Optimal climate policy under exogenous and endogenous technical change: Making sense of the different approaches☆

Léo Coppens [a], Simon Dietz [b], Frank Venmans [c,*]

[a] *Warocqué School of Business and Economics, University of Mons, Place Warocqué 17, 7000, Mons, Belgium*
[b] *Department of Geography and Environment, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom*
[c] *Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom*

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

We analyse the large and diverse literature on technical change in integrated assessment models (IAMs) of climate change, with a view to understanding how different representations of technical change affect optimal climate policy. We first solve an analytical IAM that features several models of technical change from the literature, including exogenous technical change in abatement technologies, exogenous decarbonisation of the economy, endogenous technical change via learning-by-doing, and endogenous technical change via R&D (in particular, directed technical change). We show how these models of technical change impact optimal carbon prices, emissions and temperatures in often quite different ways. We then survey how technical change is currently represented in the main quantitative IAMs used to inform policy, demonstrating that a range of approaches are used. Exogenous technical change in abatement technologies and learning-by-doing are most popular, although the latter mechanism is only partially endogenous in some models. We go on to quantify technical change in these policy models using structural estimation, and simulate our analytical IAM numerically, assessing the effect of technical change on optimal climate policy. We find large quantitative effects of technical change and large quantitative differences between different representations of technical change, both under cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness objectives.

1. Introduction

Integrated assessment models (IAMs) have played a central role in developing our understanding of economically efficient climate policies and continue to provide important inputs to decision-makers (e.g. IPCC, 2018, 2022). Technical change (hereafter TC) is one of the key assumptions in any IAM that estimates emissions abatement costs.

TC is complex and multi-faceted. Some TC mechanisms are exogenous to abatement policy decisions. For example, there may be technological spillovers from non-climate R&D, such as general-purpose membrane technologies developed in the chemical industry, which can also reduce the costs of clean hydrogen production. Some mechanisms are endogenous because they depend on climate

R&D specifically. For example, cost reductions in fuel cell technologies have depended heavily on R&D investment so far. Some mechanisms are endogenous to abatement policy because technology costs depend directly on deployment. For example, photovoltaic cells would still be expensive today if they had not been deployed at large scale. Usually, exogenous and endogenous TC will co-exist. For example, the development of Lithium-ion batteries for smartphones can reduce the future cost of electric-vehicle batteries (exogenous TC). However, the specific requirements of car batteries (e.g., large capacity and peak power) will be met more quickly if electric vehicles are produced at scale (endogenous TC).

IAMs need to make sense of the complex and diverse mechanisms of TC, simplify them and build appropriate model abstractions. Previous reviews have shown that modellers have taken many different approaches to TC (Löschel, 2002; Grubb et al., 2002; Sue Wing, 2006; Gillingham et al., 2008). At the same time, it is well known from other reviews that there is wide variation between IAMs in their estimated abatement costs of meeting pre-determined climate goals (Clarke et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2020; Riahi et al., 2022), or their prescriptions of optimal warming (Gillingham et al., 2018). The missing piece of the puzzle is knowing what role TC plays in this variation. It is difficult to know because IAMs are rich and complicated, with many relevant differences. Therefore, it is not obvious how to construct a controlled comparison that leads to an understanding of the effect of different representations of TC on optimal climate policy. This is our aim in this paper.

We begin in Section 2 with a theoretical analysis of different TC models. Our fundamental aim is to assess the effect of TC on optimal climate policy, where we mostly use marginal abatement costs (MACs), carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures as sufficient statistics for climate policy (where relevant, we also discuss innovation subsidies of different kinds). We consider two kinds of climate policy, minimising the discounted sum of abatement costs and climate damages (cost-benefit analysis), and meeting a pre-determined climate constraint at minimum discounted abatement cost (cost-effectiveness analysis). Building on the foundation of a common set of equations for welfare, utility, warming and damages, we compare three different classes of TC models. The first is models of exogenous TC. We consider both exogenous TC in abatement technologies, which reduce abatement costs, and exogenous TC that reduces the emissions intensity of economic growth (so-called Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvements or AEEI). The second class is models of endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing. In these models, the cost of abatement is a decreasing function of past cumulative abatement. The third class is models of endogenous TC based on R&D investment into abatement/clean technologies. We particularly focus on recent models of Directed Technical Change (DTC), which embed R&D in a model in which TC can improve either dirty or clean technologies.

The analysis delivers a rich set of results that we summarise in five Results, with derivations contained in the Appendices.

1. Exogenous TC that makes future abatement cheaper creates an incentive to abate less in the short run but more in the long run. Optimal carbon taxes are always lower, but emissions/temperatures are higher in the short run before ending up lower in the long run. Under cost-effectiveness, the long-run temperature is unaffected (it is constrained) but it is reached quicker.

2. Exogenous TC through AEEI has different effects. Its short-run effects are ambiguous, but plausibly it leads to lower optimal carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures. In the long run, however, it unambiguously leads to higher optimal carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures (again, under cost-effectiveness the long-run temperature is unaffected but it is reached quicker). This is because AEEI has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it reduces business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, which makes lower emissions less costly to attain. On the other hand, by decarbonising the economy, it makes further emissions reductions more difficult. The balance of these effects is different at different stages of the low-carbon transition.

3. Endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing also has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it makes future abatement cheaper, creating an incentive to wait, just like exogenous TC in abatement technologies. On the other hand, early abatement is what reduces future abatement costs, creating the opposite incentive to abate early. Optimal carbon taxes are lower, but an abatement subsidy is required to internalise the learning externality. The sum of these – the firm's MAC – can be higher or lower than without TC initially, so the effect on short-run emissions and temperatures is also ambiguous. In the long run, emissions and temperatures are lower, so emissions and temperatures under endogenous, learning-based TC can be lower all along the path. Under cost-effectiveness analysis, we show that the effect of endogenous, learning-based TC is qualitatively the same as exogenous TC in abatement technologies, but not as strong. The carbon budget is still used up more quickly and abatement is backloaded, but the endogenous future learning gain tempers the incentive to do so.

4. Models of endogenous TC based on R&D also create an incentive for early action, but not in the form of abatement. Instead, firms invest in R&D, incentivised by R&D subsidies, and delay abatement until R&D has reduced abatement costs. This means the optimal carbon tax, emissions and temperature trajectories look more like exogenous TC in abatement technologies than they do endogenous, learning-based TC. In fact, we show formally that they are the same as exogenous TC in abatement technologies, provided R&D investment costs are small relative to output.

5. We comment on clean technology dynamics in endogenous TC models. By design, learning-based models are designed to replicate negative exponential experience curves that have been demonstrated empirically for a wide range of technologies (e.g., Way et al., 2022). To do this, they conform to the process of "fishing out", meaning that it becomes harder to find new ideas, the larger the existing knowledge stock. By contrast, most DTC models conform to the opposite process of "standing on the shoulders of giants", meaning that existing knowledge makes new knowledge easier to develop. This logically means such models cannot reproduce experience curves.

Arguably a drawback of much of the literature is that endogenous, learning-based TC is represented at the exclusion of R&D, and *vice versa*. We finish Section 2 by proposing a model of endogenous R&D based on both.

Starting with Section 3, we shift our focus to quantitative models. This section contains a systematic survey of how TC is represented in the current crop of major quantitative IAMs, based on 22 families of models. We establish that a diversity of TC modelling approaches exists, as previous reviews also found. We find that TC is exogenous in the majority of models. Where it is endogenous, it is mostly based on learning-by-doing rather than R&D, a finding that is not obvious unless one-off models are excluded. Where models represent learning-by-doing, the incentive to abate early is often ignored in setting optimal policy, however. This leads us to identify a class of models where TC is 'semi-endogenous'.

Section 4 quantifies the effect of TC on climate policy. We develop a method of structural estimation, which enables us to calibrate the abatement cost and TC parameters of our model on the current crop of IAMs reviewed in the previous section. We use 'observed' variation in the timing of abatement and associated abatement costs across more than 700 IAM scenarios collected in two major databases (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or IPCC and the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System or NGFS). This gives us an estimate of how much TC drives down abatement costs in current IAMs, assuming the process is either exogenous or endogenous. We then take this calibration of abatement costs/TC and apply it to a simple, quantitative IAM, whose structure builds on the theoretical analysis of Section 2. We numerically solve for optimal MACs, carbon prices and technology subsidies, as well as emissions and temperatures. We find that TC has a quantitatively large effect on the optimal paths under cost-benefit analysis, e.g., warming in 2100 is at least 0.5 °C lower due to TC. We also find large differences between the two forms of TC considered, e.g., the difference in the initial MAC is $73/tCO_2$, attributable almost entirely to an optimal deployment subsidy to internalise the learning externality. Under cost-effectiveness analysis and an ambitious temperature constraint of 1.75 °C, emissions and temperature paths are closer together due to the small available carbon budget, but the difference in MACs caused by TC is even larger.

Section 5 provides a discussion, focusing primarily on TC uncertainties.

Related literature

We connect to three main strands of literature. The first is papers investigating the effects of TC in IAMs of different varieties. This literature is large, diverse and diffuse across fields. One of our primary purposes in this paper is to survey it, so we provide citations throughout the following sections as our survey progresses. A foundational general framework for analysing the role of endogenous TC in optimal climate policy was provided by Goulder and Mathai (2000). Much of the subsequent literature, including the models we analyse, can be understood as extensions or specialisations of this framework.

Second, the model we build for theoretical and quantitative analysis draws on the recent literature on analytical IAMs (Golosov et al., 2014; Rezai and Van der Ploeg, 2016; van den Bijgaart et al., 2016; Dietz and Venmans, 2019; Traeger, 2023). As the moniker suggests, these models are intended to provide analytical insights into the role of different parameters and assumptions, shining a light into the black box of richer quantitative IAMs. Our model has a similar level of complexity, uses specific representations from this literature, and delivers analytical as well as quantitative results.

Third, we contribute to the literature by reviewing and synthesising quantitative IAMs, specifically those with a focus on emissions abatement (sometimes called energy models or energy system models). Many of the scenario runs of these models are summarised in IPCC reports (IPCC, 2022). Weyant (2017) and Nikas et al. (2019) provide recent, general overviews. Löschel (2002), Grubb et al. (2002), Sue Wing (2006) and Gillingham et al. (2008) are examples of earlier overviews of TC in these models, and van Vuuren et al. (2020) analyse the large differences in abatement costs between models. Relative to this literature, we make several contributions: we provide an up-to-date review; unlike previous reviews, we solve different TC representations analytically, which delivers a set of formal, precise comparisons; and we provide a method of isolating the quantitative effects of TC in these models on optimal paths, controlling for other factors.

2. Theoretical analysis

Throughout this section, we assume the economy is populated by a fixed number of households, which obtain utility from consumption of an aggregate good. The representative household's welfare is

$$W = \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} u(c(t)) \, dt, \tag{1}$$

where δ is the utility discount rate and $u(c(t)) = c(t)^{1-\eta}/(1-\eta)$, with η standing for the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. In all the models we consider, households supply labour L inelastically and own capital K that is rented to firms.

Climate change is also modelled in the same way throughout. Global mean temperature T is linearly proportional to cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (Dietz and Venmans, 2019; Dietz et al., 2021):

$$T(t) = \zeta S(t). \tag{2}$$

Cumulative emissions $S(t) = \int_0^t P(u) \, du$, where P stands for emissions. The slope of the relationship between temperature and cumulative emissions is governed by ζ, the so-called Transient Climate Response to cumulative carbon Emissions or TCRE (Collins et al., 2013).

Increasing temperatures cause climate damages, which only affect production of the aggregate good. Damages Ω are given by

$$\Omega(t) = \exp\left(-\frac{\gamma}{2} T(t)^2\right), \tag{3}$$

where γ is the damage function coefficient. Note this represents the basic treatment of damages in the IAM literature: more complex dynamics and mechanisms are warranted in studies where damages are the focus (see Dietz, 2024, for a review).

2.1. Models with an aggregate abatement cost function

The first models we look at link emissions directly with production of the aggregate consumer good:

$$P(t) = \sigma(t) \left[1 - \mu(t)\right] \overline{Y}(t), \tag{4}$$

where σ is the carbon intensity of BAU production $\overline{Y}$ and μ is emissions abatement expressed as a control rate. The total cost of abatement Λ is given by

$$\Lambda(t) = \exp\left(-\frac{\varphi(t)}{2}\mu(t)^2\right), \tag{5}$$

where φ is the slope of the MAC function.

The aggregate good is produced in a competitive market using capital and labour supplied by households. Production net of abatement costs and climate damages is

$$Y(t) = K(t)^\alpha \left[A_L(t)L(t)\right]^{1-\alpha} \Lambda(t)\Omega(t), \tag{6}$$

where A_L is exogenously growing labour productivity[1] and α is the capital share.[2] Since climate damages and abatement costs enter the production function multiplicatively, they are both proportional to production. The number of firms is sufficiently large that climate damages are fully externalised. $\overline{Y}$ omits Λ and Ω.

Normalising the price of the aggregate good to one, the representative firm chooses capital and labour inputs to maximise profits:

$$\max_{K(t),L(t)} \pi(t) = K(t)^\alpha \left[A_L(t)L(t)\right]^{1-\alpha} \Lambda(t)\Omega(t) - r(t)K(t) - w(t)L(t) - \tau(t)P(t), \tag{7}$$

where r is the rental price of capital, w is the wage, and τ is a carbon tax that the firm may face. Any carbon tax revenue raised is returned to households lump-sum, so the household budget constraint is

$$c(t) + \dot{K}(t) + \delta_K K(t) = r(t)K(t) + w(t)L(t) + Y(t), \tag{8}$$

where Y represents the lump-sum transfers and δ_K is capital depreciation.

Exogenous TC

In many models, especially quantitative models but also analytical models focusing on aspects of the problem other than TC *per se*, TC is exogenous. Exogenous TC can be introduced into our model in two ways that are representative of the literature:

1. The slope of the MAC function φ decreases over time due to reductions in the cost of abatement technologies.
2. The carbon intensity coefficient σ decreases over time (as in, e.g., Nordhaus' DICE model). This is often referred to as AEEI.

If TC is exogenous, socially optimal emissions abatement is implemented using one policy instrument, a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal damage cost of carbon emissions, a.k.a. the social cost of carbon (SCC).[3] In response, firms reduce emissions until their MAC is equal to the tax. Appendix A derives this well-known result from a more general model. For the model here, the optimality condition is:

$$\underbrace{\int_{u=t}^\infty e^{-r(u-t)} Y(u)\gamma\zeta S(u) du}_{\text{SCC}} = \tau(t) = \underbrace{\frac{\varphi(t)\mu(t)}{\sigma(t)}}_{\text{MAC}}, \tag{9}$$

where $r = \delta + \eta \dot{c}(t)/c(t)$ is the Ramsey rule for the consumption discount rate. The SCC is proportional to output (and thus depends on productivity growth A_L), the damage function coefficient, the TCRE and cumulative future emissions, and it decreases with the discount rate.

The MAC is proportional to the MAC slope parameter φ. Hence, as TC decreases φ, it also decreases the MAC. The effect of this on optimal climate policy can be summarised as follows:

Result 1 (Effects of exogenous TC in abatement technologies). *Compared to a model without TC, exogenous TC that decreases the slope of the MAC generates lower optimal MACs/carbon taxes, higher short-run emissions/temperatures but lower long-run emissions. Cumulatively, emissions are lower in the long run, as is warming.*

---

[1] An alternative would be to make A_L endogenous, opening the possibility that abatement and climate damages interact with productivity growth. In the models we consider, TC in abatement is orthogonal to the dynamics of A_L.

[2] The assumption here of Cobb-Douglas production reflects much of the literature and aids comparability with models below that explicitly represent energy inputs, but the same results can be obtained from a more general production function, as in the Appendices.

[3] Or equivalently a cap on the quantity of emissions with an implied price equal to the social cost of carbon.

Appendix A provides the formal analysis in support of this. The basic intuition is that TC makes future abatement cheaper than today, and if TC is exogenous then all the social planner must do is wait for this to happen. This makes it optimal to abate emissions less in the short run but more in the long run. The net effect is not immediately obvious but in fact it must be lower cumulative emissions and warming in the long run. This is because TC makes the MAC at peak warming lower. Optimality then requires marginal damages to be lower accordingly. Since marginal damages are increasing in cumulative emissions and temperature, peak temperature must be lower.

This describes what happens if the social planner's objective is to maximise discounted net benefits. The planner's objective may instead be to minimise the discounted abatement costs of achieving a pre-determined cumulative emissions/temperature constraint. In that case, two things change. First, with a fixed emissions budget, the optimal carbon tax is not equal to the SCC but rather results from applying the Hotelling rule – it must increase at the interest rate, with an initial value equal to the present value of the MAC at zero emissions when the constraint binds. Second, if the constraint binds then evidently long-run temperatures are unaffected by TC. Exogenous TC that decreases abatement costs generates lower carbon taxes and higher short-run emissions as before, which now result in faster convergence to the constrained peak temperature. The social planner does not care about damages under cost-effectiveness and prefers to use up more of the cumulative emissions budget early on, anticipating cheaper abatement later.

The effects of AEEI on optimal climate policy are different from those of falling abatement costs. AEEI is a reduced-form representation of economy-wide decarbonisation that is not induced by climate policy, including within-sector energy efficiency improvements and structural shifts from manufacturing to services. In principle, energy efficiency can be either emissions-saving or emissions-using. One channel through which energy efficiency may increase emissions is the rebound effect: by raising the productivity of energy inputs, energy efficiency lowers the effective cost of energy services, potentially stimulating greater energy demand. If this rebound is strong enough, TC as represented by energy efficiency may be emissions-using. This mechanism can also arise in a general-equilibrium setting. Di Maria and Smulders (2017) provide a model in which emissions-using TC emerges endogenously due to complementarity between capital and polluting inputs.[4] Conversely, Casey (2024) shows that emissions intensity can fall even when TC is emissions-using, due to relative price effects and output expansion.

AEEI in models with aggregate abatement costs is typically calibrated on the global emission/output ratio, which embodies a wide range of mechanisms and has been declining since the early 20th century.[5] Then, AEEI exerts two contrasting forces on the optimal path. First, it reduces BAU emissions, which makes lower emissions less costly to attain. Second, by decarbonising the economy, it makes further emissions reductions more difficult. In an energy-efficient economy, a given relative reduction in emissions leads to lower absolute abatement ($\Delta\mu(t) \cong -\sigma(t)Y(t)\Delta P(t)$). For example, if the efficiency of the internal combustion engine increases, substitution with an electric vehicle reduces emissions by less. These forces are illustrated by inspecting the effect of a change in σ on the MAC. Using (4) to substitute the emissions control rate out of the expression for the MAC, and differentiating with respect to σ,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma(t)}\left(\underbrace{\frac{\varphi(t)}{\sigma(t)} - \frac{\varphi(t)P(t)}{\sigma(t)^2 Y(t)}}_{\text{MAC}}\right) = \frac{\varphi(t)}{\sigma(t)^2}\left(\frac{2P(t)}{\sigma(t)Y(t)} - 1\right).$$

A decrease in the carbon intensity of the economy decreases the MAC provided $2P(t) > \sigma(t)Y(t)$. $\sigma(t)Y(t)$ is simply BAU emissions. Therefore, this condition means that AEEI decreases the MAC when emissions are more than half of BAU, which if it is met[6] will be early in the transition, and increases the MAC when emissions are less than half of BAU, i.e., late in the transition. Early in the transition, the main effect of AEEI is to reduce BAU emissions, making lower absolute emissions easier to achieve. Late in the transition, the main effect of AEEI is to make further emissions reductions harder, which is aligned with the results of Di Maria and Smulders (2017), who also show that TC may raise the MAC.

Appendix B derives optimal emissions, which by extension give optimal temperatures, under AEEI. We summarise the effects of AEEI on optimal climate policy as follows:

Result 2 (Effects of exogenous TC: AEEI). *Compared to a model without TC, AEEI generates higher optimal MACs/carbon taxes, cumulative emissions and temperatures in the long run. The short-run effects of AEEI are ambiguous, but, assuming initial emissions are more than half of BAU, AEEI generates lower MACs/carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures.*

Since AEEI increases the MAC when emissions are less than half of BAU, AEEI increases the MAC at peak warming (zero emissions). Optimality then requires the SCC to be higher too. Since the SCC is an increasing function of temperature, peak temperature must be higher. This is the opposite of the effect of exogenous TC, which decreases the slope of the MAC. In the short run, the effects of AEEI are ambiguous. As the effect on the MAC illustrates, the important condition is whether emissions are more or less than half of BAU. We might consider the former case more realistic in the short run, as large jumps in emissions are difficult. When emissions are more than half of BAU, AEEI reduces the MAC/carbon tax as shown above, and it reduces emissions and therefore temperatures.

---

[4] When TC increases the productivity of capital, and capital is strongly complementary with polluting intermediate inputs, firms invest more in capital and expand output, thereby increasing pollution.

[5] Global Carbon Budget (2024); Bolt and van Zanden – Maddison Project Database 2023; with major processing by Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/co2-intensity).

[6] Technically, the optimal value of initial emissions can be anywhere between BAU and zero unless further constraints are applied. In our quantitative analysis, we introduce emissions inertia, which makes a big jump in initial emissions very costly.

If the planner's objective is cost-effectiveness and the temperature constraint binds, then AEEI does not affect peak warming. In principle, the effect of AEEI on the emissions path that uses up the cumulative emissions budget is ambiguous, but again if initial emissions are more than half of BAU, then AEEI decreases emissions in the short run, compensated by higher emissions in the long run and peak warming is reached later.

Endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing

In other models, TC is endogenous because the cost of clean technologies decreases the more they are deployed. This dynamic is often referred to as learning-by-doing. It was one of the two cases explored by Goulder and Mathai (2000) and has also been analysed/used by, for example, Van der Zwaan et al. (2002); Bramoullé and Olson (2005); Rezai and Van Der Ploeg (2017); Olijslagers et al. (2023); Grubb et al. (2024), and various quantitative/policy models reviewed in Section 3. In the model here, it can be represented by writing the MAC as a function of cumulative abatement[7]:

$$\mathrm{MAC}(t) = \frac{\varphi\mu(t)}{\sigma(t)}\left(\frac{\tilde{H}(t)}{\tilde{H}(0)}\right)^{-\chi}, \tag{10}$$

where $\tilde{H}(t) = \int_{u=0}^{t}\sigma(u)\mu(u)Y(u)\,du$ is cumulative abatement and χ is the learning elasticity. Thus, for every percent increase in cumulative abatement, the MAC decreases by χ percent.

With a large number of firms, we assume for the sake of simplicity that the future learning gain from present abatement is fully externalised – incremental knowledge fully "spills over". Then, with a negative climate externality and a positive learning externality, the social planner generally needs two policy instruments, the carbon tax and an abatement subsidy s (e.g., a feed-in-tariff).[8] The firm's profit function becomes

$$\pi(t) = Y(t) - r(t)K(t) - w(t)L(t) - \tau(t)P(t) + s(t)\sigma(t)\mu(t)Y(t). \tag{11}$$

Lump-sum transfers in the household's budget constraint are now tax revenues net of subsidy payments.[9]

Socially optimal emissions abatement in this model is implemented by the following pricing rule:

$$\underbrace{\int_{u=t}^{\infty} e^{-r(u-t)}Y(u)\gamma\zeta S(u)du}_{\text{SCC}} + \underbrace{\int_{u=t}^{\infty} e^{-r(u-t)}Y(u)\frac{\varphi\chi}{2\tilde{H}(0)}\left(\frac{\tilde{H}(u)}{\tilde{H}(0)}\right)^{-\chi-1}\mu(u)^2 du}_{\text{Social benefit of learning}} = \tau(t) + s(t). \tag{12}$$

Therefore, the social optimum can be achieved by setting the carbon tax equal to the SCC and the abatement subsidy equal to the marginal external gain in abatement knowledge. This is proportional to output, the MAC slope parameter φ and the learning elasticity χ, and increases with the square of current abatement effort (via $\mu(t)$). It is inversely related to cumulative abatement $\tilde{H}(u)$, reflecting diminishing learning returns.

A particular feature of this model of learning-based TC, where TC depends on cumulative aggregate abatement, is that the tax and subsidy are additive and the social optimum can in principle also be implemented by a single policy instrument, call it a 'learning-adjusted' tax, which is equal to the MAC. The intuition is that both climate damages and TC depend on cumulative abatement. However, we encourage readers to think of this tax/subsidy additivity result as more of theoretical curiosity. It does not hold in the model with clean and dirty energy discussed in the next section, or in other circumstances, such as when different abatement technologies have different learning rates (see Appendix A.3).

Result 3 (Effect of learning-based TC). *Compared to a model without TC, endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing generates lower optimal carbon taxes when accompanied by abatement subsidies equal to the marginal future learning gain, but it has an ambiguous effect on emissions and temperatures in the short run. Emissions and temperatures are lower in the long run. Thus, emissions and temperatures can be lower all along the path.*

Appendix B provides the formal analysis in support of this. The basic intuition is that under endogenous TC from learning-by-doing, two countervailing effects are at play. First, there is the cost-reduction effect: TC makes future abatement cheaper than today, as with exogenous TC. Second, however, there is the endogenous future gain effect: the reason abatement is cheaper in the future is abatement today. This creates an incentive for early abatement and is optimally incentivised by an abatement subsidy (ignoring the additivity result above). Thus, while the optimal carbon tax is lower, the subsidy/marginal future learning gain can be large enough to produce higher abatement and lower emissions in the short run than without TC. In the long run, emissions and temperatures are lower, as they were in the previous case.

Under a cost-effectiveness objective, endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing has the same effect as exogenous TC in abatement technologies – lower carbon taxes, higher short-run emissions and consequently faster convergence to the constrained peak temperature – but the positive effect on emissions and temperatures in the short run is not as strong as under exogenous TC. Again, the difference is due to the endogenous future learning gain, which tempers the incentive to backload abatement.

---

[7] Appendix A develops a more general model of deployment-based endogenous TC.

[8] In the case where companies can appropriate part of the knowledge generated, the optimal subsidy will only cover the non-appropriable part.

[9] If lump-sum transfers are negative then taxation is assumed to be non-distortionary.

Price-induced TC

In a few models, technology is directly linked to prices (e.g., Jakeman et al., 2004; Wilkerson et al., 2013). We can connect the analysis up to this point with such models.

The key driver of endogenous TC in the above model is a state variable (cumulative emissions $\tilde{H}$), which can be interpreted as a knowledge stock. The knowledge stock's equation of motion depends on the quantity of abatement. In general, we can write $\dot{\tilde{H}}(t) = f(\mu(t))$. Suppose the knowledge stock is a function of the carbon price rather than abatement quantity. This can give the same dynamics, because any quantity of abatement has a corresponding carbon price: $\mu(t) = g(\tau(t))$, where $g(\cdot)$ is the inverse MAC function.[10] As a result, the same equation of motion can now be written as a function of τ rather than μ: $\dot{\tilde{H}}(t) = f(g(\tau(t)))$. Integrating this equation gives current technology/knowledge, which will be a function of *past* carbon prices. Result 3 thus applies to this kind of model. This generalizes the empirical insight in Sue Wing (2008), who uses cumulative price shocks as a reduced-form proxy for an energy-saving knowledge stock. For models in which abatement affects other prices, which in turn affect the buildup of knowledge (via the function $f(\cdot)$), abatement indirectly affects the dynamics of the knowledge stock, and again we can say in general that there will be an extra term for the social benefit of learning that drives a wedge between the SCC and the MAC as in (12).

Technology parameters may be a function of the current price rather than past prices (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993), and technology is not modelled as a stock variable but rather as an instantaneous variable. As a result, TC is not path-dependent (there is no knowledge stock) and it makes more sense to consider it as a model of exogenous TC (Gillingham et al., 2008).

2.2. Models with clean and dirty energy substitution

Endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing

Instead of modelling emissions as a function of aggregate output and emissions abatement via an aggregate abatement cost function, many models explicitly link emissions with the use of dirty/fossil energy (e.g., Golosov et al., 2014; Fried, 2018; Hart, 2019; Hassler et al., 2021, and various quantitative/policy models reviewed in Section 3). Thus, the somewhat abstract concept of abatement, evoking models of controlling point-source pollution, is unpacked into substituting energy with other inputs, and substituting dirty with clean energy.

Taking the model of endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing, here we introduce clean and dirty energy intermediates in production. Final-good production is now

$$Y(t) = K(t)^{\alpha} E(t)^{\nu} \left[A_L(t) L(t) \right]^{1-\alpha-\nu} \Omega(t), \tag{13}$$

where E is an energy composite and ν is the energy expenditure share. As the final-good production function is Cobb–Douglas, this is close to the model in Golosov et al. (2014). Other models use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function for final-good production (e.g., Hassler et al., 2021).

The composite, intermediate energy good is produced by combining clean and dirty energy, assuming a constant elasticity of substitution (CES):

$$E(t) = \left[E_c(t)^{\epsilon} + E_d(t)^{\epsilon} \right]^{1/\epsilon} \tag{14}$$

where ϵ determines the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy (indexed c and d respectively). How clean and dirty energy are produced varies between models, with some using labour (e.g., Fried, 2018; Golosov et al., 2014) and others using final goods as the input (Hart, 2019). This choice is not consequential for our purposes. We follow the latter approach, so $E_i(t) = A_i(t)X_i(t)$, $i \in \{c, d\}$, where A_i is clean/dirty energy productivity and X_i is the quantity of final goods used in clean/dirty energy production.[11] Fossil fuels are assumed to be abundant (i.e., specifically coal is abundant). Expressing dirty energy use in tonnes of carbon dioxide, emissions are identified with dirty energy use, $P = E_d$. A caveat is that with CES between clean and dirty energy, the MAC is implicitly infinite at zero emissions. Therefore, in numerical applications this structure would need to be augmented, for example, with a backstop technology if the SCC is large enough to make zero or negative emissions desirable.

In general, learning-by-doing applies to both clean and dirty energy. The experience-curve dynamic can be represented by writing clean/dirty energy productivity as a function of a stock of knowledge:

$$A_i(t) = A_i(0) \left(\frac{H_i(t)}{H_i(0)} \right)^{\chi}, \tag{15}$$

where H is cumulative aggregate knowledge, which accumulates in proportion to deployment/use of the respective energy sources (e.g. Rezai and Van Der Ploeg, 2017):

$$\dot{H}_i(t) = E_i(t). \tag{16}$$

This formulation abstracts from knowledge depreciation, which is assumed to be slow. Knowledge is assumed to be technology-specific and there are no spillovers from one technology to the other. On the contrary, using green technology will slow down the knowledge built up in the dirty sector and *vice versa*, which is a form of crowding out.

---

[10] In a model with both a carbon price and a subsidy, one can write $\mu(t) = g(\tau(t), s(t))$.

[11] Technically X_d is the quantity of final goods used in dirty energy production *adjusted for* the productivity of fossil-fuel extraction, as explained by Hart (2019). Dirty energy production $E_d(t) = A_d(t)D_d(t)$, where D_d stands for fossil inputs, and $D_d(t) = A_{dx}X_d(t)$ is fossil-fuel extraction with extraction productivity A_{dx}. The price of the final good is one and productivity is also constant since the final good is unchanging, so unit extraction costs are constant and equal to $1/A_{dx}$.

We remain in a competitive market and we assume the planner can use two policy instruments, a carbon tax and a clean-energy subsidy. The profit function of the firm in this case is

$$\pi(t) = Y(t) - r(t)K(t) - w(t)L(t) - \left[p_c(t) - s(t)\right]E_c(t) - \left[p_d(t) + \tau(t)\right]E_d(t). \tag{17}$$

Socially optimal emissions abatement in this model can be implemented by setting the carbon tax equal to the SCC *minus* the marginal future learning gain from dirty energy use, and the clean-energy subsidy equal to the marginal future learning gain from clean energy use:

$$\underbrace{\int_{u=t}^{\infty} e^{-r(u-t)} Y(u)\gamma\zeta S(u)du}_{\text{SCC}} - \underbrace{\int_{u=t}^{\infty} e^{-r(u-t)} Y(u)\left[E_d(u)/E(u)\right]^{\epsilon}\frac{\chi}{H_d(u)}du}_{\text{Social benefit of learning: dirty}} = \tau(t), \tag{18}$$

$$\underbrace{\int_{u=t}^{\infty} e^{-r(u-t)} Y(u)\left[E_c(u)/E(u)\right]^{\epsilon}\frac{\chi}{H_c(u)}du}_{\text{Social benefit of learning: clean}} = s(t). \tag{19}$$

The social benefit of learning for each energy type is proportional to output, the learning elasticity, and the energy type's market share $\left[E_i(u)/E(u)\right]^{\epsilon}$, and is inversely related to cumulative knowledge $H_i(u)$. The firm will use dirty energy up to the point where its marginal product equals the price of dirty energy plus the tax,

$$\frac{\partial Y(t)}{\partial E_d(t)} = \left[p_c(t) - s(t)\right]\left(\frac{A_d(t)}{A_c(t)}\right)^{\epsilon}\left(\frac{E_d(t)}{E_c(t)}\right)^{\epsilon-1} = p_d(t) + \tau(t). \tag{20}$$

Similarly, it will use clean energy up to the point where its marginal product equals the price of clean energy minus the subsidy.

The effect of TC in this model can be seen by decomposing the productivity term in (20):

$$\left(\frac{A_d(t)}{A_c(t)}\right)^{\epsilon} = \left(\frac{A_d(0)}{A_c(0)}\right)^{\epsilon}\left(\frac{H_c(t)}{H_c(0)}\right)^{\epsilon\chi}\left(\frac{H_d(t)}{H_d(0)}\right)^{-\epsilon\chi}. \tag{21}$$

This decreases with cumulative clean energy use with an elasticity of $-\epsilon\chi$ and increases with cumulative dirty energy use with an elasticity of $\epsilon\chi$.

As mentioned above, the carbon tax and the innovation subsidy are not perfect substitutes in this model. A carbon tax will lead to both less energy use and energy substitution from dirty to clean. Although a clean-energy subsidy will also incentivise substitution from dirty to clean, by itself it will lead to more energy use, not less.[12] In fact, the vigilant reader will notice that in principle the planner could use three policy instruments: the carbon tax and the clean-energy subsidy, plus a dirty-energy subsidy equal to the marginal future learning gain from dirty energy use. However, the dirty-energy subsidy is additive to the carbon tax and it makes little sense to implement it separately.

These additional features aside, Result 3 and its extension to cost-effectiveness also apply to the effects of TC on optimal climate policy in this case.

Endogenous TC based on R&D: directed technical change

So far, TC has either been exogenous or it has been endogenous because of learning-by-doing. The third important class of models makes TC endogenous because future abatement costs depend on current R&D investments. This was the other case explored by Goulder and Mathai (2000). Further early models of this type included Smulders and De Nooij (2003); Buonanno et al. (2003); Popp (2004), with diverse mechanisms through which R&D reduces abatement costs. Within the last decade, R&D-based TC has been popularised by applying models of DTC (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2016; Fried, 2018; Hart, 2019; Hassler et al., 2021). Distinguishing between clean and dirty energy is the most obvious (and popular) way to introduce a direction to TC. As previously discussed in the context of AEEI, TC can be emissions-saving or emissions-using depending on the mechanism and its effect on input demand. In DTC models, this distinction plays a central role: the direction of innovation depends on relative economic incentives, and the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty energy shapes the strength of this trade-off (Hémous and Olsen, 2021). These models formalise competition between clean and dirty R&D, whereas the models considered so far assume emissions-saving TC.

We start with a general functional form for R&D-based TC:

$$\dot{A}_i(t) = \psi\left(z_i(t), A_i(t)\right), \tag{22}$$

where z_i stands for R&D investments. For $\partial\psi/\partial A_i > 0$, we have so-called "standing on the shoulders of giants", meaning that existing knowledge makes new knowledge easier to develop. The opposite case, $\partial\psi/\partial A_i < 0$, is called "fishing out", meaning that it becomes harder to find new ideas, the larger the existing knowledge stock. We will return to this important issue below.

A feature of R&D models is usually imperfect competition – the prospect of a monopoly achieved by patenting a new invention incentivises costly R&D. This complicates the model dynamics, so DTC models, which are written in discrete time, typically assume the patent lasts just one period (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012). We follow this assumption in our continuous-time model, noting the

---

[12] Yet, defining the MAC as the difference between the marginal products of dirty and clean energy, $\text{MAC} := dY(t)/dE_d(t) - p_d(t) - dY(t)/dE_c(t) + p_c(t) = \tau(t) + s(t)$. So, although the tax and the subsidy are not perfect substitutes, the MAC is equal to their sum.

assumption is less realistic when the time step is infinitesimal. Practically, the implication is that R&D needs to be subsidised in order for it to happen, because the monopoly vanishes instantaneously as an approximation for vanishing in a few years as it does in discrete-time models. If we made the model more complex by introducing an explicit time dependence of monopoly profits, the main addition would be that some R&D happens without subsidies. Appendix D discusses such a model with a private knowledge stock that gradually becomes public. More broadly, even in the absence of strong intellectual property rights, firms that invest in innovation may still enjoy first-mover advantages or market power (e.g., through cost asymmetries and deterrence under Bertrand competition) that enable partial appropriation of returns. The rest of the model is the same as the previous section. We assume that R&D costs are homogeneous of degree one.

The social planner has three tools: a carbon tax, and subsidies for clean- and dirty-energy R&D. The carbon tax and the dirty-energy R&D subsidy are not additive in this case. That is because TC no longer depends on cumulative abatement. The firm's profit function becomes

$$\pi(t) = Y(t) - r(t)K(t) - w(t)L(t) - p_c E_c - \left[p_d(t) + \tau(t)\right] E_d(t) - c(z_c(t) + z_d(t)) + s_c(t)z_c(t) + s_d(t)z_d(t), \tag{23}$$

where $c(\cdot)$ is an R&D cost function. This is where crowding out happens. Most models assume costs are linear in $z_c + z_d$, where z is often described as the number of scientists in a given sector.[13] If the number of scientists is assumed fixed (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012), crowding out of dirty innovation by clean is strong because additional scientists cannot be recruited from outside the R&D sector. In Popp (2004), which is an R&D model but not a DTC model *per se*,[14] crowding out is also strong because the opportunity cost of innovation is set at three times the investment in R&D.

Socially optimal emissions abatement in this model is implemented by setting the carbon tax equal to the SCC and the clean- and dirty-energy subsidies equal to the social marginal productivity benefits of R&D in the respective sectors:

$$\underbrace{\int_{u=t}^{\infty} e^{-r(u-t)} Y(u)\gamma\zeta S(u)du}_{\text{SCC}} = \tau(t), \tag{24}$$

$$\underbrace{\int_{v=t}^{\infty} \left[\exp\left[-\int_{u=t}^{v}\left[r(u) - \partial\psi/\partial A_c(u)\right]du\right]\partial Y(v)/\partial A_c(v)dv\right]\partial\psi/\partial z_c(t)}_{\text{Social benefit of clean R\&D}} = s_c(t), \tag{25}$$

$$\underbrace{\int_{v=t}^{\infty} \left[\exp\left[-\int_{u=t}^{v}\left[r(u) - \partial\psi/\partial A_d(u)\right]du\right]\partial Y(v)/\partial A_d(v)dv\right]\partial\psi/\partial z_d(t)}_{\text{Social benefit of dirty R\&D}} = s_d(t). \tag{26}$$

The social benefit of R&D is decreasing in the discount rate and depends on the rate of change of research productivity with knowledge accumulation $\partial\psi/\partial A_i$, which may increase or decrease the effective discounting depending on whether research faces diminishing or increasing returns. It is increasing in the marginal productivity of knowledge $\partial Y/\partial A_i$, and decreasing in the marginal cost of R&D $\partial\psi/\partial z_i(t)$.

Firms will respond by reducing emissions until their MAC equals the tax and by investing in R&D until marginal investment costs in each sector equal the subsidies. Eq. (26) reflects the internalisation of positive innovation externalities in dirty energy, but it does not capture indirect effects of dirty energy R&D on fossil-fuel discoveries, nor general-purpose spillovers from dirty R&D. In models with such channels, optimal subsidies toward dirty R&D may differ.

In this model, TC is endogenous in the sense that it is affected by the future trajectory of the carbon price. This can be seen from (25) and (26), because the marginal benefit of energy R&D is a function of the marginal product of energy knowledge, and this in turn depends on energy use, which is affected by the carbon price. However, this does not change the fact that in R&D/DTC models, the MAC equals the SCC (or the MAC follows the Hotelling rule under cost-effectiveness analysis). Furthermore, at the optimum a model of exogenous TC via falling abatement costs will have the same dynamics as this model of R&D-based TC:

Result 4 (Effect of R&D-based TC). *Replace a model of endogenous TC based on R&D with a model of exogenous TC, ensuring abatement costs follow an identical time path. The models will have the same optimal carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures provided R&D investment costs are small relative to output.*

Appendix E.3 shows this result formally. The basic intuition is that early action is optimal in R&D models, but unlike learning-based models the early action comes in the form of clean energy R&D investment, rather than abatement. The planner optimally invests in R&D before deploying clean technology, with effects on optimal carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures that with suitable calibration are identical to when the planner waits for technology costs to fall exogenously. This result depends on the assumption that R&D investment costs are small relative to output/consumption growth, because these costs reduce consumption and therefore have the potential to alter marginal climate damages and the discount rate, i.e., to alter the SCC. It is highly likely that R&D investment costs are relatively small (IPCC, 2022). It is also important to stress that although Result 4 holds at the optimum, the exogenous TC

---

[13] Often the innovation sector is represented as a separate sector, which receives a patent when a successful innovation is realised. We have assumed innovation is realised in-house, but the dynamics are the same.

[14] Although Popp has a clean and dirty sector, TC in the dirty sector is exogenous.

model so calibrated will not give the same climate-policy dynamics away from the optimum. Therefore, the result does not imply exogenous TC will always capture the dynamics of endogenous, R&D-based TC. It is merely intended to sharpen our intuitions about how optimal policies differ qualitatively.

Bretschger et al. (2011, 2017) develop IAMs with endogenous growth based on expanding varieties and knowledge diffusion. This strand of work shows how carbon pricing and R&D-driven innovation can interact with productivity spillovers across sectors and countries, offering valuable insights that complement the DTC literature by focusing on the pace and spread of innovation rather than its direction.

Technology cost dynamics in learning- versus R&D-based models

We now return to standing on the shoulders of giants versus fishing out, and the dynamics of TC in learning- versus R&D-based models. Besides having different implications for optimal abatement, these two classes of endogenous TC models tend to predict different technology-cost trajectories, which in turn can lead to very different optimal carbon taxes. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2012) famously found that optimal carbon taxes could be very low because a temporary clean R&D subsidy was so effective in reducing future abatement costs.

First, note that we can rewrite the learning-based model using energy productivity A_i instead of knowledge H_i as the state variable. Taking the time derivative of (15) gives us the new equation of motion:

$$\dot{A}_i(t) = \frac{A_i(0)^{\frac{1}{\chi}}}{H_i(0)} A_i(t)^{1-\frac{1}{\chi}} E_i(t). \tag{27}$$

In this equation, instantaneous productivity on the right-hand side is raised to the power $1 - 1/\chi$. Assuming $0 < \chi < 1$, this power is negative, consistent with $\partial\psi/\partial A_i < 0$ and giving us fishing out.

This is in contrast to most DTC models. Take Acemoglu et al. (2012), in which the equation of motion of clean/dirty energy productivity, written in continuous time, is

$$\dot{A}_i(t) = \xi_i z_i(t) A_i(t), \tag{28}$$

where ξ_i represents the expected productivity gain per unit of R&D. Because productivity growth is proportional to the current level of productivity, it is clear that in this model there is a strong standing on the shoulders of giants effect.

Later DTC models such as Fried (2018) introduce additional features that weaken the size of the standing on the shoulders of giants effect, but it still holds. In Fried (2018),

$$\dot{A}_i(t) = \xi_i z_i(t)^{\iota} A_i(t) \left[\frac{A_i(t)}{A_i(t) + A_j(t)} \right]^{-\varsigma} = \xi_i z_i(t)^{\iota} A_i(t)^{1-\varsigma} \left[A_i(t) + A_j(t) \right]^{\varsigma}, \tag{29}$$

where $\iota \in (0,1)$ implies diminishing returns to R&D within a period (the "stepping on toes effect"), creating an incentive to smooth out R&D effort over time, and the factor $\left[\frac{A_i(t)}{A_i(t)+A_j(t)} \right]^{-\varsigma}$ introduces cross-sectoral technology spillovers between sectors. Fried assumes $\varsigma \in (0,1)$. Thus, cross-sectoral spillovers reduce the elasticity of productivity growth with respect to current productivity, but still $\partial\psi/\partial A_i > 0$ – there is standing on the shoulders of giants. It is perhaps worth emphasising that despite the superficial similarity of language, standing on the shoulders of giants and stepping on toes are mutually compatible dynamics. The former amounts to $\partial\psi/\partial A_i < 0$, the latter to $\partial^2\psi/\partial z_i^2 < 0$.

An exception is the DTC model of Hart (2019). In Hart's model, the equation of motion of the knowledge stock is

$$\dot{H}_i(t) = -\delta_H H_i(t) + A_L(t)^{\varsigma_1} \left(H_i(t) + \varsigma_2 H_j(t) \right)^{1-\varsigma_1} \xi z_i(t)^{1-\iota}. \tag{30}$$

The first term is knowledge depreciation and the second term is knowledge accumulation. Within the second term, $H_i + \varsigma_2 H_j$ ensures there is standing on the shoulders of giants overall in this equation, albeit with diminishing returns given Hart's assumption that $\varsigma_1 \in (0,1)$ and further attenuation from positive cross-sectoral spillovers ($\varsigma_2 \in (0,1)$). Again, $\iota \in (0,1)$ produces the stepping on toes effect in relation to instantaneous R&D effort.

However, Hart's model separates productivity from knowledge, which is unusual in endogenous TC models. The justification Hart gives is that energy productivity has a physical maximum. This function is concave, so the marginal gains from accumulating knowledge are decreasing, which is important. Concretely, energy productivity evolves according to

$$A_i(t) = \bar{A}_i \frac{H_i(t)}{H^* + H_i(t)}, \tag{31}$$

where $\bar{A}_i$ is the theoretical maximum productivity as knowledge H_i goes to infinity and H^* is the knowledge stock at which productivity is $\bar{A}_i/2$.

Combining Eqs. (30) and (31), we get

$$\dot{A}_i(t) = \frac{\left[\bar{A}_i - A_i(t) \right]^2}{\bar{A}_i H^*} \left[-\delta_H \frac{A_i(t) H^*}{\bar{A}_i - A_i(t)} + A_L(t)^{\varsigma_1} \left[\frac{A_i(t) H^*}{\bar{A}_i - A_i(t)} + \varsigma_2 H_j(t) \right]^{1-\varsigma_1} \xi z_i(t)^{1-\iota} \right]. \tag{32}$$

It can be shown that the sign of the derivative of this with respect to A_i is positive for small A_i, but for large A_i the knowledge decay term comes to dominate and the derivative is negative. Thus, Hart's model has standing on the shoulders of giants at low productivity levels, but fishing out at high productivity levels.

Result 5 (Comparative dynamics of endogenous TC). *Learning-based models of TC exhibit fishing out whereas most DTC models exhibit standing on the shoulders of giants. Breaking the link between knowledge and productivity allows DTC models to exhibit fishing out when technologies are mature.*

The importance of this result lies in the fact that learning-based models are designed to fit the empirical regularity of Wright's law and negative exponential experience curves. To reproduce such an experience curve, there must be diminishing returns to R&D as the knowledge stock increases, but early DTC models exhibit increasing returns. The standing on the shoulders of giants effect is motivated by trends in patent counts. However, both effects can co-exist if the marginal productivity of patents is decreasing. One way to capture both of these effects is to introduce diminishing marginal energy productivity gains with respect to knowledge, which is what occurs in Hart's model at high levels of knowledge.

More broadly, assumptions about knowledge spillovers and path dependence in DTC models are central to optimal policy design. While writing $\dot{A}(t)$ as a function of $A(t)$ can capture path dependence in reduced form, DTC models typically interpret $A(t)$ narrowly as knowledge or productivity. In practice, however, path dependence may also reflect other mechanisms (e.g., network effects, scale economies, infrastructure lock-in, political-economy factors, etc.), which could imply a need for more policy instruments than just R&D subsidies and carbon pricing. Thus, it is best not to interpret these models too literally.

Extensions

The idea that knowledge only accumulates through learning-by-doing or R&D is unrealistic, compared with the idea that it responds to both (Grubb et al., 2021). Unfortunately, it is a feature of the literature that models tend to use one representation at the expense of the other. But they can be combined. Represent the interdependency between deployment and R&D by an equation of motion of the general form

$$\dot{A}_i(t) = \psi\left(z_i(t), E_i(t), A_i(t)\right). \tag{33}$$

The dependence on E_i introduces learning-by-doing. The optimal policy now requires a *deployment* subsidy for clean energy

$$\underbrace{\int_{v=t}^{\infty}\left[\exp\left[-\int_{u=t}^{v}\left[r(u) + \partial\psi/\partial A_c(u)\right]du\right]\partial Y(v)/\partial A_c(v)dv\right]\partial\psi/\partial E_c(t)}_{\text{Marginal innovation benefit of clean deployment}} = s_c^{deploy}(t), \tag{34}$$

on top of the R&D subsidy for clean energy from Eq. (25). Technically, the same applies to dirty energy.

Note that the integral in the formula corresponds to the forward-looking value of an extra unit of $A_c(t)$ and is also an element of the R&D subsidy. This leads to the useful result that the ratio of the deployment subsidy and the R&D subsidy should be equal to the ratio of their marginal productivities:

$$\frac{s_c^{deploy}}{s_c^{R\&D}} = \frac{\partial\psi/\partial E_c(t)}{\partial\psi/\partial z_c(t)}. \tag{35}$$

The right-hand side may be amenable to empirical estimation. If so, this may provide a guide to the elusive question of how much to subsidise R&D versus deployment (Cervantes et al., 2023).

The MAC defined as the difference in net productivity between dirty and clean energy is higher than the SCC due to the effect of deployment on innovation:

$$MAC = SCC - s_d^{deploy} + s_c^{deploy}. \tag{36}$$

Thus, this model will have optimal paths qualitatively similar to endogenous, learning-based TC. Typically, the clean-energy deployment subsidy will dominate the dirty-energy deployment subsidy due to the larger innovation potential of clean energy. Note that this increase in the MAC is still present in a model where there is no innovation without R&D effort, for example, in a model with the following equation of motion: $\dot{A}_i(t) = z_i(t) + \rho z_i(t)E_i(t)$.

Bretschger et al. (2017) offer a complementary perspective on R&D-based TC. Their multi-sector, multi-region model has expanding varieties in the tradition of Romer (1990), as well as national and international knowledge diffusion. R&D-driven innovation raises economy-wide productivity by increasing the diversity of intermediate inputs, and carbon pricing indirectly affects the pace and pattern of this growth through sectoral reallocation. This mechanism brings the important insight that endogenous TC can influence the costs of climate policy through broad productivity channels and international spillovers, not just through abatement cost reductions for specific clean technologies.

3. Survey of quantitative IAMs

We now move from theoretical models to quantitative IAMs intended to inform policy. This section describes our systematic review of how TC is represented in these models currently.

We first compiled a list of candidate IAMs, populating the list using a set of international databases/web resources and previous reviews on the topic.[15] The resulting long list comprised 87 models. We then screened this long list of IAMs based on the following

---

[15] In particular, we used the IPCC AR6 Scenario Explorer and Database hosted by IIASA (https://data.ece.iiasa.ac.at/ar6/#/workspaces); the web resources of the Integrated Assessment Modeling Consortium or IAMC (https://www.iamconsortium.org/resources/models-documentation/), the United Nations Framework

Table 1

Representation of technical change in 22 IAMs. In models with learning-by-doing (LbD), the cost of a technology depends on past (cumulative) deployment. In models with R&D, the cost of a technology depends on past investments in R&D. The "Other IAMs" category contains energy system models coupled with other modules such as land use.

Model	Type	Intertemporal optimisation	Exgenous or endogenous TC	LbD/R&D	References
AIM/CGE	CGE	No	exogenous		Fujimori et al. (2017a,b)
DICE	Optimal growth	Yes	exogenous		Nordhaus (2017)
DNE21 +	Energy system	Yes	exogenous*		Sano et al. (2006); Wada et al. (2012)
E3ME	Macroeconometric	No	semi-endogenous	LbD/R&D	Mercure et al. (2018)
					Cambridge Econometrics (2019)
ENV-Linkages	CGE	No	exogenous		Château et al. (2014)
EPPA	CGE	No	exogenous		Chen et al. (2015); Jacoby et al. (2006)
					Octaviano et al. (2016)
GCAM	Other IAMs	No	exogenous		Bond-Lamberty et al. (2022); Calvin et al. (2017)
GEM-E3	CGE	No	semi-endogenous	LbD	Capros et al. (2013)
GTAP-E	CGE	No	exogenous		Burniaux and Truong (2002); Corong et al. (2017)
GTEM	CGE	No	semi-endogenous	LbD	Jakeman et al. (2004); Pant (2007)
ICES	CGE	No	exogenous*		Eboli et al. (2010); Parrado and De Cian (2014)
IGEM	CGE	Yes	exogenous		Goettle et al. (2007)
IMACLIM-R	CGE	No	semi-endogenous	LbD	Bibas et al. (2022)
IMAGE	Other IAMs	Yes	endogenous	LbD	Stehfest et al. (2014)
MARKAL/TIMES	Energy system	Yes	endogenous**	LbD	Loulou et al. (2016)
MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM	Other IAMs	Yes	exogenous*		Fricko et al. (2017); Krey et al. (2020)
					Messner (1997)
PACE	CGE	Yes***	exogenous		Böhringer et al. (2009a); Gavard et al. (2022)
Phoenix	CGE	No	exogenous		Sue Wing et al. (2011); Lucena et al. (2018)
POLES	Energy system	No	semi-endogenous	LbD	Keramidas et al. (2017)
REMIND	Optimal growth	Yes	endogenous	LbD	Luderer et al. (2015)
WEM	Energy system	No	exogenous		IEA (2021)
WITCH	Optimal growth	Yes	endogenous	LbD/R&D	Emmerling et al. (2016)

* A study adding endogenous change exists, but this is not incorporated in the main model (e.g., Messner (1997) for MESSAGE; Parrado and De Cian (2014) for ICES; Sano et al. (2006) for DNE21 +).

** Most applications do not use the endogenous TC feature of the model.

*** There is an extension allowing intertemporal optimisation of the model (Böhringer et al. (2009b)).

criteria for inclusion. First, the model must be global. Second, the model must be in current/recent use, which we defined as having yielded a publication within the three years prior to undertaking our review. Third, the model must have been designed to estimate mitigation costs from the energy system (this excluded models primarily intended to estimate the SCC, and it also excluded specialist land-use models). Fourth, the model must have been used in multiple papers or projects (we excluded 'one-off' models). Lastly, we consolidated versions of the same model into a single family. After screening and combining, we were left with 22 model families for analysis of their representation of TC. These are listed in Table 1.

The table describes the type of model and then classifies the models' representation of TC. We divide the models into exogenous, endogenous and what we call 'semi-endogenous' TC, and for endogenous TC models we further specify whether the process is based on learning or R&D. We use semi-endogenous to describe models in which current deployment of an abatement technology makes the technology cheaper in the future, but where this learning mechanism does not affect the optimal price/subsidy trajectory. In other words, models with semi-endogenous TC feature larger future deployment as technologies become cheaper (learning-by-doing), but omit the incentive for early abatement that would arise from anticipating the endogenous future cost reduction.[16]

The results of our systematic review are as follows. First, the diversity of modelling approaches to TC identified in earlier reviews endures today. Second, we find that TC is exogenous in the majority of models. Four models include endogenous TC, and five other models have semi-endogenous TC. TC is exogenous in the remaining 13 models. A pre-requisite for fully endogenous TC is the ability

Convention on Climate Change or UNFCCC response measures modelling tools (https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/response-measures/modelling-tools-to-assess-the-impact-of-the-implementation-of-response-measures), the Stanford University Energy Modeling Forum (Böhringer et al., 2021), and previous review articles by Gillingham et al. (2008) and Nikas et al. (2019).

[16] One could therefore also describe these models as not fully optimising, or as second-best models. We prefer the term semi-endogenous to highlight the specific mechanism of learning-by-doing without full intertemporal optimisation. To ensure our classification of models as semi-endogenous was reasonable, we contacted the relevant modelling teams to explain our concept of semi-endogenous TC and check our characterisation of their model. We contacted eight modelling teams (IMAGE, GTEM, POLES, E3ME, GEM-E3, EPPA, IMACLIM-R, IGEM) and received answers from seven of them.

to optimise the model intertemporally; only eight models do this, as column 3 shows. Lastly, of the models with semi-endogenous or endogenous TC, the majority represent learning-by-doing, with R&D investments explicitly represented in only two models. In their sample, Gillingham et al. (2008) identified a larger share of models with R&D, but most of these models were one-off developments: R&D is less prevalent as a TC mechanism in the most commonly used core versions of IAMs that feed into inter-comparison exercises like the IPCC scenario database.

4. Quantitative analysis

The purpose of this section is to estimate the effects of TC in the quantitative/policy IAMs on optimal climate policy. This is not easy. Previous literature asking similar questions has relied on regression of IAM outputs on model features (e.g. Kuik et al., 2009), sensitivity analysis using a single model (e.g. Manne and Richels, 2004), and harmonised runs of multiple IAMs (e.g. Gillingham et al., 2018). Each approach has its pros and cons. Standard, regression-based meta-analysis provides a convenient way to explore a wide range of model features, but it is typically limited to qualitative results on the effects of TC (since model features are represented as dummy variables). Given the nature of the data, regression also faces identification problems such as low statistical power and multi-collinearity. Sensitivity analysis with individual IAMs permits a tightly controlled experiment into the effects of TC but is limited to an individual model structure. By contrast, harmonised runs of multiple IAMs allow model uncertainty to be explored, but it is practically difficult to evaluate many models this way, let alone multiple parameterisations of each model.

Our approach consists of two steps. The first step is structural estimation of how much TC reduces abatement costs in the current crop of IAMs. The second step is to build a simple IAM, based on the theoretical models of Section 2, and use it to simulate optimal climate policy based on the TC parameter estimates from the first step. Thus, our approach is most similar to running sensitivity analysis with an individual IAM, but by ensuring through the first step that the model replicates TC in more complex IAMs, and by using a simple model structure broadly in the tradition of analytical IAMs, the model is set up to perform more of a meta-analytical function.

We implement both exogenous TC in abatement technologies and endogenous, learning-based TC, as these are the two principal types of TC that feature in the quantitative/policy IAMs. R&D-based TC is not included in this analysis, because it rarely features in quantitative/policy IAMs and when it does it is alongside learning-based TC – we cannot differentiate their effects in the data. However, we know from Section 2 that R&D-based TC will give approximately the same optimal climate policy paths as exogenous TC when the metrics of interest are carbon taxes, emissions and temperatures, as long as R&D costs are not large enough to shift the consumption growth rate. We run our simple IAM under cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness objectives.

4.1. Structural estimation of TC

Our structural estimation uses 'observed' variation in the timing of abatement and associated abatement costs across a large number of IAM scenarios collected in two major databases (the IPCC and the NGFS).[17] This gives us an estimate of how much TC drives down abatement costs in current IAMs, supposing the process is either exogenous or endogenous, learning-based.

The abatement cost/TC parameters are calibrated on 739 scenarios from 13 leading IAM families,[18] obtained by pooling results from the IPCC and NGFS databases. We exploit variation between IAM scenarios in total abatement costs, MACs and emissions. If the underlying IAMs were static, a given quantity of abatement would cost the same whenever it happens. But with TC, a given quantity of abatement is more costly the earlier it happens. This is our identifying variation. A model of exogenous TC can be estimated by assuming that observed cost reductions in the dataset are driven by time. Specifically, we estimate the following formula for the slope of the MAC function: $\varphi(t) = \varphi(\infty) + (\varphi(0) - \varphi(\infty)) e^{-g_\varphi t}$. Alternatively, a model of endogenous, learning-based TC can be estimated by assuming that observed MAC reductions are a function of cumulative abatement: $\left(\tilde{H}(t)/\tilde{H}(0) \right)^{-\chi}$. We cannot estimate a mixed exogenous/endogenous model – the underlying models are either exogenous or endogenous, and there is high collinearity between time and cumulative abatement. However, the parameter estimates recovered from the pure exogenous and pure endogenous, learning-based TC models could still be used in a mixed TC model, where the MAC function is a weighted average of the two.

Parameter estimation is made using the Generalised Method of Moments, estimating total and marginal abatement cost functions simultaneously. This allows us to obtain more robust results: although the MAC function is more economically meaningful as it determines the FOCs of the optimum, the MAC functions of the underlying IAMs could be non-linear. We give equal weight to the errors of both the total and marginal abatement cost functions and assume they are independent and normally distributed. For both exogenous and endogenous TC, we report four specifications. First, we fit the exogenous or endogenous TC parameters on all the IAMs in the databases. This utilises all the available variation between models, but treats IAMs with endogenous, learning-based TC *as if*

---

[17] The IPCC AR6 database is available at https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ar6/ and the NGFS Phase 5 transition database is available at https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/ngfs/#/workspaces.

[18] Alternatively, 45 different IAMs counting multiple members of the same family, e.g., different model versions, or energy models with and without coupling to land-use models.

Table 2

Parameter estimates for fitting both total and marginal abatement costs to the IPCC and NGFS databases of IAM results. In the fixed-effects (FEs) columns, we report mean coefficients and standard errors. *** indicates significance at the 1 % level.

	No TC	Exogenous TC				Endogenous, learning-based TC			
	All models	All models	Exog models	FEs: initial MACs	FEs: initial MACs & TC	All models	Endog models	FEs: initial MACs	FEs: initial MACs & TC
φ_0	2.7e-05***	1.2e-04***	1.2e-04***	1.1e-04***	1.1e-04***	1.4e-04***	1.3e-04***	9.1e-05***	1.1e-04***
g_φ		.048***	.049***	.013***	0.027***				
φ_∞		1.9e-05***	1.5e-05***	2.2e-07	1.7e-05***				
χ						.362***	.302***	.315***	0.211***
$\tilde{H}(0)$						16.3***	12.7***	92.5***	36.6***
θ	1.5e-03***	−1.7e-05	−2.9e-05	7.7e-04***	4.7e-04***	5.1e-05	9.2e-05	6.6e-04***	4.5e-04***
N	12393	12393	6545	12393	12393	12393	5848	12393	12393
LL	4.9e+04	5e+04	2.7e+04	5.2e+04	5.2e+04	5.0e+04	2.3e+04	5.2e+04	5.2e+04

they had exogenous TC, and *vice versa*. The second specification fits the exogenous TC parameters only on the subset of IAMs with exogenous TC, and similarly for endogenous, learning-based TC. Third, we include a fixed-effects specification, where we allow each model to have its own initial MAC slope.[19] Fourth, we include a fixed-effects specification where each model has its own initial MAC slope *and* its own TC rate. The fixed effects control for unobserved, model-specific factors, which could confound the effects of TC. The fourth specification is the most flexible and is the one we use. Table 2 summarises the resulting parameter estimates (Appendix F Table A1 gives the full, model-specific estimates).

For our preferred specification with model-specific initial MAC slopes and rates of TC, exogenous TC reduces the MAC slope by around 3 % per year to a long-run value that is around 85 % lower than its initial value. The slope halves every 25 years or so. For endogenous TC, the learning elasticity $\chi = 0.21$ in our preferred specification. This gives a learning rate $1 - 2^{-\chi} = 14$ %, i.e., the percentage reduction in the MAC slope each time cumulative abatement doubles. Larger historical learning rates have been recorded for some technologies, such as photovoltaics (32 %), wind power (19 %) and battery technologies (42 %), while lower learning rates have been recorded for other technologies, such as hydroelectricity and nuclear (both 0 %) (Way et al., 2022).[20] Notice that for both types of TC, the fit on all models and the fit only on IAMs with TC of the same type give similar outcomes. For endogenous TC, the learning rate is faster but this is partially offset by lower cumulative emissions at time zero, $\tilde{H}(0)$. Therefore, we find little evidence of a systematic relationship between the speed and the representation of TC.

4.2. Simple IAM

We calibrate and simulate a simple numerical IAM building on the theoretical models of Section 2, in particular the model with an aggregate abatement cost function. To make the model more realistic, we add population, normalised to one in the initial period and growing at a decreasing rate n. We assume the economy is on an approximately balanced growth path, so consumption and output grow at the constant rate of exogenous labour productivity g, and we avoid explicitly modelling capital accumulation. Supported by the fact that BAU emissions scenarios in the IPCC/NGFS databases are roughly constant over this century, we assume that $\sigma(t) = \sigma(0)e^{-gt}$ – AEEI exactly offsets the scale effect on emissions. We define $\overline{P} = \sigma(0)Y(0)$ as the constant level of BAU emissions. Emissions are redefined as greenhouse gas rather than just CO_2 emissions.[21] To avoid unrealistic jumps in initial emissions, we also add a quadratic penalty on the speed of abatement to the abatement cost multiplier, $\exp\left(-\frac{\theta}{2}\overline{P}^2 \dot{\mu}(t)^2\right)$. This is a simple way to factor in the effect of adjustment costs and capital inertia, without explicitly modelling them. Rapid abatement may require costly repurposing/stranding of dirty capital, and green capital accumulation may also face bottlenecks. The parameter θ is recovered from the structural estimation above, reflecting the fact that quantitative/policy IAMs typically incorporate such constraints. Appendix C derives the effect of inertia on the model's optimality conditions.

The social planner chooses a time path for the emissions abatement growth rate $\dot{\mu}(t)$, where μ is defined as the fraction of BAU emissions abated at time t, to maximise discounted utility of consumption. The optimisation problem in full is:

$$\max_{\dot{\mu}(t)} \quad W = \int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta - n(t))t} \frac{c(t)^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \, dt$$

---

[19] We group some of the 18 model families together to form 11 groups, to avoid non-convergence.

[20] Our aggregate learning rate is not easy to compare with technology-specific learning rates, because not only learning rates χ_i but also initial levels of knowledge A_i are heterogeneous. Our aggregate initial level of cumulative abatement A_0 assumes endogenous TC is slower in later decades (that is, green technology as a 'family' matures). Yet, there will be new fast-learning technologies in the future merely because they start with a low initial stock of knowledge $A_{0,i}$. Comparing the dynamics of an aggregate learning mechanism with disaggregated technologies as in Appendix B is a fruitful area of future research.

[21] We make a corresponding adjustment to the TCRE coefficient ζ.

Table 3

Exogenous parameter values for the numerical simulations.

Parameter	Value	Source
δ	0.008	Drupp et al. (2018), 20 % trimmed mean of experts
η	1.3	As above
$n, -g_n$	0.0105, 0.013	United Nations (2022)
g	0.02	By assumption
ζ	0.0006	IPCC AR6 WGI (IPCC, 2021)
γ	0.0154	Howard and Sterner (2017)
$Y(0)$	US\$84.537 trn	IMF (2021)
$\overline{P}$	60 GtCO2eq	IPCC AR6 WGIII (IPCC, 2022)

$$\text{subject to} \begin{cases} \dot{T}(t) = \zeta P(t) \\ P(t) = \overline{P}(1 - \mu(t)) \\ \text{if endogenous TC:} \quad \dot{\tilde{H}}(t) = \overline{P}\mu(t) \\ c(t) = c(0) \cdot e^{gt} \cdot \Omega(t) \cdot \widetilde{\Lambda}(t) \\ \Omega(t) = \exp\left(-\frac{\gamma}{2}T(t)^2\right) \\ \widetilde{\Lambda}(t) = \exp\left(-\frac{\varphi(t)}{2}\overline{P}^2\mu(t)^2\Psi(t) - \frac{\theta}{2}\overline{P}^2\dot{\mu}(t)^2\right) \\ \Psi(t) = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{\tilde{H}(t)}{\tilde{H}(0)}\right)^{-\chi}, & \text{endogenous TC} \\ 1, & \text{exogenous TC} \end{cases} \\ \varphi(t) = \begin{cases} \varphi(0), & \text{endogenous TC} \\ \varphi(\infty) + [\varphi(0) - \varphi(\infty)]\,e^{-g_\varphi t}, & \text{exogenous TC} \end{cases} \\ \text{Initial conditions:} \quad T(0) = T_0, \quad \tilde{H}(0) = \tilde{H}_0, \quad c(0) = c_0 \end{cases}$$

The model is solved as a boundary value problem with MATLAB's bvp5c function.[22] Table 3 reports the additional, exogenous parameter values that complement the TC parameter values recovered from the structural estimation. The model is run out to 2500 in order to avoid terminal values affecting the optimal paths during our period of interest.

4.3. Results

Cost-benefit analysis

Fig. 1 plots optimal, cost-benefit climate policies for no TC (think of this as a straw-person scenario), exogenous TC and endogenous, learning-based TC. The key point is that TC has a quantitatively large effect on optimal emissions, temperatures and MACs, and there is a substantial difference between the two forms of TC.

The incentive to wait for abatement costs to fall is clear under exogenous TC. Emissions fall immediately, but they are higher than under no TC until 2036. Thereafter, they continue to fall in a roughly linear fashion and by 2100 they are much lower than under either of the other two scenarios.[23] Under endogenous, learning-based TC, emissions fall very rapidly in the first ten years (this despite the presence of capital inertia), illustrating the incentive to abate early in order to reduce future abatement costs. Either form of TC results in temperatures at the end of the century that are substantially lower than under no TC – from 3.0 °C under no TC to 2.5 °C under exogenous TC and 2.4 °C under endogenous, learning-based TC. Exogenous TC leads to a substantial reduction in the MAC/optimal carbon price, starting 26 % lower than under no TC and with a widening gap over time. By contrast, under endogenous TC the optimal MAC starts 12 % higher than under no TC but then grows more slowly, ending up 30 % lower in 2100. This difference reflects the fundamentally different dynamics of endogenous TC, where early abatement is undertaken optimally in order to generate future cost reductions, whereas under exogenous TC cost reductions arrive independently of abatement effort. Below we decompose this effect on the optimal MAC into the SCC (optimal carbon tax) and the marginal future learning gain (optimal deployment subsidy). The difference between the initial MAC under exogenous and endogenous, learning-based TC is \$73/tCO₂. Appendix G reports an equivalent set of results when capital inertia is ignored. Results are similar but large initial differences in emissions are optimal.

---

[22] For the cost-effectiveness analysis, we minimise total abatement costs choosing abatement every two years until 2200 using MATLAB's fmincon function. The model has two state variables, abatement and temperature ($\tilde{H}$ can be written as a function of time and temperature). The decision variable is the change in abatement.

[23] Note that under exogenous TC, emissions are substantially negative in the very long run, beyond 2100.

Fig. 1. Optimal, cost-benefit climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Fig. 2 plots optimal, cost-effective climate policies, imposing a temperature constraint of 1.75 °C as representative of the UN Paris Agreement goal of "well below 2 °C". This is a very demanding scenario in general, as evidenced by the rapidly falling emissions paths and high MACs. As in the cost-benefit case, exogenous TC leads to backloading abatement effort. Emissions are higher than under no TC until mid-century and lower thereafter. Consequently, temperatures hit the 1.75 °C ceiling ten years earlier. Compared to exogenous TC, endogenous, learning-based TC leads to more abatement in the next few decades and less abatement thereafter. Effort is marginally more frontloaded in order to internalise the social benefit of learning. However, unlike the cost-benefit case, endogenous, learning-based TC does not lead to lower emissions in the short run than under no TC, rather they are higher. This was identified as a possible outcome in the theory section. In a very ambitious abatement scenario, the cost-reduction effect of endogenous, learning-based TC outweighs the future learning effect. The difference in MACs due to TC is very large in this 1.75 °C cost-effectiveness scenario. The MAC under exogenous TC is 26 % lower in 2020 than under no TC, widening to 44 % in 2050. This is interpretable as the difference in the optimal carbon tax. The MAC under endogenous, learning-based TC is 33 % lower in 2020 than under no TC and 46 % lower in 2050. This contains both the optimal carbon tax and deployment subsidy.[24]

Estimating the endogenous future gain effect

The above figures show different effects of exogenous and endogenous TC on optimal climate policies. The main conceptual difference between the two TC processes is the social benefit of learning, i.e., internalising the marginal external gain in abatement knowledge. However, the above results do not isolate the social benefit of learning. So, Fig. 3 decomposes the optimal MAC under endogenous, learning-based TC into its two components, the SCC/Hotelling price and the social benefit of learning. An optimal policy would comprise a carbon tax equal to the former and a deployment subsidy equal to the latter.

Looking first at the cost-benefit problem, the SCC is \$143/tCO$_2$ in 2020 and \$303/tCO$_2$ in 2050. The social benefit of learning is \$70/tCO$_2$ in 2020, falling to \$48/tCO$_2$ in 2030 and roughly flat thereafter. In the cost-effectiveness case, the Hotelling price is similar to the SCC, at \$144/tCO$_2$ in 2020 and \$371/tCO$_2$ in 2050. However, the social benefit of learning is larger at \$98/tCO$_2$ in 2020 and \$73/tCO$_2$ in 2030. One might wonder why the initial Hotelling price is not much larger than the SCC given that cumulative emissions are much lower. The answer is twofold: first, the Hotelling path increases at a steeper rate. This in turn increases the forward-looking endogenous learning gains, which make abatement cheaper.

---

[24] Note that the MAC paths under the two forms of TC cross each other in 2060 (not shown in the figure), with the MAC under exogenous TC subsequently being lower than under endogenous, learning-based TC.

Fig. 2. Optimal, cost-effective climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.


Fig. 3. Decomposition of the optimal MAC into the SCC/Hotelling price and the social benefit of learning (SBL), for the cost-benefit (left) and cost-effectiveness (right) problems.

But how does the dynamic incentive created by endogenous TC impact optimal emissions, temperatures and MACs? This requires a different kind of analysis, because this dynamic incentive also affects the SCC. That is, take the social benefit of learning away and the SCC also changes. Here we develop a method of isolating the dynamic incentive of endogenous, learning-based TC. The method proceeds in two steps. The first step is to estimate a time-dependent MAC function (i.e., exogenous TC), with a MAC that is identical to the endogenous, learning-based TC model at each point in time. This can be achieved using a sufficiently high-order polynomial. The second step is to take the exogenous-TC MAC curve so estimated, and use it to recalculate optimal model trajectories. Any difference between the optimal paths of the endogenous, learning-based TC model and its exogenous replica must then be due to the dynamic incentive of endogenous TC (see Appendix E.1).

Fig. 4 plots the results. Emissions are 10 % lower in 2050 and 5 % lower in 2100 due to the endogenous future gain effect, leading to 0.13 °C less warming at the end of the century. The MAC starts 41 % higher and is 9 % higher in 2050. These results indicate that, insofar as TC is endogenous and based on learning-by-doing, models that do not include the incentive structure of a learning externality produce too little abatement, optimal MACs that are too low, and temperatures that are too high. In our review of models, we showed that TC is exogenous in most IAMs, but this observation also applies to models of semi-endogenous TC, as these also omit

Fig. 4. Comparison of a model of endogenous TC with a model without TC, but where the static MAC function is calibrated to give the same marginal cost and quantity of abatement at each point in time as the endogenous TC model. The difference between the paths is exactly the endogenous future gain effect. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.

the dynamic incentive. The estimates here provide an upper bound on the bias though, because they are derived from comparing a model of pure exogenous TC and a model of pure endogenous TC. Reality likely incorporates both.

Appendix E.2 further compares a model of exogenous TC with a static model with identical MACs at each point in time. For example, if, say, the exogenous TC model projects zero emissions in 2050 at a marginal cost of \$250/tCO$_2$, the static model would have the same MAC at zero emissions. The static MAC function will be concave, since TC causes the linear instantaneous MAC function to decline over time. We show theoretically that the static approximation of the exogenous TC model is exact under certain assumptions and quantitatively that it is almost exact under more general assumptions. By contrast, a static model cannot replicate the dynamics of a model with endogenous, learning-based TC.

Sensitivity analysis

Here we analyse the sensitivity of the optimal, cost-benefit policy to variation in the abatement cost/TC parameters, and the discount rate. For the former variation, we use the standard errors from the GMM estimates in Table 2. For the latter, we use the range of responses from the expert survey on discounting by Drupp et al. (2018). The results are summarised in Table 4, with detailed results contained in Appendix G. There are four scenarios: low discount rate; high discount rate; slow TC; fast TC.

Reducing the discount rate leads to lower emissions/temperatures and higher MACs, as expected. Increasing the discount rate leads to the opposite effects. The effects of TC are qualitatively the same under different discount rates, except that with a low discount rate, endogenous, learning-based TC leads to a lower initial MAC than under no TC, not a higher one. The explanation for this is the same as in the cost-effectiveness case above: when emissions fall very fast, the cost reduction effect outweighs the endogenous learning effect.

If TC is slow, emissions/temperatures are higher, but so are MACs.[25] The opposite is true for fast TC. The comparative effects of exogenous and endogenous TC are qualitatively the same whether TC is slow or fast.[26]

5. Discussion

Our aim in this paper has been to assess, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the effect of different representations of TC in the IAM literature on optimal climate policy. In doing so, we have surveyed a wide range of models distributed across several strands of

---

[25] Under endogenous, learning-based TC, the MAC is lower under slow TC for just the first two years.

[26] Care should be taken in comparing exogenous and endogenous, learning-based TC under low/high rates, however – setting the parameters at plus/minus one standard deviation is not assured to produce comparable rates of TC.

Table 4

Sensitivity analysis on the discount rate and the rate of technical change. The low discount rate corresponds to $\delta = 0$ and the high discount rate to $\delta = 0.02$. Further sensitivity analysis on η can be found in Appendix G. Fast (slow) TC corresponds to plus (minus) one standard deviation for g_φ in the model of exogenous TC and for χ and A_0 in the model of endogenous, learning-based TC.

	Emissions (GtCO$_2$)			Temperatures (°C)			MACs ($/tCO$_2$)	
	2030	2050	2100	2030	2050	2100	2020	2050
Main specification								
No TC	39.10	38.60	35.33	1.45	1.91	3.03	190.62	421.05
Exogenous TC	40.93	32.31	6.91	1.46	1.90	2.49	140.32	285.47
Endogenous TC	30.48	25.74	17.81	1.41	1.75	2.40	213.26	345.54
Low discount rate								
No TC	17.80	20.03	19.65	1.34	1.57	2.18	383.72	745.72
Exogenous TC	30.81	21.11	−3.79	1.42	1.73	1.97	224.63	394.30
Endogenous TC	9.89	6.59	4.34	1.32	1.41	1.58	343.94	472.22
High discount rate								
No TC	50.00	48.90	45.57	1.50	2.09	3.51	86.22	221.19
Exogenous TC	48.88	42.26	19.64	1.50	2.05	2.96	76.62	184.71
Endogenous TC	45.37	41.41	32.56	1.48	2.00	3.11	107.23	216.68
Slow technical change								
No TC	39.10	38.60	35.33	1.45	1.91	3.03	190.62	421.05
Exogenous TC	40.94	33.35	9.92	1.46	1.91	2.56	143.75	294.66
Endogenous TC	32.65	29.20	22.46	1.42	1.79	2.57	209.88	367.71
Fast technical change								
No TC	39.10	38.60	35.33	1.45	1.91	3.03	190.62	421.05
Exogenous TC	40.88	31.21	4.29	1.46	1.90	2.42	137.29	277.34
Endogenous TC	28.27	22.03	12.96	1.41	1.70	2.22	215.44	321.47

literature, including mostly theoretical contributions to environmental economics and applied, quantitative contributions to policy. TC has been represented in multiple ways and has complex dynamic effects on emissions, temperatures, costs, taxes and subsidies. We have tried to make sense of the different approaches by setting up a common theoretical and quantitative framework, within which different TC mechanisms can be analysed.

TC matters. Exogenous TC that makes future abatement cheaper creates an incentive to abate less in the short run and more in the long run if temperature is optimally chosen. Emissions are much lower in the long run according to our quantitative analysis, resulting in 0.5 °C less warming in 2100 compared to no TC. If temperature is constrained, exogenous TC creates a similar incentive to backload abatement, so the temperature ceiling is hit faster. If exogenous TC happens instead through AEEI, it plausibly reduces emissions in the short run but increases them in the long run. Again, if temperature is constrained, abatement is backloaded and the temperature ceiling is hit faster. Endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing also makes future abatement cheaper, but there is the additional and opposing learning effect, which incentivises early abatement. Our quantitative results suggest that under cost-benefit analysis, the latter effect outweighs the former so that emissions and temperatures are always lower than under no TC (e.g., emissions are 20 % lower in 2030). The results also suggest that the optimal paths under exogenous, MAC-reducing TC and endogenous, learning-based TC diverge significantly under cost-benefit analysis (less so under cost-effectiveness analysis), driven by a social benefit of learning that we estimate at $70/tCO$_2$ initially. We also show how models of endogenous, R&D-based TC create an incentive for early action through subsidising R&D, but optimal emissions, temperature and MAC/carbon tax paths are plausibly isomorphic with exogenous TC, so our quantitative results for exogenous TC should also apply.

The two forms of endogenous TC that we consider, based on learning-by-doing or R&D, can imply different technology cost dynamics, an issue we feel deserves further analysis and discussion in the future. We try to get this discussion started with an analytical comparison of technology cost paths and an illustration of how learning and R&D can be combined within a single model of relatively low complexity. More broadly, it is not our view that any one class of model is inherently superior to the others. In reality, TC is driven by a combination of mechanisms, including factors that may be treated as exogenous to the abatement/energy sector (e.g., R&D spillovers from other sectors), and learning-by-doing and R&D in the abatement/energy sector. A mixed model may therefore provide a more realistic representation of the various processes at play. R&D is facilitated by deployment, which creates an endogenous future gain effect associated with R&D. That matters. The interactions between the abatement/energy sector and the wider economy can also be modelled explicitly. However, such models also involve greater complexity and reduced transparency, and the appropriate degree of model complexity ultimately depends on the intended use of the model and the audience.

Sensitivity analysis reveals that our results are qualitatively robust to variation in the rate of TC (and the discount rate). The sensitivity analysis on the rate of TC, carried out using the standard errors of our statistical estimates, also provides an insight into the likely impacts of TC on optimal trajectories, in case the IAM literature as a whole underestimates future technology cost reductions. This is an implication of recent work by Way et al. (2022), who argue IAMs underestimate deployment rates for renewable energy technologies and overestimate their costs. Supposing this critique has some validity, we might then be more guided by our results for

high-end TC as calibrated on the IAM databases.[27] Mechanically, fast TC, so defined and measured, results in a larger quantitative effect on optimal emissions, temperatures and carbon prices.

Uncertainty about TC is an important feature of the problem. Although there exist many papers with sensitivity analysis on technological parameters, like ours, to the best of our knowledge the literature has not yet investigated optimal emissions under uncertainty in a dynamic model where information on TC is gradually discovered. A fully dynamic stochastic model goes beyond the scope of this paper, but from our analytical solutions we can speculate about the effect of uncertainty.

Since total abatement costs are convex in abatement, Jensen's inequality indicates that the expected value of future abatement costs increases under uncertainty. This increases future abatement costs relative to current, certain abatement costs, and is an argument for earlier abatement with a higher initial MAC. The higher MAC can be understood as a risk premium society is willing to pay to insure against the possible outcome of slower-than-expected TC.

But how much this matters depends as usual on whether TC is exogenous or endogenous, and whether the objective is cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness. When TC is exogenous and the objective is cost-effectiveness, the above effect is the only one at play and in principle the risk premium on TC uncertainty could be quantitatively large. In the case of endogenous TC, we would expect the risk premium to be lower, because we know from our analysis that the endogenous future gain effect attenuates the effect of TC uncertainty on the initial MAC. In other words, since endogenous TC has a smaller impact on the optimal MAC (compared to exogenous TC), the societal cost of wrongly anticipating TC is lower. Similarly, in a cost-benefit analysis, lower-than-expected TC leads to a higher optimal peak temperature, attenuating the initial price/MAC adjustment. Again, since the effect of TC on the initial MAC is lower than under cost-effectiveness, the social cost of wrongly anticipating TC and the corresponding risk premium are lower. Combining both effects, i.e. in a cost-benefit analysis with endogenous TC, the effect of TC on the initial MAC should be small.

Note that these are mere first-order effects of adding uncertainty on parameters χ and g_φ. There are other effects that go beyond this intuition, for example when the uncertainty regarding the growth rate of the economy is correlated with uncertainty regarding TC. Also, uncertainty affects investment incentives. In the case of long-term, irreversible investments with large uncertainty over the profitability of the technology, uncertainty leads to an incentive to postpone the investment and wait for new information, a.k.a. option value, the value of keeping options open. For example, uncertainty about the availability of nuclear fusion in the future can create an incentive to postpone the investment in a new nuclear fission plant today. Investigating optimal emissions under technological uncertainty is therefore a fruitful avenue for future research.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Léo Coppens: Writing – original draft, Visualization, Software, Investigation, Conceptualization. **Simon Dietz:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Investigation, Conceptualization. **Frank Venmans:** Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Methodology, Formal analysis, Conceptualization.

Declaration of competing interest

Appendices for online publication

In Appendices A–E, we formally derive the analytical results in Section 2. Our strategy is to use the most general possible model. That is, to the extent possible we derive results for general functional forms, which then apply to the specific functions used in Section 2. This tends to keep the mathematical notation uncluttered and provides a set of results of potentially broad use, while maintaining a model structure in the main text that is more immediately relatable to the literature. Some results hold under more general conditions than others, therefore, as we proceed through the analysis we will make more specialised assumptions. Appendices F and G contain further results from our quantitative analysis.

Appendix A. General model

For ease of notation, we omit time subscripts unless confusion is possible. Other subscripts are used to indicate partial derivatives. To obtain a simpler expression for the MAC, the MAC growth rate and abatement speed, we will use abatement $a = \overline{P} - P$ rather than abatement relative to BAU emissions $\mu = (\overline{P} - P)/\overline{P}$.[28]

Define a knowledge stock H that accumulates according to the following equation of motion, which depends on time t, the existing knowledge stock, investment I, and abatement a:

$$\dot{H} = \psi(t, H, I, a). \tag{37}$$

---

[27] In our fast TC scenario, abatement costs are reduced by one third between 2020 and 2040. This corresponds to the cost reduction for wind technologies in the fast transition scenario of Way et al. (2022). Their cost reductions for batteries and electrolysers are even larger because these technologies start with a very low cumulative installed capacity. By contrast, they argue that other technologies such as carbon capture and storage and nuclear have seen almost no cost reductions over the last decades.

[28] The same results can be obtained by defining a business-as-usual consumption path, a carbon intensity path, and defining $a = \mu \sigma c_{BAU}$. This gives marginal abatement costs $c_a = \frac{c_\mu}{\sigma c_{BAU}}$ with growth rate $\dot{c}_a/c_a = \dot{c}_\mu/c_\mu - \dot{\sigma}/\sigma - \dot{c}_{BAU}/c$. The abatement growth rate can be decomposed as $\dot{a}/a = \dot{\mu}/\mu + \dot{\sigma}/\sigma + \dot{c}_{BAU}/c_{BAU}$.

The most intuitive interpretation of H is a knowledge stock, but it can be any technological parameter that is path-dependent. Assume the function ψ is twice differentiable in all its arguments. The presence of H in the function may represent standing on the shoulders of giants ($\psi_H > 0$) or fishing out ($\psi_H < 0$). We assume $\psi_H < r$, i.e., the consumption discount rate, to avoid a bang-bang solution. The knowledge stock may increase over time ($\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial t} \geq 0$), e.g., via technological spillovers from non-green sectors, as a response to green R&D investment ($\psi_I \geq 0; \psi_{II} \leq 0$), or from learning-by-doing as a result of clean technology deployment ($\psi_a \geq 0; \psi_{aa} < 0$).

As in the main text, we assume that warming is proportional to cumulative emissions, that is, $T = \zeta S$ with

$$S_t = S_0 + \int_0^t P_u du \leftrightarrow \dot{S} = P. \tag{38}$$

A.1. Cost-benefit analysis

Consider a consumption function $c(a, H, I, T, t)$, twice differentiable in all its arguments, where positive abatement is costly $-c_a \geq 0$, the MAC function is increasing ($-c_{aa} > 0$), and emissions beyond BAU are useless $-c_a|_{a\leq 0} = 0$. Knowledge decreases total and marginal abatement costs ($c_H > 0; -c_{aH} > 0$), and green R&D investment reduces consumption ($c_I = 1$). Time dependence of the consumption function captures both exogenous TC and AEEI. Climate warming causes convex damages ($c_T < 0, c_{TT} < 0$). We assume that apart from abatement costs, green R&D and damages, the economy is on a balanced growth path with a constant savings rate as in Dietz and Venmans (2019). As a result, we do not distinguish between production and consumption.

Population at time zero is normalised to one and grows at rate n. The utility function has the standard properties $u_c > 0, u_{cc} < 0$. The social planner maximises welfare as discounted utility,

$$\max_{\{a, I\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta-n)t} u(c(a, H, I, T, t)) \, dt, \tag{39}$$

subject to

$$\dot{S} = \overline{P} - a; \quad \dot{H} = \psi(t, H, I, a); \quad S_0, H_0 \text{ given.} \tag{40}$$

The current value Hamiltonian of the problem is

$$\mathcal{H} = u(c(a, H, I, T(S), t)) - \lambda^S \left(\overline{P} - a\right) + \lambda^H \psi(t, H, I, a). \tag{41}$$

The FOCs include

$$u_c c_a + \lambda^H \psi_a = \lambda^S, \tag{42}$$

$$\dot{\lambda}^S = (\delta - n)\lambda^S - u_c \zeta c_T, \tag{43}$$

$$u_c = \lambda^H \psi_I, \tag{44}$$

$$\dot{\lambda}^H = (\delta - n)\lambda^H - u_c c_H - \lambda^H \psi_H. \tag{45}$$

The transversality conditions are $\lim_{t\to\infty} \lambda^S e^{-(\delta-n)t} = 0$ and $\lim_{t\to\infty} \lambda^H e^{-(\delta-n)t} = 0$.

Integrating (43) and (45), and plugging the integrals into (42), we obtain

$$c_{a_t} = \int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta-n)(u-t)} \frac{u_{c_u}}{u_{c_t}} \zeta \left(-c_{T_u}\right) du + \psi_{a_t} \int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^u ((\delta-n)+\psi_H) ds} \frac{u_{c_u}}{u_{c_t}} c_{H_u} du. \tag{46}$$

Acknowledging that $\ln \frac{u_{c_u}}{u_{c_t}} = \int_t^u \frac{\dot{u}_c}{u_c} ds$ and defining the discount rate $r = \delta - n - \frac{\dot{u}_c}{u_c}$, we obtain that the MAC equals the present value of future marginal damages (the SCC) plus the future learning gain from an extra tonne of abatement today:

$$\underbrace{c_{a_t}}_{\text{MAC}} = \underbrace{\int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^u r ds} \zeta \left(-c_{T_u}\right) du}_{\text{SCC}} + \underbrace{\overbrace{\psi_{a_t}}^{\text{knowledge increment}} \overbrace{\int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^u (r+\psi_H) ds} c_{H_u} du}^{\text{...and its effect on abatement costs}}}_{\text{Social benefit of learning}}. \tag{47}$$

This corresponds to Eq. (12) in the main text, i.e., the optimality condition for the model with endogenous TC based on learning-by-doing. In the absence of learning-by-doing, the endogenous future gain term drops out, giving the optimality condition for exogenous TC in Eq. (9).

Differentiating (42) and combining it with the other FOC gives

$$\dot{c}_a = r c_a + \frac{\psi_H \psi_a - \dot{\psi}_a}{\psi_I} + c_H \psi_a - \zeta c_T, \tag{48}$$

which after dividing through by c_a gives the growth rate of the MAC,

$$\frac{\dot{c}_a}{c_a} = r + \underbrace{\frac{c_H \psi_a + \frac{\psi_H}{\psi_I} \psi_a - \frac{\dot{\psi}_a}{\psi_I}}{c_a}}_{\text{Social benefit of learning}} - \underbrace{\frac{\zeta c_T}{c_a}}_{\text{Damages}}. \tag{49}$$

Peak warming

Lemma 1. *Assume that from the point at which peak warming is reached the marginal abatement cost and damage functions are static. Then TC decreases peak warming.*

Proof. If the MAC and damage functions are static from the point at which peak warming is reached, peak warming is also the steady state. If we conjecture that $\dot{P} = 0$, the MAC, temperature and hence marginal damages will be constant, Eq. (47) is satisfied and has the solution

$$MAC^* = \frac{-\zeta c_T^*}{r}. \tag{50}$$

Since a model with TC has a lower MAC in the steady state, from (50) $-c_T^*$ is lower. And since marginal damages are increasing in temperature, the steady state temperature is lower. ∎

This lemma depends on static MACs and marginal damages after peak warming, which ensure peak warming is the model's steady state. However, peak warming may not be a steady state. One special case is where both the MAC and damage functions are proportional to consumption. In this case, r in (50) is replaced by $r - g$ and the claim still holds, in fact.

Moreover, in the specialised model of Appendix B, we relax the assumption of no TC after peak warming, allowing TC to continue after peak warming such that it is optimal to cool the earth after peak warming with negative emissions. Yet, we will show that TC still decreases peak warming under highly plausible conditions.

Lemma 1 underpins Results 1–3 in the main text as they relate to optimal emissions and temperatures in the long run.

Exogenous TC

Lemma 2. *In a cost-benefit setting, exogenous TC $(\psi_a = 0)$ results in a lower initial MAC, lower initial abatement, and a lower initial MAC growth rate than a model without TC.*

Proof. To show this, conjecture that the model with exogenous TC has the same initial MAC as the model without TC. From Eq. (49), this implies that initial MAC growth is also the same (the initial conditions ensure marginal damages are the same). The same MAC growth rate combined with a decreasing MAC curve in the model with exogenous TC will lead to faster abatement and lower temperatures after the start. This will, in turn, lead to faster growth of the MAC in later periods (from Eq. 49). From (47), lower emissions and temperatures lead to a lower MAC, which contradicts our conjecture. As a result, the initial MAC needs to be lower. If the MAC is lower and the MAC function is identical at time zero, initial abatement will be lower. Regarding the initial MAC growth rate, (49) shows that since c_T is identical from the initial condition on temperature and c_a is lower, the change in the MAC will initially be lower. ∎

In later periods, the lower MAC is compensated by lower marginal damages and the effect of exogenous TC on the growth rate is ambiguous.

Lemma 2 provides the basis for the rest of Result 1 in the main text, determining the qualitative effect of exogenous TC in abatement technologies on MACs, emissions and temperatures in the short run. In a model of exogenous TC, the MAC and the carbon price are equivalent.

Endogenous, learning-based TC

Corollary 1. *In a cost-benefit setting, endogenous TC $(\psi_a > 0)$ has ambiguous effects on the initial MAC, initial abatement and the initial MAC growth rate compared to a model without TC.*

In a model with endogenous TC, there is the additional social benefit of learning (Eq. 47), which increases the MAC, all else being equal. Hence, the effect of endogenous TC on the initial MAC, initial abatement and the initial MAC growth rate is in general ambiguous. This provides the remaining basis for Result 3 in the main text, determining the qualitative effect of endogenous, learning-based TC on optimal MACs, emissions and temperatures in the short run.

A.2. Cost-effectiveness analysis

In the case of cost-effectiveness analysis, damages are replaced by a temperature ceiling $T \leq \bar{T}$, which corresponds to a constraint on cumulative emissions $\bar{T} = \zeta \bar{S}$. The Hamiltonian in Eq. (41) is replaced by the following Lagrangian,

$$\mathcal{L} = u\left(c\left(a, H, I, t\right)\right) - \lambda^S \left(\overline{P} - a\right) + \lambda^H \psi\left(t, H, I, a\right) - \theta \left(\overline{P} - a\right), \tag{51}$$

where the Lagrange multiplier θ indicates that whenever $S = \bar{S}$, emissions cannot be positive. The FOCs are

$$u_c c_a + \lambda^H \psi_a = \lambda^S + \theta, \tag{52}$$

$$\dot{\lambda^S} = (\delta - n)\lambda^S, \tag{53}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\text{If} \quad S = \bar{S}: \quad \theta > 0; \ \dot{\theta} \leq 0; \ P \leq 0. \\
&\text{If} \quad S < \bar{S}: \quad \theta = 0. \tag{54}
\end{aligned}$$

Eqs. (60) and (62) remain the same. Call $\bar{t}$ the time when the constraint hits. Before $\bar{t}$, the Lagrange multiplier is zero and the integral expression for the MAC is

$$\underbrace{c_{a_t}}_{\text{MAC}} = \underbrace{\lambda_0^S e^{rt}}_{\text{Hotelling}} + \underbrace{\overbrace{\psi_{a_t}}^{\text{knowledge increment}} \overbrace{\int_t^\infty e^{-\int_t^u (r+\psi_H)ds} c_{H_u} du}^{\text{...and its effect on abatement costs}}}_{\text{Social benefit of learning}}. \tag{55}$$

At time $\bar{t}$, the continuity of the costate variable implies continuous MACs and therefore continuous emissions at zero. Using boundary conditions at time $\bar{t}$, $a_{\bar{t}} = \overline{P}$, $S_{\bar{t}} = \bar{S}$, $\int_0^{\bar{t}} P dt = \bar{S} - S_0$, and assuming that endogenous future learning gains are negligible after time $\bar{t}$, we establish that λ_0^S is the present value of the MAC at zero emissions at time $\bar{t}$, $\lambda_0^S = e^{-r\bar{t}} c_{a_{\bar{t}}}|_{a=\overline{P}}$ (this requires the knowledge stock at time $\bar{t}$, so there will be no closed-form solution in the general case).

For green R&D or exogenous TC, we have $\psi_a = 0$ and the Hotelling rule is preserved. For general cases of endogenous TC, the Hotelling rule is no longer valid.

Exogenous TC

Lemma 3. *In a cost-effectiveness setting, exogenous TC has no effect on the growth rate of the MAC (the Hotelling rule is unaffected), but results in a lower MAC over the entire path, less initial abatement, higher abatement later, and peak warming being reached earlier.*

Proof. From Eq. (49) and the assumptions of cost-effectiveness ($c_T = 0$) and no endogenous TC ($\psi_a = 0$), we see that the MAC increases according to the Hotelling rule at rate r in both models. Conjecture that the initial MAC would start at the same level. The model with TC has lower abatement costs after time zero and would have weakly higher abatement over the whole path, reaching zero emissions earlier. This would violate the condition that cumulative emissions before reaching zero emissions must be equal in both models ($\zeta \int_0^\infty E = \bar{T}$). Hence, the MAC must start lower. Since the MAC function is identical at the start, this must result in lower abatement at the start. Since cumulative emissions must be identical, the abatement path must cross the no-TC abatement path and lead to zero emissions earlier. ∎

Endogenous, learning-based TC

Lemma 4. *In a cost-effectiveness setting, endogenous TC $(\psi_a > 0)$ has ambiguous effects on the initial MAC, initial abatement and the initial MAC growth rate compared to a model without TC.*

Proof. In a model with endogenous TC, there is the additional endogenous future gains component (Eq. 47), which increases the MAC, all else being equal. Hence the effect of endogenous TC on the initial MAC, and in turn initial abatement and the initial MAC growth rate, is generally ambiguous. ∎

A.3. Technological processes with different learning speeds

It is straightforward to extend the model to more technologies. We will show the derivation for two families of abatement technology, each with a different TC process. Assume the same conditions as above apply to each technology, $c_a < 0; c_{aa} < 0; c_a|_{a<0} = 0$, meaning that within each abatement family there are diminishing returns to scale (see Bramoullé and Olson, 2005, for a model with constant MACs and a technology accumulation function $\dot{H} = a$). The assumption of differentiability and zero MACs for negative emissions implies zero MAC at zero abatement. This will ensure an interior solution for each technology family: at least some abatement is optimal for each technological family.[29]

The planner's objective is

$$\max_{a,I} \int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta-n_t)t} u\left(c\left(a_1, a_2, H_1, H_2, I_1, I_2, T(S), t\right)\right) dt, \tag{56}$$

subject to

$$\dot{S} = \overline{P} - a_1 - a_2; \quad \dot{H}_i = \psi\left(t, H_i, I_i, a_i\right). \tag{57}$$

The current value Hamiltonian of the problem is

$$\mathcal{H} = u\left(c\left(a_1, a_2, H_1, H_2, I_1, I_2, T(S), t\right)\right) - \lambda^S\left(\overline{P} - a_i\right) + \sum_{i=1,2} \lambda_i^H \psi^i\left(t, H_i, I_i, a_i\right). \tag{58}$$

The seven FOCs for $i = 1, 2$ include

$$u_c c_{a_i} + \lambda_i^H \psi_{a_i}^i = \lambda^S, \tag{59}$$

---

[29] In case abatement costs are non-continuous at zero, a non-negativity condition $a_i \geq 0$ should be added and will lead to the obvious conclusion that families of technologies that are more expensive than alternative families of technologies, even at very low levels of deployment, and even when endogenous future gains are taken into account, should not be deployed yet.

$$u_c = \lambda_i^H \psi_{I_i}^i, \tag{60}$$

$$\dot{\lambda^S} = (\delta - n_t) \lambda^S - u_c \zeta u_T, \tag{61}$$

$$\dot{\lambda_i^H} = (\delta - n_t) \lambda_i^H - u_c c_{H_i} - \lambda^H \psi_{H_i}. \tag{62}$$

Integrating the costate Eq. (62) for each technology family and substituting into (59) allows us to write (12) for each technology family separately.

Appendix B. Specialised model

To obtain further analytical results, we must specialise some functional relationships. The assumptions regarding welfare and warming are the same as in the preceding section. We now assume emissions are produced according to Eq. (4) in the main text, and we assume quadratic damages and total abatement costs, like Eqs. (3) and (5) in the main text, respectively. Exogenous TC that reduces abatement costs over time is represented by the slope of the MAC curve φ decreasing as a function of time.[30] Instead of a general knowledge stock, we assume that endogenous, learning-based TC is specifically driven by cumulative abatement $\tilde{H}_t = \int_{-\infty}^t a_u du$.[31]

We can write cumulative emissions as a function of time and the state variable S:

$$\tilde{H}(t, S) = \int_0^t \overline{P}_u du - S + S_0. \tag{63}$$

This model can be solved with only one state variable and its shadow price λ^S incorporates both damages and endogenous, learning-based TC.

We obtain the following expression for consumption per capita:

$$c = c_0 \exp\left[gt - \frac{\varphi_t}{2} \underbrace{\frac{a^2}{\sigma_t^2 c^2}}_{\mu^2} \left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0 \right)^{-\chi} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \zeta^2 S^2 \right]. \tag{64}$$

Note that we can choose the decision variable to be abatement a or relative abatement $\mu = \frac{a}{\sigma_t c}$. The solution will be the same. We will choose a as the decision variable, because it leads to easier expressions for the growth rate of the MAC and the marginal gain of TC. The MAC is

$$c_a = -\frac{\varphi_t}{\sigma_t^2 c} a \left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0 \right)^{-\chi} = -c \frac{\varphi_t}{\overline{P}_t^2} a \left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0 \right)^{-\chi}. \tag{65}$$

Utility $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}$. We assume decreasing population growth $n = n_0 e^{-g_n t}$ and standardise initial population to one. The welfare functional is

$$\max \int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta - n_t)t} u \, dt. \tag{66}$$

The present Value Hamiltonian is

$$H^{PV} = e^{-(\delta - n_t)t} u(c(t, S, a)) - \lambda^S \left(\overline{P} - a \right). \tag{67}$$

The FOCs are

$$\lambda^S = -e^{-(\delta - n_t)t} u_c c_a, \tag{68}$$

$$\dot{\lambda^S} = e^{-(\delta - n_t)t} u_c c_S, \tag{69}$$

where $c_S = c \left(-\gamma \zeta^2 S - \frac{\chi \varphi_t}{2 \tilde{H}_0 \sigma_t^2 c^2} a^2 \left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0 \right)^{-\chi - 1} \right)$ includes both marginal damages and endogenous learning gains from TC.

---

[30] The slope of the MAC curve is also affected by a separate R&D knowledge stock, which is accumulated by R&D investments (but not by abatement), $\dot{H} = \tilde{\psi} \left(\tilde{I}, t \right)$. This stock is optimised according to a third FOC, $u_c = \dot{\lambda}^H \tilde{\psi}_{\tilde{I}}$.

[31] This is also compatible with a knowledge stock which builds up proportional to abatement, and a scaling factor which depends on both time and deployment-dependent R&D investments $\dot{H} = \varrho(I, t) a$. However, in this case we assume that optimal investments make the function $\varrho(I^*, t)$ constant over time (the full model would have a second optimality condition $u_c = \mu \rho_I a$). We normalise the unit of H such that $\varrho = 1$.

Integrate (69) between time t and infinity with terminal condition $\lim_{t\to\infty}\lambda^S = 0$:

$$\lambda_t^S = \int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta-n_u)u} c_u^{1-\eta}\left(\gamma\zeta^2 S + \frac{\chi\varphi_t}{2\tilde{H}_0}\mu^2\left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0\right)^{-\chi-1}\right) du. \tag{70}$$

Combining this result with (68) and dividing by $-e^{-(\delta-n_t)t} u_{c_t}$ gives the expression MAC = SCC + Social benefit of learning in the text (Eq. 12):

$$-c_a = \int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(u-t)+(n_u u - n_t t)}\left(\frac{c_u}{c_t}\right)^{-\eta} c_u\left(\gamma\zeta^2 S + \frac{\chi\varphi_u}{2\tilde{H}_0}\mu^2\left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0\right)^{-\chi-1}\right) du. \tag{71}$$

Acknowledging $\ln\frac{c_u}{c_t} = \int_t^u d\ln c_s \leftrightarrow \frac{c_u}{c_t} = e^{\int_t^u \frac{\dot{c}}{c} ds} \leftrightarrow \left(\frac{c_u}{c_t}\right)^{-\eta} = e^{-\eta\int_t^u \frac{\dot{c}}{c} ds}$ shows that the first factor in the integral is the discount factor with the Ramsey discount rate $\delta - n_t + \eta\frac{\dot{c}}{c}$.

Note that when we write the MAC as a function of BAU emissions, both MACs and damages are proportional to consumption, so we can write this equation relative to consumption while reducing the discount rate by the growth rate of consumption:

$$-c_a/c = \frac{\varphi_t}{\bar{P}_t^2}a\left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0\right)^{-\chi} = \int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(u-t)+(n_u u - n_t t)-(\eta-1)\int_t^u \frac{\dot{c}}{c} ds}\left(\gamma\zeta^2 S_u + \frac{\chi\varphi_u}{2\tilde{H}_u}\mu^2\left(\tilde{H}_u/\tilde{H}_0\right)^{-\chi}\right) du. \tag{72}$$

To find a differential equation for the MAC, first take the time derivative of (68):

$$\dot{\lambda}^S = -e^{-(\delta-n_t)t}(-\delta + n_t + \dot{n}_t t)u_c c_a - e^{-(\delta-n_t)t}\dot{u}_c c_a - e^{-(\delta-n_t)t}u_c \dot{c}_a. \tag{73}$$

Substitute out $\dot{\lambda}^S$ from (69) and (73), divide by $e^{-(\delta-n_t)t}u_c$, and use $-\frac{\dot{u}_c}{u_c} = \eta\frac{\dot{c}}{c}$ to give

$$-\dot{c}_a = \left(\delta - n_t - \dot{n}_t t + \eta\frac{\dot{c}}{c}\right)(-c_a) + c_S, \tag{74}$$

which corresponds to

$$\underbrace{\frac{\dot{c}_a}{c_a}}_{\text{MAC growth}} = r - \underbrace{\frac{\zeta c_T}{c_a}}_{\text{Marginal damages}} + \underbrace{\frac{c_{\tilde{H}}}{c_a}}_{\text{Social benefit of learning}}. \tag{75}$$

To find a differential equation for abatement, we take the time derivative of (65) to calculate the growth rate of the MAC:

$$\frac{\dot{c}_a}{c_a} = \frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} + \frac{\dot{a}}{a} - 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} - \frac{\dot{c}}{c} - \chi\frac{a}{\tilde{H}}.$$

Plugging the growth rate of the MAC into (75) results in

$$\frac{\dot{a}}{a} = \underbrace{\delta - n_t - \dot{n}_t t + (\eta+1)\frac{\dot{c}}{c}}_{r+g} - \frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} + 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} + \frac{\chi a}{\tilde{H}} - \frac{1}{2}\frac{\chi a}{\tilde{H}} - \frac{\sigma^2\,c^2\gamma\zeta^2 S}{\varphi a\left(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0\right)^{-\chi}}. \tag{76}$$

Note that if BAU emissions are constant, we have $\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} = -g$, which boils down to using $r - g$ instead of $r + g$.

Eq. (76) shows that TC will increase initial abatement speed for real-world parameters. Let us first show this for exogenous TC. Denote the (negative) growth rate of exogenous TC as $g_{TC} = \dot{\varphi}/\varphi$ and define $\frac{\partial a}{\partial g_{TC}}$ as the difference in abatement between two identical models with marginally different TC growth rates. Similarly, define $g_a = \dot{a}/a$ and denote $\frac{\partial a}{\partial g_{TC}}$ as the difference in abatement between two models, where the TC growth rate has been marginally altered. A change in the exogenous TC rate will affect initial abatement, but not $\tilde{H}$, S and φ, because they are defined by their initial conditions. Taking the derivative of Eq. (76) with respect to g_{TC} at time zero gives

$$-\frac{\partial g_a}{\partial g_{TC}} = 1 - \frac{\gamma\zeta^2 S}{\varphi a(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}}\frac{\partial a/a}{\partial g_{TC}}. \tag{77}$$

The factor $\frac{\gamma\zeta^2 S}{\varphi a(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}}$ is the marginal damage over the MAC, which is typically lower than 2 % (it is the adjusted discount rate $r + g + 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma}$ at the steady state and considerably smaller at the start of the transition). So even if $\frac{\partial a/a}{\partial g_{TC}}$ is large, say initial abatement increases by 5 % for a 1 % increase of TC, the RHS remains large and positive. Thus, exogenous TC increases the initial abatement speed.

For endogenous, learning-based TC, a very similar argument can be made. Denote the (negative) growth rate of endogenous, learning-based TC as $g_{TC} = \frac{\frac{d}{dt}(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}}{(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}} = -\frac{\chi a}{\tilde{H}}$. Taking the derivative of Eq. (76) with respect to g_{TC} at time zero gives

$$-\frac{\partial g_a}{\partial g_{TC}} = 1/2 - \frac{\gamma \zeta^2 S}{(\varphi a(\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}} \frac{\partial a/a}{\partial g_{TC}}. \tag{78}$$

The same term as for exogenous TC reappears and for the same reasons this will be small. Moreover, $\frac{\partial a/a}{\partial g_{TC}}$ is not only small, it is often negative (initial abatement increases with endogenous, learning-based TC), as it is for our parameters. The term $1/2$ comes from the fact that the endogenous future gain incentive creates a flattening effect on the abatement path that is half the size of the opposite cost-reduction effect. So again, endogenous, learning-based TC increases the initial abatement speed.

The extension to a market economy is a straightforward application of the first welfare theorem. The first order conditions will be the same provided that λ^S equals the sum of the tax and the subsidy. Appendix D shows a comparison between the market equilibrium and the social optimum in a more elaborate model.

Peak warming

We have already developed several results for the general model in Appendix A. These are of course also valid in this more specialised model. However, by adding more structure, we can produce a few more results.

Lemma 5. *TC decreases peak warming if at the time of peak warming optimal abatement satisfies*

$$\frac{\left(r + g - 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} \overbrace{-\frac{\dot{a}}{a}}^{neg} \overbrace{-\frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} + \frac{\chi a}{2\tilde{H}}}^{pos} \right)}{\left(r + g - 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} \right)} \frac{\varphi_{t^*} \left(\frac{\tilde{H}}{\tilde{H}_0} \right)^{-\chi}}{\varphi_0} < 1. \tag{79}$$

Proof. The claim follows from rewriting Eq. (76) at the time of peak warming as

$$\gamma \zeta T^* = \left(r + g + 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} \overbrace{-\frac{\dot{a}}{a} - \frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} + \frac{\chi a}{2\tilde{H}}}^{-\frac{dMAC/dt}{MAC} - \frac{c\tilde{H}}{MAC}} \right) \frac{\varphi a}{\bar{P}^2} \left(\frac{\tilde{H}}{\tilde{H}_0} \right)^{-\chi}. \tag{80}$$

and dividing this by the equivalent expression for the model without TC. ∎

This condition is satisfied unless peak warming is reached implausibly quickly. The first factor on the left-hand side of the inequality converges to one in the long term and tends to be very close to one at peak warming. The numerator comprises the discount rate, plus the degrowth rate of the MAC (the cost-reduction effect, $-d/dt(MAC/c)$), minus the endogenous future gains of learning-based TC. In the static model, this is just $r + g + 2\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma}$, but in the presence of TC we have additional terms. The second factor is much smaller than one. It is the relative reduction of the slope of the MAC curve due to TC at the time of peak warming.

Lemma 5 extends Lemma 1 to the case where TC continues after peak warming is reached. Therefore, it provides a more general set of circumstances underpinning Results 1–3 as they relate to optimal policy in the long run.

Endogenous, learning-based TC under cost-effectiveness analysis

Lemma 6. *In a cost-effectiveness setting, compared to a model without TC, the model with endogenous TC will have lower MAC growth, a lower MAC over the entire path, less initial abatement, higher later abatement, and reach peak warming earlier.*

Proof. The emissions path will still be steeper, because the cost-reduction effect $\frac{\chi a}{\tilde{H}}$ dominates the endogenous future gain effect $\frac{1}{2}\frac{\chi a}{\tilde{H}}$ in Eq. (76) (where $\gamma = 0$). Since cumulative emissions are identical with and without TC in the cost-effectiveness case, the emissions paths must cross each other, with emissions higher at the start under endogenous TC, lower at the end, and zero emissions reached earlier. Higher initial emissions imply a lower initial MAC. Eq. (75) shows that endogenous future gains will reduce the growth rate of the optimal MAC (marginal damages are zero in the cost-effectiveness analysis). A lower initial MAC combined with lower growth implies a lower MAC over the entire path. ∎

Note that the shadow price of carbon, λ^S in Eq. (53), always follows a Hotelling path irrespective of TC. This result is also reported in Goulder and Mathai (2000).

Decreasing carbon intensity (AEEI)

Lemma 7. *In a cost-effectiveness setting, compared to a model with constant carbon intensity ($\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} = 0$), the model with decreasing carbon intensity will have lower initial emissions and reach peak warming later, if optimal initial emissions are less than half of BAU emissions.*

Proof. To investigate the role of decreasing carbon intensity $\dot{\sigma}$ on the emission path, we need to find an expression for the change in emissions, because abatement depends on σ. Taking the time derivative of abatement $a = \sigma c - P$ yields

$$\frac{\dot{a}}{a} = -\frac{1-\mu}{\mu}\frac{\dot{P}}{P} + \frac{1}{\mu}\underbrace{\left(\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} + \frac{\dot{c}}{c}\right)}_{\frac{\dot{\overline{P}}}{\overline{P}}}. \tag{81}$$

Combining this result with (76) and acknowledging that the damage term is zero for cost-effectiveness analysis (replaced by a constraint on temperature), gives

$$\frac{\dot{P}}{P} = g + \left(2 - \frac{\overline{P}}{P}\right)\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} + \left(\frac{\overline{P}}{P} - 1\right)\left(\frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} - \frac{\chi a}{2\tilde{H}} - r\right), \tag{82}$$

where $\overline{P} = \sigma c$.[32]

The factor $2 - \frac{\overline{P}}{P}$ is positive whenever emissions are less than half of BAU emissions ($P < \frac{1}{2}\overline{P}$). So if initial emissions are less than half of BAU emissions, the entire emissions path will be flatter. Since the exogenous temperature constraint sets cumulative emissions, the flatter emissions path will lead to lower initial emissions and later peak warming. ∎

By contrast, for lenient, unambitious climate scenarios, AEEI will initially steepen the emissions path (when $P_t > \frac{1}{2}\overline{P}_t$) and later on flatten the emissions path (when $P_t < \frac{1}{2}\overline{P}_t$). The effect of AEEI on initial emissions and the time of peak warming is therefore ambiguous.

The case of cost-benefit analysis is more complicated because AEEI increases peak warming. Consider again the case where $P_0 = \frac{1}{2}\overline{P}_0$. The growth rate of emissions at time zero is

$$\frac{\dot{P}}{P} = g + \frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} - r + \overbrace{c\gamma\zeta^2 S_0 \frac{\sigma}{\varphi\mu}}^{c_S/c_E}.$$

This is unaffected by AEEI because marginal damages are set by initial cumulative emissions and the MAC is set by our hypothesis that $\mu = 1/2$. In subsequent periods, AEEI will again flatten the emissions path. This flattening will be reinforced by an increasing MAC in later periods (effect of σ in the last term). However, combined with larger cumulative emissions, initial emissions are ambiguous. Nevertheless, in the limit case where initial emissions are extremely low (approaching zero), AEEI will flatten the emissions path and therefore (slightly) decrease initial emissions.[33] By contrast, in the limit case where initial emissions approach BAU emissions, AEEI reduces the emission speed $\lim_{P->\overline{P}}\dot{P} = g + \frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma}$.

These results are summarised in Result 2 in the main text.

Heterogeneous learning rates

A more detailed model may have several groups of abatement technologies, each with a MAC function $c_{i,t}\frac{\varphi_{i,t}}{\overline{P}_t^2}a_i\left(\frac{\tilde{H}_i}{\tilde{H}_{0i}}\right)^{\chi_i}$. Cumulative emissions are now $S_t = S_0 + \overline{P}t - \sum \tilde{H}_i$. For N groups of technologies, the model now has N decision variables and N stock variables (cumulative abatement for each group of technologies). Assuming a constant discount rate, the integral form of the Euler equations for each technology is

$$\underbrace{\frac{\varphi_{i,t}}{P_{BAU_{i,t}}^2}a_{i,t}\left(\tilde{H}_{i,t}/\tilde{H}_{0,i}\right)^{-\chi_i}}_{MAC_i^\%} = \int_t^\infty \underbrace{e^{-(r-g)(u-t)}}_{\text{Discount factor}}\left(\underbrace{\gamma\zeta^2 S_u}_{\text{Marg. damages}^\%} + \underbrace{\frac{\chi_i\varphi_{i,u}}{2\tilde{H}_{i,0}}\mu_{i,u}^2\left(\tilde{H}_{i,u}/\tilde{H}_{i,0}\right)^{-\chi_i-1}}_{\text{Endogenous future gains}_i^\%}\right)du. \tag{84}$$

Appendix C. The specialised model with inertia

This model builds on the specialised model described in Appendix B. It is the model that we will use for quantitative analysis. To fit the model to the observation that BAU emissions $\bar{P}$ in the IPCC-NGFS database are constant (or at least not increasing), we set AEEI equal to GDP growth. This also simplifies notation as the change of abatement and relative abatement are proportional $\dot{a} = \dot{\mu}\bar{P}$.

---

[32] When we assume constant exogenous TC ($\frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} = g_\varphi$.) and decreasing carbon intensity at a constant rate ($\frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} = g_\sigma$), we can integrate $\dot{P}$ using boundary conditions $\int_0^T P_t dt = \bar{S}$ and $P_T = 0$. This gives

$$P_t = \overline{P}_0 e^{(g+g_\sigma)t} - a_0 e^{(g+2g_\sigma-g_\varphi+r)t}. \tag{83}$$

The first term describes BAU emissions over time and the second term describes abatement over time. AEEI has a double effect: it reduces BAU emissions (steepening the emissions path) and it slows down abatement (flattening the emissions path).

[33] At low emissions, the equation of motion for emissions converges to $\lim_{E->0}\dot{E} = c_0\sigma_0\left(\frac{\dot{\varphi}}{\varphi} - \frac{\dot{\sigma}}{\sigma} - r + \frac{\sigma_0}{\varphi_0}\gamma\zeta^2 S_0\right)$ showing that fast AEEI leads to a flatter emissions path.

Call $v = \dot{a}$ the abatement speed. Assume a quadratic penalty on abatement speed (as a proportion of GDP) of $\frac{\theta}{2}v^2$. Consumption per capita now becomes

$$c = c_0 e^{\left(gt - \frac{\varphi_t}{2} a^2 (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi} - \frac{\theta}{2}v^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2}\zeta^2 S^2 \right)}. \tag{85}$$

The present value Hamiltonian is

$$H^{PV} = e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u(c) - \lambda^S (E_{BAU} - a) + \lambda^a v, \tag{86}$$

with FOCs

$$\lambda^a = e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c\theta v, \tag{87}$$

$$\dot{\lambda}^a = e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c\varphi_t a (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi} - \lambda^S, \tag{88}$$

$$\dot{\lambda}^S = e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c_S. \tag{89}$$

Differentiate the FOC of the maximisation:

$$\dot{\lambda}^a = e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c\theta v \left[-\delta + n_t + \dot{n}_t t - \eta \frac{\dot{c}}{c} + \frac{\dot{c}}{c} + \frac{\dot{v}}{v} \right], \tag{90}$$

substitute this result in Eq. (88) and divide by $e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c\theta$:

$$v \left[-\delta + n_t + \dot{n}_t t - (\eta - 1)\frac{\dot{c}}{c} \right] + \dot{v} = \frac{\varphi_t a (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}}{\theta} - \frac{\lambda^S}{e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c\theta}, \tag{91}$$

with

$$n_t + \dot{n}t = n_0 e^{-g_n t} \left(1 - g_n t \right), \tag{92}$$

and

$$\frac{\dot{c}}{c} = g + \frac{(\varphi_0 - \varphi_\infty) g_\varphi}{2} a^2 (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi} - \varphi_t a v (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi} + \frac{\varphi_t}{2} a^2 \chi (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi} \frac{a}{\tilde{H}} - \theta v \dot{v} - \gamma \zeta^2 S \left(E_{BAU} - a \right). \tag{93}$$

The growth rate of consumption is very close to g, but the component $-\theta v \dot{v}$ cannot be neglected. Reorganise to obtain a differential equation in $\dot{v}$,

$$\dot{v} = \frac{1}{1 + (\eta - 1)\theta v^2} \left[\left(\left(\delta - n_0 e^{-g_n t} \left(1 - g_n t \right) + (\eta - 1) \overbrace{\left(\frac{\dot{c}}{c} \right)}^{\text{Net of } \theta v \dot{v}} \right) v + \frac{\varphi_t a (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}}{\theta} - \frac{\lambda^S}{e^{(-\delta + n_t)t} u_c c\theta} \right]. \tag{94}$$

We now have a system of four differential equations in four variables S, a, v, λ^S (Eqs. 38, 76, 94 and 89). The boundary conditions are

$$\begin{aligned} S(0) &= S_0, \\ a(0) &= a_0 = E_{BAU} - E_0, \\ a(\infty) &= E_{BAU}, \\ v(\infty) &= 0. \end{aligned} \tag{95}$$

The MAC is the current value shadow price of carbon, expressed in consumption units, i.e.,

$$\text{MAC} = \frac{\lambda^S e^{\delta t}}{u_c}. \tag{96}$$

From Eq. (91) we can rewrite this as [34]

$$\text{MAC} = e^{n_t t} \left\{ \underbrace{c\varphi_t a (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi}}_{\partial c/\partial a \text{ standard MAC}} + \underbrace{c\theta v \left[\delta - n_t - \dot{n}_t t + (\eta - 1)\frac{\dot{c}}{c} \right] - c\theta \dot{v}}_{\text{Abatement speed costs (pos.)}} \right\}. \tag{97}$$

Alternatively, the integration of Eq. (89) gives the MAC as the sum of both the SCC and the endogenous future gains:

$$\text{MAC} = \frac{\lambda^S e^{\delta t}}{u_c} = \int_t^\infty e^{n_u u} \underbrace{e^{-\delta(u-t) - \eta \int_t^u \frac{\dot{c}}{c} ds}}_{\text{Discount factor}} c_u \left(\gamma \zeta^2 S + \frac{\chi \varphi_u}{2\tilde{H}} a^2 (\tilde{H}/\tilde{H}_0)^{-\chi} \right) du. \tag{98}$$

---

[34] For analytical simplicity, we usually focus on the marginal effect of abatement on consumption per capita, i.e. c_a. However, since a is expressed as worldwide abatement, the marginal effect of abatement on total consumption is more relevant, because it responds to costs in production. So we report the latter and we multiply costs by population size $e^{n_t t}$.

The discount factor is the standard Ramsey discount factor as can be seen from $\left(\frac{c_u}{c_t}\right)^{-\eta} = e^{-\eta \int_t^u \frac{\dot{c}}{c} ds}$.

Appendix D. Model with energy inputs and knowledge spillovers from private to aggregate

In this Appendix, we extend the simple model of Section 2 in two directions. First, we explicitly model energy inputs, giving the model two mechanisms for abatement: energy efficiency and carbon intensity of energy, which is modelled with a simple abatement variable rather than explicit clean and dirty energy. We assume that innovation affects the carbon intensity of energy and not energy efficiency. This feature creates a different role for the carbon price and the innovation subsidy: the optimal tax applies to all abatement technologies and equalises the MAC between sectors, whereas subsidies target the sectors with the largest innovation potential.

Second, we assume that when firms innovate, they obtain an individual advantage before their knowledge diffuses in the wider economy. That is, not all knowledge is shared with other producers, some knowledge is private as in Gerlagh et al. (2009); Greaker and Pade (2009). We show that the optimal R&D subsidy does not compensate for private knowledge, only for the gradual leakage from private firms to public firms.

Firm i produces with the following Cobb-Douglas production function, combining labour L, capital K and energy E (we leave out index i for now),

$$Y = (A_L L)^{1-\nu-\alpha} K^\alpha E^\nu \Gamma \Lambda, \tag{99}$$

where Γ and Λ represent abatement costs and damages from climate change, respectively. Emissions are defined as $P = \psi(1-\mu)E$, where $\mu \in [0,1]$ is abatement effort and σ is the carbon intensity of energy inputs. Dirty inputs are expressed in tonnes of CO_2. Companies can abate $a = \mu\sigma E$, which is costly. Abatement costs are proportional to production and quadratic in abatement,

$$\Gamma = e^{-\frac{\varphi}{2}a^2 \left(\frac{H+\omega h_i}{H_0+\omega h_0}\right)^{-\chi}}, \tag{100}$$

where H is the public knowledge stock and h is the private knowledge stock. Companies make an effort z to reduce their abatement costs, building up their private knowledge stock. However, the private knowledge stock becomes public after some time. This leads to the following dynamics: $\dot{h}_i = z_i - \delta h_i$ and $\dot{H} = \sum_i^N \delta h_i$. The knowledge stock reduces abatement costs with a constant elasticity χ. Effort z costs $C(z)$.

As TC is the result of R&D which is different from abatement, the optimal policy requires two instruments, a Pigouvian carbon tax τ and a knowledge subsidy s which is proportional to z. Also, the model has two different abatement mechanisms: energy efficiency and carbon intensity of energy. TC only applies to the latter. As a result, using only a carbon tax leads to excessive energy efficiency effort and insufficient TC, whereas using only a subsidy leads to insufficient energy efficiency.

Market equilibrium

We assume the total number of companies N is large enough that companies are price takers and the market is competitive. Normalising the price of the final good to one, the profit function of the company is

$$\pi = A_L L^{1-\nu-\alpha} K^\alpha E^\nu \Gamma \Lambda - wL - rK - p_E E - C(z) - \tau\sigma(1-\mu)E + sz. \tag{101}$$

s.t. $\dot{H} = \sum_i^N \delta h_i$; $\dot{h}_i = z_i - \delta h_i$. To maximise profits intertemporally, the company solves the following current value Hamiltonian

$$\mathscr{H}^{CV} = \pi + \lambda^H \left(\sum_i^N \delta h_i\right) + \lambda^{h_i}\left(z_i - \delta h_i\right). \tag{102}$$

The FOCs include

$$\frac{\partial\mathscr{H}}{\partial\mu} = 0 \leftrightarrow Y\varphi a\left(\frac{H+\omega h_i}{H_0+\omega h_0}\right)^{-\chi} = \tau, \tag{103}$$

$$\frac{\partial\mathscr{H}}{\partial E} = 0 \leftrightarrow \nu Y/E = \sigma(1-\mu)\tau, \tag{104}$$

$$\frac{\partial\mathscr{H}}{\partial z} = 0 \leftrightarrow \frac{dC}{dz} - s = \lambda^h, \tag{105}$$

$$\dot{\lambda^H} = r\lambda^H - Y\frac{\varphi}{2}a^2\chi\left(\frac{H+\omega h_i}{H_0+\omega h_0}\right)^{-\chi-1}\frac{1}{H_0+\omega h_0}, \tag{106}$$

$$\dot{\lambda^h} = (r+\delta)\lambda^h - Y\frac{\varphi}{2}a^2\chi\left(\frac{H+\omega h_i}{H_0+\omega h_0}\right)^{-\chi-1}\frac{\omega}{H_0+\omega h_0} - \delta\lambda^H. \tag{107}$$

The integral form of (106) and (107) gives

$$\lambda_t^H = \int_t^\infty e^{-r(u-t)}\left[Y_i\frac{\varphi}{2}a^2\chi\left(\frac{H+\omega h_i}{H_0+\omega h_0}\right)^{-\chi-1}\frac{\omega}{H_0+\omega h_0}\right]du, \tag{108}$$

$$\lambda_t^h = \int_t^\infty e^{-(r+\delta)(u-t)} \left[Y_i \frac{\varphi}{2} a^2 \chi \left(\frac{H + \omega h_i}{H_0 + \omega h_0} \right)^{-\chi-1} \frac{\omega}{H_0 + \omega h_0} + \delta \lambda^H \right] du. \tag{109}$$

The company sets the subsidy net of R&D costs equal to λ^h, which is the value of knowledge. This value of knowledge is composed of all future direct effects on its abatement efforts (the first term in the integral) plus the fact that the firm contributes to aggregate knowledge, which will also make abatement cheaper for the individual firm. Yet, the shadow price of this aggregate knowledge λ_t^H corresponds to the aggregate productivity gains for firm i only, which is N times lower than the gain from a social point of view. To make that point more formally, we now derive the social optimum.

Social optimum

We assume taxes and subsidies are collected lump sum, without a cost of public funds. All variables are now aggregate quantities, unless indexed by i. The social planner maximises the present value of production

$$Y = \sum_i^N Y_i = \sum_i^N A_L L_i^{1-v-\alpha} K_i^\alpha E_i^v e^{-\frac{\varphi}{2} a_i^2 \left(\frac{H+\omega h_i}{H_0+\omega h_0} \right)^{-\chi} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \zeta^2 S^2} - \sum_i^N C(z_i), \tag{110}$$

s.t. $\dot{H} = \sum_i^N \delta h_i; \dot{h}_i = z_i - \delta h_i; \dot{S} = \sigma(1-\mu)E$. The current value Hamiltonian is

$$\mathcal{H}^{CV} = Y + \lambda^H \left(\sum_i^N \delta h_i \right) + \sum_i^N \lambda_i^h \left(z_i - \delta h_i \right) - \lambda^S \sigma(1-\mu)E. \tag{111}$$

The FOCs include

$$Y \varphi a \left(\frac{H + \omega h_i}{H_0 + \omega h_{i_0}} \right)^{-\chi} = \lambda^S, \tag{112}$$

$$vY/E = \sigma(1-\mu)\lambda^S \tag{113}$$

$$\frac{dC}{dz_i} = \lambda_i^h, \tag{114}$$

$$\dot{\lambda^H} = r\lambda^H - \sum_i^N Y_i \frac{\varphi}{2} a^2 \chi \left(\frac{H + \omega h_i}{H_0 + \omega h_{i_0}} \right)^{-\chi-1} \frac{1}{H_0 + \omega h_{i_0}}, \tag{115}$$

$$\dot{\lambda_i^h} = (r+\delta)\lambda_i^h - Y_i \frac{\varphi}{2} a^2 \chi \left(\frac{H + \omega h_i}{H_0 + h_{i_0}} \right)^{-\chi-1} \frac{\omega}{H_0 + \omega h_{i_0}} - \delta \lambda^H. \tag{116}$$

The integral form of (115) and (116) gives

$$\lambda_t^H = \int_t^\infty e^{-r(u-t)} \left[\sum_i^N Y_i \frac{\varphi}{2} a^2 \chi \left(\frac{H + \omega h_i}{H_0 + \omega h_{i_0}} \right)^{-\chi-1} \frac{\omega}{H_0 + h_{i_0}} \right] du, \tag{117}$$

$$\lambda_t^h = \int_t^\infty e^{-(r+\delta)(u-t)} \left[Y_i \frac{\varphi}{2} a^2 \chi \left(\frac{H + \omega h_i}{H_0 + \omega h_{i_0}} \right)^{-\chi-1} \frac{\omega}{H_0 + h_{i_0}} + \delta \lambda^H \right] du. \tag{118}$$

Eq. (115) shows that the shadow price of aggregate knowledge is now N times larger. Therefore, the term $\delta \lambda^H$ inside the integral of (118) of the company specific shadow price is N times larger. Indeed, the individual company may take into account that spillovers to the aggregate knowledge stock will be beneficial for itself too, but this advantage is N times larger from a social perspective. Comparing both solutions indicates that the subsidy should be

$$s = (1 - 1/N) \int_t^\infty e^{-(r+\delta)(u-t)} \left[\delta \lambda^H \right] d\tau. \tag{119}$$

Note that when spillovers are negligible the subsidy converges to zero, $\lim_{\delta \to 0} s = 0$, whereas when spillovers are extremely large, the subsidy converges to the shadow price of the aggregate knowledge stock $\lim_{\delta \to \infty} s = (1 - 1/N)\lambda^H$.

The first FOCs (112) and (113) indicate that both the MAC via decarbonisation of energy and the MAC via energy efficiency gains equal the SCC. Comparing this with the FOCs of the market equilibrium indicates that the optimal tax should be set at the SCC, $\tau = \lambda^S$.

Appendix E. Correspondence between exogenous and endogenous TC

E.1. Method of isolating endogenous future gain effect

Our method of isolating the endogenous future gain effect proceeds in two steps. The first step is to estimate a time-dependent MAC function (i.e., exogenous TC), with a MAC that is identical to the endogenous TC model at each point in time. This can be achieved using a sufficiently high-order polynomial. The second step is to take the exogenous TC MAC curve and use it to recalculate optimal model trajectories. Any difference between the optimal paths of the endogenous TC model and its exogenous replica must then be due to the endogenous future gain effect.

We can show this in theory. Call a^* the optimal abatement path of the model with endogenous TC. Conjecture that this is also the optimal path of the model with exogenous TC. By the assumption of identical MACs, the abatement path a^* will result in the same SCC in Eq. (12) at each point in time. Given that we use the same climate model (Eq. 38), both models result in the same temperature path. Fig. A1 shows that since MACs are identical, total abatement costs are also identical. Hence, consumption and the discount rate are the same. However, in the exogenous TC model, the absence of the endogenous future gain effect increases the left-hand side of Eq. (12). Hence, our conjectured abatement path a^* does not solve Eq. (12), and the initial MAC and abatement are lower in the model with exogenous TC. Lower abatement results in higher temperatures, higher marginal damages, and a higher SCC in Eq. (12). Therefore, both models converge in the long run. If TC is zero after peak warming ($\forall t > t^{peak} : \dot{H} = 0$), Eq. (12) shows that the optimal abatement path of the endogenous TC model also solves the exogenous TC model, i.e., peak warming and long-run temperatures are identical (although peak warming occurs earlier in the endogenous TC model).

E.2. Static approximation of MAC function under exogenous TC

We can also test the ability of a suitably calibrated static model to approximate the optimal solution of a model of exogenous TC. Fig. A2 shows our approach visually. Exogenous TC results in an optimal pair $\{MAC^{\%*}, a^*\}$ at each moment in time, where again $MAC^\% = \varphi_t a$, i.e., the MAC as a proportion of consumption. Next, we construct a static MAC function that is fitted to be identical at each point in time (i.e., at each level of abatement on the optimal path of the exogenous TC model). This static MAC function will be concave, since TC makes the MAC function, which is assumed to be linear, decrease over time. We fit based on a polynomial such that

$$MAC^{\%*} = \left(\sum_{n=0}^{N} \varphi_n^{nolearn} a_n^* \right), \tag{120}$$

where the coefficients $\varphi_n^{nolearn}$ are independent of time, unlike in the model with exogenous TC.

We optimise the model with the static MAC function and check that the solution is close to the optimum of the model with exogenous TC. Fig. A3 shows that the correspondence is almost exact (less than 0.1 % difference in emissions or MACs).

In fact, under certain specific functional forms the correspondence is exact in theory. In particular, if marginal abatement costs and marginal damages are proportional to consumption to the power ν and marginal utility is CES, the static MAC function is a *perfect* substitute for exogenous TC. The assumption of constant elasticities implies that we can factorise the marginal cost functions into a factor that does not depend on consumption and a power function of consumption, respectively: $c_a = -MAC^\%(a,t)c^\nu$;


Fig. A1. Graphical representation of the comparison between endogenous TC and exogenous TC with identical MAC function. The endogenous TC model has a linear marginal abatement cost function $MAC^\% = \varphi A^{-\chi} a$. The optimal path (which depends on cumulative abatement) results in optimal slopes at each point in time. Next, a 25th-degree polynomial in time is fitted to obtain the same MAC but without the dependence on cumulative abatement. $MAC = (\varphi_1 + \varphi_2 t + \varphi_3 t^2 + \varphi_4 t^3 \ldots) a$.

Fig. A2. Graphical representation of the comparison between TC and no TC with identical but static MAC. The model with TC has a linear abatement cost function but with a time-dependent slope $\varphi_t a = (\varphi_\infty + (\varphi_0 - \varphi_\infty)e^{-g\varphi t}) a$ in the case of exogenous TC. This model results in an optimal set of $\{MAC^{\%*}, a^*\}$ depicted by the blue squares. Next, a polynomial in a (of order 15) is fitted to obtain a time-independent MAC that is identical on the optimal path. The polynomial also goes through the origin, in order to ensure similar total abatement costs, represented by the area under the curve. The dotted area is the difference between the total abatement costs of both models in 2100. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

$c_T = -MD^{\%}(T)c^\nu$. Integrating Eq. (43) yields

$$\lambda_t^S = \int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta-n)(u-t)} u_{c_u} \zeta c_u^\nu MD^{\%}(T) du. \tag{121}$$

Substituting Eq. (42) gives

$$u_{c_t} c_t^\nu MAC^{\%}(a,t) = \int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta-n)(u-t)} u_{c_u} \zeta c_u^\nu MD^{\%}(T) du. \tag{122}$$

$u_{c_t} c_t^\nu$ is a constant (independent of time u) and can therefore be included in the integral,

$$MAC^{\%}(a,t) = \int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta-n)(u-t)} \left(\frac{c_u}{c_t}\right)^{\nu-\eta} \zeta MD^{\%}(T) du. \tag{123}$$

Call a^* the optimal abatement path of the model with exogenous TC. We try this path as a candidate solution to the model without TC. By assumption of identical MACs, the abatement path a^* will result in the same left-hand side of Eq. (123) at each point in time. Given that we use the same climate model (Eq. 38), the model without TC will result in the same temperature path. Fig. A2 shows that although MACs are identical, total abatement costs will be higher in the model without TC (dotted area). Hence, consumption will be slightly lower in the model without TC. But since we assume $\nu = \eta$, the right-hand side of Eq. (123) will also be identical at each point in time. Hence our candidate solution solves the Euler equation and is the optimal solution of the model without TC.

What if $\eta > \nu$? Fig. A2 shows that although MACs are identical, total abatement costs will be lower in the model with TC (dotted area). Hence, consumption will be slightly higher in the model with TC. As a result, the discount factor $\left(\frac{c_u}{c_t}\right)^{\zeta-\eta}$ will be slightly lower, and MACs and abatement will be lower too. The effect is too small to be visible on a graph though.

E.3. Approximation of R&D-based TC by exogenous TC

In this subsection we compare a model with exogenous TC to a model with endogenous R&D which is unaffected by deployment.

Consider the general model of Appendix A, where the knowledge stock is independent of abatement, but responds to investment I in early-stage R&D, that is, $\dot{H} = \psi(t, H, I)$. Assume that this endogenous R&D is replaced by an exogenously decreasing MAC function, such that on the optimised path, the MAC function is identical at each point in time. Then, the optimal emission and MAC paths are quasi-identical, they differ only to the extent that R&D investment costs reduce consumption.

To show this, ignore investment costs c_I for a moment. Call $H^*(t)$ and $I^*(t)$ the optimal knowledge stock and investment respectively of the model with early-stage R&D. Compare this to a model with exogenous TC, where the paths of the knowledge stock and investment respectively are replaced by an exogenous function of time $f(t)$, such that $\forall t : c(a, H^*(t), I^*(t), T, t) = c(a, f(t), T, t)$. The production function (which equals consumption in this setup) will be identical over the path, resulting in the same MAC and marginal damage functions. Since $\psi_a = 0$ in both cases, the optimal abatement path a^* of both models satisfies Eq. (47) for cost-benefit analysis and Eq. (55) for cost-effectiveness analysis. Hence the exogenous TC model and the early-stage R&D model have the same optimal abatement path.

Now bring back the R&D investment costs – these reduce consumption and therefore alter marginal damages and the discount rate. The critical observation is that this effect on consumption growth will generally be negligible, given the small size of the investment costs when converted into a growth impact (IPCC, 2022). This is basis of Result 4 in the main text.

Fig. A3. Exogenous TC versus no TC: fitting a polynomial in abatement to the MAC of the exogenous TC curve. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC on the bottom.

Two caveats are in place though. First, note that although the technology function ψ is independent of abatement, the dependence on investment makes TC endogenous, that is, investment in green technology becomes more attractive in a lower emissions scenario. This is also why solving the model for the optimal R&D investment rule is not straightforward, as investment depends on the abatement and *vice versa*.

Second, whenever policy is not optimal, or whenever beliefs about future costs and damages are updated, the two models will no longer behave in the same way, because exogenous TC is independent of policy whereas investment in R&D depends on forward-looking policy.

Appendix F. GMM results by model

Table A1

Parameter estimates for fitting both total and marginal abatement costs to the IPCC and NGFS databases of IAM results, including model-specific estimates. Models are grouped as follows: (1) AIM, (2) C3AIM, MERGE or C_ROADS, (3) GCAM, (4) GEM, (5) MESSAGE, (6) REMIND, (7) WITCH, (8) POLES, (9) IMAGE, (10) COFFEE, (11) DNE. Idem indicates that the value of the preceding (left) model is imposed. *** indicates significance at the 1 % level.

	No TC	Exogenous TC					Endogenous TC				
	All models	All models	Exog models	FE: initial MAC	FE: initial MAC & quadr	FE: initial MAC & TC	All models	Endog models	FE: initial MAC	FE: initial MAC & quadr	FE: initial MAC & TC
θ	1.5e-03***	−1.7e-05	−2.9e-05	7.7e-04***	idem	4.7e-04***	5.1e-05	9.2e-05	6.6e-04***	idem	4.5e-04***
φ	2.7e-05***	1.2e-04***	1.2e-04***				1.4e-04***	1.3e-04***			
g_φ		.048***	.049***	.013***	.011***						
φ_∞		1.9e-05***	1.5e-05***	2.2e-07	idem	1.7e-05***					
φ_1				6.9e-05***	6.8e-05***	1.3e-04***			8.2e-05***	7.1e-05***	2.2e-04***
φ_2				1.3e-04***	1.2e-04***	9.7e-05***			1.5e-04***	1.2e-04***	8.0e-05**
φ_3				1.1e-04***	1.0e-04***	7.7e-05***			1.3e-04***	1.1e-04***	9.9e-05***
φ_4				4.3e-05***	4.6e-05***	8.7e-05***			5.1e-05***	5.0e-05***	8.7e-05***
φ_5				4.5e-05***	4.6e-05***	1.4e-04***			5.1e-05***	4.9e-05***	9.1e-05***
φ_6				5.3e-05***	5.6e-05***	8.6e-05***			6.4e-05***	6.1e-05***	9.1e-05***
φ_7				7.2e-05***	7.2e-05***	8.0e-05***			8.8e-05***	7.8e-05***	1.0e-04***
φ_8				1.8e-04***	1.5e-04***	1.7e-04***			2.1e-04***	1.5e-04***	2.0e-04***
φ_9				9.3e-05***	6.6e-05***	1.3e-04***			1.1e-04***	6.9e-05***	1.2e-04***

Table A1 (*continued*)

	No TC	Exogenous TC					Endogenous TC				
	All models	All models	Exog models	FE: initial MAC	FE: initial MAC & quadr	FE: initial MAC & TC	All models	Endog models	FE: initial MAC	FE: initial MAC & quadr	FE: initial MAC & TC
φ_{10}				2.0e-05***	2.6e-05***	8.3e-06***			2.3e-05***	3.1e-05***	3.9e-06***
φ_{11}				1.9e-04***	1.7e-04***	1.8e-04***			2.3e-04***	1.9e-04***	1.3e-04***
φ_{sq}					−4.0e-07***					−2.8e-07***	
$g_{\varphi 1}$						.038***					
$g_{\varphi 2}$						8.8e-03					
$g_{\varphi 3}$						9.5e-03***					
$g_{\varphi 4}$						.056***					
$g_{\varphi 5}$						.068***					
$g_{\varphi 6}$						.041***					
$g_{\varphi 7}$						.023***					
$g_{\varphi 8}$						.013***					
$g_{\varphi 9}$						.026***					
$g_{\varphi 10}$						3.0e-03**					
$g_{\varphi 11}$						.011***					
χ							.361***	.302***	.315***	.216***	
$\tilde{H}(0)$							16.3***	12.7***	92.5***	idem	36.6***
χ_1											.515***
χ_2											.058
χ_3											.164***
χ_4											.387***
χ_5											.402***
χ_6											.336***
χ_7											.274***
χ_8											.213***
χ_9											.267***
χ_{10}											−.236***
χ_{11}											−.064
N	12393	12393	6545	12393	12393	12393	12393	5848	12393	12393	12393
ll	4.9e+04	5.0e+04	2.7e+04	5.2e+04	5.3e+04	5.2e+04	5.0e+04	2.3e+04	5.2e+04	5.2e+04	5.2e+04

Appendix G. Additional quantitative results

Fig. A4 presents optimal, cost-benefit climate policies in the absence of abatement inertia (i.e., no abatement speed penalty). Without inertia, the social planner is free to choose large variations in initial emissions. Accordingly, initial emissions are much lower than in the presence of capital inertia, regardless of the existence and type of TC. This results in more slowly increasing temperatures, but since capital inertia is relevant in the short to medium run but less so in the long run, temperatures in 2100 are similar.

Consistent with the theoretical results in Appendix B, emissions under exogenous TC are initially higher (abatement is lower) than without TC, with a lower MAC/carbon price. Conversely, under endogenous, learning-based TC emissions are initially lower than without TC, with a higher MAC. The abatement path is steeper under both forms of TC, which is also consistent with the theory.

Figs. A5–A8 present optimal, cost-benefit climate policies with low/high discount rates and slow/fast TC. These plots provide further details on the results summarised in Table 4.

Fig. A4. Optimal, cost-benefit climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC, for the case of **no capital inertia**. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.


Fig. A5. Optimal, cost-benefit climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC, under **low discount rates** ($\delta = 0$ or $\eta = 1$). Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.

Fig. A6. Optimal, cost-benefit climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC, under **high discount rates** ($\delta = 0.02$ or $\eta = 2$). Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.


Fig. A7. Optimal, cost-benefit climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC, under **slow TC**. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.

Fig. A8. Optimal, cost-benefit climate policies without TC, with exogenous TC and with endogenous TC, under **fast TC**. Emissions in the top-left panel, temperature above pre-industrial in the top right, and the MAC/carbon price on the bottom.

Data availability

The code and data used to fit the parameters reported in Table 2 are available at https://github.com/FVenmans/TechnicalChange. MATLAB code is available upon request.

References

Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L., Hemous, D., 2012. The environment and directed technical change. The Am. Econ. Rev. 102, 131–166.

Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Hanley, D., Kerr, W., 2016. Transition to clean technology. J. Polit. Econ. 124, 52–104.

Bibas, R., Cassen, C., Crassous, R., Guivarch, C., Hamdi-Cherif, M., Hourcade, J.C., Leblanc, F., Méjean, A., Broin, E.Ó., Rozenberg, J., et al, 2022. Impact assessment of CLIMate policies with IMACLIM-R 1.1. Model documentation version 1.1.

Böhringer, C., Löschel, A., Moslener, U., Rutherford, T.F., 2009a. EU climate policy up to 2020: an economic impact assessment. Energy Econ. 31, S295–S305.

Böhringer, C., Löschel, A., Rutherford, T.F., 2009b. Policy analysis based on computable equilibrium (PACE). In: Bosetti, V., Gerlagh, R., Schleicher, S.P. (Eds.), Modelling Sustainable Development. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Böhringer, C., Peterson, S., Rutherford, T.F., Schneider, J., Winkler, M., 2021. Climate policies after Paris: pledge, trade and recycle: insights from the 36th energy modeling forum study (EMF36). Energy Econ. 103, 105471.

Bond-Lamberty, B., Patel, P., Lurz, J., Kyle, P., Calvin, K.V., Smith, S., Snyder, A., Dorheim, K.R., Russell, H.Z., Bins, M., Link, R., Kim301, S., Narayan, K., Turner, S.W.D., Feng, L., Lynch, C., Khan, Z., Ou, Y., Iyer, G., 2022. JGCRI/gcam-core: GCAM 6.0. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6619287

Bramoullé, Y., Olson, L.J., 2005. Allocation of pollution abatement under learning by doing. J. Public Econ. 89, 1935–1960.

Bretschger, L., Lechthaler, F., Rausch, S., Zhang, L., 2017. Knowledge diffusion, endogenous growth, and the costs of global climate policy. Eur. Econ. Rev. 93, 47–72.

Bretschger, L., Ramer, R., Schwark, F., 2011. Growth effects of carbon policies: applying a fully dynamic CGE model with heterogeneous capital. Resour. Energy. Econ. 33, 963–980.

Buonanno, P., Carraro, C., Galeotti, M., 2003. Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto. Resour. Energy. Econ. 25, 11–34.

Burniaux, J.M., Truong, T.P., 2002. GTAP-E: an energy-environmental version of the GTAP model (Technical Report). GTAP Technical Papers.

Calvin, K., Bond-Lamberty, B., Clarke, L., Edmonds, J., Eom, J., Hartin, C., Kim, S., Kyle, P., Link, R., Moss, R., McJeon, H., Patel, P., Smith, S., Waldhoff, S., Wise, M., 2017. The SSP4: a world of deepening inequality. Glob. Environ. Change 42, 284–296.

Cambridge Econometrics, 2019. E3ME technical manual v6.1.

Capros, P., Van Regemorter, D., Paroussos, L., Karkatsoulis, P., Fragkiadakis, C., Tsani, S., Charalampidis, I., Revesz, T., Perry, M., Abrell, J., 2013. GEM-E3 model documentation (JRC Scientific and Policy Reports 26034). Publications Office of the European Union.

Casey, G., 2024. Energy efficiency and directed technical change: implications for climate change mitigation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 91, 192–228.

Cervantes, M., Criscuolo, C., Dechezlepretre, A., Pilat, D., 2023. Driving low-carbon innovations for climate neutrality (OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers). OECD Publishing, http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions

Château, J., Dellink, R., Lanzi, E., 2014. An overview of the OECD ENV-linkages model (Technical Report). OECD.

Chen, Y.H., Paltsev, S., Reilly, J.M., Morris, J.F., Babiker, M.H., 2015. The MIT EPPA6 model: economic growth, energy use, and food consumption (Technical Report). MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change.

Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K., et al, 2014. Assessing transformation pathways. In: Edenhofer, O., Pichs-Madruga, R., Sokona, Y., et al. (Eds.), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.

Collins, M., Knutti, R., Arblaster, J., Dufresne, J.L., Fichefet, T., Friedlingstein, P., Gao, X., Gutowski, W., Johns, T., Krinner, G., Shongwe, M., Tebaldi, C., A.J., W., Wehner, M., 2013. Long-term climate change: projections, commitments and irreversibility. In: Stocker, T., Qin, C., Plattner, G.K., Tignor, M., Allen, S., Boschung, J., Nauels, A., Xia, Y., Bex, V., Midgeley, P. (Eds.), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.

Corong, E.L., Hertel, T.W., McDougall, R., Tsigas, M.E., Van Der Mensbrugghe, D., 2017. The standard GTAP model, version 7. J. Glob. Econ. Anal. 2, 1–119.

Di Maria, C., Smulders, S., 2017. A paler shade of green: environmental policy under induced technical change. Eur. Econ. Rev. 99, 151–169.

Dietz, S., 2024. Chapter 1 - introduction to integrated assessment modeling of climate change. In: Handbook of the Economics of Climate Change, vol. 1. North-Holland, pp. 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesecc.2024.10.002. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S3050729424000023

Dietz, S., van der Ploeg, F., Rezai, A., Venmans, F., 2021. Are economists getting climate dynamics right and does it matter? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 8, 895–921.

Dietz, S., Venmans, F., 2019. Cumulative carbon emissions and economic policy: in search of general principles. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 96, 108–129.

Drupp, M.A., Freeman, M.C., Groom, B., Nesje, F., 2018. Discounting disentangled. Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Policy 10, 109–134.

Eboli, F., Parrado, R., Roson, R., 2010. Climate-change feedback on economic growth: explorations with a dynamic general equilibrium model. Environ. Dev. Econ. 15, 515–533.

Emmerling, J., Drouet, L., Reis, L.A., Bevione, M., Berger, L., Bosetti, V., Carrara, S., De Cian, E., D'Aertrycke, G.D.M., Longden, T., et al, 2016. The WITCH 2016 model-documentation and implementation of the shared socioeconomic pathways (Technical Report).

Fricko, O., Havlik, P., Rogelj, J., Klimont, Z., Gusti, M., Johnson, N., Kolp, P., Strubegger, M., Valin, H., Amann, M., Ermolieva, T., Forsell, N., Herrero, M., Heyes, C., Kindermann, G., Krey, V., McCollum, D.L., Obersteiner, M., Pachauri, S., Rao, S., Schmid, E., Schoepp, W., Riahi, K., 2017. The marker quantification of the shared socioeconomic pathway 2: a middle-of-the-road scenario for the 21st century. Glob. Environ. Change 42, 251–267.

Fried, S., 2018. Climate policy and innovation: a quantitative macroeconomic analysis. Am. Econ. J.: Macroecon. 10, 90–118.

Fujimori, S., Hasegawa, T., Masui, T., 2017a. AIM/CGE v2.0: basic feature of the model. In: Fujimori, S., Kainuma, M., Masui, T. (Eds.), Post-2020 Climate Action: Global and Asian Perspectives. Springer Singapore, Singapore, pp. 305–328.

Fujimori, S., Hasegawa, T., Masui, T., Takahashi, K., Herran, D.S., Dai, H., Hijioka, Y., Kainuma, M., 2017b. SSP3: AIM implementation of shared socioeconomic pathways. Glob. Environ. Change 42, 268–283.

Gavard, C., Voigt, S., Genty, A., 2022. Using emissions trading schemes to reduce heterogeneous distortionary taxes: the case of recycling carbon auction revenues to support renewable energy. Energy Policy 168, 113–133.

Gerlagh, R., Kverndokk, S., Rosendahl, K.E., 2009. Optimal timing of climate change policy: interaction between carbon taxes and innovation externalities. Environ. Resour. Econ. 43, 369–390.

Gillingham, K., Newell, R.G., Pizer, W.A., 2008. Modeling endogenous technological change for climate policy analysis. Energy Econ. 30, 2734–2753.

Gillingham, K., Nordhaus, W., Anthoff, D., Blanford, G., Bosetti, V., Christensen, P., McJeon, H., Reilly, J., 2018. Modeling uncertainty in integrated assessment of climate change: a multimodel comparison. J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 5, 791–826.

Goettle, R.J., Ho, M.S., Jorgenson, D.W., Slesnick, D.T., Wilcoxen, P.J., EP-W, E.C., 2007. IGEM, an inter-temporal general equilibrium model of the US economy with emphasis on growth, energy and the environment (Technical Report, Model documentation in support of ongoing policy analysis for the US Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Contract No. EP-W-05-035). EPA, Office of Atmospheric Programs.

Golosov, M., Hassler, J., Krusell, P., Tsyvinski, A., 2014. Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium. Econometrica 82, 41–88.

Goulder, L.H., Mathai, K., 2000. Optimal CO_2 abatement in the presence of induced technological change. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 39, 1–38.

Greaker, M., Pade, L.L., 2009. Optimal carbon dioxide abatement and technological change: should emission taxes start high in order to spur R&D? Climatic Change 96, 335–355.

Grubb, M., Köhler, J., Anderson, D., 2002. Induced technical change in energy and environmental modeling: analytic approaches and policy implications. Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 27, 271–308.

Grubb, M., Lange, R.J., Cerkez, N., Sognnaes, I., Wieners, C., Salas, P., 2024. Dynamic determinants of optimal global climate policy. Struct. Change Econ. Dyn. 71, 490–508.

Grubb, M., Wieners, C., Yang, P., 2021. Modeling myths: on DICE and dynamic realism in integrated assessment models of climate change mitigation. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev.: Clim. Change 12, e698.

Hart, R., 2019. To everything there is a season: carbon pricing, research subsidies, and the transition to fossil-free energy. J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 6, 349–389.

Hassler, J., Krusell, P., Olovsson, C., 2021. Directed technical change as a response to natural resource scarcity. J. Polit. Econ. 129, 3039–3072.

Hémous, D., Olsen, M.S., 2021. Directed technical change and environmental economics. Annu. Rev. Econ. 13, 255–286.

Howard, P.H., Sterner, T., 2017. Few and not so far between: a meta-analysis of climate damage estimates. Environ. Resour. Econ. 68, 197–225.

IEA, 2021. World energy model documentation. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-model-documentation-2021

IMF, 2021. World economic outlook database. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October

IPCC, 2018. Global Warming of 1.5C: An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5C Above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/

IPCC, 2021. Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896. https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6/wg1/IPCC_AR6_WGI_FullReport.pdf

IPCC, 2022. Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf

Jacoby, H.D., Reilly, J.M., McFarland, J.R., Paltsev, S., 2006. Technology and technical change in the MIT EPPA model. Energy Econ. 28, 610–631.

Jakeman, G., Hanslow, K., Hinchy, M., Fisher, B.S., Woffenden, K., 2004. Induced innovations and climate change policy. Energy Econ. 26, 937–960.

Jorgenson, D.W., Wilcoxen, P.J., 1993. Reducing US carbon emissions: an econometric general equilibrium assessment. Resour. Energy. Econ. 15, 7–25.

Keramidas, K., Kitous, A., Després, J., Schmitz, A., Diaz Vazquez, A., Mima, S., et al, 2017. POLES-JRC model documentation. Publ. Office Eur. Union 10, 225347.

Krey, V., Havlik, P., Kishimoto, P., Fricko, O., Zilliacus, J., Gidden, M., Strubegger, M., Kartasasmita, G., Ermolieva, T., Forsell, N., et al, 2020. MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM documentation-2020 release (Technical Report). IIASA.

Kuik, O., Brander, L., Tol, R.S., 2009. Marginal abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions: a meta-analysis. Energy Policy 37, 1395–1403.

Löschel, A., 2002. Technological change in economic models of environmental policy: a survey. Ecological Economics 43, 105–126.

Loulou, R., Goldstein, G., Kanudia, A., Lehtila, A., Remne, U., 2016. Documentation for the TIMES model-Part 1 2016 (Technical Report).

Lucena, A.F., Hejazi, M., Vasquez-Arroyo, E., Turner, S., Köberle, A.C., Daenzer, K., Rochedo, P.R., Kober, T., Cai, Y., Beach, R.H., et al, 2018. Interactions between climate change mitigation and adaptation: the case of hydropower in Brazil. Energy 164, 1161–1177.

Luderer, G., Leimbach, M., Bauer, N., Kriegler, E., Baumstark, L., Bertram, C., Giannousakis, A., Hilaire, J., Klein, D., Levesque, A., et al, 2015. Description of the REMIND model (version 1.6) (Technical Report). Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.

Manne, A., Richels, R., 2004. The impact of learning-by-doing on the timing and costs of CO_2 abatement. Energy Econ. 26, 603–619.

Mercure, J.-F., Pollitt, H., Edwards, N.R., Holden, P.B., Chewpreecha, U., Salas, P., Lam, A., Knobloch, F., Vinuales, J.E., 2018. Environmental impact assessment for climate change policy with the simulation-based integrated assessment model E3ME-FTT-GENIE. Energy Strategy Rev. 20, 195–208.

Messner, S., 1997. Endogenized technological learning in an energy systems model. J. Evol. Econ. 7, 291–313.

Nikas, A., Doukas, H., Papandreou, A., 2019. A detailed overview and consistent classification of climate-economy models. In: Doukas, H., Flamos, A., Lieu, J. (Eds.), Understanding Risks and Uncertainties in Energy and Climate Policy: Multidisciplinary Methods and Tools for a Low Carbon Society. Springer.

Nordhaus, W.D., 2017. Revisiting the social cost of carbon. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 114, 1518–1523.

Octaviano, C., Paltsev, S., Gurgel, A.C., 2016. Climate change policy in Brazil and Mexico: results from the MIT EPPA model. Energy Econ. 56, 600–614.

Olijslagers, S., van der Ploeg, R., van Wijnbergen, S., 2023. On current and future carbon prices in a risky world. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 146, 104569. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3851900

Pant, H., 2007. Global Trade and Environment Model (GTEM) (Technical Report). Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences Canberra, Australia.

Parrado, R., De Cian, E., 2014. Technology spillovers embodied in international trade: intertemporal, regional and sectoral effects in a global CGE framework. Energy Econ. 41, 76–89.

Popp, D., 2004. ENTICE: endogenous technological change in the DICE model of global warming. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 48, 742–768.

Rezai, A., Van der Ploeg, F., 2016. Intergenerational inequality aversion, growth, and the role of damages: Occam's rule for the global carbon tax. J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 3, 493–522.

Rezai, A., Van Der Ploeg, F., 2017. Second-best renewable subsidies to de-carbonize the economy: commitment and the green paradox. Environ. Resour. Econ. 66, 409–434.

Riahi, K., Schaeffer, R., Arango, J., Calvin, K., Guivarch, C., Hasegawa, T., Jiang, K., Kriegler, E., Matthews, R., Peters, G., Rao, A., Robertson, S., Sebbit, A., Steinberger, J., Tavoni, M., Van Vuuren, D., 2022. Mitigation pathways compatible with long-term goals. In: Shukla, P., Skea, J., Slade, R., Khourdajie, A.A., van Diemen, R., McCollum, D., Pathak, M., Some, S., Vyas, P., Fradera, R., Belkacemi, M., Hasija, A., Lisboa, G., Luz, S., Malley, J. (Eds.), Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. book section 3. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.005. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Chapter03.pdf

Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. J. Polit. Econ. 98, S71–S102.

Sano, F., Akimoto, K., Homma, T., Tomoda, T., 2006. Analysis of technological portfolios for CO_2 stabilizations and effects of technological changes. Energy J. 27, 141–162.

Smulders, S., De Nooij, M., 2003. The impact of energy conservation on technology and economic growth. Resour. Energy. Econ. 25, 59–79.

Stehfest, E., van Vuuren, D., Bouwman, L., Kram, T., et al, 2014. Integrated assessment of global environmental change with IMAGE 3.0: model description and policy applications (Technical Report). Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL).

Sue Wing, I., 2006. Representing induced technological change in models for climate policy analysis. Energy Econ. 28, 539–562.

Sue Wing, I., 2008. Explaining the declining energy intensity of the US economy. Resour. Energy. Econ. 30, 21–49.

Sue Wing, I., Daenzer, K., Fisher-Vanden, K., Calvin, K., 2011. Phoenix model documentation (Technical Report). Joint Global Change Research Institute, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Maryland.

Traeger, C.P., 2023. ACE – analytic climate economy. Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Policy 15, 372–406.

United Nations, 2022. World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.

van den Bijgaart, I., Gerlagh, R., Liski, M., 2016. A simple formula for the social cost of carbon. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 77, 75–94.

van Vuuren, D.P., van der Wijst, K.I., Marsman, S., van den Berg, M., Hof, A.F., Jones, C.D., 2020. The costs of achieving climate targets and the sources of uncertainty. Nat. Clim. Chang. 10, 329–334.

Wada, K., Sano, F., Akimoto, K., Homma, T., 2012. Assessment of Copenhagen pledges with long-term implications. Energy Econ. 34, S481–S486.

Way, R., Ives, M.C., Mealy, P., Farmer, J.D., 2022. Empirically grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition. Joule 6, 2057–2082.

Weyant, J., 2017. Some contributions of integrated assessment models of global climate change. Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy 11, 115–137.

Wilkerson, J.T., Cullenward, D., Davidian, D., Weyant, J.P., 2013. End use technology choice in the national energy modeling system (nems): an analysis of the residential and commercial building sectors. Energy Econ. 40, 773–784.

Van der Zwaan, B.C., Gerlagh, R., Schrattenholzer, L., et al, 2002. Endogenous technological change in climate change modelling. Energy Econ. 24, 1–19.