

## **Does Union Canvassing Affect Voter Turnout under Conditions of Political Constraint?**

### **Empirical Evidence from Illinois**

#### **Abstract**

The positive effects of union canvassing on individual-level union member voter turnout within union-friendly environments have been well documented. Yet, whether unions increase turnout among their membership under constrained circumstances has remained unexamined. Furthermore, there is little consensus on whether union canvassing effects are generalizable to populations with heterogeneous political attributes and individual characteristics. This paper identifies the mechanisms that might explain how union canvassing can be effective under conditions characterized by anti-union legislative actions, adversarial judicial decisions, and right-wing populist rhetoric. We use canvassing and turnout data taken from the 2016 Democratic state and Cook County primary election in Illinois, and our results show that, despite constrained political circumstances relative to those found in previous studies, union canvassing achieved positive union membership turnout effects. This study also tests the moderating effects of individual political attributes (ideology and vote propensity) and voter characteristics (income and ethnicity). The most salient finding is that the effects are more potent for ideologically conservative registered Democrat voters, highlighting the imperative of recognizing the ideological heterogeneity among union members and suggesting specific resource allocation strategies under politically constrained conditions.

**Keywords:** turnout, labor unions, political participation, ideology, vote propensity, and SEIU.

Labor unions have mobilized their members and nonmembers to vote in elections as a fundamental approach to support favored candidates, promote their ideals, and exert political influence in the United States political system. It is well accepted that unions are important political mobilizing forces, and their positive effects on voter turnout have been documented through an array of scholarship. However, studies empirically assessing the effects of labor union canvassing at the individual level are rare outside of highly pro-labor environments, such as Southern California, and have not been conducted in contexts characterized by significant constraints. This is particularly concerning given that the labor movement in many U.S. states is currently forced to make difficult strategic decisions when it comes to political canvassing as a result of these constraints caused by recent legislative and political developments.

In this study, we empirically investigate the effects of union political canvassing on member voter turnout in the state of Illinois in 2016, which we believe more accurately represents conditions facing most labor movements currently in the Midwest and presumably nationally. We utilize a unique data set, constructed from SEIU HCIIMK (Service Employees International Union-Healthcare Illinois, Indiana, Missouri & Kansas) canvassing records in the 2016 Democratic state and Cook County primary elections in Chicago and supplemented with individual-level voter information acquired from a leading political data vendor (Catalist).<sup>1</sup> The union under examination, like many other unions in the Midwest, has operated for a decade under constraints generated by legislative activities and judicial decisions in conjunction with the

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<sup>1</sup> SEIU HCIIMK is also known as SEIU HCII or SEIU Healthcare in Illinois. Since its founding in 2008, SEIU HCII has expanded to serve healthcare workers throughout Missouri and Kansas. SEIU HCIIMK has been the complete name since then.

rapid rise of right-wing populist politics. For instance, the 2014 Supreme Court ruling in the Illinois-derived *Harris v. Quinn* case, which restricts unions' abilities to collect dues, coupled with actions taken by the state's anti-union then-governor Bruce Rauner, severely curtailed SEIU HCIIMK's ability to mobilize. We theorize that despite the union facing more complicated restrictions and difficulties than its counterparts in prior studies have encountered, it was able to connect the union's appeals with members' vital interests and demands to generate positive canvassing effects in its electoral campaign.

Understanding union canvassing under constrained circumstances is important because Illinois' experience may be more reflective of what unions in the Midwest and nationally have faced over the past decade than what has been uncovered previously from unions in California and other pro-labor contexts. SEIU HCIIMK's success despite the more difficult political environment may provide relevant lessons to unions in other states who are either currently, or likely in the near future, to be functioning under similar political constraints. For example, the *Harris v. Quinn* decision was the state-level precursor to the national-level *Janus v. AFSCME* (2018) Supreme Court ruling. The *Janus* decision virtually extended the *Harris* decision from Illinois to the whole country, such that unions are banned from collecting union fees from nonunion public-sector employees. As a result of *Janus*, public-sector unions across the country will be financially weakened as a whole due to the financial interlock among affiliates, and their political mobilizing capacity will likely be harmed (Finger and Hartney 2021). Therefore, understanding what happened to a large union in Illinois immediately after *Harris* provides a useful testing ground for whether labor canvassing might be effective post-*Janus* at the national level.

Finally, to further understand the potentially divergent effectiveness of union canvassing among different member groups and explore possible union canvassing strategies, it is useful to also examine the moderating effects of individual characteristics that might affect the member's receptiveness to union communications. The data allow us to analyze factors that have not been accounted for in previous individual-level studies. Specifically, we examine whether an individual's ideology, vote propensity, income, and ethnicity moderate union canvassing effects. Testing union canvassing effects along with these potential moderators extends our contribution since we can examine whether the politically constrained post-*Harris* canvassing outcomes were homogeneous or heterogeneous across union members. This may be particularly helpful as unions in other states, facing increased resource constraints, are likely to need to strategically siphon resources toward certain voter types as efficiently as possible and will be required to carefully target certain cohorts of voters at the expense of others.

### **Canvassing Under Political Constraints**

We begin this section by highlighting the political conditions for unions in the Midwest, which may be substantially different from the more pro-union environments examined by previous individual-level union canvassing-turnout studies. There are two previous studies that we draw upon in our analysis. First, Lamare's (2010a) study found strong union canvassing effects on turnout among individual members and non-members in South Los Angeles, but was conducted among a population already galvanized to participate in politics by anti-immigration legislation prior to union canvassing. Second, Zullo's (2004) study found positive union mobilization effects among grocery workers in a setting similar to ours (Wisconsin) in 2000, but was conducted prior to the radical political shifts in the Midwest. The current adverse

circumstances in the Midwest were created by recent anti-union political and legislative developments over the past decade and have imposed significant constraints on unions that may result in outcomes not anticipated by past research. We argue that these constraints have largely resulted in several types of pressures for unions that may have weakened the efficacy of union canvassing. However, the same constraints, as we will discuss in a subsequent section, may also present opportunities for unions to connect to their members and to encourage political efficacy.

First, when compared against the Southern California unions' unique contextual advantages in labor mobilization two decades ago, it is likely that Illinois unions in 2016 were interacting with a member base that had not been as overtly motivated toward political action. In California, the labor movement's success in increasing member vote turnout in the early-2000s was largely predicated on a strategy of building strong ties with marginalized but deeply politically galvanized Latino communities. The incident that immediately and significantly politicalized Latinos in Southern California prior to union canvassing interventions was the passage of Prop. 187, an anti-immigrant proposition banning public services, non-emergency health care, and public education for illegal immigrants, which was endorsed by Republican governor Pete Wilson in 1994 (Scott 2000; Milkman, Wong, and Contreras 2002; Milkman 2006). Unions tapped into the anger expressed by immigrant workers and their families and used it to their canvassing advantage in support of candidates who they saw as capable of building bridges between the labor movement and social movements (Frank and Wong 2004). Absent such a direct and visceral political threat to their well-being, union members in our sample might not have been galvanized to a level of political readiness that would allow for equally effective union mobilization.

Second, in addition to likely having a less politically motivated member base, SEIU HCIIMK, like other unions in the Midwest, was confronted with a number of radical legislative and judicial activities designed to limit its capabilities. SEIU HCIIMK encountered organizational obstacles specifically from the anti-union Rauner administration in the mid-2010s. Governor Rauner was viewed as an organizational "existential threat" by public-sector union leaders (though not necessarily their members), having frequently spoken negatively about unions and having aimed to undermine their ability to act politically (Mackey 2015). Not only did governor Rauner support anti-labor organizations in their campaigns against unions, but he also proposed to make Illinois a right-to-work (RTW) state in 2015 (Lynch 2017).<sup>2</sup> Although his attempt was defeated, the political attacks on SEIU HCIIMK underscored a set of conditions that unions in previous studies (i.e., California or Wisconsin in the early-2000s) never encountered, which may result in reduced effectiveness of union mobilization in our sample.

Moreover, SEIU HCIIMK would have likely been financially affected by the passage of RTW laws elsewhere in the Midwest states they represent (i.e., Indiana and Missouri; Kansas has been RTW since 1958) because of the financial interlock with its affiliates in surrounding states. In the 2010s, after the Republican Party gained power in a number of Midwestern state legislatures and governorships, it introduced a round of initiatives to pass RTW laws partially as a response to the global financial crisis (Devinatz 2011; Bruno et al. 2015). Concurrently during our sample time period, coordinated networks of right-wing activists, led by groups like the

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<sup>2</sup> The term "right-to-work states" refers to states that ban any form of voluntarily agreed upon union security provisions that require employees who are not union members, but are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, to pay a fee to cover the union's cost of representing members and nonmembers.

American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and supported by right-wing media, pushed for the passage of RTW legislation throughout the region (DiGrazia and Dixon 2020). As a result, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin sequentially passed such laws.<sup>3</sup> Because RTW financially constrains unions within these states from contributing to political campaigns and mobilizing members (Bruno et al. 2015; Feigenbaum et al. 2018), SEIU HCIIMK would have needed to engage in financial solidarity with its affiliates within these states to ensure their financial stability (Finger and Hartney 2021). In sum, although SEIU HCIIMK is headquartered in a relatively pro-labor environment without its own RTW regime, its ability to support political canvassing would have been constrained by the union's financial interlocks spanning other RTW states, as well as the anti-union principles espoused by then-governor Rauner.

We argue that the Supreme Court's *Harris v. Quinn* decision and the rise of right-wing populism may have imposed substantial challenges to union mobilization in our study as well. In the *Harris* decision, the Supreme Court ruled that nonmember home care workers in a unionized workplace in Illinois have "a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their fair share of the cost of services that the union is statutorily required to provide" (Fisk and Poueymirou 2014). The *Harris* decision was seen as an authoritative endorsement of RTW (Bennett 2012; Merryman 2019). Consequently, the agency fee provision of the collective bargaining agreement between Illinois and the SEIU was invalidated by the Court. The negative effects of *Harris* were

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<sup>3</sup> Additionally, in 2011 a RTW public-sector law in Ohio was passed but subsequently repealed (see, Andy Kroll, "Bye Bye, SB 5: Anti-Union Law Repealed in Ohio" at <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/issue-2-sb-5-ohio-repeal/>) and in 2018 a Missouri RTW law was overturned by a statewide referendum (see, Scott Neuman, "Missouri Blocks Right-To-Work Law" at <https://www.npr.org/2018/08/08/636568530/missouri-blocks-right-to-work-law>).

compounded for SEIU HCIIMK since it had already suffered considerable financial damage caused by the RTW efforts among its interlocked union networks. As such, the direct financial impact of the court ruling was heavily felt by SEIU HCIIMK. Prior to the decision, the union received \$3.6 million in “fair share” fees from 20,000 personal assistants’ Medicaid payments each year (*Harris v. Quinn* 2014). Following *Harris*, these payments were prohibited, and could therefore not be used for political canvassing efforts or any other union activities.

Additionally, the court decision may have led to some skepticism among union members about the legitimacy of the union’s use of resources for political activities. According to Masters et al. (2009), proponents of prohibiting the collection of agency fees have often misleadingly argued that it is a form of “compulsory spending” that infringes upon “first amendment rights of nonmembers, grant[ing] unions an unusual power to couple money for political purposes, enable[ing] unions to acquire union political power vis-a-vis other interest groups without such ‘taxation’ authority, and corrupt[ing] the electoral process.” The *Harris* ruling might therefore have diminished the image of SEIU HCIIMK for its members. Put simply, if SEIU HCIIMK members perceived the *Harris* ruling as an endorsement of RTW by the Supreme Court, they may have been induced to question the legitimacy of allocating dues to political activities, which may in turn have caused them to become less responsive to the union's political canvassing.

A final constraint that may have been placed on SEIU HCIIMK’s ability to successfully canvass in 2016 relative to earlier canvassing examples is the rise of right-wing populism in the United States during the sample timeframe. As with the spillover from *Harris* to *Janus*, President Trump’s populist rhetoric and influence extended from Washington DC throughout the country and created a challenge that unions in previous studies would not have encountered. President



Trump's populist message appealed to many union members in a way that no Republican presidential figure had since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Neal 2016). Whereas unions are commonly seen as established voice institutions for working-class people in politics (Radcliff and Davis 2000; Carnes 2012; Wasser and Lamare 2013), right-wing populists frequently assert themselves as the anti-establishment voice of the people (Mudde 2017). Unions, if perceived as elite institutions, are viewed as unnecessary at best and part of a corrupt system at worst. SEIU HCIIMK members arguably may have been vulnerable to populist speech during the sample timeframe, which would have claimed that establishment labor groups like the SEIU disregard their members' concerns and instead function to support the union's own narrow organizational interests. This might undermine the union's connections with its members. These populist views, coupled with the members' deep concerns over job security, may have mitigated against the urge to respond positively to canvassing because the union may have been seen as a tool of the establishment.

### **Opportunities for Canvassing Success**

Although SEIU HCIIMK faced several sources of pressure in 2016, there were also a number of mechanisms that may have driven the union to be quite successful in its canvassing efforts. Generally, there may have been a recognition among SEIU HCIIMK members that the political developments facing the union did in fact represent a critical threat to the wellbeing of their interests and values, in a manner not dissimilar to the galvanizing events in California in the 1990s. This awareness could conceivably have encouraged members to be more receptive to canvassing in order to help protect their union. Also, SEIU HCIIMK itself put considerable effort into political mobilization and union-member tie building in order to convince members to turn

out as a way of rebalancing the political circumstances facing the union. We expand on these processes below to argue that union canvassing can be a successful means for generating strong membership turnout effects even under constrained conditions.

Political threats usually come from election outcomes and legislative attempts that are perceived to dramatically undermine a group's preferences and fortunes. As noted earlier, it is also well known that political threats can serve as galvanizing moments for voters and canvassers alike. For individual voters who are made vulnerable or marginalized by these events, threats can act to promote political awareness, enhance responsiveness to canvassing, and trigger voting actions (Pantoja, Ramírez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Ramírez 2007; Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Kim 2016). In Illinois, no single salient event, as discussed, galvanized political participation of ethnic groups like California's Prop. 187, but there were in fact a series of incidents that may have served cumulatively as catalysts for members' willingness to engage in political action.

These incidents challenged SEIU HCIIMK members' union interests and values, and ethnic identities, which may have provided the union critical opportunities to secure and strengthen its connection with its members; moreover, being materially and emotionally harmed might have motivated the members to recognize the importance of rallying around the union. First, the members' union interests were deeply threatened by the switching of allegiances from a key politician (Kenneth Dunkin), a Democrat representing the 5<sup>th</sup> House District in Illinois who was strongly supported by the union and subsequently chose to support Governor Rauner on several occasions, including endorsing the *Harris* decision. These attacks by both Rauner and Dunkin may in fact have been viewed as an "existential threat" not just to union leaders but

conceivably to members as well, who relied on the union for workplace protections.

Acknowledging this possibility, Jaquie Algee, vice president of SEIU HCIIMK, said, “Let me be clear that no one bears more responsibility today for the defeat of this legislation (a bill that would have reversed Rauner’s cuts to the state’s Child Care Assistance Program (CCAP) for working parents, children and providers) which protects our children and childcare and home care in Illinois, than Rep. Ken Dunkin himself” (Sfondeles, 2016). Further, Greg Kelley, president of SEIU HCIIMK, characterized the Supreme Court decision as a direct attack against the members that presented an opportunity for response by the union and its constituents, stating, “[W]hen these forces came against our members in *Harris v. Quinn*, we fought back and became even stronger” (Waltmire 2018).

In addition to inadvertently having a spotlight shone on their collective interests, these events may have become prime guide points for members’ political actions based on their social identities as union members. Research shows that individuals are not mobilized solely based on instrumental calculations of individual self-interests (Klandermans 1989). Those with a strong sense of social identities, such as union identity, may be more receptive to mobilization because they value group interests, gains and losses (Fireman and Gamson 1979; Turner et al. 1987; Gamson et al. 1992; Kelly 1998). Thus, members whose sense of union identity was reinforced by the deterioration in their union’s circumstances were more likely to rally around the union and may have been more receptive to canvassing. In addition, even members with a less affirmative union identity may also be influenced by their peers, as they may be mobilized to comply with social norms or maintain their social networks and ties (Klandermans 1989; Uhlaner 1989). Therefore, the threats to the union might have activated and reinforced members’ union

identities, which might have encouraged SEIU HCIIMK members to become more responsive to union canvassing.

From this perspective, union members' ethnic identities may have also been deeply triggered by the alleged misconduct of the sitting Cook County State Attorney General, Anita Alvarez. At the same time the union canvassing occurred in our sample timeframe, Alvarez was suspected of covering up the video of a police shooting of a young Black man, Laquan McDonald, an event that caused imminent and salient impacts on the Black community in Chicago in a manner similar to the Prop. 187 effects on the Latinx community in California. As SEIU HCIIMK is primarily composed of Black members, it is conceivable that many members might be politicized to act in unity to express in civic behaviors in response to perceived threats against their ethnic identity. Further, a key focus of SEIU HCIIMK's canvassing efforts in our study timeframe was to support Alvarez's challenger, Kim Foxx (though we do not have precise details of the specific message sent by each canvasser to the union's members).

Concurrent with Alvarez's potentially galvanizing act and the union's support for her opponent, SEIU HCIIMK had been strengthening its relationship with ethnic minority members in a manner resembling California unions' efforts to strengthen ties with the Latinx community in the 1990s. In 2015, Greg Kelley (who is Black), was announced as executive vice president; Kelley was later elected president in 2017. Kelly's ascension within this largely Black and Latinx labor organization would likely have consolidated the ties between the leadership and the rank-and-file members. A strong and close ethnic connection also may have helped to defend against populist anti-union rhetoric, since members might have been more likely to trust their union to voice for them and represent their ethnic identity interests. And finally, while ethnic minority

members might naturally have supported a union that is signaling its willingness to fight for their interests by electing a Black leader, its white members may also have shared the same point of view for structural reasons, as union membership has been shown to lead white members to have more support for policies benefitting Black members (Frymer and Grumbach 2021).

### **Setting and Data**

To test whether union canvassing can successfully produce increased turnout under political constraints (and/or opportunities), we studied the 2016 Democratic state primary and Cook County elections in the Fifth State General Assembly District of Illinois. The District covers the northern and western urban parts of the pan-Chicago area, consisting of parts of Cook and DuPage counties. Our union member sample reflects a diverse population, and the large proportion of Black workers in our data mirrors SEIU HCIIMK's union member demographic composition.

SEIU HCIIMK sought to increase voter turnout in the Chicago area on behalf of its endorsed, non-incumbent primary candidates for the General Assembly seat and Cook County State Attorney General. As noted, a primary goal of the union was to canvass in support of Kim Foxx's challenge to sitting Cook County State's Attorney Anita Alvarez following the protests over her handling of the Laquan McDonald shooting incident. Again as noted earlier, a second primary goal was to unseat Kenneth Dunkin as State Representative in Illinois' 5<sup>th</sup> House District and to replace him with a more labor-friendly candidate, Julia Stratton. Canvassing was predominantly centered around these two goals, according to the union.

In order to identify the target of canvassing, the union acquired a list of registered voters in the 5<sup>th</sup> district who were SEIU HCIIMK members from a group called Catalist, which is a

leading political data service providing voter information to pollsters, researchers, and campaigners. Catalist, based in Washington DC, was founded in 2006 with a focus on collaborating with the progressive community. The voter file provided by Catalist included information regarding each individual union member's turnout records in elections dating back to the 2000s, as well as the individual's first and last name, political ideology, voter registration length, vote propensity, income group, age, gender, marital status, and housing condition. The union reached out to voters from the list by calling, mailing, or visiting them in person. The canvasser endeavored to engage with as many voters as possible and kept track of the number of contacts with each individual and whether they made actual contact. The canvassing was always conducted by union member volunteers or staff. There is no evidence to suggest that the choice and number of contacts were affected by any of the known characteristics of the voters.<sup>4</sup> That is, we see no qualitative or quantitative evidence of selection effects into canvassing by those that were inclined to be more politically active.

The voter list acquired by the union includes 4,395 individuals. For analysis purposes,

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<sup>4</sup> To examine whether union member characteristics played a role in the choice and number of contacts, we ran a logistic regression on union contact (binary) and a negative binomial regression on union contact (count) with all independent variables included in the primary models of this article. Strong correlations between certain characteristics and the likelihood of being contacted would suggest selection concerns with the contacted sample. We found that age, ethnicity (Latino), and vote propensity were statistically significant predictors of contact. Yet the negligible effect sizes of the correlations indicate that they have little effect on the choice and number of contacts. More importantly, the values of pseudo R-squared for both regressions are small and substantially less than those in the main models of this paper. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test of the logistic regression on union contact (binary) yields a small p-value of 0.0117, where small p-values (usually under 5%) indicate a poor fit. So, in our sample, individual characteristics do not meaningfully explain variation of union contact, suggesting little if any selection issues between the contacted and non-contacted groups. Detailed regression results aforementioned are available on request.

those with missing data or recorded as deceased were removed from the data set, which resulted in a sample of 4,176 registered voters. Among the 4,176 individuals, 2,506 of them had information on what approach the union used to contact them, either by bulk mail, in-person visit, or phone call. Table 1 provides the coding schemes, summary statistics, and frequency information for the variables included in the analysis. Turnout of voters, the dependent variable, is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that a registered voter voted, and 0 otherwise. The turnout for the studied election was 73.3 percent, which can be considered as a relatively high rate. Union contact, the main independent variable, has been coded in three ways: ordinal, dichotomous, and categorical. For the ordinal measure, we added up the number of actual contacts with each individual, including visiting, calling, and mailing, but failed attempts were not summed. The maximum number of contacts was 5; however, because of the low incidence of 4 and 5 contacts, we consolidated these, along with 3 contacts, into one group (3 = three or more times). The dichotomous contact measure takes 1 when an individual was actually contacted once or more and 0 otherwise. Among those in the given list, the canvasser was able to make actual contact with 38.39 percent of registered voters, and most of those canvassed were contacted either once or twice. The categorical measure is union contact type, and we have a subsample of 2,535 registered voters with information about union contact methods.<sup>5</sup> As shown

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<sup>5</sup> The method of canvassing was recorded each time by the union, and a small number of the subsample, 29 individuals, were contacted multiple times using different methods (e.g., one of the members was attempted for the first time to be contacted by mail and then by in-person visit for the second time.). All other individuals were either approached once or several times but with the same method. Because it is almost impossible to determine which contact method exerted actual influence on turnout in regression analysis for those who were contacted by multiple methods, we decided to drop those 29 individuals. Since the portion is very small, deleting these observations will not interfere with our analyses.

in Table 2, the variable was coded in four categories, with 1 denoting no contact ( $n = 984$ ), 2 bulk mail ( $n = 370$ ), 3 in-person visit ( $n = 924$ ), and 4 phone call ( $n = 228$ ), and 36.87 percent of the subsample was contacted by union in-person visit.

Political ideology and vote propensity were each measured on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 100 and were estimated and provided by Catalist algorithms accounting for prior vote history, demographics, and related survey questions. According to Wood et al. (2019), Catalist calculates ideology scores by conducting a series of regression comprised of over 2.7 million responses to nearly 200 unique survey items covering a variety of political and social issues, including gun control, feminism, and RTW legislation.<sup>6</sup> For political ideology, 0 denotes a perfect conservative view, whereas 100 means a perfect liberal view. Also, Catalist determines vote propensity using vote history and demographics from administrative records and national surveys.<sup>7</sup> High vote propensity indicates that an individual is more likely to vote and low vote propensity otherwise. As Table 1 shows, the sample of this study is a generally centrist with liberal leanings (political ideology,  $M = 57.94$ ,  $Min = 17.80$ ,  $Max = 85.20$ ,  $SD = 6.35$ ) and frequent (vote propensity,  $M = 83.49$ ,  $SD = 25.35$ ) voter group. In addition, the voter registration length, based on the date of registration, is greater than 18 years on average. Considering the distribution of vote propensity and voter registration length, the voters from this sample are arguably politically active on the whole.

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<sup>6</sup> Catalist deems that their prediction models are proprietary and does not release survey questions. Validation of Catalist's ideology measure was conducted by Rhodes and Schaffner (2017), finding that Catalist's measure was highly correlated with scores generated by other sources and methods.

<sup>7</sup> The vote propensity scores estimated by Catalist have been used in array of studies. See Ansolabehere and Hersh's (2012) study for more information regarding validating Catalist data.



Individual characteristics included in this study are age, gender, marital status, living conditions, ethnicity, and geographical information represented by zip codes. The voters were aged 19 to 103 with a mean age of 56. Around 30 percent of the voters were male, and around 15 percent were married at the time the data were collected. As the individuals were mostly located in downtown Chicago according to the five most frequent zip codes, 27.16 percent of them were living in an apartment. The right-skewed distribution of income groups indicates that the sample contains mostly medium low-income individual voters. Moreover, because the dataset we obtained did not include ethnicity data, we utilized NamSor API service to infer each individual's ethnicity by translating their first and last names and geographical information (zip codes) into four ethnic categories: Asian, Black non-Latino, Hispanic Latino, and White non-Latino.<sup>8</sup> NamSor generated two most probable ethnicities, and we used the first-likely ethnicity for analysis. To crosscheck the prediction, we also randomly picked 100 individuals in the data and manually searched their names on different social media platforms. Our manual search generally confirmed the prediction by NamSor. Additionally, the process of translating names into ethnicity was encrypted, so that no personal information was revealed or retained by the process. The ethnicity prediction shows that the data set comprises mostly Black workers. Overall, the modal individual within the sample would be either a middle-aged or elderly, low-income, Black, female health care union worker who was living in the core Chicago area.

[Table 1 about here]

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<sup>8</sup> NamSor (<https://v2.namsor.com/NamSorAPIv2/index.html>) is a machine learning-based package and API service that employs Naïve Bayes algorithms to classify names by gender, country of origin, or ethnicity, and it has been widely used in academic research (see Krishnan et al. for a list of recent research using NamSor).

## Logistic Regressions

Logistic regressions have been employed to estimate the effects of union contact on registered voter turnout since logistic regressions are the appropriate tool for dichotomous dependent variables. Factors known to influence voting behavior are included in regressions as controls. Every logistic regression model controls for the individual's political ideology, vote propensity, income, ethnicity, age, gender, marital status, living conditions, registration length, and geographical information. Because of model identification, some observations were dropped when the logistic regressions were estimated, and thus 4,169 individuals were included in Models 1 and 2, and 2,353 individuals were included in Model 3 (Model 3 used a subsample constituted by those with contact type information). Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 in Table 2 detail the baseline outcomes of logistical regressions. Union contact in Models 1 and 2 is coded in a dichotomous and ordinal scheme, respectively. Union contact type in Model 3 is coded in a categorical scheme. Only the regression outcomes for the key independent variables are reported in the table, and for each regression, income group and ethnicity used reference categories of less than \$20,000 and white ethnicity, respectively.

[Table 2 about here]

The logistic regression outcomes for the three models in Table 2 suggest that union contact substantially enhanced turnout rates when considered either dichotomously, in an ordinal manner, or by different contact methods ( $p < 0.01$  for dichotomous measure,  $p < 0.05$  for two contacts, and  $p < 0.1$  for one contact and three or more contacts). As listed in Table 3 for the binary union contact variable, marginal effects show that contacted voters had a voting probability of 75.7 percent, which indicates they were approximately four percentage points

more likely to vote than those who were not contacted. This magnitude of increase in voting likelihood mirrors the prior California-based studies measured under more ideal canvassing conditions. Furthermore, repeated contact efforts provide higher margins. The turnout to non-turnout odds ratio for one contact, two contacts, and three or more contacts increased successively, ranging from 1.214 to 1.593, and their margins ranging from 74.8 percent to 78.7 percent. While the likelihood of turnout resulting from one, two, or three or more contacts were all significantly higher than no contact, the marginal effects for one vs. two vs. three or more contacts were not statistically different from one another. Similar to prior individual-level studies of repeated union canvassing on turnout, the biggest marginal increase can be observed between none and one contact (an approximate 3 percent increase in voting likelihood). In addition, Model 3 shows that each type of contact method was associated with a higher turnout. Marginal effects of union contact type in Table 3 show that contact by bulk mail had the highest estimated margin while contact by in-person visit had the lowest estimated margin.

[Table 3 about here]

### **Testing for Moderation**

The logistic regression results reveal the existence of the positive relationship between union contact and voter turnout after controlling for contributing factors to voting behaviors, including individual characteristics and political attributes. We then test whether there exists a moderated relationship between the dependent and independent variables. By exploring the interactive effects, we aim to examine if union contact is evenly effective for both conservative Democrat and liberal Democrat voters, if the strength of the relationship is uniform for different types of voters, and whether the canvassing effects differ depending on income and ethnicity.

Below we discuss the expectations for each potential moderator and test them by including them in the baseline model.

### *Moderation by Voter Political Attributes*

Individual political attributes have been found to influence voting behavior. First, political ideology, as a critical individual predisposition, is a strong and essential predictor of voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Larcinese 2009; Kim 2016). Ideology might be a unique attribute, separate from something like party affiliation. For instance, when looking at Latino voters, the consensus over the years has been that Latinos generally hold a strong party affiliation with the Democratic Party (see Nicholson and Segura 2005), but also that they are ideologically divided into equal thirds: liberal, moderate, and conservative (see Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005). Moreover, as the general population's ideological stance becomes polarized, it is crucial to understand how ideology affects voter turnout in the United States. Though the connection between unions and political ideology (as opposed to party affiliation) is not empirically well documented, Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) found that the left-leaning ideological view is associated with high participation among union members independent of canvassing effects. Given that ideologically liberal union members will already tend to be frequent voters, ideologically conservative Democrat union members might be more sensitive to union canvassing. Therefore, we expect that while liberal individuals are more likely to turn out to vote regardless of canvassing, union canvassing will exert a stronger influence on more moderate and conservative Democrats who might otherwise not vote absent the canvassing.

It is also well accepted that vote propensity plays an extremely important role in shaping the effects of canvassing on turnout, yet the propensity level best suited for canvassing is unclear

(Gerber and Green 2000; Niven 2001; Hillygus 2005; Nickerson 2008; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009; Lamare 2010*b*; Arceneaux, Kousser, and Mullin 2012; Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck 2014). Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) summarize the empirical discrepancies: the effectiveness of canvassing has at times operated independent of vote propensity, (Gerber and Green 2000), but also has been shown as stronger for low-propensity voters (Hillygus 2005), stronger for high-propensity voters (see Enos, Fowler, and Vavreck 2014 for a recent example), or stronger for occasional voters (Niven 2001). The occasional voter theory has proven accurate for union canvassing in the past, but prior studies are limited in their access to vote propensity, relying on prior vote history rather than a valid survey instrument such as that provided by a group like Catalist. We use a carefully survey-accessed vote propensity score to examine the expectation that occasional member voters in SEIU HCIIMK will be more susceptible to union contact than other types of voters.

#### *Moderation by Voter Characteristics*

Political science literature has also addressed two other individual characteristics that influence political participation and should be treated as something more than just controls in our analysis: income and ethnicity (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). First, income or socioeconomics is a strong predictor of turnout likelihood. Particularly, empirical evidence has shown that high-income people are more willing to vote, whereas low-income people have a low level of political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Tam Cho 1999; Conway 2000; see Barreto 2005 for an example). Turning to the influence of income on the effectiveness of union mobilization, Freeman (2003) found that household income lowered union canvassing effects. A more recent study by Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) showed that whereas

income alone had a positive association with political participation, income did not influence the relationship between union membership and political participation. The latest data included in both studies were from the 1990s, a time when populism had not yet formed a large-scale wave that can considerably affect the ties between unions and their low-income members. Populist rhetoric, as argued previously, is more likely to influence members who are economically vulnerable and thereby may undermine their connections with the canvasser. Therefore, we expect that union canvassing would be less effective for low-income people in our data.

Moreover, studies have suggested that ethnicity has a substantial influence on voter turnout (Cassel 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Tam Cho 1999; Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005; Teixeira 2011; Fraga 2018). Historical turnout data from 1972 to 2008 generally showed that the turnout of whites (non-Hispanic) led other ethnicities, although Black individuals voted at a rate not substantially different from whites in 2008. Nevertheless, white and Black voters maintain higher turnout rates than Hispanic and other minorities (Leighley and Nagler 2013). Studies on Latino voters found that certain circumstances, such as the presence of a viable Latino candidate (Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005) or a strong alliance between the canvasser and ethnic groups (Lamare 2010*b*), might increase Latino turnout. However, given SEIU HCIIMK's racial and ethnic makeup in the 5<sup>th</sup> District we do not expect to see the same degree of canvassing effectiveness among Latinos.

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 displays the results of the interaction model, including standard errors and odds ratios. It contains the interaction terms between union contact (coded in dichotomous scheme) and the measures of aforementioned factors, including political ideology, vote propensity,

income groups, and ethnicity groups. For conciseness, only statistically significant results are shown.<sup>9</sup> Figure 1 represents the marginal increase in turnout rates resulting from union canvassing by ideology. As politically liberal individuals were more likely ( $p < 0.01$ ) to cast ballots than politically conservative Democrats, the turnout to non-turnout odds ratio of 0.965 suggests that conservative Democrat union members were more susceptible ( $p < 0.05$ ) to canvassing than those who held liberal views. According to Figure 1, the most conservative contacted union members in the sample were around 23 percent more likely to vote than those who were not contacted and scored the same on the ideology score. Furthermore, the marginal positive effects of canvassing decline as the political ideology score increases (i.e., becomes more liberal). Union contact generally made no significant difference to turnout for those who already held a relatively liberal view (i.e., those who scored more than 60 on political ideology).

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 2 shows the marginal increase of turnout from union canvassing for different income groups with 95% confidence intervals plotted. While the interactive effects between union contact and income group were not statistically significant for those who fall in groups whose income was less than \$75,000, logistic regression results suggest that voters with an income of more than \$75,000 were more likely ( $p < 0.01$  for both the group whose income ranged from \$50,000 to \$100,000 and the group whose income was higher than \$100,000) to be mobilized to vote than those who earned less income. Figure 2 further indicates that an individual union member with an income of more than \$100,000 annually was even more

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<sup>9</sup> A full version of Table 2 and Table 4, which includes regression coefficient and odds ratio of each variable, can be found in the appendix.

sensitive to union mobilization. The results suggest that union canvassing is generally more effective for individuals who earned more; however, the outcomes were not confirmed across all income levels: it seems that \$75,000–\$100,000 was the threshold group for union contacts to become most effective.

[Figure 2 about here]

However, there is no meaningful evidence for the interactive effects between contact and vote propensity, and between contact and ethnicity, respectively. For vote propensity, no significant marginal differences in turnout rates were noted among voters with a high and low likelihood of voting following union contact. For ethnicity, none of the minority groups showed different levels of responsiveness to union contact.

### **Discussion and Implications**

The logistic regression models help us to answer each of the research questions posed. The key research question examined whether SEIU HCIIMK mobilization could promote turnout rates under political constraints resulting from a decade of radical developments. Our models with interactive terms offered a nuanced test of whether individual political attributes (ideology and vote propensity) and voter characteristics (income and ethnicity) moderate the relationship between union canvassing and turnout. The most salient finding is that SEIU HCIIMK was able to effectively translate membership contact into voter turnout under conditions of constraint. Additionally, for the moderating effects, individual political ideology presented a statistically meaningful influence on the relationship, and union canvassing effects were particularly meaningful among higher-income individuals.

The empirical results from the first three models (models in Table 2) corroborate the



notion that contacted union members were more likely to cast ballots than non-contacted union members; moreover, people who were contacted multiple times had higher point estimates of turnout odds than those who were not contacted at all. Importantly, the marginal increase in turnout probability from two or more contacts was both materially meaningful but also precisely in line with prior research into this issue. The turnout to non-turnout odds ratio found in this study, ranging from 1.214 to 1.593 (Table 2), is comparable to what was found in the less constrained Southern California environment, where the odds ratio ranged from 1.234 to 1.44 (Lamare 2010a). Therefore, while facing conceivably more complicated and difficult conditions, union canvassing in Illinois post-*Harris* appears to have had effects similar to those found under ostensibly more optimal canvassing conditions in California. In addition, the primary finding of examining different union contact modes is that all types of union contact were effective in enhancing turnout rates and that personal visits were not more effective than the other two types of contact. Though this finding may seem initially surprising, it is important to note that the political science literature exploring which mobilization type affects turnout most effectively has not reached a consensus. For instance, although Gerber and Green (2000) found that in-person canvassing was more effective than mail and that phone calls did not generate meaningful effects on turnout, later studies found that phone calls were effective in influencing turnout (Ramirez 2005; Nickerson 2006) and even had greater effects than personal canvassing for some specific group of voters (Bedolla and Michelson 2012). Additionally, it has been argued that the quality of mobilizing messages and timing also play important roles in affecting turnout (Nickerson 2007; Panagopoulos 2012). Given the debates and our findings, questions inquiring about the most effective mobilizing methods among union members across different contexts deserve

further investigation beyond the scope of this study.

Our findings suggest that SEIU HCIIMK's commitment to political mobilization and the strong union-member ties, combined with their members' willingness to collaborate with their union, overcame the pressures caused by hostile political conditions and subsequently, increased voter turnout. The series of events prior to the election cultivated the conditions for canvassing by galvanizing the community. While the *Harris* decision, Rauner's campaign to weaken labor unions and the rise of conservative populism might have been expected to adversely affect the effectiveness of union canvassing, a series of political incidents may have actually prompted the union and its members to cooperate in fighting for their common interests. In fact, the *Harris* ruling, together with the switching allegiances from Dunkin and Alvarez's misconduct, may have served as galvanizing antecedents akin to the union's own version of Prop. 187, which created the opportunity for the union and its members to recognize the threats they were facing together and the importance of strengthening the connection between them.

Further, the findings in this study may have broader generalizability than just the Illinois setting. Given that these results occurred immediately after *Harris*, they can speak to some degree about the national-level capability of union canvassing in the post-*Janus* era. Expanding on *Harris*, the *Janus* ruling imposes fiscal constraints on public-sector unions nationwide. Public-sector unions will inevitably experience a degree of the financial loss that SEIU HCIIMK has assumed. However, by seizing and focusing on events related to the vital interests of union members at every election turn, unions also have a good chance to strategize their expenditure allocations and direct them to mobilization, improve their messaging around union solidarity, and anticipate members being more receptive than they might otherwise be to the union's overtures.

The findings on ideologies' moderating effects expand the extant literature and suggest that ideologically conservative Democrat union members are more responsive to mobilization than liberal union members. Although this may seem a counterintuitive finding on the surface, we believe that this result might occur because a rational ideologically conservative registered Democrat voter may be unlikely to turn out in a Democratic primary election in theory *unless* they are convinced by a union canvasser to turn out. We think this may be true for two reasons. First, because of their conservative ideological stance, they may not be able to identify with any of the Democrat candidates in the Chicago political system, which is generally considered more a left-wing in its orientation. Second, even if a conservative Democrat voter identifies a right-wing candidate who represents their values, they can be confident that the vote will be meaningless in Illinois' winner-take-all electoral system. Unlike the proportional representation electoral system, in a winner-take-all system, voters who support minority parties are not incentivized to vote at all because their votes cannot translate into congressional seats or political influence (Downs 1957). Therefore, without external intervention, turnout is an irrational option for Democrat voters who hold conservative values because casting a ballot does not pay off, yet incurs significant costs to the voter (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). However, SEIU HCIIMK's involvement and canvassing may push a conservative Democrat union member toward seeing that voting benefits them by highlighting a candidate who shares and represents the interests and values embedded in their union membership. Thus, voting can become relevant to these voters because, even if their individually ideal candidates do not have a chance in the election, they may vote to support a candidate who is seen by the union to speak for union members, reflecting their collective interests as opposed to their individual interests. While the data did not reveal the

exact vote choices of the union members, it is almost certain that union members voted in support of the union. The defeat of Dunkin and Alvarez in the election also suggests that union members were receptive to the canvassing and that union mobilization was critical in campaigning for their preferred candidates in elections.

The election outcomes also provide implications for the Democratic Party and union leaders in determining future candidates to support. For instance, Kenneth Dunkin was replaced by Juliana Stratton, a more progressive Democrat, who later became Illinois' first African American female lieutenant governor. In contrast, Dunkin was later appointed as Rauner's aid after a subsequent failed attempt to take back the 5<sup>th</sup> District seat. Kim Foxx replaced Alvarez as the Cook County State Attorney, receiving 24 percent greater vote share. In short, the union was successful in seeking to replace less progressive Democrats with more pro-union Democrats in order to mitigate risks to unions and enhance union support, which may portend national trends as the Democratic Party wrestles with its identity as either a more centric or more progressive political entity.

Another implication of these findings is that contrary to the conventional image of union members, which suggests that union members tend to be liberal or at least have liberal-leaning ideologies, our study's data showed that members' political ideologies were distributed almost normally. The implication of this finding is that unions should not see their members as ideologically homogeneous but rather recognize, value, and take advantage of their ideological heterogeneity. This awareness is crucial when the union tries to build and improve ties with members; that is, assuming that all members are left-leaning in solidifying and canvassing work might impair the effectiveness of the union. In addition, it suggests that unions might optimize

their resources allocation under politically constrained conditions to promote their mobilization effectiveness: if the union is able to identify conservative member voters, then canvassers might be able to further increase turnout by investing more resources toward this group.

The interactions also suggest that none of the voter propensity types were more or less receptive to union canvassing. Thus, the higher turnout among occasional voters in previous studies was not replicated in Illinois. Two reasons might account for this discrepancy with prior research. First, the Catalist-provided list of voters were, overall, already high propensity individuals (mean score of 83.49 out of 100). So, the interactive effects between contact and vote propensity would be less likely to be statistically significant simply due to statistical effects of a small sample of infrequent voters. Second, SEIU HCIIMK might not have applied the same strategy as the Southern California unions, who deliberately invested in encouraging occasional voters to cast ballots following the occasional voter theory posited by Marshall Ganz (Ganz 1993).

The results regarding the interactive effect of income indicate that low-income groups were not statistically less susceptible to union canvassing; moreover, people who fell into the two highest income groups showed a higher level of sensitivity to union canvassing. This result might be due to the overall low-level income of union members in the data: most people earned less than \$75,000 annually. A recent study suggested that economic inequality does not demobilize turnout in salient elections (Macdonald 2021), which implies that in our studied election, low-income or middle-income unions members might decide to vote or not regardless of union contact. Though caution should be applied to the interpretation that high-income people are more susceptible to union contact, at minimum, the evidence indicates that income is not a

strong differentiating factor in the relationship between canvassing and turnout, which is consistent with prior findings.

This study is not without limitations. First, the ethnicity variable used in this study was not from actual survey questions but instead was predicted by a statistical algorithm, which may have caused less accurate estimation results and may also help explain our non-findings when testing for moderation by ethnicity. Although we addressed this concern by employing a sophisticated prediction tool that takes account of not only the first and last names of the person but also location information and including geographical information in estimating ethnicity has been found to have promising accuracy (Fiscella and Fremont 2006), this may help explain our non-finding for the ethnicity effects. Second, the statistical models may also suffer from missing some control variables accounting for turnout, such as level of education (though this measure in particular is likely highly correlated with our income and ethnicity measures). Generally, though some variables were not available in the dataset we acquired, we believe the variables we controlled for and the theoretical analysis we articulated led to meaningful estimates. Last, an important limitation is that, although we have extremely rich and unique empirical turnout and canvassing data, we did not have access to the actual messaging content delivered by the union, or to the internal strategies SEIU HCIIMK used in 2016. Nevertheless, we are aware that the union did craft a message that was attentive to their minority membership and that addressed racial and income inequality. Therefore, we are able to only indirectly consider the constraints and opportunities present for the union, rather than being able to directly measure these. Although we believe it is clear that the Illinois circumstances were more constrained when compared against previous studies of individual-level turnout, we cannot be as sure that the

results are wholly explained by the union efforts we highlighted. It is conceivable that there are other explanations, omitted from our theory and uncontrolled for empirically, that might explain the results. Indeed, this study utilized observational data, which might not provide as strong evidence of causality as random field experiments. However, it is not easy to randomly assign contacts or contact methods in a canvassing effort where the union was trying to reach out to every member, and we additionally conducted different extra analyses as robustness tests to address potential issues from omitted variables and selection effects. It is not likely that selection effects explain our findings, as we control for individual vote propensity and know qualitatively that the canvassers were not seeking out certain types of voters with their canvassing. And, the fact that our 3-4 percentage point turnout increase from canvassing falls precisely in line with experimental turnout studies from political science as well as similar union-based analyses, gives us confidence in the legitimacy of our results. Yet we emphasize that our results should not be taken as a causal argument regarding the effects of unions on turnout, but rather that they should be considered comparable to other similar observational union canvassing-turnout studies.

Overall, this study adds to both the labor relations and canvassing literature in establishing that union canvassing effects at the individual level persist in ostensibly constrained contexts. It addresses a limitation raised by prior studies on union canvassing that prior findings might not be generalizable to the broader population. At their core, the results suggest that union canvassing may promote member turnout under a post-*Janus* world in a manner roughly equivalent to those found in Illinois post-*Harris* as long as the union and its members engage in building trust with each other and identifying shared collective values. In sum, in addition to its obvious challenges, the rise of right-wing populism and the post-*Janus* political climate for union

canvassing may in fact present a series of opportunities for unions to grow voter turnout among their members.



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**Table 1 Coding Schemes and Summary Statistics**

Variable Name	Coding Scheme	Mean (Std. Dev.)	Frequency
<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</b>			
Turnout of Voters	Dichotomous 1 = turnout; 0 = no turnout	0.73 (0.44)	73.30%
<b>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>			
Union Contact (Binary)	Dichotomous 1 = contact; 0 = no contact	0.38 (0.49)	38.39%
Union Contact (Count)	Ordinal 0 = no contact 1 = once 2 = twice 3 = three or more times	0.59 (0.85)	- 61.61% 20.47% 14.99% 2.92%
Union Contact Type	Categorical 1 = no contact 2 = bulk mail 3 = visit 4 = phone	2.16 (1.05)	- 39.27% 14.76% 36.87% 9.10%
Political Ideology	Continuous, Conservative to Liberal (Min = 17.80; Max = 85.20)	57.94 (6.35)	-
Vote Propensity	Continuous, Low to High (Min = 0.62; Max = 97.40)	83.49 (25.35)	-
Income Group	Categorical 1 = less than \$20,000 2 = \$20,000 - \$30,000 3 = \$30,000 - \$50,000 4 = \$50,000 - \$75,000 5 = \$75,000 - \$100,000 6 = greater than \$100,000	2.64 (1.18)	- 20.74% 23.28% 34.03% 16.50% 4.00% 1.46%
Ethnicity	Categorical 1 = Asian ethnicity 2 = Black ethnicity 3 = Latino ethnicity 4 = White ethnicity	2.13 (0.52)	- 1.03% 91.43% 0.72% 6.82%
Age	Continuous in Years (Min = 19; Max = 103)	55.83 (16.67)	-
Male Gender	Dichotomous (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	0.30 (0.46)	29.55%
Married	Dichotomous (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	0.15 (0.36)	15.42%
Living in an Apartment	Dichotomous (1 = Yes, 0 = No)	0.27 (0.44)	27.16%
Registration Length	Continuous in Days (Min = 369; Max = 19905)	6826.20 (3165.44)	-
Zip Code	Categorical; 5 Most Frequent: 60637 60653 60649 60619 60615	- - - - -	- 33.36% 16.40% 15.06% 14.15% 6.70%

Note: Number of observations was 4,176 for all variables, except for union contact type. Number of observations of union contact type was 2,506.



**Table 2 Logistic Regressions on Turnout**

Key Independent Variables	Estimated Logistic Regression Coefficient (Standard Error) [Odds Ratio]		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Union Contact (Binary)	0.255*** (0.0843) [1.291]	-	-
One Union Contact	-	0.194* (0.106) [1.214]	-
Two Union Contacts	-	0.295** (0.122) [1.343]	-
Three or more Union Contacts	-	0.466* (0.250) [1.593]	-
Contact Type - Bulk Mail	-	-	1.051*** (0.223) [2.861]
Contact Type - Visit	-	-	0.391*** (0.130) [1.478]
Contact Type - Phone	-	-	0.487** (0.215) [1.628]
Political Ideology	0.0359*** (0.00753) [1.037]	0.0359*** (0.00753) [1.037]	0.0390*** (0.0102) [1.040]
Vote Propensity	0.0309*** (0.00172) [1.031]	0.0310*** (0.00173) [1.031]	0.0273*** (0.00201) [1.028]
Income Group Controls	Included	Included	Included
Ethnicity Group Controls	Included	Included	Included
Age, Gender, Married, Living Condition Controls	Included	Included	Included
Registration Length	Included	Included	Included
Zip Code	Included	Included	Included
N	4,169	4,169	2,353
Chi Squared	793.8	795.1	584.6
Pseudo R-squared	0.164	0.164	0.201

\*\*\* = significant at the .01 level; \*\* = significant at the .05 level.

Dependent variable: turnout (1 = yes; 0 = no).

A detailed version of this table can be found in the appendix.

**Table 3 Marginal Effects of Union Contact on Turnout**

Measure of Union Contact	Margin	SE	95% Confidence Interval
Union Contact (Binary)			
No Actual Contact	0.718***	0.00799	0.702 - 0.733
Contact	0.757***	0.00987	0.738 - 0.777
Union Contact (Count)			
No Actual Contact	0.718***	0.00799	0.702 - 0.734
One Union Contact	0.748***	0.0140	0.721 - 0.776
Two Union Contacts	0.763***	0.0159	0.732 - 0.794
Three or more Union Contacts	0.787***	0.0323	0.723 - 0.850
Union Contact Type			
No Actual Contact	0.638***	0.0157	0.607 - 0.669
Bulk Mail	0.802***	0.0254	0.752 - 0.852
Visit	0.707***	0.0154	0.677 - 0.737
Phone	0.722***	0.0308	0.662 - 0.783

\*\*\* = significant at the .01 level; \*\* = significant at the .05 level.

Dependent variable: turnout (1 = yes; 0 = no).



**Table 4 Moderating Effects of Political Ideology and Income**

Key Independent Variables	Estimated Logistic Regression Coefficient	SE	Odds Ratio
Union Contact (Binary) * Political Ideology	-0.0357**	0.0143	0.965
Union Contact (Binary) * Income Group (\$20,000 - \$30,000)	-0.234	0.248	0.792
Union Contact (Binary) * Income Group (\$30,000 - \$50,000)	-0.00937	0.237	0.991
Union Contact (Binary) * Income Group (\$50,000 - \$75,000)	-0.136	0.282	0.873
Union Contact (Binary) * Income Group (\$75,000 - \$100,000)	1.612**	0.697	5.015
Union Contact (Binary) * Income Group (greater than \$100,000)	3.553***	1.316	34.92

N = 4,169  
Chi Squared = 817.5  
Pseudo R-squared = 0.169

\*\*\* = significant at the .01 level; \*\* = significant at the .05 level.

Dependent variable: turnout (1 = yes; 0 = no).

Other variables included in the regression were union contact (binary), union contact (binary) \* vote propensity, union contact (binary) \* ethnicity groups, political ideology, vote propensity, income group controls, ethnicity group controls, age, gender, married, living condition, registration length, and zip codes.

A detailed version of this table can be found in the appendix.

Figure 1




Figure 2

