When do people trust their government?[1]

Charles A. E. Goodhart[2], Ly Hoang Vu[3]

Abstract:

There has been widespread concern about the decrease in trust in government and the need to regain it. Policymakers and researchers have been working on reasons for this, and how to reverse it. In this study, we rely on a recent sample prepared by the World Values Survey, wave 7. It includes over 81,000 observations across 52 countries for the years 2017 - 22. Our study offers three main findings. The first is that economic growth plays a crucial role in determining trust in government, and its importance appears consistent across all regions. The second is the presence of a "Trust Paradox," whereby trust in government tends to be lower in fully democratic countries compared to single-party states, with the exception of Latin America. The third is that migration generally is positively related to trust in government. We explain this by noting that, historically, this has often been the case; however, when inward migration exceeds a certain threshold, the effect on trust often shifts.

Keywords: Democracy, Economic growth, Immigration, Media, Trust in government, Trust Paradox.

1. Introduction

Governor of Bank of England Andrew Bailey once said in his remarks at King's College, Cambridge in January 2025[4] as follows:

> "But it has taken on greater force in a world of so-called populism which embodies at least three pertinent features: first a greater emphasis on domestic production and the

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[2] LSE, United Kingdom (Email: C.A.Goodhart@lse.ac.uk)
[3] University of Lille, France (Email: hvlwork@gmail.com)
[4] Source: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2025/january/andrew-bailey-remarks-at-bretton-woods-institutions-cambridge

distribution of wealth relative to stability and the benefits of openness; second, a tendency to attribute unfavourable conditions to outside forces in a context of low trust societies; and third, with this decline in trust institutions are viewed as distant, unresponsive and acting for the benefit of powerful and uncontrollable interests."

There has been widespread concern about falling trust in societies since trust plays a crucial role in most aspects of human life and society. Trust reduces agency, transaction, monitor and control costs (Macaulay, 1963; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zand, 1972). It fosters relationships and cooperation (Das & Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1995). One of the well-known definitions of trust is *"the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party"* (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). Low trust environments impact social cohesion adversely. It also limits governments' ability to function efficiently and deal with domestic and global problems (OECD, 2023). In addition, when citizens believe in a policy's benefits, they are more likely to comply, reducing implementation costs and expanding feasible interventions. Thus, state effectiveness increases with greater trust in government (Besley & Dray, 2024). In contrast, when distrusting their own government, citizens are motivated to vote to replace the distrusted government in power (Müller, 2013). The recent work of Kuang et al. (2025) finds a link between political polarization and trust in the Federal Reserves (Fed) in the USA. In particular, after doing an experiment with over 5,600 respondents on the President Trump's 2025 inauguration day, the authors find that people viewing the Fed as politically aligned have greater trust in the Fed. This also leads to lower inflation expectations and uncertainty.

The literature also shows a negative relation between trust in government and democracy. Hosking (2019) argues that a tacit bargain exists between elites and the rest of society in democratic societies. The latter accepts the former's power, prestige and prosperity, but only if they prosper as well. However, when people feel that the country is not being governed for them, their trust in the government declines. "Political life and trust have an uneasy relationship with each other" (Uslaner, 2022, p.172), and so the link between democracy and trust in government is unstable. Rainer and Siedler (2009) analyze the change in levels of institutional trust in East (under the communist regime) and West Germany (liberal democratic system) after they were reunited in

1990. The authors find that institutional trust in the East increased significantly to converge towards those in the West in the post-reunification period. However, transitioning from the communist regime to a liberal democratic system did not create more social trust in the East. It might be due to the economic and social problems faced by many East Germans in the post-reunification period. In other words, economic growth also plays a role here.

In this exercise, we have relied heavily on the World Values Survey wave 7 (hereafter WVS 7). This surveyed respondents in 66 countries between 2017 and 2022. We report the countries involved and the number of respondents, and then discuss the questions that the WVS 7 asked in Section 2 at greater length. We include a description of all of variable in Table 1 in the Appendix. Because it provides the background to much of our work, we go on to describe how the respondents' attitude to trust in government reacted to a variety of questions asked in that wave, enabling us to see how such trust responded in countries and continents (e.g. Asia, Europe and other advanced economies, Latin America, Africa and Middle East), and to social and economic factors such as age, gender, education, etc. We report briefly on the results of these factors, which we also generally use as control variables in later studies. We also note how trust in government tends to be highly correlated with trust in other types of authority, such as trust in Parliament, World Bank and IMF, a correlation that has been found by other research workers.

Then in Section 3, we examine growth and the "Trust paradox". The "Trust Paradox", as has been noted by several other economists and other research workers in this field, indicates that the more a country is reckoned to be democratic, the *less* its inhabitants tend to trust its government. To do so, we proceed to introduce additional variables into our exercise. First, we add variables of economic growth: real GDP growth and real GDP per capita growth. They are on on a ten and five-year average growth basis. Then we include the same set of personal variables as we ran in Section 2 to test their effect. Next, we rerun the regression equation for countries in each continent separately. Besides continents, we also divide our sample of countries into three different groups: single-party, fully-democratic and mixed countries. The groups were those which had a single party continuously in power, sometimes described as autocratic countries; a group of countries which had strong and persistent democratic elections and institutions; and in between, a group of countries which had a mixed recent history, with some degree of alternation between single party

and democratic elections in recent decades. The dividing line between these groups is undoubtedly fuzzy. We state which countries we have put into which group in Section 3 as well. In practice, the dividing line between the single party and the mixed group did not matter very much for our analysis, because in both cases the relationship between trust in government as the dependent variable, and growth and democracy are broadly similar. This is very much in accord with the work and findings of the recent work by Besley et. al. (2025). After rerunning the regression for the three groups, we find that the relationship between growth, democracy and trust in government is much less clear for the main full democratic countries. In other words, the relationship between growth, democracy and trust in government tends to be rather unstable, probably in our view because there is considerable collinearity between low growth and full democracy. We also provide bilateral charts for the linkage between economic growth and trust in government for each group.

Next, we use V-DEM Democracy Indices by the V-Dem Institute to obtain an electoral democracy index and liberal democracy index. Based on them, we create two variables for the country's level of democracy. Adding those two, we rerun the estimation regressions. In a considerable number of regression studies of this relationship, we find that the relationship between growth and trust in government showed some instability. This might be affected by the country's level of democracy. Autocratic countries are not so concerned with legitimacy, people's trust in the government because they can suppress that by political manipulation or military power. Meanwhile, in democratic states coercion is replaced by people's voluntary compliance (Letki, 2018). In addition, with economic growth, better economic conditions, more employment opportunities, people trust their government more (Chen, 2017; Muringani et al., 2024; Wright, 2007) and they likely accept public policy and program weaknesses (Cheema, 2013). So trust in government is greater in some autocratic countries with high economic growth than in democratic ones with low growth.

In Section 4, we consider what factors might have led to such a steady decline in trust in government in these countries, besides low growth. Again, we focus on the set of fully democratic countries, but we also in some cases look at the full set of countries, including the single party and mixed groups. Greater access to information allows citizens to follow what is going on in their country and around the globe, and be well-positioned to hold the government accountable, increasing the transparency of performance and policies of the government. Most people learn

about government from outside sources rather than, or as well as, their own personal experience. They get news and information from two common sources: traditional (e.g. TV, radio, newspapers) and social channels (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc). For the former, most information and news need to be checked and verified by editorial boards before being released to the public. Criticism in newspapers hurts trust in government (Miller et al., 1979). Regarding the latter, although social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter (now renamed X) have verification teams, misleading information and fake news are still difficult to control. Ehrmann and Wabitsch (2022) study central bank's communication and find that X posts with negative, stronger or more subjective views are more likely reposted and reacted by audience. This suggests that social media can act as a multiplier of criticism. Especially in recent years, the use of social media has become stronger as the mobile internet becomes more affordable and popular. Analyzing the sample of around 840,000 people in 2,232 subnational regions of 116 countries across all continents during 2008-17, Guriev et al. (2021) find that the development of 3G mobile internet infrastructure results in increasing Internet use. This enables people to become more aware of corruption and less confident in the country's government. However, they also note that 3G mobile internet reduces trust in government only when the Internet is not censored. This suggests that autocrats may often use internet censorship as a rational strategy. In addition, the authors also emphasize that the impact of the internet on trust in government is significant when traditional media is censored while the Internet is free. In other words, people use the Internet to get political information when there are no other sources. Gozgor (2022) highlights that the effect of media on trust in government is mixed: positive or negative. More recently, Burn-Murdoch (2025) analyses the link between TikTok usage and support for Reform UK in the UK general election by utilizing data from waves 21 and 28 of the British Election Study, which follows the same group of British adults over time to track changes in their political views and attitudes. This analysis suggests that news consumption on TikTok is associated with increased support for Reform UK between 2021 and 2024, particularly among men, highlighting the distinct political environments shaped by social media platforms across different demographics. The author then states that *"The misinformation discourse will doubtless rumble on, but like the teen glued to the screen, it misses the broader context."*. Here we attempt to assess whether those who follow traditional news media differ in their trust in government from those who focus on increasingly popular social media. We include both variables, traditional and social channels, in the estimation regression rather than placing

them separately. We find that those following traditional media tend to trust government, while those following mainly social media tend to distrust government. Again, we examine the extent to this relationship differs between the fully democratic countries and the single party countries. Norris (2000), argues that access to media fosters people's political interest and participation, thereby increasing public trust of the ruling party. Media also shapes political values and mobilizes voters (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Interestingly, we also find the similar results for countries in each continent separately.

Finally, in this section, we note that the extent of net inward migration has become a major political issue and seek to examine whether it has had a (negative) effect on trust in government. Section 5 then concludes.

2. Respondents' trust in Government differs greatly from country to country

A key feature of the WVS survey wave 7 (WVS 7) relating to trust in government is how much the survey results differ from country to country. In Table 1 below, we show the coefficient of the trust in government when we divide our survey sample by the respondents in each country. These vary from the most trusting country, which is China with a coefficient of 1.374, to the country where the respondents have least trust, in Peru with a coefficient of -0.512.

What is quite notable is that the degree of trust appears to vary quite strongly by continent,[5] though the coverage of countries in each continent in this sample is somewhat lopsided. Thus, coverage of countries in the land-mass of the Americas, both North and South, was good, which included the vast bulk of the population; however, there were no entries whatsoever from the myriad island countries in the Caribbean, neither the middling sized countries, such as Cuba and Jamaca, nor the many tiny ones, such as St Kitts and the Leeward Islands. Again, there was good coverage of Asian countries, though the three countries with the greatest recent governance problems, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, were all excluded, which may lead to a slight exaggeration

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[5] There are a couple of countries where the continental affiliation is uncertain. The first is Türkiye, which could be included in either Europe, Asia or the Middle East. We have included it in the Middle East because this seems to us to be its closest connection. But that is debatable. The second is Armenia, which in some respects is quite European, rather like Georgia, but obviously could have been included in Asia.

of the degree of trust in most Asian countries. Also, India was not included, a pity since it will shortly be the world's most populous country, though Pakistan and Bangladesh were both included.

We have separated the Middle East and North-African countries into a separate group. This proved to be important in at least one respect, which is that religious affiliation is an important determinant of trust in these Muslim countries, but not elsewhere. In contrast, the coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa was very limited, only four countries in the sample, out of the 40, or so, countries there; with no representatives at all from francophone West Africa.

Table 1: The coefficients of trust in government for each country.

Country	Coef.	Country	Coef.	Country	Coef.	Country	Coef.
China	1.374	Malaysia	0.417	Czechia	0.086	Ukraine	-0.229
Vietnam	1.232	Kyrgyzstan	0.414	Netherlands	0.064	Iraq	-0.339
Indonesia	1.08	South Korea	0.412	Armenia	0.035	Brazil	-0.355
Philippines	1.052	Zimbabwe	0.404	Ecuador	0.024	Venezuela	-0.374
Bangladesh	1.045	Taiwan	0.388	US	0.011	Guatemala	-0.385
Singapore	0.944	Kenya	0.366	Argentina	0	Mexico	-0.387
Kazakhstan	0.82	Canada	0.348	Nicaragua	-0.001	Greece	-0.411
Türkiye	0.799	Germany	0.312	Bolivia	-0.008	Tunisia	-0.47
Ethiopia	0.742	Japan	0.294	Morocco	-0.082	Peru	-0.512
Pakistan	0.644	Nigeria	0.243	UK	-0.107		
Thailand	0.533	Mongolia	0.239	Serbia	-0.119		
New Zealand	0.487	Cyprus	0.226	Lebanon	-0.156		
Russia	0.458	Jordan	0.125	Colombia	-0.182		
Uruguay	0.438	Chile	0.119	Slovakia	-0.225		
Hong Kong	0.435	Australia	0.118	Romania	-0.229		
Observations	82022						
Adjusted R^2	0.246						

The coverage of Europe was patchy. There were no countries included at all from the Nordic area, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and none of the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. The only countries from Mediterranean Europe were Greece, and rather oddly, Cyprus, (presumably just Greek Cyprus), leaving out Portugal, Spain, Italy, Israel and Malta. The

sample from East Europe included Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Russia and Ukraine. The entries from West Europe were Germany, Netherlands and the UK, leaving out Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland.

Given the limited coverage of some major parts of the world, the conclusions that we draw from the rest of our study are necessarily subject to revision both from a wider sample and over time.

Of these countries, those in Asia showed the greatest trust, and Latin American countries the least, by a surprisingly large margin. European and other Advanced Economies come rather in the middle. Middle East countries also have little trust, whereas respondents in the African countries appear to be much more trusting, though there are only four countries from Africa in the WVS sample, so this is really too small a sample to be sure whether it is a proper representation of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is set out in Table 2 below.

Compared to the importance of which country the respondents happen to live in, the extent to which personal variables, which we shall continue to use as control variables, help to explain trust in government, is much more limited. Thus, we show in Table 3 below the result of regressing trust in government against these personal variables.

Note that the fit in Table 1, as represented by the adjusted R^2, of 0.25, is far greater than the adjusted R^2 in Table 3, of 0.149. This is mainly because the fixed country effects are largely, though not wholly, affected by the relative success of the government in maintaining economic growth and the provision of improving services to the community. As a result, whether a government is successful in serving its own community has more to do with people's trust in it than personal considerations. That said, some of the personal variables obviously are, when entered by themselves, something of a proxy for government success, in particular whether the respondent is satisfied, and expects their children to have a better life than themselves. So, what we turn to next is a regression including both the country variables and the personal variables at the same time. This is shown in Table 4 below. The addition of the country fixed effects strongly raises the adjusted R^2, from 0.149 to 0.315.

Table 2: The coefficients of trust in government for each country and its continent.

Asia		Europe & Other advanced economies		Latin America	
Country	**Coef.**	**Country**	**Coef.**	**Country**	**Coef.**
China	1.374	New Zealand	0.487	Ecuador	0.024
Vietnam	1.232	Russia	0.458	Argentina	0
Indonesia	1.08	Canada	0.348	Nicaragua	-0.001
Philippines	1.052	Germany	0.312	Bolivia	-0.008
Bangladesh	1.045	Cyprus	0.226	Colombia	-0.182
Singapore	0.944	Australia	0.118	Brazil	-0.355
Kazakhstan	0.82	Czechia	0.086	Venezuela	-0.374
Pakistan	0.644	Netherlands	0.064	Guatemala	-0.385
Thailand	0.533	Armenia	0.035	Mexico	-0.387
Hong Kong	0.435	US	0.011	Peru	-0.512
Malaysia	0.417	UK	-0.107	Ecuador	0.024
Kyrgyzstan	0.414	Serbia	-0.119	**Average Coef.**	**-0.218**
South Korea	0.412	Slovakia	-0.225		
Taiwan	0.388	Romania	-0.229	**Middle East**	
				Country	**Coef.**
Japan	0.294	Ukraine	-0.229	Türkiye	0.799
Mongolia	0.239	Greece	-0.411	Jordan	0.125
Average Coef	**0.71**	**Average Coef**	**0.06**	Morocco	-0.082
		Africa		Lebanon	-0.156
		Country	**Coef.**	Iraq	-0.339
		Ethiopia	0.742	Tunisia	-0.47
		Zimbabwe	0.404	**Average Coef**	**-0.02**
		Kenya	0.366		
		Nigeria	0.243		
		Average Coef	**0.44**		

Table 3: The linkage between trust in government and personal variables.

	TRUST_GOV
	(1)
RELIGIOUS	0.089***
	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.080***
	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.029***
	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.036***
	(0.000)
BETTER	0.148***
	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.049***
	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.002
	(0.830)
IMIGRANT	0.006
	(0.674)
EMPLOYED	0.028***
	(0.000)
EDU	-0.120***
	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.254***
	(0.000)
SECURE	0.156***
	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.112***
	(0.000)
Constant	1.548***
	(0.000)
Observations	74052
Adjusted R^2	0.149

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The linkage between trust in government and personal variables where we control for fixed effects of country.

	TRUST_GOV (1)
RELIGIOUS	0.105***
	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.075***
	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.037***
	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.032***
	(0.000)
BETTER	0.045***
	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.031***
	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.083***
	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.097***
	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.039***
	(0.000)
EDU	-0.045***
	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.083***
	(0.000)
SECURE	0.131***
	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.086***
	(0.000)
Constant	0.921***
	(0.000)
Country FE	Yes
Observations	74052
Adjusted R^2	0.315

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We start by comparing the coefficients in Table 3 with those in Table 4. Rather surprisingly there is little change to the coefficient on Satisfied, but the coefficients on Better and Employed go down sharply, while those on Age, Immigrant Status, Education and Urban rise significantly. This is probably because the faster growing countries, which are seen as more successful, are also those with people who are younger, where there are more people of immigrant status, where there are fewer living in the urban areas, and where there are fewer highly educated people. In a nutshell,

this represents a comparison between the faster growing countries, both in Asia, as well as Australia, New Zealand and Canada on the one hand, and the aged but more stagnant countries in Europe.

Since achieving growth is such a significant part of a government's success, and that is largely caught, (but there are other factors as well), in country-fixed effects, it is probably better to comment on the coefficients of the personal variables in Table 4 rather than in Table 3.

There are three fairly standard personal characteristics, which have already been much discussed in the literature; these are Gender, Age and Rural, as contrasted with Urban. It is well known in the literature that women are more trusting, in this case of government as well as everything else; that the old are more trusting than the young, and that those living in smaller rural communities are more trusting than those living in big towns. Some of the literature is as follows:

1) For Female, the prior studies find that Female have greater trust in government. (see Foster & Frieden, 2017; McDermott & Jones, 2020). The reason is that those willing to be involved with the community are generally more trusting (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Delhey & Newton, 2003). Females are more communal and caring than men; therefore, the former likely has higher levels of trust in government.

2) Regarding Age, older people trust the government more than younger generations because the former tend to be collective-oriented. Older people have experienced the build-up of the welfare state and will therefore trust their government more. (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005).

3) For Rural, the studies of Wang and You (2016), Brinkerhoff et al. (2018) and Bland et al. (2023) find that people in rural areas trust their government more than urban ones. This can be explained by the fact that people in rural areas access media less than urban ones. Thus, the former are less likely to know wrongdoings from the government and fake news than the latter. Another reason is that perceptions of integrity and benevolence are somewhat higher in rural areas, (McKay et al., 2023).

Then there are a set of variables which represent individual respondents' feelings about their own condition. These are: Health, Satisfied, Better and feeling Secure. All these naturally have a significant positive effect on the respondents' trust in their own government. Naturally, when anyone views their government as Corrupt, their trust goes down sharply. As already noted, the

effect of Religious affiliation is limited to Islamic countries. This leaves four other personal variables. That Immigrant status is positively related to trust in government is again understandable, since why else would they have taken the, often arduous, exercise of moving there. But the other three effects, with the Political Interest of the respondent being positive, while their Education status was negative, strikes us as a bit surprising, as is the apparent negative effect on trust in government being greater amongst those not Employed, rather than those in Employment. Regarding Political Interest, the greater trust in government is perhaps due to those having interest in politics being more likely to engage with information and knowledge about their political system and the norms which integrate them into the system (March & Olsen, 1989). The more information and knowledge make them better understand how the political system and government work, thereby increasing their trust in government. For Education, our finding is similar to the past studies in which people with higher education levels trust their government less, perhaps being more critical (Gronlund & Setala, 2007; Norris, 2000; Zhao & Hu, 2017). For Employed, our finding is in line with the study by Zhao and Hu (2017) where the authors find that people with higher salaries tend to trust the government in China less. Christensen and Laegreid (2005) show the same when they examine respondents in Norway. A possible reason is that employed people may feel more stressed and this impacts their satisfaction with life and their government. They also have to pay taxes and therefore have higher expectations for their own government. If the state welfare does not meet their expectations, their trust in government could decrease.

At this point, it is worth noting that there is in all cases a notably strong correlation between respondents' trust in government, and their trust in other forms of authority. Thus, when running the regressions in Table 1 against trust in Parliament (TRUST_PARL), trust in World Bank (TRUST_WB) and trust in IMF (TRUST_IMF), we get the following correlations. The correlation rates between trust in government and trust in Parliament, trust in World Bank and trust in IMF are high, namely 94%, 71% and 73% respectively (see Table 5 below).

Table 5: The correlation between trust in government and trust in other types of authority (Parliament, World Bank and IMF). The sample consists of 94,278 observations in 62 countries.

TRUST_GOV	TRUST_PARL	TRUST_WB	TRUST_IMF
	94%	71%	73%

3. Growth and the trust paradox

In several respects, our paper here is a companion piece to that already written by Besley, Dann and Dray, on "Growth Experiences and Trust in Government", (2025), though we both began our papers independently. Their paper is more comprehensive, based on a wider set of data sources, and seeks to track the effects on growth of people's attitudes as they grow older and experience differing growth periods. In contrast, our own paper just focusses on the most recent developments, as represented by the latest available (to us) reports from the World Values Survey wave 7, as already described in Section 2.

We strongly agree on one key feature, which is that growth plays a major and positive role in making people more trusting of their government, see for example, Figure 5, page 11 and Table 1, page 17, in Besley, et al. (2025). But we would caution that growth only explains a large, but limited proportion of the country differences, which we have already described in Section 2. Before continuing, we should note that there are numerous ways to measure growth. In Figure 5, page 11, of Besley, et al. (2025), they use ten-year average growth. We follow his example, but also examine the effects of a shorter five-year average growth. However, wellbeing may be more affected by per capita growth, so we also look at that on a ten and five-year average growth basis. We show the results for these growth data just by themselves in Table 6. Note that the R^2s are considerably lower than that shown for the regression just using country fixed effects in the earlier table in Section 2. The values for all these R^2s are shown below. [6]

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[6] We discovered that one should not run regressions, including both country fixed effects and country growth, because of collinearity between these variables. If you try to do this, the results become extremely unstable, as we discovered through much trial and error.

Table 6: The linkage between trust in government and economic growth.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.099***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.066***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.117***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.074***
				(0.000)
Constant	1.009***	1.159***	1.070***	1.200***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	82022	82022	82022	82022
Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.061	0.089	0.064

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Then we examined what would happen when we added the same set of personal variables as we ran in Section 2. The results are shown in Table 2 in the Appendix. Both the growth variables and the personal control variables generally became larger, and the overall fit improved, with the R^2 now becoming about 0.22; though this is still lower than the fit just with the country fixed effects. There were, however, large changes to two of the personal control variables. First, the negative coefficient previously found on Employed, which we had found hard to interpret, now became much smaller and insignificant. Second, the coefficient on the Urban variable now doubled in size.

Recall that in Section 2 we found major differences in Trust, depending on the continent in which country was sited. So, our next step was to rerun the regression equation for countries in each continent separately. In Table 7 below, we show the coefficients for the ten-year average growth variable for all the separate continents, and in Table 8 below we show which personal control variables varied interestingly (and significantly) between countries in the different continents for the ten-year growth exercise. The full data set for the regressions for all the other growth variables, e.g. the five-year growth and ten and five-year per capita growth are shown in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 in the Appendix.

Table 7: Summary of the coefficients for the ten-year average growth variable for all the separate continents.

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV							
GG10Y	0.107***		0.052***		0.013**		0.115***	
GDPPC10Y		0.123***		-0.022***		0.034***		0.133***
Obs	24841	24841	22888	22888	13922	13922	12401	12401
Adjusted R^2	0.189	0.200	0.142	0.141	0.109	0.110	0.175	0.187
	Asia		**Europe & other AEs**		**Latin America**		**Africa and Middle East**	

Note that the Asian (and Africa and Middle East) countries have the highest coefficient on growth, whereas the European countries and other advanced economies (AE), a grouping including most of the fully democratic countries, have a comparatively low coefficient, even negative for the ten-year per capita growth data! Several of the Asian countries are effectively autocratic, i.e. single-party countries. So, like Besley, et al. (2025), we next turn to regressions in which our data set then becomes divided into three groups. These are those with single parties, those that are fully democratic, and those who have had a mixed record over recent decades. We show how we have divided our set of countries into these groups in Table 7 in the Appendix though we accept that the dividing line is quite fuzzy in some cases, e.g. are Singapore and Türkiye in single party or mixed; are Brazil and Philippines in mixed or fully democratic? We decided, somewhat uncertainly, to leave Singapore in single party and to put Türkiye and Brazil in mixed. We discuss the case of the Philippines below.

Table 8: Summary of the coefficients for the personal control variables in all the separate continents for the ten-year growth.

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV							
	GG10Y	**GDPPC10Y**	**GG10Y**	**GDPPC10Y**	**GG10Y**	**GDPPC10Y**	**GG10Y**	**GDPPC10Y**
RELIGIOUS	0.091***	0.146***	0.131***	0.139***	-0.036**	-0.041***	0.181***	0.200***
PINTEREST	0.081***	0.079***	0.068***	0.067***	0.090***	0.092***	0.089***	0.086***
HEALTH	0.032***	0.034***	0.036***	0.032***	0.025**	0.028***	0.089***	0.112***
SATISFIED	0.040***	0.041***	0.028***	0.030***	0.038***	0.038***	0.048***	0.043***
BETTER	0.125***	0.099***	0.062***	0.060***	-0.052***	-0.049***	0.089***	0.074***
FEMALE	0.034***	0.030***	0.030***	0.034***	0.034**	0.035**	0.045**	0.036**
LNAGE	0.086***	0.064***	0.036**	0.036**	0.173***	0.179***	0.042*	0.046**
IMIGRANT	0.153***	0.183***	0.064***	0.059***	0.215***	0.213***	0.014	0.230***
EMPLOYED	-0.026**	-0.023**	-0.039***	-0.043***	-0.068***	-0.069***	-0.041**	-0.060***
EDU	-0.108***	-0.104***	-0.008	-0.012	-0.053***	-0.055***	-0.175***	-0.152***
URBAN	-0.201***	-0.206***	-0.002	-0.007	-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.128***	-0.102***
SECURE	0.177***	0.170***	0.079***	0.079***	0.112***	0.113***	0.044***	0.087***
CORRUPT	-0.059***	-0.057***	-0.115***	-0.116***	-0.122***	-0.122***	-0.119***	-0.110***
Obs	24841	24841	22888	22888	13922	13922	12401	12401
Adjusted R^2	0.189	0.200	0.142	0.141	0.109	0.110	0.175	0.187
	Asia		**Europe & other AEs**		**Latin America**		**Africa and Middle East**	

When we included the Philippines amongst the group of fully democratic countries, we got results quite closely in line with those of Besley, et al. (2025). Thus, on page 25, Table 3, their coefficients on growth experience were as follows:

Single-Party	Fully-Democratic	Mixed
0.060***	0.121***	0.016***

Our results in Table 9a, including the Philippines, were:

Table 9a: Economic growth over ten years when Philippines is in the group of Full-democracy countries

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV					
GG10Y	0.100***		0.177***		0.121***	
GDPPC10Y		0.123***		0.176***		0.145***
Obs	15346	15346	22948	22948	35758	35758
Adjusted R^2	0.230	0.249	0.173	0.159	0.203	0.210
	Single-party		**Fully-democratic**		**Mixed**	

Whereas, when we exclude the Philippines, our results become as shown in Table 9b.

Table 9b: Economic growth over ten years when shifting from Full to Mixed for Philippines[7].

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV					
GG10Y	0.100***		0.101***		0.129***	
GDPPC10Y		0.123***		0.069***		0.152***
Obs	15346	15346	21751	21751	36955	36955
Adjusted R^2	0.230	0.249	0.141	0.138	0.213	0.221
	Single-party		**Fully-democratic**		**Mixed**	

It is quite easy to see why the classification of the Philippines is so important by comparing Chart 1a with Chart 1b. Much of the apparent significance of the results for the fully-democratic countries comes from two outliers, the Philippines and Greece. For the remaining fully-democratic

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[7] See more in Tables 8, 9, and 10 in the Appendix for Single-party, Fully-democratic and Mixed-democratic respectively.

countries, the relationship is rather weak, whereas the relationship in fully-autocratic countries is much stronger, with, or without, the inclusion of Venezuela, which again appears to be an outlier.

Chart 1a (When Philippines is in Full): Bilateral chart for real GDP growth rate over 10 years and trust in government for fully-democratic countries.


Chart 1b (When Philippines is in Mixed): Bilateral chart for real GDP growth rate over 10 years and trust in government for fully-democratic countries.

Chart 2: Bilateral chart for real GDP growth rate over 10 years and trust in government for single-party countries.

Chart 3 (When Philippines is in Mixed group): Bilateral chart for real GDP growth rate over 10 years and trust in government for mixed countries.

We certainly do not want to suggest that we believe that growth is not important to trust in fully democratic countries, but the relationship is likely to be more complex, depending on circumstances. When an economic disaster occurs, as happened in Greece and Venezuela, trust in government will disappear. Again, if by some economic miracle growth (per capita) shot up from, say, 1% to 7% per annum, trust would rise sharply. But the extent of improvement in AEs that could be realistically expected of about 1% per annum will not shift the dial much.

We move on next from this subsection where our interpretation of our results differ somewhat from those of Besley, et al. (2025), to another subsection where again our results are in much stronger agreement. This is that there is a significant, but quite stable, *negative* relationship between measures of the extent of democracy in each country and respondents' trust in their own government. We use two alternative measures of the extent of democracy. To build those, we use V-DEM Democracy Indices by the V-Dem Institute. This is published annually and has five core indices: the electoral democracy index, liberal democracy index, participatory democracy index, deliberative democracy Index, and egalitarian democracy index. After looking at the contents of those indices and evaluating them carefully, we decided to use the electoral democracy index and liberal democracy index as measures of democracy as fitting our study best. The electoral democracy index measures the principle of electoral or representative democracy, including whether elections were free and fair and whether media was free and independent. The liberal democracy index measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and the concepts measured in the electoral democracy index. Using the former and latter, we create variables named VDEMOE and VDEMOL, respectively.

Then, we show in Table 10 below for the VDem measure, its coefficient in the following regressions, where trust is the dependent variable, and the following are the independent variables. Everywhere, the Trust Paradox appears to remain significant and rather stable in size. The coefficients for the other measure of democracy are similar in their overall stability.

Table 10: Summary of the coefficients of VDem measures.

Independent Variables	Coefficient
Just VDem (see Columns 1 and 2 in Table 11 in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -0.946[***] VDEMOL: -0.789[***]
VDem and personal variables (see Columns 3 and 4 Table 11 in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -0.888[***] VDEMOL: -0.824[***]
VDem, personal variables, country FE (see Table 12 in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -3.536[***] VDEMOL: -2.190[***]
VDem, personal variables, and ten-year growth variable (see Table 13 in Appendix)	**GG10Y** VDEMOE: -0.431[***] VDEMOL: -0.357[***] **GDPPC10Y** VDEMOE: -0.429[***] VDEMOL: -0.364[***]
VDem, personal variables and Asia (see Columns 1 and 2 in Table 14a in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -0.651[***] VDEMOL: -0.681[***]
VDem, personal variables and Europe and other advanced economies (see Columns 3 and 4 in Table 14a in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -0.406[***] VDEMOL: -0.351[***]

Table 10: Summary of the coefficients of VDem measures (Cont.)

Independent Variables	Coefficient
VDem, personal variables and Latin America (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 14b in Appendix)	VDEMOE: 0.190*** VDEMOL: 0.208***
VDem, personal variables and Middle East and Africa (see Columns 3 and 4 in Table 14b in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -1.278*** VDEMOL: -1.613***
VDem, personal variables and single-party (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 15a in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -1.311*** VDEMOL: -1.085***
VDem, personal variables and mixed (see Columns 3 and 4 in Table 15a in Appendix)	VDEMOE: -0.828*** VDEMOL: -0.879***
VDem, personal variables and fully- democracy (see Table 15b in Appendix)	VDEMOE: 0.265* VDEMOL: -0.020

4. The Trust Paradox

Furthermore, this decline in trust in government amongst the advanced economies appears to have gotten worse in recent years. We have not, ourselves, done any research on this, but we show two charts that others have prepared on this topic. Pew Research Center (2024) conducts the survey in the USA and shows that trust in government decreased between 1958 and 2024 (see Chart 4). In addition, the Eurofound finds the same for the EU during 2020-22 (see Chart 5).

Chart 4: The USA's Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 (Source: Pew Research Center, 2024[8]).

Chart 5: Trust in national institutions across EU between 2020 and 2022. (Source: Eurofound, 2022[9])


Chart 6 below illustrates that trust in government is higher among members of party that controls presidency

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[8] Source link: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/06/24/public-trust-in-government-1958-2024
[9] Source link: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/blog/2022/trust-national-institutions-falling-data-behind-decline

Chart 6: The USA's Trust in Government: 1958-2024 (Source: Pew Research Center, 2024[10]).

In their 2015 book: "Democracy in Decline*?"* edited by Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, there is already much concern about western democracy being in retreat, notably Chapter 6, on "Facing up to the Democratic Recession', by Larry Diamond. In this, for example, he states, page 113:

> "Perhaps the most worrisome dimension of the democratic recession has been the decline of democratic efficacy, energy, and self-confidence in the West, including the United States. There is a growing sense, both domestically and internationally, that democracy in the United States has not been functioning effectively enough to address the major challenges of governance."

That democratic recession in the USA can be seen in Gallup's (2024) survey, where they asked respondents the question, "*Are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in the USA*?". Chart 7a below shows that their satisfaction with democracy decreased between 1984 and 2023. Interestingly, the survey by Gallup (2024) also presents that after 1999, Democrats, Republicans and Political independents were less satisfied with the USA's democracy (see Chart 7b).

Chart 7: Democracy level in the USA during 1984 – 2023 (Source: Gallup, 2024)[11]

Chart 7a

Are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in the USA?

Chart 7b:

**Are you satisfied with the way democracy is working in the USA?**

We are not political scientists, so we enter this field with some due trepidation. Nevertheless, what we tend to find surprising is that most people, or so we believe, are themselves surprised by the fact that trust in government is clearly *negatively* related to democracy. After all, democracy

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[11] Source: https://news.gallup.com/poll/548120/record-low-satisfied-democracy-working.aspx

involves having political parties competing for executive power. Such political parties are usually coalitions of differing interests, for example land owners (Tories) versus mercantile interests (Whigs), or capitalists versus workers. Each party, given freedom of speech, will try to support its own side and discredit the other. Most people do not have much direct relationship with government and will get their information and views from the media. In turn, the media will tend to have their own allegiance, more or less, to each party. So those supporting the party, or parties, not in power are likely to have relatively little trust in the current government.

In contrast, in single party countries, there is a single continuing centre of power, though how that moves from person to person within the party is a complex matter. But the point is that the media has much less incentive to oppose those in power.

That raises the question, why a coalition which has gained executive power does not try to maintain its supremacy by abolishing the chance of its being replaced in a subsequent free and fair election. There are two main overlapping reasons why a party in power continues to allow such elections. The first is that its own executive control relies on maintaining the support of a large proportion of those in the middle of the road, i.e. not firmly committed to any particular party and who value the possibility of maintaining free elections above the more narrow interests of the coalition currently in power. Second, that there are institutions, especially in the judiciary, with the rule of law, that make it harder for the executive to stay in power indefinitely by getting rid of free and fair elections. These two conditions are overlapping, because if there are not enough people who prefer the continuation of democracy above the interests of any party, then it is unlikely that the existing institutions can hold.

The more that the electorate becomes polarised, which implies supporting parties which would strongly prefer to remain in power, rather than submit to future elections, the less likely is democracy to hold. Polarisation of view within a country is the enemy of democracy. This idea has considerable similarity with the approach of Acemoglu and his concept of the narrow path for liberty (i.e. the book entitled "The Narrow Corridor States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty" by Acemoglu and Robinson). A large part of the reason why democracy seems to be in decline in recent years may well be because the electorate has become more polarised. One of the reasons for polarisation, appears to have been the concern of much of the electorate of the scale of inwards

migration. We seek to examine the direct effect of migration on respondents' attitude to trust in government, as discussed further below.

Be that as it may, what we are able to do with our survey data is to look at some of the ways in which the role of the media influences trust in government. Thus, two of the questions are whether the respondent obtains her information from traditional media, or from social media. We used the WVS 7 to create following variables of media: TRDMEDIA for traditional media and SMEDIA for social media. For the former, TRDMEDIA is a dummy variable of whether respondents learn daily what is going on in their country and the world from traditional media sources: daily newspapers, TV and radio). To create that, we adopted the questions Q201, Q202 and Q203, *"People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources"*. We coded it as 1 if respondents choose "Daily" and 0 otherwise. Regarding SMEDIA, it is a dummy variable of whether respondents learn daily what is going on in their country and the world from social media sources (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc). To create that, we referred to the question Q207 *"People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources"*. We coded it as 1 if respondents choose "Daily" and 0 otherwise. We had two hypotheses that we wanted to test. The first was that traditional media would have a more positive relationship with trust in government than social media, because its ability to distort what was going on was somewhat more constrained than in the social media by the ability to check facts, libel laws, etc. Our next hypothesis was that in single party countries the relationship between both traditional media and social media and trust in government would be more positive than in full democracies.

We show the coefficients for both traditional media and social media in Table 11 below, for the various regressions that we have run for these two variables and for average economic growth over 5 and 10 years. The results indicate that reliance on traditional media usually has a positive and significant effect, whereas for the respondents relying most on social media more they generally have a negative attitude towards trust in government. Whereas none of these relationships is very strong, the positive (negative) effect on trust of reliance on traditional (social) media in single and mixed party countries is interesting. We find the same effects of traditional and social media in Asia, Europe and other AEs, Latin America, and Africa and Middle East (see Table 12 below).

Table 11: The impacts of traditional and social media on trust in government in three groups: Single-party, Fully-democratic and Mixed countries[12].

Real GDP growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV					
GG10Y	0.103***		0.124***		0.124***	
GG5Y		0.149***		0.027***		0.126***
TRDMEDIA	0.109***	0.085***	-0.022	-0.019	0.123***	0.106***
SMEDIA	-0.053***	-0.104***	-0.036***	-0.033***	-0.120***	-0.111***
Obs	15229	15229	20002	20002	35954	35954
Adjusted R^2	0.234	0.268	0.143	0.134	0.217	0.234
	Single-party		**Fully-democratic**		**Mixed**	

Real GDP per capita growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV					
GDPPC10Y	0.127***		0.064***		0.146***	
GDPC5Y		0.161***		-0.011*		0.128***
TRDMEDIA	0.121***	0.089***	-0.023	-0.005	0.095***	0.087***
SMEDIA	-0.054***	-0.107***	-0.026**	-0.036***	-0.121***	-0.111***
Obs	15229	15229	20002	20002	35954	35954
Adjusted R^2	0.253	0.283	0.136	0.134	0.223	0.235
	Single-party		**Fully-democratic**		**Mixed**	

Table 12: The impacts of traditional and social media on trust in government by different continents[13]

Real GDP growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV							
GG10Y	0.111***		0.068***		0.017***		0.111***	
GG5Y		0.157***		0.010		0.001		0.096***
TRDMEDIA	0.107***	0.090***	0.066***	0.065***	-0.021	-0.010	0.157***	0.110***
SMEDIA	-0.078***	-0.073***	-0.056***	-0.048***	-0.098***	-0.099***	-0.091***	-0.142***
Obs	24377	24377	21079	21079	13552	13552	12177	12177
Adjusted R^2	0.193	0.211	0.142	0.140	0.113	0.112	0.179	0.187
	Asia		**Europe & other AEs**		**Latin America**		**Africa and Middle East**	

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[12] See in Appendix Table 16a for Single, Table 16b for Full and Table 16c for Mixed.
[13] See in Appendix Table 17a for Asia, 17b for Europe & other AEs, 17c for Latin America and 17d for Africa and Middle East.

Real GDP per capita growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV							
GDPPC10Y	0.127***		-0.027***		0.038***		0.126***	
GDPC5Y		0.172***		-0.058***		0.009*		0.088***
TRDMEDIA	0.103***	0.082***	0.069***	0.078***	-0.029*	-0.015	0.127***	0.089***
SMEDIA	-0.080***	-0.068***	-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.095***	-0.097***	-0.097***	-0.150***
Obs	24377	24377	21079	21079	13552	13552	12177	12177
Adjusted R^2	0.205	0.222	0.140	0.143	0.114	0.112	0.189	0.184
	Asia		**Europe & other AEs**		**Latin America**		**Africa and Middle East**	

Next, one of the key factors driving political concern and the growth of the populist right, has been the scale of net inwards migration in advanced economies. So, what we then did is to include the scale of such migration, as a percentage of total population, in our regressions seeking to explain the determinants of trust in government. We also included real GDP growth and real GDP per capita growth over five and ten years. The results are shown in Table 13, below. When analyzing by continents, we find that the coefficient of net migration on trust in government for Asia is negative and statistically significant while that for Europe and other advanced economies, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East is positive and statistically significant. When doing by single party, full democracy and mixed, we find that the effect of net migration on trust in government isstatistically significant and positive, except for average five-year economic growth in single-party countries (see Table 14 below).

Table 13: The impacts of net migration on trust in government by different continents.[14]

Real GDP growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV							
GG10Y	0.110***		0.075***		0.007		0.103***	
GG5Y		0.152***		-0.006		-0.004		0.085***
TRDMEDIA	0.113***	0.093***	0.076***	0.078***	-0.024	-0.018	0.139***	0.105***
SMEDIA	-0.041***	-0.051***	-0.066***	-0.056***	-0.107***	-0.109***	-0.106***	-0.152***
NETMIGRA	-0.203***	-0.105***	0.233***	0.231***	0.128***	0.137***	0.096***	0.058***
Obs	23205	23205	21079	21079	13552	13552	12177	12177
Adjusted R^2	0.196	0.210	0.156	0.153	0.115	0.115	0.191	0.191
	Asia		**Europe & other AEs**		**Latin America**		**Africa and Middle East**	

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[14] See in Appendix Table 18a for Asia, 18b for Europe & other AEs, 18c for Latin America and 18d for Africa and Middle East.

Real GDP per capita growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV							
GDPPC10Y	0.125***		0.078***		0.023***		0.116***	
GDPC5Y		0.168***		-0.014**		0.003		0.078***
TRDMEDIA	0.108***	0.083***	0.075***	0.079***	-0.030*	-0.022	0.114***	0.084***
SMEDIA	-0.045***	-0.056***	-0.061***	-0.056***	-0.104***	-0.107***	-0.112***	-0.160***
NETMIGRA	-0.187***	-0.044***	0.318***	0.218***	0.105***	0.132***	0.082***	0.070***
Obs	23205	23205	21079	21079	13552	13552	12177	12177
Adjusted R^2	0.209	0.222	0.156	0.153	0.116	0.115	0.198	0.190
	Asia		**Europe & other AEs**		**Latin America**		**Africa and Middle East**	

Table 14: The impact of net migration on trust in government by Single-party, Fully- Democratic and Mixed groups[15].

Real GDP growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV					
GG10Y	0.106***		0.082***		0.123***	
GG5Y		0.149***		0.006		0.125***
TRDMEDIA	0.107***	0.086***	-0.020	-0.014	0.115***	0.104***
SMEDIA	-0.054***	-0.105***	-0.056***	-0.060***	-0.127***	-0.113***
NETMIGRA	0.198***	-0.062	0.145***	0.168***	0.065***	0.014**
Obs	15229	15229	18830	18830	35954	35954
Adjusted R^2	0.235	0.268	0.146	0.143	0.220	0.235
	Single-party		**Fully-democratic**		**Mixed**	

Real GDP per capita growth rate over 10 and 5 years

	Dependent variable: TRUST_GOV					
GDPPC10Y	0.133***		0.083***		0.144***	
GDPC5Y		0.161***		-0.005		0.127***
TRDMEDIA	0.119***	0.088***	-0.025*	-0.010	0.091***	0.086***
SMEDIA	-0.057***	-0.107***	-0.055***	-0.060***	-0.126***	-0.113***
NETMIGRA	0.336***	0.017	0.229***	0.163***	0.041***	0.017***
Obs	15229	15229	18830	18830	35954	35954
Adjusted R^2	0.257	0.283	0.146	0.143	0.224	0.235
	Single-party		**Fully-democratic**		**Mixed**	

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[15] See in Appendix Table 19a for Single-party, 19b for Fully-democratic, and 19c for Mixed.

Chart 8: Bilateral chart for net migration over total population and trust in government for Asia.

Chart 9: Bilateral chart for net migration over total population and trust in government for Europe and other advanced economies.

Given current political concerns about the scale of immigration into the USA and Western Europe, these results, that trust in government was *positively* related to inwards net migration, was initially a surprise to us, but it should not have been. The countries with the worst economic and political outcomes, such as Lebanon, Venezuela, Greece and Ukraine, tend to have both the biggest net

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outflows (-) and the lowest trust in government. Similarly, some successful, but relatively empty, AEs, such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have combined fast growth, high inwards migration and considerable trust in government.

Up to a point, net migration benefits both the unfortunate country losing migrants and the more fortunate country gaining them, (as with the Irish exodus to the USA after the potato famine) (also see "Malthusian Migrations" by Blanc and Wacziarg (2025) in NBER WP 33542). The political concern about inwards net migration is about its scale, i.e. that it has gone well beyond the threshold at which it causes social and political disturbance, not about its potential desirability. With so few European countries being sampled in the WVS survey, it is rather hard to use these data to explore where this threshold may occur, though political history in the USA does give an indication when it has occurred there.

5. Conclusion

We found that the disparity of respondents' reported trust in their own government to be remarkable, ranging from almost complete trust in certain fast growing, single party Asian countries, to active distrust in several Latin American countries, and those which have suffered from economic and political collapse. We were also surprised by the degree to which the response appears to depend in which continent the respondent was based, though the lop-sided nature of the sample that we can use from this survey, e.g. the lack of entries from Sub-Saharan African and (Northern) Europe countries, makes firm judgement premature.

Overall, it seems that economic growth is a very important determinant of trust in government, but here we differ from the prior work of Besley, et al., (2025). We find such growth about equally important everywhere. Indeed, our results suggest that feasible increases in aggregate growth might have *less* effect in Europe and other AEs than elsewhere in the world.

Meanwhile, the Trust Paradox, that trust is *less* in fully democratic countries than in single party countries, (except in Latin America), is strongly supported in the data. We examined whether this was due to the kind of media that respondents used to get their news. Here there were indications that reliance on traditional (social) media enhanced (reduced) trust in government, but the significance was not that strong.

Owing to the current salience of inwards migration in influencing political concern, we then assessed its effect on trust, and were initially surprised to find that migration generally had a *positive* effect on trust. We rationalise this by noting that normally and historically this is the case; it is only when inwards net migration passes beyond some acceptable threshold that the effect on trust changes sign. Quite where that threshold may be, and what determines it, is a matter beyond the scope of this exercise.

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Appendix
Table 1: Data description

Name	Definition	Source
Trust variables		
TRUST_GOV	Trust in Government. It is coded as 3 for "A great deal", 2 for "Quite a lot", 1 for "Not very much" and 0 for "Not at all".	Q71 of WVS7
Variables of economic growth		
GG10Y	The average real GDP growth rate over ten years.	IMF Data
GG5Y	The average real GDP growth rate over five years.	IMF Data
GDPPC10Y	The percentage change in GDP per capita over ten years.	IMF Data
GDPPC5Y	The percentage change in GDP per capita over five years.	IMF Data
Variables of democracy		
VDEMOE	The electoral democracy index measures the principle of electoral or representative democracy, including whether elections were free and fair and whether media was free and independent.	V-DEM Democracy Indices
VDEMOL	The liberal democracy index measures of rule of law, checks and balances, and civil liberties along with the concepts measured in the electoral democracy index.	V-DEM Democracy Indices
Variables of media		
TRDMEDIA	Dummy variable of whether respondents learn daily what is going on in their country and the world from traditional media sources: daily newspapers, TV and radio. It is coded as 1 if "Daily" and 0 otherwise.	Q201, Q202 and Q203 of WVS7
SMEDIA	Dummy variable of whether respondents learn daily what is going on in their country and the world from social media sources (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc). It is coded as 1 if "Daily"; 0 otherwise.	Q207 of WVS7
Variable of migration		
NETMIGR	Net migration = (Immigration – Emigration) / Population	WB Data
Control variables for individuals		
RELIGIOUS	Being religious. It is coded 1 for "A religious person"; 0 otherwise	Q173 of WVS7
PINTEREST	How interested in politics. It is coded as 3 for "Very interested", 2 for "Somewhat interested", 1 for "Not very interested" and 0 for "Not at all interested".	Q199 of WVS7
HEALTH	State of health. It is coded as 4 for "Very good", 3 for "Good", 2 for "Fair", 1 for "Poor" and 0 for "Very poor".	Q47 of WVS7
SATISFIED	Being satisfied with life. It is coded ranging from 9 for "Completely satisfied" to 0 for "Completely dissatisfied".	Q49 of WVS7
BETTER	Thinking the standard of life better compared to parents. It is coded 1 for "Better off"; 0 otherwise.	Q56 of WVS7
FEMALE	Being female. It is coded 1 for "Yes"; 0 otherwise.	Q260 of WVS7

Table 1: Data description (Cont.)

Name	Definition	Source
LNAGE	Logarithm of age	Q262 of WVS7
IMIGRANT	Being an immigrant. It is coded 1 for being immigrants; 0 otherwise.	Q263 of WVS7
EDU	Having a bachelor degree or higher for the education level. It is coded 1 for having a bachelor degree or higher; 0 otherwise.	Q275 of WVS7
EMPLOYED	Being employed. It is coded 1 for being employed; 0 otherwise.	Q279 of WVS7
Control variables for cities		
SECURE	Security level. It is coded as 2 for "Very secure", 1 for "Quite secure" and 0 for both "Not very secure" and "Not at all secure".	Q131 of WVS7
URBAN	Being urban area. It is coded as 1 for "Urban" and 0 for "Rural".	WVS7
Control variables for countries		
CORRUPT	Corruption level. It is coded ranging from 9 "There is abundant corruption in my country" to 0 "There is no corruption in my country".	Q112 of WVS7

Table 2: The linkage between trust in government and economic growth when including personal variables.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.133***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		0.155***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			0.138***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.141***
				(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.042***	0.084***	0.050***	0.085***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.089***	0.091***	0.080***	0.082***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.038***	0.053***	0.029***	0.040***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.040***	0.035***	0.039***	0.036***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.109***	0.086***	0.092***	0.078***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.057***	0.046***	0.053***	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.127***	0.087***	0.100***	0.061***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.126***	0.146***	0.098***	0.114***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	0.010	-0.001	0.001	-0.008
	(0.125)	(0.874)	(0.934)	(0.207)
EDU	-0.068***	-0.074***	-0.071***	-0.080***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.162***	-0.156***	-0.152***	-0.155***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.135***	0.150***	0.137***	0.151***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.108***	-0.103***	-0.107***	-0.103***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.508***	0.677***	0.694***	0.902***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	74052	74052	74052	74052
Adjusted R^2	0.219	0.228	0.223	0.222

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for Asia.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.107***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		0.123***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			0.153***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.169***
				(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.091***	0.146***	0.072***	0.120***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.081***	0.079***	0.070***	0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.032***	0.034***	0.040***	0.041***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.040***	0.041***	0.033***	0.034***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.125***	0.099***	0.092***	0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.034***	0.030***	0.038***	0.037***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.086***	0.064***	0.122***	0.098***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.153***	0.183***	0.192***	0.219***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.026**	-0.023**	-0.022**	-0.015
	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.173)
EDU	-0.108***	-0.104***	-0.051***	-0.037***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)
URBAN	-0.201***	-0.206***	-0.148***	-0.156***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.177***	0.170***	0.184***	0.175***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.059***	-0.057***	-0.066***	-0.062***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.707***	0.813***	0.470***	0.599***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	24841	24841	24841	24841
Adjusted R^2	0.189	0.200	0.206	0.218

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for Europe and other advanced economies.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.052***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		-0.022***		
		(0.001)		
GG5Y			0.008	
			(0.187)	
GDPPC5Y				-0.051***
				(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.131***	0.139***	0.133***	0.147***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.068***	0.067***	0.069***	0.064***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.036***	0.032***	0.034***	0.036***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.028***	0.030***	0.029***	0.030***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.062***	0.060***	0.060***	0.061***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.030***	0.034***	0.033***	0.032***
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
LNAGE	0.036**	0.036**	0.037**	0.036**
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.016)
IMIGRANT	0.064***	0.059***	0.064***	0.055***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
EMPLOYED	-0.039***	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.044***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.008	-0.012	-0.009	-0.017
	(0.473)	(0.295)	(0.433)	(0.137)
URBAN	-0.002	-0.007	-0.004	-0.010
	(0.876)	(0.564)	(0.728)	(0.417)
SECURE	0.079***	0.079***	0.078***	0.079***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.115***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.114***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.090***	1.231***	1.177***	1.256***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	22888	22888	22888	22888
Adjusted R^2	0.142	0.141	0.140	0.143

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for Latin America.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.013**			
	(0.025)			
GDPPC10Y		0.034***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			-0.001	
			(0.772)	
GDPPC5Y				0.007
				(0.171)
RELIGIOUS	-0.036**	-0.041***	-0.027*	-0.032**
	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.089)	(0.045)
PINTEREST	0.090***	0.092***	0.090***	0.090***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.025**	0.028***	0.022**	0.024**
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.015)
SATISFIED	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	-0.052***	-0.049***	-0.056***	-0.054***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.034**	0.035**	0.032**	0.033**
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.030)
LNAGE	0.173***	0.179***	0.165***	0.169***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.215***	0.213***	0.213***	0.215***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
EMPLOYED	-0.068***	-0.069***	-0.066***	-0.068***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.053***	-0.055***	-0.049***	-0.052***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.005)
URBAN	-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.057***	-0.055***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
SECURE	0.112***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.122***	-0.122***	-0.122***	-0.122***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.804***	0.749***	0.888***	0.856***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	13922	13922	13922	13922
Adjusted R^2	0.109	0.110	0.109	0.109

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for Africa and Middle East.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.115***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		0.133***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			0.099***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.092***
				(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.181***	0.200***	0.240***	0.268***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.089***	0.086***	0.090***	0.085***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.089***	0.112***	0.067***	0.090***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.048***	0.043***	0.054***	0.052***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.089***	0.074***	0.055***	0.049***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.004)
FEMALE	0.045**	0.036**	0.040**	0.030*
	(0.012)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.097)
LNAGE	0.042*	0.046**	0.009	0.014
	(0.077)	(0.050)	(0.704)	(0.558)
IMIGRANT	0.014	0.230***	-0.019	0.202***
	(0.852)	(0.002)	(0.792)	(0.006)
EMPLOYED	-0.041**	-0.060***	-0.040**	-0.058***
	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.001)
EDU	-0.175***	-0.152***	-0.188***	-0.181***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.128***	-0.102***	-0.183***	-0.182***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.044***	0.087***	0.045***	0.070***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.119***	-0.110***	-0.107***	-0.102***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.642***	0.678***	0.901***	0.956***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	12401	12401	12401	12401
Adjusted R^2	0.175	0.187	0.182	0.179

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Classification by country: Fully-democratic, Single-party and Mixed.

Country	Classification	Country	Classification	Country	Classification
Australia	Full	China	Single	Argentina	Mixed
Canada	Full	Hong Kong	Single	Bangladesh	Mixed
Taiwan	Full	Kazakhstan	Single	Armenia	Mixed
Czechia	Full	Kyrgyzstan	Single	Bolivia	Mixed
Germany	Full	Mongolia	Single	Brazil	Mixed
Greece	Full	Nicaragua	Single	Chile	Mixed
Japan	Full	Russia	Single	Colombia	Mixed
South Korea	Full	Singapore	Single	Cyprus	Mixed
Netherlands	Full	Vietnam	Single	Ecuador	Mixed
New Zealand	Full	Zimbabwe	Single	Ethiopia	Mixed
Romania	Full	Venezuela	Single	Guatemala	Mixed
Slovakia	Full			Indonesia	Mixed
UK	Full			Iraq	Mixed
US	Full			Jordan	Mixed
Uruguay	Full			Kenya	Mixed
				Lebanon	Mixed
				Malaysia	Mixed
				Mexico	Mixed
				Morocco	Mixed
				Nigeria	Mixed
				Pakistan	Mixed
				Peru	Mixed
				Philippines	Mixed
				Serbia	Mixed
				Thailand	Mixed
				Tunisia	Mixed
				Türkiye	Mixed
				Ukraine	Mixed

Table 8: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for single-party countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.100***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		0.123***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			0.143***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.155***
				(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.029**	0.077***	0.156***	0.195***
	(0.044)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.110***	0.099***	0.102***	0.094***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.037***	0.040***	0.019**	0.020**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(0.010)
SATISFIED	0.025***	0.026***	0.020***	0.023***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.298***	0.266***	0.185***	0.146***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.080***	0.076***	0.052***	0.048***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.233***	0.220***	0.189***	0.166***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.132***	0.168***	0.126***	0.133***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.001	0.005	-0.062***	-0.061***
	(0.969)	(0.743)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.067***	-0.053***	-0.057***	-0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)
URBAN	-0.153***	-0.156***	-0.139***	-0.159***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.128***	0.129***	0.129***	0.130***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.079***	-0.078***	-0.079***	-0.073***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.177**	0.207**	0.440***	0.591***
	(0.033)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	15346	15346	15346	15346
Adjusted R^2	0.230	0.249	0.263	0.277

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for fully-democratic countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.101***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		0.069***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			0.018***	
			(0.004)	
GDPPC5Y				-0.006
				(0.292)
RELIGIOUS	0.024**	0.021*	0.025**	0.032***
	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.028)	(0.004)
PINTEREST	0.025***	0.030***	0.018***	0.018***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)
HEALTH	0.039***	0.044***	0.045***	0.046***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.046***	0.045***	0.042***	0.041***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.043***	0.044***	0.050***	0.053***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.024**	0.027**	0.024**	0.024**
	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.031)
LNAGE	0.059***	0.058***	0.059***	0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.064***	0.078***	0.061***	0.056***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.003)
EMPLOYED	-0.045***	-0.047***	-0.048***	-0.046***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	0.003	0.010	0.005	0.002
	(0.787)	(0.374)	(0.690)	(0.882)
URBAN	0.100***	0.101***	0.100***	0.100***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.083***	0.084***	0.092***	0.094***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.111***	-0.113***	-0.111***	-0.111***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.829***	0.923***	0.999***	1.052***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	21751	21751	21751	21751
Adjusted R^2	0.141	0.138	0.135	0.135

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: The linkage between economic growth and trust in government for mixed-democratic countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.129***			
	(0.000)			
GDPPC10Y		0.152***		
		(0.000)		
GG5Y			0.129***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.132***
				(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.138***	0.156***	0.133***	0.158***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.111***	0.115***	0.110***	0.111***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.049***	0.070***	0.051***	0.069***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.042***	0.034***	0.039***	0.034***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.065***	0.046***	0.057***	0.045***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.041***	0.028***	0.044***	0.033***
	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.001)
LNAGE	0.109***	0.076***	0.103***	0.075***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	-0.007	0.035	-0.079**	-0.021
	(0.841)	(0.341)	(0.028)	(0.556)
EMPLOYED	0.008	-0.007	0.010	-0.003
	(0.418)	(0.494)	(0.310)	(0.784)
EDU	-0.151***	-0.164***	-0.171***	-0.190***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.267***	-0.240***	-0.235***	-0.218***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.147***	0.175***	0.147***	0.170***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.104***	-0.099***	-0.097***	-0.094***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.468***	0.635***	0.494***	0.667***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	36955	36955	36955	36955
Adjusted R^2	0.213	0.221	0.230	0.232

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: The linkage between democracy and trust in government.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
VDEMOE	-0.946***		-0.888***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
VDEMOL		-0.789***		-0.824***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
RELIGIOUS			0.051***	0.029***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST			0.085***	0.088***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH			0.046***	0.045***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED			0.041***	0.041***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER			0.117***	0.126***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE			0.051***	0.056***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE			0.092***	0.102***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT			0.065***	0.079***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED			0.024***	0.027***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU			-0.077***	-0.079***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN			-0.182***	-0.182***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE			0.133***	0.137***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT			-0.107***	-0.110***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.882***	1.702***	1.604***	1.461***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	82022	82022	74052	74052
Adjusted R^2	0.060	0.046	0.196	0.191

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: The linkage between democracy and trust in government, having country fixed effects.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)
VDEMOE	-3.536***	
	(0.000)	
VDEMOL		-2.190***
		(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.105***	0.105***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.075***	0.075***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.037***	0.037***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.032***	0.032***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.045***	0.045***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.097***	0.097***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.039***	-0.039***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.045***	-0.045***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.083***	-0.083***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.131***	0.131***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.086***	-0.086***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	3.584***	2.266***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	74052	74052
Adjusted R^2	0.315	0.315

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: The impacts of the average ten-year economic growth and democracy on trust in government.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.105***	0.109***		
	(0.000)	(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.127***	0.131***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
VDEMOE	-0.431***		-0.429***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
VDEMOL		-0.357***		-0.364***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.034***	0.025***	0.066***	0.058***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.089***	0.091***	0.091***	0.093***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.044***	0.044***	0.057***	0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.041***	0.041***	0.037***	0.037***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.102***	0.106***	0.082***	0.086***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.056***	0.058***	0.048***	0.050***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.144***	0.148***	0.115***	0.118***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.129***	0.136***	0.149***	0.157***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	0.012*	0.013*	0.002	0.003
	(0.075)	(0.050)	(0.758)	(0.644)
EDU	-0.058***	-0.059***	-0.061***	-0.062***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.147***	-0.147***	-0.139***	-0.140***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.128***	0.131***	0.140***	0.143***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.106***	-0.108***	-0.102***	-0.103***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.754***	0.656***	0.861***	0.774***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	74052	74052	74052	74052
Adjusted R^2	0.227	0.225	0.236	0.234

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14a: The linkage between democracy and trust in government for Asia and Europe and other Advanced economies (AEs)

	Asia	Asia	Europe & other AEs	Europe & other AEs
	TRUST_GOV	TRUST_GOV	TRUST_GOV	TRUST_GOV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VDEMOE	-0.651***		-0.406***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
VDEMOL		-0.681***		-0.351***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.108***	0.081***	0.095***	0.094***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.074***	0.075***	0.079***	0.080***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.028***	0.029***	0.045***	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.041***	0.041***	0.032***	0.032***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.125***	0.130***	0.066***	0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.031***	0.033***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
LNAGE	0.051***	0.062***	0.058***	0.060***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	-0.009	-0.002	0.085***	0.085***
	(0.716)	(0.929)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.034***	-0.032***	-0.035***	-0.035***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
EDU	-0.096***	-0.094***	-0.019	-0.018
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.108)	(0.127)
URBAN	-0.196***	-0.185***	0.004	0.007
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.727)	(0.584)
SECURE	0.197***	0.197***	0.079***	0.078***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.055***	-0.057***	-0.121***	-0.122***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.611***	1.526***	1.392***	1.310***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	24841	24841	22888	22888
Adjusted R^2	0.161	0.161	0.147	0.147

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14b: The linkage between democracy and trust in government for Latin America and Africa and the Middle East.

	Latin America	Latin America	Africa & Middle East	Africa & Middle East
	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
VDEMOE	0.190***		-1.278***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
VDEMOL		0.208***		-1.613***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	-0.021	-0.015	0.263***	0.261***
	(0.174)	(0.344)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.091***	0.092***	0.067***	0.067***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.021**	0.019**	0.110***	0.099***
	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.038***	0.039***	0.036***	0.037***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	-0.060***	-0.062***	0.099***	0.112***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.030**	0.028*	0.041**	0.039**
	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.024)	(0.027)
LNAGE	0.154***	0.149***	-0.035	-0.033
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.141)	(0.160)
IMIGRANT	0.203***	0.196***	-0.163**	-0.085
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.240)
EMPLOYED	-0.073***	-0.074***	-0.012	-0.020
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.490)	(0.259)
EDU	-0.044**	-0.042**	-0.194***	-0.213***
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.068***	-0.071***	-0.227***	-0.216***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.119***	0.120***	0.028**	0.055***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.017)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.122***	-0.122***	-0.104***	-0.098***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.803***	0.842***	1.923***	1.796***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	13922	13922	12401	12401
Adjusted R^2	0.109	0.110	0.160	0.183

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 15a: The linkage between democracy and trust in government for single-party countries and mixed.

	Single TRUST_GOV (1)	Single TRUST_GOV (2)	Mixed TRUST_GOV (3)	Mixed TRUST_GOV (4)
VDEMOE	-1.311***		-0.828***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
VDEMOL		-1.085***		-0.879***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	-0.036***	-0.081***	0.239***	0.229***
	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.110***	0.117***	0.093***	0.095***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.042***	0.040***	0.053***	0.055***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.021***	0.021***	0.044***	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.241***	0.279***	0.070***	0.074***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.077***	0.081***	0.034***	0.037***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.209***	0.224***	0.025**	0.034***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.049)	(0.008)
IMIGRANT	0.040	0.038	-0.138***	-0.107***
	(0.144)	(0.172)	(0.000)	(0.004)
EMPLOYED	0.013	0.017	0.037***	0.039***
	(0.356)	(0.251)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.035**	-0.052***	-0.191***	-0.199***
	(0.027)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.157***	-0.155***	-0.301***	-0.300***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.146***	0.149***	0.132***	0.135***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.080***	-0.083***	-0.098***	-0.098***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.222***	1.011***	1.630***	1.498***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	15346	15346	36955	36955
Adjusted R^2	0.221	0.206	0.185	0.187

p-values in parentheses
$^*\,p < 0.1$, $^{**}\,p < 0.05$, $^{***}\,p < 0.01$

Table 15b: The linkage between democracy and trust in government for fully-democratic countries

	Full TRUST_GOV (1)	Full TRUST_GOV (2)
VDEMOE	0.265*	
	(0.069)	
VDEMOL		-0.020
		(0.811)
RELIGIOUS	0.034***	0.030***
	(0.003)	(0.008)
PINTEREST	0.017***	0.019***
	(0.006)	(0.002)
HEALTH	0.046***	0.046***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.041***	0.041***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.052***	0.052***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.023**	0.024**
	(0.034)	(0.028)
LNAGE	0.055***	0.057***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.055***	0.059***
	(0.003)	(0.002)
EMPLOYED	-0.048***	-0.047***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	0.003	0.003
	(0.801)	(0.809)
URBAN	0.098***	0.100***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.095***	0.093***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.110***	-0.111***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.820***	1.055***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	21751	21751
Adjusted R^2	0.135	0.135

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 16a: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for single-party countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.103***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.149***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.127***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.161***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.109***	0.085***	0.121***	0.089***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.053***	-0.104***	-0.054***	-0.107***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.020	0.147***	0.069***	0.186***
	(0.157)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.105***	0.100***	0.093***	0.091***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.038***	0.022***	0.042***	0.024***
	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.003)
SATISFIED	0.024***	0.020***	0.026***	0.023***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.297***	0.186***	0.264***	0.146***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.086***	0.057***	0.082***	0.053***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.192***	0.136***	0.175***	0.111***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.133***	0.127***	0.169***	0.134***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	0.007	-0.051***	0.012	-0.049***
	(0.652)	(0.000)	(0.393)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.061***	-0.047***	-0.045***	-0.034**
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.025)
URBAN	-0.145***	-0.123***	-0.149***	-0.143***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.131***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.079***	-0.079***	-0.077***	-0.073***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.255***	0.579***	0.296***	0.740***
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	15229	15229	15229	15229
Adjusted R^2	0.234	0.268	0.253	0.283

p-values in parentheses
$^{*}\ p < 0.1$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$

Table 16b: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for fully-democratic countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.124***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.027***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.064***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				-0.011*
				(0.087)
TRDMEDIA	-0.022	-0.019	-0.023	-0.005
	(0.112)	(0.166)	(0.101)	(0.721)
SMEDIA	-0.036***	-0.033***	-0.026**	-0.036***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.034)	(0.003)
RELIGIOUS	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.029**
	(0.121)	(0.143)	(0.127)	(0.014)
PINTEREST	0.033***	0.023***	0.034***	0.022***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
HEALTH	0.041***	0.048***	0.047***	0.049***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.049***	0.044***	0.045***	0.042***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.036***	0.046***	0.040***	0.049***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.026**	0.024**	0.024**	0.022*
	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.053)
LNAGE	0.061***	0.058***	0.058***	0.047***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)
IMIGRANT	0.054***	0.053***	0.068***	0.046**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.020)
EMPLOYED	-0.054***	-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	0.005	0.006	0.008	0.001
	(0.683)	(0.651)	(0.495)	(0.914)
URBAN	0.102***	0.103***	0.104***	0.103***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.079***	0.089***	0.083***	0.093***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.112***	-0.112***	-0.113***	-0.111***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.802***	1.012***	0.959***	1.114***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	20002	20002	20002	20002
Adjusted R^2	0.143	0.134	0.136	0.134

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 16c: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for mixed-democratic countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.124***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.126***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.146***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.128***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.123***	0.106***	0.095***	0.087***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.120***	-0.111***	-0.121***	-0.111***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.122***	0.118***	0.143***	0.144***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.111***	0.110***	0.116***	0.113***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.052***	0.053***	0.072***	0.071***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.040***	0.037***	0.032***	0.032***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.067***	0.060***	0.049***	0.049***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.042***	0.045***	0.029***	0.033***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)
LNAGE	0.041***	0.041***	0.014	0.016
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.284)	(0.215)
IMIGRANT	-0.003	-0.072**	0.034	-0.019
	(0.931)	(0.046)	(0.359)	(0.597)
EMPLOYED	0.014	0.015	0.001	0.003
	(0.160)	(0.140)	(0.954)	(0.772)
EDU	-0.127***	-0.147***	-0.140***	-0.165***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.253***	-0.223***	-0.228***	-0.207***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.148***	0.149***	0.175***	0.172***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.106***	-0.098***	-0.101***	-0.096***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.704***	0.710***	0.863***	0.879***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	35954	35954	35954	35954
Adjusted R^2	0.217	0.234	0.223	0.235

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 17a: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for Asia.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.111***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.157***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.127***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.172***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.107***	0.090***	0.103***	0.082***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.078***	-0.073***	-0.080***	-0.068***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.076***	0.058***	0.134***	0.108***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.076***	0.065***	0.074***	0.061***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.034***	0.042***	0.036***	0.042***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.040***	0.032***	0.041***	0.033***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.126***	0.092***	0.099***	0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.036***	0.040***	0.032***	0.038***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.038**	0.078***	0.015	0.057***
	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.305)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.159***	0.197***	0.189***	0.223***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.019	-0.016	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.103)	(0.159)	(0.177)	(0.402)
EDU	-0.094***	-0.036***	-0.089***	-0.024*
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.059)
URBAN	-0.192***	-0.138***	-0.197***	-0.148***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.175***	0.182***	0.168***	0.173***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.060***	-0.067***	-0.058***	-0.063***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.822***	0.580***	0.937***	0.709***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	24377	24377	24377	24377
Adjusted R^2	0.193	0.211	0.205	0.222

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 17b: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for Europe and other AEs.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.068***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.010		
		(0.121)		
GDPPC10Y			-0.027***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				-0.058***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.066***	0.065***	0.069***	0.078***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.056***	-0.048***	-0.047***	-0.046***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.125***	0.129***	0.138***	0.147***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.068***	0.069***	0.066***	0.062***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.040***	0.036***	0.034***	0.039***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.027***	0.029***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.058***	0.055***	0.055***	0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.030***	0.033***	0.034***	0.032***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
LNAGE	-0.007	-0.007	-0.009	-0.012
	(0.674)	(0.703)	(0.596)	(0.492)
IMIGRANT	0.060***	0.060***	0.054***	0.050***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.007)
EMPLOYED	-0.048***	-0.052***	-0.055***	-0.055***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.005	-0.007	-0.011	-0.016
	(0.705)	(0.573)	(0.382)	(0.185)
URBAN	0.001	-0.003	-0.007	-0.010
	(0.926)	(0.807)	(0.598)	(0.460)
SECURE	0.075***	0.074***	0.074***	0.075***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.115***	-0.117***	-0.116***	-0.114***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.215***	1.332***	1.400***	1.428***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	21079	21079	21079	21079
Adjusted R^2	0.142	0.140	0.140	0.143

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 17c: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for Latin America.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.017***			
	(0.005)			
GG5Y		0.001		
		(0.874)		
GDPPC10Y			0.038***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.009*
				(0.080)
TRDMEDIA	-0.021	-0.010	-0.029*	-0.015
	(0.234)	(0.556)	(0.098)	(0.393)
SMEDIA	-0.098***	-0.099***	-0.095***	-0.097***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	-0.036**	-0.029*	-0.039**	-0.032**
	(0.027)	(0.082)	(0.016)	(0.049)
PINTEREST	0.100***	0.099***	0.102***	0.100***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.029***	0.026**	0.032***	0.027***
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.006)
SATISFIED	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	-0.048***	-0.052***	-0.045***	-0.050***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
FEMALE	0.036**	0.034**	0.037**	0.035**
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.022)
LNAGE	0.140***	0.129***	0.146***	0.134***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.211***	0.209***	0.207***	0.210***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
EMPLOYED	-0.060***	-0.058***	-0.061***	-0.060***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.042**	-0.037*	-0.044**	-0.041**
	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.032)
URBAN	-0.046**	-0.048***	-0.047***	-0.047***
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
SECURE	0.112***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.121***	-0.120***	-0.121***	-0.121***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.917***	1.012***	0.867***	0.983***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	13552	13552	13552	13552
Adjusted R^2	0.113	0.112	0.114	0.112

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 17d: The linkage between traditional and social media and trust in government for Africa and Middle East.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.111***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.096***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.126***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.088***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.157***	0.110***	0.127***	0.089***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.091***	-0.142***	-0.097***	-0.150***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.165***	0.218***	0.186***	0.246***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.082***	0.088***	0.081***	0.085***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.085***	0.067***	0.109***	0.090***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.048***	0.054***	0.043***	0.052***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.087***	0.057***	0.073***	0.052***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)
FEMALE	0.044**	0.034*	0.034*	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.189)
LNAGE	-0.009	-0.049**	-0.003	-0.043*
	(0.718)	(0.046)	(0.912)	(0.076)
IMIGRANT	0.010	-0.024	0.211***	0.184**
	(0.889)	(0.740)	(0.004)	(0.012)
EMPLOYED	-0.038**	-0.034*	-0.056***	-0.051***
	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.002)	(0.004)
EDU	-0.159***	-0.158***	-0.135***	-0.149***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.125***	-0.165***	-0.100***	-0.161***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.048***	0.048***	0.088***	0.072***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.121***	-0.108***	-0.112***	-0.103***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.820***	1.127***	0.865***	1.189***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	12177	12177	12177	12177
Adjusted R^2	0.179	0.187	0.189	0.184

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18a: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for Asia.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.110***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.152***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.125***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.168***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.113***	0.093***	0.108***	0.083***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.041***	-0.051***	-0.045***	-0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	-0.203***	-0.105***	-0.187***	-0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.007)
RELIGIOUS	0.062***	0.053***	0.121***	0.109***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.075***	0.065***	0.072***	0.059***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.037***	0.044***	0.039***	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.038***	0.031***	0.039***	0.032***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.121***	0.091***	0.095***	0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.042***	0.041***	0.037***	0.037***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
LNAGE	0.087***	0.110***	0.066***	0.085***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.177***	0.207***	0.204***	0.228***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.006	-0.013	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.604)	(0.276)	(0.661)	(0.271)
EDU	-0.088***	-0.035***	-0.081***	-0.020
	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.116)
URBAN	-0.166***	-0.125***	-0.168***	-0.133***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.172***	0.184***	0.170***	0.182***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.059***	-0.065***	-0.056***	-0.060***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.629***	0.465***	0.733***	0.595***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	23205	23205	23205	23205
Adjusted R^2	0.196	0.210	0.209	0.222

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18b: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for Europe and other AEs

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.075***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		-0.006		
		(0.315)		
GDPPC10Y			0.078***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				-0.014**
				(0.041)
TRDMEDIA	0.076***	0.078***	0.075***	0.079***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.066***	-0.056***	-0.061***	-0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	0.233***	0.231***	0.318***	0.218***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.168***	0.174***	0.169***	0.175***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.048***	0.049***	0.047***	0.048***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.025***	0.023***	0.027***	0.024***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
SATISFIED	0.028***	0.030***	0.028***	0.030***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.056***	0.054***	0.056***	0.054***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.031***	0.034***	0.030***	0.034***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
LNAGE	-0.021	-0.020	-0.019	-0.021
	(0.225)	(0.238)	(0.282)	(0.230)
IMIGRANT	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.683)	(0.613)	(0.645)	(0.617)
EMPLOYED	-0.050***	-0.055***	-0.050***	-0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.009	-0.013	-0.007	-0.014
	(0.456)	(0.268)	(0.575)	(0.235)
URBAN	-0.018	-0.023*	-0.020	-0.023*
	(0.170)	(0.078)	(0.122)	(0.075)
SECURE	0.077***	0.076***	0.075***	0.076***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.107***	-0.109***	-0.106***	-0.109***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.167***	1.320***	1.142***	1.333***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	21079	21079	21079	21079
Adjusted R^2	0.156	0.153	0.156	0.153

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18c: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for Latin America.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.007			
	(0.304)			
GG5Y		-0.004		
		(0.368)		
GDPPC10Y			0.023***	
			(0.002)	
GDPPC5Y				0.003
				(0.613)
TRDMEDIA	-0.024	-0.018	-0.030*	-0.022
	(0.158)	(0.292)	(0.080)	(0.197)
SMEDIA	-0.107***	-0.109***	-0.104***	-0.107***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	0.128***	0.137***	0.105***	0.132***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	-0.026	-0.020	-0.031*	-0.024
	(0.111)	(0.216)	(0.059)	(0.139)
PINTEREST	0.102***	0.102***	0.103***	0.102***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.025**	0.023**	0.028***	0.024**
	(0.012)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.015)
SATISFIED	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	-0.049***	-0.051***	-0.047***	-0.050***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
FEMALE	0.034**	0.033**	0.035**	0.034**
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.027)
LNAGE	0.123***	0.114***	0.131***	0.120***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.186**	0.183**	0.189**	0.185**
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
EMPLOYED	-0.065***	-0.065***	-0.066***	-0.065***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.025	-0.020	-0.030	-0.024
	(0.192)	(0.297)	(0.118)	(0.216)
URBAN	-0.051***	-0.053***	-0.051***	-0.052***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
SECURE	0.116***	0.117***	0.116***	0.116***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.119***	-0.119***	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.001***	1.062***	0.943***	1.030***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	13552	13552	13552	13552
Adjusted R^2	0.115	0.115	0.116	0.115

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18d: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for Africa and Middle East.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.103***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.085***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.116***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.078***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.139***	0.105***	0.114***	0.084***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.106***	-0.152***	-0.112***	-0.160***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	0.096***	0.058***	0.082***	0.070***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.137***	0.201***	0.162***	0.222***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.080***	0.085***	0.079***	0.083***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.088***	0.072***	0.109***	0.093***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.049***	0.053***	0.044***	0.052***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.080***	0.056***	0.069***	0.050***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)
FEMALE	0.048***	0.037**	0.038**	0.028
	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.113)
LNAGE	0.006	-0.041*	0.008	-0.034
	(0.794)	(0.089)	(0.757)	(0.165)
IMIGRANT	-0.038	-0.054	0.152**	0.126*
	(0.604)	(0.456)	(0.037)	(0.086)
EMPLOYED	-0.025	-0.026	-0.043**	-0.039**
	(0.165)	(0.154)	(0.017)	(0.029)
EDU	-0.112***	-0.130***	-0.097***	-0.115***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.098***	-0.151***	-0.081***	-0.143***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.054***	0.049***	0.089***	0.071***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.118***	-0.108***	-0.110***	-0.103***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.810***	1.145***	0.874***	1.193***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	12177	12177	12177	12177
Adjusted R^2	0.191	0.191	0.198	0.190

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 19a: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for single-party countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.106***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.149***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.133***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.161***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.107***	0.086***	0.119***	0.088***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.054***	-0.105***	-0.057***	-0.107***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	0.198***	-0.062	0.336***	0.017
	(0.000)	(0.110)	(0.000)	(0.654)
RELIGIOUS	0.017	0.149***	0.067***	0.186***
	(0.225)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.105***	0.099***	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.036***	0.023***	0.038***	0.023***
	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.003)
SATISFIED	0.026***	0.020***	0.029***	0.023***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.296***	0.186***	0.260***	0.146***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.082***	0.058***	0.075***	0.053***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LNAGE	0.179***	0.140***	0.153***	0.110***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
IMIGRANT	0.127***	0.131***	0.162***	0.134***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EMPLOYED	-0.006	-0.047***	-0.008	-0.050***
	(0.705)	(0.001)	(0.581)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.070***	-0.043***	-0.060***	-0.034**
	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.023)
URBAN	-0.151***	-0.121***	-0.157***	-0.144***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.131***	0.129***	0.133***	0.131***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.079***	-0.079***	-0.077***	-0.073***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.280***	0.567***	0.336***	0.744***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	15229	15229	15229	15229
Adjusted R^2	0.235	0.268	0.257	0.283

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 19b: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for fully-democratic countries

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.082***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.006		
		(0.411)		
GDPPC10Y			0.083***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				-0.005
				(0.507)
TRDMEDIA	-0.020	-0.014	-0.025*	-0.010
	(0.167)	(0.332)	(0.079)	(0.488)
SMEDIA	-0.056***	-0.060***	-0.055***	-0.060***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	0.145***	0.168***	0.229***	0.163***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
RELIGIOUS	0.029**	0.032***	0.027**	0.035***
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.004)
PINTEREST	0.019***	0.012*	0.016**	0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.078)	(0.018)	(0.070)
HEALTH	0.049***	0.056***	0.051***	0.056***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.049***	0.046***	0.049***	0.045***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.036***	0.042***	0.036***	0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.023**	0.022*	0.023*	0.022*
	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.067)
LNAGE	0.070***	0.064***	0.073***	0.061***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
IMIGRANT	0.031	0.027	0.030	0.026
	(0.125)	(0.177)	(0.133)	(0.192)
EMPLOYED	-0.058***	-0.060***	-0.058***	-0.060***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
EDU	-0.008	-0.012	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.539)	(0.363)	(0.687)	(0.312)
URBAN	0.103***	0.099***	0.104***	0.099***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.062***	0.063***	0.060***	0.063***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.110***	-0.110***	-0.109***	-0.110***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.780***	0.946***	0.765***	0.976***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	18830	18830	18830	18830
Adjusted R^2	0.146	0.143	0.146	0.143

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 19c: The linkage between net migration on trust in government for mixed-democratic countries.

	TRUST_GOV (1)	TRUST_GOV (2)	TRUST_GOV (3)	TRUST_GOV (4)
GG10Y	0.123***			
	(0.000)			
GG5Y		0.125***		
		(0.000)		
GDPPC10Y			0.144***	
			(0.000)	
GDPPC5Y				0.127***
				(0.000)
TRDMEDIA	0.115***	0.104***	0.091***	0.086***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SMEDIA	-0.127***	-0.113***	-0.126***	-0.113***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NETMIGR	0.065***	0.014**	0.041***	0.017***
	(0.000)	(0.018)	(0.000)	(0.004)
RELIGIOUS	0.122***	0.119***	0.144***	0.145***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
PINTEREST	0.113***	0.111***	0.117***	0.113***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
HEALTH	0.050***	0.053***	0.071***	0.070***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SATISFIED	0.039***	0.037***	0.032***	0.032***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
BETTER	0.066***	0.060***	0.049***	0.049***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
FEMALE	0.042***	0.045***	0.029***	0.033***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
LNAGE	0.039***	0.039***	0.012	0.015
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.381)	(0.256)
IMIGRANT	-0.024	-0.077**	0.018	-0.025
	(0.521)	(0.034)	(0.614)	(0.484)
EMPLOYED	0.013	0.015	0.000	0.003
	(0.206)	(0.144)	(0.986)	(0.779)
EDU	-0.117***	-0.145***	-0.134***	-0.162***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
URBAN	-0.250***	-0.223***	-0.227***	-0.207***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
SECURE	0.156***	0.151***	0.180***	0.174***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
CORRUPT	-0.105***	-0.098***	-0.101***	-0.096***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.725***	0.721***	0.885***	0.890***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	35954	35954	35954	35954
Adjusted R^2	0.220	0.235	0.224	0.235

p-values in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$