Environmental Issue Linkage as an Electoral Advantage: The Case of NAFTA

Why would some legislators alter their votes on trade agreements in return for environmental side agreements that may be hard to enforce? While numerous studies have examined the effects of side agreements, few have evaluated their impact on legislators' positions on a trade agreement over time. This paper examines the effects of the environmental side deal attached to NAFTA, with novel time-series survey data that captures the evolution of House members' positions on NAFTA during discussion and finalization of the environmental side of the free trade agreement. I find that pro-environmental legislators in safe districts tended to withdraw their support for NAFTA once the side deal was agreed upon, whereas those in competitive districts stood their ground and increased their support in the final stage of voting. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find little evidence that the side deal assuaged legislators in import-competing districts. This article shows how the effectiveness of international institutions is moderated in important ways by electoral considerations.

Keywords: preferential trade agreements, issue linkages, side agreements, environmental standards, elite survey, legislative politics

Word count: 10,907

Introduction

How exactly do side deals on the environment facilitate trade agreements? The economic benefits of successfully concluded major trade agreements often amount to billions of dollars. Most observers agree that governments increasingly link non-trade issues (i.e., labor and the environment) to trade agreements in the form of side agreements in order to promote support for consequential trade deals (Postnikov & Bastiaens 2020; Bastiaens &Postnikov 2019; Morin et al. 2018; Bastiaens & Postnikov 2017; Lechner 2016; Postnikov & Bastiaens 2014; Spilker & Böhmelt 2013; Hafner-Burton 2011; Kim 2012; Ehrlich 2010; Davis 2004; Ruggie 1982). However, despite a voluminous literature on issue linkage, we know little about how non-trade issue linkage affects trade negotiations, and in particular, how it helps governments obtain legislative support for trade deals.

Scholars have argued that issue linkage assuages coalitions between environmentalists and anti-trade interest groups (Bastiaens & Postnikov 2019) or promote coalitions between environmentalists and pro-trade businesses (Vogel 1997). This logic of issue linkage does not fully explain why side agreements can boost legislative support for trade deals in majoritarian electoral systems. In majoritarian systems, concentrated interests prevail (Rickard 2012): environmentalists with diffuse interests may suspect that powerful economic interest groups (i.e., anti-trade labor, pro-trade businesses) will capture legislators and obstruct the enforcement of the side agreements once ratification is over. Because they know about these potential challenges to enforcement, environmentalists may not lend support to legislators who support the side agreements.

Given the challenges, why do some legislators in majoritarian systems have strong incentives to support side agreements? To explain how side agreements boost legislative support

for trade deals, this article provides an electoral theory of side agreements. In particular, I argue that legislators in competitive districts are more likely than those in safer districts to serve as brokers for hybrid coalitions and to boost support for trade agreements that include side agreements. Once an environmental side agreement is reached, legislators from pro-environment districts become more amenable to supporting trade deals. Without the side agreement, they may oppose the trade deal, fearing that they will be punished by environmental voters. This fear is more acute for legislators in competitive districts, who may lose elections by a small margin. In addition, legislators in competitive districts find side agreements particularly useful in attracting campaign funds from pro-trade businesses; in this way, the side agreement opens up the political space for legislators under siege to preserve environmental voters while receiving funding from pro-trade constituents. In contrast, those in pro-environment and safer districts do not necessarily have the incentive to reach out to businesses and broker coalitions.

I evaluate the effect of trade-environmental issue linkage on the legislative progression of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the first trade agreement with an enforceable environmental side agreement. I use novel survey data that reveal how legislators' attitudes on NAFTA changed over time as the environmental side agreement was negotiated and attached to the NAFTA Implementation Act in November 1993. The time-series survey provides a rare opportunity to test whether legislators changed their positions on NAFTA as Clinton negotiated the environmental side agreement. Exploiting the temporal variation before and after the side agreement, I find that pro-environmental legislators responded to Clinton's environmental side agreement by increasing their support for NAFTA, but only if they were in competitive electoral districts that required them to broaden their base of support to remain in

office. In contrast, I find little evidence that issue linkage swayed legislators representing import-competing industries.

This article makes several contributions. First, it stands as the first study to investigate how individual legislators' attitudes on a trade agreement change in response to issue linkage. Ratification represents as an important stage at which the executive branch dynamically modifies the contents of trade agreements to broaden legislative coalitions. However, it has been difficult to study the dynamic effects of issue linkage on legislative attitudes about international agreements, due to the lack of data on legislators' behavior. Using time-varying elite survey data, this article examines the important question, "does issue linkage work?"

Second, building on a growing literature on non-trade standards in trade agreements (Lechner 2016; Bastiaens & Postnikov 2017; Kim 2012), I show how linkage of environmental issues broadens trade coalitions in the US House of Representatives, a strong legislative veto player to trade liberalization (Baker 1995; Rogowski 1987). Starting in the 1990s, US presidents from Clinton to Bush to Obama considered environmental side deals as a means to gain pro-trade support from House Democrats (Destler 2007).[1] Yet, studies on American political institutions often suggest that environmental and human rights side agreements may not be suitable for placating House members facing geographically constricted constituencies. According to these studies, legislators prefer to trade their votes on a policy for concessions that would exclusively benefit their local constituencies: because the benefits of localized concessions are geographically concentrated, legislators who "bring home the bacon" might be better able to claim credit and gain the leeway they need to vote their conscience on trade deals (Ferejohn

[1] The Bust administration in particular negotiated extensive environmental side agreements starting in 2007 when the House was dominated by Democrats.

1974, Chapter 3; Lizzeri & Persico 2001; Howell 2013; Kriner & Reeves 2015).[2] Environmental issue linkages are far from the kind of targeted benefits those legislators seek. Because the benefit of environmental protection is geographically diffuse, House members with geographically constricted constituencies may not have strong incentives to support trade agreements simply because of environmental side deals.[3] This article analyzes this gap between theory and political reality and examines how linking an issue with public welfare implications promotes support for international trade agreements among legislators with strong incentives to cater to sub-national concessions.

NAFTA's Influence on Modern Environmental Issue Linkages in Trade Agreements

The case study of NAFTA enhances our understanding of environmental side agreements in several respects. First, NAFTA has had a lasting influence on the design of trade agreements. Baccini et al. (2015) show that NAFTA has been used as a template for later trade agreements, and the effect of the NAFTA model has increased over time relative to the EU template. NAFTA is important not only because of its influence as a template but also because of the way it emphasized enforcement: US agreements tend to ensure the legal enforceability of linked issue areas (i.e., environmental rules) and to include more precise rules than EU agreements do (Horn et al. 2010; Baccini et al. 2015). Reflecting on this trend, Figure 1 shows that the number of trade

[2] For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between presidents and legislators in the realm of international trade, see Milner and Tingley 2015.

[3] Environmental issues have been typically non-salient during legislative elections, especially at subnational levels. For example, when the Clinton administration attached an environmental side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to gain support from House Democrats, only 2% of the American voters listed environmental issues as the most decisive factor in the 1992 House election. See "The American National Election Studies, 1992 Time Series Study." VAR 900228: Did you tend to prefer one of the House of Representatives candidates because of this issue?

agreements worldwide that include environmental obligations has increased dramatically since NAFTA was drafted (Morin et al. 2018).



Figure 1. NAFTA's Influence on Environmental Provisions in PTAs (Data source: Morin et al. 2018)

Given NAFTA's influence on modern trade agreements, it is crucial to understand why the US had to embark on this policy innovation. Most observers would agree that the Clinton administration needed side deals that benefited labor and the environment in order to pass the trade agreement, as the Democratic Party held a majority in the House (Destler 2007). And history tends to repeat itself. The Obama administration, under a pro-trade and Democratic president, faced a House controlled by anti-trade Democrats. Similarly, the Biden administration will have to sway House Democrats to pass any mega-trade deal in the future, as House Democrats hold a close majority. Reflecting on the need to form a winning coalition, Democratic primary candidates, including Senator Elizabeth Warren, proposed platforms that included elaborate plans to incorporate climate concerns into trade agreements (Warren 2019; Bhatt et al.

2020). Given recent policy discussions, side agreements will likely continue to be an important tool the President can use to form minimum winning coalitions in support of trade agreements. Thus, it is crucial to understand whether and how environmental agreements sway legislators in the US.

Issue Linkage and Legislators

The embedded liberalism thesis argues the following: pro-trade governments provide social and environmental insurance (i.e., side agreements) to those who lose from trade liberalization in order to maintain public support for liberalization (Ruggie 1982; Hays et al. 2005). Such side agreements may, then, boost support for trade deals if environmentalists see the strategic value of the side agreements. One important implication of the thesis is that the side agreements would boost support for trade deals by brokering coalitions between value-driven activists and profit-seeking interest groups (Yandle 1983, 1999; DeSombre 2000; Hafner-Burton 2011; Bastiaens & Postnikov 2019). Yandle (1983) coined the term "Baptist and bootlegger" coalitions to characterize unlikely alliances between profit-seeking economic groups and value-driven actors. In the context of trade and the environment, Hillman and Ursprung (1994) and DeSombre (2000) show that special interest groups are better at securing preferred trade policies when they form coalitions with environmentalists. The influence of hybrid coalitions is not limited to environmental issues. Hafner-Burton (2011) and Mosley and Tello (2015) investigate how human rights issue linkage provides a powerful moral smokescreen for special interest groups (i.e., pro-trade, labor groups).

While hybrid coalitions play an important role in explaining the validity of the embedded liberalism thesis, scholars have paid little attention to how legislators form their trade preferences

in response to hybrid coalitions. In this section, I closely examine the nature of hybrid coalitions in the context of trade and the environment. Notably, I contend that the implication that hybrid coalitions affect legislative attitudes on trade deals provides only a partial explanation for how side agreements work; this assumption ignores competition between interest groups to lure pro-environment legislators into their pro-trade or anti-trade camps.

Most studies on this topic have focused on coalitions between environmentalists and protectionist interest groups. This body of literature views environmental provisions as non-tariff barriers. Accordingly, those studies understand the motivation to include these provisions as originating from protectionist lobbies (Bhagwati 1995; Esty et al. 1994). Because protectionist lobbies (i.e., labor, import-competing industries) could use environmental provisions to protect their incomes from downward pressures on wages, the inclusion of those provisions would boost support for a trade deal among protectionist groups at the margin. Partially in line with this reasoning, Lechner (2016) argues that social and environmental provisions are more likely to emerge when there is a large difference in wage levels between home and negotiating countries. Bastiaens and Postnikov (2019) show that environmentalists in a majoritarian electoral system can lobby legislators to implement punitive environmental standards in trade deals when they ally with more influential labor groups. Altogether, these studies demonstrate how protectionist interest groups can support environmental side deals in alliance with environmentalists.

However, it is unclear how alliances between protectionists and environmentalists affect legislators' attitudes toward trade deals during ratification. First, pro-environment constituencies generally have little overlap with protectionist constituencies, complicating legislators' calculus during ratification. Studies of environmental politics find educational attainment to be an important predictor of environmental activism in the US (Steg et al. 2011; Marquart-Payatt

2012). IPE scholarship, however, finds education is positively correlated with pro-trade attitudes (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006). Most notably, Ehrlich (2010) shows that the citizens who support environmental and social standards in trade agreements are distinct from those who support economic protectionism. Considering the paucity of overlap between pro-environment and protectionist constituencies, how do environmental agreements help legislators in protectionist districts assuage those constituencies' grievances about trade deals?

On closer examination, observers would agree that legislators in protectionist districts are not likely to be swayed by environmental agreements in the ratification process. Sociologists interested in labor-environmental relations document the contentious relationship between the two groups. In the context of the US, Obach (2004) shows that the United Auto Workers had "a falling out with environmentalists over efforts to raise the federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards (p. 9)," which was a subject of a WTO dispute between the US and the EU in 1994. Similarly, labor and environmentalists have traditionally been divided on climate change. For example, labor unions such as AFL-CIO opposed the passage of the Kyoto Protocol because the Protocol's greenhouse gas emissions requirements for developed countries might prompt companies to export jobs to developing countries (Obach 2004). In contrast, environmentalists lobbied the Clinton administration to include the Kyoto Protocol in the environmental side agreement for NAFTA. Mayer (2011) aptly summarizes labor's animosity against environmentalists during his interview with a worker at a plant in Boston: "[T]hose environmentalists want to save the whales and kill the workers (p.2)."[4] Given the longstanding

[4] Of course, there are numerous instances of cooperation (e.g., the alliance of Teamsters and Turtles at the 1999 WTO protest in Seattle). Given the long-running animosity, however, the formation of such coalitions should not be taken for granted.

animosity, legislators from predominantly import-competing or labor-intensive districts may face a backlash if they support trade deals in exchange for environmental side agreements.

Of course, labor-environmental animosity may have little relevance in the context of trade agreements. Environmental standards in US trade agreements are typically limited to (i) multilateral environmental agreements already implemented by negotiating parties or (ii) contain obligations weaker than US domestic environmental regulations. Therefore, US import-competing businesses may expect to use environmental side deals to impose adjustment costs on foreign exporters. However, this reasoning does not account for the possibility that such mild environmental obligations may fail to impose meaningful costs on competitive foreign exporters. Studies on the "California effects" show that major foreign exporters to the market with higher regulations (i.e., the US) voluntarily update their products to comply with more stringent standards and lobby their home governments to adopt similar regulations to exploit economies of scale (Vogel 1997; Prakash & Potoski 2006; Perkins & Neumayer 2012). In this sense, US businesses may not expect to use environmental side agreements to gain a commercial advantage over competitive foreign exporters that are already manufacturing products capable of complying with US standards.

Reflecting on this possibility, House members representing import-competing districts during the ratification of NAFTA were not more likely to express concerns about the agreement's environmental impact than those who represented less protectionist districts. According to the congressional survey conducted in September 1993, legislators representing districts with more employees in import-competing sectors relative to those in exporting sectors were not more likely to express environmental concerns on NAFTA (Pearson correlation = -0.09). Given the historical evidence, it is plausible that import-competing industries understood

that mild environmental obligations in trade agreements would not be sufficient to gain an advantage over highly competitive foreign exporters.

This leaves us with the possibility that legislators representing pro-environment districts are the main driver of side agreements that facilitate trade liberalization. In line with this reasoning, prior research shows that environment-conscious citizens can be pro-trade, selectively supporting sustainable trade. This line of reasoning, however, fails to answer how legislators representing pro-environment constituencies respond to side agreements when their districts are reliant on export-oriented businesses. Figure 2 illustrates the distinctive pathways by which business preferences and voter attitudes affect legislators' environmental commitments. In line with prior research that highlights the link between education and the public's preferences on environmental protection (Steg et al. 2011; Marquart-Payatt 2012), in 1993, Democrats who represented districts with a larger proportion of college-educated voters tended to vote in support of stronger environmental legislation (Pearson correlation = 0.39). However, even if voters support environmental protection, exporting industries may not be ready to go green. Supporting this reasoning, Democrats representing districts with a concentration of exporting businesses in 1993 were typically indifferent to environmental issues (Pearson correlation = -0.16). There is anecdotal evidence of the conflict between pro-trade businesses and environmental voters. Starting in the late 1980s, various businesses that supported free trade expressed strong opposition to the idea of using sanctions and taxation to enforce the NAFTA side agreement; instead, they proposed the use of "shaming" and "fines" to enforce the deal.[5] This was not just a one-off incident during NAFTA negotiations. Most recently, in 2020, pro-trade interests and

[5] See various issues in Inside U.S. Trade that cover business groups' opinions about the environmental side agreement attached to NAFTA. Among others, see "TEXT: Industry Letter to Kantor on NAFTA Side Accords." (June 4, 1993). Retrieved from the Inside U.S. Trade online archive.

environmentalists were divided over the US Trade Representative's investigation into allegations that Vietnam was allowing illegal trade in lumber. While environmentalists called for trade sanctions against Vietnam, North American wood importers urged the US government to quickly resolve USTR's investigation to "provide certainty for business (Forth 2020)." Given the potential for this type of conflict, legislators who support trade deals in return for environmental concessions must have strong political incentives to gain support from both environmental voters and pro-trade businesses.



Figure 2. Legislator Commitment to Environmental Protection and District Characteristics

Pro-environment Legislators and Electoral Incentives

I contend that side agreements can boost support for trade agreements when legislators have an electoral incentive to broaden their bases of support. In particular, I argue that pro-environment legislators in competitive electoral districts are under pressure to reach out to pro-trade businesses for campaign financing while also maintaining support from environmental constituencies.

Some legislators' constituencies are more pro-environment than others. Without an environmental side agreement, these legislators have no choice but to oppose trade deals, fearing punishment from voters. In line with this reasoning, Ehrlich (2018) shows that left-leaning

legislators are more likely to support sustainable trade if they represent constituents with sincere preferences for environmental protection (Chapter 5). NAFTA was not an exception. One of the NAFTA surveys that I will introduce in the Data section has fine-grained information about whether legislators expressed concerns about NAFTA's environmental impact. The data shows that House members tended to represent their constituencies' preferences sincerely, and only those who represented environmentally conscious voters demanded an environmental side deal. Specifically, Figure 3 shows that House members who represented states where a higher percentage of citizens supported three prominent environmental NGOs were more likely to express environmental concerns about NAFTA (Pearson correlation = 0.52). Altogether, members representing pro-environment districts have a strong incentive to consider side agreements as they form decisions on trade deals.

However, not all pro-environment legislators end up increasing their support for trade agreements in response to side deals. I argue that electoral competition moderates the effect of environmental side agreements on legislative support for trade deals. Legislators have sufficiently strong incentives to support trade deals only when they expect elections to be competitive, and thus *face strong pressure to reach out to pro-trade businesses*. Recent studies find that lobbying in the trade policy-making process is monopolized by export-oriented industries, which use their financial resources to help pro-trade groups secure private access to policymakers (Osgood 2017; Rodrik 2018). Confirming this line of reasoning, McCarty et al. (2016) document that pro-trade campaign contributions increased in the 1990s as a viable source of campaign financing for both Republicans and Democrats. The availability of access-seeking trade PACs would have been a tempting opportunity for legislators in competitive districts.



Figure 3. Legislative Concerns on NAFTA's Impact on the Environment (Data source: USA*NAFTA Survey September wave) and Constituency Membership in Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the National Wildlife Federation (Data source: List and Sturm 2006)

Without an environmental side agreement, legislators in pro-environment districts face a dilemma: if they support a trade agreement, they can tap into lucrative campaign funds from pro-trade businesses; but supporting the agreement could backfire in pro-environment districts even when environmental voters are few in number, leading to electoral defeats in competitive electoral districts. Previous studies convincingly show that competitive elections amplify the influence of environmental voters. List and Sturm (2006) find that US governors tend to implement pro-environment policies when their electoral sensitivity to environmental voters increases due to electoral competition. Focusing on secondary issues such as gun control, the environment, and reproductive rights, Bouton et al. (2019) show that US Senators vote according

to their own policy preferences toward the beginning of their terms, but more in line with the preferences of single-issue voters in their districts as they approach re-election. This study finds this effect to be especially strong among Senators in highly competitive electoral districts. Most recently, McAlexander and Urpelainen (2020) find that election proximity determines pro-environment voting in the House. Together, these studies show that politicians tend to be more responsive to issue stakeholders with diffuse interests if they face competitive elections.

Environmental side agreements open up a political space in which cross-pressured legislators can broker coalitions between environmental voters and pro-trade businesses. Once an environmental side deal is added to a trade agreement, environmental voters are more willing to accept the trade agreement, thus allowing these legislators to support the agreement. Several legislators fall into this category. Among those who won extremely close elections in 1992 were Jim Bacchus (FL-15, by a 1.4 percentage point margin), Jay Inslee (WA-4, by a 1.7 percentage point margin), Karen Shepherd (UT-2, by a 3 percentage point margin) and Richard Lehman (CA-19, by a 0.5 percentage point margin). These legislators kept their positions on NAFTA ambiguous until after the side agreement was finalized. Once the side deal was concluded, they used the side deal to justify their support for NAFTA and voted for the legislation in November 1993. Most notably, Jay Inslee justified his support for NAFTA, saying:

> "This is the first time we have had a hammer over Mexico to improve their environmental standards. We can punish them with a $20 million trade tariff, if they do not improve enforcement of their environmental standards. Never had it before. (…) Will not have it without NAFTA (Congressional Record Archive 1993)."

As I explain further in the qualitative evidence section, legislators in competitive districts typically used the side agreement as political cover to preserve the support of environmental

voters while attracting campaign financing from pro-trade businesses. The side agreement is not as useful for pro-environment legislators in safe districts because they have a weak electoral incentive to gain pro-trade campaign financing, which could antagonize environmental voters.

If this line of reasoning is valid, pro-environment legislators would be expected to increase their support for trade agreements only if they faced competitive elections.

Electoral advantage hypothesis: Environmental issue linkage boosts support for trade deals from pro-environmental legislators in competitive electoral districts.

Alternative Accounts

The main argument of this paper is distinct from an alternative view that considers legislators as strategic actors who use side agreements to protect import-competing businesses. This alternative view suggests that politicians in protectionist districts support complex environmental standards to disguise their protectionist motivation while effectively avoiding criticism from consumer groups that may benefit from trade (Kono 2006) or partner countries that may bear the cost of environmental standards (Kim 2012). Similarly, Bastiaens and Postnikov (2019) argue that environmental side agreements unite environmentalists and economic protectionist groups particularly in majoritarian electoral systems. If this line of reasoning is valid, we could expect legislators representing districts with a heavy presence of import-competing industries to increase their support for trade deals in exchange for environmental issue linkages.

Economic protection hypothesis: Environmental issue linkage boosts support for trade agreements from legislators representing import-competing industries.

My argument is also distinct from another alternative account that highlights the role of environmentally conscious voters who support fair trade. Prior research shows that some voters support trade liberalization as long as it is environmentally sustainable, thus allowing their legislators to support sustainable trade. Following this reasoning, legislators in pro-environment districts may consider side agreements more seriously when making decisions on trade agreements. Further, they may increase their support for a trade agreement once side agreements are in place if their districts are heavily dependent on export industries. This alternative account views legislators as non-strategic representatives of voter preferences regardless of electoral competition. In contrast, the electoral theory prioritizes legislators' office-seeking motivations and highlights how side agreements become useful for legislators who need to satisfy diverse groups with conflicting demands. If the alternative account is valid, we could expect pro-environment legislators representing districts with a heavy presence of exporting industries to increase their support for trade deals in exchange for environmental issue linkages.

Sustainable trade hypothesis: Environmental linkage increases support for trade deals from legislators representing highly educated, hence environmentally conscious, voters in export-dependent districts.

Data

To test these hypotheses, I draw from surveys of legislators' attitudes on NAFTA. A survey of elites—commissioned by the biggest pro-NAFTA business coalition (USA*NAFTA)—was conducted monthly throughout the year of 1993 in the run up to the final vote for the NAFTA implementation Act in November 1993. Canvassers for the survey called or visited individual members to conduct face-to-face interviews with the members themselves or their staff. The

survey's estimates rank each legislator's attitude toward NAFTA on a scale from zero to one (0 = oppose, 0.25 = leaning against, 0.5 = uncommitted, 0.75 = leaning in favor, 1 = support).

I investigated three sources for the data: trade journals, presidential records, and media coverage. First, a membership-based trade journal, *Inside US Trade*, featured two surveys of legislative attitudes on NAFTA conducted in March and September.[6] Because the USA*NAFTA coalition treated the survey as confidential, they published the results only sparingly. Second, I retrieved survey results dated June 16 through archival research of the Clinton Presidential Records; in June, the coalition had shared its survey results with the Clinton Administration. Third, I investigated the media coverage of NAFTA, recovering two sets of media-led surveys of legislative attitudes on NAFTA. Taken together, I retrieved five waves of congressional survey on NAFTA (For descriptive statistics and the sources of data, see Appendix C).

Date	Survey source	Archival source	Missing data	Mean (St. deviation)
March 11	US Alliance for NAFTA	Inside US Trade	8	0.49 (0.28)
June 16	US Alliance for NAFTA	Clinton Presidential Library Archives	46[7]	0.56 (0.35)
September 20	US Alliance for NAFTA	Inside US Trade	0	0.49 (0.37)
October (no exact date)	Congress Daily	National Journal's Congress Daily	0	0.43 (0.38)
November 15 (2 days before the votes)	The Associated Press	USA Today	0	0.47 (0.45)

Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Outcome Variable

Figure 4 illustrates how members changed their positions on NAFTA in the five surveys. Primarily, I used legislators' attitudes on NAFTA in surveys conducted at two time points: the first on June 16 (pre-linkage) and the second on September 20 (post-linkage). I then subtracted

[6] Also see Cinar and Gulotty N.P. for the September survey.
[7] There are 46 missing observations in this survey. 24 members in New York, 18 in Texas, 3 in Tennessee, and one in California. Except for California, the missing observations are due to the accidental and random omission of two pages of the survey in the Presidential Records. The survey does not have data on California's 17th district is because the seat was vacant during this time period.

the June estimates from the September estimates to measure the degree to which individual legislators increased their support for NAFTA from June 16 to September 20.

The choice to present the results from the June and September surveys was made in the interest of prioritizing causal leverage. On May 21, NAFTA parties circulated the first draft text of environmental and labor side agreements.[8] The Composite Draft of the environmental agreement shows that the negotiating parties had divergent preferences regarding enforcement: the U.S. proposed that the dispute settlement mechanism in the NAFTA agreement should be used to resolve environmental disputes (e.g., trade sanctions as an enforcement tool), whereas Canada and Mexico were opposed. Due to the conflict with Canada and Mexico, the Clinton administration tabled the environmental agreement in May 1993. As such, the June 16 survey captures legislators' baseline attitudes on NAFTA, assuming that the environmental side agreement would lack any meaningful enforcement mechanism. In August 1993, the government signed off on a "document virtually identical to the tabled document" except for the language on dispute settlement (Inside US Trade 1993: p.20). On September 13, the NAFTA parties signed an environmental side agreement with strong enforcement provisions preferred by the US. The final agreement allows for monetary fines and the suspension of trade benefits as enforcement tools. As such, the September 20 survey captures the legislators' updated attitudes on NAFTA, after the Clinton administration delivered a stronger environmental agreement than they had expected on June 16. This clean change allows me to study how legislators changed their attitudes on the trade agreement after the executive branch reduced the uncertainty on enforcement of the side agreement. That said, I recognize the possibility that the September

[8] See Special Report on NAFTA, Inside US Trade, June 11, 1993. S6-S7.

survey did not fully capture legislative attitudes on the side agreement for various reasons. To allay the concern, I conduct robustness checks using the final vote.





Figure 4. House Member Attitudes on NAFTA in 1993 (Data source in Table 1)

Results

The focus of this analysis is to test hypotheses regarding whether and how issue linkage sways legislators. First, I test whether environmental issue linkages increase support for trade among legislators representing import-competing industries (*Economic Protection hypothesis*). To do so, I rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of import-competing industries from 1993. If this theory is valid, I should find a positive correlation between the concentration of import-competing industries in a district and a change in the legislators' support for NAFTA. It is also possible that the ratio of employees in import-competing industries to those in exporting

industries may be more relevant for legislators, so I also report the results using this ratio as the explanatory variable.[9]

Second, I test whether issue linkage boosts support for trade deals among pro-environment legislators serving exporting industries *(Sustainable Trade hypothesis).* In order to measure legislators' commitment to environmental issues, I use the annual scorecard indicators from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV). The scores range from 0 to 1, and are "calculated by dividing the number of pro-environmental votes cast by the total number of votes scored (The League of Conservation Voters website)." The League selects which votes to include in the indicators based on "the consensus of experts from about 20 respected environmental and conservation organizations." The indicator usually includes environmental issues such as energy, global warming, public health, public land and wildlife conservation, and spending on environmental programs.[10] I then analyze the interaction of the LCV scores with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for exporting industries in each electoral district. If the hypothesis is valid, I expect to find a positive correlation between the interaction term and the effects of linking the environmental side deal to NAFTA, as this theory argues that issue linkage facilitates logrolling between environmental voters and pro-trade businesses. If environmental voters tended to become more supportive of NAFTA because of the environmental side deal, pro-environment legislators representing exporting industries would be expected to increase their support for NAFTA accordingly.

[9] I use the data from Conconi et al. (2014). Drawing from the Census data, the authors compute the number of employees of each constituency in export and import-competing industries.

[10] I present the results using legislators' lifetime scores measured in 1993, rather than the annual scores, because the cumulative data better capture their genuine commitment to environmental protection. Although the correlation between members' lifetime and annual scores is relatively high (Pearson correlation = 0.89), I also report the results based on legislators' annual environmental scores in Appendix E.

Third, I test whether pro-environmental legislators increased their support for NAFTA because of the side agreement only if they faced electoral competition. To test this hypothesis, I interact the League of Conservation Voters' environmental scores with another variable that captures electoral competition in each district. I call this variable *Competition*. *Competition* is a binary variable that measures the competitiveness of the most recent past election in which legislators ran. For the House of Representatives, the most recent election at the time was held in 1992. I code congressional districts as safe if the winning candidate gained more than 60% of the total vote, and competitive otherwise. My theoretical expectation is that pro-environmental legislators tend to increase their support for NAFTA in return for environmental linkages if they are facing competitive elections. Thus, if this theory is valid, I would expect the interaction of *Environment* and *Competition* to show a positive sign. I also conduct a set of robustness checks by varying the threshold for competitive elections in Appendix A.

Finally, I include labor donations to control for the effect of the labor side agreement that was negotiated in the same time period. For legislators highly dependent on labor contributions, labor's support was the most important consideration in their decision on NAFTA. In general, I expect this variable to be negatively correlated with the outcome variable, because labor groups strategically changed their contribution plans closer to the NAFTA vote. However, if the labor side accord negotiated by the Clinton administration convinced some pro-labor legislators to support NAFTA despite labor's lobbying efforts, the correlation may not be as strong as expected. I also include a variable for Democrats to control for the effect of partisanship. Studies suggest a strong positive correlation between the representation of left-wing parties and pro-environmental policies (Neumayer 2004, 2003). If this is the case, congressional Democrats

should be more likely to change their positions and support NAFTA after the finalization of the environmental side agreement.

I estimate the models using OLS regressions. Table 2 reports the results of the OLS models in which the dependent variable is the extent to which legislators changed their positions on NAFTA one week after the conclusion of the environmental agreement relative to their stated positions in June 1993.

As the results from Model 1 indicate, I find no evidence that legislators representing import-competing industries became more supportive of NAFTA after the conclusion of the environmental side agreement. While the coefficient on Import-competing industries, measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is positive as predicted by the *Economic Protection* theory, it is not statistically significant. Alternatively, Model 2 uses the ratio of employees in import-competing sectors to those in exporting industries. With the alternative indicator, the null results still hold. Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that the environmental side deal swayed legislators representing import-competing constituencies.

Next, I test whether legislators representing pro-environment constituencies in export-reliant districts tend to increase their support for trade deals when side agreements are reached. The results from Model 3 suggest that legislators' environmental scores alone are in no way correlated with their support for NAFTA following the approval of the side agreement. In Model 4, I test the *Sustainable Trade hypothesis* using legislators' environmental scores (LCV lifetime scores) and the export dependence of their districts to determine whether the side agreement boosted support for the trade deal among pro-environment legislators in export-dependent districts. If this hypothesis is valid, the interaction of legislators' environmental scores and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for exporting industries will be positively related to the outcome

variable. As the results from Model 4 indicate, the coefficient on the interaction of *Environment* and *Export* is negative but statistically non-significant. Instead of using legislators' environmental scores, I use voter education as a proxy to capture voter preferences for environmental sustainability. As reported in Appendix F, neither *Education* nor its interaction with *Export* is correlated with linkage effects.

	LINKAGE EFFECT				
	(1.Protection)	(2.Protection)	(3.Sustainable Trade)	(4.Sustainable Trade)	(5.Electoral Advantage)
IMPORT-COMPETING	0.07				
	(0.15)				
EMPLOYEES		−0.001			
		(0.01)			
ENVIRONMENT			−0.06	0.01	−0.11**
			(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.05)
EXPORT				−0.04	
				(0.20)	
ENVIRONMENT:EXPORT				−0.23	
				(0.37)	
COMPETITION					−0.04
					(0.04)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION					0.13**
					(0.06)
LABOR PAC	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
DEMOCRAT	−0.05**	−0.05**	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CONSTANT	−0.08**	−0.07**	−0.07***	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Observations	388	388	387	387	387
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.04
Adjusted R-squared	0.01	0.005	0.01	0.01	0.02
Residual standard error	0.19 (df = 384)	0.19 (df = 384)	0.19 (df = 383)	0.19 (df = 381)	0.19 (df = 381)
F statistic	1.68 (df = 3; 384)	1.61 (df = 3; 384)	2.50* (df = 3; 383)	1.93* (df = 5; 381)	2.84** (df = 5; 381)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1				

Table 2. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA after the Finalization of the Environmental Side Agreement (OLS Regressions)

Finally, I find support for the *Electoral Advantage hypothesis*. The sign on the interaction term in Model 5 is positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis. Figure 5 is a marginal effect plot that visualizes how environmental commitment conditions the effect of electoral competition. The results indicate that by September, a legislator with the highest environmental score running in a safe district would be expected to have decreased her support for NAFTA by 15.3 percentage points from her baseline support in June. In competitive districts, a legislator with the highest environmental commitment score would be expected to have decreased her

support for NAFTA by only 5.9 percentage points compared to her position in June. According to the results, if legislators in safe districts are strongly committed to environmental issues, we can expect to see a significant drop in their support for a trade deal even if environmental safeguards are attached. By contrast, pro-environment legislators in competitive districts are expected to maintain their support for NAFTA. To contextualize the results, the general sentiment about NAFTA in the Congress became significantly negative in early September of 1993. In August, approximately thirty members were either undecided or negative about NAFTA.[11] However, another undisclosed survey published on September 10, three days before the signing of the environmental side agreement, records that fifty one members were undecided or negative about NAFTA. In this adverse environment, pro-environmental members in competitive districts stood their ground.

The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables such as partisanship, ideology, labor lobbying, and education. Of course, there may be important characteristics that the models do not account for, such as pollution, unemployment rates, or other regional variations. Although these are important confounders, it is difficult to map them onto electoral districts. Pollution typically affects multiple districts in a state; people find work in a commuting zone rather than within an electoral district. For this reason, I include state-level fixed effects to control for the average differences in pollution, unemployment, and other latent confounders across states. As reported in Appendix B, the results still hold, and the interaction term in the fully saturated model with state-level fixed effects is significant at the 90% confidence level.

Altogether, the results suggest that the establishment of the environmental side agreement did not boost support for NAFTA among pro-environment or pro-protection legislators. If

[11] Inside US Trade records that the Clinton administration was thirty votes short as of August 1, and thirty-one votes short as of August 27, 1993. See Special Report in Inside US Trade, October 1, 1993.

anything, pro-environment legislators in safe districts tended to increase their opposition to NAFTA in September 1993 despite the inclusion of the side agreement. That said, some pro-environment legislators in competitive districts were less negative about NAFTA and remained uncommitted to a position on the agreement in the post-linkage period, presumably feeling the need to diversify their bases of support.



Figure 5. Marginal Effects of Environmental Scores on Support Increases by Electoral Conditions (OLS results)

The above findings reveal that pro-environmental and pro-protection legislators did not boost their support for NAFTA, and even decreased their support, immediately after the conclusion of the side agreement. One important remaining question is whether these patterns lasted. Given the high stakes of the trade agreement, some legislators might have strategically delayed committing to a position until the final voting date. To investigate this possibility, I study whether the environmental side agreement boosted legislators' support for the NAFTA Implementation Act. The NAFTA Implementation Act (H.R. 3450) was passed in the House on

November 17, 1993, approximately two months after the September survey. I thus test whether the moderating effect of electoral competition is still borne out in the final votes.

In this case, I use logistic regression models to estimate legislators' final votes. My goal is to estimate individual legislators' tendency to change their positions at the final voting stage given their baseline attitudes on NAFTA in the pre-linkage period. I again include the estimates of individual legislators' positions collected in June of 1993 in order to capture their baseline attitudes. This variable is *Pre-linkage attitude*.

	FINAL VOTES				
	(1.Protection)	(2.Protection)	(3.Sustainable trade)	(4.Sustainable trade)	(5.Electoral advantage)
IMPORT-COMPETING	2.21				
	(2.01)				
EMPLOYEES		−0.02			
		(0.08)			
ENVIRONMENT			0.14	1.08	−0.89
			(0.65)	(1.98)	(0.78)
EXPORT				2.03	
				(2.99)	
ENVIRONMENT:EXPORT				−2.34	
				(5.27)	
COMPETITION					−1.52***
					(0.59)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION					2.42**
					(0.94)
LABOR PAC	−0.06	−0.05	−0.04	−0.04	−0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
DEMOCRAT	−0.42	−0.39	−0.52	−0.59	−0.50
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.43)
PRE-LINKAGE ATTITUDE	4.32***	4.33***	4.38***	4.37***	4.61***
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.50)
CONSTANT	−1.77***	−1.44***	−1.65***	−2.38**	−0.94
	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.52)	(1.19)	(0.59)
Observations	388	388	387	387	387
Log likelihood	−179.61	−180.20	−178.96	−178.69	−175.29
Akaike information criterion	369.23	370.41	367.93	371.37	364.59
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1				

Table 3: Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Support for NAFTA in the Final Roll Call Votes

The results reported in Table 3 are largely consistent with the above findings. Of course, the coefficients on *Pre-linkage attitude* are positively correlated with final votes, with p-values smaller than 0.01. While the coefficient on *Import-competing* is positively correlated with legislators' tendency to increase support for the NAFTA Implementation Act (Models 1), it is

not statistically significant at any conventional levels. Likewise, the ratio of employees in import-competing sectors to export sectors does not explain legislative behavior in the final vote. Similarly, there is only weak support for the *Sustainable Trade hypothesis*. Contrary to the theory's prediction, the coefficient on the interaction of *Environment* and *Export* is negatively associated with legislative support for NAFTA, indicating that pro-environment legislators in export-dependent districts withdrew their support in the final vote. That said, the coefficient is not significant at any conventional levels.

Although the results for the *Sustainable Trade hypothesis* are largely in line with the previous results from OLS regressions, there is one difference. In an alternative model, I substitute *Education* for *Environment* (legislators' environmental scores) to capture voter attitudes on sustainable trade, and then analyze the interaction of *Education* and *Export*. Although education alone is in no way correlated to the extent to which legislators increased support for NAFTA, legislators in export-dependent and highly educated constituencies significantly increased support for NAFTA in the final vote compared to their proclaimed positions in June 1993 (See Appendix F). The results partially confirm previous findings on the link between education and preferences for sustainable trade (e.g., Ehrlich 2010). However, the results also show that college-educated voters alone may not be able to pressure legislators into changing their positions on a trade deal due to the addition of a side agreement. Without the strong pressure from exporters in their districts, legislators rarely increase their support for trade deals at the last minute.

Finally, the results from Model 5 lend strong support to the *Electoral Advantage hypothesis*: legislators' environmental scores and their post-linkage support for NAFTA are positively associated only for those in competitive electoral districts, not those representing safe

districts. Substantively, a pro-environmental legislator with the highest environmental score has a 44.3% predicted probability of supporting NAFTA if she is in a safe seat. The model predicts that a similar legislator with a strong environmental reputation would have a 65.3% likelihood of supporting NAFTA if she is in a competitive seat. To sum up, pro-environmental legislators in competitive electoral districts are 21 percentage points more likely to increase support for the trade deal than those in safe districts once the environmental side agreement is concluded.



Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Environmental Scores on Support Increases in the Final Votes



Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities of Pro-NAFTA Support Controlling for Proclaimed Positions in the Pre-linkage Period (Green: Competitive seat, Red: Safe seat)

Issue Linkage as Means to Diversify Support

The findings support the conclusion that issue linkage works conditionally. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, environmental issue linkage does not boost support from economically-motivated protectionists. Neither does it sway pro-environment legislators in export-dependent districts. Instead, the results show that issue linkage divides pro-environment legislators into pro-linkage and anti-linkage factions depending on the electoral worthiness of the linkage.

Regarding the mechanism behind this electoral account, pro-environmental legislators in competitive districts face an electoral dilemma when major trade agreements are negotiated. On the one hand, they can oppose trade agreements and preserve support from environmental voters. However, this may not be the best strategy, as it may cost them support from pro-trade groups. Alternatively, they may choose to placate pro-trade groups by supporting trade deals; doing so,

however, may antagonize environmental constituencies who tend to lean against trade liberalization. Either way, the risk of choosing one side is higher in competitive districts, because losing support from the other side can have decisive effects on the upcoming election.

Qualitative evidence provides support for this line of reasoning. Jim Bacchus's Florida district was one of the districts where environmental issues would play a key role in the 1994 election according to an environmental media organization (Greenwire 1993). In an interview on October 18, 1993, Bacchus's press secretary (FL-15) said on record that NAFTA would open up markets for the aerospace and high-tech industries in his district. When the journalist asked what they would tell Bacchus's other anti-NAFTA constituents, recalling the narrow margin of victory in his last election, the aide said that they would have to "balance" that. In this interview, another congressional staff member confirmed that many legislators were facing an electoral dilemma between pro-trade and environmental groups (Gerstenzang 1993). He said:

> There's no real grass-roots support for this thing. In talking to some of the business community, they say they'll support it and send a letter. But is it a defining moment? No. But you've got a lot of environmentalists, who are the most vocal, and labor too. They see blood on the water. They're like sharks.

In this circumstance, if legislators can convince environmental groups of the strategic worthiness of the side agreement and earn environmentalists' support for NAFTA, they can minimize the risk of losing environmental groups' support on the ballot and preserve support from pro-trade groups. To sum up, when the level of electoral sensitivity increases, legislators have stronger incentives to support the issue linkage strategy and diversify their support base.

To contextualize the results, I closely examine whether pro-environment legislators who supported NAFTA were motivated by the need to diversify their support base. In October 1993,

the *Greenwire*, a news organization covering energy and environmental policies, selected fifteen House districts where environmental issues were expected to play a key role in the upcoming 1994 election. Among those districts, thirteen legislators won the 1992 election by less than 10 percentage points. The upper plot in Figure 3 illustrates how those legislators changed their positions on NAFTA as the Clinton administration finalized the environmental agreement in September. It is notable that Daniel Hamburg (CA-1) was the only legislator who continued to express his firm opposition to NAFTA since March, while most of those legislators changed or maintained ambiguous positions until September and October, around the time the environmental side agreement was finalized in mid-September. Among them, five legislators ended up supporting NAFTA.

Did the legislators who supported the side agreement consider the need to diversify their support base? The lower plot in Figure 8 shows the proportion of campaign contributions these legislators gained from individual voters affiliated with a pro-NAFTA corporation in 1993 and 1994.[12] Although the plot does not reveal any causal relationship, it shows that the legislators who supported NAFTA after the environmental side deal typically gained more support from pro-NAFTA voters during and after the discussion on the NAFTA bill than those who ended up opposing NAFTA.

Simultaneously, environmental groups did not punish legislators for their pro-NAFTA vote. For example, the League of Conservation Voters, a group of environmental experts from

[12] Campaign finance data from the Federal Election Commission at www.fec.gov. I identified pro-NAFTA companies based on membership information regarding the USA*NAFTA coalition. Also see Osgood 2017.



Figure 8. Temporal Trends of Pro-environment Legislators' Attitudes on NAFTA in Competitive Districts & Pro-NAFTA Donations

major NGOs, did not include the NAFTA vote as part of the key environmental votes on which they assessed legislators' commitment to environmental protection in 1993. This may be partly due to the fact that environmentalists themselves were divided on the credibility of the environmental side agreement. In 1993, major environmental NGOs such as the Sierra Club and Friends of Earth formed an adversarial coalition with anti-NAFTA economic interest groups such as Mobilization on Development, Trade, Labor, and the Environment (MODTLE) and Citizen's Trade Watch Campaign (CTWC). These activists demanded that the government make the agreement more enforceable by granting the North American Commission for the Environment (NACE) the mandate to use trade sanctions without the NAFTA parties' approval. Against the adversarial coalition of environmental activists, there emerged a coalition of accommodating NGOs: the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Wildlife Fund, and Conservation International formally announced their support for NAFTA and constituted the crux of the accommodating coalition (Audley 1997). Those NGOs, both anti-linkage and pro-linkage, together make up the expert panel that assesses legislators' environmental commitment through the League of Conservation Voters initiative. As a result of the division within the environmental community, pro-environment legislators who supported the NAFTA bill could avoid compromising their environmental reputations. Thus, pro-environment legislators who supported the side agreement were able to gain an electoral advantage by attracting pro-trade support, while also using the side deal as political cover to justify their pro-NAFTA votes to environmental groups.

A second important consideration regarding mechanisms is the following: why is there little evidence in support of the *Economic Protection* theory? The finding is puzzling given that

studies find evidence that environmental and health standards in trade deals can serve as barriers to foreign products, hence, protecting domestic import-competing industries. Despite the protectionist effects of environmental linkages, legislators representing import-competing industries did not boost their support for NAFTA after the inclusion of the environmental side agreement.

It is possible that import-competing industries found the enforcement of environmental linkages non-credible *ex ante*. Although environmental linkages could be used as barriers to foreign trade *ex post*, their economic effects may not have been clear to import-competing industries and labor groups during the negotiation phase. Supporting this line of reasoning, qualitative evidence suggests that protectionist groups invested their resources to lobby the government to gain exclusive protectionist measures that were more credible to them and largely deferred to environmental groups when it came to the environmental agreement. Specifically, I analyzed the news articles featured in *Inside US Trade*, a trade journal, from January to September 1993. This organization exhaustively covered the negotiations of the environmental side agreement and featured various interest groups' demands regarding the side deal. As reported in Appendix G, protectionist groups were largely silent on the design of the environmental side deal, whereas they proactively engaged in discussions on the labor side agreement. With the exception of one broad statement by the AFL-CIO, the letters and statements regarding the environmental side deal were mostly from environmental groups demanding stronger enforcement clauses.

Discussion

Side agreements are known to enhance the prospects for international cooperation, especially when negotiating parties have differential preferences on a set of issues (McKibben 2010; Tollison & Willett 1979; Sebenius 1983). In the context of trade negotiations such as NAFTA, the NAFTA parties expected that the environmental side agreement would be essential to satisfy House Democrats, one of the most important veto players to the ratification of NAFTA. Since NAFTA, the U.S. government has continued to negotiate labor and environmental side agreements to attract pro-trade support from environmentally conscious legislators and enhance the chances of ratification. The linkage practice was widely adopted by President Bush and President Obama. President George W. Bush kept environmental provisions in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement in 2001, despite his campaign pledge to readjust those clauses negotiated by the Clinton administration ("Bush Says Trade" 2001). Despite important economic and environmental consequences of those side deals, there have been no rigorous tests of the claim that the issue linkage successfully boosts support for the trade agreements.

Using novel survey data, this study advances our understanding of how side agreements promote strategic coalitions between pro-trade businesses and environmental groups in the cauldron of domestic politics. Scholars have assumed that issue linkages facilitate the formation of strange coalitions between Baptists and Bootleggers. The results of this study show that such strange coalitions successfully form only when pro-environment politicians have the electoral incentive to diversify their bases of support and reach out to pro-trade businesses.

I also tested the validity of a set of existing arguments regarding the effectiveness of issue linkage. Most importantly, I find little evidence that legislators representing protectionist districts promote environmental linkages during the negotiation stage. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that import-competing industries refrain from using environmental clauses to protect their

businesses once those clauses are in effect. Instead, the results suggest that environmental issue linkages are not sufficient to ease economically-motivated opponents' grievances *during the negotiation stage.*

There are a few important scope conditions for this argument. First, issue linkage may operate differently in other countries with different types of legislatures. For example, the electoral account may be less relevant in legislatures with strong party discipline. When political parties can discipline their members on important issues such as trade, individual legislators may not have the leeway to deviate from their party lines despite side agreements. The European Commission, for instance, may have to negotiate a very strong environmental side deal that can satisfy European legislators affiliated with ecological parties because those parties, not individual legislators, typically exercise more in influence in election campaigns than in the US. Second, the findings may be less generalizable to legislative behavior in developing democracies and authoritarian countries, where environmental groups find it difficult to exercise influence on legislators. The findings on electoral competition are predicated on the idea that legislators have the incentive to cater to two constituencies, pro-trade groups and environmental voters, if doing so helps them win close elections. Therefore, even if individual citizens in developing countries view environmental linkages in a positive light, as Bernauer and Nguyen (2015) suggest, additional research is needed to determine whether pro-environment politicians in those countries would support trade deals if environmental groups do not have the same level of electoral influence that their American counterparts had in 1993.

That said, this article has important implications for our understanding of how issue linkage promotes trade liberalization among legislators operating in post-materialist economies with majoritarian electoral systems (e.g., the US, UK). Although scholars have studied the

benefits of inter-state logrolling, this line of studies has left unanswered how issue linkages reshape domestic cleavages on trade liberalization in legislatures. This article has addressed this question by examining the case of NAFTA. In doing so, it shows that the effect of international institutions can be better understood by analyzing the incentives of domestic political agents.

The findings presented in this article have useful policy implications for pro-trade political leaders in the US. Experts tend to advise US presidents to include environmental clauses in trade deals as a concession to House Democrats writ large. The analysis in this paper adds rigor to this reasoning. This article suggests that pro-trade presidents should not expect environmental linkages to reduce the grievances of all House Democrats or legislators representing import-competing industries. Instead, they are well-advised to consider how best to design face-saving measures for electorally pressured legislators in pro-environment districts, who need political cover for supporting trade deals.

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Appendix

A. *How Competitive Should Future Elections Be?*

I consider electoral pressure to be relatively high, if a member's previous vote share did not exceed 60%. I conduct additional tests by lowering the threshold of electoral competition to 51%. As the results in Table A-1 show, the signs of the baseline variables and the interaction term are consistent with the general theory throughout the models. Overall, the coefficients are statistically significant except for the 51% threshold.

	LINKAGE EFFECT BY VOTE SHARE					
	(<58%)	(<57%)	(<56%)	(<55%)	(<52%)	(<51%)
ENVIRONMENT	−0.12**	−0.11**	−0.11**	−0.09*	−0.08	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
COMPETITION	−0.05	−0.05	−0.07	−0.06	−0.10**	−0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	0.16**	0.15**	0.17**	0.14*	0.15*	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
LABOR PAC	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
DEMOCRAT	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CONSTANT	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.05	−0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	387	387	387	387	387	387
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
Adjusted R-squared	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01
Residual standard error (df = 381)	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
F statistic (df = 5; 381)	3.19***	2.92**	3.12***	2.30**	2.33**	2.08*
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1					

Table A-1. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA at Different Levels of Electoral Competition (OLS Regressions)

	LINKAGE EFFECT BY VOTE SHARE (FINAL VOTES)					
	(<58%)	(<57%)	(<56%)	(<55%)	(<52%)	(<51%)
ENVIRONMENT	−0.68	−0.46	−0.29	−0.34	0.03	0.10
	(0.74)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.69)
COMPETITION	−1.44**	−1.16*	−1.25**	−1.53**	−1.19*	−1.73**
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.71)	(0.74)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	2.40**	2.03**	1.85*	2.30**	1.34	1.28
	(0.94)	(0.96)	(0.98)	(1.00)	(1.16)	(1.27)
DEMOCRAT	−0.54	−0.51	−0.53	−0.55	−0.58	−0.64
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)
LABOR PAC	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.06	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
PRE-LINKAGE ATTITUDE	4.55***	4.45***	4.46***	4.51***	4.45***	4.51***
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
CONSTANT	−1.04*	−1.15**	−1.21**	−1.16**	−1.45***	−1.46***
	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.53)	(0.53)
Observations	387	387	387	387	387	387
Log likelihood	−175.56	−176.72	−176.93	−175.97	−177.50	−174.90
Akaike information criterion	365.13	367.45	367.87	365.94	369.00	363.81
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1					

Table A-2. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA at Different Levels of Electoral Competition (Logistic Regressions)

B. *Other Controls: How Robust Are the Results?*

In addition to the controls in the main analysis, I include two other control variables, *Education* and *Ideology* scores. As for education, I include the proportion of the population over the age of 25 holding a B.A. degree. I draw from Conconi et al.'s data based on the U.S. Census (2014). Typically, *Education* is expected to be positively correlated with support for trade liberalization. That said, it is not clear whether *Education* plays an equally important role in explaining the "change" in legislative support for trade deals. Because voter make-up is a relatively static factor, legislators representing highly educated districts may have already taken their constituents' trade preferences into account in June. If this were the case, the relationship between *Education* and an increase in support for NAFTA is expected to be positive yet weak at best. Confirming this line of reasoning, the coefficients on *Education* are positive yet not significant.

One might also argue that legislators' ideology scores could weaken the results, as their ideological positions might affect their chances of being elected in competitive districts to begin with. However, including the economic ideological score does not change the results.

Finally, I also include state-level fixed effects to test whether latent confounding variables such as pollution or unemployment are affecting the results. The results still hold in the models with fixed effects (See Tables B-1 and B-2).

	LINKAGE EFFECT		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ENVIRONMENT	−0.12**	−0.11	−0.13
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)
COMPETITION	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	0.13**	0.12*	0.15**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
LABOR PAC	0.004	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
DEMOCRAT	−0.02	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
EDUCATION	0.08	0.07	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
CONSERVATISM		0.03	−0.03
		(0.08)	(0.09)
CONSTANT	−0.06	−0.07	−0.12
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.09)
State Fixed Effects			✓
Observations	387	387	387
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.16
Adjusted R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual standard error	0.19 (df = 380)	0.19 (df = 379)	0.19 (df = 330)
F statistic	2.42** (df = 6; 380)	2.08** (df = 7; 379)	1.11 (df = 56; 330)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		

Table B-1. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA with Controls and State-level Fixed Effects (OLS Regressions)

	FINAL VOTES		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ENVIRONMENT	−1.19	−0.63	−0.58
	(0.81)	(1.00)	(1.26)
COMPETITION	−1.55***	−1.51**	−2.54***
	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.78)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	2.43***	2.27**	3.55***
	(0.94)	(0.96)	(1.26)
DEMOCRAT	−0.32	0.21	−0.62
	(0.45)	(0.70)	(0.92)
LABOR PAC	−0.07	−0.05	−0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
EDUCATION	2.42	2.38	1.96
	(1.97)	(1.98)	(2.33)
CONSERVATISM		1.17	0.71
		(1.17)	(1.40)
PRE-LINKAGE ATTITUDE	4.52***	4.46***	4.99***
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.67)
CONSTANT	−1.25*	−1.83**	−2.89*
	(0.64)	(0.87)	(1.52)
State Fixed Effects			✓
Observations	387	387	387
Log likelihood	−174.54	−174.03	−133.96
Akaike information criterion	365.07	366.07	383.92
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		

Table B-2. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA with Controls and State-level Fixed Effects (Logistic Regressions)

	LINKAGE EFFECT			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ENVIRONMENT	−0.13**	−0.13*	−0.12**	−0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
COMPETITION	−0.04	−0.05	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	0.13**	0.16**	0.13**	0.14**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
LABOR PAC	0.004	0.001	0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
DEMOCRAT	−0.03	−0.02	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
IMPORT-COMPETING	0.10	0.12		
	(0.15)	(0.16)		
EXPORT	−0.16	−0.13		
	(0.11)	(0.13)		
EMPLOYEES			−0.003	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)
CONSTANT	0.001	−0.09	−0.04	−0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.08)
State Fixed Effects		✓		✓
Observations	387	387	387	387
R-squared	0.04	0.16	0.04	0.16
Adjusted R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual standard error	0.19 (df = 379)	0.19 (df = 330)	0.19 (df = 380)	0.19 (df = 331)
F statistic	2.37** (df = 7; 379)	1.14 (df = 56; 330)	2.40** (df = 6; 380)	1.15 (df = 55; 331)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1			

Table B-3. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA Controlling for on Import-competing and Export Sectors and State-level Fixed Effects (OLS Regressions)

	FINAL VOTES			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ENVIRONMENT	−0.91	−0.65	−0.93	−0.72
	(0.81)	(1.12)	(0.78)	(1.05)
COMPETITION	−1.54***	−2.65***	−1.54***	−2.56***
	(0.59)	(0.81)	(0.59)	(0.78)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	2.45**	3.82***	2.46***	3.68***
	(0.95)	(1.28)	(0.94)	(1.23)
IMPORT-COMPETING	2.53	4.49		
	(2.07)	(2.78)		
EXPORT	0.24	0.92		
	(1.53)	(2.13)		
EMPLOYEES			−0.04	0.07
			(0.08)	(0.12)
DEMOCRAT	−0.52	−1.23**	−0.48	−1.11*
	(0.43)	(0.60)	(0.43)	(0.58)
LABOR PAC	−0.06	−0.09	−0.06	−0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
PRE-LINKAGE ATTITUDES	4.59***	5.10***	4.59***	5.11***
	(0.51)	(0.68)	(0.51)	(0.67)
CONSTANT	−1.33	−3.15*	−0.78	−2.57*
	(0.85)	(1.69)	(0.67)	(1.44)
State fixed effect		✓		✓
Observations	387	387	387	387
Log likelihood	−174.50	−132.89	−175.18	−134.31
Akaike information criterion	367.00	381.79	366.37	382.62
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1			

Table B-4. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA Controlling for Import-competing and Export Sectors and State-level Fixed Effects (Logistic Regressions)

C. *Descriptive Statistics of the Dataset*

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Sources
MARCH	426	0.50	0.29	0.00	1.00	Survey
JUNE	388	0.57	0.35	0.00	1.00	Survey
SEP	434	0.49	0.37	0	1	Survey
OCT	434	0.44	0.39	0.00	1.00	Survey
NOV	434	0.48	0.45	0	1	Survey
FINAL VOTE	434	0.54	0.50	0	1	Congress archives
ENVIRONMENT	433	0.52	0.31	0.02	0.98	LCV scorecards
COMPETITION	434	0.47	0.50	0	1	Federal Election Commission
IMPORT-COMPETING	434	0.16	0.07	0.08	0.56	US Census, as cited in Conconi et al. (2014)
EXPORT	434	0.36	0.10	0.22	0.29	US Census, as cited in Conconi et al. (2014)
EMPLOYEES	434	2.87	1.76	0.34	1.69	US Census, as cited in Conconi et al. (2014)
logged(LABOR PAC)	434	8.88	3.64	0.00	12.75	Center for Responsive Politics
DEMOCRAT	434	0.59	0.49	0	1	Congress archives
EDUCATION	434	0.20	0.08	0.05	0.51	US Census, as cited in Conconi et al. (2014)
CONSERVATISM	434	−0.05	0.38	−0.77	0.79	DW-Nominate, as cited in Lewis et al. (2021)

Table C. Descriptive Statistics of the Data

D. *Other temporal thresholds*

The main analysis investigates how legislators changed their attitudes in September relative to their proclaimed positions in June 1993. I chose the June and September waves based on a careful examination of relevant qualitative evidence. That said, it is possible that the September survey did not fully capture legislative attitudes toward the side agreement for various reasons. To mitigate this concern, I use all five surveys to investigate whether pro-environment legislators in competitive electoral districts increased their support for NAFTA during any of the time periods in the survey data.

Table C reports the results. The first model (March - June) investigates how legislators' environmental commitment and their electoral incentives are associated with the linkage effect from March to June of 1993. The coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant; the other variables do a poor job explaining the variation in this model. These null results make sense in two respects. First, it was mostly Republicans who changed their positions on NAFTA in this initial period. Figure 4 in the main text illustrates the trend. In March, Republicans remained cautious about NAFTA because they were caught between loyalty to pro-trade groups and suspicions of the pro-trade Democratic president. However, many of the cautious House Republicans had chosen to support NAFTA by June, and Republican positions on NAFTA remained relatively constant until the final vote (except for a brief deviation in October). Because my model is designed to capture the effect of the environmental side agreement, I expect this model to have little explanatory power with regard to Republican attitudes, since the environmental side agreement was designed to sway House Democrats.

At first glance, the results from the September - October model seem to suggest that pro-environment members in competitive districts decreased their support for the agreement relative to those in safe districts. On closer examination, however, among the 54 pro-environment members (with lifetime LCV scores of at lest 90), 14 members increased their support in October; only two of whom represented safe districts.[13] Anti-environment members in competitive districts better explain the variation during this time period: among the 114 anti-environmental members with LCV scores of 20 or lower, 36 (approximately 32%) decreased their support for NAFTA in October compared to their stated positions in September. A majority of those members were staunch supporters of NAFTA. Out of 60 anti-environmental members who were in the "support" category in September, twenty members had lowered their support to "leaning in favor" or "undecided" by October. Among those twenty members, eighteen ultimately reverted back to their original position and supported the NAFTA bill in the final vote.[14] Considering the final positions held by those members, I am confident that the results in the September-October model are largely driven by anti-environmental members' legislative posturing.

Finally, in line with the main results, the results from the October - November model confirm the importance of pro-environment members in competitive districts. In October 1993, fifteen pro-environmental members (with LCVs greater than or equal to 90) remained undecided on NAFTA. Except for NY-9 and CA-8 represented respectively by Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi, the remaining thirteen districts were highly competitive. Incumbents in competitive

[13] They are Nancy Pelosi (CA-8: Leaning opposed to Undecided), Jo Kennedy (MA-8: Undecided to Support).

[14] Those 18 members who postured to re-consider their support represented highly competitive electoral districts.

districts had a strong incentive to delay committing themselves to positions early in the ratification process. Among those fifteen pro-environmental legislators, eight confirmed their support two days before the final vote, and ten ended up supporting NAFTA at the final vote. The results suggest that pro-environment members in competitive districts are generally cautious about taking a firm position on trade liberalization; in this case, the side agreement must have helped move the needle for the conflicted legislators, at least on the margins.

	(MAR - JUNE)	(JUNE - SEP)	(SEP - OCT)
ENVIRONMENT	−0.04	0.18**	−0.10
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
COMPETITION	−0.01	0.01	−0.12***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ENVIRONMENT:COMPETITION	−0.01	−0.15**	0.22***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
LABOR PAC	−0.01**	−0.005	−0.01*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
DEMOCRAT	0.04	−0.01	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
EDUCATION	0.24	−0.10	0.15
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
CONSERVATISM	−0.01	−0.03	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
CONSTANT	0.12	−0.05	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	380	433	433
R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.04
Adjusted R-squared	0.005	0.04	0.02
Residual standard error	0.24 (df = 372)	0.23 (df = 425)	0.23 (df = 425)
F statistic	1.27 (df = 7; 372)	3.39*** (df = 7; 425)	2.27** (df = 7; 425)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		

Table D. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA in Each Survey Period

E. Environmental commitment: annual LCV scores

The main analyses use legislators' lifetime scores measured and published by the League of Conservation Voters. While the lifetime scores capture legislators' long-term commitment to environmental issues, their issue priority might have changed closer to 1993. To mitigate this concern, I substitute the 93 annual environmental scores for the lifetime score and conduct OLS regressions and logistic regressions. In 1993, the LCV used members' voting records on the following matters: wetlands destruction, endangered species act, arctic wilderness, desert protection. Overall, the results stand (See Tables E-1 and E-2 for the results).

	LINKAGE EFFECT		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ENVIRONMENT93	−0.13**	−0.11	−0.13
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)
COMPETITION	−0.07	−0.07	−0.10**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
ENVIRONMENT93:COMPETITION	0.18**	0.18**	0.23***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
LABOR PAC	0.002	0.003	−0.0002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
DEMOCRAT	−0.03	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
EDUCATION		0.05	0.0002
		(0.14)	(0.15)
CONSERVATISM		0.04	−0.001
		(0.08)	(0.09)
CONSTANT	−0.02	−0.05	−0.10
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.10)
State Fixed Effects			✓
Observations	387	387	387
R-squared	0.04	0.04	0.15
Adjusted R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.01
Residual standard error	0.19 (df = 381)	0.19 (df = 379)	0.19 (df = 330)
F statistic	2.89** (df = 5; 381)	2.12** (df = 7; 379)	1.06 (df = 56; 330)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		

Table E-1. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Increases in Support for NAFTA after the Finalization of the Environmental Side Agreement (OLS Regressions, LCV Score '93)

	LINKAGE EFFECT (FINAL VOTES)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ENVIRONMENT93	−1.01	−0.67	−1.54
	(0.88)	(1.16)	(1.55)
COMPETITION	−2.14***	−2.10***	−3.61***
	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.99)
ENVIRONMENT93:COMPETITION	3.26***	3.05***	5.08***
	(1.08)	(1.10)	(1.53)
DEMOCRAT	−0.57	0.19	−0.86
	(0.42)	(0.70)	(0.94)
LABOR PAC	−0.07	−0.06	−0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
EDUCATION		2.11	2.25
		(2.03)	(2.45)
CONSERVATISM		1.27	0.20
		(1.18)	(1.47)
PRE-LINKAGE ATTITUDE	4.60***	4.45***	5.01***
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.69)
CONSTANT	−0.64	−1.59*	−2.50
	(0.64)	(0.96)	(1.65)
State Fixed Effects			✓
Observations	387	387	387
Log likelihood	−174.56	−173.33	−132.10
Akaike information criterion	363.12	364.67	380.20
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1		

Table E-2. Relationship between Legislator Characteristics and Support for NAFTA in the Final Roll Call Votes (Logistic Regressions, LCV Score '93)

F. Education and Exports

There is some evidence that legislators with highly educated and export-dependent constituencies increased their support closer to the final votes. Tables F-1 and F-2 report the results in models that interact *Education* (the proportions of college-educated adults in electoral districts) and *Export* (Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes for exporting industries in districts). The coefficient on the interaction term is not significant in the OLS regression model with the outcome variable of legislative support increases in September of 1993. However, the results from the logistic regression model with the final vote outcomes show that the interaction is positive and highly significant.

	LINKAGE EFFECT
EDUCATION	−0.47
	(0.47)
EXPORT	−0.35
	(0.26)
EDUCATION:EXPORT	1.32
	(1.26)
LABOR PAC	0.003
	(0.003)
DEMOCRAT	−0.05**
	(0.02)
CONSTANT	0.06
	(0.10)
Observations	388
R-squared	0.02
Adjusted R-squared	0.005
Residual standard error	0.19 (df = 382)
F statistic	1.37 (df = 5; 382)
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table F-1. Legislator Characteristics and Increase in Support for NAFTA after the Finalization of the Side Agreement (OLS Regressions)

	FINAL VOTES
EDUCATION	−13.97*
	(8.41)
EXPORT	−7.20
	(4.44)
EDUCATION:EXPORT	47.19*
	(24.21)
LABOR PAC	−0.06
	(0.05)
DEMOCRAT	−0.36
	(0.34)
PRE-LINKAGE ATTITUDE	4.35***
	(0.49)
CONSTANT	0.62
	(1.61)
Observations	388
Log likelihood	−177.22
Akaike information criterion	368.43
Notes:	***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table F-2. Legislator Characteristics and Increase in Support for NAFTA after the Finalization of the Side Agreement (Logistic Regressions)

G. Media Coverage of Stakeholders' Demands on the NAFTA Environmental Side Deal (Jan - Sep 1993)

Date	Type	Actor	Title
January 29	News report	The National Association of Manufacturers	NAM Proposes Narrow Scope for NAFTA Side Deal on Safeguards
Feb 5	News report	Wildlife Federation	Wildlife Federation Lays Out Proposals on NAFTA Environmental Commission
February 12	News report	Environmental Groups	Environmentalists Agree NAFTA Side Pact Should Address Process Standards
February 19	Statement	Labor groups	AFL-CIO NAFTA Statement
March 5	News report	Environmental Groups	Green Groups Press Kantor for Powerful NAFTA Environmental Commission
March 19	News report	Trade Groups	Pro-NAFTA Groups Slaps Comparisons of Green Enforcement, NAFTA Dispute Rules
April 2	News report	Hispanic Groups	Hispanic Groups Prepared to Trade NAFTA Support for Regional Bank
April 9	News report	Environmental Groups	Green Groups Push Common Agenda of Basic Elements for NAFTA Side Accord
April 9	News report	Trade Groups	Business Coalition Urges Monies for Environmental Services, Not Clean-up
April 16	News report	The National Association of Manufacturers	NAM Opposes Tax on Trade, Investment To Finance Costs of NAFTA Side Deals
April 20	News report	Environmental Groups	Green Groups to Tell Kantor They Can Back NAFTA If Minimum Goals Are Met
April 30	News report	Environmental Groups	Environmental Groups Press for Dolphin Mortality Ban as Condition for NAFTA
May 7	Memorandum	Environmental Groups	TEXT: Green Groups' Position on NAFTA Environment Pact
May 21	Letter	Environmental Groups	TEXT: Green Group Letter on NAFTA Environment Accord
June 4	News Report	Trade Groups	Major Business Groups Signal Opposition to U.S. Drafts on NAFTA Side Pacts
June 4	Letter	Trade Groups	Industry Letter to Kantor on NAFTA Side Accords
July 6	News report	Conservation Groups	Conservation Group Urges Environmental Assessment of NAFTA
July 9	Letter	Border Groups	Border Groups' Letter on NAFTA Environment Accord
July 16	News report	Business Groups	Trade Groups to Support Government in NAFTA Environment Appeal
July 16	News report	Business Groups	Business Groups Urge Assessments to Enforce NAFTA Side Pacts
July 23	News report	Environmental Groups	Green Groups Signal Discontent with U.S. NAFTA Environment Stance
September 3	News report	Border environmental groups	Border Green Groups Voice Criticism of NAFTA Environmental Pact
September 17	News report	Environmental groups	Six Environmental Organizations Back NAFTA, Denounce Opponents