

Precolonial Elites and Colonial Redistribution of Political Power

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Abstract

Studies of colonialism often associate indirect colonial rule with continuity of the precolonial institutions. Yet, we know less about how colonialism affected the distribution of power between precolonial domestic elites within nominally continuous institutions. We argue that colonial authorities will redistribute power toward elites that are the most congruent with the colonizer’s objectives. We test our theory on the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Using an original dataset on members of the Egyptian parliament and a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, we show that the colonial authorities shifted parliamentary representation toward the (congruent) landed elite and away from the (oppositional) rural middle class. This shift was greater in cotton-producing provinces which were more exposed to colonial economic interest. Our results demonstrate that the colonial redistribution of power within precolonial institutions can re-engineer the social-structural fabric of colonized societies.

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1 Introduction

Over 80 percent of the Earth’s landmass has been colonized by European empires, and the majority of that colonization took place after 1800. Indirect rule – the dominant form of late colonial administration – is often associated with the preservation of precolonial political institutions. Rather than create colonial institutions, indirect colonial administrations often preserved or repurposed certain precolonial institutions (Boone 2014, Mamdani 1996, Wucherpfennig et al. 2016). This is especially apparent in places with legacies of highly centralized precolonial states (Gerring et al. 2011, Müller-Crepon 2020, Paine 2019).

Yet, case evidence from multiple academic disciplines and colonial contexts suggests that indirect rule can also induce “profound” (Apter 1972) changes to precolonial *power structures*, even as precolonial *institutions* appear to persist. Colonial favoritism of some precolonial elites over others is well-documented across cases and periods of imperial expansion (Herbst 2000, Lee 2017). In other words, the nominal continuity of precolonial institutions can complicate the observation of how indirect rule affects the hierarchical relations of the precolonial elite within those institutions. Distinguishing between institutions and the elites that populate them is all the more important given the large body of scholarship that links the long-run effects of precolonial and colonial institutions to many social scientific outcomes of interest, including post-colonial economic development, support for democracy, and the incidence of civil conflict (McNamee 2019, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2020, Wig 2016, Wilfahrt 2018).

We develop our theoretical expectations by applying insights from the literature on power-sharing in authoritarian regimes to indirect rule. We argue that colonialism is best conceptualized as a sub-type of authoritarian rule. Under indirect rule, a foreign dictator (colonizer) shares power with precolonial elites. Such power-sharing arrangements are often institutionalized using precolonial institutions. We argue that indirect colonizers are incentivized to redistribute political power within national-level precolonial institutions toward the precolonial elite most congruent with the colonizer’s strategic objectives, and shift power away from oppositional elites. Colonizers’ motivation for occupying and colonizing may vary by case, but we expect that this redistribution will be most pronounced for elites from regions related to this motivating objective. We distinguish between *political congruence*, where the colonizer selects – within the colonial ruling coalition – domestic elites with lower threat of anti-colonial rebellion, and *strategic congruence*, where the colonizer selects those with lower threat of undermining strategic colonial objectives beyond regime survival.

In this article, we undertake (to our knowledge) the first empirical study of how indirect rule redistributed power among domestic elites within national-level precolonial institutions. We base our analysis on the case of Egypt, which was occupied and indirectly ruled by Britain from 1882 to 1922. In precolonial Egypt, the Khedival regime institutionalized power-sharing with both the rural middle class (RMC) and landed elite (LE) at the national level. The LE held executive power, including the office of the Khedive (viceroy) and cabinet of ministers, while the RMC dominated the precolonial parliament, and translated economic gains from the 1860s cotton boom into significant political power. Following Egypt’s default on its European debt in 1876, parliamentarians joined forces with a successful nationalist movement led by Colonel Ahmed

'Urabi, and ultimately secured legislative oversight over the Egyptian Khedival regime in February 1882. In response, the British invaded Egypt in July 1882, defeating the 'Urabi movement and establishing indirect rule so as to ensure Egypt's debt repayment. Although the British preserved certain precolonial Khedival institutions, like parliament, the colonial (re)distribution of power among domestic elites has never been studied.

To test our elite-congruence argument, we constructed several original datasets that span the universe of precolonial and colonial Egyptian members of parliament (MPs) from 1824 to 1923. We classify MPs into three social classes: the LE, the RMC, and the urban middle class. We combine this dataset with geographic data on crop productivity from precolonial agricultural statistics and measures of elite congruence with Britain in the precolonial period. These data are unique among colonized cases, because they enable us to observe the domestic elite below the executive level both before and after colonization.

We employ a difference-in-differences model that compares the evolution of the social class composition of MPs before and after the 1882 British occupation across constituencies with varying degrees of precolonial cotton productivity. Cotton comprised 80% of Egypt's exports pre-1882. Therefore, cotton-producing provinces would be most exposed to colonial policies due to the vested interest of British capital in Egypt's cotton production. We show that under colonial rule, the composition of the Egyptian parliament shifted from the RMC to the LE, and that this shift was greater in higher cotton-productivity provinces. Our findings are *not* driven by differences in precolonial state capacity across provinces, but rather by differences in exposure to British colonial policies as captured by precolonial cotton productivity. We then demonstrate that among more cotton-productive provinces, the shift was greater in provinces where the RMC was more politically and economically oppositional, and the LE were more economically congruent. Our final analysis investigates the institutional mechanisms employed by the British to redistribute power in parliament towards the LE. Our findings lend support to both political and strategic (in colonial Egypt's case, economic) congruence.

We make several contributions to the study of the effect of precolonial and colonial legacies. First, our intervention complicates the assumption in some of the political science and economics literature of continuity of precolonial state structures under indirect colonial rule. Our analysis shows that even though precolonial institutions (the parliament) and executive elites (the Khedive and ministerial cabinet) nominally continue in colonial Egypt, colonial changes to the class composition, form, and function of the parliament completely re-engineered the distribution of political power. Second, we are the first to construct an individual-level database in a colonial setting that traces domestic elites before and after colonialism, which enables us to study the effect of colonialism on the redistribution of total power among domestic elites. Third, we are the first to theorize the calculus of elite coalition formation under indirect colonial rule by modifying theories of power-sharing in dictatorships. In doing so, we are able to show why precolonial intra-elite heterogeneity matters for political development under colonialism.

2 Theory

A central line of inquiry in the quantitative political science and economics literature on colonialism examines why colonizers may adopt direct or indirect rule, and what these colonial sub-types mean for the persistence of precolonial domestic power structures. [Gerring et al. \(2011\)](#) attribute indirect colonial rule to the existence of a precolonial state. According to their thesis, precolonial polities with greater levels of “statedness,” i.e., formal state institutions, were more likely to be indirectly ruled after occupation. Imposing direct rule on highly institutionalized states is unlikely due to the high cost of replacing the precolonial state altogether. [Müller-Crepon \(2020\)](#) also finds that more centralized states in Sub-Saharan Africa were more likely to be indirectly ruled, and that indirect rule more frequently preserved precolonial ruling dynasties than direct rule. Recent work on the legacies of precolonial states and conflict also links elite groups that organized as precolonial states with the incidence of post-colonial conflict, albeit with divergent findings ([Dincecco et al. 2022](#), [Paine 2019](#), [Wig 2016](#)). Given that precolonial and colonial institutional legacies have been shown to predict a range of political and economic outcomes, understanding precisely which elites populate those institutions over time can shed light on why.

Yet, interdisciplinary scholarship on indirect rule is replete with evidence of colonial re-engineering of the precolonial political order ([Lee 2017](#), [Naseemullah and Staniland 2016](#), [Slater 2010](#)). Traditionalization is one such method, where the colonial administration revised precolonial institutions and hierarchies under the guise of legitimating their rule and increasing control ([Boone 1995, 2014](#), [Crowder 1964](#), [Herbst 2000](#), [Hobbsawm and Ranger 2012](#), [Mamdani 1996](#)). Scholars argue that indirect rule used the legitimizing screen of precolonial institutions to shift the precolonial distribution of power to favor colonial interest. Much of this work focuses on *sub-national* local elites and institutions as a means to control peripheral regions ([Baldwin 2015](#), [Banerjee and Iyer 2005](#), [Mukherjee 2021](#)).

Our theoretical intervention helps to reconcile these accounts of persistence and change by addressing why and how colonizers shift the composition of the *national-level* domestic political class within nominally continuous state institutions. To do so, we turn to insights from scholarship on authoritarian power-sharing. This literature offers two key insights to studying the redistribution of power in colonial contexts. First, scholars of authoritarianism argue that power-sharing with elites emerges to mitigate their threat of revolt and ensure regime survival, and that power-sharing may be institutionalized in order for the dictator to credibly commit to the elites and undercut challengers ([Boix and Svolik 2013](#), [Gandhi and Przeworski 2007](#), [Meng 2019](#), [de Mesquita et al. 2003](#), [Svolik 2012](#)). We argue that colonial regimes, like sovereign autocracies, face significant threats of revolt from the populations that they govern, especially elites. To counteract the threat of anti-colonial revolt from the domestic precolonial elite, indirect rule’s use of precolonial institutions to share power with domestic elites is analogous to institutionalized power-sharing in sovereign autocracies.

The second transferable insight from the authoritarian power-sharing literature to the study of indirect rule is [Boix and Svolik \(2013\)](#)’s concept of “total power.” We argue that this is a useful heuristic for conceptualizing the institutionalization of power-sharing between the colonizer and domestic elites. In a given precolonial polity, total

power is distributed among domestic elites. Colonialism disrupts the precolonial distribution of total power, as the colonizer captures a significant share of total power, which is (exogenously) determined by the metropole’s willingness to invest in the colony.¹ The colonizer thus forms a ruling coalition with the minimum number of domestic elite allies – the “collaborators” – in order to achieve the threshold share of total power that is needed to rule. Under indirect rule, the colonizer institutionalizes power-sharing with domestic collaborators, in order to mitigate the threat of rebellion, via the creation of new colonial institutions, or the preservation of precolonial institutions, including coercive, executive, and legislative institutions.

The logic of authoritarian power-sharing helps explain why the colonizer may institutionalize power-sharing with domestic elites under indirect rule. However, this logic does not directly address our central question of why and how the colonizer would change the precolonial power distribution *within* precolonial elites, conditional on the share of power controlled by the colonizer. This literature generally conceives of power-sharing between an autocrat and a *homogeneous* elite. In contrast, our framework assumes that there are two classes of the precolonial elites who are heterogeneous with respect to the threat of revolt they may pose to the colonizer, and that each class holds sufficient share of power that would make it a viable ally for the colonizer.² We expect the colonizer will select the most politically congruent elite class – with the least threat of anti-colonial rebellion – as collaborators in the national-level colonial ruling coalition (*political congruence*). Put differently, the colonizer will redistribute power away from the most politically oppositional elites, and toward the elites that are most politically congruent with the colonizer’s objective of regime survival. This happens in order to mitigate frictions within the coalition on the question of regime survival. The excluded oppositional elite class will not be able to stage a successful anti-colonial rebellion without the support of some collaborators, as long as the colonizer is sufficiently strong relative to the collaborators, and the colonial coalition is sufficiently strong relative to the excluded oppositional elite class (Boix and Svolik 2013).

Regime survival – or mitigating the threat of revolt – does not fully capture colonial incentives to redistribute power. This reflects a crucial difference between sovereign autocracies and colonial regimes. In sovereign autocracies, the dictator’s tools of repressing an elite rebellion are limited to the domestic state resources, and in the case of a successful rebellion the dictator has little chance of exit. In colonial regimes, the colonizer has a higher chance of repressing elite rebellion by drawing on extraterritorial power (e.g., financial, military) from the metropole. If a rebellion succeeds, the colonizer may exit with relative ease. Given the weaker rebellion threat in colonial settings, we further extend the authoritarian power-sharing model by arguing that colonial power-sharing can be explained by the threat of the domestic elite to undermine the colonizer’s broader set of objectives beyond regime survival. Institutionalized power-sharing under indirect rule would thus mitigate the threat of undermining the strategic colonial objectives. We assume that domestic elites are heterogeneous with respect to

¹In the language of Boix and Svolik (2013)’s model, we focus on the case when the colonizer holds a share of power that is not sufficient to rule alone: $\lambda < \kappa^0$, where λ is the colonizer’s share of total power and κ^0 is the share of power held by the colonial ruling coalition.

²That is, by including any of the two classes, the ruling coalition will hold a share of power at least equal to κ^0 .

their threat of undermining colonial objectives.

A wide array of objectives may drive colonial expansion. Economic extraction is often cited as a motivation for late colonialism (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Dell and Olken 2020, Robinson and Acemoglu 2012). Some have focused on the cultural and ideological drivers of imperialism, such as a supremacist “civilizing” mission or religious proselytism (Daughton 2006, Porter 1992). Other strategic goals of colonial rule include maintaining access to trade routes, securing borders, and inter-state competition (Lange et al. 2006, Mahoney 2010, Paine et al. 2024). While economic extraction prevails as the most common objective in the late colonial period (Beckert 2014, Ferro 1997), our theory applies to other non-economic objectives that may motivate a colonizer to occupy a polity. Across the range of motivations, we expect the colonial autocrat will opt to redistribute power toward the elite that is most congruent with (least oppositional to) a broader set of colonial objectives (*strategic congruence*).

Our theory has two main implications. First, we expect to see an increased share of total power for congruent elites *relative* to oppositional elites under indirect rule at the national level. Whether the congruent elite would hold a greater *absolute* share in total power relative to their share in the precolonial period is ambiguous due to the fact that the colonizer controls a significant share of total power. Second, we argue that the redistribution of national-level power will reflect the geography of realizing the colonizer’s objective. We expect that the power redistribution toward congruent elites (and away from oppositional elites) will be concentrated in regions related to the colonizer’s primary objective. The effects of economically-motivated occupation, for example, should be most prevalent in regions that generate the most economic surplus. In the analysis that follows, we refer to this spatial dimension of colonial interest as *colonial exposure*. While this effect may be a consequence of intentional, targeted intervention by the colonial administration, it is also possible that this redistribution emerges as an unintended consequence of policies designed to achieve the colonial objectives.

The findings of Gerring et al. (2011) imply a contending, alternative explanation that by-passes our theory of elite congruence. Given that precolonial state institutions are more likely to persist under indirect rule, it is also possible that we would simply see either the maintenance or expansion of power in favor of precolonial elites that already control the state. The path dependant intuition of this argument is straightforward, as it would involve less colonial intervention to simply preserve the power of incumbent state elites. On the aggregate level, this alternative explanation would predict that precolonial state elites persist and maintain their relative power under the colonial regime, even though their *absolute* power would likely decrease due to colonization. Sub-nationally, precolonial state capacity, rather than elite congruence, would be the driving factor behind any colonial redistribution of power in favor of incumbent power elites. If this alternative explanation is indeed the one that captures the most variation in colonial redistribution of power, measures of precolonial statedness should be more predictive than measures of colonial exposure.

In the next section, we provide historical context related to our theory in the case of Egypt. We describe the power-sharing arrangement between the precolonial Khedival regime and the two most powerful elite groups: the LE and the RMC. We set the stage

for our empirical exercise by demonstrating the colonial regime's economic motivations to increase Egyptian cotton production and reflect on what previous work has shown about the distribution of domestic political power among precolonial elites under British indirect rule.

3 Historical Background

The remainder of this article focuses on the case of precolonial and colonial Egypt. Egypt had a well-documented parliament before and after the British occupation, allowing us to observe changes in the distribution of total power in the national-level domestic political class below the executive more extensively than in cases without a parliament. In this section, we describe the evolution of power-sharing in precolonial and colonial Egypt with the LE and the RMC.

Egypt was an autonomous Ottoman vassal state from 1805 to 1882, a *de facto* British colony under nominal Ottoman sovereignty from 1882 to 1914, and a British protectorate from 1914 to 1922, when it gained nominal independence in February 1922. During the precolonial and colonial periods, Egypt's domestic government was ruled by the dynasty of the Ottoman viceroy Muhammad Ali (1805–1848), whose descendants adopted the title of “Khedive” between 1867 and 1914. By the second half of the 19th century, the Khedival regime institutionalized power-sharing with two elite groups: the LE and the RMC (Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011, Sayyid-Marsot 1969, Schölch 1974).

The Khedival regime institutionalized power-sharing with the LE by awarding them leadership positions in government. The majority of Egypt's precolonial ministers, provincial governors, top military officers, and chiefs of government agencies came from the LE before the British occupation in 1882 (Collins 1984). The Khedival family were the largest landowners in Egypt and used state-owned usufruct land to grant large landholdings to these officials (Baer 1962, El-Dessouky 1975). The earliest 19th century LEs were ethnic Turco-Circassians (Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011, Baer 1962), but historians agree that intermarriage between Ottoman and Egyptian upper-class families, as well as upward class mobility for certain Egyptians, resulted in an ethnically blended elite by the 1870s (Sayyid-Marsot 1984) who were defined by their out-sized wealth and access to executive decision-making (Blaydes and El Tarouty 2022).

Political histories of Egypt are clear that the RMC enjoyed institutionalized power-sharing under the precolonial Khedives, first at the local level and later at the national level. The RMC were predominantly comprised of village headmen. The village headman role predates Khedival rule, but became incorporated into the Khedival local bureaucracy after the abolition of tax farming in 1813 (Cuno 1992). As intermediaries between the state and the peasantry, headmen fulfilled a hybrid role as mayor-tax collectors under the Ministry of Interior. Brown (1990, p. 29) defines the RMC as a class of commercial farmers “whose presence extended throughout rural Egypt.” The RMC were distinguished from the peasantry by the fact that they could afford paid (or slave) labor to capitalize on their agricultural production and owned landholdings that fell in the middle of the distribution (Brown 1990). Davis (1983, p. 40–41) notes that the RMC also developed a distinct class consciousness through a shared material interest (i.e., capitalist cultivation of cash crops and being subjected to heavy taxation), and

recruitment into positions in the lower ranks of government bureaucracy and military.

The precolonial parliament (1824–1882) institutionalized national-level power-sharing between the Khedive and the RMC. [Sayyid-Marsot \(1984\)](#) argues that the earliest parliament (*al-Majlis al-‘ali*, 1824–1837) was created with the primary goal of supporting Muhammad Ali’s rural reform programs. As a result, the RMC held the majority of seats by design. Members of the 1866–1882 parliament, *Majlis shura al-nuwwab* in 1866–1879 and *Majlis al-nuwwab al-misry* in 1881–1882, were mostly elected village headman, while the LE predominantly held appointed positions, such as Speaker of the Chamber (See [Figure 3](#)).

By the late 1870s, precolonial RMC MPs began to demand greater power-sharing and legislative oversight. Historians link the growth in RMC power to an abrupt increase in their economic power due to a boom in Egypt’s cotton exports ([Cuno 1992](#)). Egypt was a prominent exporter of high-quality long-staple cotton since 1820, but a cotton boom during the United States’ civil war led Egyptian cotton exports to quadruple ([Owen 1969](#)). The blockade of Southern cotton trade meant that industrializing Britain needed a new source of raw materials for its textile mills ([Cole 1993](#), p. 58). The cotton boom enriched both the LE and the RMC, although only the LE enjoyed the legal right to force local peasants to work on their large estates ([Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011](#)). These restrictions on local labor induced the RMC to purchase slaves from Sudan ([Cuno 2009](#), [Helal 1999](#), [Saleh 2023](#)).³

On the eve of colonial rule, the RMC acquired a greater share of total power than ever before. Key historical events are summarized in [Figure 1](#). The Egyptian government’s debt default in 1876 increased RMC dissent. The Khedival regime borrowed heavily from European powers to finance domestic infrastructural development. Britain and France, as the primary stakeholders, established a system of dual control over Egyptian finances through a new institution, the Caisse de la Dette Publique, and gained ministerial appointments in finance and public works. The parliamentary debates from this period feature the RMC’s opposition to increased European intervention in Egyptian domestic affairs and worsening economic conditions ([Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiya 2017](#)). The British used their increased influence to force Khedive Isma’il to abolish slavery and announce the future emancipation of slaves via the 1877 Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention. In response, the RMC MPs began to demand legislative powers and oversight over the budget and ministerial cabinet ([Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiya 2017](#)). These demands were so robust that they materialized in a draft constitution in 1879 ([Subhi 1947](#)). To quell dissent, the Khedive shuttered parliament and European powers colluded to replace Khedive Isma’il with his son, Tewfiq. By 1879, the RMC was strong enough to credibly push for greater power-sharing and enhanced their strength by allying with the ‘Urabi movement.

The ‘Urabi movement⁴ was led by Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi, an Egyptian military officer from a RMC background ([Cole 1993](#), p. 207). The 1876 default and austere fiscal regime led to the drastic reduction of the size and budget of the military, creating a discontented pool of unemployed military officers ([Cole 1993](#)). Tapping into growing

³See [Appendix A7](#) for the historiography of RMC slaveholding.

⁴English scholarship refers to this historical event as a revolt, revolution, or movement. Arabophone historians favor the term “revolution.” We use movement and revolution to refer to this event in the article.




Figure 1: Political and Legislative Event Timeline (1879–1882)

resentment against European intervention and economic turmoil, ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement spread throughout Egypt and called for sovereign control over the Egyptian treasury, parliamentary oversight of the Khedive, and increased representation of non-LEs in the Egyptian executive and military officials. The threat of overthrow from RMC MPs and allies in the military-led ‘Urabi movement was strong enough to force Khedive Tewfiq to defy the British and French and to unilaterally reopen the parliament in 1881 (Al-Rafi’i 1949). In 1882, ‘Urabi became the first RMC minister when the Khedive appointed him as the Minister of War. The final precolonial parliament (1881–1882) passed a new constitution that expanded the franchise and established the legislature’s authority over the executive (Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiya 2017, Subhi 1947). The new constitution was ratified by Khedive Tewfiq into law on February 7, 1882.

Historians argue that the European powers feared what the success of ‘Urabi and the RMC meant for their interests in Egypt. According to Sayyid-Marsot (1969, p. 17), it was clear to everyone – Egyptian and foreign – that the ‘Urabists (including the RMC) were the only power in the country in early 1882; the British Consul in Alexandria reported that the Khedive was “powerless,” and that the Anglo-French influence was, “steadily decreasing. We can only regain our ascendancy by the destruction of the military supremacy.” Britain’s financial risk under the new status quo was threefold. First, a parliament with powers of budgetary oversight and controlled by RMC interests threatened Britain’s likelihood of recouping Egypt’s outstanding debt (Jakes 2020, p. 1). Second, British manufacturing demanded cheap cotton for textile manufacturing in the metropole (Owen 1969, Schölch 1976). Third, the British believed that a change in the balance of power would jeopardize Britain’s trade routes should they lose their strategic, preferential access to the Suez Canal (Sayyid-Marsot 1969), but Galbraith and Sayyid-Marsot (1978) argue that this concern was a distant third to Egyptian debt and access to cotton. On July 11, 1882, the British launched their occupation of Egypt.

Under the British, Egypt became “huge cotton plantation to satisfy the needs and desires of a colonial power” (No Author 1964). The area under cotton cultivation ex-

panded from 693,000 feddans⁵ in 1882 to 1,723,094 feddans in 1913 (Owen 1969, p. 186). Early colonial expansion of cultivation and irrigation focused on the cotton-producing provinces of Lower Egypt and only expanded to Upper Egypt in the early 1900s (Abul-Magd 2013, Tignor 1966). Cotton was so central to colonial Egypt that the state-owned railway lost 26,500 Egyptian pounds in 1888 due to the “smallness of the cotton crop,” which reduced shipments from the provinces to the port in Alexandria (Parliament Command Papers 1890, p. 9).

The question of how Britain’s economic interests in Egypt may have altered the elite composition of Egyptian parliament remains unanswered in the historiography of Egypt. There are several reasons for this. The first is that historical and political studies of the period often favor the use of certain colonial terminology that blurred class distinctions, therefore making it difficult to track continuity and change by social class. In some sources, the RMC are considered fellaheen (peasantry), while in others they are grouped with the LE as “notables.” This elision of terminology means that many historical studies assume continuity in the precolonial and colonial ruling elite of “notables,” without considering how British rule affected the relative shares of power between the LE and RMC at the national level. The second reason why this question has received less attention is due to a long-held assumption that the parliament itself was “powerless.” Not only has this assumption been challenged by advances in the political science literature on authoritarian parliaments, but also by scholarship on Egypt’s colonial experience that identifies the parliament as an important arena of anti-colonial political opposition, particularly in the years leading up to the 1919 Revolution (Tignor 1976).

4 Data

To test our theory in the Egyptian case, we constructed a dataset at the MP-session level that spans the universe of Egyptian MPs from the first precolonial parliamentary session under Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha in 1824–1837 to the promulgation of the first post-independence constitution in 1923. This includes 11 parliamentary sessions: five sessions during the precolonial period, and six under colonial rule.⁶ Our data are based on a primary source in Arabic, *History of Parliamentary Life in Egypt since the Era of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha*, that was compiled by Subhi (1947) from MP lists in the Egyptian parliamentary archives.

For each individual MP, we know their full name, occupation (e.g., village headman), and honorific title (e.g., pasha, bey, effendi, sheikh). We also know whether each MP is elected or appointed, their date of entry into the parliament, their constituency at the province, district, or village level, and whether they held an executive position (e.g., speaker of parliament). We organize the data by session and include the dates of parliamentary sessions and the official name of each chamber.

We manually matched MPs across sessions and created a unique identifier for each MP using the MP’s full name.⁷ We also created a unique dynasty identifier that traces

⁵1 *feddan* = 6,368 square meters.

⁶The parliament was unicameral in 1824–1882 and 1913–1923, and bicameral in 1883–1913. See Appendix A8 for session dates.

⁷In Egypt, the full name consists of the person’s first name followed by the father’s first name (second

family names across MPs and sessions, where we define the family name as the last name of an MP's full name. We assigned MPs to provinces – the level at which parliamentary constituencies were defined during the colonial period (1883–1923) (see Appendix A1 for details). The final dataset consists of 771 unique MPs, who served for a total of 1,102 MP-session observations, spanning the period from 1824 to 1923.

Our main outcome variable is the social class *origin* of each MP. We classified MPs into three classes based on three variables: honorific title, occupation, and the urban/rural status of their constituency (see Appendix A2 for the historical basis for our coding criteria). We used the initial honorific and occupational titles that are observed in each MP's first session in parliament.⁸ We then assigned each MP to a social class following the steps described in Appendix A2 and summarized here. The LE (289 MP-session observations) consist of pashas and beys⁹ – the highest honorific titles in Khedival Egypt – and top bureaucrats. The RMC (679 MP-session observations) consist of MPs in rural constituencies, with non-missing honorific titles (excluding pashas and beys) or non-missing occupational titles (except top bureaucrats). The urban middle class (57 MP-session observations) consist of MPs in urban constituencies, with non-missing honorific titles (excluding pashas and beys) or non-missing occupational titles (except top bureaucrats). There are 77 MP-session observations with missing social class, because they are either not assigned to a constituency (and are not pashas, beys, or top bureaucrats), or are assigned to a constituency yet their honorific and occupational titles are both missing.

Our main explanatory variable is precolonial cotton productivity at the province level – the level at which we observe parliamentary constituencies of MPs. Precolonial cotton productivity measures colonial exposure, or the potential contribution of each province to Egypt's economic surplus during the colonial period. Cotton productivity is measured using the average cotton yield per feddan in 1877 in each province as reported in Egypt's 1877 Statistical Yearbook ([Ministère de l'Intérieur 1877](#)). We also control for precolonial cereal productivity (the average yield of wheat, barley, and beans per feddan by province in 1877) using the same source.¹⁰ Both cotton and cereals productivity measures are continuous. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of cotton and cereals productivity across provinces. On average, Lower Egypt (Nile Delta) produced more cotton and cereals than Upper Egypt (Nile Valley), but there was significant variation in productivity within each region.

Appendix Table A5.14 shows the summary statistics in our MP-session dataset during the precolonial period (1866–1882), broken down by the level of precolonial cotton productivity in the province in 1877 (above and below the median). During the precolonial period, we fail to detect statistically significant differences in the social class composition of MPs from provinces with higher precolonial cotton productivity and those from lower cotton productivity provinces. Examining the component variables of social class, we also fail to find statistically significant differences with respect to these

name), the paternal grandfather's first name (third name), etc.

⁸For robustness checks related to MP occupations, titles, and constituencies, see Appendix A4.

⁹In Egypt, pasha and bey titles were associated with land grants from the Khedive, and thus they are reliable markers of LE status during this period.

¹⁰Wheat, barley, and beans were Egypt's main subsistence crops, occupying 74% of the cultivated area in 1877.




Figure 2: Cotton and Cereals Yield Per Feddan in 1877

Notes: The maps show the province-level distribution of cotton and cereals productivity in 1877. Cotton productivity is the cotton yield in *qintars* per *feddan*, and cereals productivity is the yield of wheat, barley, and beans in *ardabbs* per *feddan*, where 1 *feddan* = 6,368 square meters, 1 *qintar* = 44.5 kilograms, and 1 *ardabb* = 135 kilograms. We use the 1882 population census administrative divisions. The quartiles of precolonial cotton productivity in 1877 are defined based on the cross-province distribution: $Q_1 = 0$, $Q_2 = 1.067931$, $Q_3 = 1.756632$.

Source: [Ministère de l'Intérieur \(1877\)](#).

variables in 1866–1882.

In the next section, we empirically test the effect of the British occupation on the distribution of political power in the Egyptian parliament, and the degree to which this redistribution is consistent with our theory of elite congruence and colonial exposure.

5 Empirical Analysis

Our theory predicts that the colonizer would redistribute political power in favor of domestic elites who are more congruent with colonial objectives. In Egypt, we argue that the colonial government's goals were not only regime survival, but also to maximize Egypt's economic surplus to ensure debt repayment and maintain access to Egyptian cotton as a primary input in British manufacturing. We expect that redistri-

bution of power would be most profound for MPs representing regions with greater colonial exposure. In Egypt, high cotton-producing provinces were the most exposed to both colonial regime survival and economic objectives because they produced most of Egypt's economic surplus.

We begin our analysis with historical evidence from archival and secondary sources that shows that the LE were the most congruent with the British in both the political and economic domains relative to the RMC. We then quantitatively show that the redistribution of power toward the LE and away from the RMC was greater in cotton-producing provinces, areas that were most exposed to colonial economic objectives. To explore the mechanisms driving this relationship, we demonstrate that within cotton-producing provinces, the colonial redistribution of power was greater in provinces where (1) the RMC were more politically oppositional, and (2) the LE were more economically congruent, and the RMC was more economically oppositional, before colonialism. Finally, we demonstrate how the colonizer re-engineered the parliament to favor the LE.

5.1 Colonial Exposure and Redistribution of Parliamentary Power

The LE were more politically and economically congruent with Britain than the RMC. The British administration was well-aware that the RMC was the “backbone of the ‘Arabist’¹¹ party,” and had demonstrated their capability to mobilize against the British administration (Cromer 1908, p. 187), both in parliament and across Egypt (Cole 1993).¹² RMC MPs had played a decisive role in the passage of the reformist 1882 constitution, participating in both the drafting committee and in parliamentary deliberations that established legislative oversight over the Khedive (Landau 1953, Al-Rafi'i 1949). RMC MPs made no secret of their opposition to colonial rule. Collins (1984, p. 215) writes that Muhammad Galal, an RMC MP from the 1881–82 session from al-Qis in Minya province, shouted publicly that the “Khedive has sold the country to the English.” After the occupation, he was sentenced to house arrest, a 3000 Egyptian pound fine, stripped of all rank and titles by Khedival decree, and did not reappear in parliament (Collins 1984, Subhi 1947). For the LE, the British occupation in 1882 provided a way to retain some semblance of power in Egypt. As Lord Cromer notes in his book *Modern Egypt* (1908, p. 188), the LE would have been “swept into the sea,” and Egypt would be ruled by the “Sheikh class” (RMC).

LE congruence extended to Britain's colonial economic objectives. For the LE, the foundations of their economic congruence can be traced to the mid-19th century. Two treaties with Western Powers established laissez-faire economic policies in Egypt. The first is the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of Balta Liman that dissolved state monopolies, reduced tariffs, and guaranteed British access to Ottoman markets. This treaty became binding for Egypt after its defeat in the Ottoman-Egyptian War in 1838–1841. The second treaty is the Capitulations, a set of treaties with Western Powers that gave Westerners extraterritorial rights in the Ottoman Empire, exempting them from taxation and being subject to local jurisdiction. During the First Globalization Era (1850–1914), the Khedives and other LE officials in the Egyptian government, starting with Sa'id

¹¹‘Arabist.

¹²See Appendices A7 and A8 for colonial and Egyptian archival evidence regarding the economic logic of redistributing power in the upper and lower houses of parliament.

(1854–1863) – who began the construction of the Suez Canal – pursued one of the most liberal laissez-faire policies in the world that encouraged the influx of European capital and financiers into Egypt (Tignor 1966, p. 38). According to Tignor (1966, p. 42), the LE were “more responsive to the economic incentives of the modernizing market system” and more able to use their landholdings as capital to invest in modern agricultural methods, such as steam pump irrigation (Owen 1969). By the 1860s, Egypt was the sixth largest provider of cotton for the British market (Owen 1969, pp. 82–3), with Britain importing 80% of Egyptian cotton. On the eve of colonial occupation, the LE held a significant share of cotton output,¹³ were fully integrated into Egypt’s European-dominated, export-oriented market economy, and themselves benefited from lower taxation designed to support maximal cotton export to Europe. In sum, these precolonial developments led to a natural convergence in economic interests of the LE and the British occupation.

Conversely, the RMC was staunchly protectionist. The RMC opposed to European involvement in agriculture and cotton production (Baer 1969). RMC cotton production was heavily dependent on slave labor, and the Khedive abolished slavery under the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention of 1877. Although the emancipation of slaves was not applied immediately, this constituted a direct conflict of economic interests between the RMC and the British. In addition, RMC MPs promoted a protectionist trade policy, taxation of European capital, and supporting domestic industrialization (Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiya 2017). Non-MP RMC also sent petitions to the precolonial parliament voicing opposition to European investors disrupting local production (Dar al-Watha’iq al-Qawmiya 2017). Despite the fact that the RMC were significant cotton producers, these protectionist preferences stood in direct opposition to colonial economic objectives in Egypt.

Our first empirical analysis establishes a link between colonial exposure (cotton) and redistribution of power away from the RMC to the LE in parliament. Figure 3 illustrates the aggregate evolution of the social class composition of MPs from 1824 to 1923. From 1824 to 1882, the parliament was dominated by the RMC. MPs during the precolonial period were mostly village headmen (*‘umda or sheikh al-balad*), mostly with sheikh or effendi titles, and predominantly from rural provinces (see Appendix Figures A2.2, A2.3, and A2.4). Following the 1882 occupation, we observe a substantial shift away from the RMC towards the LE. The share of the LE in parliament continued to rise during the colonial period, becoming the majority in the 1913–1923 parliament.

Our empirical specification is a difference-in-differences (DID) model, with a continuous treatment (colonial exposure) and universal timing of the treatment across provinces (British occupation). It compares treated groups (higher cotton productivity provinces) and control groups (lower cotton productivity provinces) before and after the universal treatment (the 1882 British occupation). We estimate the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression at the MP-session level in 1824–1923:

$$y_{mps} = \beta cotton_p \times post1882_s + X_{ps}\theta + \alpha_p + \gamma_s + \epsilon_{mps} \quad (1)$$

where y_{mps} is the social class of MP m located in province p in session s . Our outcome variables are three dummy variables indicating the LE, the RMC, and the urban middle class. The variable $cotton_p$ is the cotton yield per feddan in province p in 1877,

¹³See Appendix A7 for a discussion of the LE’s and RMC’s precolonial shares of cotton output.




Figure 3: The Social Class Composition of Members of Parliament, 1824–1923
Notes: See the Data Section and Appendix A2 for details about the classification of MPs into the three social classes.

$post1882_s$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if session s is after the 1882 occupation, α_p is a full set of province fixed effects that capture the cross-province baseline heterogeneity in the social class composition of parliament, and γ_s is a full set of session fixed effects that capture aggregate time shocks to the social class composition of parliament that may have affected all provinces (e.g., issuance of a new election law). The vector X_{ps} includes as a control variable the interaction of the post-1882 dummy variable with the cereals yield per feddan in province p in 1877. Standard errors are clustered at the province level (18 provinces).

The coefficient β measures the difference across higher and lower cotton productivity provinces in the evolution of the social composition of parliament before and after the 1882 occupation. We expect that the political power during the colonial period will shift away from the RMC and toward the LE. We also expect that this shift will be greater in higher cotton productivity areas than in lower cotton productivity areas, because these areas generated higher economic surplus. Hence, we expect β to be positive for the share of the LE, negative for the RMC, and null for the urban middle class.

The results of estimating equation (1) are shown in Table 1. We find that higher cotton productivity provinces had a greater increase in the share of the LE and a greater decrease in the share of the RMC MPs after the British occupation in 1882, versus lower cotton productivity provinces (columns 1–4). The effects on the shares of the LE and the RMC are both statistically significant and robust to controlling for cereals productivity in 1877. The effects are large in magnitude. In column 2, provinces at the 75th percentile of precolonial cotton yield in quintars per feddan ($= 1.76$) experienced an increase in the proportion of the LE in parliament after 1882 by 21 percentage points ($= 1.76 \times 0.12$), relative to provinces at the 25th percentile ($= 0$), which is three times

Table 1: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.140*** (0.040)	0.115** (0.040)	-0.138*** (0.028)	-0.115*** (0.040)	-0.003 (0.028)	0.000 (0.003)
Post-1882 × Cereals		0.053 (0.074)		-0.047 (0.044)		-0.006 (0.059)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R^2	0.34	0.34	0.54	0.54	0.58	0.58
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are not assigned a constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

the proportion of the LE in 1866–1882. Columns 5–6 show that the British occupation had a null effect on the share of the urban middle class. These findings suggest that the precolonial RMC in higher cotton productivity provinces lost their parliamentary advantage during the colonial period relative to the LE more than their counterparts in lower cotton productivity provinces.

The validity of equation (1) rests upon three assumptions (Roth et al. 2023). The first is the parallel-trends assumption; higher cotton productivity provinces would have exhibited a similar trend in the evolution of the social composition of their members of parliament to that of lower cotton productivity provinces, were it not for the British occupation.¹⁴ The second assumption is no-anticipation; higher cotton productivity provinces would not have experienced a shift in the social class composition of their MPs in the last precolonial session right before the British occupation. The third assumption is that there were no other time-varying shocks that happened in or after 1882 and that affected cotton provinces differently.¹⁵ We provide evidence in support of the first two assumptions by examining the pre-1882 trends in the social composition of MPs by cotton productivity in 1877. To do so, we allow the effect of cotton productivity to vary by parliamentary session:

$$y_{mps} = \sum_{s=1824}^{1923} \beta_s \text{cotton}_p + \alpha_p + \gamma_s + \varepsilon_{mps} \quad (2)$$

where β_s is estimated for each session from 1824–1837 to 1913–1923, with the omitted baseline session being 1881–1882, the last session before the British occupation. Under the parallel-trends and no-anticipation assumptions, we would fail to reject that $\beta_s = 0$ for each pre-1882 session. We present the estimated regression coefficients without and with controls for cereal production in Appendix Figures A3.5 and A3.6, and find

¹⁴See Appendix A3 for our discussion of continuous treatments. See Appendix Table A4.5 for non-linear specifications of cotton productivity, where we compare cotton-producing provinces in 1877 to those that did not produce any cotton.

¹⁵Other shocks that may have affected all provinces equally would be absorbed in the session fixed effects (γ_s).

support for both assumptions.¹⁶

The third assumption is supported by Egyptian historiography. Given that the 1882 British occupation was among the most significant junctures in Egyptian modern history, other time-varying shocks (e.g., the 1883 election law, cotton expansion, Suez canal concession) were either related to, or resulted from, it.

We conducted a wide range of robustness checks that we describe in Appendix A4. First, we examine an alternative explanation for our results based on [Gerring et al. \(2011\)](#). We find that precolonial cotton productivity retains its magnitude and statistical significance even when accounting for precolonial state capacity, distance to Cairo, and other geographic controls. This boosts our confidence that precolonial cotton productivity measures the degree of exposure to the British occupation, and not precolonial state capacity or geography. Second, the results are robust to alternative measures of cotton productivity – including non-linear specifications and the Food and Agriculture Organization crop suitability index – and to estimating the standard errors using the Wild Cluster Bootstrap that accounts for the small number of clusters (provinces). Third, the results are not driven by MPs whose constituencies, occupations, or honorific titles changed over time, for example due to upward social mobility, suggesting that our results are driven by colonial policies that affected the selection of MPs based on their social class *origins*. Fourth, our results are not sensitive to the way we classified MPs into social class origins. When we employ occupational and honorific titles as dependent variables – instead of our composite social class measure – we find that higher cotton productivity provinces had a greater increase in the proportions of bureaucrats, and pashas and beys – who were more likely to comprise the LE according to our definition – and a greater drop in the proportions of effendis and sheikhs, and village headmen and notables – who were more likely to comprise the RMC according to our definition. We also find larger effects when we use the session-varying social class of MPs. These larger effects suggest that there was upward class mobility for some members of RMC to the LE during the colonial period.

Our main findings indicate that higher cotton-productivity provinces had a greater increase in the proportion of LE MPs, and a greater decrease in the proportion of RMC MPs after the 1882 occupation, relative to lower cotton-productivity provinces. In the next section, we substantiate the colonial economic logic undergirding the redistribution of power toward the LE.

5.2 Mechanisms

Given the LE's congruence with, and the RMC's opposition to, British interests, we explore whether the redistribution of political power toward the LE that we documented in [Table 1](#) is greater in cotton-producing provinces that had higher levels of LE congruence and/or RMC opposition during the precolonial period. To this end, we estimate the following regression model that allows the main effect to vary by the precolonial *political* opposition of the RMC, and the precolonial *economic* congruence/opposition of the LE/RMC:

¹⁶See Appendix A3 for a detailed discussion of the parallel-trends and no-anticipation assumptions.

$$y_{mps} = \beta_1 elite_p \times cotton_p \times post1882_s + \beta_2 cotton_p \times post1882_s + \beta_3 elite_p \times post1882_s + X_{ps}\theta + \alpha_p + \gamma_s + \varepsilon_{mps} \quad (3)$$

where $elite_p$ measures the precolonial political opposition of the RMC, or the economic congruence/opposition of the LE/RMC in province p .¹⁷ While we do not observe the precolonial political congruence of the LE, the RMC's political opposition should be interpreted relative to the LE.

We measure RMC political opposition at the province level in two ways. First, we capture individual MPs' support for 'Urabist ideals using their documented support for executive constraints by parliament in the precolonial parliamentary minutes. We hand-coded MP speeches from the 1866–1882 parliamentary sessions ([Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiya 2017](#)) as pro-democratic (and therefore pro-'Urabist) if the substance of the speech supported formalizing executive constraints, legislative oversight, or electoral reforms to curb the power of the Khedival regime.¹⁸ We then counted the number of pro-democratic speeches made by each MP in all precolonial parliamentary sessions. We aggregated this measure to the province level by dividing the total number of pro-democratic speeches made by MPs in each province in 1866–1882 by the total number of MP-session observations in that province in 1866–1882, which captures the average number of precolonial pro-democratic speeches per MP-session in the province. This measure enables us to test whether the colonial administration targeted provinces where the RMC voiced more reformist, or oppositional, views prior to the occupation.

The second measure of RMC precolonial political opposition is based on the British arrest records from the 'Urabi Revolution. These arrests took place shortly after the 1882 occupation. We compiled the list of all arrests in the 'Urabi Revolution across Egypt from the British National Archives ([Foreign Office 1882](#)). Data on arrests include individuals' name, locality, and occupation, so we are able to identify the number of village headmen arrests in each province to capture the RMC support for the 'Urabi movement outside of parliament.

We measure the precolonial economic congruence of the LE at the province level by the share of '*ushuri* agricultural land from the 1877 Statistical Yearbook. '*Ushuri* land consisted of large estates that were taxed at a reduced rate than the usufruct (*kharaj*) land that belonged to the peasantry (including the RMC) ([Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011](#)). This variable captures the precolonial capacity of the LE to produce cotton. As discussed above, large estates were more open to European capital, so this variable arguably captures the LE's congruence with British economic interests. We measure the precolonial economic opposition of the RMC at the province level by the proportion of slaves in the population. The cotton boom in 1861–1865 caused the LE to increase their coercion of local labor in order to raise their cotton production, which took more local workers out of the wage labor market. Faced with a reduced supply of wage labor, the RMC responded to the cotton boom by purchasing more slaves, in order to compete with large landowners in cotton production. We thus use the proportion of slaves in the province to capture the RMC's capacity to produce cotton before the British occupa-

¹⁷Equation 3 is a heterogeneous treatment effects (HTE) model that examines whether the effect of the British occupation varies across provinces with different degrees of precolonial political opposition of the RMC, and economic congruence or opposition of the LE or the RMC.

¹⁸See Appendix A6 for our parliamentary speech coding based on [Hartnett and Saleh \(2023\)](#).

tion. We computed this variable from the 1882 (precolonial) population census – the earliest census following the abolition of slavery in 1877 – which records the number of Sudanese people in each district.¹⁹ Given the British role in the abolition of slavery in 1877, this variable arguably captures the RMC’s opposition to British economic interests.

Equation (3) provides a quantitative test of our elite congruence theory, in both the political (regime survival) interpretation and the strategic (in Egypt’s case, economic) interpretations. RMC precolonial political opposition measures their threat to rebel (à la Boix and Svolik (2013)), whereas the precolonial economic congruence (or opposition) of the LE (or the RMC) captures their capacity to produce cotton, and hence their credible promise (or threat) to promote (or disrupt) colonial economic interests, given their precolonial liberal (or protectionist) economic policies. So, according to our theory, we expect β_1 – the coefficient on the triple interaction term – to be positive for the LE MP share and negative for the RMC MP share. Among higher cotton-productivity provinces, the shift toward the LE and away from the RMC should be greater in provinces with a relatively more politically oppositional RMC, more economically congruent LE, and more economically oppositional RMC, during the precolonial period.

The findings are shown in Table 2.²⁰ Consistent with our theory, we find that the impact of the British occupation on the proportion of the LE is greater in higher cotton-productivity provinces with a higher number of pro-democratic speeches per MP-session in the precolonial parliament (column 1). Column 5 shows that the coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative for the share of the RMC as expected, but is not statistically significant. These two findings suggest that the precolonial political opposition of the RMC relative to the LE increased the shift towards the LE during the colonial period in higher cotton-productivity provinces.

We fail to find evidence that the extra-parliamentary involvement of the RMC in the ‘Urabi Revolution played a role in the colonial shift towards the LE. Columns 2 and 6 show that the number of village headmen arrests during the ‘Urabi Revolution does not drive the impact of the British occupation on the proportions of the LE and RMC MPs. This suggests that the involvement of the RMC in anti-colonial mass politics outside the parliament was not a decisive factor in the shift in representation toward the LE under the British.

We find that the precolonial economic congruence of the LE, as captured by the land share of large estates, and the precolonial economic opposition of the RMC, as captured by the proportion of slaves in the province, are both important drivers of the impact of the British occupation on the MPs’ shift towards the LE (columns 3 and 4), and away from the RMC (columns 7 and 8). The coefficients on the triple interaction terms are large in magnitude and statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of the British occupation on the social composition of MPs is more substantial in higher cotton-productivity provinces where the LE were more economically congruent, and the RMC was more economically oppositional, before colonialism.

¹⁹See Appendix A7 for the historiographic justification for this measure of precolonial RMC economic opposition.

²⁰Appendix Table A5.15 shows the results for the urban middle class.

Table 2: Mechanism: Precolonial Political and Economic Congruence of Precolonial Elites

	=1 if Landed Elite				=1 if Rural Middle Class			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-1882 × Cotton × Democratic Speeches Per MP	0.249*				-0.091			
	(0.132)				(0.076)			
Post-1882 × Cotton × N. Urabi V. Headmen Arrests		-0.117				0.120		
		(0.109)				(0.104)		
Post-1882 × Cotton × Large Estates Land Share (Q3)			0.138**				-0.141**	
			(0.062)				(0.062)	
Post-1882 × Cotton × Large Estates Land Share (Q4)			0.047				-0.048	
			(0.052)				(0.053)	
Post-1882 × Cotton × Prop. Slaves				2.466***				-2.489***
				(0.507)				(0.468)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.085*	0.113**	0.096**	0.065	-0.096**	-0.114**	-0.097**	-0.065
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Post-1882 × Prop. Democratic Speeches	-0.370				0.080			
	(0.233)				(0.113)			
Post-1882 × N. Urabi V. Headmen Arrests		0.255				-0.260		
		(0.198)				(0.189)		
Post-1882 × Large Estates Land Share (Q1)			-0.112				0.104	
			(0.410)				(0.362)	
Post-1882 × Large Estates Land Share (Q3)			-0.268				0.274	
			(0.185)				(0.186)	
Post-1882 × Large Estates Land Share (Q4)			0.001				0.001	
			(0.182)				(0.182)	
Post-1882 × Prop. Slaves				-3.265***				3.304***
				(0.548)				(0.501)
Post-1882 × Cereals	-0.082	0.040	0.035	0.088	-0.021	-0.034	-0.030	-0.082*
	(0.122)	(0.078)	(0.146)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.044)	(0.146)	(0.041)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	17	18	18	18	17	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	942	949	949	949	942	949	949	949
R ²	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.54
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned to missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. In columns 1 and 5, 7 additional observations are dropped because they belong to Rosetta, which had no MPs in 1824–1882. In columns 3 and 7, the omitted quartile of the land share of large estates is the second quartile. Provinces at the first quartile all have 0 cotton productivity, and so the triple-interaction term “Post-1882 × Cotton × Large Estates Land Share (Q1)” cannot be separately identified. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Taken together, these findings support our elite congruence theory in both its political and strategic (economic) interpretations. The political congruence of the LE enabled British colonial regime survival until the eruption of the 1919 anti-colonial revolution. Additionally, the economic congruence of the LE promoted British strategic goal of maximizing economic surplus, resulting in the British recouping Egypt’s outstanding debt by WWI.

It is important to consider, however, whether there is a counterfactual in which a politically oppositional class could ever be favored (co-opted) by the colonizer if they were strategically congruent. The British Mandate in Iraq is a useful example. The British were forced to navigate a fraught relationship with a class that politically opposed colonial occupation, but stood to benefit economically from British rule: tribal sheikhs. British Prime Minister Asquith said His Majesty’s forces occupied Mesopotamia (later Iraq) in 1914 “to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf [and] to protect the oil fields” (Kadhim 2012, p. 53). Tribal sheikhs played an important role in the strategic objectives of Britain’s Mandate in Iraq by maintaining local order in exchange for preferential access to land and lower taxes. Yet, even those sheikhs who stood to gain

economically from cooperation with the British participated in the 1920 anti-colonial Iraqi revolution that was brutally repressed by British military force. Instead of cutting these sheikhs out of the post-revolutionary colonial political system, the Iraq government increased sheikhly representation in the new parliament and provided even more economic benefits in exchange for their cooperation ([Kadhim 2012](#)). This suggests that strategic congruence was more decisive in shaping British power-sharing in Iraq than the threat of rebellion (political congruence).

Table 3: Colonial Tools of Social Re-Engineering of the Parliament: MP and Dynastic Persistence

(a) Session New Entrant and Incumbent MPs

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1) & New	(2) & Incumbent	(3) & New	(4) & Incumbent	(5) & New	(6) & Incumbent
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.036 (0.033)	0.078*** (0.020)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.067* (0.032)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)
Post-1882 × Cereals	0.033 (0.053)	0.020 (0.032)	-0.122** (0.056)	0.076* (0.038)	0.035 (0.040)	-0.042* (0.023)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R^2	0.18	0.15	0.52	0.21	0.33	0.28
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.05	0.02	0.79	0.11	0.02	0.01

(b) Session New Entrant and Incumbent Dynasties

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1) & New Dynasty	(2) & Incumbent Dynasty	(3) & New Dynasty	(4) & Incumbent Dynasty	(5) & New Dynasty	(6) & Incumbent Dynasty
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.010 (0.022)	0.096*** (0.024)	-0.009 (0.036)	-0.098*** (0.030)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)
Post-1882 × Cereals	0.029 (0.039)	0.033 (0.041)	-0.129** (0.051)	0.078 (0.047)	0.032 (0.048)	-0.043* (0.021)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	894	894	894	894	894	894
R^2	0.12	0.28	0.50	0.27	0.20	0.45
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.03	0.04	0.55	0.35	0.01	0.01

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level. The regressions in part (b) dropped 55 MP-session observations who are without a family name (i.e., only first name recorded); $N = 894$. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

5.3 The Colonial Tools of Re-Engineering the Parliament

In our final analysis, we explore *how* the British authorities re-engineered the Egyptian parliament to redistribute power among the precolonial domestic elites. Based on a qualitative examination of colonial correspondence and a comparison of the precolonial and colonial electoral laws (see Appendix A8), we identified three principal changes that the British made to the parliament that redistributed power toward the LE: 1) reducing the number of new entrants (incumbency) by creating barriers to candidacy, 2) increasing the number of appointees who served for life, and 3) adding a second chamber to the legislature.

To examine the contribution of these policy changes to the effect of the British occupation on the social class composition of MPs, we use the same specification as in equation (1) where we decompose each social class – the outcome variables – into sub-groups defined according to the policy in question. We first examine the MP persistence tool by classifying MPs within each social class and parliamentary session into new entrants, those who did not serve before a given session, and incumbents, those who served at least once before that session (see Appendix Figure A5.7). Second, we examine the dynastic persistence tool by classifying MPs within each social class and session into new entrant dynasties, those MPs who are from dynasties that did not serve before a given session, and incumbent dynasties, those MPs who are from dynasties that served at least once before that session (see Appendix Figure A5.7). Third, we examine the appointment tool by classifying MPs within each social class and session into appointed and elected (see Appendix Figure A5.8). Fourth, we examine the upper house tool by classifying MPs into those who serve in the upper house and those who serve in the lower house (see Appendix Figure A5.9.)

We then investigate the extent to which these re-engineering tools may explain the redistribution of power towards the LE. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. To interpret these results, recall that the main effects on the proportions of the LE and the RMC are 0.115 and -0.115 , respectively (columns 2 and 4 of Table 1). Part (a) of Table 3 decomposes these effects into incumbent and new entrant MPs, showing that more than half of the effect is driven by incumbent MPs. Part (b) shows that almost all of the main effects are attributable to MPs from incumbent, rather than new entrant, dynasties.²¹ This reveals that MP and dynastic persistence was indeed an effective tool in shifting parliamentary representation in favor of the LE in higher cotton-productivity provinces during the colonial period. Put differently, the colonial authorities re-engineered the parliament in favor of the LE by selecting MPs and dynasties from the LE in higher cotton-productivity provinces who persisted across parliamentary sessions.

Part (a) of Table 4 dis-aggregates the main effects across elected and appointed MPs. It shows that most of the positive effect on the LE is primarily driven by elected MPs, and secondarily by appointed MPs, whereas the negative effect on the RMC is driven by their loss of elected MPs. When we dis-aggregate the main effects by the upper and lower houses in Part (b), we found that the effect on the LE is primarily driven by their representation in the lower house, and secondarily by the upper house, while the effect on the RMC is driven by their colonial penalty in both houses.

To summarize, while the three tools of re-engineering the parliament – MP and dynastic persistence, the appointment mechanism, and the creation of an upper house – were all employed during the colonial period, the colonial authorities shifted the parliament in favor of the LE by facilitating the election of MPs and dynasties from that class into the lower house and by appointing LE members for life into the upper house. These MPs and dynasties were more likely to preserve their parliamentary seats throughout the colonial era. We argue that, by shifting parliamentary representation toward the LE, the British guaranteed that power was concentrated within the elite that was most congruent

²¹The decomposition in part (b) does not add up to the main effect, because there are 55 MP-session observations that are dropped from this analysis as they do not have a family name.

Table 4: Colonial Tools of Social Re-Engineering of the Parliament: Appointment and the Upper House

(a) Appointed and Elected MPs

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1) & Elected	(2) & Appointed	(3) & Elected	(4) & Appointed	(5) & Elected	(6) & Appointed
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.082* (0.039)	0.033* (0.019)	-0.143*** (0.041)	0.028 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Post-1882 × Cereals	0.052 (0.066)	0.001 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.044)	-0.039* (0.020)	-0.012 (0.053)	0.005 (0.032)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R^2	0.31	0.07	0.48	0.12	0.51	0.19
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.00	0.90	0.00	0.03	0.00

(b) Upper-House and Lower-House MPs

	Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1) & UH	(2) & LH	(3) & UH	(4) & LH	(5) & UH	(6) & LH
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.035 (0.020)	0.084** (0.030)	-0.048** (0.023)	-0.074** (0.028)	0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.019)
Post-1882 × Cereals	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.082** (0.038)	0.054 (0.035)	0.196*** (0.033)	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.130*** (0.029)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R^2	0.14	0.20	0.16	0.40	0.23	0.49
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: UH and LH refer to the upper and lower houses, respectively. The sample is at the MP-session level; $N = 949$. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

with colonial interests.

6 Conclusion

This article makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of colonialism. By applying insights from the authoritarian power-sharing literature to indirect rule, we provide a concise framework for understanding when and why colonizers might alter the composition of elites populating precolonial, national-level institutions that appear otherwise continuous. Historians and area specialists have documented numerous cases where colonizers, like autocrats, empower certain domestic allies over others to achieve their objectives and forestall threats. In the Egyptian case, we are able

to observe this shift in national-level representative institutions and demonstrate that the relative redistribution of power toward the congruent elite is greater for representatives of provinces most critical to the colonial economic imperative – namely, cotton production.

Dis-aggregating the class composition of the precolonial and colonial elite is necessary to observe how colonialism changes occupied societies. Studying continuity and change in the Egyptian elite under colonialism has shown the importance of disaggregating social forces in both precolonial and colonial contexts. By focusing on how representation changed after the British occupation in 1882, we were able to identify economically productive regions as the primary focus of colonial efforts to re-engineer the domestic elite.

The *prima facie* continuity of precolonial institutions and executive elites obscures meaningful variation that can serve to reinforce authoritarian rule in the long term. While the Khedival regime and parliament appear continuous under British rule, the political logic and distribution of power in Egypt were fundamentally re-engineered after 1882. One implication of this finding is that future research should build on advances in the literature on authoritarian institutions (Blaydes 2010, Lust-Okar 2006, Gandhi et al. 2020, Williamson and Magaloni 2020, Wilson and Woldense 2019) to take colonial institutions seriously as meaningful political arenas. In the Egyptian case, the British colonial administration was able to change the face of Egyptian politics by altering the structure and function of the parliament to favor the most congruent elites who would facilitate their economic motivation to extract surplus.

This study also advances our knowledge of the Egyptian case. While most English-language scholarship has portrayed the LE as monotonically powerful in the precolonial and colonial eras, our study shows a political hierarchy in flux during a critical moment of transition. While the British did not create the LE, the changes to the parliament undoubtedly altered the nature of their power within national institutions. Baer (1962) observes that land inequality and absentee landlordism increased during the colonial period, and Cuno (1992) argues that LE's outsized representation in colonial parliament and their ability to veto new taxes created unique opportunities for the landed class to monopolize Egyptian political institutions (executive and legislative) and amass even more wealth. For the RMC, the British re-engineering of national institutions constituted an immense departure from the precolonial status quo (Baer 1969). The redistribution of national-level power away from RMC fostered grievances and power-structures that gave rise to the 1919 Revolution and the Free Officers military coup in 1952 (Binder 1978, Brown 1990). In sum, what we observe in the Egyptian case provides compelling evidence that colonial power redistribution may create obstacles for states to establish stable, inclusive political orders, even after independence.

7 Supplementary Material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit the APSR website.

8 Data Availability Statement

Research documentation and data that support the findings of this study are openly available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TELPAY>.

9 Funding Statement

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10 Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

11 Research Ethics

The authors affirm this research did not involve human participants.

Precolonial Elites and Colonial Redistribution of Political Power

Allison Hartnett and Mohamed Saleh

Online Appendix

A1 A1: Geographic Assignment of Members of Parliament

The primary source of our MP dataset, [Subhi \(1947\)](#), records the constituency for most MPs. The geographic unit for parliamentary constituencies for *elected* MPs changed between the precolonial and colonial periods.²² According to the 1866 law that governed parliamentary elections in the precolonial period (1866–1882), constituencies were at the district level in rural provinces, where every district was represented by one MP, and at the province level in urban provinces, where every province was represented by a specified number of MPs: three for Cairo, two for Alexandria, and one for Damietta ([Subhi 1947](#), Volume 5, p. 84).²³ According to the 1883 law that governed parliamentary elections throughout most of the colonial period (1883–1913), constituencies of elected MPs in both the lower and upper houses became defined at the province level in both rural and urban provinces, with a specified number of MPs per province.²⁴ Appointed MPs in the colonial-era upper house (1883–1913) did not represent constituencies ([Subhi 1947](#), Volume 5, pp. 280, 283), so they have missing geographic assignment in [Subhi \(1947\)](#). The 1913 law that governed the last colonial-era parliament in 1913–1923 brought back the unicameral system. It kept the representation for elected MPs at the province level, while increasing the number of MPs per province ([Subhi 1947](#), Volume 5, p. 393). Appointed MPs were still not tied to constituencies. As a result, the unit of geographic assignment (village, district, province, or missing) varies in [Subhi \(1947\)](#) across parliamentary sessions, both across MPs and for the same MP across sessions.

Appendix Table A1.1 shows the extent to which the level of geographic assignment varies for the same MP across sessions in [Subhi \(1947\)](#). For the vast majority of MPs, the level of geographic assignment remained the same over time (see the diagonal entries): Out of 771 unique MPs (1,102 MP-session observations), 721 MPs (942 observations) are assigned at the same geographic level in every session in which they

²²There are three administrative levels of geographic units in the Egyptian population censuses. These are (from lowest to highest): village (or quarter in urban provinces), district, province.

²³[Subhi \(1947\)](#) often assigns MPs in rural provinces during the precolonial period to more fine-grained geographic units: villages instead of districts.

²⁴The law specified one MP per province in the upper house, except for Alexandria, Port Sa'id, Damietta, Rosetta, Isma'iliya, and 'Arish, that were collectively represented by one MP, and a specified number of MPs per province in the lower house, except for Isma'iliya and 'Arish that were collectively represented by one MP, and Port Sa'id and Suez that were collectively represented by one MP.

appear: 270 MPs (293 observations) are assigned at the village level, 60 MPs (61 observations) at the district level, 291 MPs (425 observations) at the province level, and 100 MPs (163 observations) have missing constituency in every session. The remaining 50 MPs (160 observations) are assigned to different geographic units across sessions, because of changes in the level of aggregation that resulted from the aforementioned legal changes in the definition of constituencies.²⁵ Apart from changes in the level of aggregation of constituencies, switching constituencies in the sense of moving from one district to another in 1866–1882, or from one province to another in 1882–1923, was extremely rare. Only 3 MPs (8 observations) switched constituencies (districts) within the same province, so they do not alter the crop productivity assignment which is measured at the province level, and none of the MPs switched provinces.

Table A1.1: Level of Aggregation of Geographic Units of Members of Parliament May Vary for the Same MP Across Sessions in [Subhi \(1947\)](#)

		MP's Highest Level of Geographic Assignment				Total
		Village	District	Province	Missing	
Lowest Level	Village	270 (293)	1 (2)	32 (103)	1 (3)	304 (401)
	District	0 (0)	60 (61)	6 (16)	1 (4)	67 (81)
	Province	0 (0)	0 (0)	291 (425)	9 (32)	300 (457)
	Missing	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	100 (163)	100 (163)
	Total	270 (293)	61 (63)	329 (544)	111 (202)	771 (1102)

Notes: The numbers in the table refer to the number of unique MPs under each category, whereas the numbers in parentheses refer to the number of MP-session observations.

We implemented a two-step procedure to impute the geographic assignment of MPs. Step A of the imputation procedure is confined to MPs who served in more than one parliamentary session and whose geographic assignment changed at least once. In this step, we assigned the earliest, most detailed, constituency of the MP to all other observations of that MP, i.e., earlier or later parliamentary sessions in which that MP served. This step reduces the number of observations with missing constituency for a given MP. It also ensures that each MP is assigned to the same constituency in all sessions in which that MP served. Step B is confined to MPs who meet four conditions: (a) they have missing constituency in every session, (b) they belong to a “parliamentary dynasty,” i.e., they share their family name with at least one other MP in the dataset, (c) there is at least one other MP from that same dynasty who has a non-missing constituency, and (d) *all* other MPs with non-missing constituency from that dynasty are assigned to the same province.²⁶ For these MPs, we assigned them to the province to

²⁵Out of these 50 MPs, (a) 11 MPs (39 observations) were assigned to a missing constituency in at least one session, and to a non-missing constituency (village, district, or province) in at least one other session, and (b) 39 MPs (121 observations) were assigned to a more aggregated constituency (district, province) in at least one session, and to a less aggregated constituency (village, district) that is located within the same aggregate constituency (district, province) in at least one other session.

²⁶The fourth condition mitigates the issue of common family names that may be shared by more than one MP, although they may not belong to the same family in reality (e.g., Mohamed, Ahmed, Mahmoud, Mostafa, Hassan). Because these common family names are likely to be held by MPs from different provinces, this condition ensures that they are *not* used in Step B of our imputation procedure.

which all the other members of their dynasty belong. Table A1.2 shows the distribution of the level of geographic assignment of MPs after the imputation procedure. Step A affected 52 MPs whose geographic assignment changed across sessions, for a total of 90 MP-session observations. Step B resulted in assigning 15 MPs (27 observations), who had missing location after Step A, to a province. As a robustness check, we dropped all 117 MP-session observations whose geographic assignment was imputed after Steps A and B (see Appendix A4).

Table A1.2: Level of Geographic Assignment of Members of Parliament Before and After Imputation

Level of Geographic Assignment	Original	STEP A	STEP B
Village	339	304 (401)	304 (401)
District	77	67 (81)	67 (81)
Province	502	300 (457)	315 (484)
Missing	184	100 (163)	85 (136)
Total	1102	771 (1102)	771 (1102)

Notes: The numbers in the column titled “Original” refers to the number of MP-session observations. The numbers in the columns titled “STEP A” and “STEP B” refer to the number of unique MPs under each category, whereas the numbers in parentheses refer to the number of MP-session observations.

A2 A2: Social Class Coding of Members of Parliament

We assign MPs to three social classes that are well-documented in social histories of 19th and early 20th century Egypt: the landed elite (LE), the rural middle class (RMC), and the urban middle class (Cuno 1992, Helal 1999, Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011). We classify MPs into one of these social classes using three variables: occupation, honorific title, and the rural/urban status of the constituency. Because we are interested in measuring the social class *origin* of each MP, we assigned to each MP the *initial* occupation, honorific title, and constituency as recorded in the parliamentary session in which the MP *first* served.

First, we assigned to each MP the occupational title in the first session with non-missing occupation in which the MP first served.²⁷ Across parliamentary sessions, 25 MPs changed their occupational title in at least one session, for a total of 37 MP-Session observations. These 37 MP-session observations are distributed as follows: (a) 32 observations shifted from “Village Headman” to “Notable,” (b) 3 observations shifted from “Business” to “Notable,” (c) 1 observation shifted from “Village Headman” to “Government Administrator,” and (d) 1 observation shifted from “Government Administrator” to “Notable.” Since the occupational title “Notable” is opaque (see the discussion at the end of this section), the 35 observations where an MP switched to a “Notable” may not indicate a real occupational switch. As a robustness check in Appendix A4, we dropped all 37 MP-session observations whose occupational title is different from the MP’s initial occupation, and the results in Table 1 hold.

Second, we assigned to each MP the honorific title in the first session with non-missing honorific title in which the MP first served.²⁸ The honorific titles of 86 MPs changed in at least one session, totalling 148 MP-Session observations. The most frequent changes are: (a) from Effendi to Bey (49), (b) from Sheikh to Bey (31 observations), (c) from Sheikh to Effendi (26 observations), (d) from Bey to Pasha (21 observations). These changes in honorific titles signal upward social class mobility, ranked as follows from lowest to highest status: Sheikh, Effendi, Bey, Pasha. As a robustness check in Appendix A4, we dropped all 148 MP-session observations whose honorific title is different from the MP’s initial title, and the results in Table 1 hold.

Third, we described the procedure that we followed to assign MPs to constituencies in Appendix A1. The final distribution of the level of geographic assignment is shown in Appendix Table A1.2 (STEP B). We then defined urban constituencies according to the 1882 census administrative division: Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Rosetta, ‘Arish, Qusayr, and Damietta. Rural constituencies consist of all provinces in the Nile Delta and Valley: al-Daqahliya, al-Sharqiya, al-Gharbiya, al-Menoufiya, al-Buhayra, Giza, Beni Souaif, Fayum, Minya, Asyut, Girga, Qena, and Isna. There are 85 MPs (136 observations) who are not assigned to a constituency.

Having constructed the initial occupation, title, and the urban/rural status of the constituency of each MP, we then constructed the social class measure as follows (see Figure A2.1): We classified an MP as LE if they were top bureaucrats, or held the

²⁷53 MPs had a missing occupation in at least one session for a total of 77 MP-session observations, and were assigned a non-missing occupational title from another session.

²⁸7 MPs had a missing honorific title in at least one session for a total of 9 MP-session observations, and were assigned a non-missing honorific title from another session.




Figure A2.1: Decision Tree for Social Class Coding

* Non-missing occupation except Top Bureaucrat, or a non-missing honorific title except Bey and Pasha.

honorific titles of Pasha or Bey. We classified an MP as RMC if (a) they belonged to a rural constituency, **and** (b) had a non-missing occupational title (except top bureaucrat) or a non-missing honorific title (except Bey and Pasha). Similarly, we classified an MP as Urban Middle Class if (a) they belonged to an urban constituency, **and** (b) had a non-missing occupational title (except top bureaucrat) or a non-missing honorific title (except Bey and Pasha). Finally, we classified an MP as Missing Social Class if (a) they were not assigned to a constituency, **or** (b) they were assigned to a constituency, yet the occupation *and* honorific title are **both** missing. Table A2.3 lists the occupation, honorific title, and urban/rural constituency distribution for each social class.

Table A2.3: Distribution of Occupation, Honorific Title, and Urban/Rural Status of Constituency by Social Class of Members of Parliament

Class	Honorific Title	Occupation	Constituency
Landed Elite (289)	Pasha (90), Bey (198), Other (1)	Missing (171), Notable (94), Bureaucrat (11), Business (7), Top bureaucrat (6)	Missing (75), Urban (47), Rural (167)
Rural Middle Class (679)	Sheikh (377), Effendi (234), Bey (1), Other (49), Missing (18)	Village headman (409), Notable (165), Missing (82), Bureaucrat (20), Professional (2), Business (1)	Rural (679)
Urban Middle Class (57)	Effendi (35), Sheikh (12), Other (2), Missing (8)	Missing (9), Notable (43), Bureaucrat (2), Business (3)	Urban (57)
Missing (77)	Effendi (33), Sheikh (19), Other (5), Missing (20)	Missing (39), Notable (10), Bureaucrat (17), Professional (7), Religious Elite (4)	Urban (13), Rural (3), Missing (61)

Notes: The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of MP-session observations under each category. Occupation, honorific title, and constituency are defined based on the first parliamentary session in which an MP appears.

Three notes are in order. First, the rationale behind our decision to assign certain MPs to a Missing Social Class is because (a) if the MP's constituency is not known,

(and the MP is not Bey, Pasha, or Top Bureaucrat), we cannot know whether the MP belonged to the Urban Middle Class or the RMC, and (b) if the constituency is known, yet the occupation and honorific title are both missing, it is not possible to identify if the MP belonged to the LE or the Middle Class (whether Urban or Rural). Second, combining information from occupation, honorific title, and the urban/rural status of constituency allowed us to assign many MPs with missing occupational title or honorific title to a social class. It also allowed us to dis-aggregate the opaque “Notable” (*a‘yan*) occupational title – that became common in the colonial period – into the LE, the RMC, and the Urban Middle Class. This term “notable” is a category with origins in the colonial writings on Egypt that is frequently used in the political historiography of Egypt. Using this term to describe political elites in the precolonial and colonial periods gives the false impression of elite continuity. Critically, “notable” does not distinguish between the LE and RMC, or “notables of fellah origin.” Third, our social class classification is based on the historical literature on 19th-century and early 20th-century Egypt and the Ottoman Empire at large. Pashas and beys were the highest honorific titles in the Ottoman Empire, and were granted by the Khedive to individuals among large landowners.²⁹ Top bureaucrats were also drawn from among large landowners (Abbas and El-Dessouky 2011). The RMC is also referred to as rural elites or rural notables in the secondary literature (Cuno 1992). This class consisted of village headmen, and other professionals in rural provinces who held the sheikh or effendi titles – the effendi title was the third highest honorific title. The urban middle class, on the other hand, consisted of merchants, and other professionals in urban provinces who held the sheikh or effendi titles.

Figure A2.2 shows the evolution of the distribution of occupations of MPs from 1824 to 1923. Village headmen dominated the precolonial parliaments, especially in 1866–1882. The 1882–1923 parliaments were dominated by “notables,” but as previously stated this term was applied to several different classes during the colonial period.

The distribution of honorific titles is presented in Figure A2.3. MPs with the Sheikh title dominated the precolonial parliaments, whereas the colonial parliaments had more Pasha and Bey MPs.

Finally, we show the rural-urban breakdown of MPs in Figure A2.4. While the parliament remained dominated by rural MPs, the 1883 colonial election law increased the number of appointed MPs who were not associated with a constituency.

A3 A3: Precolonial Trends

Figure A3.5 shows the results of estimating equation (2). We plot the point estimates of β_s , which capture the effect of precolonial cotton productivity per feddan in 1877 – our measure of colonial exposure – on the social class composition of MPs for

²⁹Granting honorific titles was not regulated before 1914 – the year in which Egypt was declared a British Protectorate independent of the Ottoman Empire. In practice, granting the titles of pasha or bey was rare, and was mainly confined to large landowners and top bureaucrats. According to a decree that first regulated this process, issued in 1914, the pasha title was granted to top bureaucrats who earned at least 1200 Egyptian Pounds (EGP) annually, or the largest landowners. The bey title was granted to bureaucrats earning at least 564 EGP annually, or large landowners who provided significant services to the country.




Figure A2.2: The Occupational Composition of Members of Parliament, 1824–1923

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the initial occupational title across MPs by session. We combined MPs in the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913.




Figure A2.3: The Honorific Title Composition of Members of Parliament, 1824–1923

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the initial honorific title across MPs by session. We combined MPs in the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913.




Figure A2.4: The Urban-Rural Status of the Parliamentary Constituency of Members of Parliament, 1824–1923

Notes: We combined MPs in the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913. We defined a rural constituency to be any village, district, or a province in the Nile Delta and Valley according to the 1882 population census administrative division. Urban constituencies are Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Rosetta, ‘Arish, Qusayr, and Damietta.

each parliamentary session from 1824–1837 to 1913–1923, where the omitted session is 1881–1882, the last precolonial parliamentary session.

Our treatment – cotton productivity – is continuous. Callaway et al. (2024) show that, in the case of continuous treatment, the parallel-trends assumption is sufficient to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated at the level of the “dose” – cotton yield per feddan in 1877 in our case – that was actually received by each treated province. This estimand is the average of the treatment effects across provinces that had positive cotton productivity, comparing each province that had positive cotton productivity to “untreated” provinces that had 0 cotton productivity. However, to estimate the marginal effect of each province increasing its cotton productivity by a few quintars, a stronger parallel trends assumption is needed. In our case, we are able to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, by comparing “treated” provinces that have positive cotton productivity with “untreated” provinces that have 0 cotton productivity.

Part (a) of Figure A3.5 shows the results for the RMC. It reveals that provinces with higher and lower cotton productivity in 1877 were on parallel trends of the proportion of RMC MPs during the precolonial period. The point estimates in 1824–1879 are all close to zero and not statistically significant, relative to 1881–1882. The figure also supports the no-anticipation assumption, since the coefficient for 1876–1879 is close to zero and not statistically significant. In the colonial period, starting from the 1890–1895 session onwards, provinces with higher cotton productivity witnessed a greater decline in the RMC representation in parliament relative to 1881–1882, in comparison to lower cotton productivity provinces.

For the LE representation, the results mirror what we observe for the RMC. Part (b) shows that provinces with higher and lower cotton productivity in 1877 were on

parallel trends of the proportion of LE MPs during the precolonial period, except for the 1876-1879 session, where the point estimate is negative and statistically significant at the 10-percent level. The colonial-era point estimates are all positive, and statistically significant starting from the 1901–1907 session. While the null coefficients for the LE from 1824–1837 to 1870–1873 support the parallel trends assumption, the negative coefficient in 1876–1879, relative to 1881–1882, is a potential violation of the no-anticipation assumption. However, we argue that this potential violation is not driving our results for three reasons. First, it is only observed for the LE, and not the RMC. Second, this negative coefficient is not due to the anticipation of the British occupation. Instead, it is arguably explained by the Khedival intervention in the 1881–1882 session to make it more representative of the LE (see Figure 3), following the dissolution of the oppositional 1876–1879 parliament. We build on our intuition that this Khedival intervention may have been motivated by the overall wealth of provinces, and not by precolonial cotton productivity per se. We thus control for precolonial cereals productivity – Egypt’s major subsistence crops – interacted with a full set of session fixed effects in equation (3). The results, shown in Figure A3.6, come in support of both the parallel trends and no-anticipation assumptions for both the RMC and the LE. The colonial-period effects are similar to those in Figure A3.5, except that they are noisier and not significant in the later colonial sessions. Third, the negative coefficient for the LE in 1876–1879, relative to 1881–1882, makes it less likely to detect statistically significant effects in the colonial period, because each colonial session is compared to the 1881–1882 session when cotton provinces had an (exceptionally) higher share of LE MPs than the previous precolonial sessions.





Figure A3.5: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament: Precolonial Trends (No Controls)

Notes: The graphs show the estimated regression coefficient ($\hat{\beta}_s$) on the interaction between cotton yield per *feddan* in 1877 and each parliamentary session indicator in 1824–1923 from the following regression model: $y_{mps} = \sum_{s=1824}^{1923} \beta_s \text{cotton}_p + \alpha_p + \gamma_s + \varepsilon_{mps}$.



**Figure A3.6: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Precolonial Trends (With Controls)**

Notes: The graphs show the estimated regression coefficient ($\hat{\beta}_s$) on the interaction between cotton yield per *feddan* in 1877 and each parliamentary session indicator in 1824–1923 from the following regression model: $y_{mps} = \sum_{s=1824}^{1923} \beta_s cotton_p + \sum_{s=1824}^{1923} \theta_s cereals_p + \alpha_p + \gamma_s + \varepsilon_{mps}$.

A4 A4: Robustness Checks

We conducted a wide range of robustness checks related to four issues: (1) alternative theoretical explanations for our findings, (2) measurement and statistical inference, (3) assignment of MPs to constituencies, occupations, and honorific titles, and (4) classification of MPs to social classes.

Alternative Explanations: Statedness and Geography As we discussed in the Theory Section, [Gerring et al. \(2011\)](#) demonstrated that precolonial statedness predicts indirect colonial rule. This alternative explanation raises three potential concerns. First, one might imagine that provinces with higher precolonial cotton productivity may have higher state capacity than less cotton-productive regions. Second, because the LE constituted the incumbent power elite prior to the ‘Urabi Revolution, we may be concerned that it might be the LE’s relationship to the state driving our findings, rather than their congruence with colonial economic interests. Third, proximity to the capital (Cairo) may mean that more proximate provinces are more likely to be influenced by colonial intervention.

To examine this alternative explanation, we re-estimated equation (1) using two additional sets of time-invariant control variables, each interacted with the post-1882 indicator. We account for precolonial statedness by controlling for precolonial military and civil bureaucratic capacity. We measure military capacity by the proportion of the population who belonged to the military and police (commissioned military officers, non-commissioned military officers, military soldiers, policemen) in the 1848 population census, and we measure civil bureaucracy capacity by the proportion of the population who belonged to the bureaucracy (high-, mid-, and low-level bureaucrats) in the same census. We use distance to Cairo to account for the relative access to provinces by the central state. We also control for latitude and longitude to allay concerns that other geographic characteristics of the provinces, not cotton, may be driving the results. [Table A4.4](#) shows the results. We find that precolonial cotton productivity retains its magnitude and statistical significance, suggesting that cotton as a measure of colonial exposure is not driven by statedness or geography.

Measurement and Statistical Inference We conducted a range of robustness checks that are related to measurement and statistical inference. The first robustness check is to examine whether our results are sensitive to the way we measure precolonial cotton productivity. One concern is that by measuring cotton productivity as a continuous variable, we assume that the effect is linear, while the real effect may be non-linear. More importantly, under continuous treatment, we are able to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated, by comparing “treated” provinces that have positive cotton productivity with “untreated” provinces that have 0 cotton productivity.

We examine three ways to capture the non-linearity of the effect: (1) comparing provinces with positive cotton productivity in 1877 to provinces that did not produce any cotton, (2) comparing provinces that are above the median cotton productivity to those that are below the median, and (3) comparing provinces at the second, third, and fourth quartiles of precolonial cotton productivity to those that are at the first quartile

Table A4.4: Alternative Interpretations of Precolonial Cotton Productivity: Precolonial State Capacity and Geography

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.153*** (0.051)	0.140*** (0.042)	-0.148*** (0.034)	-0.131*** (0.029)	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.008 (0.027)
Post-1882 × Latitude		0.040 (0.057)	-0.047 (0.037)		0.007 (0.048)	
Post-1882 × Longitude		-0.192** (0.072)	0.087 (0.065)		0.105 (0.072)	
Post-1882 × Dist. Cairo		0.001** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	
Post-1882 × Prop. Military 1848		-7.560 (5.400)		7.224 (5.369)		0.336 (2.334)
Post-1882 × Prop. Bureaucracy 1848		7.404** (3.435)		-4.429 (3.380)		-2.975 (2.256)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R ²	0.35	0.34	0.54	0.54	0.58	0.59
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are not assigned a constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

(=0).³⁰ Table A4.5 shows that our results are robust to the way we measure cotton productivity in 1877.

The second robustness check is to measure cotton and cereals productivity by crop “suitability,” or the maximum attainable yield given soil quality and water sources. To this end, we employ the Food and Agriculture Organization Global Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) crop suitability indices, which are widely used in the literature, as alternative measures of cotton and cereals productivity. Because Egyptian agriculture is irrigation-fed, we use the FAO-GAEZ crop suitability indices under irrigation and intermediate input level for the baseline period (1961–1990).³¹ The FAO-GAEZ cotton and cereals suitability indices are continuous varying between 0 and 1, with 1 being the highest value in the sample, and 0 the lowest. However, these indices are subject to a major caveat: since Egyptian agriculture is irrigation-fed, the FAO-GAEZ indices being measured in 1961–1990 may be endogenous to the evolution of the man-made irrigation network in Egypt up until 1990 (e.g., the construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1970). However, our results are robust to using the FAO-GAEZ crop suitability indices (Table A4.6).

³⁰The quartiles of precolonial cotton productivity in 1877 are defined based on the cross-province distribution: $Q_1 = 0$, $Q_2 = 1.067931$, $Q_3 = 1.756632$.

³¹The crop suitability indices under irrigation are *not* available at the *low* input level, presumably because the irrigation infrastructure requires a sufficiently high level of input. We used FAO-GAEZ Data Portal Version 3.0.1. The crop suitability indices under irrigation assume that water resources are available and that the irrigation infrastructure is in place. They take into account the type of soil and the terrain slope. The crop suitability indices under rain-fed agriculture show no variation within Egypt, which receives too little rainfall.

Table A4.5: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Non-Linear Cotton Productivity

	=1 if Landed Elite			=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post-1882 × Cotton (ζ 0)	0.150** (0.060)			-0.148*** (0.043)			-0.002 (0.041)		
Post-1882 × Cotton (ζ Median)		0.214** (0.081)			-0.214** (0.079)			-0.000 (0.017)	
Post-1882 × Cotton (Q2)			-0.007 (0.134)			0.009 (0.127)			-0.002 (0.040)
Post-1882 × Cotton (Q3)			0.164* (0.079)			-0.161** (0.063)			-0.002 (0.048)
Post-1882 × Cotton (Q4)			0.279*** (0.061)			-0.279*** (0.056)			0.000 (0.024)
Post-1882 × Cereals	0.094 (0.055)	0.082 (0.061)	0.062 (0.062)	-0.088*** (0.025)	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.056* (0.030)	-0.006 (0.048)	-0.006 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.053)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949	949	949	949
R ²	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.58	0.58	0.58
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.03	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned a missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4.6: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
FAO-GAEZ Cotton Suitability Index

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.816* (0.401)	6.406*** (2.188)	-0.784*** (0.097)	-6.432*** (2.180)	-0.032 (0.382)	0.026 (0.233)
Post-1882 × Cereals		-4.535** (1.818)		4.582** (1.757)		-0.047 (0.475)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R ²	0.33	0.34	0.54	0.54	0.58	0.58
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned a missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The third robustness check that is related to statistical inference is to re-estimate the standard errors using the Wild Cluster Bootstrap (WCB), which accounts for the small number of clusters (provinces) in our dataset. Table A4.7 shows that our results retain their statistical significance when using Wild Cluster Restricted (WCR) bootstrap, with Webb weights and 999,999 replications.

Table A4.7: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament: Wild Cluster Bootstrap (WCB) Standard Errors

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.140*** (0.010)	0.115** (0.015)	-0.138*** (0.003)	-0.115** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.852)	0.000 (0.647)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R ²	0.34	0.34	0.54	0.54	0.58	0.58
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned a missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. P -values estimated using Wild Cluster Restricted Bootstrap (WCB), and clustering the standard errors at the province level, with Webb weights and 999,999 replications, are in parentheses. We used the STATA command `boottest` to estimate the standard errors. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Assignment of Geography, Occupation, and Honorific Title We conducted a number of checks for the robustness of our results to the decisions we made in the data construction phase. First, recall that we implemented a two-step imputation procedure of the geographic assignment for MPs who are assigned to different geographic units across sessions (STEP A), and for MPs who are assigned a missing constituency (STEP B) in Appendix A1. As a robustness check, we dropped all MP-session observations whose geographic assignment was altered by our imputation procedure. Table A4.8 shows that our results are robust to this decision.

Second, recall that we assigned the first non-missing occupational title of the MP to all the other sessions in which that MP served (See Appendix A2). As a robustness check, we dropped all MP-session observations whose occupational title is different from the original occupation. Table A4.9 shows that our results are robust to this decision.

Third, recall that we assigned the first non-missing honorific title of the MP to all the other sessions in which that MP served (See Appendix A2). As a robustness check, we dropped all MP-session observations whose honorific title is different from the original title. Table A4.10 shows that our results are robust to this decision.

Classification of MPs to Social Classes Our social class coding combines information from three variables: occupation, honorific title, and the rural/urban status of constituency. While this coding is based on Egyptian historiography, it is important to check the robustness of our results to the way we coded MPs' social class origins.

Table A4.8: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Excluding MPs Whose Geographic Assignment Changed

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.181*** (0.047)	0.152** (0.056)	-0.178*** (0.038)	-0.153** (0.056)	-0.003 (0.028)	0.000 (0.003)
Post-1882 × Cereals		0.059 (0.078)		-0.052 (0.052)		-0.007 (0.056)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	834	834	834	834	834	834
R ²	0.37	0.38	0.60	0.60	0.56	0.56
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.91	0.91	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). These regressions dropped 117 MP-session observations whose geographic assignment was altered by our imputation procedure. We dropped 136 observations that are assigned a missing constituency. We further dropped 14 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4.9: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Excluding MPs Whose Occupational Title Changed

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.173*** (0.042)	0.142*** (0.044)	-0.170*** (0.030)	-0.143*** (0.044)	-0.004 (0.029)	0.001 (0.003)
Post-1882 × Cereals		0.064 (0.077)		-0.055 (0.048)		-0.009 (0.060)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	913	913	913	913	913	913
R ²	0.36	0.36	0.56	0.56	0.58	0.58
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). These regressions dropped 37 MP-session observations whose occupational title is different from the MP's original occupation. We dropped 135 observations that are assigned a missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4.10: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Excluding MPs Whose Honorific Title Changed

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.174*** (0.054)	0.149** (0.059)	-0.173*** (0.041)	-0.148** (0.058)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.003)
Post-1882 × Cereals		0.051 (0.091)		-0.050 (0.055)		-0.001 (0.072)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	806	806	806	806	806	806
R ²	0.40	0.40	0.59	0.59	0.55	0.55
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.07	0.90	0.90	0.02	0.02

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). These regressions dropped 148 MP-session observations whose honorific title is difference from the MP's original title. We dropped 131 observations that are assigned to a missing constituency.

We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

First, we re-estimate equation (1) using initial occupations and honorific titles as dependent variables. This allows us to disentangle the source of the effect of the British occupation on social class composition. In Table A4.11, we examine four occupational groups as outcomes: (1) bureaucrats (including top bureaucrats and other bureaucrats), (2) village headmen and notables, and (3) other occupations (business, religious elite), and (4) missing occupation. We restrict this analysis to MPs from rural constituencies, in order to ensure that these occupational groups are relatively more homogeneous. The results show that provinces with higher precolonial cotton productivity witnessed after 1882 a greater increase in the share of bureaucrats – who are more likely to be classified as LE according to our definition – and a greater decrease in the share of village headmen and notables – who are more likely to be classified as RMC according to our definition – in comparison to lower cotton productivity provinces.

In Table A4.12, we examine four honorific title groups: (1) Pasha and Bey, (2) Effendi and Sheikh, (3) Other (Haj, Mo'allim), and (4) missing title. The results demonstrate that more cotton productive provinces witnessed after 1882 a larger rise in the share of Pashas and Beys – who are classified as LE according to our definition – among MPs, and a greater drop in the share of Effendis and Sheikhs – who are more likely to be classified as RMC according to our definition – in comparison to less cotton productive provinces. Taken together, Tables A4.11 and A4.12 show that the positive effect of the British occupation on the proportion of LE MPs is mainly driven by its positive effect on the proportion of Pashas and Beys, and on the proportion of bureaucrats. Its negative effect on the proportion of RMC MPs is mainly driven by its negative effect on the proportion of Effendis and Sheikhs, and on the proportion of village headmen and notables. Overall, however, honorific titles are more informative in our context, given the greater missingness of occupational titles, and the issue of the “notable” title which is difficult to interpret.

Finally, because we define an MP's social class origin based on his occupation, honorific title, and urban-rural status during the first mandate, the effects in Table 1

Table A4.11: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Initial Occupational Titles as Dependent Variables

	(1) Top Bureaucrat or Bureaucrat	(2) Village Headman or Notable	(3) Other Occupation	(4) Missing Occupation
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.041* (0.020)	-0.035* (0.017)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.027 (0.044)
Post-1882 × Cereals	-0.051 (0.040)	0.069 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.146* (0.075)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	14	14	14	14
Obs (MP-Session)	677	677	677	849
R ²	0.16	0.13	0.08	0.27
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.01	0.99	0.00	0.16

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). This regression is confined to MPs in rural constituencies. We dropped 136 observations that are assigned a missing constituency, and 117 observations that are assigned an urban constituency. Columns 1–3 drop 172 observations with missing occupational title. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Controls include the interaction of the post-1882 dummy variable with the cereals yield per feddan in 1877. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The regressions include the following parliamentary sessions from 1824 to 1923: 1824–1837, 1866–1869, 1870–1873, 1876–1879, 1881–1882, 1883–1889, 1889–1895, 1895–1901, 1901–1907, 1907–1913, 1913–1923. We combine MPs from the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913, into the same session. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4.12: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament:
Initial Honorific Titles as Dependent Variables

	(1) Bey or Pasha	(2) Sheikh or Effendi	(3) Other	(4) Missing Title
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.119** (0.043)	-0.138** (0.050)	0.019 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.023)
Post-1882 × Cereals	0.043 (0.080)	-0.042 (0.088)	-0.001 (0.021)	0.089* (0.047)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	923	923	923	965
R ²	0.35	0.26	0.07	0.12
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.07	0.83	0.09	0.06

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned a missing constituency. Columns 1–3 drop 42 observations with missing honorific title. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Controls include the interaction of the post-1882 dummy variable with the cereals yield per feddan in 1877. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. The regressions include the following parliamentary sessions from 1824 to 1923: 1824–1837, 1866–1869, 1870–1873, 1876–1879, 1881–1882, 1883–1889, 1889–1895, 1895–1901, 1901–1907, 1907–1913, 1913–1923. We combine MPs from the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913, into the same session. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

are, by construction, driven by the screening of MPs based on their initial social class background, and not by the social class mobility of MPs. When we use the session-varying social class of MPs as a robustness check, we obtain (as expected) larger effects (Table A4.13). These larger effects, which are driven by both screening on initial social class background and social class mobility of MPs, suggest that there was considerable upward class mobility from the RMC to the LE during the colonial period.

Table A4.13: The British Occupation and Social Class Composition of Parliament: Session-Varying Social Class

	=1 if Landed Elite		=1 if Rural Middle Class		=1 if Urban Middle Class	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.149*** (0.045)	0.140*** (0.045)	-0.152*** (0.046)	-0.119** (0.053)	0.005 (0.030)	0.000 (0.004)
post1882=1 × cerealyieldperfed1877P		0.017 (0.082)		-0.069 (0.058)		0.010 (0.067)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	18	18	18	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	949	949	949	949	949	949
R ²	0.40	0.40	0.54	0.54	0.51	0.51
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.08	0.08	0.89	0.89	0.02	0.02

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned to a missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. Standard errors clustered at the province level and estimated using Wild Cluster Bootstrap are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A5 A5: Additional Tables and Figures


This section shows additional tables and figures. Table A5.14 shows the summary statistics of MPs during the precolonial period 1866–1882 across high- and low-cotton productivity provinces in 1877. The table demonstrates that MPs in high-cotton provinces were not statistically different with respect to social class composition from their counterparts in low-cotton provinces, prior to 1882. Table A5.15 shows the results of the mechanisms analysis for the urban middle class, finding null effects as expected.

Figures A5.7–A5.9 show the evolution of the composition of members of parliament by their incumbency and new entrance status, their appointment and election status, and their membership in the upper or lower houses. Appendix Figure A5.7 shows the proportion of new entrants and incumbents in each parliamentary session from 1824 to 1923 (defined at the MP and dynasty levels). Both MP and dynastic persistence increased over time. The proportion of incumbent MPs increased between 1866 and 1882, and increased further during the colonial period, especially starting from the 1890–1895 session. The proportion of MPs from incumbent dynasties witnessed an even larger increase during the colonial period. This suggests that MPs and dynasties became more persistent across sessions during the colonial period. Appendix Figure A5.8 shows the evolution of the composition of MPs by their election and appointment status. While the first parliamentary session in 1824–1837 included both appointed and elected MPs, the sessions from 1866 to 1882 had almost all elected MPs. Nonetheless, following the British occupation, we observe a rise in the share of appointed MPs, because the newly established upper house had 14 MPs who were appointed for life. Appendix Figure A5.9 shows the share of the upper house MPs during the colonial period.

Table A5.14: Summary Statistics in 1866–1882 by Cotton Productivity in 1877

	Low Cotton			High Cotton			Diff
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	
=1 if MP Landed Elite	104	0.12	0.33	236	0.05	0.21	-0.078
=1 if MP Rural Middle Class	104	0.79	0.41	236	0.95	0.21	0.165
=1 if MP Urban Middle Class	104	0.09	0.28	236	0.00	0.00	-0.087
=1 if MP Pasha	100	0.02	0.14	231	0.00	0.00	-0.020
=1 if MP Bey	100	0.11	0.31	231	0.05	0.21	-0.062
=1 if MP Effendi	100	0.32	0.47	231	0.18	0.38	-0.143
=1 if MP Sheikh	100	0.46	0.50	231	0.68	0.47	0.220
=1 if MP Holds Other Honorific Title	100	0.09	0.29	231	0.10	0.29	0.005
=1 if MP Missing Honorific Title	104	0.04	0.19	236	0.02	0.14	-0.017
=1 if MP Top Bureaucrat	81	0.00	0.00	202	0.00	0.00	0.000
=1 if MP Professional	81	0.00	0.00	202	0.00	0.00	0.000
=1 if MP Business	81	0.07	0.26	202	0.00	0.07	-0.069
=1 if MP Religious Elite	81	0.00	0.00	202	0.00	0.00	0.000
=1 if MP Bureaucrat	81	0.04	0.19	202	0.00	0.00	-0.037*
=1 if MP Village Headman	81	0.81	0.39	202	0.98	0.16	0.160
=1 if MP Notable	81	0.07	0.26	202	0.02	0.14	-0.054
=1 if MP Missing Occupation	104	0.22	0.42	236	0.14	0.35	-0.077
=1 if MP Rural Constituency	104	0.82	0.39	236	1.00	0.00	0.183
=1 if MP Urban Constituency	104	0.18	0.39	236	0.00	0.00	-0.183
Cotton Yield Per Feddan in 1877	104	0.40	0.45	236	1.84	0.59	1.434***
Cereals Yield Per Feddan in 1877	104	1.80	0.90	236	2.25	0.44	0.453

Notes: This table is restricted to MP-session observations that are assigned to a non-missing constituency and to a non-missing social class in 1866–1882. The “Diff” column reports the coefficient of the following MP-session level pooled OLS regression in 1866–1882: $y_{mp} = \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 HighCotton_p + \epsilon_{mp}$, where y_{mp} is the outcome of MP m who is assigned to province p in 1866–1882, and $HighCotton_p$ is a dummy variable =1 if the MP’s province is above the cross-province median cotton production per feddan in 1877, and =0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.



(a) New Entrant and Incumbent MPs

(b) New Entrant and Incumbent Dynasties

Figure A5.7: Members of Parliament by Incumbency Status, 1824–1923

Notes: We combined MPs in the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913.




Figure A5.8: Members of Parliament by Election and Appointment Status, 1824–1923

Notes: We combined MPs in the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913.

Table A5.15: Mechanism: Precolonial Political and Economic Congruence of Precolonial Elites — Urban Middle Class

	(1)	=1 if Urban Middle Class		(4)
		(2)	(3)	
Post-1882 × Cotton × Democratic Speeches Per MP	-0.157 (0.118)			
Post-1882 × Cotton × N. Urabi V. Headmen Arrests		-0.003 (0.035)		
Post-1882 × Cotton × Large Estates Land Share (Q3)			0.002 (0.003)	
Post-1882 × Cotton × Large Estates Land Share (Q4)			0.001 (0.004)	
Post-1882 × Cotton × Prop. Slaves				0.023 (0.215)
Post-1882 × Cotton	0.011 (0.015)	0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.005)
Post-1882 × Prop. Democratic Speeches	0.290 (0.215)			
Post-1882 × N. Urabi V. Headmen Arrests		0.005 (0.060)		
Post-1882 × Large Estates Land Share (Q1)			0.007 (0.193)	
Post-1882 × Large Estates Land Share (Q3)			-0.006 (0.006)	
Post-1882 × Large Estates Land Share (Q4)			-0.002 (0.006)	
Post-1882 × Prop. Slaves				-0.039 (0.251)
Post-1882 × Cereals	0.103 (0.092)	-0.007 (0.064)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.062)
Session FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clusters (Provinces)	17	18	18	18
Obs (MP-Session)	942	949	949	949
R^2	0.53	0.58	0.58	0.58
Av. Dep. Var. 1866-1882	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

Notes: The sample is at the MP-session level ($N = 1,102$). We dropped 136 observations that are assigned to missing constituency. We further dropped 16 observations with missing social class. STATA command `reghdfe` further dropped one singleton observation that belongs to Suez province. In columns 1 and 5, 7 additional observations are dropped because they belong to Rosetta that had no MPs in 1824–1882. In columns 3 and 7, the omitted quartile of the land share of large estates is the second quartile. Provinces at the first quartile all have 0 cotton productivity, and so the triple-interaction term “Post-1882 × Cotton × Large Estates Land Share (Q1)” cannot be separately identified. Standard errors clustered at the province level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.




Figure A5.9: Members of Parliament by Upper and Lower House Membership, 1824–1923

Notes: We combined MPs in the two chambers during the bicameral period from 1883 to 1913.

A6 A6: Coding Pro-Democratic Speeches in 1866–1882

We use data from [Hartnett and Saleh \(2023\)](#) who coded MP speeches as pro-democratic if the matter/issue of discussion involves meaningfully constraining the executive. The following matters/issues are included under this heading. These matters/issues are mentioned explicitly in the source, or inferred from the discussion.

Parliament	Coded Matter/Issue
1866-1869	
1870-1873	
1876-1879	Draft of Constitution Law, Rejecting Khedival Decision to dissolve the parliament.
1881-1882	Discussion of Government Report on Parliament Law Draft, Discussion of Ministers' Presentation of Khedival Amendments to Parliament Law Draft, Discussion of Need for New Parliament Law, Discussion of PM (Mahmoud Sami Elbaroudi) Speech in which He Presented New Parliament Law and Three Relevant Khedival Decrees, Discussion of Parliamentary Committee Report on Parliament Law Draft, Discussion of Prime Minister Speech on Parliament Law Draft, Draft Law on Elections, Need for Draft Constitution, Requiring Government Response to MP Inquiries.

A7 A7: Mechanism Historiography

The Colonial Parliament and British Economic Objectives: Colonial redistribution of power within Egyptian parliament had explicitly economic goals. According to Lord Dufferin – the colonial official tasked with the “reorganization” of Egypt – parliamentary reform was a necessary condition for achieving Britain’s economic goals: “The desideratum of every one is an Egypt peaceful, prosperous, and contented, able to pay its debts, capable of maintaining order along the Canal, and offering no excuse to

the troubled condition of its affairs for interference from the outside.” (Foreign Office 1883, no. 73, p. 129). Dufferin viewed the LE as “the ablest men the country is able to produce” (Foreign Office 1883, no. 73), while Lord Cromer, the British Resident in Egypt from 1883 to 1907, favored the LE over other Egyptians, writing that they had the “glamour of a dominant race” (Cromer 1908, p. 172-73). The British understood that they were enhancing the power of the LE beyond the status quo.

The redesigned colonial parliament played a significant role in matters related to economic interests, including cotton production, agriculture, and taxation. According to the 1883 Basic Law, the Legislative Council, or upper house (UH), sat continuously and had to be consulted on all legislation, with the exception of the foreign debt. The General Assembly, or lower house (LH), convened at least once every two years and must be consulted on every public loan over one million Egyptian pounds, the construction of canals and railways, and on land classification for taxation. No new taxes could be imposed without a positive, binding vote from the LH. Ministers and the Khedive issued laws, even if the British administration had to *de facto* approve them.

Colonial correspondence suggests the LE played a non-trivial policy role in parliament on matters related to colonial economic interests. Edgar Vincent, the British Financial Advisor in Egypt, recommended that the agricultural statistics be distributed to UH MPs so they could advise the Egyptian government about production given that “the agricultural question in Egypt has assumed so great a European importance” (Parliament Command Papers 85b). Lord Cromer reported that amendments suggested by UH MPs were frequently accepted by the government; rejected amendments received written justification from ministers (Parliament Command Papers 85a). LH MPs also informed policy related to cultivation and irrigation, including cotton. In the first convened LH session, MPs debated the British advisor’s plan to improve cotton yields with irrigation works. MPs formed an internal commission to liaise directly with engineers on the irrigation projects; 15 out of 22 members were pashas or beys (i.e., LEs) (Parliament Command Papers 1886). LH MPs also approved a proposal to abolish corvée labor in exchange for a nominal land tax to finance the expansion of irrigation in cotton-producing provinces (Parliament Command Papers 1890).

Slavery as a Measure of Precolonial Rural Middle Class Economic Congruence:

A few notes are in order. First, using the 1848 and 1868 censuses, Saleh (2023) shows that the vast majority of slaves working in agriculture in cotton-producing provinces in 1868 were owned by the RMC (village headmen). The LE in cotton-producing provinces, on the other hand, did not rely on purchasing slaves but rather on increasing the number of peasants working on their large estates.³² Therefore, the proportion of slaves captures the slaveholdings of the RMC, and not the LE. Second, the proportion

³²The fact that the cotton boom-induced rise in slaveholdings in cotton-producing areas was attributable to the RMC was first documented qualitatively by Helal (1999) and Cuno (2009). The fact that the LE did not respond to the cotton boom by increasing their slaveholdings, but rather on the local peasantry was first documented by Saleh (2023) based on the 1848 and 1868 censuses. Saleh (2023) argues that the employment of local peasants in large estates was via state coercion, because the legal type distribution of large estates shifted between 1848 and 1868 towards *jifliks* – a particular form of large estates that was possible to establish on tax-paying usufruct land, and not only on land in tax arrears or default as was the case with other types of large estates. We also observe a positive effect of the cotton boom on the number of soldiers in large estates.

of slaves captures the economic congruence – employing slaves in cotton cultivation – and not wealth. This has been documented by [Cuno \(2009\)](#) and [Saleh \(2023\)](#). Basically, if the observed surge in slaveholdings among the RMC in cotton areas were a pure wealth effect of the cotton boom, we would have expected most slaves to be women, as in cities where women constituted the vast majority of slaves. Instead, the vast majority of slaves of the RMC in cotton areas in the 1868 census were men in working age. Third, according to the 1848 and 1868 censuses that were digitized by [Saleh \(2013\)](#), although there was a sizeable free Sudanese population in urban provinces, the vast majority of Sudanese people in rural provinces were brought in as slaves ([Saleh 2023](#)).³³ Fourth, we use the (district-level) 1882 census, instead of the (individual-level) 1868 census, because the 1882 census is available for all provinces, whereas the 1868 census is missing for eight (out of 14) rural provinces.

Cotton Production by the Landed Elite and the Rural Middle Class: Both the LE and RMC held significant shares of cotton output in the precolonial period that would enable them – in principle – to disrupt cotton production. The 1877 Statistical Yearbook provides partial information on the share of the LE. It records for 13 out of 46 cotton-growing districts the cotton area and output for Khedival estates (*taftish*) separately from all other (non-Khedival) land. This enables us to calculate the share of Khedival estates in cotton area and output – a lower bound on the share of large estates. Within these 13 districts, the share of Khedival estates in the top two districts in terms of cotton output – that produced 10.4% of Egypt’s cotton – was at 3% and 14% of the district’s cotton output, respectively.³⁴ [Owen \(1969\)](#) provides a higher estimate for large estates in cotton output at about 30 percent. We do not directly observe the share of the RMC in cotton output. However, the cotton boom led the RMC to substantially increase their imported slaveholdings who were employed in cotton production, suggesting a rise in their cotton output share.

A8 A8: Precolonial and Colonial Parliament and Electoral Laws

Unicameral and Bicameral Periods: The dates of parliamentary sessions during the unicameral periods are: 1824–1837 (*al-majlis al-‘ali*), 1866–1869, 1870–1873, 1876–1879 (*majlis shura al-nuwwab*), 1881–1882 (*majlis al-nuwwab al-misri*), 1913–1923 (*al-jam‘iya al-tashri‘iya*). The dates of parliamentary sessions during the bicameral period for the Upper House (*majlis shura al-qawanin*) are: 1883–1890, 1890–1895, 1896–1901, 1902–1907, 1908–1913, and for the Lower House (*al-jam‘iya al-‘umumiya*) are:

³³The observed number of Sudanese in rural provinces in the 1882 census (149,312; 2.5 percent of the population) is close to the estimated number of slaves in rural provinces in the 1868 census (144,592; 2.9 percent), which boosts our confidence in using the 1882 census figures on the Sudanese population as a measure of the number of ex-slaves.

³⁴These 13 districts are not representative of cotton-growing districts, though, as they are concentrated at the lower tail of cotton productivity, holding only 9.5% of Egypt’s cotton area and producing 11.9% of cotton output. Apart from the top two districts, the shares of large estates in the other 11 districts – that produced only 1.5% of Egypt’s cotton – are much higher: 0% (1 district), 22% (1), 24% (1), 56% (1), 96% (1), and 100% (6). This suggests the Khedival estates introduced cotton production into districts that did not produce any cotton before, especially in Upper Egypt.

1885–1889, 1891–1894, 1896–1899, 1902–1907, 1909–1912. We unified the session dates during the bicameral period to be 1883–1890, 1890–1895, 1895–1901, 1901–1907, 1907–1913.

Electoral Laws: A comparative analysis of precolonial and colonial electoral laws illustrates the degree to which the colonial administration altered the precolonial parliament. Table A8.16 and Table A8.17 compare the characteristics of the original organic law of 1866, a ratified constitution in 1882, and the colonial organic law from 1883 that repealed the reformist 1882 constitution and abolished the parliamentary oversight of the executive. While the 1882 constitution was ultimately not implemented, it shows what Egypt’s legislative system would have been had the British not invaded that year.

Lord Dufferin’s 1883 bicameral legislature favored the LE in several ways. The Legislative Council, or upper house (UH) included both appointed and elected officials. Compared to precolonial parliaments, the number of elected delegates was reduced from 75 in 1866 to 60 in 1883, with 14 elected members of the UH and 46 in the LH. The result of these changes was a much less representative body that was intentionally designed to favor the LE. Dufferin said appointments to the UH would explicitly favor the landed class: “The advantages of a nominated element are obvious. It would secure the presence in this department of business of a certain number of distinguished men, whose experience, social station, and antecedents may have entitled them to the confidence of the Chief of State [...]” (Foreign Office 1883, no. 56, p. 95). Appointees were allowed to hold their positions for life, reducing turnover and privileging the LE who were more likely to be appointed.

Table A8.16: Changes in Legislative Structure, 1866, 1882, and 1883

	1866	1882	1883
Rural Provinces	13	14 (plus tribes, plus Sudan)	14
Urban Provinces	5	9	7
N Houses	1	1	2
N Delegates	75	115	72
N Elected	75	115	60 (14 in the Legislative Council, 46 in the General Assembly)
N Appointed	2	1	12
Who Appointed?	President and Vice President	President of the council (chosen by the Khedive from among three elected MPs nominated by the body (internal election))	President, VP, 11 Legislative Council Members. Appointees are permanent.
Term Length	3 years	5 years	5 years

The second set of changes introduced by the British to control representation in the legislature involved the electoral process. Appendix Table A8.17 lists the eligibility requirements for the electorate and candidates under each electoral law from 1866 to 1883. The elections in 1866 were one-stage elections where the electorate directly elected MPs. The elections became two-stage elections in 1882 and 1883, where eligible citizens elected electors, who in turn elected delegates. The 1866 electoral law restricted the electorate to village headmen in rural provinces and urban notables in urban provinces. The electors in rural provinces used a secret ballot to directly elect delegates. Members of the military, bureaucrats, individuals employed by a foreign entity, or serving mayors were not eligible to serve as delegates. The original intent of the parliament under Khedive Ismail was to collect information about the conditions in the periphery as a way to target policies. The RMC were favored by design.

The 1882 electoral law, designed with heavy input from RMC MPs, however, showed clear signs of broadening representation to other strata of the middle class and imposing meaningful constraints on the Khedival regime. In this constitution, the electorate expanded to every Egyptian who was at least 21 years old, and who paid at least 500 piasters per year in taxes. It also included the following categories, even if they did not meet the minimum tax threshold: Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious leaders, teachers, secondary school graduates, military or government officers (retired, in reserve, or active duty), lawyers, doctors, and engineers. Members of the electorate must have been resident for a minimum of ten years in their district. These provisions heavily favored the rural and urban middle class by imposing minimum tax limits, but constituted a liberalizing departure from the 1866 electoral law particularly given the expansion of the franchise, with the additional requirements that candidates be at least 25 years old and be proficient in reading and writing.

The 1883 introduced new eligibility criteria for the electorate and candidates that systematically biased the electoral system in favor of LEs. In order to be considered for election, candidates for the UH or LH must have paid a minimum of 2000 or 5000 piastres in annual property taxes in their constituency province, respectively. Notably, the more selective and powerful UH had a lower tax minimum, because candidates were effectively pre-screened through their selection to Provincial Councils, and only other Provincial Counselors could vote for them. The LH had a higher tax minimum that would prevent non-LEs from accessing office, whereas LEs were the default in the UH due to the Provincial Council participation requirement. As a result, colonial elections were less competitive than precolonial elections and were more likely to favor incumbents. [Collins \(1984, p. 213–14\)](#) corroborates this bias in his examination of an incomplete set of property records for members of both houses from 1876 to 1907. [Collins \(1984\)](#) found that the members of the UH held much larger landholdings than members of the LH, and that members who served in multiple sessions generally had more land than single-session members.

Colonial election laws also contained direct measures to exclude the RMC from participating, both in 1883 and later in the colonial period. The 1883 law banned individuals who were exiled, convicted, or surveilled by the police. In practice, these new provisions prevented anyone implicated in the ‘Urabi revolution or in anti-colonial activity from serving, including a number of precolonial RMC MPs. The British strengthened the institutional exclusion of the RMC in the 1890s by becoming directly involved in the selection of village headmen. Before 1894, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) was under Egyptian control and the ‘umdās (headmen/mayors) were locally appointed or elected. [Chalcraft \(2005\)](#) notes variation in accounts of local electoral practices based on Ministry of Interior, colonial, and parliamentary records. In 1894, British officer Elton Gorst took over the MoI to reform the process of tax collection, “reduce banditry,” and improve local bureaucracy related to cotton production ([Brown 1990, Tollefson 1990](#)). In 1895, the MoI implemented a new law that abolished village selection of headmen, codified the central appointment of ‘umda, and reduced the number of ‘umda to one per village. They also created new requirements for the ‘umda position, including landownership of a minimum of 10 feddans – a relatively large holding during this period – and literacy ([Tollefson Jr. 1987](#)). The introduction of law led to the replace-

ment of over 500 headmen across Lower and Upper Egypt (Tollefson Jr. 1987). As a result, the government effectively controlled the selection of both the electorate and the candidates for both houses of parliament.

In sum, we expect that the increase in parliamentary appointments and changes to the electoral law favored LEs more than under the precolonial status quo. We expect these effects to be particularly strong in economically productive regions that were critical to the British colonial mission and logic of indirect rule in the Egyptian case.

Table A8.17: Ratified Electoral Laws in Egypt, 1866 to 1883

	1866	1882	1883
Legislative Oversight	No	Yes	No
Electorate Eligibility			
– Election Method	In rural provinces, a secret ballot by headmen. In urban provinces, consensus among urban notables.	Electorate elects the electors (who must be at least 25 years old and are among the electorate of the district).	Rural provinces, electorate elects electors. Electors meet in the province center and elect delegates. Separate rules for urban candidates.
– Minimum Age		21	20
– Literacy	After the 11th election, must be able to read and write		None
– Residence		Resident in the district for 10 years.	<u>Electorate list</u> : 3 years residence in village before registration of list. Votes for an elector delegate from each village. Elector Delegates vote for (1) Provincial Councils, and (2) General Assembly MPs. Members of Provincial Councils vote one of their number to the Legislative Council.
– Tax		Pays all taxes owed equal to 500 piastres per year	None
– Other	Must be among those with property, cannot be bankrupt, or a former convict.	1) Ulama 2) Priests and other Christian spiritual leaders 3) Jewish rabbis 4) Teachers, civil officials, secondary school graduates 5) Royal office holders, whether they are employed or retired 6) Military officers, whether active duty, reserved, or retired 7) Registered advocates 8) Doctors and engineers Barred: foreigners. Those who lack civil or political rights (i.e., imprisoned, exiled, hard labor sentence, conviction of a felony, treason, theft, fraud, graft, or religious infractions, or officially barred from public service by the state. Convicted violators of the election law. Debtors. Owners of or workers in gambling establishments or brothels.	Barred from Electorate list if member of military or bureaucracy, bankrupt, convict, exiled, surveilled by police, corvée laborer, deported, imprisoned. Can only vote for Legislative Council if a member of a Provincial Council.
Candidate Eligibility			
– Minimum Age	25	25	30
– Literacy	After the 7th election, must be able to read and write	Read and write proficiently	Must be able to read and write
– Residence	In rural districts, local headmen are the candidates. Cannot be military, bureaucracy, employed by a foreign entity, or a current mayor or headman.	Same as electorate	Same as electoral list.
– Tax		Same as electorate	<u>Provincial Council/Legislative Council</u> : 2,000 piastres property tax in the province. <u>General Assembly</u> : Must have paid a minimum 5,000 piastres property tax in the province
– Other	Described as sane and known to the government as an Egyptian citizen.	Same as electorate	<u>Provincial Council</u> : Elector Delegate. <u>Legislative Council</u> : Member of Provincial Council. <u>General Assembly</u> : Must have been an elector for the last 5 years in the district
– Barred If	Bankrupt, “needy poor”, taken up position only one year prior, convicts	Same as electorate	Military, bureaucracy, or foreign employ.

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