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### **Small States Navigating Shelters and Political Shocks: The Republic of Cyprus Between EU Sanctions and Multivector Foreign Policy**

**Revecca Pedi and Iannis Konstantinidis**

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GreeSE Paper No. 202

Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe

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Authors: **Revecca Pedi<sup>1</sup>** and **Iannis Konstantinidis<sup>2</sup>**

## ABSTRACT

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This paper explores the geopolitical implications of EU sanctions on Russia for the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), employing small-state shelter theory and foreign policy analysis. It investigates whether these sanctions entrapped the RoC within its EU shelter or facilitated a Western-oriented emancipation. The study examines Cyprus's unique relationship with Russia, underpinned by economic, historical, and political ties, and its recent multivector foreign policy shift towards the US and the EU. Utilising a sample of 35 elite interviews and a public opinion survey of 505 participants, the paper highlights the political shock induced by the Ukraine war and subsequent sanctions, which strained Cyprus's multivector approach and its relations with Russia. The findings reveal a significant rift between elite and public perceptions: elites broadly support the EU sanctions and view them as a pivot towards the West, while the public disapproves of the sanctions, favouring a dual-track foreign policy. This divergence could potentially pose challenges to domestic unity and consensual politics. The study contributes to small state literature by proposing that shelters can be sources of political shocks and offers insights into Cypriot foreign policy dynamics, providing valuable perspectives for researchers and policymakers in Cyprus and the EU.

**Keywords:** small state shelter seeking; The Republic of Cyprus Foreign Policy; War in Ukraine; Russia; US; EU

**Acknowledgements:** We are thankful to the Hellenic Observatory at the London School of Economics for their financial support, generously provided by the A.G. Leventis Foundation through the A.G. Leventis Research Innovation Programme on Cyprus. We also appreciate the valuable assistance and steady commitment of our research assistants, Stavros Piperidis and Savvas-Arsenios Theodoridis throughout the project. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments

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## Introduction

This paper situates itself in the field of small state studies, drawing on shelter theory (Bailes et al., 2016) and foreign policy analysis, with a focus on elite and public opinion perceptions (Mader and Schoer, 2023; Ondarco, Smetana, and Etienne, 2023). The aim is to investigate the geopolitical implications of the EU sanctions on Russia for Cyprus. Specifically, it examines whether this decision entrapped the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) within its EU shelter or marked a moment of emancipation, allowing Cyprus to break with its past and adopt a Western orientation. Additionally, the paper explores perceptions regarding the RoC's role in the region in this context.

The RoC's relationship with Russia has been unique among EU member states. This relationship is underpinned by mutual economic interests, tourism, spiritual ties, historical links, arms trade, Russia's support at the UNSC for the Cypriot issue, and reciprocal support of Russian interests within the EU (Kentas, 2022; Melakopides, 2022). However, as part of its status-seeking strategy and in response to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, the RoC has shifted towards a multivector foreign policy (Pedi & Kouskouvelis, 2019; Tziarras, 2022). Notably, the RoC's rapprochement with the US despite its limitations (Zachariades, 2022), has progressed significantly (Stein, 2022). In this context, the RoC has created a network of shelters or potential shelters, seeking political, economic, and societal support from the EU, Russia, and the US. However, following the invasion of Ukraine, the crisis in the relations between Russia and the West undermined this orientation and provoked a political shock. This paper will examine the challenges the RoC faces regionally, within the EU, and in its relations with Russia and the US, while trying to safeguard its interests, security, and status. Additionally, considering that small states benefit from cooperation and coalition building within shelters to succeed in agenda-setting (Wivel, 2010), we will explore the potential of the RoC within the EU and potential grounds for cooperation or contention.

Research shows that small states feel the pressures of the international system more acutely than great powers and have less room to manoeuvre (Jervis, 1978; Waltz, 1979; Wivel et al., 2014). Nevertheless, decision-makers and elite perceptions are crucial even in small states (Gvalia et al., 2013; Kakachia et al., 2018; Kouskouvelis, 2016; Miles, 2015; Wrange & Bengtsson, 2019). Public opinion is also important, as small states' vulnerability can be mitigated by high levels of unity and consensual politics (Katzenstein, 2003; Matthews & Yan, 2007; Thorhallsson & Kattel, 2013; Thorhallsson & Kirby, 2012). In this context, we examine the perceptions of both elites and the public opinion on the foreign policy challenges the RoC faces. We focus on their views of key actors in the international system and the region in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. We explore how they perceive the RoC's interests,

potential threats, and opportunities, while also assessing the gap between elite and public opinion perspectives.

In doing so we first explore the RoC's Foreign Policy before and after the invasion of Ukraine. Then we look at it through the lens of the political shock studies and shelter-seeking literature. We delve into a discussion of the effects of shelter-seeking concerning the question of entrapment or empowerment of small states and contemplate the hypothesis that shelters can become a source of political shocks for small states. Finally, we investigate the views of elites and the public opinion in Cyprus concerning the war in Ukraine and its consequences, the role of the EU for Cyprus, and the role of the RoC in the region as well as regarding its relations with major players and its foreign policy in the future.

In the context of this paper, we consider as elites, foreign policy elites, who have deep knowledge of foreign policy issues and/or context-specific experience but also general elites, who may hold prominent positions outside of foreign policy domains but are closely related to or influenced by foreign policy decisions (Saunders, 2022). Our sample consists of 35 semi-structured interviews with diplomats, academics, ministers and ex-ministers, members of the House of Representatives, and journalists. In compiling our sample, we ensured it was gender-balanced and representative of various ages, ideological and political orientations, and backgrounds. Regarding the public opinion survey, we used a structured questionnaire to collect the data. It was designed by the research team on the grounds of small state foreign policy studies, research on political shock and studies on the role of public opinion in foreign policy. The data was collected by a research partner, which used its online panel in Cyprus to gather a sample of 505 people (for a brief report on the use of online panels, see Evans and Mathur 2018). Online panels are now widely used in political research; on the one hand, the use of the internet is gradually spreading to the older age groups and therefore there are no significant asymmetries in the age distribution of an online sample, while on the other hand, the political interest index of the participants in a panel is at the same level as that of the index of participants in telephone surveys. To collect the sample, the technique of stratified sampling by geographic area of residence was followed. Stratification is used to increase the efficiency of a sample design concerning both survey costs and estimator precision (Sharma 2017). Given the sample size, the maximum margin of error is estimated at +/- 4.5% for a 95% confidence interval. It is noted that the specific margin of error is perfectly acceptable in political behaviour research (Lenth 2001), while the specific sample size (n=500), as well as the use of an online panel, is a convention in comparative research that includes Cyprus (see Eurobarometer). The questionnaire was completed from March 3 to 13, 2024. The sample was weighted a posteriori in terms of gender and age group to be representative of the population of Cyprus.

## The RoC's Foreign Policy before and after the invasion of Ukraine

The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 impacted almost every state on earth. It accelerated systemic transformations already set in motion, while the new strategic environment increased uncertainty for small states (Wivel, 2023). The RoC had already been navigating heightened uncertainty in the Eastern Mediterranean due to Turkey's strategic autonomy course and growing assertiveness, the migration crisis and turbulence in the region (Evaghorou, 2018; Kontos and Bitsis, 2018). At the same time, it enjoyed an upgraded status, a byproduct of the transformation of its foreign policy agenda from a monothematic one focusing on the Cyprus Question only, to a more mature multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy (Pedi and Kouskouvelis, 2019; Tziarras, 2022).

This reorientation has roots in two formatting experiences, the EU Presidency of 2012 and the economic crisis (Christodoulides, 2022; Christou and Kyris, 2017). The EU Presidency the RoC upheld in 2012 sealed the latter's socialization into the EU. Lessons learnt and networks built at that time have provided the springboard for more extroversion and more Eurocentric initiatives. In addition, during the economic crisis, the RoC strived for more Europeanization in its Foreign Policy (Christou and Kyris, 2017), diverging from the de-Europeanization trend of that time (Raimundo, Stavridis and Tsardanidis, 2021). The newly discovered hydrocarbons in the region have also given a boost to RoC's potential in the region and beyond (Zachariades and Petrikkos, 2020), while at the same time, Turkey saw the RoC's initiatives as provocations (Christou and Adamides, 2013).

During that period the RoC's strategy had five distinct, yet interrelated goals which according to President Anastasiades (2014) were:

1. Reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem, which would prove of immense benefit not only to Cypriots but also to regional stability;
2. Safeguarding the exploitation of our natural wealth and the consequential internal and regional economic and political benefits;
3. Enhancing our participation in all EU pillars and policies, including becoming an integral part of the European Security System, and establishing a credible presence and cooperation with the European Union Member States;

4. Actively contributing to building and promoting peace and security in our immediate region of Eastern Mediterranean; while at the same time deepening our bilateral relations with neighboring countries of the region;

5. Upgrading our bilateral relations with the United States, UK and Israel, without negatively affecting the already deep-rooted relations with other countries such as Russia, China and those of the Arab world, so as to create a grid of alliances in support of our foreign policies and economic goals.

Although the RoC hasn't made much progress in the first and second goals since 2014 when then President Anastasiades articulated his strategy in a speech at LSE, it has managed to significantly improve its standing in the other three. President Anastasiades stated that the RoC aimed to create a grid of alliances. We suggest that the RoC's partnerships didn't reach the status of a formal alliance and not even that of a quasi-alliance (Tziarras, 2016). Still, the RoC has been building a network of shelters or potential shelters for diplomatic, economic and security issues. The invasion of Ukraine undermined this effort as the RoC could not maintain a multivector foreign policy anymore. It has been suggested that an international system tending to multipolarity is permissive to a multivector foreign policy (Pedi and Wivel, 2022). However, the Cyprus case reveals that what is critical for small states is not only the type of the system but also the level of polarization among the different poles; it provides an illustration of the limits of multivectorism in a polarized international system. Below we explore the RoC's standing concerning major players and its role in the region before and after the invasion of Ukraine and we investigate how the invasion of Ukraine affected the RoC's five goals and its efforts for sheltering.

## The RoC and the EU

The RoC's accession into the EU was a prototypical shelter-seeking move. Small states generally join the EU primarily for economic reasons, followed by political influence and, in some cases, security concerns (Nugent, 2006). However, Cyprus constitutes a unique case among the EU member states. It is not only one of the smallest but also the only one under occupation by a powerful and aggressive neighbour. Therefore, Cyprus' primary motivation for EU accession was driven by insecurity and the need for support by the EU. Cyprus sought support and recognition from other member states and the international community to gain status and leverage to safeguard its sovereignty and achieve a solution to the Cyprus Question, with economic reasons being secondary (Melakopides, 2010). This



distinct situation sets Cyprus apart within the EU (Nugent 2006). In this context, the EU has served and continues to serve as a shelter for Cyprus in the domains of security, politics, society, and economy.

During the economic crisis, the EU provided Cyprus with a safety net, though at a significant cost to its autonomy, exactly as predicted by shelter theory (Thorhallsson and Kirby, 2012). In security terms, beyond perceiving the EU membership as a means to build deterrence, the RoC has tried to upload security concerns stemming from Turkey's assertiveness in the region to the EU's agenda, especially in times of turbulence. Recently, it managed to connect the evolution of the EU-Turkey relations with the Cyprus question (KNEWS, 18.04.2024). That said, Cyprus has constantly asked for a more principled stance towards Turkey. It demanded the imposition of sanctions on Turkey when the latter was challenging its maritime sovereignty. Yet, that effort was unsuccessful.

Diplomatically the EU has enlarged the RoC's action space and enabled it to punch above its weight, as the latter is seen as a bridge between countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and the EU, by both neighbours in the region and the EU (Christodoulides, 2022). Initiatives to support Egypt, and Lebanon, or to bring Israel closer to the EU have vindicated the RoC's aspiration to assume the role of the bridge-builder in the region. Cyprus has envisioned such a role even before its formal accession into the EU. The then President of the Republic Papadopoulos in 2003 noted that Cyprus "can become an economic, political, and cultural bridge linking the two shores of the Mediterranean - a necessary bridge of mutual understanding and cooperation between the various religions, cultures and ways of life" (Press and Information Office 2003).

## The RoC and the US

The RoC's relationship with the US for the most part since the former's independence was one of mutual distrust (Zachariades, 2022). There has been a widespread perception among the Greek Cypriots that the Americans bear responsibility for the illegal Turkish invasion that led to the occupation of 37% of the island. They didn't do anything to deter Turkey and they didn't support the RoC on the negotiating table on different occasions afterwards. Even in the UNGA resolution, where Cyprus won, the US played a critical role on the side of Turkey (Keohane, 1967). At the same time, the US could not trust Makarios. He was an independent spirit hard to handle according to the Americans (Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute) known as the Red Priest and the Castro of the Mediterranean, a leading figure in the non-allied movement. US's connections to the Greek Colonels' Junta, the perpetrators of the coup against Makarios, is one more reason why the Cypriots have

despised the US. Thus, the suspicion between the two states since the early days of the Republic has been steadily increasing.

US' increased interest in the southeast Mediterranean, where according to Kontos and Georgiou (2023) the former pursues a dual balancing strategy against China and Russia, opened a new chapter in US-Cypriot relationships. US ambitions to exert more influence on the region, its complicated relationship with Turkey, and the discovery of hydrocarbons, all coincided with the RoC's openness to multivectorism and its ambition to play a greater role in the region through strengthening its relations and interdependence with neighboring countries. The fact that the then RoC's President Nicos Anastasiades has been a pro-western and pro-US politician, in contrast to his predecessor Christofias, played a great role in the improvement of the relations (Zachariades, 2022).

There are plenty of manifestations of the elevated status of the relationships between the two countries. In an exceptional visit to Cyprus in 2014, as only the second sitting US Vice President to visit the island, Joe Biden highlighted Cyprus' importance in the Eastern Mediterranean. He stated that Cyprus is "a genuine strategic partner to the United States of America" and noted, "You are emerging as a leader in the region. And Cyprus is poised to become a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean [...]—transforming the Eastern Mediterranean into a new global hub for natural gas and markets" (Biden 2014a). Incumbent President of the Republic, Nicos Christodoulides reconfirms the upgrade of the US-Cyprus relations by stating that: "our relations are as high as they have ever been... and we have a roadmap of developments that we want to see in the immediate future, developments in the direction of strengthening our bilateral relations" (quoted in KNEWS, 4.12.2023).

The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 (EastMED Act) practically vindicates the US's interest in the region, as it aims to "promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean". In addition, the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security (CYCLOPS) which was established with the support of the US in Cyprus to enhance regional security and counterterrorism efforts demonstrates the strategic partnership and mutual commitment to security between the United States and Cyprus, as it is a state-of-the-art facility providing specialized training and resources to address emerging threats. The US also gave the green light for lifting its decades-long arms embargo on Cyprus. This move marked a significant shift in US policy and was seen as a recognition of Cyprus' strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean. That said, concerning US motives the willingness of the US to balance if not eliminate Russian influence on Cyprus should not be underestimated. In the case of the EastMED Act as well as in the Lift of the Arms Embargo case, there is a prerequisite that any benefit for Cyprus should be accompanied by an elimination of Russian influence on the island, while the EastMed Act itself is considered a countermeasure to that influence.

The US-RoC's relations reached a tipping point with the launch of Strategic Dialogue between the two in June 2024 (US Department of State, 18.04.2024). On the occasion of his meeting with the US Secretary of State, the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs attributed this progress to the RoC's foreign policy reorientation. "We have taken a clear position with what is happening in Ukraine. We have shown a determination on issues that had to do with the economy, with corruption, issues that had to do with the banking system. All these things are interlinked. Of course our geographic location produces geostrategic advantage, the key is to be able to take advantage of it", as he put it (Kombos, 2024). That said, it's hard to consider the US a security shelter as in security terms there are no security guarantees, and in diplomatic terms, the relationship is still vulnerable to developments in the region, especially US relationship with Turkey (Zachariades, 2022).

## The RoC and Russia

The RoC's multivectorism strategy has also been targeting support from Russia. The RoC's relationship with Russia has been unique among the European Union member states. Mutual economic interests and tourism, spiritual ties and historical links, arms trade, support at the UNSC for the Cypriot issue from the part of Russia as well as reciprocal support of Russian interests within the EU from the part of Cyprus have galvanised RoC's relations with Russia ([Kentas, 2022](#); [Kontos, 2019](#); [Melakopides, 2022](#)). President Anastasiades emphasized the long-standing ties between the two countries, stating that "the current contacts prove the importance of Cyprus for Russia and the importance of deepening and expanding our relations across all areas" (Anastasiades 2017a). Even after the annexation of Crimea the two states signed many agreements, including one permitting Russian navy ships to access Cypriot ports (BBC 2015). In total, Cyprus and Russia have entered into 67 agreements (Anastasiades 2017a), covering areas such as "diplomacy, political cooperation, defence, trade, banking, energy, tourism, and culture" (Melakopides 2017;2022). Additionally, strong Russian economic interests are reflected in the presence of more than 30,000-40,000 Russian-speaking residents in Cyprus, Russian schools, a Russian church, efforts to establish a political party, and the fact that, at least in the pre-pandemic period, over 800,000 Russians visited Cyprus annually for tourism (Kentas, 2022; Melakopides, 2017; 2019).

Cyprus has sought to cement relations with Russia by positioning itself as a consistent and valuable partner, leveraging the cultural and historical affinities between the two nations and its EU membership advantage. President Anastasiades (2017a) noted that "[C]ommon cultural, religious, spiritual, and civilisational values strengthen our dialogue both in the economy, politics, and trade,"

and added that Cyprus has tried to persuade its EU partners to adopt “a more pragmatic approach” to the EU’s relationship with Russia following the Ukrainian conflict. It seems that Russia was also calculating on the RoC’s EU membership encouraging it to assume a bridgebuilder role between Russia and the EU. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov recognised the RoC’s contribution, as he put it “We have expressed our gratitude to our Cyprus friends that, within the EU, they are part of the group of countries that advocating coming out of this non-normal cooperation” (Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Yet, recognition was mutual. In September 2020 just a few days before receiving US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Nicos Anastasiades decorated Sergei Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs highlighting the support of the latter’s country and of his own to Cyprus. As the then-President put it:

The respective Governments of the Russian Federation, always based on international law, have defended the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus at critical moments for our country. At the same time, Russia's principled positions and the support it has provided and continues to provide to our efforts to find a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, always based on the relevant Security Council Resolutions and the principles and values of the United Nations Charter, are timeless. Your own personal contribution in this direction has been particularly important and invaluable, my friend Sergei, through your position as Foreign Minister and the other offices you have been called upon to serve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation over the past sixteen years (Press and Information Office, 2020).

However, even before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the relations between the two countries were moving to uncharted waters. Russia's rapprochement with Turkey (Reynolds, 2019) prompted worries in Nicosia. At the same time, the RoC was pursuing its rapprochement with the US. In this sense, Kontos (2019) suggests that the RoC's and Russia's interests started to diverge. Concerning the economic relations between the two countries, despite the denial of aid from the Russian part during the economic crisis, the 2013 haircut and capital flee as well as pressures coming from the EU and the US, the relations between the two countries remained important (Zhukov, 2013; Zavyalova et al, 2019).

The invasion of Ukraine constitutes a turning point in the Cyprus-Russian relations. In 2014 the RoC kept a lowkey stance to the annexation of Crimea, reflecting the EU’s rather mild reaction led by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The annexation was condemned. Sanctions were imposed. Yet, a dual-track approach, i.e. maintaining good relations with both Russia and the West, towards Russia

was followed. Since then, the President of the RoC seized every possible opportunity to call for a normalization of relations with Russia. The February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the EU's united and dynamic response redefined the geopolitical landscape, altered the dynamics and left Cyprus with less room to manoeuvre. In February 2022, when the Russian invasion started, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Christodoulides (AlphaNewsLive, 2022) connected Russia's attack to the 1974 Turkish attack. He strongly emphasized the need to find a diplomatic solution instead of a military one and the importance of the EU. At the same time, he underlined Russia's energy advantage and the need to make the Eastern Mediterranean an alternative energy route to Europe. In an interview on France24 in May 2022 President Anastasiades argued that there are parallels between Russian revisionism in Ukraine and Turkish revisionism in Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean as well as common experiences among the Ukrainians today and Greek Cypriots in 1974 (France24, 26.05.2022). Annita Demetriou, President of the Cypriot Parliament, has expressed her support for Ukraine's people, by paralleling the Russian Invasion with the Turkish Invasion of 1974 (House of Representatives, 2022). In September of the same year during the UNGA in New York, Anastasiades cancelled his meeting with Lavrov; the cancellation was attributed to pressures from the EU side (KNEWS, 24.09.2022). In February 2023 in an interview with the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, Anastasiades admitted that in the European Council, he was viewed with suspicion because of the RoC's relations with Russia, and he clarified that the RoC is a credible partner of the West.

Considering first the close economic, diplomatic, and societal relations with Russia, tsecond he fact that the RoC counts on Russia's presence in the UNSC not only for support regarding the Cyprus Question but also for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces in Cyprus, as well as the RoC's position after the annexation of Crimea, the RoC's stance after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents a significant shift in the RoC's foreign policy towards Russia; a shift that caused concerns. Nikolas Papadopoulos, leader of DIKO, believes that the Russian invasion of Ukraine constitutes a violation of international law, and hopes for a diplomatic solution -as the majority of the political parties in Cyprus do. However, he also acknowledges that Cyprus will face significant economic consequences from the war, particularly in the services and tourism sectors, and expresses concern about the impact of the EU sanctions on the relationship between Cyprus and Russia and Russia's behaviour in the Security Council. (Cyprus Times, 2022)

Russia did not receive the RoC's stance well. The then Russian Ambassador in Cyprus during an appearance on SigmaTV referred to the repercussions that Cyprus would face due to the imposition of sanctions. He highlighted potential negative impacts, such as the danger of Russian tourists redirecting from Cyprus to Turkey, and implied significant economic consequences for Cyprus. As he put it, "How

will Cyprus have Russian tourists? They will not come. They will go to Turkey. Is that what you want? They will spend their money there. Summer is coming. You closed the airspace of Cyprus. You shot yourselves in the foot. And we do not want that to happen" (quoted in Tomaras, 2022). Ambassador Osadchiy was replaced by Ambassador Zyazikov, the first Russian Muslim ambassador in the RoC, who revealed that "Russians travelling here with connections in third countries increasingly prefer to vacation in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern part of the island, where hotel and transport infrastructure is developing rapidly and prices are lower" (greekcitytimes, 28.09.23). However, the RoC remained firm on its decision, while trying not to burn bridges with Russia. The RoC's diplomatic representation in Putin's Presidential swearing-in Ceremony in May 2024 is indicative (Guardian, 07.05.2024).

### Credibility Crisis

Close relations with Russia created a credibility crisis for the RoC. It has been stigmatized within the EU as Russia's Trojan Horse (Orenstein and Kelemen, 2017; Popescu and Leonard, 2007). In September 2020, while Christodoulides still served as the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, the RoC attempted an unsuccessful linkage between the EU sanctions against the Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, who is heavily connected with Vladimir Putin, and the matter of Turkish maritime violations of the RoC's sovereignty; a move that frustrated its EU partners (Brzozowski, 2020). In October 2020, Al-Jazeera released a documentary called "The Cyprus Papers Undercover", focusing on the corruption of the Cypriot Golden Passport Program (Al Jazeera, 2020). Most of the Passport recipients were Chinese and Russians, hence the nickname Limassolgrad, which describes the Russian dominance in Limassol's property market. The program has netted Cyprus circa 7 billion euros (Stamouli,2022). Nonetheless, the RoC has been portrayed as a shelter for Russian oligarchs. In November 2023 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) explored Cyprus's role as a financial hub for Russian wealth. The ICIJ investigated how Cyprus's banking system became dominated by Russian money, facilitated by lax regulations and the "golden visa" program. It highlighted the deep ties between Cypriot banks and Russian interests, the influence of Russian oligarchs, and the complicity of Cypriot political and financial institutions, all under the supervision of the European Central Bank. Thus, a widespread perception that Cyprus has been a tax haven and a haven for Russian oligarchs was established. In his speech in the Cypriot House of Representatives in April 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky expressed gratitude for the support already received; nonetheless, he mentioned the Golden Passport program and urged the state of Cyprus to freeze the usage of yachts and other vessels by Russians in their waters and suspend privileges for Russian citizens such as golden

passports and dual citizenship. (Zelensky, 2022)

## The RoC's Role in the Region

The discovery of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean has significantly boosted regional cooperation, with Cyprus at the forefront (Zachariades and Petrikos, 2020). The RoC has been instrumental in fostering trilateral partnerships with Greece, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan and it is an important knot in the networks developing in the region aiming to enhance cooperation in various sectors, including security, economy, and energy. (Karagiannis, 2016; Pedi and Kouskouvelis, 2019; Tziarras, 2016). At the same time, the RoC serves as a vital link between the Eastern Mediterranean and the European Union. Its EU membership provides a gateway for regional states seeking closer ties with Europe and vice versa. The recent visit of President Christodoulides and the President of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen to Lebanon and the financial support of 1 billion euros to the latter is an indicative example (European Commission, 02.05.2024). Cyprus's strategic importance in the region is further underscored by its role in crisis management and humanitarian efforts. The RoC has been central in evacuation operations during crises in Lebanon, Sudan, and most recently, Gaza. The establishment of the Amalthea maritime humanitarian corridor allows aid and supplies to flow from staging areas in the Republic of Cyprus to ports in Gaza highlighting Cyprus's capability and readiness to act as a hub for regional stability and security operations (Nedos, 2023; US Department of State, 2024).

An active role in the region has long been envisioned by political elites in Cyprus across the decades and the political spectrum. President Makarios argued that it could constitute an important bridge builder in its vicinity (quoted in Holsti, 1970:267):

History and tradition, civilization and customs place Cyprus in the Western world. However, we want friendship with all states... We do not overestimate the role that Cyprus could play in the international arena. Nevertheless, I believe that its geographic location, as a bridge uniting three continents, and other factors allow Cyprus to play an international role greater than the size of its population and territory.

Echoing Makarios, President Clerides in a 1994 speech at the Council of Europe stated: "Cyprus, at the crossroads of continents and civilisations, can be a vital bridge of communication contributing to de-

confrontation and understanding, provided that it is itself free of internal fragmentation and external intervention." Following President Christofias on the occasion of the assumption of the 2012 EU Presidency stated: "Taking into account the developments in our southern neighbourhood, the Cyprus Presidency will seek, together with the High Representative and the European External Action Service, to bring Europe closer to its Mediterranean neighbours and its Mediterranean neighbours closer to Europe." Thus, the aspiration to play the role of the bridge-builder in the region lies at the core of the RoC's foreign policy across the decades.

## The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and EU Sanctions on Russia as a Political Shock

The invasion of Ukraine and the Western reaction that followed it was a political shock for the RoC, even though Cyprus was not directly involved. According to Gordell and Volgy (2022: 111-113), political shocks are events with four particular characteristics: i) they are unanticipated or unexpected, ii) they occur suddenly, iii) they manifest a dramatic disruption to current conditions, iv) they exhibit an actual, dramatic impact on the status quo experienced by the impacted state. As they point out, political shocks are not felt in the same way by every state, as some states are more vulnerable than others, while they often have a functional role being seen as a window of opportunity for policy change. Cyprus was particularly vulnerable for two different reasons. The first reason is the emphatic return to power politics and revisionism in Europe. Although the annexation of Crimea in 2014 signalled the coming of a new era, a full-scale invasion of Ukraine was rather unexpected and impacted dramatically small states, such as Cyprus (Wivel, 2023). Being occupied, having a revisionist and significantly stronger neighbour that had recently challenged its sovereignty and being non-allied put the RoC in a difficult position. Finland and Sweden could share similar concerns when applying for NATO membership. Yet, for the RoC this was not an option as Turkey would veto it.

The second reason is its economic, diplomatic, military, and societal links with Russia that were disrupted by the EU's decision to impose sanctions on the latter and severe ties with it at the Institutions and member-states level. Normal and decades-long mutually beneficial relations between the RoC and Russia were unexpectedly and suddenly disrupted, while the RoC's multivector foreign policy was undermined. One could argue that sooner or later RoC's ties with Russia would weaken, as their interests started to diverge and the RoC was turning towards the West (Kontos, 2019). Even if we accept this hypothetical argument, any change controlled by the RoC would be incremental,



calculated, based on the dual-track approach and an independent choice. While, the former effect, the heightened insecurity was an outcome of the event itself. The latter effect, the disruption in its relations with Russia, is the byproduct of a decision at the EU level. Although all EU member states have a voice at the decision-making table and small states can influence EU policies, their effectiveness depends on the framework of the negotiations, coalition building, reputation, etc (Panke, 2012). In this context, the united European and transatlantic front on a dynamic reaction and support for Ukraine as well as the magnitude of the political shock due to a full-scale invasion of a European country did not leave much room for other options. In addition, the RoC had to adhere to the EU decisions on sanctions and Russia's isolation for two more reasons. First, given the credibility deficit the RoC was facing due to its relations with Russia, it had to prove that it was a credible and reliable partner. Second, as the RoC seeks support from its EU partners and EU institutions to confront Turkey's revisionism in the region and as part of its strategic narrative was to associate Russian revisionism with Turkish revisionism, it was critical for the RoC to show solidarity with Ukraine and its Eastern partners. The RoC could not request the imposition of sanctions on Turkey, while not supporting sanctions on Russia. Exactly as the shelter theory predicts, small states pay the cost of losing a degree of their autonomy to gain some diplomatic capital through their shelter (Bailes et al., 2016).

Yet, small states seek shelters to avoid uncertainty and insecurity as shelters tend to mitigate the consequences of international crises (Brady and Thorhallsson, 2021). Comparing Iceland with Ireland during the economic crisis, Thorhallsson and Kirby (2012) suggest that Ireland's membership in the EU provided a safety net that Iceland didn't have. However, Ireland had to pay a cost concerning its domestic politics. Thus, small states need to calculate between costs and benefits. What makes the case of the RoC particularly interesting is the investigation of the effects of a political shock provoked by the decision of a small state's shelter. In this context, Brady and Thorhallsson argue that (2021: 8 )"the shelter provider tends to expect the protected state to follow its foreign policy preferences, and this may have a negative impact on small state domestic policies and domestic public opinion. Seeking shelter can potentially cause rifts within small societies". However, given that political shocks can also constitute windows of opportunity, it is worth exploring whether a political shock coming from the EU can also work as a window of opportunity, in other words, it is worth discussing whether the EU's decision on sanctions was perceived as an entrapment or emancipation moment in Cyprus.

In this sense, in this paper we connect research on political shocks with small-state shelter-seeking theory and employ a second image-reversed perspective (Gourevitch, 1978) to investigate the views of elites and public opinion in Cyprus concerning the question of whether imposing sanctions on Russia, the RoC was entrapped in its shelter or it was emancipated. In addition, we explore elite and public

opinion perceptions on the RoC's role in the region and relations with major players as the invasion of Ukraine and all the developments that followed impacted small states in general and the RoC's multivector foreign policy more specifically. That said, for the purpose of this paper we do not undertake an exhaustive exploration of the domestic structure and politics. We aim to map the trends within the elites and the public opinion and look for competing responses as those that shape politics (Gourevitch, 1978).

## Elite's Perceptions on the RoC's size and role in the region, the EU and sanctions on Russia and Major Actors

Our interviews focused on four main issues. Firstly, we explored the elite's perceptions of the RoC's role in the region. Secondly, we scrutinized their views on the RoC's relationship with the EU, particularly whether they view the EU as a shelter for the RoC and their opinions on the imposition of EU sanctions on Russia. Thirdly, we examined the relationship with Russia and the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Fourthly, we explored the relations with other major players and potential shelters. Our goal is to map the trends within the Cypriot elites and identify competing responses. Although we consider the Cyprus Question and relations with Turkey of particular importance, the perceptions of Greek Cypriot elites on these issues have already been thoroughly covered by Kontos (2016), who has identified the competing narratives on these topics.

Regarding the RoC's role in the region, there is a consensus among the interviewees that its role is shaped by its small size. All interviewees agree that the role of bridge-builder aligns well with Cyprus's characteristics, given its friendly relations with all states in the region, its EU membership advantage, and its unique understanding of both the region and the EU. However, there are different perspectives on smallness and the RoC's potential to fulfil this role. We identified three distinct views: the optimists, the sceptics and the pessimists. Firstly, the optimists suggest that the RoC can overcome its small size and effectively punch above its weight through its multivector foreign policy and regional role. EU membership is seen as an enabler, while the foreign policy reorientation and the discovery of hydrocarbons have provided a springboard for a status upgrade. The increased interest of major powers, such as the US, is cited as evidence of this elevated status, along with the RoC's initiatives in times of crisis, like the Amalthea humanitarian corridor or cases of mediation among different sides in Lebanon. In this context, one of our interviewees suggested that Cyprus is more a security provider in the region, rather than a security consumer. Some interviewees noted that the RoC's enhanced

position has been driven by the interest of major powers in the region. These views align closely with the official narrative held by both the current and previous governments. The sceptics acknowledge that the RoC can play a role in the region despite its small size, but they argue that the progress made so far is superficial. "It is not the outcome of a well-crafted strategy," one interviewee claimed; "the RoC just harnesses windows of opportunity". They cite several disadvantages, including a lack of investment in foreign policy structures and personnel, the vulnerability of trilateral cooperation due to regional instability and the Turkey factor, stalled progress in the energy sector, as well as the credibility deficit. According to a dominant view among the sceptics, "the RoC's value is not negligible, but due to these weaknesses, it is not an actor on which other powers can rely". Finally, the pessimists believe that the RoC is too small and too dependent on Turkey's status and policies in the region to be able to leave a significant footprint.

Our interviewees broadly agree on the role of the EU as a shelter for the RoC. The majority recognizes that EU membership allows the RoC to exert influence beyond its size in the region. They acknowledge that the EU has provided the RoC with significant diplomatic capital. However, in terms of security, they all agree that the EU is not a reliable security actor and express little faith in the mutual defence clause (Article 42.7 TEU). Despite dissatisfaction with the EU's handling of Turkey's violations and provocations, even lukewarm EU supporters concede that "if we were not in the EU, Turkey would be unstoppable" in the words of one of our interviewees. Additionally, there is consensus that the EU is a source of modernization for the RoC. For many of our interviewees, while the EU can facilitate a bridge-builder role for the RoC, a credibility deficit hinders this potential. Among those who highlight the credibility deficit, there is a broad consensus that the RoC's close relations with Russia, its exclusive focus on Turkey and the perceived intransigence since the rejection of the Annan Plan damage its reputation among EU partners and alienate some of them. Concerning forming coalitions within the EU, as small states do to upload their interests in the EU agenda, Greece and France are viewed as potential allies for the RoC for the majority of our participants. Yet, a realization that there are not many member states sharing the RoC's concerns is widespread.

Regarding the EU's sanctions on Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there is broad agreement that Cyprus had no option but to conform to the EU's decision, thus aligning with an entrapment perception. However, two competing responses emerged. Both consider the RoC's agreement on sanctions as a stance of solidarity. One group suggests that the Greek Cypriot experience of the 1974 invasion and the violation of international law shaped the RoC's position, while the other emphasizes a functional perspective, highlighting the RoC's duties as an EU member state and the need for reciprocal solidarity.

There is also a consensus on Russia's importance for the RoC. Although there is disagreement on the degree of this importance, Russia's motives, and the benefits of this relationship, they all agree that RoC's relationship with Russia has been significant for diplomatic, military, economic, and societal reasons. Key components of this relationship include Russia's permanent seat on the UNSC, Russian armaments procurement, investments and tourism, Christianity, and a population of 50,000 Russians on the island. Consequently, the war in Ukraine and the subsequent EU sanctions on Russia came as a political shock. The degree of this shock varies. Some believe that the process of derussification in the Cypriot economic sector had already begun under EU and US pressures, and thus consider the losses smaller. Although they acknowledge a 30% loss in the tourism sector due to the sanctions, they suggest that the RoC managed to overcome the deficit. This group views the political shock as a window of opportunity and an accelerator for the derussification of Cyprus's political and economic life. "It's time for a restart; we need a viable economic model and a transparent political system, we need to increase our credibility," one interviewee stressed. They consider it positive that the shock has accelerated the RoC's alignment with the West and enhanced the credibility of the former. Any restoration of relations with Russia in the future should take into account the RoC's position within the West and its credibility. The competing response views the sanctions as a mistake—albeit an unavoidable one—and a dangerous act that alienates Russia and its people. This group sees the consequences as grave and hopes for the restoration of relations in the near future. They condemn the West for employing double standards, noting that it did not show the same sensitivity for the Greek Cypriots after the 1974 invasion or nowadays.

The two groups hold differing views on the US, as might be expected. While both agree that the US cannot be considered a shelter for the RoC and that it is challenging for both sides to become one, they diverge on the US's role in the region and its relationship with Cyprus. The core of the disagreement lies in the notion of trust. The group that views the US as a trustworthy partner sees potential in the US-RoC relationship, believing that the recent conflict in Gaza and regional turbulence elevate the RoC's status in the eyes of the US. They argue that building credibility and capitalizing on it is the rational choice for the RoC. Conversely, those who do not trust the US undervalue the relationship, suggesting that the US seeks to exploit Cyprus to safeguard its interests and promote its agenda in the region.


What distinguishes these two groups is primarily age and ideological orientation. Younger individuals and those aligned with the right, centre-right, and liberal ideologies support the view that the political shock has provided a window of opportunity and that the US can be a trustworthy ally. In contrast, the older generation and those with centrist and leftist political orientations argue that the US cannot be

trusted and that the derussification of Cyprus is the result of an "anti-Russia hysteria in the West", according to one of our interviewees.

## Public Opinion Perceptions on the RoC's size and role in the region, the EU and sanctions on Russia and Major Actors


### Cyprus and the international and regional system

The research revealed strong contrasts in Cypriot society regarding its attitudes towards third countries of the international and regional system. Except for Greece and France, for which positive opinions significantly outweigh negative ones (88% above the average degree of sympathy for Greece and 78% respectively for France), for the rest of the countries rather symmetrical distributions were recorded between the upper average and below average likeability. Special mention should be made in the case of Russia, for which 23% of Cypriots express a very positive opinion and 25% rather positive, while at the same time 26% express absolutely negative and 26% rather negative. The percentage of very positive opinions for the US is the third highest, following Greece and France. Although the US trails Russia by 4% in very positive views, the combined total of positive views (very positive and rather positive) for the US surpasses those for Russia by 4% (Graph 1). Given the strong anti-US and anti-Western sentiment historically present on the island, this could indicate a significant shift in public opinion.



Graph 1


In the survey, Cypriots were asked for their opinion on which international actors Cyprus is closest to, as well as those to which Cyprus should be closest. As Graph 2 shows, Greece and the European Union are the factors to which Cyprus is estimated to be closest (77% and 69% respectively) with Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA garnering a very low percentage of choices (slightly higher or slightly lower than 10%). However, in the question about the factor to which Cyprus should be closest, the answers reflect a plurality of orientations regarding the position of Cyprus in the international system, with the European Union gathering the highest percentage and Greece, Russia and the USA followed with relatively high percentages (from 45% for Greece to 31% for Russia and 34% for the USA). The most notable finding concerns the significant difference between the closeness of the relationship they recognize that Cyprus has and the relationship it should have with Russia and the USA, as while few choose the two countries among those with which Cyprus has a close relationship, the percentage of those who believe that Cyprus should have a close relationship with Russia and the USA is significantly larger.



Graph 2


On the question of the most important need of Cyprus as a state today, the Cypriot public opinion seems to be divided between those who declare as the most important need the consolidation of alliances with stronger powers (20%), those who declare the resolution of the problem of the division of the Island (39%) and those who state the need to strengthen its economic position (35%) (Graph 3). It is worth noting, however, some differences in the responses of certain sub-groups of the population, such as for example the very high predominance of the need to strengthen the economy of Cyprus for young people up to 34 years of age (50%) and the need to resolve the division of the Island for those

over 55 years old (51%). It is also worth mentioning that the need selected by each respondent as the greatest for Cyprus is also linked to the dominant feeling generated by Cyprus's position in the international system. The need to consolidate alliances with some powerful countries was chosen by those who reported fear as the dominant emotion, while the need to resolve the division of the island was chosen by those who reported anger as the dominant emotion. In general, among the emotions, 35% of the sample chose fear as dominant, 22% anger and 22% hope.



Graph 3

The survey also recorded the assessments of Cypriot public opinion on how to resolve international conflicts within the next five years, to explore the dominant perspective of citizens on international issues. The role of international law in conflict resolution was not clearly recorded, with 28% of respondents saying it would be strengthened, 43% that it would be weakened, and the remaining 29% refraining from taking a position on the question (Graph 4). Clearer was the position of the Cypriots on the question of whether small states should pursue stable alliances with some of the major players in the international system or not, as 53% stated that small states should choose this path and just 28% disagreed, believing that it would be preferable for small states to avoid an exclusive alliance with a single major actor. Given the majority's assessment that conflicts between actors in the international system will increase within the next five years (63% of the sample assessed this against only 16% who rejected this possibility), the dichotomy of public opinion on the validity of international law, but also the widely accepted necessity for a small state to enter into a stable alliance with a major player, make the decisions of the Cypriot leadership in the field of foreign policy difficult to some extent.




Graph 4

#### Cyprus and the European Union

Exploring the positions of Cypriots towards the European Union, the survey recorded the extent to which Cyprus's participation in the European Union for twenty-one years is judged to be an important resource for the country in four different fields: diplomatic, security, economic and social modernisation. A higher percentage of positive evaluations was found for the last of the four fields (49%), while for both the economic field and the diplomatic field the positive evaluations were more than the negative ones (42% for the economic field and 38% for the diplomatic field). However, in the case of the security field, only 19% of Cypriots stated that Cyprus's participation in the Union was a benefit, while 43% had a completely different opinion (Graph 5). This sense of weakness of Cyprus vis-à-vis Turkey was not abated by the country's participation in the European Union and continues to maintain the feeling of fear in Cypriot society.






Graph 5

In the same section, the respondents were asked to evaluate the contribution of the European Union in dealing with serious issues that have occupied Cyprus in recent years. Only on the issue of dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic there was a clear preponderance of positive evaluations (51% positive and very positive evaluations), while on the issue of the division of the Island, the preponderance of positive evaluations was feeble (only 34% of positive and very positive evaluations). On the other hand, in the issue of the debt crisis of 2008 and the increase in the price of energy in 2022, the positive evaluations of the role of the European Union are more limited and do not exceed 26% for the first case and 28% for the second.

After all, to the direct question about whether Cyprus's participation in the Union allows it to punch above its weight and play a greater role in the international and regional system, 40% hesitate to take a clear position, while 37% answer negatively and only 17% answer positively. It is noted that the question significantly differentiates the voters of DISY from those of AKEL, as the former answered in a greater percentage that the participation of Cyprus in the Union increases its diplomatic capital and the latter denied such an assessment in a greater percentage. In this paper, only the differences in positions or attitudes between the voters of DISY and AKEL are given, as the numerical bases of the voters of the smaller parties do not exceed 50 observations. It is noted that the distribution of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 2021 is reflected with high accuracy in the distribution of the declared vote of the sample at those elections, except AKEL voters who seem to be under-represented (DHSY 28%, AKEL 14%, DHKO 10%, ELAM 8%, Did not reply 25%).

## The war in Ukraine and European Union-Russia relations


A large part of the research was devoted to recording the positions of the Cypriots regarding the causes of the war in Ukraine, the decisions of the European Union on the matter and the future of the relations of the European Union with Russia. The issue arouses the interest of the majority, as 36% of the sample stated that they follow the developments every day and 27% that they follow them at least once a week. Almost half of the respondents show that they recognize how the European Union has expressed its solidarity with Ukraine and consider that the attitude of the member states was united; however, almost one-quarter of respondents (20%-25%) consider that the European Union did not show the necessary solidarity in Ukraine and/or that the attitude of the member states was not unified. Besides, to the direct question of whether the European Union handled the Ukrainian issue satisfactorily, 29% answered negatively, 9% answered positively and 53% chose the intermediate position. It is noted that the evaluation of Cyprus' position on the issue shows great similarities with the evaluation of the European Union's position (Graph 6).



Graph 6

Evaluating the measures taken by the European Union to defend Ukraine, Cypriot public opinion was clearly positive only towards the measure of humanitarian aid to the victims of the war (77% approval) and marginally positive towards the measure of providing financial assistance to Ukraine (41% approval) and the measure of granting special reception status to Ukrainians (42% approval). On the


contrary, the rest of the European Union's measures did not receive the approval of the majority of Cypriots. For example, the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia was approved by only 31%, the granting of military equipment to Ukraine by only 19%, the banning of broadcasting by pro-Russian media in the countries of the European Union by only 20% and the granting of candidate status member of the Union in Ukraine only from 18% (Graph 7). Especially on the issue of imposing sanctions on Russia, it is worth noting that DISY voters appear much more supportive of the measure than AKEL voters, while a significant difference appears between young people up to 34 years old and those over 55 years old, with the former showing higher percentages of support to the measure than the latter. In general, it is concluded that attitudes towards the measures taken by the European Union are determined to a significant extent by whether or not the respondent considers Ukraine to be part of Europe and also by whether they attribute responsibility for the war to Russia or the West. Those who believe that Ukraine is not part of the common European area or that the West is responsible for the situation in Ukraine tend to reject the measures taken by the European Union.



Graph 7


Specifically on the issue of assigning responsibility for the situation in Ukraine to Russia and the West, the survey recorded high rates of agreement both with the statement that "Russia is to blame" (38% agreement versus 29% disagreement), and in the statement that "the West is to blame" (48% agreement vs. 15% disagreement), with the other 1/3 of responses not clearly positive or negative. It is noted that a significant difference was detected in the opinions expressed by DISY and AKEL voters, with the former agreeing in higher percentages with the opinion that "Russia is responsible" and the latter agreeing in a higher percentage that "the West is responsible" (Graph 8). Regardless of the different approaches to the question of responsibilities, the vast majority of Cypriots (62%) agree with

the opinion that the experience of the war in Ukraine testifies that the European Union needs a common foreign and defence policy.



Graph 8


The survey also recorded the Cypriots' assessments of the course that the bilateral relations between the European Union and Russia will take and the course they should take in the coming years. The findings suggest that there is a distance between the estimated reality and the desire of public opinion for the course of these relations. Although 38% believe that relations will remain frozen and 24% believe that relations will deteriorate, 76% of respondents believe that bilateral relations should improve. In other words, Cypriot public opinion recognizes the cold-war-like relations between the two sides but believes that these relations should improve (Graph 9).



Graph 9


The effects of the war in Ukraine on Cyprus

The vast majority of Cypriots believe that the war in Ukraine had negative consequences on the economy of Cyprus and the economy of the average household in the country (80% and 70% respectively for the two levels). When asked about the most important consequence of the war, 25% pointed to the rise in prices, 22% to the rise in the price of energy, and 14% to the risk of generalization of the war. It is noteworthy that 13% of the respondents indicated a possible loss of Russian support in solving the issue of the division of the Island, as the most serious consequence (Graph 10). This percentage, together with that of respondents who chose as the most serious consequence the loss of Russian funds saved or invested on the Island (12%) form the core of those who attribute responsibility for the war in Ukraine to the West and those who express dissatisfaction with the position of the European Union on the matter.



Graph 10

Concerning the crucial question posed by the inquiry as to whether Cyprus' decision to align itself with the European Union's decision on the Ukraine issue "entrapped" Cyprus and alienated it from a potential ally or, on the contrary, "liberated" it and alienated it from an unpredictable ally, the majority of Cypriots answered that it "entrapped" it (58%), while only a very small percentage answered that it "liberated" Cyprus (15%) (Graph 11). It is worth noting that the opinions of young people under 34 and those over 55 differ to some extent, as the percentage of those who believe that Cyprus is "entrapped" drops to 53% among young people up to 34 years old and rises to 63% among voters over 55 years of age.




Graph 11

In this section, there was another question of approval or rejection by the citizens of initiatives of the Cypriot side related to the war in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip. Respondents appeared extremely wary of accepting new initiatives to further support Ukraine, such as training Ukrainian soldiers in de-mining (30% approval vs. 33% rejection) or financial contributions to the established Ukraine Reconstruction Fund (22% approval vs. 40% rejection). On the contrary, Cypriots seem much more positive towards actions concerning the involvement of Cyprus in the Middle East region. For example, 59% of the sample approved the construction of a gas pipeline from Israel to Cyprus (compared to only 9% who rejected it), while 57% approved the construction of a humanitarian aid management centre for the Gaza Strip in Cyprus (compared to only 15% who rejected it).

#### The effects of the war in the Gaza Strip on Cyprus

The questionnaire also included a section on perceptions of the effects of the war on the Gaza Strip. Most of the respondents in the sample (41%) estimated that the position of Cyprus will deteriorate as a consequence of the wider conflict in the region, while much fewer were those who estimated that the position of Cyprus is strengthened (18%) or that its position will not change (22%) (Graph 12).



Graph 12

The concern caused by the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip is also confirmed by the responses of the sample to the question about the importance of the tripartite agreements that Cyprus has signed with Israel, Jordan and Egypt respectively. 42% consider the agreement with Israel as more important because of the war conflict in the region, with 18% considering it as less important and 13% answering that the developments do not affect the agreement in question. In the case of Jordan, the percentage of those who judge the agreement as more important is limited to 28%, with 22% considering it as less important and 19% answering that the developments do not affect the agreement. Finally, for the case of Egypt, the answers recorded are similar to those of Jordan, as 34% consider the agreement as more important, 21% as less important and 16% consider that the developments do not affect the due agreement. However, it should be noted that a significant part of the sample (up to 30%) did not answer the specific question, declaring ignorance on the subject.

Engaging with the survey results reveals three important trends within Cypriot society. Firstly, concerning the central question of whether the EU's decision to sanction Russia entrapped or empowered the RoC, respondents perceive it as an entrapment. This finding aligns with their scepticism about the EU's value as a diplomatic, economic, and military shelter. They do not see the EU enabling the RoC to assume a significant diplomatic role in the region and they do not trust it as a security provider. However, they recognize the value and necessity of close cooperation between Cyprus and the EU. Notably, their positions on this topic appear to be shaped by their ideological orientation. They disapprove of the sanctions on Russia, supporting only humanitarian aid and

assistance to those affected by the war. Views recorded in this survey mirror the responses in the 2022 Flash Eurobarometer (506) on the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and reflect stability in the views of the Cypriot public opinion. The perception of the economic impact of the war as significant is widespread.

Secondly, regarding the RoC's relations with major powers, there is a willingness to strengthen ties with both Russia and the US, indicating support for a multivector foreign policy and dual-track approach to Russia and the West. The positive views regarding the EU and the US suggest an approval of this strategy. Despite the RoC's historical association with the non-aligned movement, 53% of respondents support an alliance with a major power, though nearly a quarter oppose an exclusive alliance. Given public awareness of the power asymmetry with Turkey (Kontos, 2016) and their distrust in international law, it appears that a majority favours an inclusive shelter-seeking strategy. High approval ratings for France, Greece, and Egypt in the region support this view. Their views on international law are interesting and reveal a break with the past, when as Adamides and Kontos (2018) note the public tended to have great expectations from the United Nations and in a sense had misperceived the role of the organization in the Cypriot Question. The disillusionment with international law might reflect their disappointment concerning developments on the Cyprus Question. With regard to the latter, it is notable that it remains the highest priority, especially among people over 55, closely trailed by the improvement of the economic situation, that was prioritized by the younger generation.

Thirdly, regional and global crises are not perceived as opportunities. Fear is the prevailing sentiment, justified by the perception that the RoC's regional position deteriorated, their view that the likelihood of international conflicts is increasing and the international law is weakened. However, the public supports initiatives like humanitarian aid to Gaza and furthering energy cooperation with Israel. They support such initiatives more compared to those for Ukraine, confirming the tendency of small states to focus on their immediate vicinity.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we connected the small state shelter-seeking theory with research on political shocks, employing a second image reversed perspective to investigate Cypriot elite and public opinion views on whether the EU's sanctions on Russia entrapped or emancipated the RoC. We explored perceptions of the RoC's role in the region and its relations with major players, particularly as the invasion of



Ukraine and subsequent developments impacted small states, including the RoC's multivector foreign policy.

We showed that the war in Ukraine and the EU sanctions on Russia came as a political shock to both elites and public opinion in the RoC. There is a consensus that these events heightened uncertainty and insecurity and disrupted Cyprus's multivector foreign policy and its historically significant relations with Russia. Concurrently, for the majority of the elites, the political shock was viewed as an opportunity to encourage closer ties with the West, notably enhancing relations with the US. The role of the EU as a shelter was viewed with duality: it enabled Cyprus to play a larger regional role, according to the elites, yet the sanctions on Russia were seen as a cost for this shelter as both the elites and the public opinion suggest.

Comparing elite and public opinion views, we identified a significant rift. Elites, regardless of ideological orientation, viewed the EU as a diplomatic shelter and considered the RoC's support for the EU sanctions on Russia as self-evident, albeit different people highlight different reasons for this. Conversely, the public was sceptical of the EU's role and disapproved of the sanctions and other measures against Russia. Similarly, while a majority among the elites saw the sanctions as an opportunity to pivot Cyprus's foreign policy closer to the West, the public viewed the sanctions as detrimental to relations with a crucial partner. Despite this, the public did not oppose strengthening ties with the West but favoured a dual-track approach, valuing the relationship with Russia. Such a position was also traced among the elites, but it was not the dominant one.

Despite their differences, elites and public opinion agree that it is beneficial for the RoC to undertake regional initiatives. Thus, the role of the bridgebuilder in the region seems to be quite established among both the elites and the public opinion. Given its long track record as a national aspiration since the early days of the RoC's independence, it has become an integral part of the RoC's national autobiography.

Given these findings, the key question is whether this rift between elites and the public poses a threat to domestic unity and consensual politics. We argue that while the RoC's orientation towards the EU and a multivector foreign policy, which includes stronger relations with the West (France, the EU and the US) and regional initiatives, was broadly accepted, the issues of relations with Russia and specific expectations from the EU remain contentious. Such controversies can be potential targets for malign actors aiming to disrupt social cohesion in Western societies. Therefore, the RoC needs to anticipate such reactions, especially as its relations with Russia remain strained.

At the same time, the government has to handle the challenge of a mutually beneficial relationship with the EU successfully (Adamides, 2024). The RoC has to leverage its foreign policy reorientation. This will be critical in the effort to persuade the public opinion that membership in the EU is beneficial in political, economic and societal terms. Regarding EU coalitions, both elites and the public view France and Greece as reliable partners, so enhancing cooperation with them, both within and outside the EU framework, will align with the expectations of both groups and strengthen the country's position. Additionally, regional initiatives garner significant support. Given the prevailing sense of fear and uncertainty in the region, partnerships and initiatives that enhance the RoC's security will be particularly advantageous. Furthermore, a credibility deficit will hamper any effort in the region and beyond. The RoC must restore its credibility to emerge as a leader in transparency and integrity within the region. For the RoC to effectively assert itself regionally, substantial investment in foreign policy is essential. This includes not only increased financial resources and institutional reforms but also a cultural shift in how foreign policy is formulated. Small states often face resource constraints compared to great powers in their Ministries of Foreign Affairs, so they can leverage their universities, think tanks, and civil society organizations to enhance their knowledge and expertise. This approach makes the foreign policy-making process more open, transparent, and participatory while allowing small state governments to conserve resources. Also harnessing these institutions to raise awareness among the public for foreign policy issues will help to inform the public about Cyprus's foreign policy goals, challenges, and opportunities, enhance transparency and build public trust.

This paper contributes to the small state literature by proposing that shelters could be sources of political shocks for small states and by comparing elite and public perceptions of shelters and political shocks. In addition, it provides a comprehensive overview of the RoC's foreign policy before and after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and assesses the views of elites and the public on the RoC's foreign policy, the EU as a shelter, and the EU's sanctions on Russia. Therefore, it can be of value for researchers in the small state field and/or those who study the foreign policy of Cyprus, while it can also be useful for practitioners and policy makers in Cyprus and the EU.

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