

# **Anti-populist Coups d'État in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Reasons, Dynamics, and Consequences**

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# **Anti-populist Coups d'État in the 21st Century: Reasons, Dynamics and Consequences**

## **Abstract**

There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N datasets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly 20<sup>th</sup> century Latin American phenomenon. Yet, the cases of Venezuela 2002, Thailand 2006 and Turkey 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Focusing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites while possibilities for democratization are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilize the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.

**Keywords:** Venezuela, Turkey, Thailand, civil-military relations, populism

## **Introduction**

The literature on populism has significantly expanded since the 1990s, addressing the new wave of global populist upsurge. Academic studies dealing with the phenomenon have analysed the conceptual definition of the term “populism” and the relative electoral successes of various populist parties, their policies and relationships with democracy (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017). Similarly, a new literature on coups d'état has emerged in the last decade, looking at large-N datasets and asking questions related to the outcomes of coups, their relations with democratic regimes, economic development and civil wars (e.g. de Bruin 2019; Roessler 2011; Schiel 2019). Although the literatures on populism and civil-military relations were closely intertwined in the 1970s (e.g. Nun 1967; O'Donnell 1973), they began to diverge with the advent of democracy especially in Latin America after the 1980s (Kuehn and Trinkunas 2017). Yet, several cases show

that coups against populist governments have also occurred in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The list includes Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and 2014, Turkey in 2016 and Bolivia in 2019. These cases draw attention to the need to bring the literatures on populism and civil-military relations together again. With this goal in mind, the main empirical question of this article is whether military coups against populists in the 21<sup>st</sup> century succeed, and if yes, to what extent?

Anti-populist coups can be defined simply as “veto coups” (Huntington 1968), staged in order to permanently overthrow populist governments and reinstate the dominance of the previous elite groups and political institutions associated with them. Evidence from Turkey, Venezuela and Thailand suggest that these coups may take over the government in the short run but fail in the long run in their goal of eradicating populism from the politics of their countries.

In the three cases analysed in this paper, this outcome was mostly because of the inherent characteristics of populism. Populists tapped into existing socio-cultural divides and ruled for an extended period. They politically mobilized the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies and formed cross-class coalitions. The majoritarianism of populism in power hindered liberal democratic principles, such as minority rights, as most populists do in other countries as well (Urbiniati, 2017, 585-6). But the emotional identification populists had with their underprivileged supporters through populist discourse and performance (Ostiguy, 2017; Moffitt, 2016) rendered them powerful against the institutional leverages of the opposition forces (Roberts, 2006). Hence, populists’ broad coalition of supporters in Venezuela, Thailand and Turkey also made them resilient against coups. They could mobilize their supporters on the streets against a coup attempt, as in Turkey in 2016 and in Venezuela in 2002. In Thailand, the populist government failed to stop the 2006 coup at the initial stages and got ousted from power. However, even in this case of a

“fragile coup” (Gürsoy 2017), populists regained their power, mobilized and won the first free and fair elections in the aftermath of the coup.

Based on these cases, the main finding of this article is that coups may defeat populism in the short-term, but they cannot be a long-term answer in practice. This finding leads to a second and more normative question. In cases where populist rule has damaged the prospects of liberal democracy, can coups be a solution --even a temporary one? The literature on coups d'état includes debates on whether coups against authoritarian regimes can be “good” and lead to democratization (Thyne and Powell 2016; Varol 2017). Although there are differences of opinion with regards to the long-term consequences of coups for democracy, there is a consensus that, in the short run, coups lead to increased repression, human rights abuses and autocracy (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016; Miller 2016). This article adds to this debate by showing that anti-populist coups in the 21<sup>st</sup> century did not only disrupt and destroy liberal democratic principles (as all military interventions do in their immediate wake), but they also failed in defeating populism. The anti-populist coups did not increase prospects for democratization either, and on the contrary, they even aggravated polarization and further legitimized the majoritarian tendencies of the populists.

Simply put, from the point of view of liberal democracy, our cases suggest that the most effective way to oppose populism remains to be the use of legalist and pluralist methods (Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2015; Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015). Even though the recent literature on populism has overlooked coups as real-life responses to populism, normatively they were right in pointing out the value of using democratic methods against populist governments as the best alternative. Hypothetically, apart from legal-institutional means, more policy-oriented strategic responses should be considered, such as adopting inclusive economic and social policies that would undermine the appeal of populism for the underprivileged social segments (Hawkins

2016), if such policies are possible and credible for an anti-populist opposition.

Due to space limitations, the case analyses in this article are short synopses that are inductively oriented and should not be read as detailed narratives, providing new evidence. Together with the theoretical-deductive sections, their contribution is to reignite the *combined* study of populism and coups, as well as their consequences for democracy. Thus, rather than testing an already existing theory of anti-populist coups with full variation in coup outcomes, the article aims at middle-range theory-building or hypothesis generation in an “attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a large number of cases” (Lijphart 1971, 692).

Turkey 2016, Venezuela 2002 and Thailand 2006 were chosen after cross-referencing populist rule and coups in the 21<sup>st</sup> century using two datasets: the Center for Systemic Peace, Coups d’État, 1946-2018 (Marshall and Marshall 2018) and the Tony Blair Institute of Global Change, Populists in Power Around the World (Kyle and Limor 2018). Out of 17 matches of populist rule and military coups to overthrow the central government (which correspond to our definition of a “coup” below), there were only four that were not mere allegations or plots. The fourth case (Thailand 2014) was ultimately excluded because at the time of writing no free and fair elections had taken place after the coup to observe the long-term strength of populism (the central question of this article).

### **A Socio-political Definition of Populism**

Predominant approaches in the contemporary scholarship on populism take the phenomenon to be a discourse and ideology, an organizational strategy, or a style (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017). This article adopts Ostiguy’s (2017, 84) definition of populism “as the

antagonistic, mobilizational flaunting in politics of the culturally popular and native, and of personalism as a mode of decision-making.” This definition does not necessarily disagree with the discursive, strategic and stylistic approaches, but encompasses them, as does the Kyle and Limor (2018) dataset used in this article for case selection, which also incorporates cultural, socio-economic and anti-establishment classifications of populism.

The socio-political definition contends that populism cannot be seen *only* as an idea (or ideology) that separates the people and the elite, and which can be found *only* in the written and spoken discursive material generated by leaders and parties (as suggested by, for instance, Mudde 2004). It also argues that populism is not only a political movement with a low level of institutionalization displaying a direct bond between the populist leaders and masses (as suggested by, for instance, Weyland 2001). More contentiously than these definitions, populism is also a socio-political phenomenon that reflects or feeds on some societal divides (for a definition of societal divides, see Deegan-Krause 2007).

Sociologically, populist discourse and style aim to mobilize and appeal to the “popular sectors” of a given society. These popular sectors can be defined as segments of a society that have comparatively less economic resources and fewer amounts of control over cultural capital. All populists, no matter their orientation on the left or right, seek support from non-elite or “refined” sectors of their society. They politicize the symbols, praxis, traits and vocabulary of local people qua non-elite. These socio-cultural differences are not superficial, but linked to “a society’s history, existing group differences, identities, and resentments” (Ostiguy 2017, 77).

Populism usually particularly thrives on the terrain of a societal divide that stretches alongside cultural and educational differences or divides. In other words, what populist leaders and parties usually politicize are differences in socio-cultural capital, more than economic capital

(Inglehart and Norris 2016). The socio-political divide in the regionally-varied cases analysed in this article corresponds to, on the one hand, a ruling populist party politically representing a large portion of the popular sectors in a cross-class alliance with a relatively disadvantaged business class, and on the other hand, an opposition consisting overwhelmingly of (generally urban) educated middle and upper classes together with visible figures of the traditional business class and the so-called established elite.

The fact that populists, at least in developing countries, find their social basis overwhelmingly and distinctively amongst the popular sectors does not entail in any way that, by definition, they are left-wing populism. For example, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey are quite different in that regard. Yet, their electoral sociology is quite similar. While populism in developing countries can differentially be regarded as economically beneficial for the poorer elements of society, it has by no means been uniformly on the left. Similarly, popular sector “common sense” (Gramsci 1992, 323-343) is not always on the left or “progressive.” Our analysis and argument apply generically to populism --independently of left, right or centre orientation.

Once thus characterized sociologically, populism clearly relates to dynamics of coups d'état, as the latter are embedded in social conflicts, changes and divisions at the elite and mass levels. Moreover, different types of coups are also defined by organizational and mobilizational features. This is what the following sub-section turns to.

## **The Anti-Populist Coup as a Sub-type**

In this article, a coup d'état, putsch or military intervention is defined as an “operation” that aspires to be “swift” and “precise,” involving at least a faction of the armed forces and “aimed at displacing the current rulers and replacing them” with the coup-makers themselves or their candidates (Ferguson 1987, 13). Coups can be classified into various sub-types depending on their characteristics and levels of success.

The first classification refers to the ideological or political characteristics of coups, which differs significantly across countries or eras. Huntington (1968), for instance, classified coups as “breakthrough”, “guardian” or “veto”, depending on the level of socioeconomic development of the countries and the role of their militaries. Using the same classification, anti-populist coups are a sub-type of “veto coup,” staged by military officers who perceive themselves as the protectors of the status-quo and middle class interests (also see, Nordlinger 1977, 22–27; Clapham 1985, 140-149). These custodian officers try to displace the populists from power in order to re-establish the institutional arrangements associated with the previously dominant elites, such as a flawed liberal democracy.

In a second, different classification of coups, a distinction should be made between various levels of success. Gürsoy (2017), for instance, categorizes coups in terms of failed, fragile and successful ones. The definition of failed coups is relatively obvious in that the coup-makers cannot “take over the government and [the insurgents] usually face prosecution and serious penalties for organizing the mutiny” (p. 9). Among all coup instances, globally, between 1950 and 2010, 50.3% were such failed cases that were foiled within a week (Powell and Thyne 2011, 255).



Conversely, a successful coup overthrows the government and the putschists or their favoured candidates rule for a significant period. The coup achieves to change permanently the institutional set up and the political system, with no return to the main political dynamics of the previous years. Instances in history include the deportation of oligarchic rulers, who have never truly regained their power, such as the monarchy after the Egyptian coup of 1952. The defeat of Marxist socialist parties, which could not return to politics with similar left-wing ideologies, such as after the 1973 coup in Chile or the 1980 coup in Turkey, can also be listed under successful military interventions.

Fragile coups stand in between. Putschists *succeed* in overthrowing their opponents but *fail* to attain their goals. An important “indicator of such fragility is the return to governmental power” by the very opponents that the coup overthrew and their significant electoral gains in the first competitive elections following military rule (Gürsoy 2017, 9). The adjective “fragile” of course does not refer to the means of repression in the aftermath of the coup, which can be brutal, bloody and murderous. Rather, it refers to failure in ends and success in means.

Examples of fragile coups from the 20<sup>th</sup> century include other anti-populist coups in Argentina in 1955, 1962, and 1966. Following the 1955 coup in Argentina, President Juan Perón went into exile and Peronism was banned from the public sphere. However, Peronist identity remained strong and lively in the popular sectors. Despite another coup and extended military regimes, in the first competitive presidential elections of 1973, Perón won a landslide victory. The experience of Peronism precipitated a longer-lasting military regime in 1976 (Romero, 2002, 196). Yet, even this military regime was unsuccessful in wiping populism out of Argentinian politics, which continues to be a strong political force even today. In Argentina, the 20<sup>th</sup> century coups against populists were fragile. Putschists took over the government but could not defeat their

populist opponents in the long run, a situation quite similar to that of Thailand after 2006.

The variation in coup political outcomes and in level of initial success or failure (its ability to overthrow the government) depends usually on three interrelated and somewhat contingent factors: the planning of the coup, the support the coup receives from other political or social groups in contrast to the immediate action that populists and their followers take, and the ability of the putschists to gain control of the armed forces and the senior ranks in the early hours (Thompson 1976; Geddes 1999, Luttwak 2016). Small cliques of junior officers may take over the government by giving the initial impression they would be eventually successful (Singh 2016). However, quick mobilization against the coup “in the form of general strikes, road blockages and seizures of government buildings and media outlets” are detrimental to these efforts as they change the strategic calculations of some officers who “may not be willing to use the deadly force necessary to end the resistance” (Barracca 2007, 139).

As a sub-type of veto coup, an anti-populist coup has a low probability of being successful in the long run. There is a good chance that the coup will fail because of the mobilization capacities of the populists, which might swing the hierarchy of the military against the coup and thereby weaken its potential to oust the government. With good coup planning, initial support from the military hierarchy and other elite groups, and no outpouring of pro-populist masses on the streets, the coup-makers may take over the government and oust the populists from power. In other words, these factors may explain the variation between failed and fragile coups. However, even in the fragile cases, populists return to power when given the chance in free and fair elections.

## **Why Do Anti-Populist Coups Occur and Why Are They Unsuccessful?**

Even in cases where they are overthrown by a coup, populists are likely to rebound in the following competitive elections and with the lifting of repressive measures. This is because of the strong emotional rapport constructed by populist appeals. Furthermore, the coup itself may further sharpen and legitimize divisions in a society, and therefore increase the lifecycles of populists, rather than weakening or eliminating them. As defined above, populism tends to tap into and further aggravates deep-seated social, cultural and educational divides. These are difficult to overcome through a veto coup that aims to re-establish the dominance of the previous elites.

In the initial stages of populist rule, sectors historically excluded by the modernizing or “civilizing” projects of the previous elites (Ostiguy 2017, 75-76) find space to voice themselves, which may have a democratizing impact (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). As populist rule continues, however, parties and leaders in power tend to limit fair contestation due to majoritarian tendencies, by gradually dismantling most of the liberal democratic components of the regimes, such as institutional checks and balances and minority rights (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). Especially in the developing world, populist rule is often combined with distributive or clientelistic policies in favour of the economically worse-off and the use of crony regulations for the supportive business class. This further leads the populists in power to antagonize the dominant elite sectors – not only the established big businesses but also the well-educated upper and middle classes in critical state institutions, such as the military, the judiciary, and the technocratic bureaucracy. This polarization, alongside what is often the political fragmentation and the organizational incapacity of anti-populist opposition, strengthens the authoritarian and hawkish segments of anti-populist forces within the party system and the state, with a potential to lead to a coup d'état.

Such coups are more likely to happen if the country already has a history of such interventions and if the military has acted before as a representative of the upper and middle classes. According to Huntington (1968, 222) for instance, the “historical role” of the militaries in the developing world was “to open the door to the middle class and to close it on the lower class.” Similarly, José Nun argued in the Latin American context that the armed forces recruited from the middle class, had close interactions with it, and protected it (Nun 1967, 85). Therefore, as Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) also asserted, a coup coalition could form between the oligarchy and broad segments of the middle class, as happened several times in Argentina, against the activated popular sectors and in order to exclude them. This coalition was formed partly because of the shared socio-cultural and political outlook of the military and the upper and middle classes, despite divergent economic interests and their previous political struggles over representation. Members of the coup coalition also shared the view that the populists were a direct threat to their well-being and sense of propriety in politics, state administration and in public life, and that the populists could not be defeated through free and fair elections.

The analysis of 21<sup>st</sup> century anti-populist coups in this article is in agreement with the arguments of these early theorists of military interventions based on Latin America and especially Argentina. However, this article also highlights the importance of the uneven mobilizational capacities of the populists and the anti-populists. The latter resorts to staging a coup partly because, in their view, there are no other viable options left to defeat the populists in power. Populists are usually supported by the more under-privileged segments through a strong rapport, including identification and shared worldviews, and not only clientelistic benefits. The emotional and moral component of this relationship, highlighted by scholars like Ostiguy (2017) and Moffitt (2016), is usually overlooked in practice by the elite opponents of the populists, leading to a miscalculation

of their relative strength and prospects.

Indeed, against both discursive accusations and concentrated institutional leverages of elite groups, populists rely on “strength in numbers” (Weyland 2001; Roberts 2006). They often have the upper hand in winning elections and whipping up turbulent mobilization. Even in circumstances when opposition forces unite and carry out peaceful rallies or protests, populists continue their rule, seemingly unshaken. Populists organize their counter-rallies, repress some of the activities of the opposition and continue to win the elections. The coup becomes an option, often out of desperation, but also out of a misjudgement on the mobilizational potential of populism. Mistakenly, segments of elites think that a coup can sweep away corrupt and authoritarian populist patrons and their clientele, who would be supporting the government only because of material incentives.

In that sense, the main rationale behind the anti-populist coup also becomes its main handicap. Populists can use their mobilization capacity during the initial hours of the putsch and bring its immediate failure, especially if contingent factors, such as a bad coup plan, allow for it. Even if such mobilizations do not happen, populists will nonetheless not lose their capacity permanently and will still be able to use it at the earliest opportunity, such as free and fair elections, and come back to power. In short, the reasons for the anti-populist coups also ultimately seal their fates and lead them to be unsuccessful in the long run.

### **The Failed Coup of Turkey 2016**

The coup in Turkey on 15 July 2016 against Erdoğan’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) was an instant failure. Populism had become a highly visible aspect of Turkish politics since the

consolidation of the electoral and political predominance of Erdoğan's AKP at the beginning of the 2000s (Aytaç and Öniş 2014; Yabancı 2016; Çelik and Balta 2018). The rise of Erdoğan's AKP in Turkey successfully combined, on the one hand, a long lasting reaction of the traditional centre-right against the top-down nation-building and modernization project of the secular elites, and on the other, the resentments of the urban poor stemming from the social and economic failures of the Turkish political system during 1990s.

The AKP and Erdoğan have received the support of mostly two groups: the underprivileged segments of Turkish society in economic and educational terms, such as the urban poor and working people (Başlevent 2013) and the new conservative Anatolian businesses (Jang 2005). The AKP remained committed to neo-liberal macro-economic policies from its first electoral victory in 2002 until the impending economic crisis. The party has also found ways of curbing the harmful effects of urban poverty with increasing social policy spending (Bakırezer and Demirer 2009), as well as by creating vast clientelistic networks that support the urban poor (Kutlu 2018; Buğra and Keyder 2006). However, the reasons behind this support has not only been socioeconomic, but also socio-cultural in terms of identification. The AKP, through Erdoğan's and most of the party cadres' convincing populist appeal, has brought together the poor and the previously excluded segments of Turkey, such as the lower classes in the metropolitan periphery and conservative Kurds, in a well-organized political party (Baykan 2018). The party and Erdoğan have also infringed on the previous mechanisms of checks and balances, leading the political regime into a more authoritarian direction (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016; Somer 2016).

Various actors in the opposition in Turkey applied strategies to counter-balance the populist hegemony of the AKP, including a wave of secular mass rallies in 2007, a legal case for banning the party in 2008 and a nation-wide protest movement in 2013. A previous ally of the

government, which turned into a foe of Erdoğan and the AKP, namely the Gülen Community, also deployed shadier methods to combat the government, including a politically motivated corruption probe in 2014 (Taş 2015). The opposition in Turkey, albeit in a rather fragmented way, obtained the majority of the seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in the 2015 general elections. But this episode was also a dead-end as President Erdoğan intervened and delayed the formation of a coalition government. Snap elections were called and the AKP regained power as a single majority government.

The military, as well, did not shy away from assertively voicing its preferences in politics. The Turkish armed forces had historically played a dominant, modernizing role in politics (Hale 1993). This pattern of behaviour continued in the first term of AKP rule through a series of public declarations by the high command followed by an electronic memorandum in 2007 criticising the government. The AKP, in alliance with the Gülen community, retaliated with coup trials and purges in the armed forces (Gürsoy, 2017, 151-4).

Despite the purges, a small clique within the military intervened again in July 2016, this time overtly, in a coup attempt. The putschists declared their action a rightful intervention against an “autocracy based on fear”, in which “corruption and theft was rampant” (T24 2016). A couple of hours after the coup began, Erdoğan in a live broadcast on CNNTurk invited his supporters to the streets. The AKP leadership effectively mobilized its own organization and supporters against the coup. As the number of casualties increased and more than 250 people lost their lives resisting the coup, the weak military coalition behind the intervention quickly dissolved. The overwhelming majority of the people on the streets were AKP supporters and there is reason to think that a considerable part of these people were led by the party organizations (Konda 2016). The willingness of common people to defend Erdoğan and the AKP at the risk of their lives indicates

at the existence the close emotional relationship, more than just a clientelistic one, between the populist leadership and its voters.

The aim of the 2016 anti-populist coup was to oust the AKP and Erdoğan from power. From the early moments of the coup onward, the AKP accused the Gülen Community and its followers in the military of being the main culprits of the coup. Furthermore, because Gülen resides in the USA, the coup plotters were branded as foreign and elitist infiltrators of the state, or the so-called “parallel state structure” (Taş 2018). The government repeatedly claimed that fighting against this group required decisive action and the declaration of a state of emergency, which provided Erdoğan and the AKP with unprecedented new capabilities to further transform the Turkish political system toward authoritarianism.

A year after the coup, the personalistic aspect of populism fully unfolded through a referendum which changed the Turkish political system from parliamentarianism to presidentialism, granting extraordinary powers to President Erdoğan (Esen and Gümüşçü 2018). The coup confirmed the populist narrative that elite groups were conspiring against Erdoğan and the AKP, in alliance with powerful Western capitals. It also gave the pretext to further the populist project of state and political system transformation. This change meant the dismantling or dissolving of all counter-majoritarian institutions thought to be against “the national will,” while concentrating the executive power in the hands of a president who is thought to be the representative of the common, true people of the country.

The corrosive impact of the prolonged exercise of populism in power has gradually rendered anti-democratic methods more attractive for certain segments of opposition in Turkey. Not only the failure of legalist methods but also the optimism about eradicating populism through force, stemming from a distorted image of the rapport between Erdoğan’s AKP and its supporters,



enhanced the proclivity for a coup. The features of populism that led to the bloody coup in Turkey also defined the fate of the putsch. Populism based on a strong emotional relationship with the masses and their leader resulted in a forceful mass mobilization that became the main impediment to a successful coup.

### **The Failed Coup of Venezuela 2002**

The coup in Venezuela in April 2002 against the Chávez government failed within two days. Mass protests on the part of the popular sectors, which made repression very costly, and divisions within the armed forces resulted in the failure of the coup. Rather than striking a compromising posture, the coup sought abruptly to reverse everything done under the populist government, including Chávez's socioeconomic policies, thus bolstering the protests (Cannon 2004, 287–288). The lack of willingness on the part of the military to physically decimate Chavista loyalists also allowed for the quick reversal of the coup.

Certainly, Hugo Chávez has by far been the world's most emblematic and striking populist figure of the last two decades. In power, Chávez's initial political target was the *partidocracia* (McCoy 1999), a neologism invented to designate the duopoly of the two main political parties, AD (Acción Democrática) and Copei. Through various agreements, these two parties had ruled Venezuela from the 1958 Pact of Punto Fijo up to the early 1990s (Coppedge 1997; Hellinger 2004; Levine 2015). In order to decrease strife and increase stability, the two parties had established terms of governability and a division of the spoils in this oil rent economy. Venezuela had lived contently, particularly in the 1970s, and as long as the spoils of its significant oil revenues spread throughout the population, with the duopoly channelling resources to their constituencies. However, when oil revenues declined at the end of the 1980s and spoils were increasingly

restricted to “the caste,” popular discontent spread and paved way to the Caracazo in 1989, high volatility during the 1990s, and eventually the rise of Chávez by the end of the decade (Tinker Salas 2015).

After his election as President in 1998, Chávez, permanently campaigning, held five national electoral contests (including referendums to change the constitution) within the first two years in power –all of which he won by over 55% of the votes (Coppedge 2003). In that context, the electoral path against this majoritarian leader, who also did not respect republican checks and balances (particularly in the relation between Congress and the Constitutional Assembly), was not a viable option (Roberts 2012). Street protests (Hawkins 2016, 248), strikes (Trinkunas 2005, 218), lockouts and electoral boycotts became more typical means of opposition.

Chávez and Chavismo became identified over time with a socioeconomic and socio-cultural divide. Less educated, darker-skin and poorer local Venezuelans tended to identify more with the informal, more direct, somewhat “extravagant”, and culturally more plebeian leadership of Chávez. By contrast, cadres of the national oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.), professionals, and much of the significantly Americanized upper and middle classes were virulently against Chávez’s populist leadership (Roberts 2004).

While Venezuela was a remarkably stable democracy in contrast to its southern neighbours during the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the military had toppled governments before, in 1945, 1948, and arguably 1958 (Norden 1998; Trinkunas 2005). Taking place after decades of stability, the 2002 coup occurred in the specific context of a lockout by business associations and a strike called by the national union still under the control of the AD. Then, on April 11, an angry mass demonstration of opponents supported by the media decided to walk on the Presidential Palace. Chávez called on his supporters to counter-rally and block them. Confused gunning led to 18 death

and 69 injured, presented in the opposition media as the work of Chavistas. On April 12, high-ranking officers arrested Chávez and, triggered by the events of the previous day, staged a coup, dismantling all the institutions of the republic. The putsch discursively presented itself as a “constitutional rebellion” (Cannon 2002, 296), against an allegedly authoritarian leader who disregarded the rule of law.

The armed forces found allies among the civilian politicians and the middle and upper classes in Venezuela (Barracca 2007, 151). The new Cabinet formed by the coup was all white and mostly linked to the business community. On the opposite side, however, the new government faced the “Boliviarian Circles,” a popular political militia created by Chávez at the end of 2001 and forming a densely organized national network (Ellner 2008, 175-194; Handlin 2016). Learning of the coup, masses descended from the impoverished hills of Caracas to the Presidential Palace, generating a marked, bodily presence. A prolonged custody of Chávez might certainly have resulted in unprecedented bloodshed in Venezuela. As Barracca (2007, 146) highlights, “the military was aware of the significant potential for resistance, and this doubtless factored into their calculations”. The mass “bodily” show of force led to a split in the armed forces and, less than forty-eight hours after being removed from office and taken to a distant jail, Chávez was flown back by helicopter to the Presidential Palace.

The immediate aftermath of the failed coup was continued social polarization. In the context of a favourable oil price boom, Chávez engaged in a full-fledged drive to launch his social *misiones* and to constitutionally and practically concentrate powers into his hands, accelerated by his 59% victory in the 2004 referendum and his landslide win with 63% in the 2006 presidential elections. To use the poetic expression of Garcia Linera (2008), what had been a “catastrophic tie” until then was broken starting in 2006 in favour of Chavismo (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra 2007,

99–113). The coup of 2002 was simply one instance, and a failed one at that, to break that “tie” by force, in favour of the anti-populists. The coup’s immediate effect, however, was to severely delegitimize the credentials of an opposition allegedly fighting for democracy. The coup itself strengthened and in many ways confirmed the populist narrative that the “oligarchy” and “the squalid ones,” in alliance with the USA, were conspiring against the people and its “popular government” (Cannon 2004). In the years following the coup, and most clearly after Chávez’s death, Venezuela progressively descended into authoritarianism.

In sum, in the case of Venezuela too, there was a cycle of increasing populist control, an anti-populist coup and liberal democratic backsliding. Elite groups, took advantage of a wave of strikes/protests and attempted a coup. But populism based on strong popular sector support and deeply-rooted historical and socio-cultural divisions quickly reversed the situation, followed by a drift away from liberal democracy.

### **The Fragile Coup of Thailand 2006**

The coup of 19 September 2006 in Thailand is a case of fragile coup that was staged against the governing Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party and its leader Thaksin Shinawatra. A telecommunications tycoon and one of the wealthiest businessmen in Thailand, Thaksin founded the TRT in 1998. Initially he was set out to represent mostly big Thai businesses that were negatively affected by the 1997 economic crisis and the IMF program that favoured foreign capital over domestic capital (Hewison 2005). Thaksin’s politics, however, took a decisive populist turn and moved beyond business interests following a National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) case in 2000 that accused him of misreporting his assets (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 66). Thaksin coupled his “for the people” style with the distribution of material benefits, such as rural

debt relief, affordable and universal healthcare, and local community funds, specifically designed to alleviate the conditions of the rural and urban poor (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 63-68). In this way, Thaksin was able to combine business interests with mass support in a cross-class coalition.

As Thaksin appealed to the poor and represented certain businesses, he antagonized the urban middle class, state enterprise labour, academics, and various grassroots activists, who formed the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Anti-Thaksin groups organized several protests in 2005-2006 and called for the King's intervention (Connors 2008; Pye and Schaffar 2008). The PAD drew strength from the royalist elites, including representatives from the military and the bureaucracy. Although Thailand had witnessed 17 coups since the 1932 revolution that ended absolute monarchy, the royalist elite was the dominant ruling segment, especially after 1973 (Thongchai 2008). In line with these elites' understanding of democracy, the 1997 constitution recognized freedoms and rights, but established checks on elected governments through bureaucratic commissions, including the Constitutional Court (CC) and the NCCC (Connors 2008, 146-148). The monarch's role above politics was protected by strict *lèse majesté* laws.

The TRT overturned these mechanisms. By rejecting the royalist socio-cultural and political framework, Thaksin appealed to the poor more directly, especially in the more populous north and north-east (Pasuk and Baker 2008, 69-70). This made him undefeatable in competitive elections. As long as there were elections, it was clear that the TRT would win and Thaksin's business allies (and his own ventures) would expand. His majoritarianism also meant that Thailand's level of liberal democracy would gradually deteriorate. Indeed, Thaksin attacked the checks and balances system, claiming that they restricted the will of the people. He controlled the press through threats, criminal charges brought against journalists and by creating his own media network (Jäger 2012, 1143).

Thaksin's unchallenged rule posed a direct risk to the dominance of royalist elites and some of the business interests, like the Crown Property Bureau. At an ideological level, his rule clashed with the political outlooks of other entrepreneurs, such as Sondhi Limthongkul (Ukrist 2008, 130–136). The Thai military intervened in September 2006 because of this intra-elite conflict and the inability of the royalist elite to defeat Thaksin in elections, through judicial mechanisms or protests movements (Connors and Hewison 2008, 9; Hewison 2008, 205–207). In this sense, Thailand was quite similar to Turkey and Venezuela. However, when compared with them, the 2006 coup was different in its immediate wake. It was a relatively effective putsch because it was led by the Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin and had the apparent approval of the palace, which led to acquiescence within the ranks (Hewison 2008, 203–205; Thongchai 2008, 30–32; Ukrist 2008, 127–130). In coalition with the palace and groups within the bureaucracy, businesses, middle class, and intellectuals –i.e. the so-called “network monarchy” (McCargo 2005)– the military redrafted the constitution and closed down the TRT (Ockey 2008, 20–22).

The putschists justified the intervention through a simplistic, oft-cited and elitist understanding of Thaksin's success: gullible and ignorant peasants were being manipulated and bought off to vote for him (Walker 2008, 84–105; Thongchai 2008, 24–30). This reading of the 2001-2006 period led to the mistaken belief that the coup would easily succeed in its aim and it would be enough to remove Thaksin from power to return to the era before populism held sway. Thus, after about one year and a half of staying in power, the military withdrew from politics and held elections.

However, the reincarnations of the TRT won every election after the 2006 coup. Thaksin's sister Yingluck, leading the For Thais Party (PTP), became the prime minister in 2011. Furthermore, the spirit of populism was strengthened with the mobilization of the Red-Shirts under

the Thaksin-allied United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) (Connors 2011). In terms of the consequences of the 2006 coup for democracy, the outcome was grim. The return to competitive elections led to the escalation of conflict between the Red-Shirts and the PAD, now the Yellow-Shirts, and the repeated use of repressive methods by the military and other royalist bureaucracy against the successors of the TRT. Due to the more restrictive 2007 constitution and continuous tensions, Thailand did not return to the same level of democracy of the late 1990s and early 2000s again.

Although the coup succeeded in taking over the government, forcing Thaksin to exile and closing the TRT, in the end it failed in achieving its main aim of debilitating populism. The mobilization of the UDD after the coup is evidence of populism's capacity to survive repression. Thaksin supporters reorganized "immediately following the September 2006 coup" through the TV talk shows of three politicians from the TRT (Sinpeng and Martinez Kuhonta 2012, 398). Estimated in 2012 to have 5.5 million members, the UDD staged mass rallies that were clearly tied to Thaksin and his parties' fate, as well as emphasizing the need to put up an active fight against the elites that had supported the 2006 coup. While Thaksin appeared in these rallies from abroad using virtual technology, the UDD collected millions of signatures in favour of his pardon. The Red Shirts also engaged in street mobilization for the holding of new elections, which turned violent because of state repression in April-May 2010, with 94 people dying and 2,000 being injured. The UDD actively campaigned for Yingluck's PTP and brought about her landslide victory in the 2011 elections, with a quarter of their leaders occupying seats from the party list. Undeniably, mobilization through the UDD brought about electoral success for the PTP and sustained Thaksin's populist legacy (Sinpeng and Martinez Kuhonta 2012, 397-402).

In this case too, therefore, we see the cycle of populist hegemony triggering an anti-

populist coup and leading to further liberal democratic backsliding, as in the Turkish and Venezuelan cases. Although seemingly more successful, the coup in Thailand still ultimately failed in defeating the populist spirit, feeding instead its resentment and hope for an imminent comeback while continuing to be a challenge for the ongoing military-dominant regime in Thailand at the time of writing.

### **Conclusion**

This article started with the observation that in the last two decades, several developing countries with populist governments witnessed military interventions. Yet, the recent literature on populism does not address coups as a de facto instrument used in combating populism. Similarly, the recent literature on coups does not distinguish between different types of military interventions. This article has aimed to fill these gaps in the literature, by empirically looking at the consequences of anti-populist coups for the viability of populism and assessing their impact on democracy.

The brief inductive case studies suggest that populism cannot be significantly weakened through a coup. In two cases (Turkey and Venezuela), coup plotters failed within a matter of days, and in another (Thailand) populists returned to power after military rule came to an end, and free and fair elections were held. The difference in the initial ability of the putschists to take over the government seem to have resulted, on the one hand, from seemingly contingent factors such as good coup planning, recruitment of higher ranking officers, and manifest support for the coup from other political and social groups, and, on the other, from whether there was widespread, bodily, high-risk presence of populist supporters in the streets to confront the armed forces. The more repressive and bloody the coup is, the less credible its claim to “restore democracy” becomes, with the increased likelihood of a split within the military.



Through a theoretical-deductive analysis of populism and coups, it was hypothesized that the nature of populism is, paradoxically, the main reason why military interventions fail in defeating them. Populist governments politically mobilize sectors that were previously underrepresented and that hold grievances against the dominant elite. They come to and sustain themselves in power through an antagonistic, mobilizational political flaunting of the culturally popular and native, crystallized around a leader who enjoys a novel, personalistic relation with such popular sectors. While they usually form a cross-class alliance with relatively disadvantaged sectors of the business class, they also claim to speak for the authentic people. Thus, when a military coup takes place, it is unlikely to eliminate already existing socio-cultural divides; it might even deepen them. The coup may even further give credence to the narrative told by populists regarding the opposition. They can use their mobilizational capacity against a coup attempt, strengthen themselves organisationally and further dismantle counter-majoritarian institutions. As a measure against populism in power, the anti-populist coup is a dead-end and a costly exercise, incapable of achieving its main aim.

From a normative perspective and when assessed in terms of their consequences for democracy, prolonged exercises of power by populists, but even more so coups against them, are clearly negative for liberal democracy, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. In all three cases examined in this article, populists undermined the renewal or initiation of a well-functioning and unrestricted liberal democracy. The majoritarian aspects of populist rule and their usually cross-class support base had made defeating them through elections or other democratic means such as peaceful rallies very unlikely. In some ways, the putschists believed themselves to have little other option but to organize a forceful attempt to take over the government in order to restore the power of the previously dominant elites.

By analysing the phenomenon of anti-populist coup in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this article has drawn attention to the question of what happens in the long run when coups are adopted to overthrow populist rule. This article will achieve its main aim if it reignites the once vibrant 20<sup>th</sup> century discussion on the relationship between civil-military relations, populism and democracy.

However, the hypotheses generated in this article need to be further elaborated and tested. These tests may involve, and ideally combine, two different methods. First, because the main aim of this article was middle-range theory building, variation in the dependent variable was limited to different levels of non-success (failure and fragile coups). A proper test would necessarily include large-N analysis to achieve full variation in the coup outcome (including successful coups, as defined in this article). Such a methodological approach, employing the already available excellent datasets, would also allow for a deeper understanding of how various aspects of populism, such as organisational networks or a country's socioeconomic level, leads to differences in the coup outcomes.

Second, this article was limited in its small-N approach by not including two other cases of anti-populist coups in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, namely Bolivia in 2019 and Thailand in 2014. In both cases, at the time of writing, free and fair elections had not been held to gauge the success of these coups in weakening populism. In the case of Thailand, after around five years of repressive and direct military rule, elections were held in March 2019 under conditions that were unfair and possibly not free. Yet, despite all the restrictions and the prolonged repression, the Thaksin-allied, populist PTP won the plurality of the seats in the lower house. It is clear that the coup had been unsuccessful in eradicating populism from Thai politics and society, but only time will tell if the hypotheses of this article will fully be borne out by future competitive elections. Subsequent research can focus on this case, Bolivia 2019, and other countries to empirically test the hypotheses

further. Countries that have populist rule and a past with military interventions, but no anti-populist coups, would also be worth analysing in comparison, in order to finetune factors mentioned in this article, such as the miscalculation of officers in assessing their relative power.

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