (eg, the *Beyond Growth* conference hosted by the European Parliament¹⁰), is available in the literature.^{1,9,11,12} A key critique against degrowth is that it is unlikely to gain popular support and might increase resistance to climate policy.¹³ However, little systematic research has examined public support for degrowth and its drivers.

Some hypothesise that support for degrowth is hindered by the term's negative connotations, rather than the content of its key ideas, practices, and goals (referred to in this article as the full degrowth proposal; appendix pp 3–4).^{13,14} However, there is no convincing evidence to support this claim. Emerging research on the opinions of scientists and the general public finds that sizeable majorities support growth-critical positions,^{15–17} but these studies do not directly measure support for degrowth.¹⁸ Instead, they classify responses to growth-versus-environment statements into what the analysts themselves judge to be positions close to degrowth. Beyond the problem of subjective interpretation, this approach makes it difficult to distinguish support for the content of the degrowth proposal from support for the label.

Although a few studies have directly examined degrowth and found that labelling and framing are important,^{19–21} such studies generally present degrowth simplistically (eg, with generic statements about prioritising sustainability at the cost of growth) without addressing the full proposal. Moreover, they do not systematically separate content from labelling by assessing whether public support differs when people encounter degrowth content alone, its label alone, or both together. It is also unclear whether alternative labelling affects support. To investigate this aspect, researchers compared people's emotions and attitudes toward labels for degrowth and other sustainability-oriented economic approaches, such as green economy and post-growth.^{20,21} They also examined whether some of these labels (eg, post-growth) influenced evaluations of a brief degrowth description.²⁰ Although some differences emerged, those studies have not systematically separated the effects of labelling from the description itself, nor have they examined the full degrowth proposal.

Beyond content and labels, some researchers have investigated whether individual differences—such as materialism and biospheric values—predict the prioritisation of environmental protection over economic growth.²² However, those studies did not explicitly address degrowth (either the label or the full proposal), and the individual differences analysed were chosen on the basis of their availability in the World Values Survey²³ rather than selected from a broader range of measures for their relevance to degrowth.

To develop a comprehensive understanding of public support for degrowth while engaging with unresolved questions in the literature, our work had four main objectives: objective one was to test public support for the full degrowth proposal (ie, its core vision, presented without labels); objective two was to examine how the degrowth label shapes support by comparing how people respond to this economic approach when it is referred to by its label and without a description versus when it is presented as a full proposal, either with or without the label; objective three was to investigate the role of alternative labels by comparing how people respond to the full degrowth proposal when it is labelled with terms used for other linked sustainability-oriented approaches (eg, ecosocialism and wellbeing economy) versus how they respond to these labels or the full proposal alone (this comparison was important because including multiple labels allowed us to more robustly assess whether support depends on substantive ideas or label-driven impressions and explore how people respond to degrowth versus other sustainability approaches when they have little information about them—reflecting how these concepts are often encountered in real-world discourse);^{20,21} and objective four was to test which individual differences (ie, psychological characteristics and socioeconomic indicators) predict support for the proposal. These objectives addressed whether criticisms of degrowth based on its content or labelling are warranted and allowed for systematically separating support for the full proposal versus support for various labels. They also shed light on the implications of population diversity—expressed through various individual characteristics—for degrowth support.

The full degrowth proposal used in this study summarises key aspects of degrowth as reflected in the literature without explicitly using the label degrowth and captures several key elements of this economic approach—namely, that high-income countries would scale down harmful and non-essential production and consumption to help achieve ecological goals;² that wellbeing would be improved by ensuring universal access to public services, affordable housing, gainful employment, and living wages;¹ that control over the economy (production, resource use, and public services) would be progressively democratised;^{9,24} that countries in the Global South (ie, the developing economies of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) would be liberated from patterns of appropriation and enabled to achieve human development;²⁵ and that improvements in technological efficiency would be pursued alongside sufficiency principles.²⁶ The full degrowth proposal aligns with how this economic approach is typically framed by degrowth scholars, highlighting its core principles and critical stance towards the current system. Our aim was to assess how the public responds to this authentic vision as commonly advanced by degrowth advocates rather than to different arguments for or against growth. We focused on examining public support in the USA and UK—countries that hold substantial

See Online for appendix

responsibility for climate breakdown⁴ and are growth-oriented, high-income economies, matching the profile of countries where implementing degrowth would be crucial for global sustainability^{1,24,27} but is often considered politically unfeasible.^{28,29}

Methods

Study overview and participant information

We examined the four main objectives of this work in two studies conducted consecutively. Each study addressed objective one by testing public support for the full degrowth proposal. Regarding objectives two and three, Study 1 provided preliminary insights by testing people's support for the full proposal and for several economic approaches referred to by labels (eg, degrowth and ecosocialism) without any accompanying description. In contrast, in Study 2, we conducted a more systematic investigation by testing different combinations of the full proposal and selected labels, comparing them both in isolation and combination. Finally, regarding objective four, Study 1 examined a comprehensive set of 74 individual differences (detailed in the appendix [pp 26–32]) to identify key predictors of support for the full proposal, whereas Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend insights about these key predictors. Taken together, the two studies offer complementary insights, with Study 1 providing preliminary evidence and Study 2 testing the replicability of key findings and examining particular objectives in more depth.

Participants were recruited via Prolific (an ethically robust and widely used online participant pool)^{30,31} to be representative of the respective US and UK populations in age, gender, and ethnicity. Prolific achieves representativeness through stratified quota sampling, which involves dividing the target population into these three demographic subgroups and filling each with a predetermined number of participants. These quotas are based on up-to-date census data (from the US Census Bureau and UK Office for National Statistics) to ensure that each subgroup (eg, Asian women aged 25–34 years) is proportionally represented (the sampling method is detailed and appraised in the appendix [pp 7–9]). All participants were compensated at £8 per hour.

All participants had to pass several attention and quality checks (appendix p 11) to be eligible for analyses. Among participants eligible for analyses, the amount of missing data^{32,33} (referring specifically to incomplete responses from eligible participants) was low (0–1.58% depending on the analysis; appendix pp 12–14), remaining well below conservative thresholds ($\geq 5\%$) typically used to indicate meaningful risks to analytic validity.^{34–36} Therefore, missing data were handled using listwise deletion. The sample size rationale for each study is provided in the appendix (pp 15–16).

All procedures complied with the ethics code of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the studies were approved by the Department of Psychological

and Behavioural Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science (Study 1: reference 249034; Study 2: reference 292748).

Study design and procedures

The two studies followed a similar design and procedure (figure 1; a detailed description is in the appendix [pp 17–19]) and were administered online via Qualtrics. The surveys used in each study are available via the Open Science Framework. Participants completed the consent form first, followed by the three core sections: (1) economic approach (relevant to objectives one to three); (2) individual differences—psychological characteristics (relevant to objective four); and (3) individual differences—demographics (relevant to objective four). The order of the economic approach and psychological characteristics sections (ie, sections 1 and 2) was randomised; the demographics section (section 3) was always completed last. Attention checks were conducted in both studies: in Study 1, there were six instructed-response check items, all in section 2; in Study 2, there was one instructed-response check item in section 2; and in both studies, one seriousness check and one captcha test were done at the end of section 3 (appendix p 11); only participants who passed all the checks were eligible for analyses.

In the economic approach section, Study 1 used a within-subjects design, meaning that all participants rated their support for the full degrowth proposal (without any label) and for eight economic approaches presented by label only (ie, degrowth, ecomodernism, ecosocialism, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy, post-growth, and wellbeing economy) on a 7-point scale (whereby 1=strongly oppose and 7=strongly support). The selected economic approaches either share conceptual affinities with degrowth—some being used interchangeably by advocates and researchers (eg, ecosocialism and post-growth),^{16,37} although not without some controversy (eg, wellbeing economy)^{16,38–40}—or present competing sustainability visions against which degrowth is often contrasted (eg, ecomodernism, green capitalism, green growth, and green market economy).⁸ The full rationale is presented in the appendix (p 5).

In contrast, Study 2 used a between-subjects design, meaning that participants were randomly assigned (via the randomiser function in Qualtrics) to one economic approach in section 1, for which they rated their support. The economic approach could be either the full degrowth proposal, a label referring to an economic approach without description (ie, degrowth, ecosocialism, or wellbeing economy), or a combination of the full proposal with one of these labels. We focused on degrowth, ecosocialism, and wellbeing economy rather than adopting all labels from Study 1 because these terms are often used interchangeably to describe similar approaches and could, thus, be combined with the full proposal, even though ecosocialism and wellbeing economy can also be presented as compatible with a growthist narrative (appendix p 5).

For the surveys used in Study 1 and Study 2 see https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65




Figure 1: Overview of research design and procedure

Studies 1 and 2 followed a similar procedure consisting of three main sections. The order in which participants received sections 1 and 2 was randomised, whereas section 3 was always completed last. In section 1, full degrowth proposal refers to the key ideas, practices, and goals of degrowth (appendix pp 3–4).

In the individual differences—psychological characteristics section (section 2), participants in Study 1 completed a comprehensive set of 64 measures presented in a randomised order. These covered wellbeing (eg, life satisfaction⁴¹), values (eg, universalism⁴²), attitudes (eg, new ecological paradigm—balance⁴³), and various personality traits, from general (eg, Big Five⁴⁴) to more specific (eg, transformative utopian impulse for planetary health⁴⁵). All psychological characteristics were assessed with scales and instruments published in peer-reviewed journals and were selected on the basis of their conceptual relevance to degrowth (an overview and justification of the individual difference predictors is provided in the appendix [pp 26–32]). In Study 2, only the two strongest predictors of support identified in Study 1 were included in the individual differences—psychological characteristics section.

In the individual differences—demographics section in both studies (section 3), we assessed ten demographic and socioeconomic variables potentially linked to degrowth, including gender, age, political orientation (left vs right), income satisfaction, and others (appendix pp 26–32). At the end, all participants were debriefed.

Statistical analysis

For analyses involving statistical significance testing, we applied the Benjamini–Yekutieli false discovery rate correction for multiple testing,⁴⁶ assuming an uncorrected

significance level α of 0.05 and accounting for all p values computed in each study. This correction helps reduce the likelihood of mistakenly identifying false effects as real while still allowing true effects to be detected.⁴⁶ Statistical differences in support for economic approaches in each study were computed on the basis of the 7-point rating scale used to measure support. Paired *t* tests were used in Study 1, given its within-subjects design, and linear regressions were used in Study 2, given its between-subjects design.

To identify the key predictors among the 74 individual differences (appendix pp 26–32) tested as part of objective four in Study 1, we used an analytical approach combining widely used machine learning models (eg, random forest and lasso)^{47,48} with multiple linear regression analyses for each country (full details are provided in the appendix [p 20]). A variable was considered a key predictor only if it ranked among the top 30 in the most predictive machine learning models and was also statistically significant in the regression analyses for both the UK and the USA. In Study 2, the robustness of the key predictors identified in Study 1 was evaluated by conducting linear regression analyses that included these predictors along with ten demographic and socioeconomic variables (included to ensure that they did not confound the relationships between the key predictors and public support). One linear regression model was computed separately for each country (appendix p 56). We also conducted multiple linear regressions to examine whether the

relationships between the key predictors and public support varied by economic approach (appendix p 19).

Statistical analyses were conducted with R statistical software, version 4.2.3.

Role of the funding source

The funder of the study had no role in research design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the article.

Results

Data were collected from study participants between Oct 10, 2023, and Dec 1, 2023. 6228 participants from the UK and USA were initially recruited, of whom 5454 were eligible for analyses (table). The participants were representative of their country's demographics in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity (detailed demographic information is provided in the appendix [pp 33–43]).

Regarding objective one, participants generally supported the full degrowth proposal when presented without a label. A basic breakdown of support, neutrality, and opposition shows that the full degrowth proposal was supported by 736 (81%) of 910 participants in Study 1 and 210 (82%) of 255 participants in Study 2 in the UK and by 683 (73%) of 941 participants in Study 1 and 187 (72%) of 260 participants in Study 2 in the USA (figure 2; appendix pp 72–73). A more nuanced breakdown based on the full rating (7-point) scale used to measure support shows that mean scores ranged from 5.34 (Study 2; corresponding to somewhat support to support) to 5.37 (Study 1; corresponding to somewhat support) in the UK, and from 4.97 (Study 2; corresponding to somewhat support) to 5.07 (Study 1; corresponding to somewhat support) in the USA (figure 3; appendix pp 44–45).

Regarding objective two, breakdown of the support percentages (figure 2) shows that when degrowth was presented as a label alone, it received support from 50 (20%) of 250 participants in Study 2 and 237 (26%) of 910 participants in Study 1 in the UK and 34 (13%) of 270 participants in Study 2 and 266 (28%) of 941 participants in Study 1 in the USA. In contrast, in Study 2, the degrowth label accompanied by the full proposal was supported by 184 (74%) of 248 participants in the UK and 177 (68%) of 260 participants in the USA (appendix pp 72–73). Figure 3 provides an overview of statistical differences in support levels (detailed analyses are in the appendix [pp 46–49]). Support for the degrowth label alone was significantly lower than for the full proposal with or without the label, whereas support for the full degrowth proposal did not differ significantly depending on whether the label was present.

Regarding objective three, support across both studies for alternative sustainability-oriented economic approaches when labelled by name only ranged from 36% (ecosocialism, Study 2) to 81% (wellbeing economy, Study 1) in the UK and from 30% (ecosocialism, Study 2) to 73% (wellbeing economy, Study 1) in the USA (figure 2; appendix pp 72–73). Wellbeing economy had the highest

support, with 132 (51%) of 261 participants in Study 2 and 738 (81%) of 910 participants in Study 1 in the UK and 106 (39%) of 271 participants in Study 2 and 691 (73%) of 941 participants in Study 1 in the USA supporting this economic approach (appendix pp 72–73). All alternative labels received significantly higher support than the degrowth label alone (figure 3). In contrast, the full degrowth proposal (without the label) was generally supported significantly more than the alternative labels, apart from green growth and wellbeing economy, for which the findings were inconsistent across countries and studies.

In study 2, the names of the two economic approaches often associated—albeit to different extents—with degrowth (ie, ecosocialism and wellbeing economy) were combined with the full degrowth proposal. In the UK, 188 (75%) of 250 participants supported the full degrowth proposal plus ecosocialism label, and 209 (84%) of 250 supported the full degrowth proposal plus wellbeing economy label; in the USA, 176 (67%) of 264 participants supported the full degrowth proposal plus ecosocialism label, and 179 (72%) of 249 supported the full degrowth proposal plus wellbeing economy label (figure 2; appendix pp 73). Support in these cases did not significantly differ from support for the full proposal either alone or with the degrowth label, despite the degrowth label receiving significantly less support than ecosocialism and wellbeing economy labels (figure 3).

Regarding objective four, only two variables met the criteria for being key predictors in Study 1 (for all analyses, see appendix 50–55): the transformative utopian impulse⁴⁵ (ie, people's drive to address global challenges with ideas and actions) and new ecological paradigm—balance⁴³ (ie, a belief in ecosystem integrity). Both were associated with higher support levels. Figure 4 presents the ten predictors with the highest partial R^2 values (ie, their unique contribution to explaining support) from the regression models (one for the UK and one for the USA). As seen in figure 4, some psychological (ie, biospherism, pro-trait antiegalitarianism, and malicious envy) and socioeconomic (ie, political orientation) characteristics were statistically significant predictors but only for one country (either the UK or the USA) and, therefore, did not meet the criteria for key predictors. Other variables we tested were not statistically significant predictors in either country, including socioeconomic characteristics such as annual income (after tax), income satisfaction, and whether people feel secure in their surroundings²³ (appendix pp 52–55). The regression models (figure 4) explained 45.31% of the variance in the UK and 51.88% in the USA; comprehensive analysis output is available in the appendix (pp 52–55).

In Study 2, to further probe the robustness of the two key predictors, we examined whether they predicted public support across all participants, regardless of the economic approach participants were assigned to rate (ie, full proposal, labels only, or combinations thereof), and whether the strength of this relationship varied depending on the economic approach. The results confirmed that

	Sample size	Country	Age, years	Gender			
				Male	Female	Non-binary	Undisclosed
All Participants							
Study 1, sample 1	1117	UK	45·9 (15·4)	532 (47·6%)	577 (51·7%)	8 (0·7%)	0
Study 1, sample 2	1107	USA	45·7 (15·8)	537 (48·5%)	553 (50·0%)	17 (1·5%)	0
Study 2, sample 1	2001	UK	45·7 (15·6)	968 (48·4%)	1022 (51·1%)	11 (0·5%)	0
Study 2, sample 2	2003	USA	45·4 (15·8)	979 (48·9%)	995 (49·7%)	27 (1·3%)	2 (0·1%)
Eligible participants*							
Study 1, sample 1	910	UK	46·4 (15·5)	441 (48·5%)	462 (50·8%)	7 (0·8%)	0
Study 1, sample 2	941	USA	45·5 (15·8)	450 (47·8%)	478 (50·8%)	13 (1·4%)	0
Study 2, sample 1	1769	UK	45·7 (15·6)	849 (47·0%)	910 (51·4%)	10 (0·6%)	0
Study 2, sample 2	1834	USA	45·3 (15·9)	883 (48·1%)	922 (50·3%)	27 (1·5%)	2 (0·1%)
Data are n, n (%), or mean (SD). Study 2 followed a between-subjects design; the sample sizes for each economic approach to which participants were randomly allocated, among those eligible for analyses in the UK and US samples were as follows: 255 in the UK and 260 in the USA for the full proposal; 250 in the UK and 270 in the USA for degrowth (label only); 255 in the UK and 260 in the USA for ecosocialism (label only); 261 in the UK and 271 in the USA for wellbeing economy (label only); 248 in the UK and 260 in the USA for the full proposal plus the degrowth label; 250 in the UK and 264 in the USA full proposal plus the ecosocialism label; 250 in the UK and 249 in the USA for the full proposal plus the wellbeing economy label. *Participants who passed the required attention and quality checks (detailed in the appendix [p 11]) were eligible for the analyses.							
Table: Sample size and background information for all participants who completed a study and for participants who were eligible for analyses							

the transformative utopian impulse and new ecological paradigm—balance were the strongest predictors in both the UK and USA across all economic approaches (appendix p 56). This time, political orientation was also a significant predictor in both countries (unlike in Study 1, in which it was significant only for the UK), with support decreasing slightly across the left–right continuum. Relationships between these predictors and support were typically significant for participants who received the full degrowth proposal (with or without any labels), whereas those who received labels only showed weaker and less consistent effects (appendix pp 57–62). From the other variables tested, participants' educational attainment was a significant predictor only for the UK (appendix p 56); therefore, we did not investigate whether its relationship with support systematically varied depending on different economic approaches. Socioeconomic characteristics such as annual income (after tax), income satisfaction, and whether people feel secure in their surroundings²³ were again not statistically significant predictors in either country (appendix p 56). Additional findings showed that participants generally had little knowledge of degrowth and related approaches (appendix pp 64–71).

Discussion

Critics often argue that degrowth lacks public support and is unlikely to gain traction in civil society,^{14,38} but these claims are not supported by empirical evidence. Our findings show that the full degrowth proposal enjoys strong popular support, regardless of the associated label. Resistance to degrowth arises primarily when people encounter the label alone, without a description of what this economic approach entails. Additional analyses suggested that this resistance might be due to low public knowledge and awareness of degrowth combined with a dislike of the term. Therefore, when exposed only to the label, people might base their judgment on surface-level impressions

(eg, shrinking their income)²⁰ rather than on the ideas underlying the label.

These findings underscore a simple but powerful insight: public resistance to degrowth is not rooted in the substance of this concept but in the lack of opportunities to communicate it as a coherent, purposeful whole. For policy makers and advocates, the findings highlight the importance of moving beyond labels or isolated practices and, instead, presenting degrowth as a unified vision for societal transformation. One way to increase public support for degrowth could, therefore, be to raise public awareness of its key ideas and principles, presented together as an integrated and meaningful whole (appendix pp 3–4).

Importantly, socioeconomic indicators such as annual income (after tax), income satisfaction, and whether people feel secure in their surroundings²³ did not significantly predict support for the full proposal. This finding suggests that wealthier individuals might not oppose degrowth, despite its emphasis on reducing unnecessary production and consumption. Although politically right-leaning individuals were somewhat less supportive of degrowth, this finding was inconsistent, occurring in both the UK and USA only in Study 2. The strongest predictors of public support were the transformative utopian impulse⁴⁵ and belief in ecosystem integrity.⁴³

These findings suggest that degrowth support could be leveraged by nurturing people's tendencies to address societal challenges and appreciate the delicate balance of nature. The findings also have other practical implications. For example, personalised communication—ie, tailoring messages to people's personality and other psychological characteristics—is more effective than one-size-fits-all communication and is increasingly used in policy.^{49–54} Our findings could, therefore, help policy makers and campaigners to design more effective communication strategies to promote degrowth by drawing on the key individual differences identified in this study. The study findings




Figure 2: Percentage breakdown of support for degrowth and other synonymous or related economic approaches in UK and US participants representative of the respective populations by age, gender, and ethnicity (Studies 1 and 2)

Study 1 used a within-subjects design; all participants rated all approaches. Study 2 used a between-subjects design; participants were randomly allocated to one approach. Full proposal refers to the full degrowth proposal without any name label (appendix pp 3-4). Other economic approaches were either labelled by name alone (without descriptions) or combined with the full proposal. To create the percentage breakdown, support for each approach was first measured on a 7-point scale (1=strongly oppose; 2=oppose; 3=somewhat oppose; 4=neither support nor oppose; 5=somewhat support; 6=support; and 7=strongly support); responses from 1 to 3 were designated as oppose, a response of 4 was designated as neutral, and responses from 5 to 7 were designated as support.




Figure 3: Average support for degrowth and other synonymous or related economic approaches, with statistical comparisons, in UK and US participants representative of the respective populations by age, gender, and ethnicity (Studies 1 and 2)

Full proposal refers to the full degrowth proposal without any name label (appendix pp 3–4). Other economic approaches are labelled by name alone (without descriptions) or combined with the full proposal. Support was measured on a 7-point scale (1=strongly oppose; 2=oppose; 3=somewhat oppose; 4=neither support nor oppose; 5=somewhat support; 6=support; and 7=strongly support). Lines and whiskers indicate 95% CIs; the key classifies mean support for each approach on the basis of the 95% CIs (exact values provided in the appendix [pp 44–45]). Similar means might be classified differently across studies and samples due to variations in these

intervals, affecting colour coding. Some approaches do not fall within a single category and span two classifications. p values are in the appendix (pp 46–49); based on the Benjamini–Yekutieli false discovery rate correction for multiple testing, p values of 0.00159977 or lower in Study 1 and 0.00350789 or lower in Study 2 were deemed significant. Additional comparisons are provided in the appendix (pp 46–49). *Approaches with support differing significantly from support for the degrowth label only. †Approaches with support differing significantly from support for the full proposal plus degrowth label.




Figure 4: Unique contribution of individual difference predictors to public support for the full degrowth proposal (without any name label) in Study 1
Contributions are based on partial R^2 values, representing the unique percentage of variance in public support explained by each predictor. Values were derived from two linear regression models, one for the UK and one for the USA (appendix pp 52–55). Each model included all 74 assessed individual difference variables (appendix pp 26–32); only the ten strongest contributors are shown (with statistical significance indicated). Based on the Benjamini–Yekutieli false discovery rate correction for multiple testing, p values of 0.00159977 or less were deemed significant. Support was measured on a 7-point scale (1=strongly oppose; 2=oppose; 3=somewhat oppose; 4=neither support nor oppose; 5=somewhat support; 6=support; and 7=strongly support). A positive effect indicates that higher scores on a predictor are associated with greater public support; a negative effect indicates that higher scores on a predictor are associated with lower public support. For non-significant predictors, both the direction of the effect and the partial R^2 values should be interpreted with caution as non-significance indicates insufficient evidence that the effect differs reliably from zero. *Higher scores indicate more right-leaning political orientation. †Female coded as 1 and male coded as 0.

could also inform computer-based simulations⁵⁵ that could be used to develop and refine degrowth communication strategies and policy packages before real-world testing and implementation. These simulations draw on real human characteristics such as those from our research and are

increasingly used in policy research to explore how individuals with specific profiles might respond to policy-relevant survey questions.⁵⁶

This study has several limitations that, nonetheless, point to promising directions for future work (discussed further

in the appendix [pp 24–25]). We focused on the UK and USA because our comprehensive procedures made it unfeasible to include more countries within a single study. Future research should extend this work to other high-income nations where degrowth is similarly crucial for achieving global sustainability. Moreover, although our study centred on public support for the full degrowth proposal, future studies should examine the constituent ideas and policies of degrowth in more depth to understand how they are most effectively presented as a whole. For example, it could be investigated whether particular policies receive broader support than others, whether presenting them in combination produces additive effects on overall support for degrowth, and how support varies by individual and social characteristics. Importantly, although our main findings regarding the four objectives are likely to be generalisable to the broader UK and US populations, the specific numerical estimates should be interpreted with appropriate caution, given potential unmeasured differences between our samples and the general population.

Overall, our research offers some reason for cautious optimism regarding the political prospects of degrowth because it shows that individuals in two growth-oriented and affluent countries, regardless of income level, support key ideas associated with degrowth and its implementation in society, as outlined in the full proposal. Nevertheless, this finding does not mean that the political uptake of degrowth would necessarily occur without opposition. If and when introduced, degrowth could face strong resistance from vested interests and partisan media, particularly in the UK and USA, where various outlets and industries are likely to attack such proposals as they enter public discourse.⁵⁷ The adoption of degrowth will likely depend on efforts at multiple levels, from effective communication and political organising to the coordination of initiatives that bridge local actions with national and global economic reforms.

Contributors

DK was responsible for conceptualisation (lead), data curation (lead), formal analysis (lead), funding acquisition (lead), investigation (lead), methodology (lead), project administration (lead), validation (lead), visualisation (lead), writing of the original draft (lead), and writing review and editing (lead).

FB was responsible for conceptualisation (supporting), data curation (supporting), funding acquisition (supporting), investigation (supporting), methodology (supporting), validation (supporting), writing of the original draft (supporting) and writing review and editing (supporting).

JEH was responsible for conceptualisation (supporting), investigation (supporting), methodology (supporting), validation (supporting), writing of the original draft (supporting) and writing review and editing (supporting). GK was responsible for conceptualisation (supporting), investigation (supporting), methodology (supporting), validation (supporting), writing of the original draft (supporting) and writing review and editing (supporting). All authors had direct and full access to all the data in the studies, and DK and FB verified the underlying data. All authors accept responsibility for publication.

Declaration of interests

We declare no competing interests.

Data sharing

Individual de-identified participant data (including a data dictionary defining each field in the set), analysis codes, and all surveys and study materials supporting the findings from Studies 1 and 2 are publicly available via the Open Science Framework to everyone, without restrictions (https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65).

Acknowledgments

This study was supported by the London School of Economics and Political Science Research and Impact Support Fund awarded to DK and FB. GK and JEH acknowledge support by the European Research Council funding for the REAL project (grant number 101071647). Generative AI tools (ChatGPT, versions 4o and o1, and DeepL) were used to improve the readability and language of the manuscript but were not used to replace researcher tasks such as producing scientific insights, analysing and interpreting data, or drawing scientific conclusions.

References

- Hickel J, Kallis G, Jackson T, et al. Degrowth can work—here's how science can help. *Nature* 2022; **612**: 400–03.
- Fanning AL, O'Neill DW, Hickel J, Roux N. The social shortfall and ecological overshoot of nations. *Nat Sustain* 2021; **5**: 26–36.
- Hickel J, O'Neill DW, Fanning AL, Zoomkawala H. National responsibility for ecological breakdown: a fair-shares assessment of resource use, 1970–2017. *Lancet Planet Health* 2022; **6**: e342–49.
- Hickel J. Quantifying national responsibility for climate breakdown: an equality-based attribution approach for carbon dioxide emissions in excess of the planetary boundary. *Lancet Planet Health* 2020; **4**: e399–404.
- Vogel J, Hickel J. Is green growth happening? An empirical analysis of achieved versus Paris-compliant CO₂-GDP decoupling in high-income countries. *Lancet Planet Health* 2023; **7**: e759–69.
- Hickel J, Kallis G. Is green growth possible? *New Polit Econ* 2020; **25**: 469–86.
- Haberl H, Wiedenhofer D, Virág D, et al. A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part II: synthesizing the insights. *Environ Res Lett* 2020; **15**: 065003.
- Kallis G, Kostakis V, Lange S, Muraca B, Paulson S, Schmelzer M. Research on degrowth. *Annu Rev Environ Resour* 2018; **43**: 291–316.
- Kallis G, Hickel J, O'Neill DW, et al. Post-growth: the science of wellbeing within planetary boundaries. *Lancet Planet Health* 2025; **9**: e62–78.
- Kallis G, Mastini R, Zografos C. Perceptions of degrowth in the European Parliament. *Nat Sustain* 2024; **7**: 64–72.
- Fitzpatrick N, Parrique T, Cosme I. Exploring degrowth policy proposals: a systematic mapping with thematic synthesis. *J Clean Prod* 2022; **365**: 132764.
- Krpan D, Basso F, O'Dell D, Hickel JE, Kallis G. A call for psychological and behavioural science on degrowth. *Nat Hum Behav* 2025; **9**: 1513–18.
- van den Bergh JCJM. A third option for climate policy within potential limits to growth. *Nat Clim Chang* 2017; **7**: 107–12.
- Drews S, Antal M. Degrowth: A “missile word” that backfires? *Ecol Econ* 2016; **126**: 182–87.
- Drews S, Savin I, van den Bergh JCJM. Opinion clusters in academic and public debates on growth-vs-environment. *Ecol Econ* 2019; **157**: 141–55.
- Paulson L, Büchs M. Public acceptance of post-growth: factors and implications for post-growth strategy. *Futures* 2022; **143**: 103020.
- King LC, Savin I, Drews S. Shades of green growth scepticism among climate policy researchers. *Nat Sustain* 2023; **6**: 1316–20.
- Savin I, van den Bergh J. Reviewing studies of degrowth: are claims matched by data, methods and policy analysis? *Ecol Econ* 2024; **226**: 108324.
- Krpan D, Basso F. Keep degrowth or go rebirth? Regulatory focus theory and the support for a sustainable downscaling of production and consumption. *J Environ Psychol* 2021; **74**: 101586.
- Drews S, Reese G. “Degrowth” vs. other types of growth: labeling affects emotions but not attitudes. *Environ Commun* 2018; **12**: 763–72.

- 21 Tomaselli MF, Kozak R, Gifford R, Sheppard SRJ. Degrowth or not degrowth: the importance of message frames for characterizing the new economy. *Ecol Econ* 2021; **183**: 106952.
- 22 Lou X, Lin Y, Li LMW. Predicting priority of environmental protection over economic growth using macroeconomic and individual-level predictors: evidence from machine learning. *J Environ Psychol* 2022; **82**: 101843.
- 23 Haerpfer C, Inglehart R, Moreno A, et al. World values survey: round seven—country-pooled datafile version 6.0. JD Systems Institute and World Values Survey Association Secretariat, 2022.
- 24 Hickel J. Less is More. Penguin, 2021.
- 25 Hickel J, Dorninger C, Wieland H, Suwandi I. Imperialist appropriation in the world economy: drain from the global South through unequal exchange, 1990–2015. *Glob Environ Change* 2022; **73**: 102467.
- 26 D'Alessandro S, Cieplinski A, Distefano T, Dittmer K. Feasible alternatives to green growth. *Nat Sustain* 2020; **3**: 329–35.
- 27 Hickel J. What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification. *Globalizations* 2021; **18**: 1105–11.
- 28 Fiorino DJ. A good life on a finite earth: the political economy of green growth. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- 29 Terzi A. Growth for good: reshaping capitalism to save humanity from climate catastrophe. Harvard University Press, 2022.
- 30 Douglas BD, Ewell PJ, Brauer M. Data quality in online human-subjects research: Comparisons between MTurk, Prolific, CloudResearch, Qualtrics, and SONA. *PLoS One* 2023; **18**: e0279720.
- 31 Peer E, Rothschild D, Gordon A, Evernden Z, Damer E. Data quality of platforms and panels for online behavioral research. *Behav Res Methods* 2022; **54**: 1643–62.
- 32 Schafer JL, Graham JW. Missing data: our view of the state of the art. *Psychol Methods* 2002; **7**: 147–77.
- 33 Raghunathan TE. What do we do with missing data? Some options for analysis of incomplete data. *Annu Rev Public Health* 2004; **25**: 99–117.
- 34 McNeish D. Exploratory factor analysis with small samples and missing data. *J Pers Assess* 2017; **99**: 637–52.
- 35 Enders CK. Applied missing data analysis. Guilford Publications, 2022.
- 36 Graham JW. Missing data analysis: making it work in the real world. *Annu Rev Psychol* 2009; **60**: 549–76.
- 37 Engler J-O, Kretschmer M-F, Rathgens J, Ament JA, Huth T, von Wehrden H. 15 years of degrowth research: a systematic review. *Ecol Econ* 2024; **218**: 108101.
- 38 Fioramonti L, Coscieme L, Costanza R, et al. Wellbeing economy: an effective paradigm to mainstream post-growth policies? *Ecol Econ* 2022; **192**: 107261.
- 39 Buch-Hansen H. Why degrowth should be disentangled from the wellbeing economy. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **230**: 108532.
- 40 Hayden A. Buzzword or breakthrough beyond growth? The mainstreaming of the wellbeing economy. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **227**: 108375.
- 41 Cheung F, Lucas RE. Assessing the validity of single-item life satisfaction measures: results from three large samples. *Qual Life Res* 2014; **23**: 2809–18.
- 42 Schwartz SH, Cieciuch J, Vecchione M, et al. Refining the theory of basic individual values. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2012; **103**: 663–88.
- 43 Cordano M, Welcomer SA, Scherer RF. An analysis of the predictive validity of the new ecological paradigm scale. *J Environ Educ* 2003; **34**: 22–28.
- 44 Lang FR, John D, Lüdtke O, Schupp J, Wagner GG. Short assessment of the Big Five: robust across survey methods except telephone interviewing. *Behav Res Methods* 2011; **43**: 548–67.
- 45 Basso F, Krpan D. Measuring the transformative utopian impulse for planetary health in the age of the Anthropocene: a multi-study scale development and validation. *Lancet Planet Health* 2022; **6**: e230–42.
- 46 Benjamini Y, Yekutieli D. The control of the false discovery rate in multiple testing under dependency. *Ann Stat* 2001; **29**: 1165–88.
- 47 Kuhn M. Building predictive models in R using the caret package. *J Stat Softw* 2008; **28**: 1–26.
- 48 Kuhn M. caret: Classification and regression training. 2023. <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/caret/caret.pdf> (accessed Oct 18, 2023).
- 49 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Public communication scan of the United Kingdom: using public communication to strengthen democracy and public trust. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2023.
- 50 Zarouali B, Dobber T, De Pauw G, de Vreese C. Using a personality-profiling algorithm to investigate political microtargeting: assessing the persuasion effects of personality-tailored ads on social media. *Commun Res* 2022; **49**: 1066–91.
- 51 Feinberg M, Willer R. The moral roots of environmental attitudes. *Psychol Sci* 2013; **24**: 56–62.
- 52 Matz SC, Teeny JD, Vaid SS, Peters H, Harari GM, Cerf M. The potential of generative AI for personalized persuasion at scale. *Sci Rep* 2024; **14**: 4692.
- 53 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD report on public communication: the global context and the way forward. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2021.
- 54 Matz SC, Beck ED, Atherton OE, et al. Personality science in the digital age: the promises and challenges of psychological targeting for personalized behavior-change interventions at scale. *Perspect Psychol Sci* 2024; **19**: 1031–56.
- 55 Argyle LP, Busby EC, Fulda N, Gubler JR, Rytting C, Wingate D. Out of one, many: using language models to simulate human samples. *Polit Anal* 2023; **31**: 337–51.
- 56 Shrestha P, Krpan D, Koaik F, Schnider R, Sayess D, Binbaz MS. Beyond WEIRD: can synthetic survey participants substitute for humans in global policy research? *Behav Sci Policy* 2024; **10**: 26–45.
- 57 Gustafson A, Rosenthal SA, Ballew MT, et al. The development of partisan polarization over the Green New Deal. *Nat Clim Chang* 2019; **9**: 940–44.

THE LANCET Planetary Health

Supplementary appendix

This appendix formed part of the original submission and has been peer reviewed.
We post it as supplied by the authors.

Supplement to: Krpan D, Basso F, Hickel JE, et al. Assessing public support for degrowth: survey-based experimental and predictive studies. *Lancet Planet Health* 2025. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101326>

Supplementary Material for “Assessing public support for degrowth: Survey-based experimental and predictive studies”

Dario Krpan, PhD^{1,2}, Frédéric Basso, PhD¹, Prof Jason E. Hickel, PhD^{3,4,5}, and Prof Giorgos Kallis, PhD^{3,4}

¹ Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

² Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity (CUSP), University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

³ Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

⁴ Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA), Barcelona, Spain

⁵ International Inequalities Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Contents

Supplementary Methods and Insights	3
Full degrowth proposal and its rationale	3
Rationale for the selection of economic approaches used in the present research	5
Results from search for peer-reviewed publications in the Scopus database	6
Details and appraisal of the sampling methodology	7
Reading time for the full degrowth proposal (Studies 1 and 2)	10
Attention and quality check items that participants had to pass to be eligible for analyses	11
Percentage of missing data per different statistical analyses	12
Determining sample size	15
Detailed description of design, procedure, and analytic approach for each study	17
Procedure for selecting the most predictive individual differences in Study 1	20
Relationships between individual difference predictors and public support across different economic approaches assessed in Study 2	21
Additional insights: Knowledge and awareness of degrowth	22
Additional insights: Label preferences	23
Extended discussion of limitations and future directions	24
Supplementary Tables	26
Supplementary Table 1: Individual Difference Predictors and their Justification	26
Supplementary Table 2: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Age)	33
Supplementary Table 3: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Annual Income After Taxes)	34
Supplementary Table 4: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Household Financial Situation Satisfaction)	35
Supplementary Table 5: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Employment Status)	36
Supplementary Table 6: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Ethnicity)	37
Supplementary Table 7: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Gender Identity)	38

Supplementary Table 8: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Educational Attainment)	39
Supplementary Table 9: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Security)	40
Supplementary Table 10: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Political Orientation)	41
Supplementary Table 11: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Number of Children)	42
Supplementary Table 12: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Household Size)	43
Supplementary Table 13: Support for Economic Approaches (Means and Classifications; Studies 1 and 2)	44
Supplementary Table 14: Comparisons of Support for Economic Approaches (Study 1)	46
Supplementary Table 15: Comparisons of Support for Economic Approaches (Study 2)	48
Supplementary Table 16: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support Across Machine Learning (ML) Models (Study 1)	50
Supplementary Table 17: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support (Linear Regression Model: Study 1 UK)	52
Supplementary Table 18: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support (Linear Regression Model: Study 1 US)	54
Supplementary Table 19: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support (Linear Regression Models: Study 2)	56
Supplementary Table 20: Interactions Between Predictors and Economic Approaches (Study 2 UK)	57
Supplementary Table 21: Interactions Between Predictors and Economic Approaches (Study 2 US)	59
Supplementary Table 22: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support across Economic Approaches (Study 2)	61
Supplementary Table 23: Economic Approaches that Participants Associated the Most with the Full Degrowth Proposal (Study 1)	63
Supplementary Table 24: Knowledge, Awareness, and Label Preference for Economic Approaches (Means and Classifications; Study 2)	64
Supplementary Table 25: Comparisons of Knowledge, Awareness, and Label Preference for Economic Approaches (Study 2 UK)	66
Supplementary Table 26: Comparisons of Knowledge, Awareness, and Label Preference for Economic Approaches (Study 2 US)	69
Supplementary Table 27: Absolute Numbers for Percentages in Figure 2 in the Article (Study 1)	72
Supplementary Table 28: Absolute Numbers for Percentages in Figure 2 in the Article (Study 2)	73
Supplementary Table 29: Research Objectives, Associated Gaps in the Literature, and Summary of Findings	74
Supplementary References	76

Supplementary Methods and Insights

Full degrowth proposal and its rationale

The full degrowth proposal we developed describes the key ideas, practices, and goals that define this economic approach, aligning with how it is articulated in the literature.^{1–8} It summarizes central aspects of degrowth as presented across various sources. Our aim is to accurately represent how degrowth scholars conceptualize this approach—emphasizing its core principles and intended benefits—to assess whether the general public views this vision positively or negatively. In our description, we use a critical and empathic tone that is often adopted in literature on degrowth, including expressions such as unfair, unnecessary, fairer economy, ending this process of plunder, and so on.^{1,4} By doing so, we aim to stay true to how degrowth is typically presented—which, if anything, is critical of the current system and likely to create resistance^{9–11}—to understand people’s support for this authentic presentation of degrowth. Rather than presenting people with arguments for and against degrowth, our objective is to assess people’s reactions to the proposal as it is presented by degrowth advocates, not to debates about degrowth.

Below, we present the full degrowth proposal (non-indented paragraphs) and support its key points with relevant argumentation and sources (indented paragraphs marked with an arrow). Please note that participants in our research saw only the full proposal without the supporting statements.

Full degrowth proposal

High-income countries dramatically overuse energy and materials, which is driving climate change and ecological breakdown. Nonetheless, they still fail to meet many people’s basic needs (e.g., for housing, healthcare, nutrition). To solve this double problem, it is necessary to transform the economy.

→ Degrowth proposals focus specifically on high-income countries, which have high levels of energy and material use per capita (with high energy use driving high emissions, and making it more difficult to achieve sufficiently rapid decarbonization; and with material use well in excess of sustainable levels).^{12–15} Despite excess levels of global aggregate energy use and production, billions of people are denied access to the basic goods and services required for decent living standards.¹⁶ According to degrowth scholarship, decent living standards can be achieved for all, with sustainable levels of energy and material use, but this requires transforming the economy to focus production on what is most necessary for human well-being rather than what is most profitable to capital.^{17–19}

On the one hand, high-income countries must scale down non-essential forms of production and consumption to achieve faster decarbonization and reverse various forms of ecological damage (e.g., biodiversity loss). This includes reducing things like SUVs, private jets, mansions, luxury goods, industrial meat, advertising, and fast fashion; cutting the purchasing power of the very rich; shifting from private cars to public transit; ending the practice of planned obsolescence by designing products that last longer; and extending product lifespans through repair and reuse.

→ Degrowth scholarship argues that efficiency improvements cannot alone achieve sufficient reductions of energy use to enable decarbonization fast enough to achieve the Paris Agreement objectives.^{2,20–22} Unnecessary forms of production should be scaled down in order to reduce energy use directly.^{1,23}

On the other hand, social progress and human well-being must be improved by ensuring universal access to high-quality public services (e.g., healthcare, education, public transit, childcare), affordable housing, and living wages. A public job guarantee, where the government guarantees employment to those willing and able to work, would end unemployment and empower people to contribute to the most important projects of our generation: building renewable energy capacity, improving public transit, insulating homes, and regenerating ecosystems. It would put an end to economic insecurity and make it possible to achieve necessary social and ecological objectives.

→ Improvements in human welfare and subjective well-being are possible with lower levels of energy use.^{1,17,18,24} The social policies listed above are central to degrowth scenarios in the published literature.^{1,5,6,25}

This could stop climate change (i.e., limit global warming to 1.5 °C and thus achieve the goal of the Paris agreement), enable biodiversity to bounce back, and improve human well-being at the same time.

→ Degrowth scenarios can achieve decarbonization in line with the Paris Agreement targets without relying on speculative technological change.^{2,18,22} Biodiversity loss is closely linked to aggregate material use.²⁶ Reductions of material use can be achieved to sustainable levels while still ensuring decent living standards for all.^{17,27}

This economic system aims to reach economic democracy. In the current system, decisions on what is produced, how labour and resources are used during the process, and how the outputs are then distributed are made primarily by the few who hold the most investable wealth. For them, the objective of production is to maximize and accumulate profit. By contrast, the economic system described in this text would involve democratizing decisions about production (at the level of finance, the state, and the firm), which is likely to result in people prioritizing well-being and ecology. For most people, the key instantiation of economic democracy would be democracy in the workplace.

→ When people have democratic control over production they tend to prioritize sustainable production and fair allocation.^{28,29}

Crucially, this economic system would have an impact beyond the high-income countries where it would be implemented. Currently, the overuse of resources in these countries is sustained through the unfair appropriation of resources from the Global South. As a consequence, the countries in the Global South are more susceptible to various detrimental environmental and social consequences (e.g., biodiversity loss, poverty) and are drained of resources that are necessary for human development. The economic system we are describing is about ending this process of plunder. It calls for a fairer international economy so that all people on the planet can achieve decent living standards within planetary boundaries.

→ Growth and high material consumption in high-income nations is maintained through net-appropriation of resources from the global South, which drains the latter of productive capacity.^{30–32}

Finally, this economic system is not anti-technology; rather, it embraces innovation, efficiency improvements, and technological change (crucially, to the extent that these are feasible, safe, and just for people). However, it emphasizes that technology alone is not going to solve our ecological problems if non-essential forms of production and consumption are not scaled down. Therefore, this new economic system is a vision of efficiency (i.e., wasting less materials and energy in the process of production through technological innovation) plus sufficiency (i.e., reducing non-essential forms of production and sharing resources more equitably).

→ The published degrowth scenarios all assume strong technological innovation and efficiency improvements, and add sufficiency-oriented policy on top.^{18,33–35}

Rationale for the selection of economic approaches used in the present research

For this research we assessed eight labels: Ecomodernism, Green Capitalism, Green Growth, Green Market Economy, Post-Growth, Wellbeing Economy, Ecosocialism, Degrowth. All of these concepts promise to achieve a sustainable economy, but with different assumptions and parameters.

The first group of four terms (Ecomodernism, Green Capitalism, Green Growth, Green Market Economy) are similar to one another.^{36–39} They are common terms that are used widely in the media and by policymakers, and represent what might be considered the standard discourse on sustainability. They claim that the existing structure of the capitalist economy can remain in place, with the continued orientation toward profit maximization and perpetual growth, such that GDP per capita can continue to increase indefinitely while at the same time decarbonization can be achieved at a sufficiently rapid rate to meet the Paris Agreement targets and material use can either be reduced or decoupled from ecological impact, by relying on efficiency improvements and technological change. The literature on post-growth and degrowth has challenged these claims.^{2,3,5,20–22,25}

The second group of four terms (Post-Growth, Wellbeing Economy, Ecosocialism, Degrowth) represent an alternative position,^{5,36,40–42} even though, as we shall see below, Wellbeing Economy is not consistently interpreted that way, leading to some controversy. Generally, they claim that achieving sustainability requires transforming the structure of the economy by shifting away from profit maximization as the main objective and instead prioritising human well-being, social progress, and other democratically ratified goals. They all emphasize the need for greater equality and fairer distribution of resources, together with strong social policy to ensure all people have access to necessary goods and services.

Within this common perspective there are several important differences. Proponents of Post-Growth and Degrowth, as well as many advocates of Wellbeing Economy, insist that growth imperatives and growth dependencies must be overcome. However, Post-Growth and Wellbeing Economy may be agnostic about growth;^{41,43–45} in other words, while they aim to overcome growth dependence and ensure the economy can be stable without growth, and while they may also seek to reduce aggregate throughput to meet ecological objectives, they are indifferent to whether GDP increases or decreases. Moreover, some interpretations of Wellbeing Economy can be ambiguous and compatible with pro-growth, as evidenced in the literature (e.g., refs.^{46–49}) and exemplified by the Wellbeing Economy Forum.⁵⁰ Therefore Degrowth represents a stronger position than Post-Growth and Wellbeing Economy: it explicitly holds that (a) certain forms of production must actively be scaled down, and (b) sufficiently rapid reductions in throughput in high-income nations are likely to result in a temporary decline in GDP, requiring preparations to ensure the economy can remain stable under such conditions. Degrowth is a universally anti-capitalist position, but while some proponents prefer a socialist orientation, others prefer a more anarchist orientation.^{39,51–54}

Finally, ecosocialism is a school of thought that emphasizes sustainability can only be achieved by overcoming capitalism and democratizing the means of production.⁵⁵ This transformation would enable people to organize production around social and ecological goals. However, the school is split on the question of growth. Some ecosocialists subscribe to post-growth and degrowth positions, while others believe that under socialism growth can be “greened” by unleashing the power of innovation that is presently fettered by capitalism. Degrowth scholarship has challenged this view.^{53,56} The term ecosocialism is particularly interesting to us in this study because it represents an alternative framing that has been proposed as an alternative framing to degrowth while still retaining its strong content.

We selected these terms to represent the range of competing concepts that are commonly discussed in academic and public debates.

Results from search for peer-reviewed publications in the Scopus database

A search for peer-reviewed publications (‘articles’ in ‘journal’) using the Scopus database on 8 July 2025 with the keywords “degrowth OR ‘de-growth’ OR postgrowth OR ‘post-growth’ AND (study OR studies OR psychology OR experiment* OR survey)” in the ‘article title, abstract, keywords’ returned 1,821 documents. After screening the publications for eligibility based on the focus of our research—lay evaluations of policy goals, proposals, messages, or labels interpreted or presented as degrowth- or post-growth-oriented—we identified 21 research articles.

Several studies zoomed in on specific populations or sectors—such as tourism,⁵⁷ fashion,⁵⁸ students,⁵⁹ or high-income earners,⁶⁰ or rural populations.⁶¹ Another cluster delved into particular policy concepts (e.g., well-being),⁶² specific degrowth policies,⁶³ or evaluated how degrowth/post-growth measures compare with more conventional growth-focused policies.^{60,64,65} A third set approached the growth-versus-environment debate,^{66–68} probing whether the public sides with “growth at all costs,” “green growth,” “agrowth,” or “degrowth.”^{69–73} Some of these articles offered a more detailed look at degrowth or post-growth messages themselves,^{10,74,75} and few considered individual differences like age, gender, or values.^{11,60,61,63,65,74}

Details and appraisal of the sampling methodology

All participants in our research were recruited via Prolific (an ethically robust and widely used online participant pool^{76,77}) to be representative in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity. The sampling methodology that Prolific uses for this purpose is described in their documentation [here](#) and [here](#). In a nutshell, Prolific's nationally representative sampling feature uses stratified quota sampling (i.e., dividing the target population into demographic subgroups and filling each subgroup with a set number of participants) to approximate the demographic structure of national populations (UK and US) based on three core variables: age (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55+), gender (male vs. female), and ethnicity (White, Mixed, Asian, Black and Other). These strata are defined using the most recent UK Office for National Statistics and US Census Bureau data. The platform constructs a grid of demographic subgroups (e.g., 25-34-year-old Asian women) and allocates participants proportionally to match census-based distributions. Eligibility is restricted to residents of the target country who match the relevant criteria.

In addition to using Prolific's representative sampling feature, we implemented several measures to enhance data quality and minimize the possibility that our survey might disproportionately attract participants with specific viewpoints. First, participants on Prolific are reimbursed for their participation at an hourly rate of at least £6 (see [here](#)), which helps reduce the chance of attracting only those who are interested in volunteering or are motivated primarily by answering questions on topics that may be aligned with their views or opinions.⁷⁸⁻⁸⁰ In our case, participants were paid at an hourly rate of £8, which helps ensure broad participation across the Prolific pool. The demographic data we collected shows that our payment schedule did not disproportionately attract participants with particular income levels or financial satisfaction. For example, satisfaction with household financial situation was evenly distributed (see Supplementary Table 4), and participants' post-tax personal annual income levels broadly aligned with national census benchmarks, with most clustered in lower-to-middle income brackets and substantially fewer in higher-income categories (see Supplementary Table 3; please note that income data for both the US and UK are presented in \$ for comparability). Governmental data on personal income for the US is available [here](#) and [here](#), and for the UK [here](#).

Importantly, to further reduce the chance of attracting participants with particular viewpoints, our research was advertised on Prolific using a neutral description. The titles of all studies were "A study about personality and attitudes," and the descriptions (included both in the recruitment text and consent form) stated that participants would answer questions about their personality traits and attitudes regarding a political system that would be described in detail within the survey. No mention was made of specific political approaches or economic ideologies, thereby reducing the likelihood of attracting participants based on alignment with the topic.

Finally, the way participation on Prolific is set up also helps reduce the risk that participants respond in a particular way due to perceived pressure by the researcher or concerns about losing compensation. Specifically, all participants are anonymous to researchers, and Prolific requires that participants be reimbursed as long as they submit the survey, regardless of how they respond or how many questions they choose to answer.

Various publications show that Prolific is a high-quality participant recruitment pool, meaning that it yields data characterized by attentiveness, comprehension of instructions, honesty in responses, and reliability across various psychological measures^{76,77}. More specifically, participants recruited through Prolific consistently demonstrate strong attentiveness, reliability, and compliance with study instructions.^{76,81} They are likely to provide meaningful, thoughtful answers, follow directions accurately, and retain information across survey items.⁷⁶ Studies have also found that they respond at a pace consistent with careful reading, exhibit low levels of dishonest behaviour (defined as deliberately providing false information), and perform well on attention checks.^{76,77}

The main limitation of Prolific is that it relies on non-probability sampling rather than probability-based methods.⁸² This means that even in a sample like ours, which is representative in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity, individuals within the same demographic category (e.g., adults aged 85+, males, or people of mixed ethnic background) do not have a known or equal probability of selection. While internet penetration is nearly universal in the UK (97.8 %) and the US (93.1 %),⁸³ and Prolific samples are in practice highly diverse⁸⁴⁻⁸⁶ (see [here](#) for a detailed breakdown of Prolific participants by nationality, age, ethnicity, and many other characteristics), such samples may still diverge from the broader population on characteristics not captured by the quotas used to balance the sample.

Nevertheless, despite the limitations of non-probability samples, there are several reasons why it is unlikely that the main conclusions from our findings would fail to apply to the broader populations of interest.

First, according to one of the most recent large-scale reviews of non-probability samples,⁸² such samples have performed comparably to probability samples in experimental research (i.e., identifying whether an intervention or treatment causes a change in outcomes). They have also often produced broadly similar patterns in multivariate analyses (i.e., examining how multiple variables relate to one another or jointly predict an outcome), meaning that the direction of relationships tends to align even if effect sizes differ.⁸² In line with this, our research Objectives 2-3 are tested using experimental methods (e.g., assigning participants to different economic approaches to compare their support), and Objective 4 is tested using multivariate analyses that follow a highly rigorous procedure, including fitting multiple models to determine predictors of degrowth support that are consistent across them (Supplementary Material, p.20). Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the main patterns observed in our findings for these objectives are broadly reflective of those that would emerge in the general population, even if effect sizes might differ. Specifically, for Objectives 2 and 3, we find that support for degrowth is significantly higher when presented as its full proposal (regardless of the presence or absence of different labels), compared to when it is presented as a label alone. For Objective 4, we find that transformative utopian impulse⁸⁷ and new ecological paradigm-balance⁸⁸ are the two key predictors of public support among the variables tested.

Moreover, when it comes to Objective 1, the similarity in support for the full proposal between our sample and the UK and US populations would depend on the extent to which different sociodemographic variables that drive support are misaligned between our sample and the general populations.⁸² In our regression analyses, where these variables were tested alongside a comprehensive set of other individual differences (Supplementary Tables 17-18), they accounted for only small proportions of unique variance in public support for the full proposal in both the UK (with political orientation explaining the most at 1.68%) and the US (with Education and Employed explaining the most, each at 0.35%). Therefore, given that the full proposal received quite a convincing majority support in our research (UK: 74-84%; US: 67-73%), even large discrepancies in sociodemographic variables between our samples and the broader populations would be unlikely to reduce support below the majority threshold (e.g., below 50%).

Importantly, the review of non-probability samples on which we draw⁸² proposes that participants, including the ones who are inattentive and provide bogus responses (e.g., bots), are among the biggest influences on biased findings from non-probability samples. In line with this, the review recommends that “building multiple check questions into a survey is one of the strongest means of identifying problematic responses” (p.15).⁸² The present research is aligned with this recommendation, since we had various check questions in our survey (e.g., instructed-response items⁸⁹ and seriousness checks⁹⁰ for attention, and captchas to prevent bots from participating; see Supplementary Information, p.11). Moreover, Prolific generally has strong safeguards against bots and ensures that all participants are unique and real humans (see [here](#)), in addition to multiple research showing that participants on Prolific are highly attentive.^{76,77} Therefore, our studies are grounded in procedures that are recommended to reduce bias in non-probability samples.⁸²

Ultimately, probability samples are rare because they are logistically highly demanding. Notable examples include large national health or household surveys conducted by statistical agencies (e.g., the National Health Interview Survey; the American Community Survey) and a handful of long-running social surveys (e.g., the General Social Survey). Therefore, even the highest quality research with findings related to policy implications and public opinions published in the *Lancet Planetary Health*, *Nature Sustainability*, *Nature Climate Change*, *Nature Human Behaviour*, *Lancet*, *American Economic Review*, and other journals of similar standing frequently uses non-probability samples. Many such articles are based on Prolific samples (for example, refs.⁹¹⁻¹⁰¹) or on other online surveys (for example, refs.¹⁰²⁻¹⁰⁷). Therefore, our samples are aligned with standards that are followed by most rigorous publications in the field.

Overall, it is important to emphasise that no sample is perfect, and even probability samples can have weaknesses and lead to biased estimates, as indicated in various election polling errors over decades.¹⁰⁸ For example, some of these weaknesses can include nonresponse bias,¹⁰⁹ when selected individuals systematically choose not to participate, undermining representativeness, and coverage error,¹¹⁰ where parts of the population are excluded from the sampling frame. Probability samples also struggle to accurately measure rare subpopulations without extremely large sample sizes,¹¹¹ and social desirability bias and declining trust in institutions can lead to systematic

misreporting or nonparticipation by key groups, further eroding data quality.^{112,113} Therefore, as with any research, it is important that claims and findings are tested and extended by multiple researchers across different studies to contribute to cumulative scientific knowledge. In this respect, it is encouraging that our findings align with a growing body of evidence showing that radical climate views and initiatives are gaining support from increasing majorities.^{102,107,114,115}

Reading time for the full degrowth proposal (Studies 1 and 2)

Both studies included a timer to measure how long participants spent reading the full degrowth proposal (available on pp.3-4). Our analyses below show that reading times were consistent across countries (UK and US), and across different presentations of the full proposal (i.e., with or without different labels).

In Study 1, UK participants ($N = 910$) took on average 267 seconds ($SD = 220$) to read the full proposal and complete the associated task (i.e., evaluating and ranking different economic approaches: see Study 1 procedure on pp.17-18), while US participants ($N = 941$) took on average 289 seconds ($SD = 315$). The difference was not statistically significant, $F(1, 1849) = 3.08, p = 0.079, \eta^2 = 0.002$.

In Study 2, the results showed no statistically significant difference in the time UK participants spent reading the full degrowth proposal across the different presentation formats, whether the proposal was presented without a label or paired with the labels degrowth, ecosocialism, or wellbeing economy, $F(3, 999) = 2.03, p = 0.108, \eta^2 = 0.006$. The average reading times were as follows: Full Proposal Without Label ($N = 255, M = 181$ sec., $SD = 155$); Full proposal + Degrowth Label ($N = 248, M = 190$ sec., $SD = 188$); Full Proposal + Ecosocialism Label ($N = 250, M = 162$ sec., $SD = 125$); Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy ($N = 250, M = 196$ sec., $SD = 187$). Similarly, there was no statistically significant difference in the time US participants spent reading the full degrowth proposal across different presentation formats, $F(3, 1029) = 0.386, p = 0.763, \eta^2 = 0.001$. The average reading times were as follows: Full Proposal Without Label ($N = 260, M = 181$ sec., $SD = 249$); Full proposal + Degrowth Label ($N = 260, M = 187$ sec., $SD = 171$); Full Proposal + Ecosocialism Label ($N = 264, M = 173$ sec., $SD = 132$); Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy ($N = 249, M = 187$ sec., $SD = 138$).

Lastly, in Study 2, there was no statistically significant difference in the time taken by UK ($N = 1003, M = 182, SD = 166$) compared to US participants ($N = 1033, M = 182, SD = 179$) to read the full proposal, $F(1, 2034) = 0.001, p = 0.977, \eta^2 < 0.001$. The interaction effect between presentation format (namely, Full Proposal Without Label, Full proposal + Degrowth Label, Full Proposal + Ecosocialism Label, and Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy) and country (UK vs. US) was also not statistically significant, $F(3, 2028) = 0.001, p = 0.984, \eta^2 < 0.001$. Note that the average length is longer in Study 1 than in Study 2 because participants also evaluated and ranked different economic approaches within the same block as the full proposal (see Study 1 procedure on pp.17-18).

Overall, these results indicate that participants generally spent a reasonable amount of time (three to five minutes on average) reading the full proposal, and that this time did not vary between countries or different presentations of the full proposal.

Attention and quality check items that participants had to pass to be eligible for analyses

To be eligible for analyses, all participants had to pass several attention and quality check items placed in each study's survey. The attention check items included instructed-response items, in which participants are told to respond with a particular response to show they are paying attention, as recommended by ref.⁸⁹: for example "Please respond with 'Somewhat disagree' for this item (this is a check item to probe if you are paying attention)." An additional type of attention check, developed and validated by ref.⁹⁰ to improve data validity in online research, was a seriousness check. This item asks participants to explicitly state if they took the study seriously: "It would be very helpful if you could tell us at this point whether you have taken part in this study seriously, so that we can use your answers for our scientific analysis, or you were just clicking through without reading the instructions and survey questions? Please answer honestly - you will receive the payment regardless of your answer."⁹⁰ Finally, for quality check, participants were asked to complete a CAPTCHA, which verifies that they are human and not automated bots. Importantly, CAPTCHAs were included for extra precaution, since the participant recruitment platform Prolific has strong guardrails against bots and ensures that all participants are humans with real IDs (see [here](#)).

Each of our studies included one CAPTCHA and seriousness check per sample: they were administered at the end of each study after demographic and socioeconomic variables but before debriefing. Furthermore, Study 1 had six instructed-response items per sample, while Study 2 had one. These instructed-response items were embedded within the sections that assessed individual differences (surveys for each study are available via the Open Science Framework [OSF]: https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65).

Percentage of missing data per different statistical analyses

The information below summarises missing data across all statistical analyses conducted in Studies 1 and 2, as reported in Supplementary Tables 14, 16, 17, 18 and 23 (for Study 1) and Supplementary Tables 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, and 26 (for Study 2). For each table, we report: (i) the total number of participants eligible for analysis, (ii) the number included in the analysis (after excluding those with missing values), (iii) the number of participants with missing data, and (iv) the corresponding percentage of missing cases. Where a table includes multiple models, we clarify which models or variables the information applies to.

STUDY 1

Supplementary Table 14: Sample 1 – UK

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 910
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 910
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 14: Sample 1 – US

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 941
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 941
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 16: Samples 1 and 2 (UK and US) combined

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1851
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1837
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 14
% missing: 0.756 %

Supplementary Table 17: Sample 1 – UK

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 910
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 902
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 8
% missing: 0.879 %

Supplementary Table 18: Sample 2 – US

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 941
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 935
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 6
% missing: 0.638 %

Supplementary Table 23: Sample 1 – UK

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 910
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 901
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 9
% missing: 0.989 %

Supplementary Table 23: Sample 2 – US

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 941
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 939
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 2
% missing: 0.213 %

STUDY 2

Supplementary Table 15: Sample 1 – UK (Applies to each model reported in the table)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1769
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1769
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 15: Sample 2 – US (Applies to each model reported in the table)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1834
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1834
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 19: Sample 1 – UK

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1769
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1741
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 28
% missing: 1.583 %

Supplementary Table 19: Sample 2 – US

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1834
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1811
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 23
% missing: 1.254 %

Supplementary Table 20: Sample 1 – UK (Applies to each model reported in the table)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1769
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1741
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 28
% missing: 1.583 %

Supplementary Table 21: Sample 2 – US (Applies to each model reported in the table)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1834
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1811
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 23
% missing: 1.254 %

Supplementary Table 22: Sample 1 – UK (Applies to all predictors reported in the table: Utopian Impulse, NEP Balance, and Political Orientation)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1769
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1741

Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 28
% missing: 1.583 %

Supplementary Table 22: Sample 2 – US (Applies to all predictors reported in the table: Utopian Impulse, NEP Balance, and Political Orientation)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1834
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1811
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 23
% missing: 1.254 %

Supplementary Table 25: Sample 1 – UK (Applies to models for Knowledge and Awareness)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1769
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1769
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 25: Sample 1 – UK (Applies to models for label preference – please note that Label Preference was not measured for participants who were assigned to the full degrowth proposal since no label was present in this case)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1514
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1514
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 25: Sample 2 – US (Applies to models for Knowledge and Awareness)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1834
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1834
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Supplementary Table 25: Sample 2 – US (Applies to models for label preference – please note that Label Preference was not measured for participants who were assigned to the full degrowth proposal since no label was present in this case)

Total number of participants eligible for analyses: 1574
Number of participants used in analyses due to missing data: 1574
Number of participants for whom the data were missing: 0
% missing: 0 %

Determining sample size

A recent crisis of confidence in psychology and other social sciences has centred on the potentially high prevalence of false positive findings: results that appear statistically significant but do not reflect true effects (i.e., they are actually null effects).^{116–120} A major contributor to this problem has been the common use of small sample sizes,^{121–124} despite the fact that most effect sizes in the social sciences are small to medium at best (for example, refs.^{125–131}). In addition, researchers would often conduct a large number of statistical tests but report only those that reach significance, without applying appropriate corrections for multiple comparisons.^{132–137}

To address these concerns, our primary rationale when planning sample sizes was to reduce the risk of false positives by using relatively large samples, which are appropriate for detecting the kinds of effect sizes typically observed in psychology and behavioural sciences.^{125–131,138–140} Estimating reliable power for more specific effect sizes based on previous research was not feasible, as few studies directly relevant to our research exist (as reviewed in the article introduction), and none employ procedures fully consistent with ours or examine the range of effects and relationships we investigate (it is also important to point out that effects observed in individual or only a few studies are often highly variable, which limits their usefulness for precise power analyses).^{81,141–144} As a result, we could not base our sample size estimates on effect sizes more precise than general benchmarks such as “small.” Nevertheless, Planning for small to medium effects has become a widespread practice, often encouraged by high-quality journals, reflecting the increased rigour that has emerged in the field.^{145–147}

Furthermore, because our studies involved multiple statistical significance tests (see Supplementary Tables 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, and 26), we applied the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y)¹⁴⁸ false discovery rate (FDR) correction to control for multiple testing, using an uncorrected significance threshold of $\alpha = 0.05$ and accounting for all p-values computed within each study. For Study 1, this number was 234 (all p-values except for “constant” from Supplementary Tables 14, 17, 18, and 23), and for Study 2 it was 366 (all p-values except for “constant” from Table 1 and Supplementary Tables 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, and 26). This correction helps reduce the likelihood of falsely identifying null effects as significant, while maintaining reasonable power to detect true effects.¹⁴⁸ The FDR correction was computed in R using the stats package.¹⁴⁹ The code and the output are available via the Open Science Framework (OSF) using the following link: https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65

In the sections below, we describe in more detail how sample sizes were determined for each study, guided by this general objective.

Study 1. The sample size for this study was determined based on the requirements for computing machine learning (ML) models to test individual difference predictors of support for the full degrowth proposal (see section “Procedure for selecting the most predictive individual differences in Study 1” in this document) rather than on the repeated-measures analyses used to compare support for the full degrowth proposal with other economic approaches labelled by name (Supplementary Table 14), since the latter analyses generally have high statistical power and thus do not require large sample sizes.¹⁵⁰ Sample size and power for ML models implemented using k-fold cross-validation remain uninvestigated, and there are no established guidelines on power analysis in this context. Recent simulations showed that, for the 10-fold cross-validation we were planning to implement, testing 1000–2000 participants is optimal because it achieves high generalisability (i.e., the likelihood that the findings will generalise to different participant samples from the same population of interest) without increasing the time needed to compute the models.¹⁵¹ Based on this insight, we decided to recruit approximately 2,200 participants (about 1,100 in each country, the UK and US) for the total sample used in our ML models. This was expected to comfortably exceed 1,000 participants even after accounting for missing data or exclusions due to failed check items. As shown in Table 1 in the article, this sample size requirement was met.

Study 2. For each country, we aimed to achieve sample sizes that are sufficiently powered (i.e., $1 - \beta = 0.80$) to detect small effects (i.e., Cohen’s $f^2 = 0.02$)¹⁵⁰ for the main analyses we were aiming to conduct, as described in the two “Analytic approach” sections for Study 2 under “Detailed description of design, procedure, and analytic approach for each study” on p.19 (for the output of these analyses, see Supplementary Tables 15, 19, 20, and 21). Since we could not predict in advance which p-values would be considered statistically significant based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ we used a highly conservative significance criterion (i.e., $\alpha = 0.001$). All power analyses were conducted using G*Power.^{152,153} Given that comparing the differences between the mean levels of public support for the full degrowth proposal

(without the name label) and the six remaining economic approaches required conducting multiple linear regressions with six dummy variables (Supplementary Table 15), the required sample size for each country was 1,295 participants. Moreover, since the analyses testing the main individual difference predictors of public support required conducting multiple linear regressions with 12 predictors (given that this was the total number of predictors we tested; Supplementary Table 19), the required sample size for each country was 1,588 participants. Finally, since the interaction analyses we were planning to compute using multiple linear regressions included 24 predictors in total (i.e., six dummy variables for the seven economic approaches tested in the present study, 12 individual difference predictors, and six interaction terms between the dummy variables and one predictor of interest—for example, transformative utopian impulse; Supplementary Tables 20 and 21), with the focus being on the six interaction terms, the required sample size for each country was 1,296 participants. Therefore, across the main analyses we were planning to conduct, the largest required sample size was 1,588 participants. As can be seen in Table 1 in the article, this sample size was met for each country.

Detailed description of design, procedure, and analytic approach for each study

Below, we describe the detailed design and procedure for each study and provide an overview of the analytic approach used to test the research objectives that informed the results reported in the article (for an overview of research objectives, see Supplementary Table 29). All studies were administered via Qualtrics: full surveys we used with questions assessing all variables are available via the Open Science Framework (OSF): https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65

Study 1

Procedure. The procedure was identical for UK and US participants. All began by giving consent before proceeding to three main survey sections: (1) the “economic approach” section (relevant to Research Objectives 1-3), in which they answered questions about several different economic approaches; (2) the “individual differences—psychological characteristics” section (relevant to Research Objective 4) that contained various measures of individual differences pertaining to psychological characteristics (i.e., personality, attitudes, values, and wellbeing); and (3) the “individual differences—demographics” section (relevant to Research Objective 4) that assessed both basic demographics and socio-economic predictor variables. The order of the “economic approach” and “psychological characteristics” sections was randomised, while all participants completed the “demographics” section last and were then debriefed.

In the “economic approach” section, participants rated their support for the full degrowth proposal without the name label (Supplementary Material, pp.3-4) on a 7-point scale (1 = “Strongly oppose” to 7 = “Strongly support”). They then ranked a randomized set of eight economic approaches (i.e., degrowth, ecomodernism, ecosocialism, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy, post-growth, wellbeing economy)—labelled only by name and without any accompanying descriptions—based on how strongly they associated each one with the full proposal. We used these rankings in additional analyses (Supplementary Material, p.22 and Supplementary Table 23) to assess whether participants could correctly associate degrowth with its full proposal, indicating their level of knowledge about the concept. The selected economic approaches either share conceptual affinities with degrowth—some being used interchangeably by advocates and researchers (ecosocialism, post-growth, wellbeing economy),^{154–156} not without some controversy (wellbeing economy)^{46,47,154,155}—or present competing sustainability visions against which degrowth is often contrasted (ecomodernism, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy).¹⁵⁷ A full rationale is available in Supplementary Material (p.5). After the ranking task, support for each economic approach was assessed using the same 7-point scale as for the full proposal. Overall, given that in this section participants rated their support for the full proposal as well as eight other economic approaches referred to by name only, it used a within-subjects (i.e., repeated-measures) design.

In the “individual differences—psychological characteristics” section, participants completed measures assessing 64 psychological characteristics (Supplementary Table 1) we aimed to test as predictors of support for the full degrowth proposal, presented in a randomised order. These covered wellbeing (e.g., life satisfaction),¹⁵⁸ values (e.g., universalism),¹⁵⁹ attitudes (e.g., new ecological paradigm-balance),¹⁶⁰ and various personality traits, from general (e.g., BIG 5)¹⁶¹ to more specific (e.g., transformative utopian impulse for planetary health).⁸⁷ All psychological characteristics were assessed using scales and instruments published in peer reviewed journals and were selected based on their conceptual relevance to degrowth and identified through a review of several large databases of psychological measures, including the Database of Individual Differences Survey Tools.¹⁶² An overview of these individual differences, their rationale, and links to degrowth is provided in Supplementary Table 1, whereas full questions for each measure are available as part of the full survey that can be accessed via the Open Science Framework (OSF): https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65. As indicated in the section “Attention and quality check items that participants had to pass to be eligible for analyses” on p.11 above, six instructed-response items were presented alongside questions from various measures in this section and used the same response format (e.g., Please respond with ‘Somewhat disagree’ for this item [this is a check item to probe if you are paying attention]; answered on the following response scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, Strongly agree).⁸⁹

In the “individual differences—demographics” section, we assessed 10 demographic and socio-economic variables potentially linked to degrowth, including gender, age, political orientation (left vs. right), income satisfaction, etc.

These variables and their relevance to degrowth are also overviewed in Supplementary Table 1. At the end, all participants completed a seriousness check⁹⁰ and a CAPTCHA¹⁶³ (see section “Attention and quality check items that participants had to pass to be eligible for analyses” on p.11 above) and were debriefed.

Analytic Approach: Comparing public support for the full degrowth proposal and other economic approaches. To compare mean levels of public support for the full degrowth proposal (without the name label) and other economic approaches labelled by name only (i.e., degrowth, ecomodernism, ecosocialism, wellbeing economy, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy, and post-growth), we computed paired t-tests for all possible approach pairs (see Supplementary Table 14).

Analytic approach: Individual difference predictors of public support for the full degrowth proposal. To examine individual difference predictors and identify the key ones, we focused specifically on participants’ support for the full degrowth proposal, rather than its label, as the outcome variable. This ensured that our findings reflect what degrowth represents, rather than potential perceptions of its name, in line with Research Objective 1. However, to assess the extent to which the key predictors also apply to the degrowth label (with and without the full proposal), we investigated this more systematically in Study 2, as explained under that study below.

To select the key (i.e., most predictive) individual differences in Study 1, we used a rigorous two-step procedure that combined machine learning (ML) and linear regression analyses. Key predictors were identified based on their consistency across multiple ML models and their statistical significance in regression analyses for both the UK and US (full details are provided in the section “Procedure for selecting the most predictive individual differences in Study 1” on p.20 below).¹⁶⁴

Study 2

Procedure. The procedure was identical for UK and US participants. All began by giving consent before proceeding to three main survey sections: (1) the “economic approach” section, in which they were randomly allocated to an economic approach and answered related questions; (2) the “individual differences—psychological characteristics” section that contained the two key predictors of public support identified in Study 1 (i.e., transformative utopian impulse⁸⁷ and new ecological paradigm-balance);⁸⁸ and the “individual differences—demographics” section where participants provided the same demographic and socio-economic information as in Study 1. The order of the “economic approach” and the “psychological characteristics” sections was randomized, while all participants completed the “demographics” section last and were debriefed.

In the “economic approach” section, participants were randomly assigned to one of seven economic approaches in a between-subjects design: (1) the full degrowth proposal without a label (as in Study 1); (2-4) one of three economic approaches presented by label only, without any description (i.e., degrowth, ecosocialism, or wellbeing economy); or (4-7) one of three full proposal–label combinations (i.e., full proposal + degrowth, full proposal + ecosocialism, or full proposal + wellbeing economy). We focused on degrowth, ecosocialism, and wellbeing economy because these terms are often used interchangeably to describe similar proposals (Supplementary Material, p.5). Additionally, ecosocialism and wellbeing economy are the alternative approaches most similar to degrowth (although see Supplementary Material, p.5, for discrepancies). Including all eight economic approach labels from Study 1 was not appropriate, as not all align with the full degrowth proposal (Supplementary Material, p.5). Moreover, doing so would have increased the total number of economic approaches to 17, requiring an impractically large sample size for a well-powered study given recruitment platform constraints and substantially increasing the risk of Type I error (i.e., false positive findings).^{121,122,137,150}

Participants rated their support for the assigned economic approach (1=“Strongly oppose” to 7=“Strongly support”), as well as their prior knowledge (1=“Not knowledgeable at all” to 5=“Extremely knowledgeable”) and awareness of it (1=“Never” to 5=“Very often”). The latter two questions were included to provide a deeper understanding of the main findings, and the results related to these variables are reported under additional analyses in Supplementary Material (p.22) and Supplementary Tables 24-26. Additionally, for all participants except those assigned to the full proposal without a label, we assessed another additional variable for deeper insights (Supplementary Material, p.23, and Supplementary Tables 24-26): how much they liked or disliked the label degrowth (or ecosocialism or wellbeing economy) without associating it with any economic approach (1 = “Dislike a great deal” to 7 = “Like a

great deal”). Moreover, two unused questions, intended to inform future research, were included to assess how surprised participants were by the labels assigned to the full proposal. These questions were presented only to participants who received the full proposal paired with a label.

In the “individual differences—psychological characteristics” section, participants completed the Transformative Utopian Impulse for Planetary Health Scale (TUIPHS)⁸⁷ and the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (Balance),⁸⁸ as in Study 1, presented in a randomised order (Supplementary Table 1). As indicated in the section “Attention and quality check items that participants had to pass to be eligible for analyses” on p.11 above, one instructed-response item was presented alongside TUIPHS items and used the same response format (i.e., Please respond with ‘Somewhat disagree’ for this item [this is a check item to probe if you are paying attention]; answered on the following response scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, Strongly agree).⁸⁹

In the “individual differences—demographics” section, participants provided the same demographic and socioeconomic information as in Study 1 (Supplementary Table 1). At the end, all participants were debriefed.

Analytic Approach: Comparing public support for the full degrowth proposal and other economic approaches. To compare mean levels of public support for the full degrowth proposal (without its label) and the remaining six economic approaches, we computed linear regressions comparing all possible pairs of economic approaches (see Supplementary Table 15).

Analytic approach: Individual difference predictors of public support. The goal of these analyses was to further probe the robustness of the two key predictors identified in Study 1 (i.e., transformative utopian impulse⁸⁷ and new ecological paradigm-balance).⁸⁸ For this purpose, we examined (a) whether these variables predicted public support across all participants, regardless of the economic approach they rated (i.e., full proposal, labels only, or their combinations), and (b) whether the strength of these relationships varied depending on the economic approach.

For (a), we first conducted linear regression analyses that included all measured individual differences as predictors—namely, the two key predictors identified in Study 1 (transformative utopian impulse⁸⁷ and new ecological paradigm-balance),⁸⁸ along with ten demographic and socioeconomic variables (see Supplementary Table 1). Although the demographic and socioeconomic variables were not identified as key predictors in Study 1, we included them to ensure they did not confound the relationships between the two key predictors and public support. One linear regression model was computed separately for each country (Supplementary Table 19), with public support (measured for participants across all seven economic approaches) as the dependent variable.

For (b), to examine whether the relationships between transformative utopian impulse⁸⁷ or new ecological paradigm-balance⁸⁸ and public support varied by economic approach, we conducted multiple linear regressions that included interaction terms between the two key predictors and the six economic approaches (i.e., degrowth, ecosocialism, wellbeing economy, full proposal + degrowth, full proposal + ecosocialism, and full proposal + wellbeing economy) other than the full proposal (which served as the reference category) (Supplementary Tables 20-22).¹⁶⁵ In other words, these analyses examined whether the strength of the relationships between the two key predictors and public support differed for participants who evaluated the full proposal compared to those who evaluated any of the six other economic approaches. Because in Study 2 political orientation (left vs. right) emerged as a significant predictor of public support in both countries in the regression analyses described above under (a) (Supplementary Table 19), we also tested interactions between political orientation and the economic approaches to examine whether its relationship with public support differed across them. Although Education was also a significant predictor, this was only the case in the UK (Supplementary Table 19); due to this inconsistency across countries, we did not include it in the interaction analyses.

Procedure for selecting the most predictive individual differences in Study 1

To select the most predictive individual differences, we used a rigorous procedure that consisted of two steps, as in Krpan, Booth, and Damien.¹⁶⁴ In the first step, we computed the following 10 commonly used ML models using the caret package^{166,167} in R: lasso, ridge, elastic net, random forest, conditional random forest, k-nearest neighbours, regression trees, conditional inference trees, neural networks, and neural networks with a principal component step. For each model, public support for the full degrowth proposal was used as the dependent variable, and the 74 individual differences (Supplementary Table 1) as predictors. All models were computed on the combined UK and US data to ensure that the identified predictors generalise across both countries, and the 10-fold cross-validations^{168–172} were implemented.

The root-mean-square error (RMSE)^{166–168} was used to identify the most predictive ML models. In particular, the model with the lowest RMSE, indicating the best fit, was selected first, and the remaining models were compared to it using paired-samples t-tests. Overall, the ML model with the lowest RMSE (i.e., the best-fitting model) and the ones that were not statistically significantly different from it (at $p < 0.05$) were deemed the most predictive models. For each of them, using the VarImp function in R,¹⁶⁷ we first identified the 30 most important individual difference predictors, and then selected those predictors that appeared in the top 30 in all the models.

Furthermore, in the second step, we conducted separate linear regression analyses for each country, using public support for the full degrowth proposal as the dependent variable and the 74 individual differences (Supplementary Table 1) as predictors. Overall, to be identified as a key predictor of public support, a variable had to both be a top 30 predictor across the five ML models identified above and be statistically significant in the regression analyses for each country.¹⁶⁴

This approach had two main benefits. First, because different statistical models can yield varying results regarding the best predictors, using multiple models and procedures minimized the risk that findings were driven by idiosyncrasies of specific statistical tools and ensured that key predictors remained robust across different analytical approaches. Second, since in Study 2 we aimed to replicate the key predictors using linear regressions to make these variables relevant to numerous researchers who typically employ this most used analysis in social sciences, by computing linear regressions in Study 1 we wanted to ensure the predictors are replicable in the next study and useful to a large number of researchers.

Relationships between individual difference predictors and public support across different economic approaches assessed in Study 2

As described in the section “Analytic approach: Individual difference predictors of public support” for Study 2 (Supplementary Material, p.19), to examine whether the relationships between transformative utopian impulse⁸⁷ or new ecological paradigm-balance⁸⁸ and public support varied by economic approach, we conducted multiple linear regressions that included interaction terms between the two key predictors and the six economic approaches other than the full proposal (which served as the reference category) (Supplementary Tables 20-22).¹⁶⁵ Because political orientation (left vs. right) emerged as a significant predictor of public support across the overall UK and US samples in Study 2 (Supplementary Table 19), we also tested interactions between political orientation and the economic approaches to examine whether its relationship with public support differed across them (please note that Education was also a statistically significant predictor, but only for the UK, so we did not use it in interaction analyses due to its inconsistent effect across countries).

The output of the interaction analyses is presented in Supplementary Tables 20-22. Specifically, Supplementary Tables 20 and 21 present the regression analyses in which the interaction terms were computed. Statistically significant interaction terms indicate that the relationship between a given predictor (e.g., transformative utopian impulse)⁸⁷ and public support differed in magnitude for participants who rated the full proposal versus another economic approach (e.g., wellbeing economy). While these outputs show where the relationships differ across approaches, they provide only partial information about the strength and direction of each predictor-support relationship within each economic approach, and interpreting these patterns directly from the regression tables is not straightforward. These relationships are instead reported in Supplementary Table 22 and were computed using regression-based analyses of simple slopes.¹⁶⁵

Overall, the results across Supplementary Tables 20-22 generally showed that the relationships between public support and transformative utopian impulse, new ecological paradigm-balance, or political orientation were similar for the full proposal presented with or without the labels, but differed when comparing the full proposal to the economic approaches presented by label only (i.e., degrowth, ecosocialism, and wellbeing economy). This could be explained by our additional findings that people generally had little knowledge of degrowth and related approaches, suggesting that their support ratings for labels alone were driven by arbitrary factors rather than alignment with their traits or values (Supplementary Material, p.22, and Supplementary Tables 24-26).

Additional insights: Knowledge and awareness of degrowth

Previous research indicated that on average people are not very knowledgeable about degrowth.⁷⁵ As this may have implications for how people react when they encounter degrowth, in the present research we used different approaches to explore people's level of knowledge and awareness of this economic approach. To assess knowledge in Study 1, participants were provided with the full degrowth proposal (without any labels), but also with the names of eight economic approaches without any description (i.e., degrowth, ecomodernism, ecosocialism, wellbeing economy, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy, post-growth; for a rationale, see section "Rationale for the selection of economic approaches used in the present research" in this document).

We asked participants to rank these approaches according to their similarity to the economic approach described in the full proposal. As shown in Supplementary Table 23, the approach labelled as degrowth was ranked last in both the UK and US samples, which indicates that participants were least likely to associate it with the description that captured essential elements of degrowth. To test whether the differences in ranking between degrowth and other approaches were statistically significant, we first computed the Friedman test, which was significant for both the UK, $\chi^2(7) = 1279.070$, $p < 0.001$, and the US, $\chi^2(7) = 976.198$, $p < 0.001$, thus showing that on average the eight economic approaches had different rankings. We then computed the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests which specifically showed that the mean rank for degrowth was statistically significantly different from all other approaches, except for post-growth in the US sample (Supplementary Table 23). This finding shows that people were generally unable to link degrowth to its full proposal.

To further understand how knowledgeable people are about degrowth, in Study 2 we asked them to report their level of knowledge and awareness regarding the economic approach to which they were allocated (i.e., full proposal; degrowth label only, ecosocialism label only, wellbeing economy label only, full proposal + degrowth label, full proposal + ecosocialism label; full proposal + wellbeing economy label). The mean responses for each approach as well as the classification of the mean responses are available in Supplementary Table 24, while statistical comparisons between the means are available in Supplementary Tables 25-26. In most cases, participants rated themselves between "not knowledgeable at all" and "slightly knowledgeable", whereas in terms of awareness they had "never" or "rarely" heard of the economic approach (Supplementary Table 24). The only exception was the group assigned to the full proposal without any label, which showed significantly higher mean scores than the other groups (Supplementary Tables 25-26). However, even in this case, participants "rarely" heard about the described economic approach and rated themselves as "slightly" to "moderately" knowledgeable at best (Supplementary Table 24).

In sum, the key insight from the analyses is that people have a weak understanding of degrowth, as they are on average unable to associate its name with its full proposal, and as they generally self-report relatively low levels of knowledge and awareness of the economic approach when the label degrowth is used, but also in relation to the other labels we tested (e.g., ecosocialism, wellbeing economy).

Additional insights: Label preferences

Previous research has suggested that people may not always perceive the label degrowth as positive.^{70,74,75} Because this may have implications for how people react when they encounter degrowth as an economic approach, in the present research we explored people's level of preference for this and other labels used in the present research. As can be seen in Table 24, when people rated degrowth only (without any content), their preference for the label typically corresponded to "Dislike a little", and when degrowth was combined with its full proposal, the preference varied between "Dislike a little" to "Neither like nor dislike". People's preference for the degrowth label was typically statistically significantly lower compared to the other labels (Supplementary Tables 25-26). Therefore, degrowth was the least liked label, and when presented without the full proposal people generally disliked it.

Extended discussion of limitations and future directions

In the present research, we focused on the UK and US because they are high-income countries with significant historical responsibility for the climate crisis and exemplify economies where degrowth is both urgently needed to address this crisis and often perceived as politically unfeasible.^{1,5,13,14,173–175} Nevertheless, there are many other high-income countries where implementing degrowth would be important for achieving global sustainability (e.g., European countries such as Germany, France, and Spain; North American countries such as Canada; Asian countries such as Japan, and others), and where investigating its support is therefore highly relevant. We were unable to extend our study beyond the UK and US, as focusing on even two countries within the format of a single article was challenging given the complexity of our procedures (e.g., systematically distinguishing support for degrowth content versus labels, analysing 74 individual-difference predictors). Therefore, achieving a comprehensive understanding of public support for degrowth across other relevant countries will require a joint effort by multiple research teams working across several studies and publications.

Beyond the need to extend this research to other affluent nations, there are additional limitations that could inform future research. One such limitation is the counterpart of one of the main strengths of our studies. Namely, we investigated the full degrowth proposal in all its richness, combining its overarching vision with specific practices and policies, contrary to previous studies that investigated more generic and short descriptions (e.g., a statement that sustainability should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth).⁷⁰ However, the full proposal includes a variety of practices and policies, and it remains to be investigated whether participants would support each of them with equal force. Indeed, recent evidence shows that some degrowth policies are supported more widely than others (e.g., refs.^{63,65}), and it would be worthwhile testing whether the policies that comprise the full degrowth proposal are subject to an additive effect, whereby they are supported more strongly when combined and presented together rather than separately, and under which conditions.¹⁷⁶ This is one of the most direct extensions of the present work and would need to be systematically tested across a series of research projects to distinguish between support for individual policies and for policy combinations, and to examine how this support varies depending on whether the policies are presented as part of degrowth's core vision and under different labels.

Building on this, future research could investigate whether any potential additive effects of different degrowth policies on support vary across people with different personality (e.g., utopian impulse) and socioeconomic (e.g., class, SES) characteristics, and/or depending on whether one degrowth policy (e.g., job guarantee) helps address the limitations of another (e.g., loss of employment that might be due to consumption reduction).⁴ For example, future research could examine whether working-class individuals are more likely to support a degrowth policy that includes a job guarantee when it is presented alongside a policy aimed at reducing non-essential production and consumption to accelerate decarbonisation, as the job guarantee may help offset concerns about potential job losses associated with the latter policy. Future studies could also explore whether informing people of the advantages and disadvantages of the policies that comprise the degrowth policy proposal⁴ influences their level of support.¹⁷⁷ Finally, while the present research focused on policy support, it could be refined by distinguishing between the desirability and (perceived) feasibility of different degrowth solutions as climate response policies.¹⁷⁸

A final point to address concerns the generalisability of the present findings. As we discuss in detail in the “Details and Appraisal of the Sampling Methodology” section (see Supplementary Material, pp.7-9), there is good reason to believe that our main conclusions are applicable to the broader UK and US populations. These conclusions include: the finding that a majority supports degrowth (Objective 1); that support is statistically significantly higher when degrowth is presented as a comprehensive proposal (regardless of the label used) compared to when it is presented as a label alone (Objectives 2–3); and that the transformative utopian impulse and the new ecological paradigm-balance are the two strongest predictors of public support among the variables tested (Objective 4). This is because our samples were designed to be nationally representative of the UK and US populations in terms of age, gender, and ethnicity; we employed rigorous procedures to ensure high data quality and to avoid attracting participants with specific viewpoints; and sociodemographic variables explained only a small proportion of unique variance in support for degrowth in our models (e.g., Supplementary Tables 17-18), suggesting that even moderate or larger differences between our samples and the general populations would be unlikely to shift our main conclusions.

Nevertheless, because our sample was drawn using non-probability methods (see Supplementary Material, pp.7-9) and matched only on core demographic variables (age, gender, and ethnicity), it is likely that the exact percentages of support and the strength of associations between predictors and outcomes may differ somewhat from those observed in the broader UK and US populations. This is due to potential differences between our sample and the general populations on variables that were not measured but could potentially influence attitudes toward degrowth.

However, we aimed to minimise the risk of overlooking such variables by measuring a comprehensive range of individual differences and examining their associations with support for the full degrowth proposal (see Supplementary Table 1). Therefore, while the main patterns are likely to generalise, the specific numerical values should be interpreted with appropriate caution.

Supplementary Tables

Supplementary Table 1: Individual Difference Predictors and their Justification

All individual difference predictors (bold typeface) categorized into their corresponding domains (i.e., personality traits, attitudes, values, wellbeing, and demographics and socioeconomic variables), the measures used to assess them (light typeface), and their justification (Study 1)

Ideally, to identify the most important predictors of support for the full degrowth proposal, one would need to first identify all individual differences that have been conceptualised in the literature and then select those relevant to degrowth (namely, those with potential theoretical or conceptual links to degrowth, or those previously shown to relate empirically to degrowth-related outcomes) to test them together as predictors and determine the best ones. However, identifying all existing individual differences is not realistically possible, as doing so would require reviewing nearly all publications in which such variables might appear. Therefore, the next best approach is to compile a comprehensive set of individual differences which, while it cannot be claimed to include every existing one, encompasses a wide range of variables that have been documented across an extensive body of literature. In practice, this is difficult to achieve, especially for measures developed to assess psychological characteristics, because they are published in an immense number of different journals across various disciplines and subdisciplines related to psychology and behavioural sciences. Therefore, to identify as many individual differences as possible, bringing us closer to a comprehensive set from which to select those most relevant to degrowth, we drew on various sources. First, we reviewed two large databases of psychological measures: the Database of Individual Differences Survey Tools¹⁶² and Psychological Scales.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, we reviewed our own collections of articles, accumulated over the years, that refer to or contain measures of numerous individual differences across various personality traits, attitudes, values, wellbeing, demographics, and socioeconomic variables. As the main aim of the study was to uncover the key individual difference predictors of the full degrowth proposal, when reviewing the databases and sources we aimed to select all individual differences that could plausibly be linked to degrowth, based on prior theorising, empirical findings, or logical reasoning, in order to minimise the risk of omitting important predictors. All individual differences listed in the table below, including psychological characteristics (i.e., personality traits, attitudes, values, and wellbeing), as well as demographic and socioeconomic variables, were selected following this approach. It is important to emphasise that all psychological measures presented in the table come from peer-reviewed journal publications. That is, they are not arbitrary items or sets of items that we randomly selected or constructed. The full set of survey questions corresponding to these measures is available in the complete questionnaire used in the study, which can be accessed via the Open Science Framework (OSF): https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65

Given that participants have limited attention, we were aware that we needed to be as concise as possible to ensure that we were not asking them to respond to a number of scales they could not complete attentively. For this reason, we decided to always use the shortest available measure of an individual difference, and to avoid using scales that are redundant. For example, since we found in our previous research⁹⁵ that the transformative utopian impulse for planetary health scale (TUIPHS) is strongly correlated with various other scales that assess tendencies to transform the world through ethical engagement with society, such as the green consumption scale,¹⁸⁰ ethically minded consumer behaviour (EMCB) scale,¹⁸¹ or activist identity and commitment scale (AICS),¹⁸² we used TUIPHS because it is the most economical and all-encompassing measure to avoid redundancy. Furthermore, we avoided scales that directly measure a core element of degrowth, since finding an association between such scales and degrowth support would show that degrowth predicts degrowth, which would not be a meaningful finding. For example, we did not include a measure of voluntary simplicity lifestyle¹⁸³ since a degrowth economy implies some form of voluntary simplicity.¹⁸⁴

Predictor	Justification
Psychological Characteristics: Personality Traits	

Need for Cognition (NCS): Short Need for Cognition Scale (NCS-6), ¹⁸⁵ 6 items, 1-5 scale (1=Extremely uncharacteristic of me, 5=Extremely characteristic of me).	The need for cognition describes individuals' tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities characterised by the desire to come up with solutions to complex problems. ¹⁸⁶ Given that degrowth is a proposed solution to complex problems (i.e., various global issues such as climate change), ³ it might be especially appealing to individuals with higher need for cognition.
Affiliation (Independence) (FSMI_AI): Fundamental Social Motives Inventory (FSMI), ¹⁸⁷ 6 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Affiliation (independence) reflects the extent to which a person is individualistic and likes to be on their own versus engaging and spending time with others. ¹⁸⁷ Since degrowth emphasises the importance of considering others and their needs, and it aims to restore a sense of community in economic life by prioritising other-orientation, ¹⁸⁸ it is plausible that people higher on affiliation (independence) may be less likely to support degrowth.
Empathic Concern (IRI_EC), Perspective Taking (IRI_PT): Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), ¹⁸⁹ 14 items, 0-4 scale (0=Does not describe me well, 4=Describes me very well).	Empathic concern measures individuals' compassion and concern for others, while perspective taking evaluates their unplanned attempts to adopt others' perspectives. ¹⁹⁰ These dimensions are crucial when considering degrowth, as it emphasises the significance of acknowledging others and their needs. ^{184,188}
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IUS): Short Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12), ¹⁹¹ 12 items, 1-5 scale (1=Not at all characteristic of me, 5=Entirely characteristic of me).	The potential consequences of a degrowth economy are uncertain due to the difficulty in predicting the scope and impact of this change. Since it remains unclear how degrowth may impact the future, the reaction of people to degrowth may be shaped by their intolerance of uncertainty. ¹⁹²
Contra-Trait Antiegalitarianism (SDO_CTA), Contra-Trait Dominance (SDO_CTD), Pro-Trait Antiegalitarianism (SDO_PTA), Pro-Trait Dominance (SDO_PTD): Short Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO _{7(s)}), ¹⁹³ 8 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly Oppose, 7=Strongly Favor).	We assessed social dominance orientation because it is linked to people being less open to new experiences ¹⁹⁴ and indicates a preference for systems of group-based dominance and inequality. This construct may thus generally indicate resistance to change towards degrowth as it entails social justice in economic life. ³
Narcissism (DDDT_N), psychopathy (DDDT_P), and Machiavellianism (DDDT_M): Dirty Dozen Dark Triad (DDDT), ¹⁹⁵ 12 items, 1-9 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 9=Strongly Agree).	Narcissism, psychopathy, and machiavellianism are three socially aversive traits that are typically characterized by increased feelings of grandiosity, willingness to exploit others to achieve one's goals, tendency toward deception, etc. ¹⁹⁵ We therefore assessed these traits because it is plausible that scoring higher on them might be linked to lower degrowth support, as degrowth emphasises the importance of considering others and their needs, and is based on solidarity with other human beings. ¹⁸⁸
Life Orientation (LOT): Life Orientation Test (LOT), ¹⁹⁶ 10 items, 0-4 scale (0=Strongly disagree, 4=Strongly agree).	Life orientation captures optimism about the future. ¹⁹⁶ Since people may associate degrowth with negative feelings and future economic outlook, ⁷⁰ we assessed life orientation because of the possibility that more optimistic individuals may also be less pessimistic about the future impact of degrowth on human lives and thus support it more.
Cognitive Reappraisal (ERQ_CR): Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), ¹⁹⁷ 10 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Cognitive reappraisal refers to how easily people can change the way they think about a situation to reduce negative emotions and feel more positive. ¹⁹⁷ It is therefore plausible that individuals higher on cognitive reappraisal can more easily cope with potentially negative emotions that climate change evokes, ¹⁹⁸ and may thus be less likely to support and/or engage in various pro-environmental behaviours compatible with degrowth that can be prompted by negative emotions. ¹⁹⁹

Consideration of Future Consequences (CFCS): Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFCS), ^{200,201} 8 items, 1-5 scale (1=Extremely Uncharacteristic, 5=Extremely Characteristic).	Consideration of future consequences measures the extent to which people consider distant versus immediate consequences of potential actions, and it predicts health and environmental behaviours relevant to degrowth economy better than other constructs assessing how people perceive future. ²⁰²
Internal Control (BLLCTS_IC), Chance (BLLCTS_C), and Powerful Others (BLLCTS_PO): Brief Levenson Locus of Control Scale (BLLCTS), ²⁰³ 9 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Internal control, chance, and powerful others are different aspects of locus of control that indicate to what extent people believe their life is determined by their own actions, chance, and powerful others respectively. ²⁰³ Therefore, people who score higher on internal control and lower on chance and powerful others generally feel that they have more control over their lives and future. ^{203,204} Since degrowth is a planned and democratic reduction of consumption and production, ⁶ such individuals may feel more in control over potential impact of degrowth on their lives and thus view degrowth in a more positive light.
Transformative Utopian Impulse for Planetary Health (TUIPHS): Transformative Utopian Impulse for Planetary Health Scale (TUIPHS), ⁹⁵ 12 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)	The Transformative Utopian Impulse for Planetary Health Scale measures the individual propensity to have thoughts and engage in actions of which the purpose is to transform the current society into a better one in the future by addressing existing global issues. ⁹⁵ Since degrowth is considered a concrete utopia, ²⁰⁵ and prior literature found that TUIPHS predicts support for degrowth, ^{74,95} we expected this variable may be an important predictor of degrowth.
Agency (HS_A) and Pathways (HS_P): Hope Scale (HS), ²⁰⁶ 8 items, 1-7 (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)	Hope scale measures Agency, which refers to a sense of successful determination in meeting goals in the past, present, and future, and Pathways, which refers to a sense of being able to generate successful plans to meet goals. ²⁰⁶ Since degrowth requires a radical transformation of society and implementing it would therefore require considerable determination and sense of being able to meet goals, ⁶ the two dimensions of hope may be linked to degrowth support.
Agreeableness (BFI_A), Conscientiousness (BFI_C), Extraversion (BFI_E), Neuroticism (BFI_N), Openness to Experience (BFI_O): Short Big Five Inventory (BFI-S-15), ¹⁶¹ 15 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Since BIG5 are fundamental personality traits that are at the core of personality research, ²⁰⁷ it was important to investigate whether and to what degree these traits are associated with degrowth support.
Boredom Proneness (SBPS): Short Boredom Proneness Scale (SBPS), ²⁰⁸ 8 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Boredom is a negative experience that occurs in situations lacking meaning, interest, or challenge. ²⁰⁸ Boredom can motivate people to remediate these deficiencies by modifying behaviours or situations. Therefore, it could be argued that boredom proneness could have either a positive or negative relationship with degrowth support. For example, if people high in boredom proneness are easily bored with their current economic situation because they lack meaning, interest, or challenge, they may support degrowth as a radical change. In contrast, people high in this trait may think that degrowth economy could lead to boredom due to reduced economic production and consumption and be against it.
Affect Intensity-Positive Emotions (SAIS_PE) and Affect Intensity-Negative Emotions (SAIS_NE): Short Affect Intensity Scale (SAIS), ²⁰⁹ 14 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Affect intensity measures stable individual differences in the strength with which individuals experience their emotions. ²⁰⁹ These differences can affect a person's cognitive, behavioural, and emotional responses in various contexts. ²¹⁰ Since people high in affect intensity-negative emotions tend to feel these emotions very strongly, they may be more easily activated by potential negative consequences of climate change ¹⁹⁹ and thus inclined to support degrowth as an alternative economic approach. Emotions can lead to support for the current dominant social paradigm (growth), ¹⁰ but it could also be argued that people high in affect intensity-positive

	emotions may experience strong positive emotions in response to various environmental and societal benefits of degrowth, and thus support this alternative economic approach.
Perception of Change (AHS_PC): Analysis-Holism Scale (AHS), ²¹¹ 6-items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	Individuals who score highly on the scale are expected to have a non-linear perception of future events, rather than a linear one. ²¹¹ In other words, they are more likely to believe that the world can change suddenly and in a drastic manner, rather than being easily predictable. Since degrowth would involve a significant paradigm shift which results in an economic approach drastically different from the one that is predominant today, individuals higher in perception of change may be more likely to support degrowth.
Need for Material Input (NEIS_M): Need for External Input Scale (NEIS), ²¹² 4 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).	The need for material input encompasses materialism, material greed, and other similar constructs that reflect people's propensity to material possessions. ²¹² Therefore, since degrowth endorses reduction of production and consumption and its essence is the opposite of materialism, ¹⁸⁴ the need for material input may be linked to lower support for degrowth. ^{67,68}
Malicious Envy (BeMaS_Ma): Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS), ²¹³ 5 items, 1-6 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 6=Strongly Agree).	Malicious envy is linked to socially harmful behaviour aimed at bringing others down. ²¹³ It is worth investigating whether degrowth, which is a movement that advocates for reducing economic growth and consumption in order to achieve a more sustainable and equitable society, ³ is associated with this disposition. For instance, one could argue that degrowth is motivated by people envying rich others and wanting them to lose what they have. Therefore, malicious envy could be linked to higher degrowth support.
Brief Self-Control (BSCS): Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS), ²¹⁴ 13 items, 1-5 scale (1=Not at All, 5=Very Much).	Literature suggests that social problems can be analysed through the lens of self-control. Individuals with high levels of self-control are more likely to lead happier and healthier lives. ²¹⁴ Degrowth may require self-control. This includes reducing consumption and production, ⁵ which can be challenging for those with low self-control. Therefore, higher self-control may be linked to higher degrowth support.
Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT): Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT) Scale, ²¹⁵ 7 items, 1-7 scale 1=Completely Disagree, 7=Completely Agree).	Actively open-minded thinking is a thinking style that describes an individual's tendency to evaluate new evidence against their preferred belief, spend enough time on a problem before giving up, and thoughtfully consider the opinions of others when forming their own. ²¹⁶ Therefore, considering that open mindedness comprises a tendency to consider new evidence despite one's previous beliefs, and that an increasing amount of new evidence shows that degrowth is one of the few plausible ways to counter rapid climate change, ^{3,36,217} open-minded thinking could be linked to higher degrowth support.
Maximization Tendency (MTS): Maximization Tendency Scale (MTS), ²¹⁸ 9 items, 1-7 scale (1=Completely Disagree, 7=Completely Agree).	Low maximization tendency scores reflect a general tendency to satisfice (i.e., settle for a solution or outcome that is good enough, rather than seeking the absolute best possible option), whereas high scores reflect a general tendency to maximise (i.e., search for and compare all available options to make the optimal choice). ²¹⁸ Since maximisers strive toward selecting the best possible option when making a choice or solving a problem, and degrowth may be the most optimal and effective solution to tackle climate change, ^{3,36,217} higher maximisation tendency may be linked to higher degrowth support.

Psychological Characteristics: Attitudes

Egobiocentrism (EB_EGO), Biospherism (EB_BIO), and Anthropocentrism (EB_ANT): Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Environmental Beliefs (EB) Scale, ²¹⁹ 15 items, 1-5 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 5=Strongly Agree).	Three main environmental beliefs have been identified in the literature: an anthropocentric dimension based on the instrumental value of the environment for humans, a biospheric dimension that values the environment for its own sake, and finally an egobiocentric dimension that values humans within nature as a whole. ²¹⁹ Given that environmental sustainability is one of the key aspects of the degrowth proposal, ^{3,188} the environmental beliefs may play a role in degrowth support. ⁶⁰
New Ecological Paradigm–Balance (NEP_B): Abbreviated New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) Scale, ¹⁶⁰ 5 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree).	Balance characterises the idea that nature is balanced, highly interdependent and complex, and therefore susceptible to human interference. ²²⁰ Since degrowth aims to limit human interference by curbing economic growth, balance should predict support for this alternative economic model.
Resistance to Change-Beliefs–Gradual Change (RC_B_GC) Scale: Resistance to Change-Beliefs (RC_B) Scale, ²²¹ 5 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree).	Resistance to Change-Beliefs–Gradual Change captures the belief that radical change should be avoided in favour of gradual change. ²²¹ Given that degrowth represents a radical departure from the current growth-centred economic system and relies on a sense of urgency to address global warming, resistance to change may undermine support for degrowth.
Psychological Characteristics: Values	
Achievement (PVQ5X_AC), Benevolence-Caring (PVQ5X_BEC), Benevolence-Dependability (PVQ5X_BED), Conformity-Interpersonal (PVQ5X_COI), Conformity-Rules (PVQ5X_COR), Face (PVQ5X_FAC), Hedonism (PVQ5X_HE), Humility (PVQ5X_HU), Power-Dominance (PVQ5X_POD), Power-Resources (PVQ5X_POR), Security-Personal (PVQ5X_SEP), Security-Societal (PVQ5X_SES), Self-Direction Action (PVQ5X_SDA), Self-Direction Thought (PVQ5X_SDT), Stimulation (PVQ5X_ST), Tradition (PVQ5X_TR), Universalism-Concern (PVQ5X_UNC), Universalism-Nature (PVQ5X_UNN), and Universalism-Tolerance (PVQ5X_UNT): PVQ5X Value Survey, ²²² 57 items, 1-6 scale (1=Not like me at all, 6=Very much like me).	Considering that PVQ5X ²²² measures basic individual values, we used it to understand which core values underpin psychological processes regarding degrowth. We measured all values from PVQ5X both to gain a comprehensive and overarching understanding of the importance of values in predicting degrowth support, and given that many of these values could be potentially linked to this economic approach. For example, values comprising openness to change (i.e., <i>Self-direction Action, Self-direction Thought, and Stimulation</i>) and self-transcendence (i.e., <i>Universalism-Concern, Universalism-Nature, Universalism-Tolerance, Benevolence-Caring, and Benevolence-Dependability</i>) may be associated with degrowth support since this economic approach requires a transformative societal change and is underpinned by individuals going beyond their selfish needs to take care of nature and each other. ^{65,188} Furthermore, values comprising conservation (i.e., <i>Conformity-Interpersonal, Conformity-Rules, Tradition, Security-Societal, and Security-Personal</i>) and self-enhancement (i.e., <i>Achievement, Power-Dominance, and Power-Resources</i>) may be negatively linked to degrowth support since this economic approach requires going beyond conformity, tradition, and status quo to transform society, and it requires sacrificing personal success and resources to the benefit of others. ¹⁸⁸
Psychological Characteristics: Wellbeing	
Trait Negative Affect (PANAS_TNA), Trait Positive Affect (PANAS_TPA): Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), ²²³ 20 items, 1-5 scale (1=Very slightly or not at all, 5=Extremely).	People who are high in trait negative (positive) affect are generally more likely to experience negative (positive) state affect across different situations. ^{223,224} As a result, they may be predisposed to negative (positive) psychological reactions toward degrowth due to their generally negative (positive) disposition, ¹⁰ in line with how trait affect operates in other domains. ¹⁶⁴
Life Satisfaction (LST): Life Satisfaction, ¹⁵⁸ 1 item, 0-10 scale (0=Completely dissatisfied, 10=Completely satisfied).	People's life satisfaction is linked to their positive or negative feelings in various areas of their lives, such as health, work, and family. ²²⁵ This individual difference might therefore shape their reactions to different topics and situations, including degrowth. ⁶²

Loneliness (TILS): Three-Item Loneliness Scale (TILS), ²²⁶ 3 items, 1-5 (1=Never, 5=Very Often).	Loneliness emerges when the basic need for belongingness to other members of social groups is not met by the environment.²²⁶ Loneliness is associated with perceived social isolation or feelings of disconnectedness. Since degrowth has a strong community orientation and includes practices aimed at connecting individuals to the society in which they live (e.g., high quality public services, affordable housing, empowering people to contribute to their society, sharing resources),^{64,188} rather than disconnecting them from it, those who feel lonely may be more likely to support degrowth.
Grateful Disposition (GQ): Gratitude Questionnaire–6 (GQ-6), ²²⁷ 6 items, 1-7 scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree).	Highly grateful people tend to view everything they have, including life itself, as a gift. Therefore, feeling grateful can lead one to be thankful for their life and living circumstances and thus justify the system in which they live.²²⁸ Considering that degrowth involves reimagination and transformation of the current economic system,¹⁸⁴ scoring high on grateful disposition could be associated with lower degrowth support.
Demographics and Socioeconomic Variables	
Age (Age): in years.	Previous research showed that age is associated with favourable views about green growth policies. It has also been found that age is negatively correlated with support for degrowth.⁷⁴ Therefore, we expected that this variable could be a potential confound of the relationship between the individual differences tested and support for degrowth.⁶⁶
Gender Identity (Gender): Male vs. Female vs. Nonbinary (Note: Since only seven participants identified themselves as nonbinary in the UK and 13 in the US, this variable was used in its binary version—male vs. female—in all predictive models reported in Supplementary Tables 16-21. For this purpose, to avoid excluding participants, those who identified themselves as nonbinary were randomly classified as either female or male using the RANDBETWEEN function in Excel so they could be used in analyses. This approach was also used in ref. ¹⁶⁴).	Previous research showed that gender can influence people’s support for both green growth and degrowth policies.^{11,69,73} We thus included this variable in our analyses as a potential confound of the relationship between the individual differences tested and support for degrowth.
Household Financial Situation Satisfaction (SatFin): “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?” from the World Values Survey (WVS), ²³¹ 1-10 scale (1=Completely dissatisfied, 10=Completely satisfied).	In some studies, income was negatively associated with degrowth support,⁷⁴ or climate action.⁶⁰ Household financial situation satisfaction could therefore also negatively predict the support variable. People who are well off might infer from a degrowth policy that their income will be negatively impacted, thus having negative views of degrowth.
Political Orientation (Left_Right): “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using the scale below, where would you place yourself on the political spectrum?” adopted from references, ^{74,232} 0-10 scale (0=Left, 10=Right).	Political orientation influences views about economic growth and the environment.^{71,73,233} For instance, support for degrowth⁷⁴ and for a sustainable economy, which emphasise the priority of sustainability even at the cost of economic growth,⁷⁰ is negatively correlated with a right-wing political orientation. Therefore, it was important to probe whether political orientation is one of the most important predictors of degrowth support.
Educational attainment (Education): “What is your highest education level?” from the World Values Survey (WVS), ²³¹ 1-9 scale (1=Early childhood education / no education; 2=Primary education; 3=Lower secondary education; 4=Upper secondary education; 5=Post-secondary non-tertiary education; 6=Short-cycle tertiary education; 7=Bachelor or equivalent; 8=Master or equivalent; 9=Doctoral or equivalent). (Note: Educational attainment was measured in progressive categories from 1-9 so that it could be used as a continuous variable in all predictive	Previous research showed that educational attainment plays a role in public views on economic growth, the environment and prosperity.⁷¹ Consequently, we expected that educational attainment might be related to degrowth support.⁶⁶

models—see Supplementary Tables 16-21—since our main interest was to see whether degrowth support would increase or decrease as people’s educational level increases, and since some categories may substantially differ regarding sample size, so comparing them against each other as categories may not be optimal. This is consistent with other research.)^{234–241}

Number of Children (Children): “How many children do you have?” based on the World Values Survey (WVS),²³¹ 0-21 scale (0=no children, 21=more than 20).

Having one fewer child is presented as one of the most significant choices to reduce carbon footprint at individual level,²⁴² and people experience eco-anxiety through being a parent.²⁴³ Such findings indicate that having children (or not) can be associated to environmental concern and may thus be linked to degrowth support.

Annual Income After Taxes (INCM): personal annual income (after taxes) in US Dollars (\$) or British Pound (£) inputted in numbers, adopted from ref.⁷⁴ (Note: In all predictive models—see Tables 16-21—INCM in £ was converted into \$ using the World Bank purchasing power parities—PPP—conversion factor at the time of our data collection).²⁴⁴ Moreover, INCM was log transformed in line with other research given its skewness.^{245–248}

Since income was found to be negatively correlated with support for degrowth,⁷⁴ it was important to measure it to examine if it is one of the most important predictors of degrowth support.

Household Size (Household): “Including yourself, how many people – including children – live in your household?” from the World Values Survey (WVS),²³¹ 1-21 scale (1=I live on my own, 21=More than 20). (Note: Similar to INCM, in all predictive models—see Tables 16-21—Household Size was log transformed given its skewness.)

There are several ways in which household size could be linked to degrowth support. For example, larger households on average have lower carbon footprint per capita because of sharing resources and living space,²⁵⁰ which means that such households are more compatible with degrowth. Indeed, degrowth often advocates for a reduction in unnecessary consumption that can lead to a more sustainable and financially manageable lifestyle, resonating with households that need to optimize their budgets.²⁵¹

Security (Security): “How secure do you feel these days?” from the World Values Survey (WVS),²³¹ 1-4 scale (1=Not at all secure; 2=Not very secure; 3=Quite secure; 4=Very secure).

Feeling less secure in one’s surroundings is an indicator of socioeconomic status (SES) as it can be linked to crime in one’s neighbourhood, job insecurity, and various other concerns associated with lower welfare.^{252,253} Since the full degrowth proposal is about improving human welfare,¹ it could be appealing to individuals who feel less secure.

Employment Status (Employed): “What is your employment status?” adopted from reference,¹⁶⁴ 0-2 scale (0=Unemployed; 1=Self-employed; 2=Employed and working for an employer). (Note: For statistical analyses, 1 and 2 were combined into the same category, and the variable therefore had two levels: 0=Unemployed; 1=Employed).

Unemployment is one of the problems pointed out in relation to economic growth,⁷² and it could thus be linked to degrowth support. For example, people without a job might be more likely to support degrowth since it involves a public job guarantee.¹

Note. Although the recruitment platform (Prolific) provides information on participants’ ethnicity (categories: Asian, Black, Mixed, White, Other), which is summarised in Supplementary Table 6, we did not include this variable in our statistical analyses because neither our previous research⁷⁴ nor our current data indicated any relationship between ethnicity and support for degrowth. Additionally, the large discrepancy in participant numbers across ethnic groups in our representative samples could introduce bias into the analyses.

Supplementary Table 2: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Age)

Frequency distribution of Age (binned into eight brackets: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85+), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.055
Number (N) of Participants per Age Category								
18-24 N	93	100	193	183	74	85	168	171
25-34 N	224	246	399	447	180	214	349	415
35-44 N	232	192	397	367	173	161	356	336
45-54 N	177	173	323	318	150	150	287	281
55-64 N	246	249	427	408	205	211	373	372
65-74 N	124	128	223	238	110	104	202	221
75-84 N	21	15	38	40	18	13	33	36
85+ N	0	4	0	1	0	3	0	1
Percentage (%) of Participants per Age Category								
18-24 %	8.326	9.033	9.645	9.136	8.132	9.033	9.497	9.324
25-34 %	20.054	22.222	19.940	22.317	19.780	22.742	19.729	22.628
35-44 %	20.770	17.344	19.840	18.323	19.011	17.109	20.124	18.321
45-54 %	15.846	15.628	16.142	15.876	16.484	15.940	16.224	15.322
55-64 %	22.023	22.493	21.339	20.369	22.527	22.423	21.085	20.284
65-74 %	11.101	11.563	11.144	11.882	12.088	11.052	11.419	12.050
75-84 %	1.880	1.355	1.899	1.997	1.978	1.382	1.865	1.963
85+ %	0.000	0.361	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.319	0.000	0.055

Note. Age was reported in years. For the purpose of frequency reporting, it was binned into eight brackets: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85+. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 3: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Annual Income After Taxes)

Frequency distribution of Annual Income After Taxes (INCM), binned into nine brackets (\$0-24,999; \$25,000-49,999; \$50,000-74,999; \$75,000-99,999; \$100,000-149,999; \$150,000-199,999; \$200,000-299,999; \$300,000-499,999; and \$500,000+), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	10	5	15	7	8	5	13	7
Missing %	0.895	0.452	0.75	0.349	0.879	0.531	0.735	0.382
Number (N) of Participants per Income Category								
\$0-24,999 N	350	334	594	585	279	290	519	542
\$25,000-49,999 N	503	296	913	566	417	260	815	523
\$50,000-74,999 N	171	232	329	354	138	192	298	323
\$75,000-99,999 N	45	114	95	230	37	88	77	209
\$100,000-149,999 N	31	82	42	166	25	68	36	149
\$150,000-199,999 N	0	21	8	65	0	17	6	56
\$200,000-299,999 N	4	16	4	21	3	15	4	17
\$300,000-499,999 N	3	4	1	7	3	4	1	7
\$500,000+ N	0	3	0	2	0	2	0	1
Percentage (%) of Participants per Income Category								
\$0-24,999 %	31.334	30.172	29.685	29.206	30.659	30.818	29.339	29.553
\$25,000-49,999 %	45.031	26.739	45.627	28.258	45.824	27.630	46.071	28.517
\$50,000-74,999 %	15.309	20.958	16.442	17.673	15.165	20.404	16.846	17.612
\$75,000-99,999 %	4.029	10.298	4.748	11.483	4.066	9.352	4.353	11.396
\$100,000-149,999 %	2.775	7.407	2.099	8.288	2.747	7.226	2.035	8.124
\$150,000-199,999 %	0.000	1.897	0.400	3.245	0.000	1.807	0.339	3.053
\$200,000-299,999 %	0.358	1.445	0.200	1.048	0.330	1.594	0.226	0.927
\$300,000-499,999 %	0.269	0.361	0.050	0.349	0.330	0.425	0.057	0.382
\$500,000+ %	0.000	0.271	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.213	0.000	0.055

Note. Annual Income After Taxes was reported in £ for the UK and \$ for the US, but Income in £ was converted into \$ using the World Bank purchasing power parities—PPP—conversion factor²⁴⁴ at the time of our data collection for easier comparison. For the purpose of frequency reporting, it was binned into eight brackets: \$0-24,999; \$25,000-49,999; \$50,000-74,999; \$75,000-99,999; \$100,000-149,999; \$150,000-199,999; \$200,000-299,999; \$300,000-499,999; and \$500,000+. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support in its non-binned version in \$ and log transformed in line with other research given its skewness^{245–248} (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 4: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Household Financial Situation Satisfaction)

Frequency distribution of Household Financial Situation Satisfaction (SatFin), measured on a 1-10 scale (1 = Completely Dissatisfied, 10 = Completely Satisfied), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.055

Number (N) of Participants per Income Satisfaction Level (1=Lowest, 10=Highest)								
1 N	36	66	69	157	27	59	59	143
2 N	53	66	87	164	47	56	74	150
3 N	90	119	186	209	78	107	172	198
4 N	116	100	210	218	87	90	185	204
5 N	103	106	253	188	86	89	220	173
6 N	192	143	338	277	150	116	305	257
7 N	253	182	441	302	209	156	385	271
8 N	188	173	305	308	153	144	268	277
9 N	63	102	74	120	53	80	66	107
10 N	23	50	38	59	20	44	35	53

Percentage (%) of Participants per Income Satisfaction Level (1=Lowest, 10=Highest)								
1 %	3.223	5.962	3.448	7.838	2.967	6.270	3.335	7.797
2 %	4.745	5.962	4.348	8.188	5.165	5.951	4.183	8.179
3 %	8.057	10.750	9.295	10.434	8.571	11.371	9.723	10.796
4 %	10.385	9.033	10.495	10.884	9.560	9.564	10.458	11.123
5 %	9.221	9.575	12.644	9.386	9.451	9.458	12.436	9.433
6 %	17.189	12.918	16.892	13.829	16.484	12.327	17.241	14.013
7 %	22.650	16.441	22.039	15.077	22.967	16.578	21.764	14.776
8 %	16.831	15.628	15.242	15.377	16.813	15.303	15.150	15.104
9 %	5.640	9.214	3.698	5.991	5.824	8.502	3.731	5.834
10 %	2.059	4.517	1.899	2.946	2.198	4.676	1.979	2.890

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 5: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Employment Status)

Frequency distribution of Employment Status (Employed), reported on a 0-2 scale (0 = Unemployed; 1 = Self-employed; 2 = Employed and working for an employer), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	1	0	4	4	1	0	4	4
Missing %	0.090	0.000	0.200	0.200	0.110	0.000	0.226	0.218
Number (N) of Participants per Employment Category								
Unemployed N	299	265	512	516	246	241	451	477
Self-employed N	173	197	251	331	140	167	220	298
Employed (Working for Employer) N	644	645	1234	1152	523	533	1094	1055
Percentage (%) of Participants per Employment Category								
Unemployed %	26.768	23.939	25.587	25.761	27.033	25.611	25.495	26.009
Self-employed %	15.488	17.796	12.544	16.525	15.385	17.747	12.436	16.249
Employed (Working for Employer) %	57.654	58.266	61.669	57.514	57.473	56.642	61.843	57.525

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Please note that, for statistical analyses, categories 1 and 2 were combined into the same category, and the variable therefore had two levels: 0=Unemployed; 1=Employed. Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 6: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Ethnicity)

Frequency distribution of participant Ethnicity (White, Black, Asian, Mixed, and Other), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number (N) of Participants per Ethnicity Category								
White N	977	857	1746	1559	803	742	1546	1445
Black N	36	145	62	256	25	111	51	217
Asian N	76	66	145	120	61	55	132	108
Mixed N	17	22	30	38	15	21	24	38
Other N	11	17	18	30	6	12	16	26
Percentage (%) of Participants per Ethnicity Category								
White %	87.466	77.416	87.256	77.833	88.242	78.852	87.394	78.790
Black %	3.223	13.098	3.098	12.781	2.747	11.796	2.883	11.832
Asian %	6.804	5.962	7.246	5.991	6.703	5.845	7.462	5.889
Mixed %	1.522	1.987	1.499	1.897	1.648	2.232	1.357	2.072
Other %	0.985	1.536	0.900	1.498	0.659	1.275	0.904	1.418

Note. Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 7: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Gender Identity)

Frequency distribution of participant Gender Identity (Male, Female, and Nonbinary), shown separately for UK vs. US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.109
Number (N) of Participants per Gender Identity Category								
Male N	532	537	968	979	441	450	849	883
Female N	577	553	1022	995	462	478	910	922
Nonbinary N	8	17	11	27	7	13	10	27
Percentage (%) of Participants per Gender Identity Category								
Male %	47.628	48.509	48.376	48.877	48.462	47.821	47.993	48.146
Female %	51.656	49.955	51.074	49.675	50.769	50.797	51.441	50.273
Nonbinary %	0.716	1.536	0.550	1.348	0.769	1.382	0.565	1.472

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Since few participants identified themselves as nonbinary in the UK and US, this variable was used in its binary version—male vs. female—in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (Supplementary Tables 16-21). For this purpose, to avoid excluding participants, those who identified themselves as nonbinary were randomly classified as either female or male using the RANDBETWEEN function in Excel so they could be used in analyses. This approach was also used in ref.¹⁶⁴ Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 8: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Educational Attainment)

Frequency distribution of Educational Attainment (Education), measured on a 1-9 scale (1 = Early childhood education/no education, 2 = Primary education, 3 = Lower secondary, 4 = Upper secondary, 5 = Post-secondary non-tertiary, 6 = Short-cycle tertiary, 7 = Bachelor's or equivalent, 8 = Master's or equivalent, 9 = Doctoral or equivalent), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number (N) of Participants per Educational Attainment Level								
Early childhood education / no education N	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	2
Primary education N	3	34	5	76	1	29	4	64
Lower secondary education N	44	31	67	51	38	28	60	44
Upper secondary education N	228	175	393	280	184	154	353	264
Post-secondary non-tertiary education N	128	103	235	178	104	88	205	167
Short-cycle tertiary education N	58	112	100	196	50	101	91	184
Bachelor or equivalent N	437	459	814	859	351	381	715	778
Master or equivalent N	178	158	320	289	147	134	283	267
Doctoral or equivalent N	41	34	66	72	35	25	57	64
Percentage (%) of Participants per Educational Attainment Level								
Early childhood education / no education %	0.000	0.090	0.050	0.100	0.000	0.106	0.057	0.109
Primary education %	0.269	3.071	0.250	3.794	0.110	3.082	0.226	3.490
Lower secondary education %	3.939	2.800	3.348	2.546	4.176	2.976	3.392	2.399
Upper secondary education %	20.412	15.808	19.640	13.979	20.220	16.366	19.955	14.395
Post-secondary non-tertiary education %	11.459	9.304	11.744	8.887	11.429	9.352	11.588	9.106
Short-cycle tertiary education %	5.192	10.117	4.998	9.785	5.495	10.733	5.144	10.033
Bachelor or equivalent %	39.123	41.463	40.680	42.886	38.571	40.489	40.418	42.421
Master or equivalent %	15.936	14.273	15.992	14.428	16.154	14.240	15.998	14.558
Doctoral or equivalent %	3.671	3.071	3.298	3.595	3.846	2.657	3.222	3.490

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 9: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Security)

Frequency distribution of Security (i.e., how secure people feel these days), measured on a 1-10 scale (1 = Not at all secure, 2 = Not very secure, 3 = Quite secure, 4 = Very secure), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	1	9	7	0	1	9	6
Missing %	0.000	0.090	0.450	0.349	0.000	0.106	0.509	0.327
Number (N) of Participants per Security Level								
Not at all secure N	67	74	113	173	55	68	102	157
Not very secure N	349	356	641	735	287	316	554	690
Quite secure N	611	539	1091	915	490	445	980	830
Very secure N	90	137	147	173	78	111	124	151
Percentage (%) of Participants per Security Level								
Not at all secure %	5.998	6.685	5.647	8.637	6.044	7.226	5.766	8.561
Not very secure %	31.244	32.159	32.034	36.695	31.538	33.581	31.317	37.623
Quite secure %	54.700	48.690	54.523	45.681	53.846	47.29	55.399	45.256
Very secure %	8.057	12.376	7.346	8.637	8.571	11.796	7.010	8.233

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 10: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Political Orientation)

Frequency distribution of Political Orientation (Left_Right), measured on a 0-10 scale (from 0 = Left to 10 = Right), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.100	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.109

Number (N) of Participants per Political Orientation Level (0=Left, 10=Right)								
0 N	60	198	84	305	48	173	75	280
1 N	85	133	133	217	68	115	122	198
2 N	156	127	266	251	127	107	236	232
3 N	147	66	275	148	116	60	247	135
4 N	88	66	209	152	75	59	190	140
5 N	324	197	557	378	261	160	475	351
6 N	113	63	198	125	96	48	175	116
7 N	76	49	147	116	66	38	131	105
8 N	37	77	82	142	30	68	72	125
9 N	13	64	26	79	9	55	24	74
10 N	18	67	23	88	14	58	21	76

Percentage (%) of Participants per Political Orientation Level (0=Left, 10=Right)								
0 %	5.372	17.886	4.198	15.227	5.275	18.385	4.240	15.267
1 %	7.610	12.014	6.647	10.834	7.473	12.221	6.897	10.796
2 %	13.966	11.472	13.293	12.531	13.956	11.371	13.341	12.650
3 %	13.160	5.962	13.743	7.389	12.747	6.376	13.963	7.361
4 %	7.878	5.962	10.445	7.589	8.242	6.270	10.741	7.634
5 %	29.006	17.796	27.836	18.872	28.681	17.003	26.851	19.138
6 %	10.116	5.691	9.895	6.241	10.549	5.101	9.893	6.325
7 %	6.804	4.426	7.346	5.791	7.253	4.038	7.405	5.725
8 %	3.312	6.956	4.098	7.089	3.297	7.226	4.070	6.816
9 %	1.164	5.781	1.299	3.944	0.989	5.845	1.357	4.035
10 %	1.611	6.052	1.149	4.393	1.538	6.164	1.187	4.144

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 11: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Number of Children)

Frequency distribution of Number of Children (Children), measured on a 0-21 scale (from 0 = No children to 21 = More than 20 children; please note that no one reported having more than 10 children), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missing %	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Number (N) of Participants per Number of Children Level (0=No Children, 10=10 Children)								
0 N	489	528	878	956	390	453	785	885
1 N	156	164	330	313	126	139	295	276
2 N	310	229	546	420	257	187	473	395
3 N	109	119	178	194	93	104	156	175
4 N	36	48	55	80	32	42	48	70
5 N	12	15	10	25	9	12	8	20
6 N	4	2	4	8	3	2	4	7
7 N	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	5
8 N	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
9 N	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
10 N	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Percentage (%) of Participants per Number of Children Level (0=No Children, 10=10 Children)								
0 %	43.778	47.696	43.878	47.728	42.857	48.140	44.375	48.255
1 %	13.966	14.815	16.492	15.627	13.846	14.772	16.676	15.049
2 %	27.753	20.687	27.286	20.969	28.242	19.872	26.738	21.538
3 %	9.758	10.750	8.896	9.685	10.220	11.052	8.819	9.542
4 %	3.223	4.336	2.749	3.994	3.516	4.463	2.713	3.817
5 %	1.074	1.355	0.500	1.248	0.989	1.275	0.452	1.091
6 %	0.358	0.181	0.200	0.399	0.330	0.213	0.226	0.382
7 %	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.300	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.273
8 %	0.000	0.090	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.106	0.000	0.055
9 %	0.000	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.106	0.000	0.000
10 %	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 12: Breakdown of Participant Demographic Information (Household Size)

Frequency distribution of Household Size (Household), measured on a 0-21 scale (from 1 = I Live on My Own to 21 = More than 20), shown separately for UK vs US and for all participants who completed a study as well as those who were eligible for analyses due to passing attention and quality checks

Dataset	Study 1 All	Study 1 All	Study 2 All	Study 2 All	Study 1 Eligible	Study 1 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible	Study 2 Eligible
Country	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US	UK	US
Total N	1117	1107	2001	2003	910	941	1769	1834
Missing N	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	2
Missing %	0.000	0.09	0.05	0.100	0.000	0.106	0.057	0.109
Number (N) of Participants per Household Size (1=I Live on My Own to 21=More than 20)								
1 N	165	224	291	426	133	184	261	389
2 N	410	362	768	685	340	317	690	635
3 N	221	229	438	389	182	197	383	351
4 N	215	173	353	307	175	142	309	286
5 N	74	77	110	113	60	65	93	98
6 N	21	27	30	52	12	24	23	48
7 N	8	8	6	17	6	6	6	14
8 N	2	3	1	8	2	3	1	7
9 N	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	2
10 N	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	2
11 N	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
14 N	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
21 N	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Percentage (%) of Participants per Household Size (1=I Live on My Own to 21=More than 20)								
1 %	14.772	20.235	14.543	21.268	14.615	19.554	14.754	21.210
2 %	36.705	32.701	38.381	34.199	37.363	33.688	39.005	34.624
3 %	19.785	20.687	21.889	19.421	20.000	20.935	21.651	19.138
4 %	19.248	15.628	17.641	15.327	19.231	15.090	17.467	15.594
5 %	6.625	6.956	5.497	5.642	6.593	6.908	5.257	5.344
6 %	1.880	2.439	1.499	2.596	1.319	2.550	1.300	2.617
7 %	0.716	0.723	0.300	0.849	0.659	0.638	0.339	0.763
8 %	0.179	0.271	0.050	0.399	0.220	0.319	0.057	0.382
9 %	0.090	0.090	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.109
10 %	0.000	0.090	0.000	0.100	0.000	0.106	0.000	0.109
11 %	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
14 %	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.000
21 %	0.000	0.090	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.106	0.057	0.000

Note. This variable was used in analyses examining potential predictors of public support, where it was log transformed given its skewness (more information about this and other predictors is available in Supplementary Table 1, whereas analysis output is available in Supplementary Tables 16-21). Information about attention and quality checks is available in Supplementary Material (p.11).

Supplementary Table 13: Support for Economic Approaches (Means and Classifications; Studies 1 and 2)

Means, and their 95% confidence intervals and classifications for people's support for economic approaches assessed in Studies 1 and 2 (table note explains how Mean Classification was determined)

Economic Approach ^a	Mean	Mean 95% CI	Mean Classification ^b
Sample 1 – UK			
Economic Approach Support (Study 1)			
Full Proposal	5.373	5.286 – 5.459	“Somewhat support”
Degrowth	3.842	3.754 – 3.929	“Neither support nor oppose”
Ecomodernism	4.857	4.784 – 4.930	“Somewhat support”
Ecosocialism	4.721	4.628 – 4.814	“Somewhat support”
Wellbeing Economy	5.455	5.378 – 5.532	“Somewhat support” to “Support”
Green Capitalism	4.489	4.408 – 4.570	“Neither support nor oppose” to “Somewhat Support”
Green Growth	5.170	5.095 – 5.246	“Somewhat Support”
Green Market Economy	5.026	4.951 – 5.102	“Somewhat Support”
Post Growth	4.427	4.357 – 4.498	“Neither support nor oppose”
Economic Approach Support (Study 2)			
Full Proposal	5.337	5.173 – 5.501	“Somewhat support” to “Support”
Degrowth	4.024	3.896 – 4.152	“Neither support nor oppose”
Ecosocialism	4.365	4.231 – 4.499	“Neither support nor oppose”
Wellbeing Economy	4.824	4.693 – 4.954	“Somewhat support”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	5.081	4.902 – 5.259	“Somewhat support”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	5.032	4.844 – 5.220	“Somewhat support”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	5.376	5.217 – 5.535	“Somewhat support” to “Support”
Sample 2 – US			
Economic Approach Support (Study 1)			
Full Proposal	5.068	4.961 – 5.176	“Somewhat support”
Degrowth	3.832	3.734 – 3.930	“Neither support nor oppose”
Ecomodernism	4.696	4.604 – 4.788	“Somewhat support”
Ecosocialism	4.607	4.494 – 4.719	“Neither support nor oppose” to “Somewhat Support”
Wellbeing Economy	5.261	5.168 – 5.355	“Somewhat support”
Green Capitalism	4.492	4.394 – 4.590	“Neither support nor oppose” to “Somewhat Support”
Green Growth	4.994	4.898 – 5.089	“Somewhat support”
Green Market Economy	4.911	4.815 – 5.006	“Somewhat support”
Post Growth	4.365	4.278 – 4.451	“Neither support nor oppose”
Economic Approach Support (Study 2)			
Full Proposal	4.969	4.763 – 5.176	“Somewhat Support”
Degrowth	3.630	3.484 – 3.776	“Somewhat oppose” to “Neither support nor oppose”
Ecosocialism	4.096	3.923 – 4.269	“Neither support nor oppose”
Wellbeing Economy	4.613	4.478 – 4.747	“Neither support nor oppose” to “Somewhat Support”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	4.788	4.578 – 4.999	“Somewhat Support”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	4.856	4.631 – 5.081	“Somewhat Support”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	4.940	4.720 – 5.159	“Somewhat Support”

Note. ^a For Study 2, Economic Approach refers to the seven economic approaches to which participants could be randomly allocated (i.e., Full Proposal, Degrowth, Ecosocialism, Wellbeing Economy, Full Proposal + Degrowth, Full Proposal + Ecosocialism, and Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy), whereas for Study 1 it refers to the eight economic approaches regarding which all participants were asked to respond (i.e., Full Proposal, Degrowth, Ecomodernism, Ecosocialism, Wellbeing Economy, Green Capitalism, Green Growth, Green Market Economy, and Post Growth).

^b Mean classification was determined based on the 95% CI in relation to participants' response options for Economic Approach Support. The response options for this variable were 1=Strongly oppose; 2=Oppose; 3=Somewhat oppose; 4=Neither support nor oppose; 5=Somewhat support; 6=Support; and 7=Strongly support. Therefore, the mean classification was as follows: 95% CI ≤ 1.5 = Strongly oppose; 95% CI > 1.5 & ≤ 2.5 = Oppose; 95% CI > 2.5 & ≤ 3.5 = Somewhat oppose; 95% CI > 3.5 & ≤ 4.5 = Neither support nor oppose; 95% CI > 4.5 & ≤ 5.5 = Somewhat support; 95% CI > 5.5 & ≤ 6.5 = Support; 95% CI > 6.5 = Strongly support.

If two rather than one classification applied to a mean, both classifications are listed under Mean Classification (e.g., “Somewhat support” to “Support”).

Supplementary Table 14: Comparisons of Support for Economic Approaches (Study 1)

Comparisons between participants' support for the full degrowth proposal without any labels (referred to as "full proposal" in the table) and for other economic approaches labelled by their name only, computed using paired t-tests (Study 1)

Comparison Item 1	Comparison Item 2	M _{diff}	95% CI	t	p
Sample 1 – UK					
Degrowth	Ecomodernism	-1.015	-1.110 – -0.921	-21.121	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Full Proposal	-1.531	-1.627 – -1.434	-31.158	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Ecosocialism	-0.879	-0.976 – -0.782	-17.761	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Green Capitalism	-0.647	-0.756 – -0.539	-11.686	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Green Growth	-1.329	-1.428 – -1.230	-26.326	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Green Market Economy	-1.185	-1.282 – -1.087	-23.802	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Post Growth	-0.586	-0.671 – -0.501	-13.519	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Wellbeing Economy	-1.613	-1.711 – -1.515	-32.359	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Full Proposal	-0.515	-0.594 – -0.437	-12.935	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Ecosocialism	0.136	0.054 – 0.218	3.262	0.001*
Ecomodernism	Green Capitalism	0.368	0.283 – 0.453	8.494	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Green Growth	-0.313	-0.383 – -0.243	-8.800	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Green Market Economy	-0.169	-0.240 – -0.099	-4.723	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Post Growth	0.430	0.352 – 0.507	10.902	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Wellbeing Economy	-0.598	-0.671 – -0.524	-15.972	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Ecosocialism	0.652	0.578 – 0.725	17.412	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Green Capitalism	0.884	0.786 – 0.981	17.793	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Green Growth	0.202	0.125 – 0.279	5.163	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Green Market Economy	0.346	0.271 – 0.422	8.984	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Post Growth	0.945	0.856 – 1.034	20.876	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Wellbeing Economy	-0.082	-0.156 – -0.009	-2.198	0.028
Ecosocialism	Green Capitalism	0.232	0.128 – 0.336	4.388	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Green Growth	-0.449	-0.536 – -0.363	-10.203	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Green Market Economy	-0.305	-0.390 – -0.221	-7.073	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Post Growth	0.293	0.201 – 0.386	6.251	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Wellbeing Economy	-0.734	-0.818 – -0.650	-17.126	<0.0001*
Green Capitalism	Green Growth	-0.681	-0.760 – -0.603	-16.981	<0.0001*
Green Capitalism	Green Market Economy	-0.537	-0.611 – -0.463	-14.275	<0.0001*
Green Capitalism	Post Growth	0.062	-0.031 – 0.154	1.302	0.193
Green Capitalism	Wellbeing Economy	-0.966	-1.061 – -0.871	-19.987	<0.0001*
Green Growth	Green Market Economy	0.144	0.086 – 0.202	4.839	<0.0001*
Green Growth	Post Growth	0.743	0.663 – 0.823	18.241	<0.0001*
Green Growth	Wellbeing Economy	-0.285	-0.353 – -0.217	-8.222	<0.0001*
Green Market Economy	Post Growth	0.599	0.516 – 0.682	14.223	<0.0001*
Green Market Economy	Wellbeing Economy	-0.429	-0.500 – -0.358	-11.845	<0.0001*
Postgrowth	Wellbeing Economy	-1.027	-1.106 – -0.949	-25.718	<0.0001*
Sample 2 – US					
Degrowth	Ecomodernism	-0.864	-0.965 – -0.763	-16.839	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Full Proposal	-1.236	-1.341 – -1.131	-23.139	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Ecosocialism	-0.775	-0.876 – -0.673	-14.960	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Green Capitalism	-0.660	-0.772 – -0.548	-11.531	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Green Growth	-1.162	-1.262 – -1.061	-22.576	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Green Market Economy	-1.079	-1.182 – -0.975	-20.494	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Post Growth	-0.532	-0.619 – -0.445	-12.003	<0.0001*
Degrowth	Wellbeing Economy	-1.429	-1.534 – -1.325	-26.915	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Full Proposal	-0.372	-0.458 – -0.286	-8.505	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Ecosocialism	0.089	-0.004 – 0.183	1.873	0.061
Ecomodernism	Green Capitalism	0.204	0.114 – 0.294	4.446	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Green Growth	-0.298	-0.373 – -0.222	-7.718	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Green Market Economy	-0.215	-0.292 – -0.137	-5.422	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Post Growth	0.332	0.245 – 0.418	7.496	<0.0001*
Ecomodernism	Wellbeing Economy	-0.565	-0.644 – -0.486	-14.055	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Ecosocialism	0.461	0.375 – 0.548	10.460	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Green Capitalism	0.576	0.470 – 0.682	10.620	<0.0001*
Full Proposal	Green Growth	0.074	-0.011 – 0.160	1.715	0.087
Full Proposal	Green Market Economy	0.157	0.071 – 0.244	3.564	<0.001*
Full Proposal	Post Growth	0.704	0.607 – 0.800	14.356	<0.0001*

Full Proposal	Wellbeing Economy	-0.193	-0.274 – -0.113	-4.721	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Green Capitalism	0.115	-0.002 – 0.231	1.931	0.054
Ecosocialism	Green Growth	-0.387	-0.481 – -0.293	-8.092	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Green Market Economy	-0.304	-0.400 – -0.208	-6.210	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Post Growth	0.242	0.144 – 0.340	4.853	<0.0001*
Ecosocialism	Wellbeing Economy	-0.655	-0.746 – -0.564	-14.107	<0.0001*
Green Capitalism	Green Growth	-0.502	-0.582 – -0.422	-12.299	<0.0001*
Green Capitalism	Green Market Economy	-0.419	-0.499 – -0.339	-10.274	<0.0001*
Green Capitalism	Post Growth	0.128	0.030 – 0.226	2.554	0.011
Green Capitalism	Wellbeing Economy	-0.769	-0.868 – -0.671	-15.368	<0.0001*
Green Growth	Green Market Economy	0.083	0.024 – 0.142	2.764	0.006
Green Growth	Post Growth	0.629	0.541 – 0.717	14.018	<0.0001*
Green Growth	Wellbeing Economy	-0.268	-0.345 – -0.191	-6.823	<0.0001*
Green Market Economy	Post Growth	0.546	0.456 – 0.636	11.889	<0.0001*
Green Market Economy	Wellbeing Economy	-0.351	-0.430 – -0.271	-8.685	<0.0001*
Postgrowth	Wellbeing Economy	-0.897	-0.984 – -0.810	-20.252	<0.0001*

Note. Participants' support for all economic approaches was rated on a scale from 1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly support. Comparison

Items 1 and 2 refer to the economic approaches that were compared against each other. M_{diff} refers to mean difference. The study used a within-subjects design, which means that each participant rated their support of all economic approaches. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00159977 and are labelled with *. Mean values for participants' support of the economic approaches reported in this table are available in Supplementary Table 13.

Supplementary Table 15: Comparisons of Support for Economic Approaches (Study 2)

Comparisons between participants' support for the full degrowth proposal without any labels (referred to as "full proposal" in the table) and for other economic approaches labelled by their name only (degrowth and ecosocialism) or the "full proposal"-label combinations, computed using linear regressions (Study 2)

Variable (Economic Approach)	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f^2	Partial R^2 %
Sample 1 – UK							
Model 1: Baseline = Full Proposal							
(Constant)	5.337	0.079	5.183 – 5.492	67.797	<0.0001	2.609	72.289
Degrowth	-1.313	0.112	-1.533 – -1.094	-11.737	<0.0001*	0.078	7.252
Ecosocialism	-0.973	0.111	-1.191 – -0.754	-8.735	<0.0001*	0.043	4.151
Wellbeing Economy	-0.514	0.111	-0.731 – -0.296	-4.639	<0.0001*	0.012	1.207
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.257	0.112	-0.477 – -0.037	-2.289	0.022	0.003	0.296
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.305	0.112	-0.525 – -0.086	-2.728	0.006	0.004	0.421
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.039	0.112	-0.181 – 0.258	0.346	0.729	<0.001	0.007
Model 2: Baseline = Degrowth							
(Constant)	4.024	0.080	3.868 – 4.180	50.611	<0.0001	1.454	59.246
Ecosocialism	0.341	0.112	0.121 – 0.560	3.045	0.002*	0.005	0.523
Wellbeing Economy	0.800	0.111	0.582 – 1.018	7.189	<0.0001*	0.029	2.849
Full Proposal + Degrowth	1.057	0.113	0.836 – 1.278	9.378	<0.0001*	0.050	4.754
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	1.008	0.112	0.787 – 1.229	8.965	<0.0001*	0.046	4.362
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.352	0.112	1.131 – 1.573	12.024	<0.0001*	0.082	7.583
Model 3: Baseline = Ecosocialism							
(Constant)	4.365	0.079	4.210 – 4.519	55.443	<0.0001	1.745	63.564
Wellbeing Economy	0.459	0.111	0.242 – 0.676	4.147	<0.0001*	0.010	0.967
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.716	0.112	0.496 – 0.936	6.386	<0.0001*	0.023	2.262
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.667	0.112	0.448 – 0.887	5.964	<0.0001*	0.020	1.979
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.011	0.112	0.792 – 1.231	9.038	<0.0001*	0.046	4.431
Model 4: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy							
(Constant)	4.824	0.078	4.671 – 4.976	61.991	<0.0001	2.181	68.563
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.257	0.111	0.038 – 0.476	2.304	0.021	0.003	0.300
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.208	0.111	-0.010 – 0.426	1.872	0.061	0.002	0.198
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.552	0.111	0.334 – 0.770	4.964	<0.0001*	0.014	1.379
Model 5: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth							
(Constant)	5.081	0.080	4.924 – 5.237	63.645	<0.0001	2.299	69.687
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.049	0.113	-0.270 – 0.172	-0.432	0.666	<0.001	0.011
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.295	0.113	0.074 – 0.516	2.621	0.009	0.004	0.389
Model 6: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism							
(Constant)	5.032	0.080	4.876 – 5.188	63.289	<0.0001	2.273	69.450
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.344	0.112	0.123 – 0.565	3.059	0.002*	0.005	0.528
Sample 2 – US							
Model 7: Baseline = Full Proposal							
(Constant)	4.969	0.097	4.779 – 5.159	51.355	<0.0001	1.444	59.075
Degrowth	-1.340	0.136	-1.605 – -1.074	-9.881	<0.0001*	0.053	5.073
Ecosocialism	-0.873	0.137	-1.141 – -0.605	-6.380	<0.0001*	0.022	2.179
Wellbeing Economy	-0.357	0.135	-0.622 – -0.091	-2.633	0.009	0.004	0.378
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.181	0.137	-0.449 – 0.088	-1.321	0.187	0.001	0.095
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.113	0.136	-0.381 – 0.154	-0.830	0.407	<0.001	0.038
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.029	0.138	-0.301 – 0.242	-0.213	0.831	<0.001	0.002
Model 8: Baseline = Degrowth							
(Constant)	3.630	0.095	3.443 – 3.816	38.225	<0.0001	0.800	44.437
Ecosocialism	0.467	0.136	0.201 – 0.732	3.441	0.001*	0.006	0.644
Wellbeing Economy	0.983	0.134	0.720 – 1.246	7.326	<0.0001*	0.029	2.854
Full Proposal + Degrowth	1.159	0.136	0.893 – 1.425	8.548	<0.0001*	0.040	3.845

Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	1.226	0.135	0.962 – 1.491	9.082	<0.0001*	0.045	4.319
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.310	0.137	1.041 – 1.579	9.557	<0.0001*	0.050	4.761

Model 9: Baseline = Ecosocialism

(Constant)	4.096	0.097	3.906 – 4.286	42.332	<0.0001	0.981	49.516
Wellbeing Economy	0.516	0.135	0.251 – 0.782	3.812	<0.001*	0.008	0.789
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.692	0.137	0.424 – 0.961	5.059	<0.0001*	0.014	1.382
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.760	0.136	0.493 – 1.027	5.574	<0.0001*	0.017	1.672
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.844	0.138	0.572 – 1.115	6.098	<0.0001*	0.020	1.995

Model 10: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy

(Constant)	4.613	0.095	4.427 – 4.798	48.667	<0.0001	1.296	56.453
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.176	0.135	-0.090 – 0.442	1.299	0.194	0.001	0.092
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.244	0.135	-0.021 – 0.508	1.805	0.071	0.002	0.178
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.327	0.137	0.059 – 0.596	2.389	0.017	0.003	0.311

Model 11: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth

(Constant)	4.788	0.097	4.599 – 4.978	49.487	<0.0001	1.340	57.272
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.068	0.136	-0.200 – 0.335	0.496	0.620	<0.001	0.013
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.151	0.138	-0.120 – 0.423	1.094	0.274	0.001	0.065

Model 12: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism

(Constant)	4.856	0.096	4.668 – 5.044	50.570	<0.0001	1.400	58.329
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.084	0.138	-0.187 – 0.354	0.607	0.544	<0.001	0.020

Note. For models 1-6, $R^2 = 0.121$, and for models 7-12, $R^2 = 0.084$. Models 1-6 and 7-12 had 1769 and 1827 residual degrees of freedom respectively. Participants' support for the economic approach was rated on a scale from 1=Strongly oppose to 7=Strongly support. Although all models had the same number of variables, we report only unique comparisons not repeated in other models to avoid redundancy—this explains why some models have fewer variables. In all models, we used t-tests (two-sided) to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00350789 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each economic approach relative to the baseline (e.g., Wellbeing Economy relative to the Full Proposal), after controlling for the other approaches.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 1.207 indicates that a given economic approach, relative to the baseline, explains about 1.2 % of the outcome's variance beyond what is accounted for by the other approaches. Mean values for participants' support of the economic approaches reported in this table are available in Supplementary Table 13.

Supplementary Table 16: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support Across Machine Learning (ML) Models (Study 1)

ML models most predictive of support for the full degrowth proposal and their 30 most important individual difference predictors (Study 1)

Overall, as shown in the table, the most predictive ML models were lasso (RMSE = 1.155), ridge (RMSE = 1.160), elastic net (RMSE = 1.155), random forest (RMSE = 1.174), and conditional random forest (RMSE = 1.162). Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) measures how accurately each model predicted people's actual support levels when tested on data the model had not processed during training (using 10-fold cross-validation)—the lower the number, the better the predictions. RMSE was chosen as the primary evaluation metric because it is one of the most widely used measures of predictive accuracy in machine learning.²⁵⁴ Although model selection was based on RMSE, the analyses also produced R^2 values, which may be more intuitive to interpret because they are commonly used in linear models. For the five most predictive models, R^2 values ranged from 0.414 to 0.426, indicating that these models explained approximately 41-43% of the variance in public support for the full degrowth proposal in the test data. Overall, the similar RMSE and R^2 values indicate that all five models achieved comparable predictive accuracy and performed similarly well in forecasting public support. None of the differences in RMSE among these five models were statistically significant (based on paired-samples t-tests; see “Procedure for selecting the most predictive individual differences in Study 1” on p.17). However, they all significantly outperformed the remaining five models tested: k-nearest neighbours, regression trees, conditional inference trees, neural networks, and neural networks with a principal component step.

VarI in the table indicates the importance of a predictor variable, as computed using the VarImp function in R.^{166,167} This function ranks predictors according to their contribution to the model's predictive accuracy. For linear and penalised regression models (ridge, lasso, and elastic-net), it uses the absolute values of standardised regression coefficients; for tree-based models, it relies on permutation-based error increases, meaning the rise in prediction error when a variable's values are randomly shuffled. The resulting scores are then rescaled so that the most influential predictor in each model is set to 100, with all others expressed as a percentage of that maximum. Overall, as can be seen from the table, only the predictors highlighted in grey appeared among the top 30 predictors (based on VarImp) across all five of the most predictive ML models.

All analyses codes for the ML Models are available via the Open Science Framework (OSF) using the link below:

https://osf.io/6svj8/?view_only=9af8d4b0ec924deb956a33d7cb0c0f65

Lasso		Ridge		E Net		R Forest		CR Forest	
Predictor ^a	VarI	Predictor	VarI	Predictor	VarI	Predictor	VarI	Predictor	VarI
TUIPHS	100.000	TUIPHS	100.000	TUIPHS	100.000	NEP_B	100.000	NEP_B	100.000
NEP_B	88.026	NEP_B	94.357	NEP_B	90.809	TUIPHS	70.607	TUIPHS	69.693
SDO_PTA	34.467	SDO_PTA	43.958	SDO_PTA	38.712	Left_Right	29.491	Left_Right	23.386
Left_Right	28.669	Left_Right	39.468	Left_Right	33.388	SDO_CTA	26.000	SDO_PTA	17.206
SDO_CTA	24.079	SDO_CTA	35.718	SDO_CTA	30.284	SDO_PTA	24.362	SDO_CTA	17.069
Country ^b	23.338	Country ^b	31.363	Country ^b	26.457	PVQ5X_UNN	9.868	BeMaS_Ma	4.444
BeMaS_Ma	22.171	BeMaS_Ma	28.694	BeMaS_Ma	24.786	PVQ5X_UNC	9.738	Country ^b	3.205
PVQ5X_TR	21.818	PVQ5X_TR	28.570	PVQ5X_TR	24.098	INCM	8.059	PVQ5X_UNN	2.577
CFCS	16.078	SDO_PTD	21.657	CFCS	17.745	CFCS	8.005	PVQ5X_UNC	2.392
PVQ5X_COI	14.315	PVQ5X_UNN	20.997	PVQ5X_COI	16.571	AOT	7.645	PVQ5X_TR	2.327
LOT	10.868	CFCS	20.331	SDO_PTD	14.104	PVQ5X_TR	7.272	CFCS	1.993
PVQ5X_SDT	10.328	PVQ5X_COI	19.876	PVQ5X_SDT	12.946	SBPS	6.799	NEIS_M	1.698
SDO_PTD	10.021	PVQ5X_SDT	19.410	LOT	12.638	Age	6.782	AOT	1.608
BFI_C	9.967	PVQ5X_SES	18.617	BFI_C	12.364	BeMaS_Ma	6.501	EB_BIO	1.496
Gender	9.713	LST	17.631	Gender	11.978	MTS	6.472	NCS	1.423

SatFin	8·917	BFI_C	17·585	PVQ5X_SES	11·815	IUS	6·332	SatFin	1·175
NCS	8·005	EB_BIO	16·307	PVQ5X_HE	10·514	SAIS_PE	6·319	PVQ5X_SDT	1·127
PVQ5X_HE	6·944	PVQ5X_HE	15·802	LST	10·368	SAIS_NE	6·243	PVQ5X_COR	1·126
HS_P	6·918	Gender	15·705	SatFin	10·057	NCS	6·077	Age	1·122
PVQ5X_SES	6·743	PVQ5X_UNC	15·543	PVQ5X_UNN	9·660	SDO_CTD	5·926	PVQ5X_COI	1·080
LST	5·906	LOT	15·440	NCS	9·037	RC_B_GC	5·744	SDO_CTD	1·042
BLLCTS_C	5·441	AOT	15·052	EB_BIO	8·891	BSCS	5·733	SBPS	0·956
INCM	4·918	Age	14·577	AOT	7·915	EB_ANT	5·704	LOT	0·915
PVQ5X_BED	3·988	PVQ5X_POD	14·372	HS_P	7·824	NEIS_M	5·532	GQ	0·895
AOT	3·907	SatFin	12·640	PVQ5X_UNC	7·784	BLLCTS_C	5·420	IUS	0·855
Age	3·760	BSCS	12·486	Age	7·687	EB_BIO	5·174	BLLCTS_PO	0·813
RC_B_GC	3·633	RC_B_GC	11·877	INCM	7·136	DDDT_M	5·155	SAIS_NE	0·809
EB_BIO	3·440	IRI_PT	11·296	PVQ5X_POD	7·066	BLLCTS_PO	5·073	BLLCTS_IC	0·778
PVQ5X_POD	3·103	INCM	11·269	BLLCTS_C	6·766	PVQ5X_FAC	4·997	BFI_N	0·768
PVQ5X_SEP	3·081	NCS	11·137	RC_B_GC	6·752	LOT	4·966	PANAS_TPA	0·705

Note. E Net = Elastic Net; R Forest = Random Forest; CR Forest = Conditional Random Forest. VarI indicates the importance of a variable computed using the VarImp function in R.^{166,167} For clarification of predictor name abbreviations, see Supplementary Table 1.

^a The cells that are highlighted in grey indicate variables that were among the 30 most important predictors across all five models.

^b Since all machine learning (ML) models were conducted on the combined UK and US data to ensure that the key predictors identified generalised across both countries (as indicated in the section “Procedure for selecting the most predictive individual differences in Study 1” on p.20), in all ML models Country was included as a predictor to control for any potential confounding effects.

Supplementary Table 17: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support (Linear Regression Model: Study 1 UK)

Testing predictors of participants' support for the full degrowth proposal (without name labels) using multiple linear regression models (Study 1: Sample 1 – UK)

Variable	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f ²	Partial R ² %
(Constant)	1.973	1.041	-0.071 – 4.018	1.895	0.058	0.004	0.432
PANAS_TNA	0.007	0.076	-0.142 – 0.156	0.097	0.923	<0.001	0.001
PANAS_TPA	-0.009	0.079	-0.165 – 0.147	-0.113	0.910	<0.001	0.002
LST	0.015	0.032	-0.048 – 0.077	0.454	0.650	<0.001	0.025
NCS	-0.076	0.055	-0.185 – 0.033	-1.374	0.170	0.002	0.228
FSMI_AI	-0.008	0.039	-0.085 – 0.068	-0.217	0.828	<0.001	0.006
IRI_EC	-0.066	0.085	-0.233 – 0.102	-0.767	0.443	0.001	0.071
IRI_PT	0.005	0.078	-0.148 – 0.158	0.065	0.948	<0.001	0.001
IUS	0.030	0.066	-0.099 – 0.159	0.460	0.646	<0.001	0.026
SDO_PTD	0.032	0.039	-0.045 – 0.109	0.813	0.416	0.001	0.080
SDO_CTD	0.038	0.047	-0.054 – 0.129	0.811	0.417	0.001	0.080
SDO_PTA	-0.052	0.034	-0.120 – 0.015	-1.523	0.128	0.003	0.280
SDO_CTA	0.010	0.058	-0.103 – 0.124	0.177	0.859	<0.001	0.004
DDDT_M	0.020	0.034	-0.047 – 0.087	0.584	0.559	<0.001	0.041
DDDT_P	0.038	0.043	-0.047 – 0.123	0.885	0.377	0.001	0.095
DDDT_N	-0.007	0.037	-0.080 – 0.066	-0.186	0.853	<0.001	0.004
LOT	-0.120	0.071	-0.261 – 0.020	-1.689	0.092	0.003	0.344
ERQ_CR	0.028	0.046	-0.062 – 0.117	0.606	0.544	<0.001	0.044
CFCS	-0.110	0.063	-0.234 – 0.014	-1.745	0.081	0.004	0.367
BLCTS_IC	-0.019	0.057	-0.131 – 0.094	-0.324	0.746	<0.001	0.013
BLCTS_C	-0.001	0.044	-0.087 – 0.085	-0.029	0.977	<0.001	<0.001
BLCTS_PO	-0.032	0.037	-0.105 – 0.041	-0.863	0.388	0.001	0.090
PVQ5X_SDT	-0.049	0.067	-0.180 – 0.081	-0.742	0.459	0.001	0.066
PVQ5X_SES	-0.051	0.051	-0.151 – 0.050	-0.991	0.322	0.001	0.119
PVQ5X_HE	0.076	0.056	-0.034 – 0.187	1.354	0.176	0.002	0.221
PVQ5X_COI	0.132	0.046	0.041 – 0.223	2.843	0.005	0.010	0.968
PVQ5X_UNC	0.079	0.068	-0.056 – 0.213	1.150	0.250	0.002	0.160
PVQ5X_POD	0.036	0.052	-0.066 – 0.139	0.695	0.487	0.001	0.058
PVQ5X_HU	0.036	0.056	-0.075 – 0.146	0.629	0.529	<0.001	0.048
PVQ5X_UNN	-0.014	0.056	-0.123 – 0.096	-0.244	0.807	<0.001	0.007
PVQ5X_FAC	0.074	0.052	-0.028 – 0.176	1.426	0.154	0.002	0.245
PVQ5X_ST	-0.098	0.058	-0.212 – 0.015	-1.709	0.088	0.004	0.352
PVQ5X_BED	0.069	0.058	-0.046 – 0.184	1.178	0.239	0.002	0.167
PVQ5X_SEP	-0.014	0.060	-0.132 – 0.105	-0.225	0.822	<0.001	0.006
PVQ5X_POR	-0.023	0.054	-0.130 – 0.084	-0.424	0.672	<0.001	0.022
PVQ5X_UNT	-0.088	0.064	-0.213 – 0.037	-1.383	0.167	0.002	0.231
PVQ5X_COR	-0.031	0.043	-0.116 – 0.053	-0.727	0.468	0.001	0.064
PVQ5X_AC	-0.018	0.055	-0.127 – 0.090	-0.334	0.738	<0.001	0.014
PVQ5X_TR	-0.039	0.037	-0.112 – 0.033	-1.067	0.286	0.001	0.137
PVQ5X_SDA	-0.048	0.061	-0.168 – 0.072	-0.792	0.428	0.001	0.076
PVQ5X_BEC	0.051	0.065	-0.077 – 0.179	0.785	0.433	0.001	0.074
TUIPHS	0.413	0.057	0.301 – 0.526	7.213	<0.0001*	0.063	5.919
HS_A	0.008	0.068	-0.127 – 0.142	0.111	0.911	<0.001	0.001
HS_P	-0.144	0.066	-0.274 – -0.014	-2.181	0.029	0.006	0.572
BFI_O	0.080	0.044	-0.006 – 0.167	1.818	0.069	0.004	0.398
BFI_C	0.027	0.041	-0.054 – 0.109	0.658	0.511	0.001	0.052
BFI_E	-0.049	0.032	-0.112 – 0.014	-1.524	0.128	0.003	0.280
BFI_A	-0.004	0.045	-0.093 – 0.085	-0.088	0.930	<0.001	0.001
BFI_N	0.050	0.040	-0.028 – 0.127	1.252	0.211	0.002	0.189
SBPS	-0.052	0.046	-0.141 – 0.037	-1.145	0.253	0.002	0.158
SAIS_PE	0.065	0.048	-0.029 – 0.159	1.354	0.176	0.002	0.221
SAIS_NE	0.038	0.051	-0.061 – 0.138	0.756	0.450	0.001	0.069
TILS	-0.008	0.049	-0.104 – 0.088	-0.159	0.874	<0.001	0.003
AHS_PC	-0.051	0.047	-0.143 – 0.042	-1.074	0.283	0.001	0.139
NEIS_M	0.067	0.037	-0.005 – 0.139	1.816	0.070	0.004	0.397
BeMaS_Ma	0.009	0.050	-0.089 – 0.107	0.190	0.850	<0.001	0.004
BSCS	0.076	0.086	-0.093 – 0.244	0.884	0.377	0.001	0.094
GQ	0.008	0.054	-0.098 – 0.114	0.147	0.883	<0.001	0.003
AOT	0.090	0.059	-0.026 – 0.206	1.523	0.128	0.003	0.280
MTS	-0.029	0.054	-0.136 – 0.077	-0.537	0.591	<0.001	0.035

EB_EGO	-0.207	0.073	-0.350 – -0.064	-2.839	0.005	0.010	0.965
EB_BIO	0.353	0.091	0.174 – 0.532	3.871	<0.001*	0.018	1.780
EB_ANT	-0.147	0.055	-0.255 – -0.039	-2.669	0.008	0.009	0.854
NEP_B	0.275	0.044	0.189 – 0.361	6.288	<0.0001*	0.048	4.563
RC_B_GC	-0.085	0.047	-0.177 – 0.006	-1.824	0.069	0.004	0.401
Age	-0.003	0.004	-0.011 – 0.004	-0.822	0.411	0.001	0.082
Gender	0.181	0.084	0.017 – 0.346	2.164	0.031	0.006	0.563
SatFin	0.010	0.027	-0.042 – 0.063	0.384	0.701	<0.001	0.018
Left_Right	-0.087	0.023	-0.133 – -0.042	-3.763	<0.001*	0.017	1.683
Education	-0.001	0.025	-0.050 – 0.049	-0.020	0.984	<0.001	<0.001
Children	0.040	0.038	-0.035 – 0.115	1.054	0.292	0.001	0.134
Household	-0.065	0.092	-0.245 – 0.116	-0.703	0.482	0.001	0.060
Security	0.035	0.073	-0.109 – 0.179	0.481	0.631	<0.001	0.028
INCM	-0.031	0.020	-0.070 – 0.008	-1.542	0.123	0.003	0.287
Employed	0.015	0.096	-0.174 – 0.204	0.156	0.876	<0.001	0.003

Note. Model $R^2 = 0.453$; residual degrees of freedom = 827. In the model, t-tests (two-sided) were used to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00159977 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each predictor, after accounting for the effects of other variables.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 5.919 corresponds to approximately 5.9% of the variance in the outcome variable. For clarifications of variable name abbreviations and how the variables were measured, see Supplementary Table 1.

Supplementary Table 18: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support (Linear Regression Model: Study 1 US)

Testing predictors of participant's support for the full degrowth proposal (without name labels) using multiple linear regression models (Study 1: Sample 2 – US)

Variable	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f ²	Partial R ² %
(Constant)	0.268	0.969	-1.635 – 2.170	0.276	0.782	<0.001	0.009
PANAS_TNA	0.015	0.079	-0.140 – 0.170	0.192	0.848	<0.001	0.004
PANAS_TPA	0.046	0.084	-0.119 – 0.210	0.549	0.583	<0.001	0.035
LST	0.041	0.031	-0.020 – 0.103	1.321	0.187	0.002	0.202
NCS	-0.036	0.055	-0.145 – 0.073	-0.648	0.517	<0.001	0.049
FSMI_AI	-0.020	0.042	-0.103 – 0.063	-0.465	0.642	<0.001	0.025
IRI_EC	0.056	0.091	-0.122 – 0.234	0.615	0.539	<0.001	0.044
IRI_PT	-0.153	0.086	-0.322 – 0.015	-1.785	0.075	0.004	0.369
IUS	-0.012	0.074	-0.158 – 0.134	-0.163	0.871	<0.001	0.003
SDO_PTD	0.113	0.039	0.036 – 0.189	2.901	0.004	0.010	0.969
SDO_CTD	0.002	0.048	-0.093 – 0.097	0.036	0.971	<0.001	<0.001
SDO_PTA	-0.122	0.037	-0.194 – -0.050	-3.336	0.001*	0.013	1.277
SDO_CTA	0.119	0.055	0.011 – 0.227	2.158	0.031	0.005	0.539
DDDT_M	-0.014	0.037	-0.086 – 0.058	-0.392	0.695	<0.001	0.018
DDDT_P	-0.022	0.045	-0.110 – 0.066	-0.494	0.621	<0.001	0.028
DDDT_N	-0.010	0.037	-0.082 – 0.062	-0.269	0.788	<0.001	0.008
LOT	-0.052	0.076	-0.202 – 0.099	-0.675	0.500	0.001	0.053
ERQ_CR	0.044	0.049	-0.052 – 0.141	0.899	0.369	0.001	0.094
CFCS	-0.130	0.068	-0.264 – 0.004	-1.909	0.057	0.004	0.422
BLLCTS_IC	-0.073	0.059	-0.189 – 0.043	-1.241	0.215	0.002	0.179
BLLCTS_C	0.005	0.050	-0.092 – 0.103	0.110	0.912	<0.001	0.001
BLLCTS_PO	-0.009	0.042	-0.091 – 0.074	-0.208	0.836	<0.001	0.005
PVQ5X_SDT	-0.118	0.081	-0.276 – 0.040	-1.464	0.144	0.002	0.249
PVQ5X_SES	-0.075	0.058	-0.188 – 0.038	-1.299	0.194	0.002	0.196
PVQ5X_HE	0.079	0.061	-0.041 – 0.198	1.288	0.198	0.002	0.193
PVQ5X_COI	0.021	0.051	-0.080 – 0.121	0.400	0.689	<0.001	0.019
PVQ5X_UNC	0.028	0.079	-0.127 – 0.183	0.352	0.725	<0.001	0.014
PVQ5X_POD	0.075	0.054	-0.031 – 0.181	1.384	0.167	0.002	0.222
PVQ5X_HU	-0.078	0.063	-0.202 – 0.045	-1.242	0.214	0.002	0.179
PVQ5X_UNN	-0.002	0.063	-0.125 – 0.121	-0.036	0.971	<0.001	<0.001
PVQ5X_FAC	-0.064	0.063	-0.187 – 0.059	-1.016	0.310	0.001	0.120
PVQ5X_ST	0.009	0.063	-0.115 – 0.132	0.139	0.890	<0.001	0.002
PVQ5X_BED	0.039	0.065	-0.089 – 0.167	0.603	0.547	<0.001	0.042
PVQ5X_SEP	0.095	0.068	-0.038 – 0.228	1.399	0.162	0.002	0.227
PVQ5X_POR	-0.027	0.056	-0.137 – 0.083	-0.475	0.635	<0.001	0.026
PVQ5X_UNT	0.088	0.072	-0.054 – 0.230	1.218	0.224	0.002	0.172
PVQ5X_COR	0.051	0.052	-0.050 – 0.153	0.998	0.319	0.001	0.116
PVQ5X_AC	-0.014	0.063	-0.137 – 0.110	-0.218	0.827	<0.001	0.006
PVQ5X_TR	-0.102	0.045	-0.191 – -0.014	-2.265	0.024	0.006	0.593
PVQ5X_SDA	0.017	0.071	-0.123 – 0.157	0.240	0.810	<0.001	0.007
PVQ5X_BEC	-0.033	0.080	-0.190 – 0.123	-0.421	0.674	<0.001	0.021
TUIPHS	0.389	0.059	0.273 – 0.504	6.608	<0.0001*	0.051	4.832
HS_A	-0.059	0.070	-0.197 – 0.079	-0.842	0.400	0.001	0.082
HS_P	-0.005	0.067	-0.136 – 0.126	-0.079	0.937	<0.001	0.001
BFI_O	-0.003	0.046	-0.092 – 0.086	-0.068	0.946	<0.001	0.001
BFI_C	0.130	0.048	0.036 – 0.225	2.703	0.007	0.008	0.843
BFI_E	< -0.001	0.032	-0.062 – 0.062	-0.005	0.996	<0.001	<0.001
BFI_A	-0.042	0.051	-0.142 – 0.058	-0.825	0.410	0.001	0.079
BFI_N	-0.033	0.043	-0.117 – 0.052	-0.753	0.452	0.001	0.066
SBPS	0.117	0.054	0.011 – 0.223	2.170	0.030	0.005	0.545
SAIS_PE	-0.056	0.052	-0.158 – 0.047	-1.061	0.289	0.001	0.131
SAIS_NE	-0.001	0.053	-0.106 – 0.103	-0.026	0.979	<0.001	<0.001
TILS	-0.023	0.053	-0.128 – 0.081	-0.440	0.660	<0.001	0.023
AHS_PC	0.002	0.052	-0.100 – 0.103	0.030	0.976	<0.001	<0.001
NEIS_M	-0.044	0.041	-0.124 – 0.036	-1.087	0.277	0.001	0.137
BeMaS_Ma	0.173	0.055	0.066 – 0.281	3.166	0.002*	0.012	1.152
BSCS	0.105	0.090	-0.072 – 0.281	1.162	0.245	0.002	0.157
GQ	-0.043	0.056	-0.153 – 0.067	-0.767	0.443	0.001	0.068
AOT	0.097	0.062	-0.026 – 0.219	1.553	0.121	0.003	0.280
MTS	0.009	0.054	-0.097 – 0.115	0.168	0.866	<0.001	0.003
EB_EGO	0.190	0.077	0.039 – 0.342	2.467	0.014	0.007	0.702

EB_BIO	-0.106	0.104	-0.309 – 0.098	-1.019	0.309	0.001	0.120
EB_ANT	0.095	0.057	-0.018 – 0.207	1.654	0.098	0.003	0.317
NEP_B	0.341	0.051	0.240 – 0.441	6.643	<0.0001*	0.051	4.880
RC_B_GC	-0.023	0.050	-0.121 – 0.075	-0.459	0.646	<0.001	0.024
Age	-0.006	0.004	-0.013 – 0.002	-1.507	0.132	0.003	0.263
Gender	0.110	0.096	-0.079 – 0.300	1.142	0.254	0.002	0.151
SatFin	0.011	0.026	-0.041 – 0.063	0.416	0.678	<0.001	0.020
Left_Right	-0.026	0.019	-0.063 – 0.011	-1.389	0.165	0.002	0.224
Education	0.047	0.027	-0.006 – 0.101	1.728	0.084	0.003	0.346
Children	0.008	0.039	-0.069 – 0.085	0.201	0.841	<0.001	0.005
Household	0.002	0.093	-0.181 – 0.185	0.019	0.985	<0.001	<0.001
Security	0.017	0.078	-0.135 – 0.169	0.217	0.828	<0.001	0.005
INCM	-0.029	0.024	-0.076 – 0.017	-1.246	0.213	0.002	0.180
Employed	0.192	0.111	-0.026 – 0.410	1.729	0.084	0.003	0.346

Note. Model $R^2 = 0.519$; residual degrees of freedom = 860. In the model, t-tests (two-sided) were used to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00159977 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each predictor, after accounting for the effects of other variables.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 4.832 corresponds to approximately 4.8% of the variance in the outcome variable. For clarifications of variable name abbreviations and how the variables were measured, see Supplementary Table 1.

Supplementary Table 19: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support (Linear Regression Models: Study 2)

Testing predictors of public support across all economic approaches presented in Study 2 using multiple linear regression models

Variable	b	SE b	95% CI	t	P	Partial f^2	Partial R^2 %
Model 1: Sample 1 – UK							
(Constant)	2.286	0.298	1.703 – 2.870	7.683	<0.0001	0.034	3.303
NEP_B	0.242	0.032	0.178 – 0.305	7.459	<0.0001*	0.032	3.120
TUIPHS	0.404	0.034	0.339 – 0.470	12.057	<0.0001*	0.084	7.760
Age	-0.003	0.003	-0.008 – 0.002	-1.116	0.264	0.001	0.072
Gender	0.088	0.057	-0.023 – 0.200	1.551	0.121	0.001	0.139
SatFin	0.008	0.018	-0.027 – 0.043	0.447	0.655	<0.001	0.012
INCM	-0.005	0.014	-0.032 – 0.023	-0.323	0.746	<0.001	0.006
Left_Right	-0.083	0.015	-0.112 – -0.053	-5.546	<0.0001*	0.018	1.749
Education	-0.066	0.018	-0.102 – -0.030	-3.602	<0.001*	0.008	0.745
Children	<0.001	0.031	-0.062 – 0.062	<0.001	>0.999	<0.001	<0.001
Household	-0.055	0.071	-0.194 – 0.085	-0.769	0.442	<0.001	0.034
Security	0.079	0.053	-0.024 – 0.183	1.508	0.132	0.001	0.131
Employed	-0.011	0.075	-0.158 – 0.137	-0.141	0.888	<0.001	0.001
Model 2: Sample 2 – US							
(Constant)	1.383	0.301	0.794 – 1.973	4.600	<0.0001	0.012	1.163
NEP_B	0.282	0.034	0.215 – 0.349	8.304	<0.0001*	0.038	3.693
TUIPHS	0.469	0.034	0.402 – 0.537	13.677	<0.0001*	0.104	9.423
Age	-0.001	0.002	-0.006 – 0.004	-0.539	0.590	<0.001	0.016
Gender	0.112	0.064	-0.014 – 0.238	1.739	0.082	0.002	0.168
SatFin	0.001	0.019	-0.035 – 0.038	0.072	0.943	<0.001	<0.001
INCM	-0.035	0.016	-0.067 – -0.004	-2.185	0.029	0.003	0.265
Left_Right	-0.079	0.013	-0.105 – -0.054	-6.098	<0.0001*	0.021	2.027
Education	-0.003	0.020	-0.042 – 0.036	-0.149	0.881	<0.001	0.001
Children	0.020	0.030	-0.038 – 0.079	0.682	0.495	<0.001	0.026
Household	0.174	0.067	0.042 – 0.306	2.581	0.010	0.004	0.369
Security	-0.041	0.058	-0.155 – 0.072	-0.714	0.475	<0.001	0.028
Employed	0.030	0.081	-0.129 – 0.190	0.374	0.709	<0.001	0.008

Note. Model 1 $R^2 = 0.237$; Model 2 $R^2 = 0.356$. Models 1 and 2 had 1728 and 1798 residual degrees of freedom respectively. In all models, t-tests (two-sided) were used to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00350789 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each predictor, after accounting for the effects of other variables.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 4.832 corresponds to approximately 4.8% of the variance in the outcome variable. For clarifications of variable name abbreviations and how the variables were measured, see Supplementary Table 1.

Supplementary Table 20: Interactions Between Predictors and Economic Approaches (Study 2 UK)

Interactions between Transformative Utopian Impulse (TUIPHS), New Environmental Paradigm–Balance (NEP_B), and Political Orientation (Left_Right) with different economic approaches (i.e., the full proposal vs. other approaches) in predicting public support for these approaches (Study 2: Sample 1 – UK) (Note: In each model, the key predictor used in the interaction analyses, the economic approaches, and their interaction terms are presented in separate sections for clarity, although they belong to the same model)

Variable	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f ²	Partial R ² %
Model 1: Interactions between TUIPHS and the Economic Approaches							
(Constant)	1.811	0.402	1.023 – 2.600	4.506	<0.0001	0.012	1.170
Key Predictor Used in the Interaction Analyses							
TUIPHS	0.575	0.069	0.440 – 0.711	8.354	<0.0001*	0.041	3.908
Economic Approach							
Degrowth	0.911	0.466	-0.004 – 1.826	1.954	0.051	0.002	0.222
Ecosocialism	0.176	0.466	-0.738 – 1.090	0.377	0.706	<0.001	0.008
Wellbeing Economy	0.873	0.448	-0.006 – 1.752	1.949	0.051	0.002	0.221
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.389	0.443	-0.480 – 1.257	0.877	0.380	<0.001	0.045
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.166	0.456	-1.060 – 0.728	-0.364	0.716	<0.001	0.008
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.532	0.485	-0.419 – 1.483	1.097	0.273	0.001	0.070
Other Predictors							
NEP_B	0.247	0.030	0.189 – 0.304	8.356	<0.0001*	0.041	3.910
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.007 – 0.002	-0.991	0.322	0.001	0.057
Gender	0.071	0.052	-0.031 – 0.173	1.369	0.171	0.001	0.109
SatFin	0.008	0.016	-0.023 – 0.040	0.513	0.608	<0.001	0.015
INCM	0.001	0.013	-0.024 – 0.027	0.108	0.914	<0.001	0.001
Left_Right	-0.088	0.014	-0.114 – -0.061	-6.476	<0.0001*	0.024	2.386
Education	-0.049	0.017	-0.082 – -0.017	-2.958	0.003*	0.005	0.507
Children	< -0.001	0.029	-0.056 – 0.056	-0.011	0.991	<0.001	<0.001
Household	-0.045	0.064	-0.171 – 0.082	-0.695	0.487	<0.001	0.028
Security	0.053	0.048	-0.040 – 0.147	1.119	0.263	0.001	0.073
Employed	0.022	0.069	-0.113 – 0.156	0.319	0.750	<0.001	0.006
Interaction Terms between TUIPHS and the Economic Approaches							
Interaction: TUIPHS * Degrowth	-0.494	0.097	-0.683 – -0.304	-5.112	<0.0001*	0.015	1.500
Interaction: TUIPHS * Ecosocialism	-0.232	0.098	-0.425 – -0.039	-2.363	0.018	0.003	0.324
Interaction: TUIPHS * Wellbeing Economy	-0.288	0.094	-0.473 – -0.104	-3.061	0.002*	0.005	0.543
Interaction: TUIPHS * Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.132	0.092	-0.313 – 0.049	-1.428	0.153	0.001	0.119
Interaction: TUIPHS * Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.015	0.095	-0.202 – 0.172	-0.153	0.878	<0.001	0.001
Interaction: TUIPHS * Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.124	0.100	-0.320 – 0.073	-1.236	0.217	0.001	0.089
Model 2: Interactions between NEP_B and the Economic Approaches							
(Constant)	1.036	0.453	0.148 – 1.924	2.289	0.022	0.003	0.304
Key Predictor Used in the Interaction Analyses							
NEP_B	0.537	0.069	0.401 – 0.673	7.771	<0.0001*	0.035	3.399
Economic Approach							
Degrowth	2.023	0.575	0.897 – 3.150	3.522	<0.001*	0.007	0.718
Ecosocialism	0.802	0.535	-0.247 – 1.850	1.500	0.134	0.001	0.131
Wellbeing Economy	2.602	0.501	1.620 – 3.584	5.197	<0.0001*	0.016	1.550
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.300	0.525	-0.729 – 1.329	0.572	0.567	<0.001	0.019
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.706	0.522	-0.318 – 1.730	1.352	0.177	0.001	0.106
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.101	0.561	0.001 – 2.201	1.963	0.050	0.002	0.224
Other Predictors							
TUIPHS	0.376	0.030	0.317 – 0.435	12.468	<0.0001*	0.091	8.306
Age	-0.001	0.002	-0.006 – 0.003	-0.622	0.534	<0.001	0.023
Gender	0.089	0.051	-0.012 – 0.190	1.725	0.085	0.002	0.173
SatFin	0.006	0.016	-0.025 – 0.037	0.373	0.709	<0.001	0.008
INCM	0.005	0.013	-0.020 – 0.030	0.392	0.695	<0.001	0.009
Left_Right	-0.090	0.013	-0.116 – -0.063	-6.690	<0.0001*	0.026	2.542
Education	-0.054	0.016	-0.086 – -0.021	-3.253	0.001*	0.006	0.613

Children	-0.015	0.028	-0.070 – 0.040	-0.531	0.596	<0.001	0.016
Household	-0.020	0.064	-0.145 – 0.106	-0.312	0.755	<0.001	0.006
Security	0.065	0.047	-0.028 – 0.158	1.378	0.168	0.001	0.111
Employed	0.016	0.068	-0.117 – 0.149	0.233	0.816	<0.001	0.003
Interaction Terms between NEP_B and the Economic Approaches							
Interaction: NEP_B * Degrowth	-0.600	0.098	-0.793 – -0.407	-6.090	<0.0001*	0.022	2.115
Interaction: NEP_B * Ecosocialism	-0.303	0.094	-0.486 – -0.119	-3.233	0.001*	0.006	0.605
Interaction: NEP_B * Wellbeing Economy	-0.549	0.088	-0.722 – -0.377	-6.253	<0.0001*	0.023	2.228
Interaction: NEP_B * Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.090	0.092	-0.271 – 0.090	-0.981	0.327	0.001	0.056
Interaction: NEP_B * Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.166	0.091	-0.345 – 0.013	-1.816	0.070	0.002	0.192
Interaction: NEP_B * Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.204	0.096	-0.393 – -0.015	-2.118	0.034	0.003	0.261
Model 3: Interactions between Left_Right and the Economic Approaches							
(Constant)	2.855	0.302	2.263 – 3.446	9.465	<0.0001	0.052	4.961
Key Predictor Used in the Interaction Analyses							
Left_Right	-0.131	0.034	-0.197 – -0.065	-3.879	<0.001*	0.009	0.869
Economic Approach							
Degrowth	-1.893	0.208	-2.300 – -1.486	-9.119	<0.0001*	0.048	4.622
Ecosocialism	-1.154	0.214	-1.574 – -0.733	-5.381	<0.0001*	0.017	1.659
Wellbeing Economy	-1.173	0.214	-1.593 – -0.753	-5.483	<0.0001*	0.018	1.722
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.278	0.207	-0.683 – 0.128	-1.342	0.180	0.001	0.105
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.122	0.211	-0.536 – 0.293	-0.576	0.565	<0.001	0.019
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.085	0.215	-0.337 – 0.508	0.397	0.691	<0.001	0.009
Other Predictors							
NEP_B	0.259	0.030	0.201 – 0.317	8.775	<0.0001*	0.045	4.294
TUIPHS	0.383	0.030	0.323 – 0.443	12.561	<0.0001*	0.092	8.420
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.007 – 0.002	-0.911	0.362	<0.001	0.048
Gender	0.083	0.052	-0.019 – 0.184	1.588	0.113	0.001	0.147
SatFin	0.010	0.016	-0.022 – 0.041	0.605	0.545	<0.001	0.021
INCM	0.002	0.013	-0.023 – 0.027	0.130	0.896	<0.001	0.001
Education	-0.055	0.017	-0.088 – -0.022	-3.299	0.001*	0.006	0.630
Children	-0.008	0.029	-0.065 – 0.048	-0.296	0.768	<0.001	0.005
Household	-0.038	0.065	-0.165 – 0.089	-0.592	0.554	<0.001	0.020
Security	0.044	0.048	-0.050 – 0.138	0.922	0.357	<0.001	0.050
Employed	0.021	0.069	-0.114 – 0.155	0.305	0.761	<0.001	0.005
Interaction Terms between Left_Right and the Economic Approaches							
Interaction: Left_Right * Degrowth	0.120	0.047	0.028 – 0.212	2.558	0.011	0.004	0.380
Interaction: Left_Right * Ecosocialism	0.058	0.045	-0.029 – 0.146	1.309	0.191	0.001	0.100
Interaction: Left_Right * Wellbeing Economy	0.167	0.046	0.077 – 0.257	3.632	<0.001*	0.008	0.763
Interaction: Left_Right * Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.013	0.044	-0.074 – 0.100	0.290	0.772	<0.001	0.005
Interaction: Left_Right * Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.024	0.045	-0.112 – 0.064	-0.541	0.589	<0.001	0.017
Interaction: Left_Right * Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.028	0.046	-0.119 – 0.062	-0.617	0.537	<0.001	0.022

Note. Model 1 $R^2 = 0.380$; Model 2 $R^2 = 0.392$; Model 3 $R^2 = 0.378$. All models had 1716 residual degrees of freedom, and the full degrowth proposal (without a label) served as the reference category. In all models, T-tests (two-sided) were used to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00350789 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each predictor, after accounting for the effects of other variables.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 3.908 corresponds to approximately 3.9% of the variance in the outcome variable. For clarifications of variable name abbreviations and how the variables were measured, see Supplementary Table 1. The analyses of simple slopes that clarify the interaction terms from this table by computing the relationships between the key predictors from the interaction terms (i.e., TUIPHS, NEP_B, or Left_Right) and public support for different economic approaches are presented in Supplementary Table 22.

Supplementary Table 21: Interactions Between Predictors and Economic Approaches (Study 2 US)

Interactions between Transformative Utopian Impulse (TUIPHS), New Environmental Paradigm–Balance (NEP_B), and Political Orientation (Left_Right) with different economic approaches (i.e., the full proposal vs. other approaches) in predicting public support for these approaches (Study 2: Sample 2 – US) (Note: In each model, the key predictor used in the interaction analyses, the economic approaches, and their interaction terms are presented in separate sections for clarity, although they belong to the same model)

Variable	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f ²	Partial R ² %
Model 1: Interactions between TUIPHS and the Economic Approaches							
(Constant)	0.498	0.452	-0.389 – 1.385	1.102	0.271	0.001	0.068
Key Predictor Used in the Interaction Analyses							
TUIPHS	0.734	0.076	0.585 – 0.883	9.654	<0.0001*	0.052	4.960
Economic Approach							
Degrowth	2.298	0.486	1.346 – 3.250	4.733	<0.0001*	0.013	1.239
Ecosocialism	0.929	0.469	0.010 – 1.848	1.983	0.048	0.002	0.220
Wellbeing Economy	2.537	0.466	1.622 – 3.452	5.440	<0.0001*	0.017	1.630
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.327	0.478	-0.611 – 1.265	0.683	0.495	<0.001	0.026
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.292	0.472	-1.219 – 0.635	-0.618	0.537	<0.001	0.021
Full Proposal + Wellbeing	0.414	0.489	-0.546 – 1.373	0.846	0.398	<0.001	0.040
Economy							
Other Predictors							
NEP_B	0.285	0.030	0.225 – 0.345	9.346	<0.0001*	0.049	4.662
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.006 – 0.003	-0.752	0.452	<0.001	0.032
Gender	0.069	0.058	-0.044 – 0.182	1.195	0.232	0.001	0.080
SatFin	< -0.001	0.017	-0.033 – 0.032	-0.014	0.989	<0.001	<0.001
INCM	-0.033	0.015	-0.062 – 0.005	-2.283	0.023	0.003	0.291
Left_Right	-0.082	0.012	-0.104 – 0.059	-7.011	<0.0001*	0.028	2.678
Education	-0.006	0.018	-0.041 – 0.029	-0.328	0.743	<0.001	0.006
Children	0.019	0.027	-0.033 – 0.072	0.713	0.476	<0.001	0.028
Household	0.198	0.061	0.079 – 0.317	3.268	0.001*	0.006	0.595
Security	-0.050	0.052	-0.152 – 0.052	-0.962	0.336	0.001	0.052
Employed	-0.010	0.073	-0.153 – 0.133	-0.138	0.890	<0.001	0.001
Interaction Terms between TUIPHS and the Economic Approaches							
Interaction: TUIPHS * Degrowth	-0.749	0.098	-0.941 – 0.557	-7.646	<0.0001*	0.033	3.169
Interaction: TUIPHS * Ecosocialism	-0.342	0.096	-0.530 – 0.155	-3.584	<0.0001*	0.007	0.714
Interaction: TUIPHS * Wellbeing Economy	-0.580	0.094	-0.765 – 0.395	-6.154	<0.0001*	0.021	2.076
Interaction: TUIPHS * Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.062	0.098	-0.254 – 0.129	-0.639	0.523	<0.001	0.023
Interaction: TUIPHS * Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.067	0.096	-0.121 – 0.255	0.702	0.483	<0.001	0.028
Interaction: TUIPHS * Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.072	0.099	-0.266 – 0.122	-0.730	0.465	<0.001	0.030
Model 2: Interactions between NEP_B and the Economic Approaches							
(Constant)	0.378	0.455	-0.515 – 1.270	0.830	0.407	<0.001	0.039
Key Predictor Used in the Interaction Analyses							
NEP_B	0.534	0.069	0.398 – 0.670	7.712	<0.0001*	0.033	3.222
Economic Approach							
Degrowth	2.598	0.506	1.607 – 3.590	5.140	<0.0001*	0.015	1.458
Ecosocialism	1.022	0.485	0.071 – 1.974	2.109	0.035	0.002	0.248
Wellbeing Economy	3.667	0.495	2.696 – 4.639	7.402	<0.0001*	0.031	2.977
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.399	0.491	-0.563 – 1.362	0.813	0.416	<0.001	0.037
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.115	0.490	-0.845 – 1.075	0.235	0.814	<0.001	0.003
Full Proposal + Wellbeing	0.168	0.499	-0.811 – 1.147	0.336	0.737	<0.001	0.006
Economy							
Other Predictors							
TUIPHS	0.495	0.031	0.435 – 0.555	16.188	<0.0001*	0.147	12.795
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.006 – 0.002	-0.952	0.341	0.001	0.051
Gender	0.064	0.057	-0.048 – 0.177	1.124	0.261	0.001	0.071
SatFin	< -0.001	0.017	-0.033 – 0.032	-0.007	0.994	<0.001	<0.001
INCM	-0.037	0.014	-0.066 – 0.009	-2.587	0.010	0.004	0.373

Left_Right	-0.082	0.012	-0.105 – -0.060	-7.135	<0.0001*	0.029	2.771
Education	-0.013	0.018	-0.049 – 0.022	-0.753	0.452	<0.001	0.032
Children	0.029	0.027	-0.024 – 0.081	1.074	0.283	0.001	0.065
Household	0.178	0.060	0.060 – 0.295	2.961	0.003*	0.005	0.489
Security	-0.047	0.052	-0.149 – 0.054	-0.913	0.361	<0.001	0.047
Employed	<0.001	0.072	-0.142 – 0.142	0.002	0.998	<0.001	<0.001
Interaction Terms between NEP_B and the Economic Approaches							
Interaction: NEP_B * Degrowth	-0.710	0.089	-0.886 – -0.535	-7.940	<0.0001*	0.035	3.409
Interaction: NEP_B * Ecosocialism	-0.315	0.086	-0.485 – -0.146	-3.647	<0.001*	0.007	0.739
Interaction: NEP_B * Wellbeing Economy	-0.718	0.088	-0.891 – -0.545	-8.134	<0.0001*	0.037	3.572
Interaction: NEP_B * Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.069	0.087	-0.240 – 0.102	-0.789	0.430	<0.001	0.035
Interaction: NEP_B * Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.017	0.087	-0.187 – 0.154	-0.191	0.848	<0.001	0.002
Interaction: NEP_B * Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.016	0.089	-0.190 – 0.159	-0.175	0.861	<0.001	0.002
Model 3: Interactions between Left_Right and the Economic Approaches							
(Constant)	2.165	0.293	1.590 – 2.739	7.394	<0.0001	0.031	2.970
Key Predictor Used in the Interaction Analyses							
Left_Right	-0.165	0.025	-0.215 – -0.115	-6.529	<0.0001*	0.024	2.331
Economic Approach							
Degrowth	-2.056	0.168	-2.386 – -1.727	-12.224	<0.0001*	0.084	7.721
Ecosocialism	-0.992	0.171	-1.327 – -0.657	-5.808	<0.0001*	0.019	1.854
Wellbeing Economy	-1.252	0.171	-1.588 – -0.916	-7.310	<0.0001*	0.030	2.905
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.115	0.175	-0.458 – 0.228	-0.657	0.511	<0.001	0.024
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.205	0.173	-0.134 – 0.543	1.187	0.235	0.001	0.079
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.025	0.177	-0.372 – 0.322	-0.141	0.888	<0.001	0.001
Other Predictors							
NEP_B	0.265	0.031	0.204 – 0.325	8.576	<0.0001*	0.041	3.955
TUIPHS	0.475	0.031	0.414 – 0.536	15.277	<0.0001*	0.131	11.558
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.006 – 0.003	-0.701	0.483	<0.001	0.028
Gender	0.079	0.058	-0.036 – 0.193	1.351	0.177	0.001	0.102
SatFin	0.006	0.017	-0.027 – 0.039	0.339	0.735	<0.001	0.006
INCM	-0.033	0.015	-0.062 – -0.004	-2.245	0.025	0.003	0.281
Education	-0.009	0.018	-0.045 – 0.027	-0.506	0.613	<0.001	0.014
Children	0.014	0.027	-0.039 – 0.067	0.510	0.610	<0.001	0.015
Household	0.169	0.061	0.049 – 0.288	2.763	0.006	0.004	0.426
Security	-0.048	0.053	-0.151 – 0.055	-0.910	0.363	<0.001	0.046
Employed	0.016	0.074	-0.129 – 0.160	0.212	0.832	<0.001	0.003
Interaction Terms between Left_Right and the Economic Approaches							
Interaction: Left_Right * Degrowth	0.199	0.036	0.128 – 0.269	5.515	<0.0001*	0.017	1.675
Interaction: Left_Right * Ecosocialism	0.073	0.035	0.005 – 0.142	2.100	0.036	0.002	0.246
Interaction: Left_Right * Wellbeing Economy	0.247	0.035	0.180 – 0.315	7.168	<0.0001*	0.029	2.797
Interaction: Left_Right * Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.031	0.036	-0.040 – 0.101	0.859	0.391	<0.001	0.041
Interaction: Left_Right * Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.047	0.036	-0.117 – 0.022	-1.329	0.184	0.001	0.099
Interaction: Left_Right * Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.024	0.036	-0.047 – 0.095	0.663	0.508	<0.001	0.025

Note. Model 1 $R^2 = 0.487$; Model 2 $R^2 = 0.496$; Model 3 $R^2 = 0.477$. All models had 1786 residual degrees of freedom, and the full degrowth proposal (without a label) served as the reference category. In all models, T-tests (two-sided) were used to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00350789 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each predictor, after accounting for the effects of other variables.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 3.222 corresponds to approximately 3.2% of the variance in the outcome variable. For clarifications of variable name abbreviations and how the variables were measured, see Supplementary Table 1. The analyses of simple slopes¹⁶⁵ that clarify the interaction terms from this table by computing the relationships between the key predictors from the interaction terms (i.e., TUIPHS, NEP_B, or Left_Right) and public support for different economic approaches are presented in Supplementary Table 22.

Supplementary Table 22: Individual Difference Predictors of Public Support across Economic Approaches (Study 2)

People's drive to address global challenges through ideas and action (Transformative Utopian Impulse),⁹⁵ belief in the importance of ecosystem integrity (New Ecological Paradigm-Balance),¹⁶⁰ and political orientation (left vs. right) as predictors of public support across different economic approaches (Study 2) (Note: The relationships in the table were computed using analyses of simple slopes to interpret the interaction patterns from Supplementary Tables 20 and 21)

Economic Approach	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial r^2	Partial R^2 %
Sample 1 – UK							
Transformative Utopian Impulse							
Full Proposal	0.575	0.069	0.440 – 0.711	8.354	<0.0001*	0.041	3.908
Degrowth	0.082	0.070	-0.056 – 0.220	1.161	0.246	0.001	0.079
Ecosocialism	0.343	0.074	0.198 – 0.489	4.632	<0.0001*	0.013	1.235
Wellbeing Economy	0.287	0.068	0.153 – 0.421	4.209	<0.0001*	0.010	1.022
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.443	0.066	0.314 – 0.573	6.706	<0.0001*	0.026	2.554
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.561	0.069	0.425 – 0.697	8.075	<0.0001*	0.038	3.661
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.452	0.076	0.302 – 0.601	5.922	<0.0001*	0.020	2.003
New Ecological Paradigm-Balance							
Full Proposal	0.537	0.069	0.401 – 0.673	7.771	<0.0001*	0.035	3.399
Degrowth	-0.063	0.073	-0.207 – 0.081	-0.856	0.392	<0.001	0.043
Ecosocialism	0.234	0.067	0.103 – 0.366	3.502	<0.001*	0.007	0.710
Wellbeing Economy	-0.012	0.058	-0.126 – 0.102	-0.210	0.833	<0.001	0.003
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.447	0.066	0.318 – 0.576	6.790	<0.0001*	0.027	2.616
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.371	0.064	0.246 – 0.496	5.828	<0.0001*	0.020	1.941
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.333	0.071	0.194 – 0.472	4.694	<0.0001*	0.013	1.268
Political Orientation (Left vs. Right)							
Full Proposal	-0.131	0.034	-0.197 – -0.065	-3.879	<0.001*	0.009	0.869
Degrowth	-0.011	0.034	-0.077 – 0.056	-0.311	0.756	<0.001	0.006
Ecosocialism	-0.072	0.031	-0.133 – -0.012	-2.346	0.019	0.003	0.320
Wellbeing Economy	0.036	0.033	-0.028 – 0.101	1.111	0.267	0.001	0.072
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.118	0.030	-0.177 – -0.058	-3.882	<0.001*	0.009	0.871
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.155	0.031	-0.215 – -0.095	-5.036	<0.0001*	0.015	1.457
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.159	0.033	-0.223 – -0.095	-4.850	<0.0001*	0.014	1.352
Sample 2– US							
Transformative Utopian Impulse							
Full Proposal	0.734	0.076	0.585 – 0.883	9.654	<0.0001*	0.052	4.960
Degrowth	-0.015	0.067	-0.147 – 0.117	-0.223	0.823	<0.001	0.003
Ecosocialism	0.392	0.063	0.268 – 0.516	6.197	<0.0001*	0.021	2.105
Wellbeing Economy	0.154	0.061	0.034 – 0.274	2.509	0.012	0.004	0.351
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.672	0.067	0.541 – 0.803	10.051	<0.0001*	0.057	5.354
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.801	0.064	0.676 – 0.927	12.502	<0.0001*	0.088	8.048
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.662	0.068	0.528 – 0.796	9.701	<0.0001*	0.053	5.005
New Ecological Paradigm-Balance							
Full Proposal	0.534	0.069	0.398 – 0.670	7.712	<0.0001*	0.033	3.222
Degrowth	-0.176	0.063	-0.300 – -0.052	-2.791	0.005	0.004	0.434
Ecosocialism	0.219	0.058	0.104 – 0.333	3.748	<0.001*	0.008	0.780
Wellbeing Economy	-0.184	0.062	-0.305 – -0.062	-2.973	0.003*	0.005	0.492
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.465	0.060	0.348 – 0.583	7.749	<0.0001*	0.034	3.252
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.518	0.060	0.401 – 0.635	8.681	<0.0001*	0.042	4.048

Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.519	0.062	0.397 – 0.640	8.364	<0.0001*	0.039	3.769
Political Orientation (Left vs. Right)							
Full Proposal	-0.165	0.025	-0.215 – -0.115	-6.529	<0.0001*	0.024	2.331
Degrowth	0.034	0.027	-0.019 – 0.086	1.244	0.214	0.001	0.087
Ecosocialism	-0.092	0.026	-0.142 – -0.042	-3.594	<0.001*	0.007	0.718
Wellbeing Economy	0.082	0.025	0.033 – 0.131	3.298	0.001*	0.006	0.605
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.134	0.027	-0.187 – -0.081	-4.960	<0.0001*	0.014	1.359
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.212	0.027	-0.265 – -0.160	-7.962	<0.0001*	0.035	3.428
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.141	0.027	-0.195 – -0.087	-5.149	<0.0001*	0.015	1.463

Note. The relationships between different predictors and public support were computed using the analyses of simple slopes implemented using linear regressions as part of moderation analyses testing the interactions between the predictors and different combinations of the full degrowth proposal and name labels (for details, see Supplementary Tables 20-21).¹⁶⁵ Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant *p* values were ≤ 0.00350789 —they are indicated by the * sign. Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each predictor, after accounting for the effects of other variables.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 3.908 corresponds to approximately 3.9% of the variance in the outcome variable. Higher values of utopian impulse, new ecological paradigm-balance, and political orientation indicate higher drive to address global challenges with ideas and action, higher emphasis on the importance of ecosystem integrity, and more right leaning orientation, respectively.

Supplementary Table 23: Economic Approaches that Participants Associated the Most with the Full Degrowth Proposal (Study 1)

Participants' rankings regarding which of the eight economic approaches named in the table (i.e., degrowth, ecomodernism, ecosocialism, wellbeing economy, green capitalism, green growth, green market economy, post-growth) they associated the most with the full degrowth proposal (without any labels), and comparisons of whether the mean rank for degrowth was significantly different from the mean ranks for the other approaches using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Study 1).

Economic Approach Name	Mean Rank ^a	Mean Rank SD	W ^b	p
Sample 1 – UK				
Wellbeing Economy	3·323	2·150	357966·0	<0·0001*
Ecosocialism	3·397	2·242	362321·5	<0·0001*
Ecomodernism	3·938	1·980	343126·5	<0·0001*
Green Market Economy	4·026	1·883	339193·0	<0·0001*
Green Growth	4·145	1·933	332044·0	<0·0001*
Green Capitalism	5·080	2·142	285327·0	<0·0001*
Postgrowth	5·785	1·900	254335·0	<0·0001*
Degrowth	6·306	2·113	-	-
Sample 2 – US				
Ecosocialism	3·432	2·284	383569·5	<0·0001*
Wellbeing Economy	3·571	2·198	360900·5	<0·0001*
Green Market Economy	3·935	1·989	346979·5	<0·0001*
Green Growth	4·253	1·970	332870·0	<0·0001*
Ecomodernism	4·304	2·040	337324·5	<0·0001*
Green Capitalism	4·776	2·221	299588·5	<0·0001*
Postgrowth	5·771	1·909	244178·5	0·004
Degrowth	5·957	2·275	-	-

Note. ^a Lower mean rank indicates higher perceived similarity between a label and the full degrowth proposal.

^b W refers to the test statistic for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant *p* values were ≤0·00159977 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to *p* values for Constant).

Supplementary Table 24: Knowledge, Awareness, and Label Preference for Economic Approaches (Means and Classifications; Study 2)

Means, and their 95% confidence intervals and classifications for people's knowledge, awareness, and label preference regarding the full degrowth proposal and other economic approaches (i.e., degrowth, ecosocialism, wellbeing economy, full proposal + degrowth, full proposal + ecosocialism, full proposal + wellbeing economy) assessed in Study 2 (table note explains how Mean Classification was determined; label preference was not rated for the full proposal since no labels were involved in this case)

Economic Approach	Mean	Mean 95% CI	Mean Classification ^a
Sample 1 – UK			
Knowledge			
Full Proposal	2.051	1.945 – 2.157	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Degrowth	1.464	1.371 – 1.557	“Not knowledgeable at all” to “Slightly knowledgeable”
Ecosocialism	1.627	1.527 – 1.728	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Wellbeing Economy	1.575	1.469 – 1.680	“Not knowledgeable at all” to “Slightly knowledgeable”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	1.484	1.385 – 1.583	“Not knowledgeable at all” to “Slightly knowledgeable”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	1.620	1.518 – 1.722	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.592	1.481 – 1.703	“Not knowledgeable at all” to “Slightly knowledgeable”
Awareness			
Full Proposal	2.063	1.948 – 2.177	“Rarely”
Degrowth	1.512	1.411 – 1.613	“Never to Rarely”
Ecosocialism	1.733	1.621 – 1.846	“Rarely”
Wellbeing Economy	1.590	1.482 – 1.698	“Never to Rarely”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	1.411	1.317 – 1.505	“Never to Rarely”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	1.604	1.501 – 1.707	“Rarely”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.420	1.331 – 1.509	“Never to Rarely”
Label Preference			
Degrowth	3.336	3.175 – 3.497	“Dislike a little”
Ecosocialism	4.075	3.910 – 4.239	“Neither like nor dislike”
Wellbeing Economy	4.797	4.656 – 4.938	“Like a little”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	3.762	3.582 – 3.942	“Neither like nor dislike”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	4.160	3.967 – 4.353	“Neither like nor dislike”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	4.988	4.819 – 5.157	“Like a little”
Sample 2 – US			
Knowledge			
Full Proposal	2.462	2.325 – 2.598	“Slightly knowledgeable” to “Moderately knowledgeable”
Degrowth	1.474	1.375 – 1.574	“Not knowledgeable at all” to “Slightly knowledgeable”
Ecosocialism	1.692	1.580 – 1.805	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Wellbeing Economy	1.535	1.422 – 1.648	“Not knowledgeable at all” to “Slightly knowledgeable”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	1.642	1.528 – 1.756	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	1.739	1.619 – 1.858	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.651	1.525 – 1.776	“Slightly knowledgeable”
Awareness			
Full Proposal	2.358	2.221 – 2.495	“Rarely
Degrowth	1.470	1.377 – 1.564	“Never” to “Rarely”
Ecosocialism	1.727	1.602 – 1.852	“Rarely”
Wellbeing Economy	1.435	1.343 – 1.528	“Never” to “Rarely”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	1.442	1.342 – 1.542	“Never” to “Rarely”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	1.625	1.510 – 1.740	“Rarely”

Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.361	1.265 – 1.458	“Never”
Label Preference			
Degrowth	3.222	3.059 – 3.385	“Dislike a little”
Ecosocialism	3.942	3.762 – 4.123	“Neither like nor dislike”
Wellbeing Economy	4.827	4.660 – 4.993	“Like a little”
Full Proposal + Degrowth	3.608	3.410 – 3.805	“Dislike a little” to “Neither like nor dislike”
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	4.189	3.989 – 4.389	“Neither like nor dislike”
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	4.542	4.343 – 4.741	“Neither like nor dislike” to “Like a little”

Note. ^a Mean classification was determined based on the 95% CI in relation to participants’ response options for each variable. For Knowledge, the response options were 1=Not knowledgeable at all; 2=Slightly knowledgeable; 3=Moderately knowledgeable; 4=Very knowledgeable; and 5=Extremely knowledgeable. Therefore, the mean classification was as follows: 95% CI ≤ 1.5 = Not knowledgeable at all; 95%CI > 1.5 & ≤ 2.5 = Slightly knowledgeable; 95%CI > 2.5 & ≤ 3.5 = Moderately knowledgeable; 95%CI > 3.5 & ≤ 4.5 = Very knowledgeable; 95%CI > 4.5 = Extremely knowledgeable. For Awareness, the response options were 1=Never; 2=Rarely; 3=Sometimes; 4=Often; 5=Very often. Therefore, the mean classification was as follows: 95% CI ≤ 1.5 = Never; 95%CI > 1.5 & ≤ 2.5 = Rarely; 95%CI > 2.5 & ≤ 3.5 = Sometimes; 95%CI > 3.5 & ≤ 4.5 = Often; 95%CI > 4.5 = Very often. For Label preference, the response options were 1=Dislike a great deal; 2=Dislike a moderate amount; 3=Dislike a little; 4=Neither like nor dislike; 5=Like a little; 6=Like a moderate amount; and 7=Like a great deal. Therefore, the mean classification was as follows: 95% CI ≤ 1.5 = Dislike a great deal; 95%CI > 1.5 & ≤ 2.5 = Dislike a moderate amount; 95%CI > 2.5 & ≤ 3.5 = Dislike a little; 95%CI > 3.5 & ≤ 4.5 = Neither like nor dislike; 95%CI > 4.5 & ≤ 5.5 = Like a little; 95%CI > 5.5 & ≤ 6.5 = Like a moderate amount; 95%CI > 6.5 = Like a great deal. If two rather than one classification applied to a mean, both classifications are listed under Mean Classification (e.g., “Neither like nor dislike” to “Like a little”).

Data for Label preference was not measured for the Full Proposal since no name labels were used for this economic approach.

Supplementary Table 25: Comparisons of Knowledge, Awareness, and Label Preference for Economic Approaches (Study 2 UK)

The influence of the full proposal (without name labels), different economic approaches labelled by their names (without descriptions), and the full proposal-label combinations on self-reported knowledge, awareness, and label preference regarding the economic approaches (Study 2: Sample 1 - UK)

Variable (Economic Approach)	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f^2	Partial R^2 %
DV = Knowledge							
Model 1: Baseline = Full Proposal							
(Constant)	2.051	0.052	1.949 – 2.153	39.504	<0.0001	0.886	46.968
Degrowth	-0.587	0.074	-0.732 – -0.442	-7.955	<0.0001*	0.036	3.467
Ecosocialism	-0.424	0.073	-0.568 – -0.280	-5.768	<0.0001*	0.019	1.853
Wellbeing Economy	-0.476	0.073	-0.619 – -0.333	-6.524	<0.0001*	0.024	2.359
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.567	0.074	-0.712 – -0.422	-7.670	<0.0001*	0.033	3.231
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.431	0.074	-0.576 – -0.286	-5.841	<0.0001*	0.019	1.899
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.459	0.074	-0.604 – -0.314	-6.220	<0.0001*	0.022	2.149
Model 2: Baseline = Degrowth							
(Constant)	1.464	0.052	1.361 – 1.567	27.920	<0.0001	0.442	30.672
Ecosocialism	0.163	0.074	0.019 – 0.308	2.215	0.027	0.003	0.278
Wellbeing Economy	0.111	0.073	-0.033 – 0.255	1.509	0.131	0.001	0.129
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.020	0.074	-0.126 – 0.166	0.267	0.789	<0.001	0.004
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.156	0.074	0.011 – 0.301	2.104	0.036	0.003	0.251
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.128	0.074	-0.017 – 0.273	1.726	0.085	0.002	0.169
Model 3: Baseline = Ecosocialism							
(Constant)	1.627	0.052	1.526 – 1.729	31.346	<0.0001	0.558	35.801
Wellbeing Economy	-0.053	0.073	-0.196 – 0.090	-0.722	0.470	<0.001	0.030
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.144	0.074	-0.289 – 0.001	-1.942	0.052	0.002	0.214
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.007	0.074	-0.152 – 0.137	-0.101	0.920	<0.001	0.001
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.035	0.074	-0.180 – 0.109	-0.480	0.631	<0.001	0.013
Model 4: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy							
(Constant)	1.575	0.051	1.474 – 1.675	30.685	<0.0001	0.534	34.827
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.091	0.074	-0.235 – 0.053	-1.236	0.217	0.001	0.087
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.045	0.073	-0.099 – 0.189	0.617	0.537	<0.001	0.022
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.017	0.073	-0.127 – 0.161	0.236	0.814	<0.001	0.003
Model 5: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth							
(Constant)	1.484	0.053	1.381 – 1.587	28.186	<0.0001	0.451	31.076
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.136	0.074	-0.010 – 0.282	1.832	0.067	0.002	0.190
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.108	0.074	-0.038 – 0.254	1.455	0.146	0.001	0.120
Model 6: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism							
(Constant)	1.620	0.052	1.517 – 1.723	30.895	<0.0001	0.542	35.138
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.028	0.074	-0.173 – 0.117	-0.378	0.706	<0.001	0.008
DV = Awareness							
Model 7: Baseline = Full Proposal							
(Constant)	2.063	0.052	1.960 – 2.165	39.373	<.0001	0.880	46.804
Degrowth	-0.551	0.074	-0.697 – -0.405	-7.397	<.0001*	0.031	3.011
Ecosocialism	-0.329	0.074	-0.475 – -0.184	-4.446	<.0001*	0.011	1.109
Wellbeing Economy	-0.473	0.074	-0.617 – -0.328	-6.417	<.0001*	0.023	2.284
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.651	0.075	-0.798 – -0.505	-8.731	<.0001*	0.043	4.147
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.459	0.074	-0.605 – -0.313	-6.161	<.0001*	0.022	2.109
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.643	0.074	-0.789 – -0.497	-8.632	<.0001*	0.042	4.057
Model 8: Baseline = Degrowth							
(Constant)	1.512	0.053	1.408 – 1.616	28.576	<0.0001	0.463	31.669
Ecosocialism	0.221	0.074	0.075 – 0.367	2.973	0.003*	0.005	0.499

Wellbeing Economy	0.078	0.074	-0.067 – 0.223	1.054	0.292	0.001	0.063
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.101	0.075	-0.248 – 0.046	-1.343	0.179	0.001	0.102
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.092	0.075	-0.055 – 0.239	1.229	0.219	0.001	0.086
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.092	0.075	-0.239 – 0.055	-1.229	0.219	0.001	0.086

Model 9: Baseline = Ecosocialism

(Constant)	1.733	0.052	1.631 – 1.836	33.085	<0.0001	0.621	38.319
Wellbeing Economy	-0.143	0.074	-0.288 – 0.001	-1.945	0.052	0.002	0.214
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.322	0.075	-0.468 – -0.176	-4.316	<0.0001*	0.011	1.046
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.129	0.074	-0.275 – 0.017	-1.737	0.083	0.002	0.171
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.313	0.074	-0.459 – -0.167	-4.208	<0.0001*	0.010	0.995

Model 10: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy

(Constant)	1.590	0.052	1.488 – 1.692	30.705	<0.0001	0.535	34.857
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.179	0.074	-0.324 – -0.033	-2.409	0.016	0.003	0.328
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.014	0.074	-0.131 – 0.159	0.189	0.850	<0.001	0.002
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.170	0.074	-0.315 – -0.025	-2.297	0.022	0.003	0.298

Model 11: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth Label

(Constant)	1.411	0.053	1.307 – 1.515	26.566	<0.0001	0.401	28.599
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.193	0.075	0.046 – 0.340	2.570	0.010	0.004	0.374
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.009	0.075	-0.138 – 0.156	0.116	0.908	<0.001	0.001

Model 12: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism Label

(Constant)	1.604	0.053	1.500 – 1.708	30.315	<0.0001	0.522	34.278
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.184	0.075	-0.331 – -0.037	-2.459	0.014	0.003	0.342

DV = Label Preference

Model 13: Baseline = Degrowth

(Constant)	3.336	0.086	3.167 – 3.505	38.827	<0.0001	1.000	49.992
Ecosocialism	0.739	0.121	0.501 – 0.976	6.108	<0.0001*	0.025	2.414
Wellbeing Economy	1.461	0.120	1.225 – 1.697	12.152	<0.0001*	0.098	8.919
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.426	0.122	0.187 – 0.665	3.500	<0.001*	0.008	0.806
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.824	0.122	0.586 – 1.062	6.781	<0.0001*	0.030	2.959
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.652	0.122	1.414 – 1.890	13.596	<0.0001*	0.123	10.919

Model 14: Baseline = Ecosocialism

(Constant)	4.075	0.085	3.908 – 4.241	47.894	<0.0001	1.521	60.335
Wellbeing Economy	0.722	0.120	0.488 – 0.957	6.039	<0.0001*	0.024	2.362
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.312	0.121	-0.550 – -0.075	-2.579	0.010	0.004	0.439
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.085	0.121	-0.152 – 0.323	0.707	0.480	<0.001	0.033
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.913	0.121	0.676 – 1.151	7.555	<0.0001*	0.038	3.647

Model 15: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy

(Constant)	4.797	0.084	4.632 – 4.962	57.045	<0.0001	2.158	68.334
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-1.035	0.120	-1.271 – -0.799	-8.590	<0.0001*	0.049	4.665
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.637	0.120	-0.873 – -0.401	-5.298	<0.0001*	0.019	1.827
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.191	0.120	-0.045 – 0.427	1.589	0.112	0.002	0.167

Model 16: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth

(Constant)	3.762	0.086	3.593 – 3.931	43.610	<0.0001	1.261	55.775
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.398	0.122	0.159 – 0.637	3.268	0.001*	0.007	0.703
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.226	0.122	0.987 – 1.465	10.069	<0.0001*	0.067	6.299

Model 17: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism

(Constant)	4.160	0.086	3.991 – 4.329	48.417	<0.0001	1.555	60.854
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.828	0.122	0.590 – 1.066	6.814	<0.0001*	0.031	2.987

Note. For models 1-6, $R^2 = 0.046$, for models 7-12, $R^2 = 0.059$, and for models 13-17, $R^2 = 0.149$. Models 1-12 had 1762 residual degrees of freedom, and models 13-17 had 1508 residual degrees of freedom. Although all models 1-12, and all models 13-17 had the same number of variables, we do not report duplicate effects of different variables across different models to avoid redundancy—this explains why some models in the table have fewer variables. In all models, we used t-tests (two-sided) to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00350789 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each economic approach relative to the baseline (e.g., Wellbeing Economy relative to the Full

Proposal), after controlling for the other approaches.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 3.231 indicates that a given economic approach, relative to the baseline, explains about 3.2% of the outcome's variance beyond what is accounted for by the other approaches. DV refers to a dependent variable: Knowledge evaluates how knowledgeable participants were about the economic approach and was assessed on a scale from 1=Not knowledgeable at all to 5=Extremely knowledgeable; Awareness refers to whether participants had previously heard about the economic approach and was assessed on a scale from 1=Never to 5=Very often; and Label Preference indicates how much people liked or disliked a label if they thought of it independently without trying to associate it with any economic approach, on a scale from 1=Dislike a great deal to 7=Like a great deal. Since the Full Proposal on its own involved no labels, this economic approach was not analysed for the label preference. Mean values for the variables reported in this table are available in Supplementary Table 24.

Supplementary Table 26: Comparisons of Knowledge, Awareness, and Label Preference for Economic Approaches (Study 2 US)

The influence of the full proposal (without name labels), different economic approaches labelled by their names (without descriptions), and the full proposal-label combinations on self-reported knowledge, awareness, and label preference regarding the economic approaches (Study 2: Sample 2 - US)

Variable (Economic Approach)	b	SE b	95% CI	t	p	Partial f^2	Partial R^2 %
DV = Knowledge							
Model 1: Baseline = Full Proposal							
(Constant)	2.462	0.060	2.344 – 2.579	41.122	<0.0001	0.926	48.068
Degrowth	-0.987	0.084	-1.152 – -0.823	-11.774	<0.0001*	0.076	7.053
Ecosocialism	-0.769	0.085	-0.935 – -0.603	-9.087	<0.0001*	0.045	4.324
Wellbeing Economy	-0.926	0.084	-1.091 – -0.762	-11.057	<0.0001*	0.067	6.272
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.819	0.085	-0.985 – -0.653	-9.677	<0.0001*	0.051	4.876
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.723	0.084	-0.888 – -0.558	-8.572	<0.0001*	0.040	3.866
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.811	0.086	-0.979 – -0.643	-9.475	<0.0001*	0.049	4.684
Model 2: Baseline = Degrowth							
(Constant)	1.474	0.059	1.359 – 1.589	25.095	<0.0001	0.345	25.634
Ecosocialism	0.218	0.084	0.054 – 0.383	2.602	0.009	0.004	0.369
Wellbeing Economy	0.061	0.083	-0.102 – 0.224	0.735	0.463	<0.001	0.030
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.168	0.084	0.004 – 0.333	2.006	0.045	0.002	0.220
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.265	0.084	0.101 – 0.428	3.167	0.002*	0.005	0.546
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.177	0.085	0.010 – 0.343	2.082	0.038	0.002	0.237
Model 3: Baseline = Ecosocialism							
(Constant)	1.692	0.060	1.575 – 1.810	28.272	<0.0001	0.437	30.434
Wellbeing Economy	-0.157	0.084	-0.322 – 0.007	-1.877	0.061	0.002	0.192
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.050	0.085	-0.216 – 0.116	-0.591	0.555	<0.001	0.019
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.046	0.084	-0.119 – 0.212	0.549	0.583	<0.001	0.017
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.042	0.086	-0.210 – 0.126	-0.487	0.626	<0.001	0.013
Model 4: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy							
(Constant)	1.535	0.059	1.420 – 1.650	26.181	<0.0001	0.375	27.283
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.107	0.084	-0.057 – 0.272	1.280	0.201	0.001	0.090
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.204	0.083	0.040 – 0.367	2.439	0.015	0.003	0.325
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.116	0.085	-0.051 – 0.282	1.364	0.173	0.001	0.102
Model 5: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth							
(Constant)	1.642	0.060	1.525 – 1.760	27.436	<0.0001	0.412	29.179
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.096	0.084	-0.069 – 0.262	1.142	0.253	0.001	0.071
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.008	0.086	-0.160 – 0.176	0.097	0.923	<0.001	0.001
Model 6: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism							
(Constant)	1.739	0.059	1.622 – 1.855	29.268	<0.0001	0.469	31.920
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.088	0.085	-0.255 – 0.079	-1.032	0.302	0.001	0.058
DV = Awareness							
Model 7: Baseline = Full Proposal							
(Constant)	2.358	0.056	2.248 – 2.467	42.229	<0.0001	0.976	49.394
Degrowth	-0.887	0.078	-1.041 – -0.734	-11.343	<0.0001*	0.070	6.580
Ecosocialism	-0.631	0.079	-0.786 – -0.476	-7.989	<0.0001*	0.035	3.375
Wellbeing Economy	-0.922	0.078	-1.076 – -0.769	-11.801	<0.0001*	0.076	7.083
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.915	0.079	-1.070 – -0.761	-11.593	<0.0001*	0.074	6.853
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.733	0.079	-0.887 – -0.578	-9.315	<0.0001*	0.047	4.534
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.996	0.080	-1.153 – -0.840	-12.480	<0.0001*	0.085	7.856
Model 8: Baseline = Degrowth							
(Constant)	1.470	0.055	1.363 – 1.578	26.838	<0.0001	0.394	28.276
Ecosocialism	0.257	0.078	0.103 – 0.410	3.280	0.001*	0.006	0.585

Wellbeing Economy	-0.035	0.077	-0.187 – 0.117	-0.451	0.652	<0.001	0.011
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.028	0.078	-0.181 – 0.125	-0.359	0.720	<0.001	0.007
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.155	0.078	0.002 – 0.307	1.984	0.047	0.002	0.215
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.109	0.079	-0.264 – 0.046	-1.377	0.169	0.001	0.104

Model 9: Baseline = Ecosocialism

(Constant)	1.727	0.056	1.617 – 1.836	30.931	<0.0001	0.524	34.369
Wellbeing Economy	-0.291	0.078	-0.445 – -0.138	-3.730	<0.001*	0.008	0.756
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.285	0.079	-0.439 – -0.130	-3.605	<0.001*	0.007	0.706
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.102	0.079	-0.256 – 0.052	-1.296	0.195	0.001	0.092
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.365	0.080	-0.522 – -0.209	-4.578	<0.0001*	0.011	1.134

Model 10: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy

(Constant)	1.435	0.055	1.328 – 1.543	26.248	<0.0001	0.377	27.384
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.007	0.078	-0.146 – 0.160	0.088	0.930	<0.001	<0.001
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.190	0.078	0.037 – 0.342	2.435	0.015	0.003	0.324
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.074	0.079	-0.229 – 0.081	-0.936	0.349	<0.001	0.048

Model 11: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth

(Constant)	1.442	0.056	1.333 – 1.552	25.833	<0.0001	0.365	26.755
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.183	0.079	0.028 – 0.337	2.323	0.020	0.003	0.294
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.081	0.080	-0.237 – 0.076	-1.013	0.311	0.001	0.056

Model 12: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism

(Constant)	1.625	0.055	1.516 – 1.734	29.328	<0.0001	0.471	32.01
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.264	0.080	-0.420 – -0.108	-3.314	0.001*	0.006	0.598

DV = Label Preference

Model 13: Baseline = Degrowth

(Constant)	3.222	0.092	3.041 – 3.403	34.895	<0.0001	0.777	43.711
Ecosocialism	0.720	0.132	0.461 – 0.979	5.462	<0.0001*	0.019	1.867
Wellbeing Economy	1.604	0.130	1.348 – 1.860	12.297	<0.0001*	0.096	8.795
Full Proposal + Degrowth	0.385	0.132	0.127 – 0.644	2.924	0.004*	0.005	0.542
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.967	0.131	0.710 – 1.225	7.364	<0.0001*	0.035	3.343
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	1.320	0.133	1.058 – 1.581	9.901	<0.0001*	0.063	5.884

Model 14: Baseline = Ecosocialism

(Constant)	3.942	0.094	3.758 – 4.127	41.895	<0.0001	1.119	52.816
Wellbeing Economy	0.884	0.132	0.626 – 1.143	6.713	<0.0001*	0.029	2.794
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-0.335	0.133	-0.596 – -0.074	-2.514	0.012	0.004	0.402
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.247	0.133	-0.013 – 0.507	1.864	0.063	0.002	0.221
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.600	0.135	0.336 – 0.864	4.459	<0.0001*	0.013	1.252

Model 15: Baseline = Wellbeing Economy

(Constant)	4.827	0.092	4.646 – 5.007	52.365	<0.0001	1.749	63.621
Full Proposal + Degrowth	-1.219	0.132	-1.477 – -0.961	-9.253	<0.0001*	0.055	5.178
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	-0.637	0.131	-0.895 – -0.380	-4.856	<0.0001*	0.015	1.482
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	-0.284	0.133	-0.546 – -0.023	-2.135	0.033	0.003	0.290

Model 16: Baseline = Full Proposal + Degrowth

(Constant)	3.608	0.094	3.423 – 3.792	38.339	<0.0001	0.937	48.385
Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	0.582	0.133	0.322 – 0.842	4.388	<0.0001*	0.012	1.213
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.934	0.135	0.671 – 1.198	6.946	<0.0001*	0.031	2.985

Model 17: Baseline = Full Proposal + Ecosocialism

(Constant)	4.189	0.093	4.006 – 4.373	44.862	<0.0001	1.284	56.208
Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	0.353	0.134	0.090 – 0.616	2.632	0.009	0.004	0.440

Note. For models 1-6, $R^2 = 0.091$, for models 7-12, $R^2 = 0.111$, and for models 13-17, $R^2 = 0.115$. Models 1-12 had 1827 residual degrees of freedom, and models 13-17 had 1568 residual degrees of freedom. Although all models 1-12, and all models 13-17 had the same number of variables, we do not report duplicate effects of different variables across different models to avoid redundancy—this explains why some models in the table have fewer variables. In all models, we used t-tests (two-sided) to assess the significance of the coefficients. Based on the false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple testing using the Benjamini-Yekutieli (B-Y) approach,¹⁴⁸ significant p values were ≤ 0.00350789 and are labelled with * (this does not apply to p values for Constant). Partial f^2 refers to Cohen's f^2 effect size (0.02=small; 0.15=medium; 0.35=large).¹⁵⁰ Partial R^2 refers to the proportion of variance in the outcome variable uniquely explained by each economic approach relative to the baseline (e.g., Wellbeing Economy relative to the Full

Proposal), after controlling for the other approaches.¹⁵⁰ For ease of interpretation, we express this value as a percentage (%). For example, a partial R^2 of 4.324 indicates that a given economic approach, relative to the baseline, explains about 4.3% of the outcome's variance beyond what is accounted for by the other approaches. DV refers to a dependent variable: Knowledge evaluates how knowledgeable participants were about the economic approach and was assessed on a scale from 1=Not knowledgeable at all to 5=Extremely knowledgeable; Awareness refers to whether participants had previously heard about the economic approach and was assessed on a scale from 1=Never to 5=Very often; and Label Preference indicates how much people liked or disliked a label if they thought of it independently without trying to associate it with any economic approach, on a scale from 1=Dislike a great deal to 7=Like a great deal. Since the Full Proposal on its own involved no labels, this economic approach was not analysed for the label preference. Mean values for the variables reported in this table are available in Supplementary Table 24.

Supplementary Table 27: Absolute Numbers for Percentages in Figure 2 in the Article (Study 1)

Absolute numbers (Response Category N) and corresponding percentages (%) of participants who opposed, supported, or were neutral toward each economic approach shown in Figure 2 in the article (Study 1)

Sample	Economic Approach	Total N	Response Category	Response Category N	%
UK	Full Proposal	910	Oppose	95	10.440
UK	Full Proposal	910	Neutral	79	8.681
UK	Full Proposal	910	Support	736	80.879
UK	Degrowth	910	Oppose	311	34.176
UK	Degrowth	910	Neutral	362	39.780
UK	Degrowth	910	Support	237	26.044
UK	Ecomodernism	910	Oppose	68	7.473
UK	Ecomodernism	910	Neutral	279	30.659
UK	Ecomodernism	910	Support	563	61.868
UK	Ecosocialism	910	Oppose	145	15.934
UK	Ecosocialism	910	Neutral	241	26.484
UK	Ecosocialism	910	Support	524	57.582
UK	Wellbeing Economy	910	Oppose	48	5.275
UK	Wellbeing Economy	910	Neutral	124	13.626
UK	Wellbeing Economy	910	Support	738	81.099
UK	Green Capitalism	910	Oppose	157	17.253
UK	Green Capitalism	910	Neutral	292	32.088
UK	Green Capitalism	910	Support	461	50.659
UK	Green Growth	910	Oppose	55	6.044
UK	Green Growth	910	Neutral	167	18.352
UK	Green Growth	910	Support	688	75.604
UK	Green Market Economy	910	Oppose	65	7.143
UK	Green Market Economy	910	Neutral	206	22.637
UK	Green Market Economy	910	Support	639	70.220
UK	Post Growth	910	Oppose	105	11.538
UK	Post Growth	910	Neutral	427	46.923
UK	Post Growth	910	Support	378	41.538
US	Full Proposal	941	Oppose	154	16.366
US	Full Proposal	941	Neutral	104	11.052
US	Full Proposal	941	Support	683	72.582
US	Degrowth	941	Oppose	337	35.813
US	Degrowth	941	Neutral	338	35.919
US	Degrowth	941	Support	266	28.268
US	Ecomodernism	941	Oppose	142	15.090
US	Ecomodernism	941	Neutral	264	28.055
US	Ecomodernism	941	Support	535	56.854
US	Ecosocialism	941	Oppose	211	22.423
US	Ecosocialism	941	Neutral	185	19.660
US	Ecosocialism	941	Support	545	57.917
US	Wellbeing Economy	941	Oppose	93	9.883
US	Wellbeing Economy	941	Neutral	157	16.684
US	Wellbeing Economy	941	Support	691	73.433
US	Green Capitalism	941	Oppose	198	21.041
US	Green Capitalism	941	Neutral	238	25.292
US	Green Capitalism	941	Support	505	53.666
US	Green Growth	941	Oppose	123	13.071
US	Green Growth	941	Neutral	169	17.960
US	Green Growth	941	Support	649	68.969
US	Green Market Economy	941	Oppose	132	14.028
US	Green Market Economy	941	Neutral	186	19.766
US	Green Market Economy	941	Support	623	66.206
US	Post Growth	941	Oppose	160	17.003
US	Post Growth	941	Neutral	392	41.658
US	Post Growth	941	Support	389	41.339

Note. Total N refers to the total number of participants in a given sample who rated the corresponding economic approach. Response Category N indicates the number of participants whose support rating fell into a specific response category. % represents the percentage of participants in each response category for each economic approach.

Supplementary Table 28: Absolute Numbers for Percentages in Figure 2 in the Article (Study 2)

Absolute numbers (Response Category N) and corresponding percentages (%) of participants who opposed, supported, or were neutral toward each economic approach shown in Figure 2 in the article (Study 2)

Sample	Economic Approach	Total N	Response Category	Response Category N	%
UK	Full Proposal	255	Oppose	24	9.412
UK	Full Proposal	255	Neutral	21	8.235
UK	Full Proposal	255	Support	210	82.353
UK	Degrowth	250	Oppose	40	16.000
UK	Degrowth	250	Neutral	160	64.000
UK	Degrowth	250	Support	50	20.000
UK	Ecosocialism	255	Oppose	27	10.588
UK	Ecosocialism	255	Neutral	137	53.725
UK	Ecosocialism	255	Support	91	35.686
UK	Wellbeing Economy	261	Oppose	9	3.448
UK	Wellbeing Economy	261	Neutral	120	45.977
UK	Wellbeing Economy	261	Support	132	50.575
UK	Full Proposal + Degrowth	248	Oppose	32	12.903
UK	Full Proposal + Degrowth	248	Neutral	32	12.903
UK	Full Proposal + Degrowth	248	Support	184	74.194
UK	Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	250	Oppose	38	15.200
UK	Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	250	Neutral	24	9.600
UK	Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	250	Support	188	75.200
UK	Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	250	Oppose	22	8.800
UK	Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	250	Neutral	19	7.600
UK	Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	250	Support	209	83.600
US	Full Proposal	260	Oppose	49	18.846
US	Full Proposal	260	Neutral	24	9.231
US	Full Proposal	260	Support	187	71.923
US	Degrowth	270	Oppose	84	31.111
US	Degrowth	270	Neutral	152	56.296
US	Degrowth	270	Support	34	12.593
US	Ecosocialism	260	Oppose	47	18.077
US	Ecosocialism	260	Neutral	134	51.538
US	Ecosocialism	260	Support	79	30.385
US	Wellbeing Economy	271	Oppose	11	4.059
US	Wellbeing Economy	271	Neutral	154	56.827
US	Wellbeing Economy	271	Support	106	39.114
US	Full Proposal + Degrowth	260	Oppose	59	22.692
US	Full Proposal + Degrowth	260	Neutral	24	9.231
US	Full Proposal + Degrowth	260	Support	177	68.077
US	Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	264	Oppose	56	21.212
US	Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	264	Neutral	32	12.121
US	Full Proposal + Ecosocialism	264	Support	176	66.667
US	Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	249	Oppose	49	19.679
US	Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	249	Neutral	21	8.434
US	Full Proposal + Wellbeing Economy	249	Support	179	71.888

Note. Total N refers to the total number of participants in a given sample who rated the corresponding economic approach. Response Category N indicates the number of participants whose support rating fell into a specific response category. % represents the percentage of participants in each response category for each economic approach.

Supplementary Table 29: Research Objectives, Associated Gaps in the Literature, and Summary of Findings

Overview of the main research objectives, their links to gaps in the literature, and findings regarding each objective

Overarching research aim		
A comprehensive examination of public support for the full degrowth proposal (Supplementary Material, pp.3-4) and its determinants, including name labels and individual differences (i.e., personality traits, attitudes, values, wellbeing, and socio-economic indicators).		
Research objective	Literature gap addressed by the objective	Summary of findings for the objective
- To test public support for the full degrowth proposal. - This objective examines people's support for an economic approach characterised by key degrowth principles and initiatives, without referring to the degrowth label.	Previous research on support for degrowth has either presented this economic approach in a simplistic manner, ⁷⁴ or assessed opinions on various growth versus environment statements, ^{69,154,255} but it has not measured support for the full degrowth proposal.	Support for the full proposal was generally high ($\geq 81\%$ in the UK, $\geq 72\%$ in the US), whereas opposition was low ($\leq 10\%$ in the UK, $\leq 19\%$ in the US) (Figure 2 in the article). Across both countries, average support ranged from "somewhat support" to "support" (Figure 3 in the article).
- To examine how the degrowth label shapes public support. - This objective examines if degrowth support changes when people encounter its full proposal versus the label only, and if combining the label with the full proposal makes a difference.	Whereas previous work has considered the potential negative impact of the degrowth label on public support, ^{70,74,75,256} no research has systematically distinguished between support for the label and the economic approach itself, by comparing the full proposal and the label in isolation, vs. in combination.	When people rated degrowth based solely on its label, public support was statistically significantly lower than for the full proposal alone or when combined with the label (Figures 2 and 3 in the article). However, public support for the full proposal did not differ with or without the label.
- To examine the role of alternative labels in public support. - This objective examines if labelling an economic approach as degrowth (without any description of it) changes support compared to the names of other sustainability-oriented economic approaches (e.g., green market economy, post growth), and if some of these names, which denote economic approaches similar to degrowth (e.g., ecosocialism, wellbeing economy), change support for its full proposal when attached to it, compared to labelling it as degrowth.	Previous research has explored how people evaluate degrowth and other sustainability-oriented economic approaches based on their labels alone (e.g., green economy, post growth). ⁷⁵ Some studies have also examined whether labels for approaches similar to degrowth influence evaluations of its brief description. ⁷⁰ However, previous work has not systematically distinguished between labels and descriptions, nor has it examined the full degrowth proposal rather than its brief description.	Alternative sustainability-oriented economic approaches labelled by name only (Figures 2 and 3 in the article) received statistically significantly higher support than degrowth (label only). However, support for these alternatives was statistically significantly lower than for the full proposal (without the label), except for green growth and ecosocialism, where findings were inconsistent. When the names of the two economic approaches very similar to degrowth (i.e., ecosocialism and wellbeing economy) were combined with its full proposal, support was not statistically significantly different from the full proposal alone or with the degrowth label (Figures 2 and 3 in the article). This contrasts with findings for labels in isolation, where both ecosocialism and wellbeing economy were supported more than degrowth.
- To test which individual differences predict public support for the full proposal. - This objective examines a comprehensive range of individual differences (e.g., personality, values, socio-economic indicators) with potential links to degrowth, to determine which ones predict support for its full proposal.	Previous research has explored individual differences but mainly in relation to the prioritization of environmental protection over economic growth, ²⁵⁷ rather than public support for degrowth. Moreover, the individual differences used were limited to a specific dataset (i.e., World Values Survey). ²³¹	People's drive to address global challenges with ideas and action (i.e., transformative utopian impulse) ⁸⁷ and the belief in the importance of ecosystem integrity (i.e., new ecological paradigm-balance) ⁸⁵ were key predictors of support for the full proposal. Socio-economic indicators such as political orientation or income were not consistent predictors.
Overarching message		

The full degrowth proposal is generally supported by UK and US citizens, regardless of whether it carries the degrowth label. In contrast, support is low when the degrowth label is used alone but increases with alternatives like ecosocialism or wellbeing economy. Therefore, increasing public support for degrowth requires raising awareness of its ideas and principles or experimenting with alternative labels and frames. Since people driven to address global challenges with ideas and action, and those who value ecosystem integrity, are more likely to support degrowth, nurturing these tendencies through education and other initiatives could further facilitate the transition toward degrowth.

Supplementary References

- 1 Hickel J, Kallis G, Jackson T, *et al.* Degrowth can work — here’s how science can help. *Nature* 2022; **612**: 400–3.
- 2 Vogel J, Hickel J. Is green growth happening? An empirical analysis of achieved versus Paris-compliant CO₂–GDP decoupling in high-income countries. *Lancet Planet Health* 2023; **7**: e759–69.
- 3 Kallis G, Kostakis V, Lange S, Muraca B, Paulson S, Schmelzer M. Research On Degrowth. *Annu Rev Environ Resour* 2018; **43**: 291–316.
- 4 Kallis G, Hickel J, O’Neill DW, *et al.* Post-growth: the science of wellbeing within planetary boundaries. *Lancet Planet Health* 2025; **9**: e62–78.
- 5 Hickel J. Less is More. 2021 <https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/441772/less-is-more-by-jason-hickel/9781786091215> (accessed Jan 22, 2024).
- 6 Fitzpatrick N, Parrique T, Cosme I. Exploring degrowth policy proposals: A systematic mapping with thematic synthesis. *J Clean Prod* 2022; **365**: 132764.
- 7 Demaria F, Schneider F, Sekulova F, Martinez-Alier J. What is Degrowth? From an Activist Slogan to a Social Movement. *Environ Values* 2013; **22**: 191–215.
- 8 Demaria F, D’Alisa G, Kallis G. Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era (E-BOOK). Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015.
- 9 Feinberg M, Willer R, Kovacheff C. The activist’s dilemma: Extreme protest actions reduce popular support for social movements. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2020; **119**: 1086–111.
- 10 Avery RAT, Butera F. Minority Influence and Degrowth-Oriented Pro-environmental Conflict: When Emotions Betray Our Attachment to the Social Dominant Paradigm. *Front Psychol* 2022; **13**: 899933.
- 11 Avery RAT, Korichi A, Vagli C, *et al.* A qualitative and quantitative study of radical pro-environmental social change as anticipated future loss and threat: A gender perspective. *Br J Soc Psychol* 2025; **64**: e12841.
- 12 Fanning AL, O’Neill DW, Hickel J, Roux N. The social shortfall and ecological overshoot of nations. *Nat Sustain* 2021; **5**: 26–36.
- 13 Hickel J, O’Neill DW, Fanning AL, Zoomkawala H. National responsibility for ecological breakdown: a fair-shares assessment of resource use, 1970–2017. *Lancet Planet Health* 2022; **6**: e342–9.
- 14 Hickel J. Quantifying national responsibility for climate breakdown: an equality-based attribution approach for carbon dioxide emissions in excess of the planetary boundary. *Lancet Planet Health* 2020; **4**: e399–404.
- 15 Fanning AL, Hickel J. Compensation for atmospheric appropriation. *Nat Sustain* 2023; **6**: 1077–86.
- 16 Kikstra JS, Mastrucci A, Min J, Riahi K, Rao ND. Decent living gaps and energy needs around the world. *Environ Res Lett* 2021; **16**: 095006.
- 17 Vélez-Henao JA, Pauliuk S. Material Requirements of Decent Living Standards. *Environ Sci Technol* 2023; **57**: 14206–17.
- 18 Millward-Hopkins J, Steinberger JK, Rao ND, Oswald Y. Providing decent living with minimum energy: A global scenario. *Glob Environ Change* 2020; **65**: 102168.
- 19 Hickel J. The double objective of democratic ecosocialism. *Mon Rev* 2023; **75**. <https://monthlyreview.org/2023/09/01/the-double-objective-of-democratic-ecosocialism/>.
- 20 Hickel J, Kallis G. Is Green Growth Possible? *New Polit Econ* 2020; **25**: 469–86.
- 21 Hickel J, Brockway P, Kallis G, *et al.* Urgent need for post-growth climate mitigation scenarios. *Nat Energy* 2021; **6**: 766–8.
- 22 Keyßer LT, Lenzen M. 1.5 °C degrowth scenarios suggest the need for new mitigation pathways. *Nat Commun* 2021; **12**: 2676.

- 23 Barrett J, Pye S, Betts-Davies S, *et al.* Energy demand reduction options for meeting national zero-emission targets in the United Kingdom. *Nat Energy* 2022; **7**: 726–35.
- 24 Galbraith ED, Barrington-Leigh C, Miñarro S, *et al.* High life satisfaction reported among small-scale societies with low incomes. *Proc Natl Acad Sci* 2024; **121**: e2311703121.
- 25 Jackson T. Prosperity without growth? : the transition to a sustainable economy. Sustainable Development Commission, 2009 <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/2163> (accessed May 17, 2024).
- 26 Steinmann ZJN, Schipper AM, Hauck M, Giljum S, Wernet G, Huijbregts MAJ. Resource Footprints are Good Proxies of Environmental Damage. *Environ Sci Technol* 2017; **51**: 6360–6.
- 27 Bringezu S. Possible Target Corridor for Sustainable Use of Global Material Resources. *Resources* 2015; **4**: 25–54.
- 28 Hauser OP, Rand DG, Peysakhovich A, Nowak MA. Cooperating with the future. *Nature* 2014; **511**: 220–3.
- 29 Ostrom E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- 30 Hickel J, Dorninger C, Wieland H, Suwandi I. Imperialist appropriation in the world economy: Drain from the global South through unequal exchange, 1990–2015. *Glob Environ Change* 2022; **73**: 102467.
- 31 Dorninger C, Hornborg A, Abson DJ, *et al.* Global patterns of ecologically unequal exchange: Implications for sustainability in the 21st century. *Ecol Econ* 2021; **179**: 106824.
- 32 Patnaik U, Patnaik P. Capital and Imperialism: Theory, History, and the Present. Monthly Review Press, 2021.
- 33 D’Alessandro S, Cieplinski A, Distefano T, Dittmer K. Feasible alternatives to green growth. *Nat Sustain* 2020; **3**: 329–35.
- 34 Victor P, Rosenbluth G. Managing without growth. In: Lawn P, ed. Environment and Employment: A Reconciliation. Routledge, 2009: 337–62.
- 35 Hickel J. On technology and degrowth. *Mon Rev* 2023; **75**. DOI:<https://monthlyreview.org/2023/07/01/on-technology-and-degrowth/>.
- 36 Polewsky M, Hankammer S, Kleer R, Antons D. Degrowth vs. Green Growth. A computational review and interdisciplinary research agenda. *Ecol Econ* 2024; **217**: 108067.
- 37 Ziegler R, Bauwens T, Roy MJ, Teasdale S, Fourrier A, Raufflet E. Embedding circularity: Theorizing the social economy, its potential, and its challenges. *Ecol Econ* 2023; **214**: 107970.
- 38 Burkhart C, Schmelzer M, Treu N, editors. Degrowth in Movement(s): Exploring Pathways for Transformation. zer0 books, 2020 <https://www.collectiveinkbooks.com/zer0-books/our-books/degrowth-movements>.
- 39 Chaudhary AS. Sustaining What? Capitalism, Socialism, and Climate Change. In: Azmanova A, Chamberlain J, eds. Capitalism, Democracy, Socialism: Critical Debates. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022: 197–239.
- 40 Engler J-O, Kretschmer M-F, Rathgens J, Ament JA, Huth T, von Wehrden H. 15 years of degrowth research: A systematic review. *Ecol Econ* 2024; **218**: 108101.
- 41 Fioramonti L, Coscieme L, Costanza R, *et al.* Wellbeing economy: An effective paradigm to mainstream post-growth policies? *Ecol Econ* 2022; **192**: 107261.
- 42 Kongshøj K. Social policy in a future of degrowth? Challenges for decommodification, commoning and public support. *Humanit Soc Sci Commun* 2023; **10**: 850.
- 43 Banerjee SB, Jermier JM, Peredo AM, Perey R, Reichel A. Theoretical perspectives on organizations and organizing in a post-growth era. *Organization* 2021; **28**: 337–57.
- 44 Hayden A, Dasilva C. The wellbeing economy: Possibilities and limits in bringing sufficiency from the margins into the mainstream. *Front Sustain* 2022; **3**. <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsus.2022.966876>.
- 45 Fioramonti L. Post-growth theories in a global world: A comparative analysis. *Rev Int Stud* 2024; : 1–11.

- 46 Buch-Hansen H. Why degrowth should be disentangled from the wellbeing economy. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **230**: 108532.
- 47 Hayden A. Buzzword or breakthrough beyond growth? The mainstreaming of the Wellbeing Economy. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **227**: 108375.
- 48 Mason N, and Büchs M. Barriers to adopting wellbeing-economy narratives: comparing the Wellbeing Economy Alliance and Wellbeing Economy Governments. *Sustain Sci Pract Policy* 2023; **19**: 2222624.
- 49 Hayden A. The wellbeing economy in practice: sustainable and inclusive growth? Or a post-growth breakthrough? *Humanit Soc Sci Commun* 2024; **11**: 879.
- 50 The Wellbeing Economy Forum. Previous Forums | Wellbeing Economy Forum 2024. WBEF. <https://www.wellbeingeconomyforum.com/previous-forums> (accessed June 30, 2025).
- 51 D'Alisa G, Kallis G. Degrowth and the State. *Ecol Econ* 2020; **169**: 106486.
- 52 Trainer T. The Degrowth Movement from the Perspective of the Simpler Way. *Capital Nat Social* 2015; **26**: 58–75.
- 53 Kallis G. Socialism Without Growth. *Capital Nat Social* 2019; **30**: 189–206.
- 54 Toro FJ. Are the State and Public Institutions Compatible with De-growth? In: Locret-Collet M, Springer S, Mateer J, Acker M, eds. *Inhabiting the Earth*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.
- 55 Brownhill L, Engel-Di Mauro S, Giacomini T, Isla A, Löwy M, Turner TE, editors. *The Routledge Handbook on Ecosocialism*. London: Routledge, 2021.
- 56 Löwy M, Akbulut B, Fernandes S, Kallis G. For an Ecosocialist Degrowth. 2022; **73**. <https://monthlyreview.org/2022/04/01/for-an-ecosocialist-degrowth/>.
- 57 Pinto H, Barboza M, Nogueira C. Perceptions and Behaviors Concerning Tourism Degrowth and Sustainable Tourism: Latent Dimensions and Types of Tourists. *Sustainability* 2025; **17**: 387.
- 58 Joanes T. Personal norms in a globalized world: Norm-activation processes and reduced clothing consumption. *J Clean Prod* 2019; **212**: 941–9.
- 59 Borusiak B, Pierański B, Gawel A, *et al.* Can the intention to protect the environment lead to reduced consumption among business students? *Econ Environ* 2024; **89**: 754.
- 60 Mundaca L, Wamsler C. Engaging high-income earners in climate action: Policy insights from survey experiments. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **227**: 108387.
- 61 Helseth EV, Nordtug H, Skavhaug IM, Gómez-Baggethun E. Beyond green growth: Mapping sustainability pathways for rural transformations in Norway. *Environ Sci Policy* 2025; **170**: 104110.
- 62 Delhey J, Steckermeier LC. The Good Life, Affluence, and Self-reported Happiness: Introducing the Good Life Index and Debunking Two Popular Myths. *World Dev* 2016; **88**: 50–66.
- 63 Kongshøj K, Hedegaard TF. Limits to degrowth? Exploring patterns of support for and resistance against degrowth policies. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **237**: 108699.
- 64 Lee J, Koch M, Alkan-Olsson J. Deliberating a Sustainable Welfare–Work Nexus. *Polit Vierteljahresschr* 2023; **64**: 825–44.
- 65 O'Dell D, Contu D, Shreedhar G. Public support for degrowth policies and sufficiency behaviours in the United States: A discrete choice experiment. *Ecol Econ* 2025; **228**: 108446.
- 66 Ančić B, Domazet M. Potential for degrowth: attitudes and behaviours across 18 european countries. *Teor Praksa* 2015; **52**: 456-475,566.
- 67 Gugushvili D. Public attitudes toward economic growth versus environmental sustainability dilemma: Evidence from Europe. *Int J Comp Sociol* 2021; **62**: 224–40.
- 68 Paulson L, Büchs M. Public acceptance of post-growth: Factors and implications for post-growth strategy. *Futures* 2022; **143**: 103020.

- 69 Drews S, Savin I, van den Bergh JCJM. Opinion Clusters in Academic and Public Debates on Growth-vs-Environment. *Ecol Econ* 2019; **157**: 141–55.
- 70 Drews S, Reese G. “Degrowth” vs. Other Types of Growth: Labeling Affects Emotions but Not Attitudes. *Environ Commun* 2018; **12**: 763–72.
- 71 Drews S, van den Bergh JCJM. Public views on economic growth, the environment and prosperity: Results of a questionnaire survey. *Glob Environ Change* 2016; **39**: 1–14.
- 72 Savin I, Drews S, van den Bergh J. Free associations of citizens and scientists with economic and green growth: A computational-linguistics analysis. *Ecol Econ* 2021; **180**: 106878.
- 73 Tomaselli MF, Sheppard SRJ, Kozak R, Gifford R. What do Canadians think about economic growth, prosperity and the environment? *Ecol Econ* 2019; **161**: 41–9.
- 74 Krpan D, Basso F. Keep Degrowth or go Rebirth? Regulatory focus theory and the support for a sustainable downscaling of production and consumption. *J Environ Psychol* 2021; **74**: 101586.
- 75 Tomaselli MF, Kozak R, Gifford R, Sheppard SRJ. Degrowth or Not Degrowth: The Importance of Message Frames for Characterizing the New Economy. *Ecol Econ* 2021; **183**: 106952.
- 76 Douglas BD, Ewell PJ, Brauer M. Data quality in online human-subjects research: Comparisons between MTurk, Prolific, CloudResearch, Qualtrics, and SONA. *PLOS ONE* 2023; **18**: e0279720.
- 77 Peer E, Rothschild D, Gordon A, Evernden Z, Damer E. Data quality of platforms and panels for online behavioral research. *Behav Res Methods* 2022; **54**: 1643–62.
- 78 Groves RM, Presser S, Dipko S. The Role of Topic Interest in Survey Participation Decisions. *Public Opin Q* 2004; **68**: 2–31.
- 79 Singer E, Ye C. The Use and Effects of Incentives in Surveys. *Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci* 2013; **645**: 112–41.
- 80 Smith MG, Witte M, Rocha S, Basner M. Effectiveness of incentives and follow-up on increasing survey response rates and participation in field studies. *BMC Med Res Methodol* 2019; **19**: 230.
- 81 Albert DA, Smilek D. Comparing attentional disengagement between Prolific and MTurk samples. *Sci Rep* 2023; **13**: 20574.
- 82 Freese J, Jin O. Online Nonprobability Samples. *Annu Rev Sociol* 2025. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-090524-043117>.
- 83 Kemp S. Digital 2025: Global Overview Report. We Are Social, 2025 <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-global-overview-report> (accessed June 24, 2025).
- 84 Peer E, Brandimarte L, Samat S, Acquisti A. Beyond the Turk: Alternative platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. *J Exp Soc Psychol* 2017; **70**: 153–63.
- 85 Palan S, Schitter C. Prolific.ac—A subject pool for online experiments. *J Behav Exp Finance* 2018; **17**: 22–7.
- 86 Tang J, Birrell E, Lerner A. Replication: How well do my results generalize now? The external validity of online privacy and security surveys. 2022: 367–85.
- 87 Basso F, Krpan D. Measuring the transformative utopian impulse for planetary health in the age of the Anthropocene: a multi-study scale development and validation. *Lancet Planet Health* 2022; **6**: e230–42.
- 88 Cordano M, Welcomer SA, Scherer RF. An analysis of the predictive validity of the new ecological paradigm scale. *J Environ Educ* 2003; **34**: 22–8.
- 89 Meade AW, Craig SB. Identifying careless responses in survey data. *Psychol Methods* 2012; **17**: 437–55.
- 90 Aust F, Diedenhofen B, Ullrich S, Pie J. Seriousness checks are useful to improve data validity in online research. *Behav Res Methods* 2013; **45**: 527–35.
- 91 Lau SSS, Fong JWL, van Rijsbergen N, *et al.* Emotional responses and psychological health among young people amid climate change, Fukushima’s radioactive water release, and wars in Ukraine and the Middle East,

- and the mediating roles of media exposure and nature connectedness: a cross-national analysis. *Lancet Planet Health* 2024; **8**: e365–77.
- 92 Lawrance EL, Jennings N, Kioupi V, Thompson R, Diffey J, Vercammen A. Psychological responses, mental health, and sense of agency for the dual challenges of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic in young people in the UK: an online survey study. *Lancet Planet Health* 2022; **6**: e726–38.
 - 93 Barnett MJ, Hancock PI, Klotz LE, Attari SZ. Recycling bias and reduction neglect. *Nat Sustain* 2023; **6**: 1418–25.
 - 94 Banerjee S, Galizzi MM, John P, Mourato S. Sustainable dietary choices improved by reflection before a nudge in an online experiment. *Nat Sustain* 2023; **6**: 1632–42.
 - 95 Basso F, Krpan D. Measuring the transformative utopian impulse for planetary health in the age of the Anthropocene: a multi-study scale development and validation. *Lancet Planet Health* 2022; **6**: e230–42.
 - 96 Dubey R, Hardy MD, Griffiths TL, Bhui R. AI-generated visuals of car-free US cities help improve support for sustainable policies. *Nat Sustain* 2024; **7**: 399–403.
 - 97 Cerf M, Matz SC, MacIver MA. Participating in a climate prediction market increases concern about global warming. *Nat Clim Change* 2023; **13**: 523–31.
 - 98 Spampatti T, Hahnel UJJ, Trutnevyte E, Brosch T. Psychological inoculation strategies to fight climate disinformation across 12 countries. *Nat Hum Behav* 2024; **8**: 380–98.
 - 99 Walker J, Tepper SJ, Gilovich T. People are more tolerant of inequality when it is expressed in terms of individuals rather than groups at the top. *Proc Natl Acad Sci* 2021; **118**: e2100430118.
 - 100 Panizza F, Dimant E, Kimbrough EO, Vostroknutov A. Measuring norm pluralism and perceived polarization in US politics. *PNAS Nexus* 2024; **3**: pgae413.
 - 101 Salvi F, Horta Ribeiro M, Gallotti R, West R. On the conversational persuasiveness of GPT-4. *Nat Hum Behav* 2025; published online May 19. DOI:10.1038/s41562-025-02194-6.
 - 102 Dechezleprêtre A, Fabre A, Kruse T, Planterose B, Sanchez Chico A, Stantcheva S. Fighting Climate Change: International Attitudes toward Climate Policies. *Am Econ Rev* 2025; **115**: 1258–300.
 - 103 Lewandowski RE, Clayton SD, Olbrich L, *et al.* Climate emotions, thoughts, and plans among US adolescents and young adults: a cross-sectional descriptive survey and analysis by political party identification and self-reported exposure to severe weather events. *Lancet Planet Health* 2024; **8**: e879–93.
 - 104 Herrmann A, Krippel N, Fischer H, *et al.* Acceptability of health-only versus climate-and-health framings in lifestyle-related climate-sensitive health counselling: results of a randomised survey experiment in Germany. *Lancet Planet Health* 2025; **9**: e456–66.
 - 105 Kotcher J, Luong K, Charles J, Gould R, Maibach E. Calling attention to opponents of climate action in climate and health messaging. *Lancet Planet Health* 2023; **7**: e938–46.
 - 106 Geiger SJ, Köhler JK, Delabrida ZNC, *et al.* What We Think Others Think and Do About Climate Change: A Multicountry Test of Pluralistic Ignorance and Public-Consensus Messaging. *Psychol Sci* 2025; **36**: 421–42.
 - 107 Ogunbode CA, Doran R, Ayanian AH, *et al.* Climate justice beliefs related to climate action and policy support around the world. *Nat Clim Change* 2024; **14**: 1144–50.
 - 108 Jennings W, Wlezien C. Election polling errors across time and space. *Nat Hum Behav* 2018; **2**: 276–83.
 - 109 Groves RM. Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys. *Public Opin Q* 2006; **70**: 646–75.
 - 110 Smith TW. Total Survey Error. In: Kempf-Leonard K, ed. *Encyclopedia of Social Measurement*. New York: Elsevier, 2005: 857–62.
 - 111 Kalton G. Methods for oversampling rare subpopulations in social surveys. *Surv Methodol* 2009; **35**: 125–41.

- 112 Keeter S, Hatley N, Lau A, Kennedy C. What 2020's Election Poll Errors Tell Us About the Accuracy of Issue Polling. Pew Research Center, 2021.
- 113 Boyle J, Dayton J, ZuWallack R, Iachan R. The shy respondent and propensity to participate in surveys: A proof-of-concept study. *Surv Pract* 2023; **16**. DOI:<https://doi.org/10.29115/SP-2014-0026>.
- 114 Andre P, Boneva T, Chopra F, Falk A. Globally representative evidence on the actual and perceived support for climate action. *Nat Clim Change* 2024; **14**: 253–9.
- 115 Dixon G, Clarke C, Jacquet J, Evensen DTN, Hart PS. The complexity of pluralistic ignorance in Republican climate change policy support in the United States. *Commun Earth Environ* 2024; **5**: 76.
- 116 Nosek BA, Hardwicke TE, Moshontz H, *et al*. Replicability, robustness, and reproducibility in psychological science. *Annu Rev Psychol* 2022; **73**: 719–48.
- 117 Pashler H, Wagenmakers E. Editors' Introduction to the Special Section on Replicability in Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence? *Perspect Psychol Sci* 2012; **7**: 528–30.
- 118 Open Science Collaboration. An Open, Large-Scale, Collaborative Effort to Estimate the Reproducibility of Psychological Science. *Perspect Psychol Sci* 2012; **7**: 657–60.
- 119 Shrout PE, Rodgers JL. Psychology, Science, and Knowledge Construction: Broadening Perspectives from the Replication Crisis. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* 2018; **69**: 487–510.
- 120 Anvari F, and Lakens D. The replicability crisis and public trust in psychological science. *Compr Results Soc Psychol* 2018; **3**: 266–86.
- 121 Simonsohn U. Small Telescopes: Detectability and the Evaluation of Replication Results. *Psychol Sci* 2015; **26**: 559–69.
- 122 Simmons JP, Nelson LD, Simonsohn U. False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant. *Psychol Sci* 2011; **22**: 1359–66.
- 123 Button KS, Ioannidis JPA, Mokrysz C, *et al*. Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience. *Nat Rev Neurosci* 2013; **14**: 365–76.
- 124 Bakker M, van Dijk A, Wicherts JM. The Rules of the Game Called Psychological Science. *Perspect Psychol Sci* 2012; **7**: 543–54.
- 125 Richard FD, Bond Jr. CF, Stokes-Zoota JJ. One Hundred Years of Social Psychology Quantitatively Described. *Rev Gen Psychol* 2003; **7**: 331–63.
- 126 Gignac GE, Szodorai ET. Effect size guidelines for individual differences researchers. *Personal Individ Differ* 2016; **102**: 74–8.
- 127 Hemphill JF. Interpreting the magnitudes of correlation coefficients. *Am Psychol* 2003; **58**: 78–9.
- 128 Bosco FA, Aguinis H, Singh K, Field JG, Pierce CA. Correlational effect size benchmarks. *J Appl Psychol* 2015; **100**: 431–49.
- 129 Lovakov A, Agadullina ER. Empirically derived guidelines for effect size interpretation in social psychology. *Eur J Soc Psychol* 2021; **51**: 485–504.
- 130 Funder DC, Ozer DJ. Evaluating Effect Size in Psychological Research: Sense and Nonsense. *Adv Methods Pract Psychol Sci* 2019; **2**: 156–68.
- 131 Cafri G, Kromrey ,Jeffrey D., and Brannick MT. A Meta-Meta-Analysis: Empirical Review of Statistical Power, Type I Error Rates, Effect Sizes, and Model Selection of Meta-Analyses Published in Psychology. *Multivar Behav Res* 2010; **45**: 239–70.
- 132 Wicherts JM, Veldkamp CLS, Augusteijn HEM, Bakker M, van Aert RCM, van Assen MALM. Degrees of Freedom in Planning, Running, Analyzing, and Reporting Psychological Studies: A Checklist to Avoid p-Hacking. *Front Psychol* 2016; **Volume 7-2016**.
<https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01832>.

- 133 Masicampo EJ, Lalande DR. A peculiar prevalence of p values just below .05. *Q J Exp Psychol* 2012; **65**: 2271–9.
- 134 Simonsohn U, Nelson LD, Simmons JP. P-curve: A key to the file-drawer. *J Exp Psychol Gen* 2014; **143**: 534–47.
- 135 Simonsohn U, Simmons JP, Nelson LD. Better P-curves: Making P-curve analysis more robust to errors, fraud, and ambitious P-hacking, a Reply to Ulrich and Miller (2015). *J Exp Psychol Gen* 2015; **144**: 1146–52.
- 136 Head ML, Holman L, Lanfear R, Kahn AT, Jennions MD. The Extent and Consequences of P-Hacking in Science. *PLOS Biol* 2015; **13**: e1002106.
- 137 Rubin M. When does HARKing hurt? Identifying when different types of undisclosed post hoc hypothesizing harm scientific progress. *Rev Gen Psychol* 2017; **21**: 308–20.
- 138 Cohen J. A power primer. *Psychol Bull* 1992; **112**: 155–9.
- 139 Abraham WT, Russell DW. Statistical Power Analysis in Psychological Research. *Soc Personal Psychol Compass* 2008; **2**: 283–301.
- 140 Mertens S, Herberz M, Hahnel UJJ, Brosch T. The effectiveness of nudging: A meta-analysis of choice architecture interventions across behavioral domains. *Proc Natl Acad Sci* 2022; **119**: e2107346118.
- 141 Cumming G. The New Statistics: Why and How. *Psychol Sci* 2014; **25**: 7–29.
- 142 Schönbrodt FD, Perugini M. At what sample size do correlations stabilize? *J Res Personal* 2013; **47**: 609–12.
- 143 Lakens D, Evers ERK. Sailing From the Seas of Chaos Into the Corridor of Stability: Practical Recommendations to Increase the Informational Value of Studies. *Perspect Psychol Sci* 2014; **9**: 278–92.
- 144 Open Science Collaboration. Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. *Science* 2015; **349**: aac4716.
- 145 Giner-Sorolla R. Approaching a fair deal for significance and other concerns. *J Exp Soc Psychol* 2016; **65**: 1–6.
- 146 Points of significance. *Nat Hum Behav* 2023; **7**: 293–4.
- 147 Vankelecom L, Schacht O, Laroy N, Loeys T, Moerkerke B. A Systematic Review on the Evolution of Power Analysis Practices in Psychological Research. *Psychol Belg* 2025; **65**. DOI:10.5334/pb.1318.
- 148 Benjamini Y, Yekutieli D. The control of the false discovery rate in multiple testing under dependency. *Ann Stat* 2001; **29**: 1165–88.
- 149 Hill C, Du L, Johnson M, McCullough BD. Comparing programming languages for data analytics: Accuracy of estimation in Python and R. *WIREs Data Min Knowl Discov* 2024; **14**: e1531.
- 150 Cohen J. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences, 2nd edn. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1988.
- 151 Song QC, Tang C, Wee S. Making sense of model generalizability: A tutorial on cross-validation in R and Shiny. *Adv Methods Pract Psychol Sci* 2021; **4**: 2515245920947067.
- 152 Faul F, Erdfelder E, Buchner A, Lang AG. Statistical power analyses using G* Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. *Behav Res Methods* 2009; **41**: 1149–60.
- 153 Faul F, Erdfelder E, Lang A-G, Buchner A. G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behav Res Methods* 2007; **39**: 175–91.
- 154 Paulson L, Büchs M. Public acceptance of post-growth: Factors and implications for post-growth strategy. *Futures* 2022; **143**: 103020.
- 155 Fioramonti L, Coscieme L, Costanza R, et al. Wellbeing economy: An effective paradigm to mainstream post-growth policies? *Ecol Econ* 2022; **192**: 107261.
- 156 Engler J-O, Kretschmer M-F, Rathgens J, Ament JA, Huth T, von Wehrden H. 15 years of degrowth research: A systematic review. *Ecol Econ* 2024; **218**: 108101.

- 157 Kallis G, Kostakis V, Lange S, Muraca B, Paulson S, Schmelzer M. Research On Degrowth. *Annu Rev Environ Resour* 2018; **43**: 291–316.
- 158 Cheung F, Lucas RE. Assessing the validity of single-item life satisfaction measures: Results from three large samples. *Qual Life Res* 2014; **23**: 2809–18.
- 159 Schwartz SH, Cieciuch J, Vecchione M, *et al.* Refining the theory of basic individual values. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2012; **103**: 663–88.
- 160 Cordano M, Welcomer SA, Scherer RF. An Analysis of the Predictive Validity of the New Ecological Paradigm Scale. *J Environ Educ* 2003; **34**: 22–8.
- 161 Lang FR, John D, Lüdtke O, Schupp J, Wagner GG. Short assessment of the Big Five: Robust across survey methods except telephone interviewing. *Behav Res Methods* 2011; **43**: 548–67.
- 162 Condon D. Database of Individual Differences Survey Tools. 2019. DOI:10.7910/DVN/T1NQ4V.
- 163 Storozuk A, Ashley M, Delage V, Maloney EA. Got bots? Practical recommendations to protect online survey data from bot attacks. *Quant Methods Psychol* 2020; **16**: 472–81.
- 164 Krpan D, Booth JE, Damien A. The positive–negative–competence (PNC) model of psychological responses to representations of robots. *Nat Hum Behav* 2023; **7**: 1933–54.
- 165 Hayes AF. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach, 2nd edn. Guilford Press, 2018.
- 166 Kuhn M. Building predictive models in R using the caret package. *J Stat Softw* 2008; **28**: 1–26.
- 167 Kuhn M. caret: Classification and Regression Training. 2023. <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/caret/caret.pdf>.
- 168 de Rooij M, Weeda W. Cross-Validation: A Method Every Psychologist Should Know. *Adv Methods Pract Psychol Sci* 2020; **3**: 248–63.
- 169 Jacobucci R, Brandmaier AM, Kievit RA. A practical guide to variable selection in structural equation modeling by using regularized multiple-indicators, multiple-causes models. *Adv Methods Pract Psychol Sci* 2019; **2**: 55–76.
- 170 McNeish DM. Using lasso for predictor selection and to assuage overfitting: A method long overlooked in behavioral sciences. *Multivar Behav Res* 2015; **50**: 471–84.
- 171 Orrù G, Monaro M, Conversano C, Gemignani A, Sartori G. Machine learning in psychometrics and psychological research. *Front Psychol* 2020; **10**: 2970.
- 172 Sheetal A, Feng Z, Savani K. Using machine learning to generate novel hypotheses: Increasing optimism about COVID-19 makes people less willing to justify unethical behaviors. *Psychol Sci* 2020; **31**: 1222–35.
- 173 Fiorino DJ. A Good Life on a Finite Earth: The Political Economy of Green Growth. Oxford University Press, 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190605803.001.0001.
- 174 Terzi A. Growth for Good: Reshaping Capitalism to Save Humanity from Climate Catastrophe. Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press, 2022 DOI:10.2307/j.ctv2k4fwv.
- 175 Hickel J. What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification. *Globalizations* 2021; **18**: 1105–11.
- 176 Laenen T. What makes social policy programs (un)popular? Disentangling the causal impact of policy design, risk group deservingness and mode of delivery. *J Eur Soc Policy* 2025; : 09589287251331599.
- 177 Flusberg SJ, Holmes KJ, Thibodeau PH, Nabi RL, Matlock T. The Psychology of Framing: How Everyday Language Shapes the Way We Think, Feel, and Act. *Psychol Sci Public Interest* 2024; **25**: 105–61.
- 178 Tank L, Voget-Kleschin L, Garschagen M, *et al.* Distinguish between feasibility and desirability when assessing climate response options. *Npj Clim Action* 2025; **4**: 34.
- 179 Psychological Scales. <https://scales.arabpsychology.com/> (accessed May 15, 2024).

- 180 Haws KL, Winterich KP, Naylor RW. Seeing the world through GREEN-tinted glasses: Green consumption values and responses to environmentally friendly products. *J Consum Psychol* 2014; **24**: 336–54.
- 181 Sudbury-Riley L, Kohlbacher F. Ethically minded consumer behavior: Scale review, development, and validation. *J Bus Res* 2016; **69**: 2697–710.
- 182 Klar M, Kasser T. Some Benefits of Being an Activist: Measuring Activism and Its Role in Psychological Well-Being. *Polit Psychol* 2009; **30**: 755–77.
- 183 Leonard-Barton D. Voluntary Simplicity Lifestyles and Energy Conservation. *J Consum Res* 1981; **8**: 243–52.
- 184 Buch-Hansen H, Nesterova I. Less and more: Conceptualising degrowth transformations. *Ecol Econ* 2023; **205**: 107731.
- 185 Lins de Holanda Coelho G, H. P. Hanel P, J. Wolf L. The Very Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition: Developing a Six-Item Version. *Assessment* 2020; **27**: 1870–85.
- 186 Cacioppo JT, Petty RE. The need for cognition. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 1982; **42**: 116–31.
- 187 Neel R, Kenrick DT, White AE, Neuberg SL. Individual differences in fundamental social motives. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2016; **110**: 887.
- 188 D’Alisa G, Demaria F, Kallis G. Degrowth. A vocabulary for a new era. Routledge, 2014.
- 189 Davis MH. A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. *Cat Sel Doc Psychol* 1980; **10**: 85.
- 190 Keaton SA. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). In: The Sourcebook of Listening Research. 2017: 340–7.
- 191 Hale W, Richmond M, Bennett J, *et al.* Resolving uncertainty about the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale–12: Application of modern psychometric strategies. *J Pers Assess* 2016; **98**: 200–8.
- 192 van den Bergh J. Climate policy versus growth concerns: Suggestions for economic research and communication. *J Behav Exp Econ* 2023; **107**: 102125.
- 193 Ho AK, Sidanius J, Kteily N, *et al.* The nature of social dominance orientation: Theorizing and measuring preferences for intergroup inequality using the new SDO7 scale. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2015; **109**: 1003–28.
- 194 Klimstra TA, Hale III WW, Raaijmakers QAW, Branje SJT, Meeus WHJ. A developmental typology of adolescent personality. *Eur J Personal* 2010; **24**: 309–23.
- 195 Jonason PK, Webster GD. The dirty dozen: A concise measure of the dark triad. *Psychol Assess* 2010; **22**: 420–32.
- 196 Scheier MF, Carver CS, Bridges MW. Distinguishing optimism from neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): a reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 1994; **67**: 1063–78.
- 197 Gross JJ, John OP. Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2003; **85**: 348–62.
- 198 Schwartz SEO, Benoit L, Clayton S, Parnes MF, Swenson L, Lowe SR. Climate change anxiety and mental health: Environmental activism as buffer. *Curr Psychol* 2023; **42**: 16708–21.
- 199 Ogunbode CA, Doran R, Hanss D, *et al.* Climate anxiety, wellbeing and pro-environmental action: correlates of negative emotional responses to climate change in 32 countries. *J Environ Psychol* 2022; **84**: 101887.
- 200 Petrocelli JV. Factor Validation of the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale: Evidence for a Short Version. *J Soc Psychol* 2003; **143**: 405–13.
- 201 Hevey D, Pertl M, Thomas K, Maher L, Craig A, Ni Chuinneagain S. Consideration of future consequences scale: Confirmatory Factor Analysis. *Personal Individ Differ* 2010; **48**: 654–7.
- 202 Strathman A, Gleicher F, Boninger DS, Edwards CS. The consideration of future consequences: Weighing immediate and distant outcomes of behavior. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 1994; **66**: 742–52.

- 203 Sapp SG, Harrod WJ. Reliability and Validity of a Brief Version of Levenson's Locus of Control Scale. *Psychol Rep* 1993; **72**: 539–50.
- 204 Levenson H. Differentiating among internality, powerful others, and chance. In: Lefcourt HM, ed. Research with the locus of control construct. New York, NY: Academic Press, 1981: 15–63.
- 205 Kallis G, March H. Imaginaries of Hope: The Utopianism of Degrowth. *Ann Assoc Am Geogr* 2015; **105**: 360–8.
- 206 Snyder CR, Harris C, Anderson JR, *et al.* The will and the ways: Development and validation of an individual-differences measure of hope. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 1991; **60**: 570–85.
- 207 Digman JM. Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. *Annu Rev Psychol* 1990; **41**: 417–40.
- 208 Struk AA, Carriere JSA, Cheyne JA, Danckert J. A Short Boredom Proneness Scale: Development and Psychometric Properties. *Assessment* 2017; **24**: 346–59.
- 209 Geuens M, De Pelsmacker P. Developing a Short Affect Intensity Scale. *Psychol Rep* 2002; **91**: 657–70.
- 210 Larsen RJ, Diener E. Affect intensity as an individual difference characteristic: A review. *J Res Personal* 1987; **21**: 1–39.
- 211 Choi I, Koo M, Jong An Choi. Individual Differences in Analytic Versus Holistic Thinking. *Pers Soc Psychol Bull* 2007; **33**: 691–705.
- 212 Krpan D. Exploring the need for external input through the prism of social, material and sensation seeking input. *R Soc Open Sci* 2022; **9**: 211373.
- 213 Lange J, Crusius J. Dispositional Envy Revisited: Unraveling the Motivational Dynamics of Benign and Malicious Envy. *Pers Soc Psychol Bull* 2015; **41**: 284–94.
- 214 Tangney JP, Boone AL, Baumeister RF. High self-control predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. In: Self-Regulation and Self-Control. Routledge, 2018.
- 215 Haran U, Ritov I, Mellers BA. The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration. *Judgm Decis Mak* 2013; **8**: 188–201.
- 216 Baron J. Why Teach Thinking?-An Essay. *Appl Psychol* 1993; **42**: 191–214.
- 217 Parrique T, Barth J, Briens F, *et al.* Decoupling debunked – Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability. European Environmental Bureau, 2019 <https://eeb.org/library/decoupling-debunked/>.
- 218 Diab DL, Gillespie MA, Highhouse S. Are maximizers really unhappy? The measurement of maximizing tendency. *Judgm Decis Mak* 2008; **3**: 364–70.
- 219 Amérigo M, Aragonés JI, de Frutos B, Sevillano V, Cortés B. Underlying Dimensions of Ecocentric and Anthropocentric Environmental Beliefs. *Span J Psychol* 2007; **10**: 97–103.
- 220 Dunlap RE, Van Liere KD, Mertig AG, Jones RE. New Trends in Measuring Environmental Attitudes: Measuring Endorsement of the New Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP Scale. *J Soc Issues* 2000; **56**: 425–42.
- 221 White KRG, Kinney D, Danek RH, Smith B, Harben C. The Resistance to Change-Beliefs Scale: Validation of a New Measure of Conservative Ideology. *Pers Soc Psychol Bull* 2020; **46**: 20–35.
- 222 Schwartz SH, Cieciuch J, Vecchione M, *et al.* Refining the theory of basic individual values. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2012; **103**: 663–88.
- 223 Watson D, Clark LA, Tellegen A. Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 1988; **54**: 1063–70.
- 224 Leger KA, Turiano NA, Bowling W, Burris JL, Almeida DM. Personality traits predict long-term physical health via affect reactivity to daily stressors. *Psychol Sci* 2021; **32**: 755–65.

- 225 Rojas M. Life satisfaction and satisfaction in domains of life: Is it a simple relationship? *J Happiness Stud Interdiscip Forum Subj Well-Being* 2006; **7**: 467–97.
- 226 Klein EM, Zenger M, Tibubos AN, *et al.* Loneliness and its relation to mental health in the general population: Validation and norm values of a brief measure. *J Affect Disord Rep* 2021; **4**: 100120.
- 227 McCullough ME, Emmons RA, Tsang J-A. The grateful disposition: A conceptual and empirical topography. *J Pers Soc Psychol* 2002; **82**: 112–27.
- 228 Eibach RP, Wilmut MO, Libby LK. The System-Justifying Function of Gratitude Norms. *Soc Personal Psychol Compass* 2015; **9**: 348–58.
- 229 Chien S-E, Chu L, Lee H-H, *et al.* Age Difference in Perceived Ease of Use, Curiosity, and Implicit Negative Attitude toward Robots. *J Hum-Robot Interact* 2019; **8**. DOI:10.1145/3311788.
- 230 Schweinberger SR, Pohl M, Winkler P. Autistic traits, personality, and evaluations of humanoid robots by young and older adults. *Comput Hum Behav* 2020; **106**: 106256.
- 231 Haerpfer C, Inglehart R, Moreno A, *et al.* World values survey: Round seven–country-pooled datafile. *Madr Spain Vienna Austria JD Syst Inst WWSA Secr* 2020; **7**: 2021.
- 232 Whitmarsh L, Corner A. Tools for a new climate conversation: A mixed-methods study of language for public engagement across the political spectrum. *Glob Environ Change* 2017; **42**: 122–35.
- 233 Drews S, van den Bergh JCJM. Scientists’ views on economic growth versus the environment: a questionnaire survey among economists and non-economists. *Glob Environ Change* 2017; **46**: 88–103.
- 234 Lavrinenko O. Exploring Protest in Europe with a Multi-Level Cross-National Test of the Structural Cognitive Model. *Int J Sociol* 2021; **51**: 321–35.
- 235 Slootmaeckers K, O’Dwyer C. Europeanization of attitudes towards homosexuality: exploring the role of education in the transnational diffusion of values. *Innov Eur J Soc Sci Res* 2018; **31**: 406–28.
- 236 Gugushvili A. Intergenerational objective and subjective mobility and attitudes towards income differences: evidence from transition societies. *J Int Comp Soc Policy* 2016; **32**: 199–219.
- 237 Gugushvili A. Intergenerational Social Mobility and Popular Explanations of Poverty: A Comparative Perspective. *Soc Justice Res* 2016; **29**: 402–28.
- 238 Jordá V, Alonso JM. New Estimates on Educational Attainment Using a Continuous Approach (1970–2010). *World Dev* 2017; **90**: 281–93.
- 239 Dutta N, Giddings L, Sobel R. Attitudes towards abortion: what role do educational attainment and cultural traits play? *Rev Soc Econ* 2024; **82**: 343–66.
- 240 Lu J, Zhang S, He G. How time orientation matters for happiness: The nonmonotonic relations featured with a middle valley. *Appl Psychol Health Well-Being* 2023; **15**: 1656–72.
- 241 Rözer JJ, Brashears ME. Partner selection and social capital in the status attainment process. *Soc Sci Res* 2018; **73**: 63–79.
- 242 Wynes S, Nicholas KA. The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions. *Environ Res Lett* 2017; **12**: 074024.
- 243 Brophy H, Olson J, Paul P. Eco-anxiety in youth: An integrative literature review. *Int J Ment Health Nurs* 2023; **32**: 633–61.
- 244 Madan S, Ma A, Pandey N, Rattan A, Savani K. Support for increasing low-wage workers’ compensation: The role of fixed-growth mindsets about intelligence. *J Exp Psychol Gen* 2023; **152**: 935–55.
- 245 Ives AR. For testing the significance of regression coefficients, go ahead and log-transform count data. *Methods Ecol Evol* 2015; **6**: 828–35.
- 246 Osborne J. Notes on the Use of Data Transformations. *Pract Assess Res Eval* 2002; **8**.

- 247 Hajizadeh M, Mitnitski A, Rockwood K. Socioeconomic gradient in health in Canada: Is the gap widening or narrowing? *Health Policy* 2016; **120**: 1040–50.
- 248 Kaufman JE, Gallo WT, Fahs MC. The contribution of dementia to the disparity in family wealth between black and non-black Americans. *Ageing Soc* 2020; **40**: 306–27.
- 249 Ghimire R, Skinner J, Carnathan M. Who perceived automation as a threat to their jobs in metro Atlanta: Results from the 2019 Metro Atlanta Speaks survey. *Technol Soc* 2020; **63**: 101368.
- 250 Ivanova D, Büchs M. Implications of shrinking household sizes for meeting the 1.5 °C climate targets. *Ecol Econ* 2022; **202**: 107590.
- 251 Schneider F. Housing for degrowth narratives. In: *Housing for Degrowth*. London: Routledge, 2018: 14–29.
- 252 Meyer OL, Castro-Schilo L, Aguilar-Gaxiola S. Determinants of Mental Health and Self-Rated Health: A Model of Socioeconomic Status, Neighborhood Safety, and Physical Activity. *Am J Public Health* 2014; **104**: 1734–41.
- 253 Kristensen TS, Borg V, Hannerz H. Socioeconomic status and psychosocial work environment: results from a Danish national study. *Scand J Public Health* 2002; **30**: 41–8.
- 254 Hodson TO. Root-mean-square error (RMSE) or mean absolute error (MAE): when to use them or not. *Geosci Model Dev* 2022; **15**: 5481–7.
- 255 King LC, Savin I, Drews S. Shades of green growth scepticism among climate policy researchers. *Nat Sustain* 2023; **6**: 1316–20.
- 256 Drews S, Antal M. Degrowth: A “missile word” that backfires? *Ecol Econ* 2016; **126**: 182–7.
- 257 Lou X, Lin Y, Li LMW. Predicting priority of environmental protection over economic growth using macroeconomic and individual-level predictors: Evidence from machine learning. *J Environ Psychol* 2022; **82**: 101843.