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

Policy in hard times: How individuals' energy insecurity shape energy, climate, and social policy preferences☆

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HIGHLIGHTS

- Energy insecurity raises support for compensation and investment energy policies.
- Energy insecure citizens favour investment climate and compensation social policies.
- Expected, not past, energy insecurity is the strongest predictor of policy support.
- August 2022 UK survey links household energy insecurity to multi-domain policy views.
- Energy shocks spill over; insecurity shapes climate and social policy preferences.

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ABSTRACT

In an era of prolonged economic stagnation and global shocks, a central question is how individuals' material conditions shape support for policy interventions and goals. In recent years, energy insecurity, the inability to easily meet the costs of household energy, has emerged as a key factor in explaining declining household living standards and difficulties meeting the costs of living. This paper examines how energy insecurity affects policy preferences in the context of the UK's recent energy crisis. Utilising an original survey fielded in the United Kingdom in August 2022, the paper examines how energy insecurity shapes preferences for compensation- and investment-based policy preferences for energy, climate, and social policy. The results show that support for energy, climate, and social policy depends on individuals' energy insecurity. Additionally, while compensatory and investment based policies see similar levels of support in terms of energy policy, there is differentiation in the other policy areas. Energy insecure individuals significantly prioritise investment-based climate policy and compensation-based social policy. These results hold even after adjusting for general concerns about the cost of living. The findings help us understand how policy preferences are sensitive to changing economic conditions, and the impact of the energy crisis on a broader set of policy preferences.

1. Introduction

In an era of prolonged economic stagnation and global shocks, a central question is how individuals' material conditions shape support for policy interventions and goals. Understanding how economic shocks shape citizens' policy preferences is one of the key questions of political economy (e.g. Garrett, 1998; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Hays et al., 2005; Balcells Ventura, 2006; Hays, 2009; Schaffer and Spilker, 2016, 2019; Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019; Genschel et al., 2024; Beiser-McGrath, 2024). These questions become even more salient in the context of recent shocks, such as the recent energy crisis in Europe. The UK has been one of the most affected countries by this crisis, seeing some of the largest rises in energy prices as well as highest levels of inequality in its impact upon energy bills (Ari et al., 2022), tying into a broader cost of living crisis that has led to a decline in living standards.

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Energy insecurity—the monetary difficulties faced by households in meeting their energy needs and bills—has emerged as a growing concern across a large number of countries. A growing literature has emerged that considers the importance of energy insecurity generally and its consequences for policy and politics (e.g. Carley and Konisky, 2020; Baker et al., 2021; Dolšak and Prakash, 2022; Graff et al., 2021; Memmott et al., 2021b,a; Konisky et al., 2022). Yet while some research has examined how macro factors like energy prices are associated with public opinion (e.g. Drews and van den Bergh, 2016; Aklin, 2021), this literature has yet to directly connect individuals' experiences and expectations of energy insecurity to the formation of policy preferences. This is an important step, given the large body of research that examines how individuals' material conditions affect energy and climate policy support (e.g. Kitcher, 2010; Kahn and Kotchen, 2011; Brulle et al., 2012; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012; Shum, 2012; Howell, 2013; Kachi et al., 2015; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017; Bakaki and Bernauer, 2018; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2024; Beiser-McGrath, 2022; Genschel et al., 2024; Böhmelt and Zhang, 2023; Rudolph and Gomm, 2024).

This paper examines how energy insecurity affects policy preferences, in light of the UK's energy crisis. To do so it builds upon research on how economic insecurity affects individuals' policy preferences (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Ruggie, 1982; Katzenstein, 1985; Burgoon, 2001; Hays et al., 2005; Hays, 2009; Schaffer and Spilker, 2016; Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019). Specifically, I distinguish between compensation- and investment-based policy preferences across the areas of energy, climate, and social policy. I argue that energy insecurity increases support for all policies that are directly related to the energy crisis, i.e., compensation and investment-based energy policy. It also shapes policy preferences for less directly connected issue areas, climate and social policy, depending on the type of policy. While compensation should generally be preferred, investment-based climate policy and compensation-based social policy are expected to see high levels of support amongst the energy insecure, given that they either address the root cause of the energy crisis by increasing renewable energy (investment-based climate policy) or provide immediate material relief from increasing energy costs (compensation-based social policy).

To test these empirical expectations I utilise original survey data from the UK in August 2022. This allows an examination of how energy insecurity shapes policy preferences in the midst of the energy crisis. I measure public support for compensation- and investment-based policies across three policy domains: energy, climate, and social policy. To examine the role of energy insecurity, I rely on individuals' assessments of their energy insecurity (in terms of experiences and expectations) regarding difficulty paying energy bills. The results find that individuals' experiences and expectations of energy insecurity shape policy preferences in the predicted manner. Energy insecure individuals have higher levels of support for all forms of energy policy, prefer investment-based climate policy and prefer compensation-based social policy.

The paper adds to the existing literature by: (i) highlighting the centrality of individuals' energy insecurity to the societal acceptance of energy policy interventions and (ii) identifying how this spills over to broader policy preferences regarding the green transition and social policy instruments, emphasising the centrality of energy to understanding the (just) green transition (e.g. Bergquist et al., 2020; Dodd et al., 2020; Nelson and Dodd, 2023; Sovacool et al., 2023; Upham et al., 2023; Gazmararian, 2024; Kockel et al., 2024).

First, the paper sheds new light on the material foundations of policy preferences, with particular focus on the interlinkages between climate policy, energy policy and its connection to broader issues of social policy and redistribution (Gough, 2010, 2016; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2019b; Fritz and Koch, 2019; Bergquist et al., 2020; Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Armingeon and Bürgisser, 2021; Fritz et al., 2021). By examining case of the energy crisis experienced by the UK, the paper provides additional evidence highlighting the role of individuals' material conditions in policy preference formation (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Rehm, 2009, 2011; Margalit, 2013). In doing so, it also provides new evidence on how macroeconomic shocks affect individuals' policy preferences when considering compensation and investment based policy responses (e.g. Garrett, 1998; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Hays et al., 2005; Balcells Ventura, 2006; Hays, 2009; Walter, 2010; Schaffer and Spilker, 2016, 2019; Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019).

Second, the paper contributes to the literature on how economic conditions affect public support for climate, energy, and environmental policy. Commonly referred to as the economy–environment trade-off, this literature examines whether individuals facing economic hardship deprioritise tackling these issues (e.g. Kitcher, 2010; Kahn and Kotchen, 2011; Brulle et al., 2012; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012; Shum, 2012; Howell, 2013; Kachi et al., 2015; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017; Bakaki and Bernauer, 2018; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2024; Beiser-McGrath, 2022; Genschel et al., 2024; Böhmelt and Zhang, 2023; Beiser-McGrath, 2024). This literature has found mixed results regarding the importance and existence of this effect, suggesting that there may be unexplored heterogeneity in terms of individuals' susceptibility to shocks and the types of policies that are affected. This paper adds nuance to this literature by finding that policies differ in their susceptibility to (de)prioritisation from economic shocks, depending on policy type (compensation vs. investment) and the issue area applied to.

Third, the paper contributes to the literature on the importance of individuals' energy insecurity. A growing body of research measures the scope of energy insecurity faced by individuals in a variety of contexts (e.g. Carley and Konisky, 2020; Baker et al., 2021; Dolšak and Prakash, 2022; Graff et al., 2021; Memmott et al., 2021b,a; Konisky et al., 2022). By examining how individuals' experiences and expectations of energy insecurity shape their policy preferences this paper sheds new light on the importance of energy insecurity for understanding the politics of policy responses to shocks, such as the energy crisis, and its consequences for reactive vs. proactive policy solutions.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain the theoretical approach on how policy preferences respond to shocks, delineating compensation- and investment-based policies, and applying these to the case of the energy crisis, deriving empirical implications for energy, climate, and social policy preferences. The next section describes the survey that generates the data used for examining these empirical implications. I then present the results of the statistical analysis of how energy insecurity is associated with policy preferences. The final section offers concluding thoughts.

2. Theoretical approach

This paper focuses on explaining individuals' energy, climate, and social policy preferences in the context of the UK energy crisis. To do so it builds upon a broader literature on how individuals experiencing economic insecurity as a result of macroeconomic shocks form policy preferences. I then turn to applying this logic to explain individuals' policy preferences in response to energy crises. I do so by first examining the logic in the context of energy policy preferences, the policy area most directly related to the shock. I then extend this logic to the issues of climate and social policy, where compensation- and investment-based policies have differing levels of relevance to the immediate issue of the energy crisis. In doing so, I highlight the potential spillovers of energy insecurity into a broader set of policy preferences, which broadens our understanding of individuals' responses to energy shocks beyond direct policy action.

2.1. Compensatory and investment based policy interventions and the energy crisis

In this Section 1 we provide a short overview of the categorisation of policy interventions—compensation and investment—examined in the context of understanding the impact of the energy crisis on policy preferences. Put simply, compensation-based policies focus on *reactive* policies in response to economic shocks, such as transfers. In contrast,

the investment-based policies focus on *proactive* policies, such as education investment, that increase the skills and competitiveness of workers making them more robust to economic downturns.

Previous research finds that, in response to economic shocks, individuals may respond in manners that demand either compensation or investment. Workers experiencing economic insecurity due to their exposure to the uncertainties of international markets, are expected to increase demands for compensation through the welfare state (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Ruggie, 1982; Katzenstein, 1985; Burgoon, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Walter, 2010). There is a body of evidence that finds support for these links at the micro-level, in terms of individuals' perception of economic insecurity (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004), preferences for redistribution (Balcells Ventura, 2006), and policy preferences and subsequent vote choice (Walter, 2010) although, more recent research using a broader set of countries suggests this link may not be as clear cut (Schaffer and Spilker, 2016).

Governments can use compensatory energy policy to shield individuals from rising energy costs. An example of such compensatory policies is to provide direct transfers to households in order to lower their energy bills. In the context of the energy crisis, the UK government introduced the Energy Bills Support Scheme in July 2022.[1] The scheme provides a £400 one-off payment to households, spread over 6 months, paid directly through energy bill reductions. The government later extended compensatory support for individuals' energy bills in October 2022, by introducing a unit price cap on energy that would result in the average annual household energy bill being £2500 a year.[2] The primary beneficiaries of this policy are the energy insecure, given its larger proportional impact relative to their incomes and necessary spending. However, given the universal nature of policy support in the UK context this is also likely supported by those who are not experiencing energy insecurity. Nevertheless, the benefit of this policy instrument is most felt by those experiencing energy insecurity who therefore will receive higher support.

In contrast, demands for investment arise in a context where individuals favour prioritisation of skill investment over short-term compensation, due to the positive impacts of human capital on job retention and search (e.g. Busemeyer, 2012; Bonoli, 2013; Hemerijck, 2013; Garritzmann et al., 2018; Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019). While there is evidence for the link between globalization and education spending at the macro level (e.g. Boix, 1998; Rudra and Haggard, 2005; Ansell, 2008; Dreher et al., 2008), there is less at the microlevel. A notable exception is Busemeyer and Garritzmann (2019) who find evidence that there is an increased demand for investment-based policy, in the form of education spending. Importantly for this research, recent evidence finds that individuals with a higher socio-economic status have higher support for investment based policy (Eick et al., 2023), suggesting demands for compensation may primarily arise from those energy insecure individuals most affected by the crisis.

Investment based energy policy focuses on issues surrounding the supply of energy. In the context of the energy crisis this has typically focused on government commitments to transitioning away from fossil-fuel based energy by funding renewable sources of energy and improving energy efficiency. To this end the UK government has focused on renewable investment as a way of increasing national energy security to increase the reliability and stock of energy supply.[3] While investment-based policies do less to provide immediate short-term relief to individuals, with household energy efficiency measures being a notable exception, their focus on the fundamental cause of the energy crisis' impact on energy costs should lead to high levels of support, particularly amongst the energy insecure. Nevertheless, I expect that support for compensation-based policy is higher amongst the energy insecure, given the immediate relief it provides in response to the energy crisis.

Just-transition research nuances this dichotomy by foregrounding *who pays*. Policies that look "investive" in aggregate can still redistribute costs regressively if equity is not built into tariff design (Dodd et al., 2020; Nelson and Dodd, 2023). In short, individuals' experiences with and expectations of energy insecurity feed into individuals' perceptions as to their benefits from compensation- or investment-based policy.

Mounting evidence shows that "double energy vulnerability"—paying disproportionate shares of income for both domestic energy and transport—has become a key lens through which UK citizens judge energy policy (Upham et al., 2023; Sovacool et al., 2023). In this way compensation can act as a buffer to shield households from immediate cost spikes. Yet citizens also back longer-run investment, if the funding mechanism does not raise bills for the energy-poor. International evidence corroborates this point: in Germany, opinion briefly swung toward re-opening coal during the 2022 gas crunch, underscoring how perceived inequity can undercut decarbonisation commitments (Kockel et al., 2024).

In summary, the compensation and investment hypotheses detail how individuals form energy policy preferences in response to increased economic insecurity driven by macro-level shocks. Experiencing heightened energy vulnerability clarifies the perceived urgency of compensation-based measures, as households prioritise immediate relief to maintain economic stability. Yet, persistent or recurrent energy shocks can also motivate support for investment-based policies aimed at reducing future vulnerability. As discussed in the next section, this logic can be applied to help explain why individuals experiencing energy insecurity as a result of the energy crisis shape not just their energy policy preferences, but also potentially spill over into related policy domains.

2.2. Policy spillovers

Energy insecurity affects individuals' policy preferences by shifting their assessments of immediate versus long-term economic security across multiple policy domains. This dynamic tension between short-term compensation and long-term investment can spillover beyond direct energy policy, as individuals facing acute insecurity become highly sensitive to how policies in climate and social domains also affect individuals' immediate vulnerability to energy shocks. Specifically, experiencing energy insecurity can lead individuals to evaluate and prioritise cross-domain policies according to how effectively these policies balance immediate compensation with long-term resilience-enhancing investments aligned with the energy sector.

In the context of climate policy, recent research has emphasised distinctions between compensatory and investment based climate policy (e.g. Gaikwad et al., 2022). Similar to the research on economic globalization, this research focuses on individuals' vulnerability, with emphasis on the relation of climate policy to individuals' employment activity (Meckling, 2011; Genovese, 2019). A related literature on carbon taxation and revenue recycling, examines how compensation- and investment-based revenue usage can foster political support for stringent climate policy (e.g. Klenert et al., 2018; Jagers et al., 2018; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2019b; Carattini et al., 2019; Dolšak et al., 2020; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2024; Mildenberger et al., 2022).

Compensation-based climate policy typically focuses on easing individuals' transition out of fossil-fuel based industries through fiscal transfers and providing immediate financial assistance in the event of adverse climatic events. Compensation therefore prioritises short-term relief from the negative costs associated with climate change and policy efforts to transition to a greener economy. On the other hand, investment-based policies focus on financing policy that both limits economic activity which contributes to climate change and increases climate resilience through adaptation measures. Investment therefore prioritises longer-term policy goals, by investing in renewable sources

[1] https://www.gov.uk/get-help-energy-bills/getting-discount-energy-bill.
[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/energy-bills-support/energy-bills-support-factsheet-8-september-2022.
[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/powering-up-britain.

of energy, investments in low-emission technology, and climate-resilient infrastructure.

In the context of social policy, compensation and investment-based policies respond to different needs amongst the population that can be provided by the welfare state. This ultimately leads to differing levels of support for social policies in times of energy crises.

Compensation-based social policy typically focuses on addressing individuals' immediate economic needs and provides a safety net for the population at large. This often takes the form of unemployment benefits and insurance. One new policy proposal in this area is the idea of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). UBI takes the form of a guaranteed income to all citizens, that provides a minimum level of economic stability for all. This form of compensation therefore provides a buffer against unexpected economic shocks, such as the energy crisis, that may affect individuals.

Investment-based social policy, on the other hand, often takes the form of policies that increase individuals' economic security by giving them skills that make them more robust to economic shocks. A broad literature (e.g. Busemeyer, 2012; Busemeyer et al., 2018; Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019; Busemeyer et al., 2020) examines this in the context of education policy. Investment in education offers citizens to chance to develop skills that increase their economic competitiveness, increasing their ability to adapt to changing economic situations and building social mobility. Such human capital investment therefore attempts to weaken individuals' sensitivity to economic fluctuations and foster economic insecurity. Yet such social investments are often prioritised by individuals from a high socio-economic status who are able to reap the benefits from long-term investments without being concerned about immediate costs (Eick et al., 2023), as is the case for energy insecure individuals.

2.3. Summary

In summary, individual policy preferences during an energy crisis are shaped by the tension between immediate economic needs and long-term security. Individuals experiencing heightened energy insecurity are expected to prioritise compensation-based policies, given their urgent need to stabilise economic conditions disrupted by energy price shocks. In contrast, preferences for energy and climate-related investment policies (such as renewable energy infrastructure and low-emission technology) may maintain support since these directly address the root causes of energy vulnerability, even if benefits are realised only in the medium to long term. Conversely, investment-based social policies like education which promote longer term resilience may, despite their long-term benefits, be deprioritised due to their delayed returns. This leads to the following set of testable empirical implications:

1. Individuals affected by energy insecurity will prefer compensation-based policies over investment-based policies.
2. Energy insecurity will lead to stronger support for investment-based climate policies relative to compensation-based climate policies.
3. Energy insecurity will lead to stronger support for investment-based social policies relative to compensation-based social policies.

3. Research design

In order to test these empirical expectations, I fielded an original survey in the UK from 15th to 17th August 2022. Respondents were recruited through the Lucid platform (Coppock and McClellan, 2019) and completed the survey in Qualtrics. In order to ensure representativeness, I used quotas for age, country (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales), education, and sex based upon the UK census. We initially started with a sample of 1180 respondents recruited from Lucid. To ensure respondent quality 149 respondents were removed who failed an attention check where they were asked to click the "Neither agree nor disagree" response for a statement.

3.1. Dependent variables

The dependent variables of this study measure individuals' support for a particular policy. This consist of six survey items, covering the three issue areas (energy, climate, and social) and two policy types (compensation and investment), drawn from previous research on these issues.

For energy policy I measure compensation through government transfers in the form of energy bill support, and investment in the funding and development of alternative sources of energy.

Energy Policy

- **Compensation:** To what extent do you support increasing the Energy Bills Support Scheme, that provides a non-repayable £400 discount for households energy bills?
- **Investment:** To what extent do you support increasing funding and investment for alternative sources of energy?

For climate policy, I create compensation and investment-based policy options by combining the policy options presented in Gaikwad et al. (2022).

Climate Policy

- **Compensation:** To what extent do you support transfers to those affected by climate change? This may be due to individuals whose homes are harmed by climate change or lose jobs due to climate policy.
- **Investment:** To what extent do you support funding investments that deal with climate change? This may be infrastructural investment to protect individuals homes from climate change or policies to reduce emissions.

Social Policy

Finally, for social policy I follow operationalisations of compensation (Busemeyer and Sahm, 2022) and investment (Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019) used in previous research.

- **Compensation:** Some countries are currently talking about introducing a basic income scheme. A basic income scheme means the government pays everyone a monthly income to cover essential living costs, replacing other social benefits. The purpose is to guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living, regardless of whether or not they are working. People can also keep the money they earn from work or other sources. This scheme is paid for by taxes. Overall, would you be against or in favour of having this scheme?
- **Investment:** We are interested in your views about government spending on education. Please select whether you would like to see more or less government spending on education. Remember that if you say 'more', it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

Responses to these items are on a five-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Oppose (1) to Strongly Support (5). In order to estimate the proportion of respondents who support a policy, I recode this outcome so that 1 indicates either strong (5) or slight (4) support and 0 otherwise. This follows previous research which collapses somewhat support and strongly support into a dichotomous indicator (e.g. Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2019b; Beiser-McGrath and Busemeyer, 2024). Results are robust to using the original 5-point Likert scale and are displayed in Tables A9–A16 of the appendix.

3.2. Energy insecurity

To measure energy insecurity I focus on individuals' retrospective experiences with energy insecurity and their prospective expectations about future energy insecurity.

For individuals' experiences and expectations with energy insecurity, I adapt items from the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al., 2020) that measure individuals' financial difficulties in terms of meeting the costs of living. Although other measures of energy insecurity



Fig. 1. Policy support varies by type and issue area. Points indicate predicted support for each policy type. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.

exist, following this format allows for isolating the impact of the energy crisis, when adjusting for the British Election Study's similarly worded cost of living measures in Section 4.4 of the empirical analysis.

Specifically, to measure individuals' experiences with energy insecurity I use the following item:

> In the last 12 months has it been more difficult or easier to pay your energy bills?

To measure individuals' expectations of energy insecurity I use the following item:

> In the next 12 months do you think it will be more difficult or easier to pay your energy bills?

Both are measured using a five-point Likert scale ranging from Very Difficult (1) to Very Easy (5). This is transformed into a binary variable where individuals are defined as experiencing or expecting energy insecurity (= 1) if they answer Very Difficult (1) or Somewhat Difficult (2) for the relevant item.[4]

3.3. Estimation

To estimate how energy insecurity affects policy support, I use Ordinary Least Squares regression with robust (HC3) standard errors (i.e., a linear probability model), for ease of interpretation.[5] The results presented are also robust to estimating support with a Logit estimation.[6] I estimate these models both with and without covariate adjustment. Specifically, I adjust for respondents' age, education, income, left-right ideology, political party support, and sex.[7]

4. Results

Before examining how energy insecurity affects individuals' policy preferences, I first present overall support levels for the different policy types across issue areas. Fig. 1 displays the proportion of respondents supporting each policy. Examining the first row, we see that there is overwhelming support for both compensation and investment based energy policies, with approximately 70 % of respondents supporting both the compensation and investment based energy policies.

Turning to climate and social policies, however, we see interesting variation in support. Specifically, we see that a preference for compensation versus investment based policy depends on the issue area. For climate policy we see that a majority supports investment-based policy (≈55 %), while compensation-based policy fails to achieve majority support (≈45 %). The opposite is found for social policy, with a majority supporting compensation-based policy (≈53 %) and the lowest support across all policies for investment-based social policy (≈38 %). As discussed in the theoretical argument, this likely reflects differences across the potential for compensation and investment policies in these issue areas to aid individuals in the midst of the energy crisis.

Table 1
Energy policy support and energy insecurity.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.088***	0.154***	0.071**	0.177***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

4.1. Energy insecurity and direct policy support

We now turn to examining how energy insecurity is associated with individuals' policy preferences. Table 1 displays how energy insecurity experiences, expectations, and information are associated with compensation and investment-based energy policy support. In general we find that individuals' experiences and expectations of energy insecurity are significantly associated with support for both compensation- and investment-based policies. Amongst these, the prospective measure of energy insecurity (expectations) has a significantly larger association, being approximately twice the size of the retrospective measure.

[4] The joint distribution of these responses is displayed in Table A30 of the appendix.

[5] Results are robust to using the original 5-point Likert scale, and are displayed in Tables A9–A16 of the appendix.

[6] Tables A17–A24 in the appendix.

[7] Item wording for these measures is included in the appendix. Descriptive statistics are located in Table A29 in the appendix.



Fig. 2. Energy policy support depends upon energy insecurity. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table 1.

Table 2
Climate policy support and energy insecurity.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.078**	0.089**	0.082**	0.138***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Fig. 2 displays how the association between individuals' energy insecurity and policy preferences translates into overall support for each policy type. Examining the figure, we can see that the larger impact of prospective energy insecurity is driven by those who do not expect to experience energy insecurity in the next 12 months having the lowest levels of policy support across policy types. In contrast, there is little differentiation between the high levels of support for energy policy across those who have experienced or expect energy insecurity. Notably, while differences do emerge between those who are energy insecure or not, all groups have a majority supporting compensation and investment based policies.

4.2. Energy insecurity and indirect policy support

Having demonstrated the link between energy insecurity and energy policy preferences, I now turn to examining those policy areas that indirectly provide assistance in the energy crisis: climate and social policies.

First, Table 2 displays how energy insecurity experiences, expectations, and information are associated with compensation and investment-based climate policy support. The results mirror those for energy policy (Table 1), with individuals' energy insecurity experiences and expectations significantly increasing support for climate policy. As before, the association between climate policy support and energy insecurity is stronger for expectations compared to experiences; however this is only meaningfully so in the case of investment.

To better understand these results Fig. 3 displays how the association between individuals' energy insecurity and climate policy preferences translates into overall support for each policy type. Similar to Fig. 2 we see that those experiencing and expecting energy insecurity have almost identical policy preferences. However, unlike the results for energy policy, we also see that achieving majority support for a policy type depends upon energy insecurity. We see that there is only a significant majority supporting investment-based climate policy amongst those who are energy insecure. In contrast, for those who did not previously experience energy insecurity or do not expect to be energy insecure, support is not significantly different from indifference for investment-based climate policy. Turning to compensation based policy, we see a different picture where there is a significant majority not supporting compensation based climate policy amongst those who did not experience and are not expecting energy insecurity. In contrast, for those who have experienced or expect energy insecurity, support is not significantly different from indifference. This suggests that the patterns exhibited in Fig. 1, with majority support for investment and a lack of support for compensation, are driven by whether individuals are energy insecure or not.

Second, Table 3 displays how energy insecurity experiences, expectations, and information are associated with compensation and investment-based social policy support. Unlike the results for energy and climate policy we see significant differences in the association between energy insecurity and policy support across compensation- and investment-based policy. For compensation-based social policy we see a similar pattern as before, with experiences and expectations of energy insecurity associated with higher levels of policy support. In contrast, there is no significant association between these forms of energy insecurity and investment-based social policy preferences.

Fig. 4 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based social policy varies by individuals' experiences and expectations of energy insecurity. As was the case for energy and climate policy, we see that those experiencing and expecting energy insecurity have almost identical policy preferences. However, these preferences are only significantly different from those who did not experience and do not expect energy insecurity in the case of compensation-based social policy. In that case, there is a significant majority supporting compensation-based



Fig. 3. Climate policy support depends upon energy insecurity. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table 2.

Table 3
Social policy support and energy insecurity.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.105***	0.161***	0.012	0.028
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

social policy amongst the energy insecure. Those who have not previously experienced energy insecurity are not significantly different from policy indifference, while those who do not expect energy insecurity have a significant majority who do not support compensation based social policy. When examining investment-based social policy, we see that all groups have a significant majority that do not support investment-based social policy.

4.3. Energy insecurity pathways

We now turn to examining energy insecurity pathways, that is the interaction between individuals' energy insecurity expectations and experiences. This allows examination of potential heterogeneous effects for those entering and leaving energy insecurity, as well as those who have always or never experienced energy insecurity.

Table 4 displays these interaction effects across all policy domains.

Fig. 5 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based energy policy varies by individuals' energy insecurity pathways. The main finding from the figure is that high levels of policy support are primarily driven by individuals' expectations of energy insecurity, rather than energy insecurity expectations. Across all categories and policy domains, individuals who expect to experience energy insecurity have significantly higher levels of support when compared to those who don't. While there is some variation with individuals who have transitioned into energy insecurity being slightly more supportive of compensation-based policy, and less supportive of investment-based policy, this is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Additionally, those least supportive of policy are individuals who previously experienced energy insecurity but no longer expect to in the future. However, this is a very small proportion of the sample, and thus inferences are incredibly uncertain.

Turning to climate policy, Fig. 6 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based climate policy varies by individuals' energy insecurity pathways. A similar pattern emerges with energy insecurity expectations being the primary driver of policy support across the different domains. In this case, there is only majority support for investment based climate policies, and this is confined to those who are expecting energy insecurity, regardless of whether they previously experienced energy insecurity or not.

Finally, Fig. 7 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based social policy varies by individuals' energy insecurity pathways. Mirroring the results for climate policy, when majority support is observed it is only amongst those with energy insecurity expectations. However, and echoing the previous results, this is the case for compensation-based social policy, with investment-based social policy having a significant majority not in support.

In summary, these results highlight that expectations of energy insecurity play a stronger role in shaping policy preferences than individuals' previous experiences. This relates to broader discussions of the relative weight that prospective versus retrospective economic assessments play in shaping individuals' political behaviour (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000, 2007; Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Tilley et al., 2018). In this context, when thinking about longer-term policy interventions, individuals appear to be driven by how they expect to be affected over the future time period, with support being driven by those who expect to be most affected in the time frame.

4.4. Partialing out the general costs of living

A potential concern with the analysis so far is that energy insecurity picks up individuals' general difficulties with meeting the costs of living, rather than energy insecurity per se. As a result I conduct additional



Fig. 4. Social policy support depends upon energy insecurity. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table 3.

Table 4
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions.

	Energy		Climate		Social	
	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Experience	−0.061	−0.045	0.089	−0.142	0.001	−0.024
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.095)
Expectation	0.125***	0.181***	0.071	0.092**	0.132***	0.024
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Experience × Expectation	0.094	0.031	−0.047	0.189*	0.044	0.026
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

analyses where items about individuals' general cost of living are included in the empirical specification. These items are adapted from the British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al., 2020) and their wording is directly comparable to the measures of energy insecurity I use.

Specifically, to measure individuals' experiences with the general costs of living I use the following item:

> In the last 12 months has it been more difficult or easier to pay your everyday costs of living?

To measure individuals' expectations of energy insecurity I use the following item:

> In the next 12 months do you think it will be more difficult or easier to pay your everyday costs of living?

Both are measured using a five-point Likert scale ranging from Very Difficult (1) to Very Easy (5). This is transformed into a binary variable where individuals are defined as experiencing or expecting cost of living difficulties (= 1) if they answer Very Difficult (1) or Somewhat Difficult (2) for the relevant item.[8]

In the interest of space I focus on the results for the energy insecurity pathways presented in Section 4.3, when adjusting for individuals' cost of living pathways (i.e., the interaction between experiences and expectations of having difficulties with the costs of living).[9]

Fig. 8 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based energy policy varies by individuals' energy insecurity pathways (replicating Fig. 5), after adjusting for individuals' cost of living pathways. The main findings remain consistent with high levels of policy support primarily driven by individuals' expectations of energy insecurity, rather than energy insecurity expectations. While there is greater statistical uncertainty now associated with the point estimates, individuals who expect to experience energy insecurity have significantly higher levels of support when compared to those who don't across all policy domains.

Turning to climate policy, Fig. 9 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based climate policy varies by individuals' energy insecurity pathways (replicating Fig. 6), after adjusting for individuals' cost of living pathways. Again, while there is an increase in statistical uncertainty, point estimates are incredibly similar after adjusting for individuals' cost of living pathways. I find that energy insecurity

[8] The joint distribution of these responses is displayed in Table A31 of the appendix.

[9] Full results for all other analyses not presented in the main text are in the appendix.



Fig. 5. Energy policy support depends upon energy insecurity pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table 4.



Fig. 6. Climate policy support depends upon energy insecurity pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table 4.

expectations are the primary driver of policy support across the different domains. In this case, there is only majority support for investment based climate policies, and this is confined to those who are expecting energy insecurity, regardless of whether they previously experienced energy insecurity or not.

Finally, Fig. 10 displays how support for compensation- and investment-based social policy varies by individuals' energy insecurity pathways (replicating Fig. 7), after adjusting for individuals' cost of living pathways. While majority support continues to be observed amongst those with energy insecurity expectations in terms of compensation-based social policy, the differences between the energy insecure and secure decrease and are no longer statistically significant. However, it is also the case that a similar pattern and lack of statistical significance occurs when calculating the same effects for cost of living pathways,



Fig. 7. Social policy support depends upon energy insecurity pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table 4.



Fig. 8. Energy policy support depends upon energy insecurity pathways, even after adjusting for cost of living pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table A8.

adjusting for energy insecurity pathways (Fig. A6 in the appendix). This suggests that in the case of social policy it is not possible to disentangle which aspect of the financial hardship individuals are facing, energy insecurity or general costs of living, is driving increased demands for compensation.

In summary, I find that individuals' energy insecurity is associated with their policy preferences even after accounting for their general costs of living. This suggests that the impacts of the current energy crisis are having significant effects on individuals' policy preferences, which are not just confined to the particular issue of energy policy



Fig. 9. Climate policy support depends upon energy insecurity pathways, even after adjusting for cost of living pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table A8.



Fig. 10. Social policy support depends upon energy insecurity pathways, even after adjusting for cost of living pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Estimates based upon Table A8.

but also related but distinct policy domains such as climate and social policy.

5. Conclusion and policy implications

In an era of economic volatility and global shocks, a fundamental question in political economy is how citizens' material conditions shape their policy preferences across diverse issue areas. Scholars have long examined how economic uncertainty influences support for various policy interventions, yet the mechanisms by which acute shocks affect preferences across interconnected policy domains remain underexplored (e.g. Garrett, 1998; Hays et al., 2005; Schaffer and Spilker, 2016; Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2019). Europe has recently an unprecedented rise in energy prices and resulting decline in living standards, with the UK being one of the most affected countries by this crisis. Given the importance of individuals' material conditions for policy

support (e.g. Kitcher, 2010; Kahn and Kotchen, 2011; Brulle et al., 2012; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012; Shum, 2012; Howell, 2013; Kachi et al., 2015; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017; Bakaki and Bernauer, 2018; Beiser-McGrath, 2022; Genschel et al., 2024), it serves as a significant case for understanding how shocks have consequences for individuals' policy preferences.

The results demonstrate that being impacted by this shock has consequences for policy preferences over an array of issue areas. I find that individuals' experiences and expectations of energy insecurity shape their policy preferences, not only for energy policy but also for climate and social policy. While there is broad based support for energy policy in response to the energy crisis, it has differentiated effects on other policy preferences. Energy insecurity spills over into these other issue areas by affecting their prioritisation for certain policy types. In the area of climate policy, individuals prioritise investment-based policy that prioritises renewable energy funding which addresses the fundamental cause of the energy crisis' impact, i.e., the dependence on fossil fuels. In contrast, in the area of social policy individuals prioritise compensation-based policy which provides immediate economic relief to the energy insecurity generated by the energy crisis.

More broadly the paper brings attention to how shocks in one issue area, i.e., energy, can have consequences for policy preferences in related but distinct policy areas, such as climate and social policy. An emerging research area explores the interlinkages between social policy, welfare, and issues surrounding climate change and energy security (Gough, 2010, 2016; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2019b; Fritz and Koch, 2019; Bergquist et al., 2020; Otto and Gugushvili, 2020; Armingeon and Bürgisser, 2021; Fritz et al., 2021). In this context, energy insecurity will continue to have a strong impact on individuals' policy preferences, shaping the future trajectory of policy responses not only to the energy crisis, but also to related policy areas such as climate and social policy.

Additionally, the findings of this research speak to broader discussions of the economic backlash to the green transition and how economic concerns potentially crowd out long-term investment (e.g. Scruggs and Benegal, 2012; Shum, 2012; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017; Beiser-McGrath, 2022; Bergquist et al., 2023; Busemeyer and Beiser-McGrath, 2024; Rudolph and Gomm, 2024). In this instance, crises may lead to windows of opportunity that spur policy action (Kingdon, 1984), especially long-term policy responses that lead to longer term resilience against the source of these crises. However, this long-term perspective only appears to have an effect on investments clearly related to the shock at hand (e.g., energy and climate investments), rather than broader social investments that provide a broader social safety net. Selectively coupling these policy areas and types therefore offers the opportunity for building long-term stable coalitions (e.g. Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer, 2019a; Gaikwad et al., 2022).

These results provide evidence toward an additive policy strategy in which governments layer short-run compensation on top of long-run investment across the energy–climate–social nexus. Need-based measures can cushion vulnerable households while universal renewable-energy subsidies, grid-modernisation funds and large-scale efficiency programmes accelerate the structural shift away from volatile fossil inputs. Likewise, carbon-pricing or windfall-profit revenues can be recycled simultaneously into transfers for communities facing climate damages or automatic stabilisers to provide a predictable floor without crowding out capital outlays for clean-technology deployment. As each instrument addresses a different temporal and distributional facet of energy insecurity, layering them widens the coalition for reform and ensures that near-term relief need not come at the expense of the longer-term climate and social investments required for a just and resilient transition.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Liam F. Beiser-McGrath: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Visualization, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Appendix

Regression tables with covariate adjustment coefficients

See Tables A1–A8.

Table A1
Energy policy support and energy insecurity.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.088***	0.154***	0.071**	0.177***
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Age	0.008***	0.008***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.018	0.012	0.008	0.000
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Educ: Low	−0.002	0.007	−0.080*	−0.073*
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Educ: Mid	0.015	0.016	−0.080**	−0.082**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Left-right	−0.018**	−0.016**	−0.010	−0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
PID: DUP	0.052	0.046	0.309	0.303
	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.223)
PID: Green Party	−0.087	−0.057	−0.011	0.020
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)
PID: Labour Party	0.014	0.014	−0.021	−0.025
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.007	−0.007	−0.060	−0.063
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.065)
PID: No Party	−0.049	−0.052	−0.089*	−0.095**
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)
PID: Other	−0.032	−0.035	−0.176	−0.190*
	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.115)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.006	0.010	0.305	0.319*
	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.184)
PID: SDLP	0.276	0.239	0.249	0.204
	(0.312)	(0.310)	(0.318)	(0.314)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.499	0.483	0.418	0.390
	(0.443)	(0.439)	(0.451)	(0.445)
PID: SNP	0.062	0.072	0.103	0.114
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.082)
PID: UKIP	−0.095	−0.088	−0.084	−0.082
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.087)
PID: UUP	0.325	0.298	0.025	−0.002
	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.223)
Intercept	0.291***	0.241***	0.502***	0.422***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A2
Climate policy support and energy insecurity.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.078**	0.089**	0.082**	0.138***
	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.011	−0.015	−0.003	−0.009
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Educ: Low	−0.034	−0.025	−0.130**	−0.121**
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Educ: Mid	−0.028	−0.025	−0.061*	−0.060*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Left-right	−0.016**	−0.015*	−0.010	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
PID: DUP	−0.134	−0.137	−0.255	−0.260
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.245)
PID: Green Party	−0.043	−0.022	0.003	0.030
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)
PID: Labour Party	0.081*	0.084*	0.048	0.048
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.161**	0.164**	0.076	0.077
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
PID: No Party	−0.101*	−0.102**	−0.069	−0.072
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
PID: Other	−0.174	−0.168	−0.258**	−0.261**
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.241	0.235	0.155	0.158
	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.201)
PID: SDLP	0.559	0.540	0.420	0.386
	(0.347)	(0.347)	(0.346)	(0.344)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.583	0.581	0.620	0.606
	(0.491)	(0.491)	(0.490)	(0.488)
PID: SNP	0.267***	0.274***	0.136	0.145
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.089)
PID: UKIP	−0.219**	−0.209**	−0.192**	−0.185*
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.095)
PID: UUP	0.041	0.022	0.175	0.150
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.245)
Intercept	0.422***	0.413***	0.362***	0.318***
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A3
Social policy support and energy insecurity.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.105***	0.161***	0.012	0.028
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Age	0.003***	0.002**	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.028	0.021	−0.027	−0.028
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Educ: Low	0.035	0.046	−0.156***	−0.155***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Educ: Mid	0.046	0.048	−0.032	−0.032
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Left-Right	−0.022**	−0.020**	−0.012	−0.011
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.011*	0.010*	0.006	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
PID: DUP	0.502**	0.496**	0.443*	0.442*
	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.241)	(0.240)
PID: Green Party	−0.040	−0.007	0.094	0.099
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.079)
PID: Labour Party	0.058	0.060	0.086**	0.086**
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.034
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A3 *(continued)*

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
PID: No Party	−0.098*	−0.101*	−0.099*	−0.100**
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)
PID: Other	−0.070	−0.070	−0.040	−0.042
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.124)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.167	0.167	0.489**	0.491**
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.198)	(0.198)
PID: SDLP	0.465	0.427	0.630*	0.623*
	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.339)	(0.339)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.515	0.502	0.750	0.746
	(0.495)	(0.492)	(0.480)	(0.480)
PID: SNP	0.088	0.099	−0.098	−0.096
	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.088)
PID: UKIP	0.037	0.048	−0.024	−0.024
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.094)
PID: UUP	0.240	0.210	0.099	0.094
	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.241)	(0.240)
Intercept	0.332***	0.289***	0.484***	0.472***
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A4
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions.

	Energy		Climate		Social	
	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Experience	−0.061	−0.045	0.089	−0.142	0.001	−0.024
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.095)
Expectation	0.125***	0.181***	0.071	0.092**	0.132***	0.024
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Experience X Expectation	0.094	0.031	−0.047	0.189*	0.044	0.026
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Age	0.008***	0.005***	0.000	0.004***	0.003**	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.014	0.000	−0.015	−0.005	0.022	−0.028
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Educ: Low	0.006	−0.071	−0.032	−0.120**	0.042	−0.154***
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Educ: Mid	0.014	−0.081**	−0.028	−0.063*	0.046	−0.033
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Left-Right	−0.015**	−0.007	−0.016*	−0.007	−0.020**	−0.011
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.009	0.008	0.013**	0.012**	0.011*	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
PID: DUP	0.045	0.303	−0.135	−0.262	0.496**	0.442*
	(0.220)	(0.223)	(0.246)	(0.244)	(0.247)	(0.241)
PID: Green Party	−0.052	0.027	−0.036	0.044	−0.010	0.102
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.080)
PID: Labour Party	0.014	−0.023	0.079*	0.050	0.057	0.086**
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.010	−0.062	0.162**	0.072	0.032	0.034
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)
PID: No Party	−0.051	−0.093**	−0.104**	−0.068	−0.101*	−0.099*
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)
PID: Other	−0.041	−0.187	−0.177	−0.268**	−0.079	−0.042
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.124)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.013	0.315*	0.245	0.161	0.174	0.490**
	(0.181)	(0.184)	(0.203)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.198)
PID: SDLP	0.244	0.204	0.542	0.395	0.431	0.623*
	(0.310)	(0.314)	(0.347)	(0.344)	(0.348)	(0.339)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.473	0.390	0.578	0.588	0.493	0.744
	(0.439)	(0.446)	(0.491)	(0.488)	(0.493)	(0.480)
PID: SNP	0.071	0.115	0.271***	0.145	0.097	−0.096
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.088)
PID: UKIP	−0.089	−0.078	−0.219**	−0.184*	0.042	−0.023
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.094)
PID: UUP	0.305	−0.004	0.029	0.161	0.219	0.095
	(0.220)	(0.223)	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.247)	(0.241)
Intercept	0.241**	0.430***	0.394***	0.323***	0.279***	0.474***
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.095)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A5
Energy policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.095**	0.116**	0.049	0.189***
	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Cost of Living	−0.011	0.048	0.032	−0.016
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Age	0.008***	0.008***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.019	0.008	0.007	0.001
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Educ: Low	−0.002	0.005	−0.079*	−0.073*
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Educ: Mid	0.015	0.015	−0.080**	−0.081**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Left-Right	−0.018**	−0.016**	−0.009	−0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Income	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
PID: DUP	0.052	0.042	0.309	0.305
	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.223)
PID: Green Party	−0.088	−0.062	−0.007	0.022
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)
PID: Labour Party	0.014	0.011	−0.022	−0.024
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.007	−0.009	−0.062	−0.062
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.065)
PID: No Party	−0.048	−0.054	−0.091*	−0.094**
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)
PID: Other	−0.030	−0.046	−0.181	−0.186
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.115)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.005	0.009	0.309*	0.319*
	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.184)
PID: SDLP	0.276	0.233	0.250	0.206
	(0.312)	(0.310)	(0.318)	(0.314)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.500	0.479	0.416	0.391
	(0.443)	(0.439)	(0.451)	(0.445)
PID: SNP	0.061	0.068	0.106	0.115
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.082)
PID: UKIP	−0.095	−0.090	−0.084	−0.082
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.087)
PID: UUP	0.327	0.305	0.020	−0.005
	(0.222)	(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.223)
Intercept	0.294***	0.238**	0.493***	0.423***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A6
Climate policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.058	0.033	0.057	0.108**
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Cost of Living	0.029	0.073	0.036	0.040
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.013	−0.021	−0.005	−0.012
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Educ: Low	−0.033	−0.027	−0.129**	−0.123**
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Educ: Mid	−0.028	−0.028	−0.061*	−0.062*
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Left-Right	−0.016**	−0.015*	−0.010	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
PID: DUP	−0.134	−0.143	−0.255	−0.263
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.245)
PID: Green Party	−0.040	−0.030	0.007	0.026
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A6 *(continued)*

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
PID: Labour Party	0.080*	0.079*	0.047	0.045
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.160**	0.161**	0.074	0.075
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
PID: No Party	−0.103**	−0.105**	−0.071	−0.074
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
PID: Other	−0.179	−0.183	−0.264**	−0.269**
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.126)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.244	0.234	0.159	0.157
	(0.203)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.201)
PID: SDLP	0.560	0.531	0.421	0.382
	(0.347)	(0.346)	(0.346)	(0.345)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.581	0.576	0.617	0.603
	(0.491)	(0.491)	(0.491)	(0.488)
PID: SNP	0.269***	0.268***	0.139	0.142
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)
PID: UKIP	−0.220**	−0.212**	−0.193**	−0.187**
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.095)
PID: UUP	0.036	0.033	0.169	0.156
	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.245)
Intercept	0.414***	0.408***	0.352***	0.316***
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.095)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A7
Social policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.038	0.070	0.040	−0.021
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.052)
Cost of Living	0.097**	0.118**	−0.041	0.063
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.051)
Age	0.003***	0.003**	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.023	0.011	−0.025	−0.033
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Educ: Low	0.037	0.042	−0.157***	−0.157***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Educ: Mid	0.047	0.044	−0.032	−0.035
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Left-Right	−0.021**	−0.020**	−0.012	−0.011
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.011*	0.010*	0.005	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
PID: DUP	0.501**	0.486**	0.443*	0.437*
	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.241)	(0.240)
PID: Green Party	−0.029	−0.020	0.089	0.092
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.079)
PID: Labour Party	0.055	0.051	0.087**	0.081*
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.029	0.030	0.037	0.032
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)
PID: No Party	−0.105**	−0.106**	−0.096*	−0.102**
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)
PID: Other	−0.086	−0.095	−0.033	−0.055
	(0.128)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.124)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.178	0.165	0.484**	0.490**
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.198)	(0.198)
PID: SDLP	0.467	0.413	0.629*	0.615*
	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.339)	(0.339)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.508	0.493	0.753	0.741
	(0.494)	(0.491)	(0.480)	(0.480)
PID: SNP	0.095	0.089	−0.101	−0.101
	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.088)
PID: UKIP	0.035	0.042	−0.023	−0.027
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.094)
PID: UUP	0.223	0.229	0.106	0.104
	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.241)	(0.241)
Intercept	0.304***	0.281***	0.496***	0.468***
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A8
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions adjusting for cost of living interactions.

	Energy		Climate		Social	
	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Energy Experience	0.002	−0.021	0.090	−0.113	−0.016	−0.008
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.097)
Energy Expectation	0.129**	0.201***	0.037	0.090	0.065	−0.025
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Energy Exper. X Expect.	0.037	0.009	−0.065	0.149	0.017	0.044
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.106)
Costs Experience	−0.333***	−0.105	−0.050	−0.167*	−0.003	−0.111
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.097)
Costs Expectation	−0.010	−0.033	0.046	−0.004	0.088	0.086
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Costs Exper. X Expect.	0.324***	0.110	0.064	0.184*	0.048	0.037
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.106)
Age	0.008***	0.005***	0.000	0.003***	0.003**	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.009	0.001	−0.020	−0.009	0.012	−0.032
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Educ: Low	0.005	−0.070	−0.033	−0.120**	0.041	−0.156***
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Educ: Mid	0.010	−0.082**	−0.030	−0.065*	0.043	−0.036
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Left-Right	−0.015**	−0.007	−0.016*	−0.007	−0.019**	−0.011
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.008	0.008	0.012**	0.012**	0.011*	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
PID: DUP	0.037	0.302	−0.141	−0.267	0.487**	0.432*
	(0.219)	(0.224)	(0.246)	(0.244)	(0.247)	(0.241)
PID: Green Party	−0.061	0.026	−0.041	0.040	−0.017	0.090
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.080)
PID: Labour Party	0.013	−0.022	0.076*	0.049	0.050	0.084*
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.015	−0.064	0.158**	0.068	0.026	0.034
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)
PID: No Party	−0.045	−0.091*	−0.106**	−0.066	−0.107**	−0.096*
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)
PID: Other	−0.048	−0.185	−0.189	−0.276**	−0.103	−0.048
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.124)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.001	0.313*	0.242	0.156	0.173	0.477**
	(0.180)	(0.184)	(0.203)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.198)
PID: SDLP	0.239	0.206	0.536	0.393	0.422	0.607*
	(0.308)	(0.315)	(0.347)	(0.344)	(0.347)	(0.339)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.454	0.386	0.571	0.577	0.485	0.739
	(0.437)	(0.446)	(0.491)	(0.488)	(0.492)	(0.480)
PID: SNP	0.061	0.114	0.266***	0.141	0.092	−0.108
	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.088)
PID: UKIP	−0.103	−0.083	−0.223**	−0.193**	0.036	−0.024
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.094)
PID: UUP	0.295	−0.013	0.031	0.152	0.222	0.116
	(0.219)	(0.224)	(0.247)	(0.245)	(0.247)	(0.241)
Intercept	0.282***	0.442***	0.398***	0.342***	0.273**	0.494***
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.095)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Regression tables with original 5-point Likert scale

See Tables A9–A16.

Table A9
Energy policy support and energy insecurity - 5-point Likert.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.167**	0.287***	0.150**	0.373***
	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.071)
Age	0.021***	0.020***	0.013***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.005	−0.018	0.036	0.019
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.064)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A9 *(continued)*

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Educ: Low	−0.003	0.014	−0.198**	−0.185*
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Educ: Mid	0.095	0.097	−0.186**	−0.190**
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Left-Right	−0.050**	−0.047**	−0.043**	−0.038**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
PID: DUP	0.454	0.444	0.533	0.520
	(0.556)	(0.554)	(0.505)	(0.499)
PID: Green Party	−0.196	−0.140	0.025	0.091
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.166)	(0.164)
PID: Labour Party	0.052	0.053	−0.051	−0.059
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.089)	(0.088)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.030	−0.029	−0.105	−0.111
	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.148)	(0.146)
PID: No Party	−0.125	−0.132	−0.160	−0.172
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.105)
PID: Other	−0.192	−0.198	−0.488*	−0.517**
	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.260)	(0.257)
PID: Plaid Cymru	−0.408	−0.402	0.669	0.698*
	(0.458)	(0.456)	(0.416)	(0.411)
PID: SDLP	0.463	0.393	0.379	0.283
	(0.783)	(0.780)	(0.711)	(0.703)
PID: Sinn Féin	1.530	1.500	1.309	1.250
	(1.110)	(1.105)	(1.008)	(0.996)
PID: SNP	0.233	0.251	0.306*	0.328*
	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.185)	(0.183)
PID: UKIP	−0.489**	−0.475**	−0.307	−0.305
	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.197)	(0.194)
PID: UUP	0.593	0.543	−0.527	−0.584
	(0.556)	(0.554)	(0.505)	(0.499)
Intercept	3.141***	3.049***	3.628***	3.459***
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.195)	(0.194)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A10
Climate policy support and energy insecurity – 5-point Likert.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.113*	0.151**	0.116*	0.215***
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Age	0.003	0.002	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.087	0.081	0.082	0.072
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educ: Low	−0.053	−0.040	−0.140	−0.128
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Educ: Mid	−0.050	−0.048	−0.132*	−0.132*
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Left-Right	−0.046***	−0.044**	−0.057***	−0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	0.019*	0.019	0.018	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
PID: DUP	−0.076	−0.082	−0.520	−0.528
	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.507)	(0.506)
PID: Green Party	0.069	0.102	−0.025	0.016
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.166)	(0.166)
PID: Labour Party	0.114	0.118	0.040	0.039
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.089)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.203	0.206	0.129	0.129
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.148)
PID: No Party	−0.117	−0.120	−0.201*	−0.206*
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.106)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A10 *(continued)*

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
PID: Other	−0.534**	−0.529**	−0.814***	−0.821***
	(0.245)	(0.244)	(0.261)	(0.260)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.393	0.389	0.517	0.525
	(0.391)	(0.391)	(0.418)	(0.416)
PID: SDLP	0.511	0.476	0.277	0.225
	(0.669)	(0.668)	(0.714)	(0.712)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.623	0.615	1.541	1.516
	(0.948)	(0.947)	(1.012)	(1.009)
PID: SNP	0.356**	0.366**	0.083	0.097
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.185)
PID: UKIP	−0.480**	−0.467**	−0.383*	−0.375*
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.198)	(0.197)
PID: UUP	0.043	0.014	0.081	0.044
	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.507)	(0.506)
Intercept	3.342***	3.313***	3.496***	3.421***
	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.196)	(0.196)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A11
Social policy support and energy insecurity – 5-point Likert.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.182**	0.277***	−0.094*	−0.044
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.057)	(0.061)
Age	0.006**	0.005**	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.031	0.019	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Educ: Low	0.113	0.132	−0.240***	−0.252***
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Educ: Mid	0.055	0.058	−0.053	−0.059
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Left-Right	−0.050**	−0.047**	−0.030**	−0.030**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income	0.011	0.011	0.016	0.018*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
PID: DUP	1.142**	1.132**	0.852**	0.853**
	(0.575)	(0.573)	(0.431)	(0.432)
PID: Green Party	0.098	0.156	0.207	0.191
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.141)	(0.142)
PID: Labour Party	0.226**	0.230**	0.144*	0.135*
	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.076)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.154	0.156	0.003	−0.004
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.126)	(0.126)
PID: No Party	−0.021	−0.027	−0.113	−0.115
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.091)	(0.091)
PID: Other	−0.046	−0.045	−0.058	−0.079
	(0.296)	(0.295)	(0.222)	(0.222)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.623	0.623	0.887**	0.907**
	(0.474)	(0.472)	(0.355)	(0.356)
PID: SDLP	1.596**	1.531*	0.707	0.713
	(0.809)	(0.807)	(0.607)	(0.608)
PID: Sinn Féin	1.624	1.601	1.021	1.005
	(1.147)	(1.144)	(0.861)	(0.862)
PID: SNP	0.476**	0.494**	−0.090	−0.095
	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.158)	(0.158)
PID: UKIP	0.191	0.210	−0.107	−0.125
	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.168)	(0.168)
PID: UUP	0.403	0.352	0.139	0.156
	(0.575)	(0.573)	(0.431)	(0.432)
Intercept	3.152***	3.079***	3.412***	3.375***
	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.167)	(0.168)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A12
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions – 5-point Likert.

	Energy		Climate		Social	
	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Experience	−0.199	−0.247	0.105	−0.297	−0.145	−0.222
	(0.219)	(0.197)	(0.188)	(0.200)	(0.226)	(0.170)
Expectation	0.214**	0.349***	0.130	0.138	0.194*	−0.014
	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.105)	(0.079)
Experience X Expectation	0.277	0.243	−0.057	0.366*	0.247	0.141
	(0.233)	(0.210)	(0.200)	(0.213)	(0.241)	(0.182)
Age	0.020***	0.012***	0.003	0.006***	0.005**	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.012	0.023	0.081	0.079	0.025	−0.001
	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.055)
Educ: Low	0.015	−0.175*	−0.049	−0.122	0.129	−0.237**
	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.113)	(0.085)
Educ: Mid	0.093	−0.189**	−0.050	−0.135*	0.053	−0.054
	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.064)
Left-Right	−0.045**	−0.037**	−0.045**	−0.052***	−0.045**	−0.028*
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Income	0.003	0.009	0.020*	0.018	0.011	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)
PID: DUP	0.441	0.516	−0.080	−0.533	1.130**	0.849**
	(0.554)	(0.500)	(0.475)	(0.505)	(0.573)	(0.432)
PID: Green Party	−0.121	0.121	0.086	0.048	0.166	0.223
	(0.184)	(0.166)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.190)	(0.143)
PID: Labour Party	0.054	−0.051	0.112	0.044	0.228**	0.146*
	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.076)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.036	−0.112	0.203	0.122	0.148	0.000
	(0.162)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.168)	(0.126)
PID: No Party	−0.126	−0.166	−0.122	−0.198*	−0.022	−0.110
	(0.117)	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.121)	(0.091)
PID: Other	−0.212	−0.514**	−0.539**	−0.832***	−0.063	−0.061
	(0.285)	(0.257)	(0.245)	(0.260)	(0.295)	(0.222)
PID: Plaid Cymru	−0.396	0.689*	0.400	0.525	0.634	0.886**
	(0.456)	(0.412)	(0.391)	(0.416)	(0.472)	(0.356)
PID: SDLP	0.407	0.289	0.479	0.239	1.545*	0.710
	(0.780)	(0.703)	(0.669)	(0.712)	(0.807)	(0.608)
PID: Sinn Féin	1.473	1.237	0.611	1.485	1.572	1.009
	(1.105)	(0.997)	(0.948)	(1.008)	(1.144)	(0.861)
PID: SNP	0.252	0.332*	0.363**	0.099	0.493**	−0.088
	(0.203)	(0.183)	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.210)	(0.158)
PID: UKIP	−0.475**	−0.291	−0.479**	−0.368*	0.204	−0.103
	(0.216)	(0.195)	(0.185)	(0.197)	(0.224)	(0.169)
PID: UUP	0.560	−0.583	0.022	0.060	0.373	0.142
	(0.554)	(0.500)	(0.475)	(0.506)	(0.574)	(0.432)
Intercept	3.053***	3.486***	3.291***	3.438***	3.072***	3.416***
	(0.217)	(0.196)	(0.186)	(0.198)	(0.225)	(0.169)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A13
Energy policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living – 5 point Likert.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.179*	0.217*	0.059	0.361***
	(0.103)	(0.119)	(0.093)	(0.108)
Cost of Living	−0.018	0.091	0.130	0.015
	(0.103)	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.105)
Age	0.021***	0.020***	0.014***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.004	−0.025	0.030	0.018
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educ: Low	−0.004	0.011	−0.195*	−0.185*
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Educ: Mid	0.095	0.094	−0.186**	−0.190**
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Left-Right	−0.050**	−0.047**	−0.042**	−0.038**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
PID: DUP	0.454	0.437	0.532	0.519
	(0.556)	(0.554)	(0.505)	(0.500)
PID: Green Party	−0.199	−0.149	0.040	0.089
	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.166)	(0.164)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A13 *(continued)*

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
PID: Labour Party	0.053	0.046	−0.054	−0.060
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.089)	(0.088)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.029	−0.033	−0.112	−0.111
	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.148)	(0.146)
PID: No Party	−0.124	−0.136	−0.170	−0.173
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.107)	(0.105)
PID: Other	−0.190	−0.218	−0.509*	−0.520**
	(0.287)	(0.286)	(0.260)	(0.258)
PID: Plaid Cymru	−0.411	−0.403	0.684	0.698*
	(0.458)	(0.456)	(0.416)	(0.411)
PID: SDLP	0.463	0.383	0.382	0.282
	(0.783)	(0.780)	(0.711)	(0.704)
PID: Sinn Féin	1.531	1.493	1.300	1.249
	(1.110)	(1.105)	(1.007)	(0.997)
PID: SNP	0.231	0.244	0.315*	0.327*
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.185)	(0.183)
PID: UKIP	−0.489**	−0.480**	−0.310	−0.305
	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.197)	(0.195)
PID: UUP	0.596	0.557	−0.549	−0.582
	(0.557)	(0.554)	(0.505)	(0.500)
Intercept	3.146***	3.043***	3.590***	3.458***
	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.197)	(0.194)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A14
Climate policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living – 5-point Likert.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.069	0.010	0.070	0.066
	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.094)	(0.109)
Cost of Living	0.063	0.183*	0.066	0.193*
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.094)	(0.106)
Age	0.003	0.002	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.084	0.066	0.079	0.057
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educ: Low	−0.051	−0.046	−0.138	−0.134
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Educ: Mid	−0.050	−0.054	−0.132*	−0.138*
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Left-Right	−0.046***	−0.044**	−0.056***	−0.054***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	0.020*	0.019*	0.018	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
PID: DUP	−0.077	−0.097	−0.521	−0.544
	(0.475)	(0.474)	(0.507)	(0.505)
PID: Green Party	0.076	0.082	−0.017	−0.005
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.167)	(0.166)
PID: Labour Party	0.113	0.105	0.038	0.026
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.089)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.200	0.199	0.126	0.121
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.148)
PID: No Party	−0.122	−0.127	−0.206*	−0.214**
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.106)
PID: Other	−0.544**	−0.568**	−0.825***	−0.862***
	(0.245)	(0.245)	(0.262)	(0.261)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.400	0.386	0.525	0.522
	(0.392)	(0.390)	(0.418)	(0.416)
PID: SDLP	0.512	0.455	0.279	0.202
	(0.669)	(0.668)	(0.714)	(0.711)
PID: Sinn Féin	0.619	0.602	1.537	1.502
	(0.948)	(0.946)	(1.012)	(1.008)
PID: SNP	0.361**	0.351**	0.088	0.081
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.185)
PID: UKIP	−0.481**	−0.476**	−0.385*	−0.385*
	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.198)	(0.197)
PID: UUP	0.033	0.042	0.070	0.074
	(0.475)	(0.474)	(0.508)	(0.505)
Intercept	3.324***	3.300***	3.477***	3.408***
	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.198)	(0.196)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A15
Social policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living – 5-point Likert.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy Insecurity	−0.059	0.064	−0.059	−0.093
	(0.106)	(0.123)	(0.080)	(0.093)
Cost of Living	0.345***	0.276**	−0.050	0.064
	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.080)	(0.091)
Age	0.007***	0.005**	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.016	−0.003	−0.001	−0.007
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Educ: Low	0.120	0.123	−0.241***	−0.254***
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Educ: Mid	0.057	0.049	−0.053	−0.061
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Left-Right	−0.049**	−0.046**	−0.030**	−0.030**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income	0.012	0.011	0.016	0.018*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
PID: DUP	1.140**	1.109*	0.852**	0.848**
	(0.572)	(0.572)	(0.432)	(0.432)
PID: Green Party	0.139	0.126	0.202	0.184
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.142)	(0.142)
PID: Labour Party	0.216**	0.210**	0.145*	0.130*
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.076)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.136	0.145	0.005	−0.007
	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.126)	(0.126)
PID: No Party	−0.047	−0.038	−0.109	−0.118
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.091)	(0.091)
PID: Other	−0.101	−0.103	−0.050	−0.092
	(0.295)	(0.295)	(0.223)	(0.223)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.663	0.619	0.881**	0.906**
	(0.471)	(0.471)	(0.356)	(0.356)
PID: SDLP	1.604**	1.499*	0.706	0.705
	(0.805)	(0.806)	(0.607)	(0.608)
PID: Sinn Féin	1.599	1.580	1.025	1.000
	(1.142)	(1.141)	(0.861)	(0.862)
PID: SNP	0.501**	0.472**	−0.094	−0.100
	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.158)	(0.158)
PID: UKIP	0.184	0.196	−0.106	−0.128
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.168)	(0.168)
PID: UUP	0.344	0.395	0.148	0.166
	(0.572)	(0.572)	(0.432)	(0.432)
Intercept	3.053***	3.060***	3.426***	3.370***
	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.168)	(0.168)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A16
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions adjusting for cost of living interactions – 5-point Likert.

	Energy		Climate		Social	
	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Energy Experience	−0.094	−0.220	0.095	−0.231	−0.222	−0.187
	(0.224)	(0.203)	(0.192)	(0.204)	(0.231)	(0.175)
Energy Expectation	0.209	0.360***	0.019	0.059	0.050	−0.072
	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.139)	(0.105)
Energy Exper. X Expect.	0.198	0.186	−0.074	0.265	0.131	0.140
	(0.245)	(0.221)	(0.210)	(0.223)	(0.253)	(0.191)
Costs Experience	−0.552**	−0.158	−0.069	−0.454**	0.151	−0.221
	(0.223)	(0.201)	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.230)	(0.174)
Costs Expectation	0.007	−0.030	0.161	0.100	0.156	0.096
	(0.140)	(0.127)	(0.120)	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.109)
Age	0.019***	0.012***	0.003	0.005**	0.006**	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.019	0.019	0.066	0.062	−0.001	−0.008
	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.056)
Educ: Low	0.013	−0.175*	−0.051	−0.126	0.127	−0.239**
	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.113)	(0.085)
Educ: Mid	0.086	−0.191**	−0.055	−0.143*	0.050	−0.059
	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.064)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A16 *(continued)*

	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5	PC6
Left-Right	−0.044**	−0.036**	−0.044**	−0.051***	−0.045**	−0.028*
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Income	0.002	0.009	0.019*	0.017	0.012	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)
PID: DUP	0.426	0.513	−0.096	−0.555	1.115*	0.836*
	(0.553)	(0.500)	(0.475)	(0.504)	(0.572)	(0.432)
PID: Green Party	−0.139	0.120	0.071	0.026	0.162	0.207
	(0.184)	(0.166)	(0.158)	(0.168)	(0.190)	(0.143)
PID: Labour Party	0.053	−0.052	0.102	0.036	0.210**	0.143*
	(0.098)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.077)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.044	−0.117	0.197	0.109	0.130	−0.002
	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.168)	(0.126)
PID: No Party	−0.116	−0.166	−0.127	−0.197*	−0.047	−0.106
	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.121)	(0.091)
PID: Other	−0.223	−0.522**	−0.571**	−0.869***	−0.132	−0.073
	(0.286)	(0.258)	(0.245)	(0.260)	(0.295)	(0.223)
PID: Plaid Cymru	−0.420	0.688*	0.391	0.506	0.651	0.868**
	(0.456)	(0.412)	(0.391)	(0.415)	(0.471)	(0.356)
PID: SDLP	0.394	0.293	0.457	0.220	1.539*	0.690
	(0.779)	(0.704)	(0.669)	(0.710)	(0.805)	(0.608)
PID: Sinn Féin	1.443	1.225	0.599	1.451	1.553	0.996
	(1.103)	(0.998)	(0.948)	(1.006)	(1.141)	(0.861)
PID: SNP	0.231	0.330*	0.349**	0.077	0.492**	−0.104
	(0.203)	(0.183)	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.210)	(0.158)
PID: UKIP	−0.496**	−0.302	−0.486**	−0.393**	0.186	−0.109
	(0.216)	(0.196)	(0.186)	(0.197)	(0.224)	(0.169)
PID: UUP	0.552	−0.601	0.040	0.054	0.351	0.161
	(0.554)	(0.501)	(0.476)	(0.505)	(0.573)	(0.433)
Intercept	3.124***	3.501***	3.295***	3.488***	3.023***	3.449***
	(0.219)	(0.198)	(0.188)	(0.200)	(0.227)	(0.171)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Regression tables with logit estimation

See Tables A17–A24.

Table A17
Energy policy support and energy insecurity – logit.

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.428**	0.751***	0.345**	0.869***
	(0.153)	(0.160)	(0.150)	(0.159)
Age	0.044***	0.042***	0.027***	0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	0.095	0.065	0.038	0.002
	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Educ: Low	−0.049	−0.007	−0.420*	−0.408*
	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.228)	(0.231)
Educ: Mid	0.070	0.066	−0.416**	−0.450**
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.175)
Left-Right	−0.091**	−0.083**	−0.048	−0.038
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Income	0.036	0.038	0.037	0.042
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
PID: DUP	0.183	0.175	14.726	14.721
	(1.183)	(1.194)	(721.980)	(703.532)
PID: Green Party	−0.388	−0.229	−0.048	0.137
	(0.358)	(0.364)	(0.369)	(0.378)
PID: Labour Party	0.071	0.081	−0.111	−0.131
	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.202)	(0.204)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A17 *(continued)*

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.011	−0.010	−0.305	−0.330
	(0.341)	(0.343)	(0.330)	(0.334)
PID: No Party	−0.254	−0.273	−0.429*	−0.471**
	(0.241)	(0.242)	(0.233)	(0.236)
PID: Other	−0.194	−0.206	−0.829	−0.924*
	(0.588)	(0.594)	(0.543)	(0.550)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.060	0.029	14.746	14.855
	(0.953)	(0.940)	(575.509)	(562.369)
PID: SDLP	14.573	14.331	14.416	14.162
	(973.195)	(1007.544)	(1025.601)	(1028.130)
PID: Sinn Féin	15.683	15.607	15.285	15.141
	(1455.398)	(1455.398)	(1455.398)	(1455.398)
PID: SNP	0.399	0.488	0.641	0.732
	(0.459)	(0.468)	(0.489)	(0.496)
PID: UKIP	−0.453	−0.436	−0.393	−0.404
	(0.431)	(0.432)	(0.423)	(0.427)
PID: UUP	14.851	14.671	0.166	−0.054
	(682.231)	(700.488)	(1.207)	(1.184)
Intercept	−1.123**	−1.389***	−0.088	−0.483
	(0.436)	(0.444)	(0.432)	(0.441)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A18
Climate policy support and energy insecurity – logit.

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.333**	0.383**	0.348**	0.591***
	(0.138)	(0.150)	(0.139)	(0.149)
Age	0.002	0.000	0.018***	0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	−0.048	−0.064	−0.014	−0.038
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Educ: Low	−0.142	−0.107	−0.555**	−0.527**
	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Educ: Mid	−0.117	−0.107	−0.264*	−0.266*
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Left-Right	−0.070**	−0.066*	−0.043	−0.036
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Income	0.053**	0.051**	0.052**	0.053**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
PID: DUP	−0.622	−0.641	−1.130	−1.172
	(1.167)	(1.169)	(1.173)	(1.183)
PID: Green Party	−0.185	−0.098	0.019	0.142
	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.344)
PID: Labour Party	0.323*	0.338*	0.205	0.210
	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.184)	(0.184)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.659**	0.671**	0.331	0.336
	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.313)	(0.313)
PID: No Party	−0.437*	−0.440**	−0.279	−0.296
	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.217)	(0.218)
PID: Other	−0.815	−0.784	−1.102*	−1.121**
	(0.602)	(0.600)	(0.566)	(0.566)
PID: Plaid Cymru	1.010	0.996	0.664	0.691
	(0.888)	(0.894)	(0.890)	(0.898)
PID: SDLP	14.805	14.726	14.232	14.089
	(623.856)	(617.746)	(623.731)	(621.693)
PID: Sinn Féin	14.904	14.901	15.090	15.039
	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)
PID: SNP	1.140***	1.170***	0.604	0.654
	(0.406)	(0.406)	(0.401)	(0.404)
PID: UKIP	−1.057**	−1.008**	−0.818*	−0.790*
	(0.480)	(0.478)	(0.421)	(0.419)
PID: UUP	0.160	0.079	0.840	0.699
	(1.021)	(1.016)	(1.191)	(1.175)
Intercept	−0.324	−0.363	−0.598	−0.791*
	(0.404)	(0.406)	(0.403)	(0.408)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A19
Social policy support and energy insecurity- logit.

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.443***	0.675***	0.050	0.128
	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.141)	(0.153)
Age	0.013***	0.010**	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.113	0.084	−0.122	−0.128
	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.137)
Educ: Low	0.147	0.195	−0.731***	−0.728***
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.222)	(0.221)
Educ: Mid	0.195	0.203	−0.133	−0.135
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Left-Right	−0.091**	−0.084**	−0.051	−0.049
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Income	0.044*	0.044*	0.025	0.025
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
PID: DUP	14.574	14.561	1.942*	1.939*
	(438.708)	(433.896)	(1.173)	(1.173)
PID: Green Party	−0.169	−0.030	0.393	0.415
	(0.337)	(0.341)	(0.339)	(0.339)
PID: Labour Party	0.238	0.250	0.367**	0.364**
	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.186)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.138	0.147	0.153	0.151
	(0.302)	(0.303)	(0.306)	(0.306)
PID: No Party	−0.407*	−0.422*	−0.486**	−0.491**
	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.241)	(0.241)
PID: Other	−0.296	−0.292	−0.180	−0.190
	(0.533)	(0.533)	(0.565)	(0.564)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.720	0.725	2.316**	2.336**
	(0.895)	(0.895)	(1.118)	(1.120)
PID: SDLP	14.428	14.263	15.112	15.081
	(610.147)	(623.250)	(620.585)	(619.135)
PID: Sinn Féin	14.631	14.582	15.687	15.667
	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)
PID: SNP	0.374	0.430	−0.471	−0.462
	(0.387)	(0.392)	(0.422)	(0.422)
PID: UKIP	0.154	0.200	−0.108	−0.108
	(0.403)	(0.403)	(0.429)	(0.428)
PID: UUP	1.071	0.952	0.403	0.383
	(1.170)	(1.172)	(1.015)	(1.014)
Intercept	−0.699*	−0.888**	−0.040	−0.098
	(0.401)	(0.407)	(0.410)	(0.412)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A20
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions – logit.

	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Experience	−0.175	−0.106	0.388	−0.662	0.011	−0.102
	(0.420)	(0.412)	(0.414)	(0.451)	(0.417)	(0.433)
Expectation	0.645***	0.949***	0.308	0.395**	0.551***	0.119
	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.197)
Experience X Expectation	0.299	−0.026	−0.211	0.863*	0.179	0.099
	(0.460)	(0.453)	(0.441)	(0.477)	(0.443)	(0.461)
Age	0.042***	0.025***	0.001	0.016***	0.011**	−0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.073	0.001	−0.063	−0.025	0.091	−0.127
	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.137)
Educ: Low	−0.006	−0.395*	−0.137	−0.522**	0.179	−0.723***
	(0.234)	(0.232)	(0.206)	(0.208)	(0.206)	(0.222)
Educ: Mid	0.061	−0.445**	−0.118	−0.275*	0.193	−0.135
	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Left-Right	−0.081**	−0.037	−0.068*	−0.030	−0.084**	−0.048
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Income	0.038	0.041	0.054**	0.053**	0.047*	0.025
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A20 *(continued)*

	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
PID: DUP	0.166	14.724	−0.634	−1.168	14.561	1.937*
	(1.191)	(703.711)	(1.169)	(1.178)	(434.057)	(1.173)
PID: Green Party	−0.217	0.161	−0.157	0.207	−0.045	0.428
	(0.370)	(0.383)	(0.345)	(0.352)	(0.345)	(0.344)
PID: Labour Party	0.079	−0.119	0.316*	0.219	0.237	0.367**
	(0.208)	(0.205)	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.186)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.023	−0.320	0.662**	0.317	0.132	0.151
	(0.343)	(0.334)	(0.305)	(0.313)	(0.304)	(0.306)
PID: No Party	−0.268	−0.469**	−0.450**	−0.279	−0.422*	−0.489**
	(0.243)	(0.236)	(0.225)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.241)
PID: Other	−0.228	−0.898	−0.825	−1.153**	−0.331	−0.188
	(0.594)	(0.551)	(0.602)	(0.567)	(0.535)	(0.565)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.048	14.836	1.039	0.699	0.757	2.332**
	(0.942)	(562.649)	(0.894)	(0.895)	(0.896)	(1.120)
PID: SDLP	14.359	14.153	14.733	14.126	14.283	15.084
	(999.136)	(1026.671)	(621.656)	(623.896)	(620.297)	(619.251)
PID: Sinn Féin	15.565	15.165	14.886	14.967	14.542	15.662
	(1455.398)	(1455.398)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)
PID: SNP	0.484	0.740	1.159***	0.659	0.421	−0.460
	(0.468)	(0.496)	(0.407)	(0.404)	(0.392)	(0.422)
PID: UKIP	−0.443	−0.384	−1.053**	−0.799*	0.174	−0.102
	(0.435)	(0.428)	(0.480)	(0.423)	(0.405)	(0.429)
PID: UUP	14.701	−0.084	0.110	0.752	0.984	0.384
	(699.757)	(1.182)	(1.019)	(1.180)	(1.171)	(1.015)
Intercept	−1.387***	−0.453	−0.444	−0.775*	−0.928**	−0.088
	(0.447)	(0.443)	(0.411)	(0.413)	(0.412)	(0.416)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A21
Energy policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living – logit.

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.466**	0.571**	0.240	0.918***
	(0.206)	(0.242)	(0.203)	(0.244)
Cost of Living	−0.057	0.237	0.157	−0.063
	(0.206)	(0.240)	(0.204)	(0.242)
Age	0.044***	0.042***	0.027***	0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Female	0.098	0.044	0.029	0.008
	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.150)
Educ: Low	−0.051	−0.012	−0.415*	−0.407*
	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.228)	(0.231)
Educ: Mid	0.069	0.059	−0.416**	−0.448**
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.175)
Left-Right	−0.092**	−0.083**	−0.047	−0.038
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Income	0.036	0.037	0.037	0.042
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
PID: DUP	0.183	0.156	14.724	14.725
	(1.183)	(1.197)	(721.463)	(704.446)
PID: Green Party	−0.394	−0.258	−0.031	0.145
	(0.359)	(0.366)	(0.369)	(0.379)
PID: Labour Party	0.074	0.061	−0.118	−0.126
	(0.206)	(0.208)	(0.203)	(0.205)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.008	−0.025	−0.315	−0.326
	(0.341)	(0.343)	(0.331)	(0.334)
PID: No Party	−0.248	−0.287	−0.444*	−0.468**
	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.234)	(0.236)
PID: Other	−0.185	−0.264	−0.857	−0.910*
	(0.588)	(0.596)	(0.545)	(0.553)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.051	0.023	14.768	14.854
	(0.952)	(0.942)	(574.198)	(563.104)
PID: SDLP	14.569	14.302	14.421	14.169
	(974.629)	(1007.725)	(1024.273)	(1028.145)
PID: Sinn Féin	15.689	15.581	15.269	15.147
	(1455.398)	(1455.398)	(1455.398)	(1455.398)
PID: SNP	0.395	0.463	0.652	0.739
	(0.459)	(0.468)	(0.489)	(0.497)
PID: UKIP	−0.451	−0.448	−0.399	−0.401
	(0.431)	(0.433)	(0.423)	(0.428)
PID: UUP	14.868	14.695	0.127	−0.061
	(680.237)	(706.334)	(1.201)	(1.185)
Intercept	−1.108**	−1.397***	−0.130	−0.480
	(0.439)	(0.444)	(0.436)	(0.441)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A22
Climate policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living – logit.

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.251	0.143	0.243	0.462**
	(0.194)	(0.227)	(0.192)	(0.226)
Cost of Living	0.118	0.311	0.152	0.167
	(0.195)	(0.221)	(0.193)	(0.221)
Age	0.002	0.000	0.018***	0.016***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	−0.053	−0.088	−0.021	−0.052
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.136)
Educ: Low	−0.139	−0.116	−0.552**	−0.533**
	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Educ: Mid	−0.116	−0.117	−0.263*	−0.272*
	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Left-Right	−0.069**	−0.065*	−0.042	−0.036
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Income	0.053**	0.051**	0.052**	0.053**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
PID: DUP	−0.624	−0.671	−1.131	−1.190
	(1.167)	(1.171)	(1.173)	(1.185)
PID: Green Party	−0.171	−0.132	0.038	0.124
	(0.340)	(0.342)	(0.341)	(0.345)
PID: Labour Party	0.320*	0.318*	0.201	0.198
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.185)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.653**	0.660**	0.323	0.328
	(0.305)	(0.304)	(0.313)	(0.313)
PID: No Party	−0.445**	−0.453**	−0.291	−0.303
	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.217)	(0.218)
PID: Other	−0.834	−0.850	−1.129**	−1.156**
	(0.603)	(0.602)	(0.567)	(0.568)
PID: Plaid Cymru	1.025	0.996	0.683	0.691
	(0.889)	(0.897)	(0.891)	(0.900)
PID: SDLP	14.808	14.692	14.236	14.070
	(624.070)	(617.602)	(623.265)	(621.643)
PID: Sinn Féin	14.896	14.878	15.079	15.026
	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)
PID: SNP	1.149***	1.144***	0.616	0.639
	(0.406)	(0.407)	(0.401)	(0.404)
PID: UKIP	−1.057**	−1.022**	−0.820*	−0.798*
	(0.480)	(0.479)	(0.420)	(0.420)
PID: UUP	0.141	0.129	0.804	0.721
	(1.020)	(1.016)	(1.186)	(1.173)
Intercept	−0.357	−0.386	−0.641	−0.801**
	(0.407)	(0.407)	(0.407)	(0.408)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A23
Social policy support and energy insecurity – adjusting for cost of living – logit.

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.161	0.293	0.181	−0.089
	(0.191)	(0.223)	(0.198)	(0.233)
Cost of Living	0.408**	0.498**	−0.188	0.282
	(0.192)	(0.218)	(0.198)	(0.228)
Age	0.014***	0.011**	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.095	0.045	−0.115	−0.150
	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Educ: Low	0.156	0.180	−0.736***	−0.736***
	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.222)	(0.221)
Educ: Mid	0.198	0.188	−0.134	−0.145
	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Left-Right	−0.091**	−0.084**	−0.051	−0.049
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Income	0.046*	0.045*	0.024	0.026
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
PID: DUP	14.573	14.526	1.946*	1.919
	(436.727)	(430.259)	(1.173)	(1.174)
PID: Green Party	−0.121	−0.085	0.372	0.385
	(0.339)	(0.343)	(0.339)	(0.341)
PID: Labour Party	0.226	0.216	0.373**	0.345*
	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.186)
PID: Liberal Democrats	0.118	0.128	0.162	0.141
	(0.303)	(0.304)	(0.307)	(0.306)

(*continued on next page*)

Table A23 *(continued)*

	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
PID: No Party	−0.439**	−0.445**	−0.472*	−0.502**
	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.241)	(0.241)
PID: Other	−0.365	−0.399	−0.149	−0.250
	(0.536)	(0.535)	(0.566)	(0.566)
PID: Plaid Cymru	0.776	0.725	2.298**	2.336**
	(0.899)	(0.899)	(1.119)	(1.121)
PID: SDLP	14.442	14.204	15.110	15.049
	(604.257)	(623.340)	(619.274)	(619.023)
PID: Sinn Féin	14.602	14.546	15.704	15.646
	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)
PID: SNP	0.405	0.390	−0.484	−0.486
	(0.389)	(0.392)	(0.423)	(0.423)
PID: UKIP	0.144	0.176	−0.106	−0.120
	(0.403)	(0.404)	(0.429)	(0.428)
PID: UUP	0.991	1.018	0.435	0.428
	(1.166)	(1.169)	(1.017)	(1.017)
Intercept	−0.816**	−0.927**	0.014	−0.119
	(0.406)	(0.409)	(0.414)	(0.413)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Table A24
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions adjusting for cost of living interactions – logit.

	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Energy Experience	0.067	−0.013	0.399	−0.559	−0.059	−0.029
	(0.442)	(0.424)	(0.425)	(0.461)	(0.428)	(0.442)
Energy Expectation	0.667**	1.028***	0.161	0.394	0.273	−0.095
	(0.289)	(0.286)	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.251)	(0.263)
Energy Exper. X Expect.	0.110	−0.103	−0.288	0.717	0.068	0.184
	(0.494)	(0.479)	(0.465)	(0.499)	(0.466)	(0.484)
Costs Experience	−1.527***	−0.446	−0.222	−0.767*	−0.019	−0.552
	(0.486)	(0.424)	(0.430)	(0.449)	(0.429)	(0.462)
Costs Expectation	−0.035	−0.125	0.198	−0.028	0.366	0.379
	(0.306)	(0.303)	(0.265)	(0.269)	(0.262)	(0.272)
Age	0.040***	0.024***	0.001	0.015***	0.011**	−0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.053	0.004	−0.086	−0.041	0.049	−0.150
	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.139)
Educ: Low	−0.009	−0.396*	−0.140	−0.530**	0.175	−0.734***
	(0.236)	(0.233)	(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.222)
Educ: Mid	0.044	−0.450**	−0.125	−0.286*	0.184	−0.149
	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.156)
Left-Right	−0.079**	−0.036	−0.067*	−0.029	−0.084**	−0.047
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Income	0.036	0.040	0.053**	0.052**	0.047*	0.023
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)
PID: DUP	0.125	14.719	−0.661	−1.187	14.530	1.906
	(1.190)	(705.952)	(1.171)	(1.178)	(431.023)	(1.176)
PID: Green Party	−0.268	0.153	−0.179	0.192	−0.073	0.380
	(0.374)	(0.384)	(0.346)	(0.353)	(0.347)	(0.346)
PID: Labour Party	0.077	−0.113	0.303*	0.214	0.210	0.358*
	(0.211)	(0.206)	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.187)
PID: Liberal Democrats	−0.048	−0.324	0.649**	0.299	0.111	0.152
	(0.344)	(0.335)	(0.305)	(0.314)	(0.305)	(0.307)
PID: No Party	−0.244	−0.457*	−0.459**	−0.276	−0.451**	−0.478**
	(0.246)	(0.237)	(0.226)	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.242)
PID: Other	−0.263	−0.889	−0.877	−1.185**	−0.432	−0.217
	(0.595)	(0.554)	(0.604)	(0.569)	(0.537)	(0.568)
PID: Plaid Cymru	−0.017	14.818	1.029	0.679	0.761	2.297**
	(0.939)	(564.506)	(0.897)	(0.895)	(0.900)	(1.125)
PID: SDLP	14.325	14.161	14.707	14.120	14.245	15.022
	(1003.111)	(1026.791)	(621.337)	(623.931)	(620.068)	(613.501)
PID: Sinn Féin	15.486	15.145	14.860	14.924	14.509	15.643
	(1455.398)	(1455.398)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)	(882.743)
PID: SNP	0.415	0.730	1.138**	0.636	0.398	−0.513
	(0.467)	(0.496)	(0.407)	(0.404)	(0.392)	(0.424)
PID: UKIP	−0.499	−0.402	−1.070**	−0.828**	0.150	−0.105
	(0.433)	(0.428)	(0.480)	(0.423)	(0.406)	(0.430)
PID: UUP	14.671	−0.110	0.120	0.708	0.989	0.477
	(698.992)	(1.187)	(1.020)	(1.180)	(1.171)	(1.020)
Intercept	−1.204**	−0.395	−0.428	−0.692*	−0.958**	0.000
	(0.455)	(0.448)	(0.416)	(0.418)	(0.418)	(0.422)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.

Additional analysis partialing out the general costs of living

See Tables A25–A27 and Figs. A1–A3.

Table A25
Energy policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.095**	0.116**	0.049	0.189***
	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Cost of Living	−0.011	0.048	0.032	−0.016
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.



Fig. A1. Energy policy support depends upon energy insecurity, even after adjusting for cost of living pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.

Table A26
Climate policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.058	0.033	0.057	0.108**
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Cost of living	0.029	0.073	0.036	0.040
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.052)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.



Fig. A2. Climate policy support depends upon energy insecurity, even after adjusting for cost of living pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.

Table A27
Social policy support and energy insecurity adjusting for cost of living.

	Compensation		Investment	
	Experience	Expectations	Experience	Expectations
Energy insecurity	0.038	0.070	0.040	−0.021
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.052)
Cost of living	0.097**	0.118**	−0.041	0.063
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.051)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.



Fig. A3. Social policy support depends upon energy insecurity, even after adjusting for cost of living pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.

Energy insecurity and cost of living pathways

See Figs. A4–A6 and Table A28.

Table A28
Policy preferences and energy insecurity interactions adjusting for cost of living interactions.

	Energy		Climate		Social	
	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment	Compensation	Investment
Energy Experience	0.002	−0.021	0.090	−0.113	−0.016	−0.008
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.097)
Energy Expectation	0.129**	0.201***	0.037	0.090	0.065	−0.025
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Energy Exper. X Expect.	0.037	0.009	−0.065	0.149	0.017	0.044
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.106)
Costs Experience	−0.333***	−0.105	−0.050	−0.167*	−0.003	−0.111
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.097)
Costs Expectation	−0.010	−0.033	0.046	−0.004	0.088	0.086
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Costs Exper. X Expect.	0.324***	0.110	0.064	0.184*	0.048	0.037
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.106)
Num.obs.	993	993	993	993	993	993
Covariate adjustment	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.005$.



Fig. A4. How energy policy support depends upon cost of living pathways, after adjusting for energy insecurity pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.



Fig. A5. How climate policy support depends upon cost of living pathways, after adjusting for energy insecurity pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.



Fig. A6. How social policy support depends upon cost of living pathways, after adjusting for energy insecurity pathways. Points indicate predicted policy support by energy insecurity. Lines indicate 95 % confidence intervals.

Full item wording for items not detailed in main text

Sex
Q: What is your sex? *If you're not sure how to answer, use the sex registered on your official documents, such as passport or driving licence.*

- Female
- Male

Education (1–2 = Low Education, 3–5 = Medium Education, 6–7 = High Education)
Q: What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1. Primary school
2. Secondary school
3. General National Vocational Qualification Foundation or Intermediate Level (GNVQ, GSVQ) / GCSE/ SCE standard
4. NVQ1, NVQ2
5. NVQ3 / SCE Higher grade / Scottish Certificate of Sixth Year Studies / General National Vocational Qualification Advanced Level / GCE Advanced Level (GCE A/AS)
6. NVQ4 / Higher National Certificate (HNC) / Higher National Diploma (HND)/ Diploma in HE (including nurse training) / Bachelor's degree (BA, BSc, BEd, BEng, MB, BDS, BV, etc.)
7. NVQ5 / Master's degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) / Post-graduate diplomas and certificates / Doctorate (Ph.D.)

Country
Q: Which country in the UK do you live in?

- England
- Northern Ireland
- Scotland
- Wales

Income
Q: What is the combined total yearly income after taxes earned by all members of your household? *Please include all your income sources including: wages, scholarships, pension and other benefits, dividends from shares, income from rental properties, child support and alimony etc. We are not interested in the type of income source, only in the total annual income earned by all the members of your household together.*

- Under £12,000 (Under £1000 per month) (1)
- £12,000 - £16,000 (£1000 - £1333 per month) (2)
- £16,000 - £20,000 (£1334 - £1666 per month) (3)
- £20,000 - £24,000 (£1667 - £2000 per month) (4)
- £24,000 - £29,000 (£2001 - £2416 per month) (5)
- £29,000 - £35,000 (£2417 - £2916 per month) (6)
- £35,000 - £41,000 (£2917 - £3416 per month) (7)
- £41,000 - £51,000 (£3417 - £4250 per month) (8)
- £51,000 - £66,000 (£4251 - £5500 per month) (9)
- More than £66,000 (More than £5500 per month) (10)
- No answer (−99)

Left-right position
Q: In political matters, people talk of "left" and "right". How would you place your views on this scale?

- 0 (Left)
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10 (Right)

Political party support
Q: Which political party do you feel closest to politically?

1. Conservative party
2. Labour party
3. Scottish National Party (SNP) [if respondent in Scotland]
4. Liberal democrats
5. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) [if respondent in NI]
6. Sinn Féin [if respondent in NI]
7. Plaid cymru [if respondent in Wales]
8. Green party
9. Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) [if respondent in NI]
10. Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) [if respondent in NI]
11. UK Independence Party (UKIP)
12. Other
13. No party

Energy insecurity: experience
Q: In the last 12 months has it been more difficult or easier to pay your energy bills?

- Very difficult (1)
- Somewhat difficult (2)
- Neither difficult nor easy (3)
- Somewhat easy (4)
- Very easy (5)

Cost of living (CoL): experience
Q: In the last 12 months has it been more difficult or easier to pay your everyday costs of living?

- Very difficult (1)
- Somewhat difficult (2)
- Neither difficult nor easy (3)
- Somewhat easy (4)
- Very easy (5)

Energy insecurity: expectation
Q: In the next 12 months do you think it will be more difficult or easier to pay your energy bills?

- Very difficult (1)
- Somewhat difficult (2)
- Neither difficult nor easy (3)
- Somewhat easy (4)
- Very easy (5)

Cost of living (CoL): expectation
Q: In the next 12 months do you think it will be more difficult or easier to pay your everyday costs of living?

- Very difficult (1)
- Somewhat difficult (2)
- Neither difficult nor easy (3)
- Somewhat easy (4)
- Very easy (5)

Descriptive statistics

Table A29
Summary statistics.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
energy_compensate_supp	1031	0.7	0.46	0	0	1	1
energy_compensate	1031	4	1.2	1	3	5	5
energy_invest_supp	1031	0.7	0.46	0	0	1	1
energy_invest	1031	4	1	1	3	5	5
climate_compensate_supp	1031	0.46	0.5	0	0	1	1
climate_compensate	1031	3.4	0.95	1	3	4	5
climate_invest_supp	1031	0.56	0.5	0	0	1	1
climate_invest	1031	3.6	1	1	3	4	5
social_compensate_supp	1031	0.53	0.5	0	0	1	1
social_compensate	1031	3.5	1.1	1	3	4	5
social_invest_supp	1031	0.38	0.49	0	0	1	1
social_invest	1031	3.3	0.87	1	3	4	5
energy_last12_bin	1031	0.51	0.5	0	0	1	1
energy_next12_bin	1031	0.72	0.45	0	0	1	1
costs_last12_bin	1031	0.53	0.5	0	0	1	1
costs_next12_bin	1031	0.68	0.47	0	0	1	1
age	1031	47	17	18	32	60	80
female	1031	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1
educ_categ	1031						
… HighEduc	330	32 %					
… LowEduc	181	18 %					
… MidEduc	520	50 %					
leftright	1031	4.9	2.1	0	4	6	10
income	993	5.4	2.8	1	3	8	10
pid	1031						
… Conservative Party	278	27 %					
… DUP	5	0 %					
… Green Party	49	5 %					
… Labour Party	383	37 %					
… Liberal Democrats	59	6 %					
… No Party	160	16 %					
… Other	17	2 %					
… Plaid Cymru	7	1 %					
… SDLP	2	0 %					
… Sinn Féin	1	0 %					
… SNP	36	3 %					
… UKIP	30	3 %					
… UUP	4	0 %					

Table A30
Distribution of energy insecurity measures.

	Energy expectations: 0	Energy expectations: 1
Energy Experience: 0	0.26	0.23
Energy Experience: 1	0.03	0.48

Table A31
Distribution of cost of living measures.

	CoL expectations: 0	CoL expectations: 1
CoL Experience: 0	0.29	0.18
CoL Experience: 1	0.03	0.50

Table A32
Joint distribution of energy insecurity and cost of living measures – experience.

	CoL experience: 0	CoL experience: 1
Energy Experience: 0	0.41	0.08
Energy Experience: 1	0.06	0.45

Table A33
Joint Distribution of energy insecurity and cost of living measures – expectations.

	CoL expectations: 0	CoL expectations: 1
Energy Expectations: 0	0.25	0.03
Energy Expectations: 1	0.07	0.65

Data availability

Data will be made available on the Harvard Dataverse upon publication.

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