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The socioeconomic dimensions of racial inequality in South Africa: A social space perspective

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Abstract

It is well evidenced that South Africa is characterised by extreme socioeconomic inequality, which is strongly racialised. We offer an original sociological perspective, which departs from established perspectives considering the dynamics of vulnerability and poverty to focus on the structuring of classed and racialised privilege. We map how stocks of economic, cultural, and social capital intersect to generate systematic and structural inequalities in the country and consider how far these are associated with fundamental racial divides. To achieve this, we utilise rich, nationally representative data from the National Income Dynamics Study and employ Multiple Correspondence Analysis to construct a model of South African 'social space'. Our findings underscore how entrenched racial divisions remain within South Africa, with White people being overwhelmingly located in the most privileged positions. However, our cluster analysis also indicates that forms of middle-class privilege percolate beyond a core of the 8% of the population that is white. We emphasise how age divisions are associated with social capital accumulation. Our cluster analysis reveals that trust levels increase

with economic and cultural capital levels within younger age groups and could therefore come to intensify social and racial divisions.

KEYWORDS
racial inequality, social, social class, South Africa, wealth

1 | INTRODUCTION

Thirty years after the end of apartheid, scholarship on South Africa remains uncertain about how far forms of White socioeconomic privileges have been dented, even in the presence of significant policy initiatives that seek to address inequality (see in general, Díaz Pabon et al., 2021). Sociological studies considering how far non-White groups have been upwardly mobile into the middle classes are currently limited. They tend to rely either on a restatement of theoretical fiat (often some kind of political economy perspective, as ultimately with Southall, 2018), or extrapolate from (often outstanding) qualitative research grounded in specific localities. A fascinating, though also singular, example is Alexander et al.'s (2013) study of Soweto, which demonstrates the very subtle class boundaries that are evoked by racialised communities. Our paper's core contribution is to examine *the contemporary racialised structuring of wealth and privilege in South Africa*, demonstrating that alongside entrenched advantages that white South Africans enjoy, there are also significant forms of upward mobility from the non-White majority into privileged positions.

Our paper is innovative because hitherto quantitative analyses of social mobility have relied on an economic framing which focuses on the extent and prospects for mobility across the poverty threshold (Schotte et al., 2022). Although there is now a substantial discussion about the size and significance of the middle, and to a lesser extent, upper class, hitherto the definition of these groups is largely characterised in negative terms—by the fact that they are not in poverty (in some versions, not at significant risk of falling into poverty)—with the implications being that their lifestyles are characterised by freedom from scarcity (Schotte et al., 2018). By contrast, we ask how far racial divisions remain inscribed in the structuring of privilege in South Africa.

We break new ground by showing how sociological 'social space' models might be valuable in shedding light on the relationship between racial and socioeconomic divides. Previously this perspective has mostly been applied to European nations, and our paper is original in adopting this approach outside of the global north (with exceptions including Jodhka et al., 2017 and to a lesser extent Atkinson, 2020). We emphasise that we are not using this approach to 'replicate' European models, but rather as a tool to dissect and interpret how racialised divisions may be changing in South Africa. While we appreciate Bourdieu's influential (Bourdieu, 1985) ideas, our goal is not to apply his structure of social space, originally designed for French society, to South Africa.

We start by reflecting how European scholarship on the racialisation of economic and cultural capital presents analytical questions that we will address in our research. The second section demonstrates the entrenchment of inequality in South Africa across numerous dimensions, including race. In the third section, we discuss how we use the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) data to model social space. The fourth section reveals the racial divides in South African social space, and the fifth presents five clusters derived from the social space analysis. Finally, in Section 6, we take advantage of questions on social trust to demonstrate racialisation of social capital.

2 | THEORISING RACIAL DIVIDES IN SOCIAL SPACE

In examining the racialisation of socioeconomic privilege, we aim to move beyond the extensive literature analysing poverty dynamics and alleviation in South Africa by 'turning the telescope' (see Savage, 2021) to the structuring of privilege. Here social space models, originally derived from Pierre Bourdieu's sociological analysis, have proved effective in dissecting the multidimensional structuring of privilege (Vandebroeck, 2018). However, most research using this approach has centred social class, rather than race, as fundamental to the structuring of social space (e.g., Atkinson, 2017; Le Roux et al., 2008). This narrow focus has been criticised for overlooking the powerful racialisation of economic and cultural capital, prompting the need for a more thorough examination. We build on important recent research which has demonstrated how economic and cultural capital are highly racialised.

With respect to economic capital, research by economists has demonstrated very strong racialisation of wealth (e.g., Shapiro, 2017; Derenoncourt et al., 2021 for the US and Karagiannaki, 2023 for the UK). In the UK, White British households have 10 times as much economic wealth as Black African and Bangladeshi households (Khan, 2020). Furthermore, Derenoncourt et al. (2023a) argue that asset price inflation indicates that racial wealth divides may be intensifying as wealthier White households see their assets boom, leaving the considerably asset-poorer non-White households behind. Given these entrenched and extreme levels of racialised wealth inequality, it is remarkable that Bourdieusian scholarship has previously had such little direct concern with race.

Although analyses of cultural capital from the global north tend to have been 'colour-blind' (e.g., Richards, 2020), there is an important emerging scholarship, mostly qualitative, exploring the racialisation of cultural capital, which is relevant for the South African case. Drawing on Hage's (1998) Australian-based reflections, Bennett et al. (2009) discuss how dominant forms of British cultural capital evoke whiteness, making racialised immigrant groups feel 'outside' the dominant cultural capital parameters, underscoring cultural capital's role as a form of 'national capital'. This can generate two counter-responses. Drawing on the work of Rollock (2014) and Wallace (2017), Meghji (2019) points out that upwardly mobile Black professionals in the UK, aware of their outsider status, instead purposely evoke forms of 'black cultural capital' as an alternative to dominant, white modes. Alternatively, Ayling (2015) suggests that Nigerian elites seek to assimilate with the cultural capital associated with upper class whiteness. In discussing the reasons why Black Nigerian elites increasingly send their children to British private schools, Ayling (2015) argues that for these parents, 'British upper-class Whiteness (is) a source of highly valuable cultural and symbolic capital that is central to the struggle of social distinction in modern-day Nigeria'. She links Bourdieu's approach to cultural capital to Fanon's association of whiteness with supremacy, whereby 'One is White as one is rich, as one is beautiful, as one is intelligent' (Ayling, 2015, p. 419).

This important research on the racialisation of cultural capital needs to be extended in three main ways. First, because it is based in European, and notably in British contexts, it can be difficult to distinguish racialisation from the wider politics of migration. This is clear, for example, in the way that Bennett et al. (2009) associates cultural capital with 'national capital' that excludes non-white immigrant communities. Here, the South African case offers a vital corrective, given that it was the White population who were immigrants, mostly as colonial settlers. Secondly, with the partial exception of Bennett et al. (2009) and Savage et al. (2010), there is limited quantitative work, and qualitative research tends to be focused on the experiences of upwardly mobile non-White groups. Although highly revealing, this needs to be extended to more wide-ranging and representative groups. By extending these discussions to the South African case, where the White population is a minority population but a majority of the wealthiest, and originates through colonial emigration from Europe, racial dynamics can be analysed in a very different context.

These reflections lead to our third point, that European studies need to be decentred more fundamentally. Bourdieu's own elucidation of the structuring of social space, derived from his studies of 1970s France, continue to frame the recent deployment of social space models. In particular, this has centred on his argument that social space is differentiated not only be 'capital volume' but also by 'capital composition' which distinguishes those with higher stocks of economic or cultural capital, or between 'industrialists' and 'intellectuals'. European debates

concentrate on whether this model still applies: Bennett et al. (2009) claimed that in the UK by the early 2000s, this second axis was differentiated more along age divides, pitting older people more attached to conventional high-brow culture, against younger people more attracted to contemporary and digital activities. A similar argument has also been made in the Danish case, leading Prieur and Savage (2013) to coin the term 'emerging cultural capital' to characterise the younger middle and upper classes. Other sociologists, however, argue that the capital composition remains strong even in contemporary societies such as in Norway (Flemmen et al., 2018) or Germany (Atkinson & Schmitz, 2022).

Although these arguments have been influential, it is not clear that they are the best lens to examine nations such as South Africa which have colonial histories and far more intense economic divisions. In particular they do not directly focus on the role of race in shaping the structuring of social space and tend towards a focus on class as the core structuring divide (e.g., Bennett et al., 2009). There is some research projecting racist and xenophobic attitudes onto social space (notably Flemmen & Savage, 2017), but not considering how far forms of White dominance may be associated with various stocks of capital themselves. This is why the South African case, with its extensive history of racial divides is of great analytical importance. Our next section provides the necessary context to appreciate this point.

3 | RACE AND THE STRUCTURING OF PRIVILEGE AND INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

We situate our discussion in a recognition of South Africa's brutal colonial experience and its ongoing imprint in contemporary society. Apartheid institutionalised racial divisions in notoriously vicious forms and inscribed them into the organisation of wealth, property, and privilege itself. The labour market was fundamentally stratified along racial lines. Black people were prevented from living in 'white' areas, except by formal permit, with the majority relegated to rural peripheries. Those who were permitted into 'white' areas under the hated pass laws, were concentrated in informal settlements where acquisition of property wealth was largely impossible and very few were permitted to acquire owner occupied property.

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ANC government has, ostensibly at least, sought to address racial divisions through multiple reconstruction, development, and redistributive policies (e.g., the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)). Redistribution was largely directed at extending services to the poor, rather than addressing social inequality more directly (Levy et al., 2014). Similarly, social expenditures were expanded and restructured to be progressively targeted. By the late 1990s, policies were in place to target discrimination. All of these held out the promise of addressing racial economic divides and were buttressed by a range of active civil society and campaigning groups, which offered the potential for building social capital and politicising racial inequalities.

Other than the roll-out of RDP houses, very little was done in terms of direct asset or wealth redistribution and, given sluggish growth and employment, it is not surprising that inequality has become more, and not less, entrenched. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated markedly, and statistics characteristically place South Africa as the most unequal nation in the world, having overtaken Brazil during the 2000s. Using tax and survey data, Bassier and Woolard (2021) show that the gap between a stagnant middle and the top end of the income distribution widened between 2003 and 2018. Analyses from the World Income Database (WID) show that the share of total income taken by the top 10% of the population rose rapidly from the end of apartheid in 1994 until 2012, faster than any other major nation apart from India. When attention is paid to the 1% of earners, who became the focus of economic attention following the lead of Piketty and Saez (2003), South Africa is less of a marked outlier. South African inequality therefore appears not simply to be driven by a small '1%' elite but stretches down into wider mechanisms of privilege amongst a somewhat wider upper middle class group.

Economic data (such as from WID) does not include any measure of ethnic or racial background. We do know, from other evidence, that the racialisation of economic divisions is very strong (e.g., Leibbrandt et al., 2010). These racialised differences are reflected in both employment rates, as well as in the wages earned amongst those who are employed.[1] The unemployment rate for Black[2] individuals increased from 28.6% to 31% between 2011 and 2017, while the corresponding statistics for White South Africans were much lower, 5.8% and 6.7%, respectively (Statistics South Africa, 2019).

Extreme income inequalities may also be compounded by wealth dynamics. The South African income Gini coefficient is around 0.67, while for wealth it is at least 0.9–0.95. This stark wealth inequality is consistently found by those using NIDS survey data (Mbewe & Woolard, 2016), tax data (Chatterjee et al., 2022), and survey and tax data combined (Orthofer, 2016). For example, using the second wave of NIDS (2010–2011) Mbewe and Woolard (2016) find that, in relative terms, Black households only hold about 1% of the wealth held by White households. The figures in Coloured and Asian/Indian households are 12% and 63%, respectively.

Although there is prima facie evidence that extreme inequality is associated with racial divides, this needs further investigation. Importantly, 'turning the telescope' (Savage, 2021) to examine this structuring of privilege involves more than the analysis of income and wealth inequalities. Following Bourdieu, it also involves the analysis of cultural and social capital, recognising that the mobilisation of these resources also involves the deployment of forms of privilege.

3.1 | Cultural and social capital inequalities

As with income, the quality of education provision is distributed unequally in South Africa, and is strongly stratified by race, geographical location, and income (Branson & Lam, 2021). Under apartheid, different education systems existed for each race group. Education for the Black population was purposefully inferior to that of the White population in terms of years of compulsory schooling, curriculum, resources, and teacher qualifications. While educational attainment increased rapidly for cohorts born between the 1950s and 1980s, and the racial gap decreased from seven to 2 years, disparities in educational outcomes remain stark.

Low levels of post-school enrolment reflect limited, and unequal, levels of learning in primary and secondary schools (Branson & Lam, 2021).[3] Figure 1 shows that since the end of apartheid, White South Africans' attainment levels in post-school education (47% in 2021) have been three times higher than attainment levels among Black and Coloured people. Furthermore, although all population groups have seen an increase in the post-school qualification share since 1994, the growth has been 10 and 14% points within the White and Indian population group and only 5 and 7% points within the Black and Coloured population groups. This pulling away is especially noteworthy given that the prior baseline levels of achievement were substantially higher amongst the White group; highlighting again the widening gap in post-school attainment between race groups.

With a labour market that increasingly favours those with post-secondary education, racial gaps in education play an important part in perpetuating inequality. Performance in secondary school, which is unequal across schools, strongly determines eligibility to study further, and upward socioeconomic mobility is further limited by the fact that inequality in income and educational attainment among parents strongly correlates with inequality in education outcomes for the next generation (Branson & Lam, 2021).

In addition to the importance of education for labour market outcomes in South Africa, the economic returns to English language proficiency are large (Kahn et al., 2019; Posel & Casale, 2011). Although South Africa is a multilingual society with 11 official languages, English remains the dominant language in educational, economic, and political spheres. Given this, proficiency in English is an important cultural capital dimension, but as with the other forms of capital, there are large differences in English language proficiency by race group. Table 1 shows that Black and Coloured South Africans are less likely to report being proficient in English than Indian and White South Africans.

FIGURE 1 Qualification attainment by subgroup. *Source*: www.siyaphambili.uct.ac.za. The graph reflects attainment of post-school qualifications, which include any qualifications from universities, colleges, or post-school institutions.

The analysis of social capital as a cause and/or consequence of cycles of (racialised) inequality in South Africa has hitherto received less prominence than economic and cultural capital. Many household surveys that are strong on the social capital front (e.g., the Afrobarometer Surveys and the South African Reconciliation Barometer Surveys) are not sufficiently strong across the other two domains to analyse relationships in-depth. We rectify this absence by reporting the fullest analysis of the stratification of social capital in our analysis below.

Substantial inequalities straddling economic, cultural, and social dimensions exist in South Africa. These have a powerful racialised component, which may have intensified in recent decades. Furthermore, privilege is not simply associated with a small elite but is more widely distributed amongst a broader upper middle-class population. These structural inequalities are persistent, and there is evidence that they may reinforce each other, for instance as racial divisions in educational attainment generate subsequent income inequalities. Hitherto, however, there are no studies adopting a more sociological perspective to consider how these forms of capital interact. This makes our analysis here highly original.

4 | MODELLING SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SPACE

We now turn to the heart of our paper, where we take advantage of the rich questions on economic, social, and cultural capital in the NIDS to provide a composite picture of the structuring of privilege in South Africa, and the extent to which it is associated with categorical divisions. Although we give particular attention to race, we are also attentive to other divides, notably those of gender and age.

NIDS (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, 2018) is a longitudinal survey of individuals and their households, developed as a tool for government to track and understand the shifting face of poverty and inequality. NIDS was designed to be nationally representative of the population in 2008. Over time, attrition has affected the sample and in Wave 5 the sample was topped up to account for high attrition in high-income areas (Branson & Wittenberg, 2019).

NIDS has rich information on socioeconomic variables, and has dedicated sections for physical and emotional health, and has been used widely in both the economics and health fields but is yet to be maximally utilised for sociological analysis.[4] We use Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) to analyse 'social space' in South Africa using NIDS. MCA is a form of principal components analysis, which considers the number and nature of axes required to interpret the variation within complex data sets that include measures of economic, social, and cultural

TABLE 1 Mean of active variables by race.

	All	Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Economic capital					
Quintile of the income per capita distribution					
Quintile 1	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.02	0.003
Quintile 2	0.17	0.19	0.15	0.04	0.02
Quintile 3	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.09	0.02
Quintile 4	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.40	0.09
Quintile 5	0.27	0.20	0.21	0.45	0.87
Property ownership (owner occupied housing)					
Not living in own property	0.59	0.60	0.63	0.52	0.47
Owner occupied, RDP	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.01
Owner occupied	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.44	0.49
Owner occupied, value missing	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.03	0.03
Net worth					
Something left over	0.44	0.42	0.40	0.55	0.64
Break even	0.28	0.29	0.25	0.31	0.16
In debt/don't know	0.27	0.28	0.31	0.11	0.16
Missing info	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04
Financial assets					
Missing info	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.03
None	0.30	0.31	0.39	0.28	0.08
Financial assets ≤ median value	0.34	0.36	0.31	0.18	0.16
Financial assets > median value	0.36	0.32	0.29	0.53	0.73
Ownership of a computer					
Missing info	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Yes	0.16	0.11	0.15	0.23	0.64
No	0.84	0.89	0.85	0.77	0.35
Rooms in house					
1–2 rooms	0.28	0.31	0.27	0.02	0.04
3–4 rooms	0.32	0.32	0.37	0.44	0.21
5–6 rooms	0.24	0.22	0.28	0.45	0.36
7+ rooms	0.16	0.15	0.08	0.09	0.39
Cultural capital					
Mother's education					
Don't know/missing	0.07	0.06	0.15	0.13	0.12
No schooling	0.36	0.41	0.26	0.31	0.02

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	All	Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Primary	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.03
Incomplete secondary	0.20	0.19	0.25	0.15	0.28
Matric	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.29
Post-school qualification	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.25
Individual education					
Don't know/missing	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02
No schooling	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.00
Primary	0.14	0.15	0.19	0.14	0.00
Incomplete secondary	0.34	0.35	0.39	0.28	0.17
Matric	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.33	0.26
Post-school qualification	0.29	0.27	0.22	0.20	0.55
Self-reported proficiency writing in English					
Missing	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Very well	0.56	0.53	0.50	0.83	0.84
Fair	0.21	0.21	0.25	0.11	0.11
Not well/not at all	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.06	0.04
Social capital					
Trust others of the same race[a]					
Missing info	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04
Not at all	0.30	0.33	0.22	0.14	0.09
Just a little	0.41	0.42	0.41	0.35	0.26
Somewhat	0.24	0.20	0.32	0.39	0.49
A lot	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.11	0.12
Trust other races[a]					
Missing info	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05
Not at all	0.41	0.46	0.28	0.18	0.12
Just a little	0.35	0.35	0.38	0.30	0.28
Somewhat	0.20	0.15	0.29	0.38	0.46
A lot	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.10
Trust relatives[b]					
Missing info	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
Not at all	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.03	0.03
Just a little	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.15	0.07
I trust them somewhat	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.20	0.19
I trust them a lot	0.46	0.42	0.49	0.61	0.69

T A B L E 1 (Continued)

	All	Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White
Trust others you know					
Missing info	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Not at all	0.20	0.22	0.15	0.12	0.04
Just a little	0.39	0.42	0.34	0.28	0.20
Somewhat	0.31	0.29	0.40	0.37	0.44
A lot	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.23	0.30
Likelihood of neighbour returning wallet with R200					
Missing	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.04
Very likely	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.29
Somewhat likely	0.22	0.22	0.15	0.33	0.28
Not likely at all	0.61	0.63	0.68	0.48	0.39
Observations[c]	17,359	13,543	2431	316	1067

Note: Data are weighted using post-stratification weights. Sample is restricted to adults aged 24–85 (excluding proxy respondents).

[a]Categories 'somewhat' and 'a lot' grouped due to low 'a lot' frequency.

[b]Categories 'not at all' and 'just a little' grouped for model stability.

[c]28 observations have missing information on all trust variables and were filtered out of the analysis. (*N* = 17,331).

capital (see Hjellbrekke, 2018; Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). Here we follow a growing trend in sociological analysis (e.g., Alecu et al., 2022; Bennett et al., 2009; Flemmen et al., 2018; Flemmen & Savage, 2017) that uses MCA to construct a 'social space'. This is the first time this has been attempted for South Africa, or as far as we are aware, for any African nation.

In developing our South African social space, we used six variables on economic capital, three on cultural capital, and five on social capital (*Q* = 14). The sample is restricted to respondents aged 24–85. Respondents who have not answered any of the questions on trust are filtered out.[5] There are 17,331 active cases observations, which have been weighted to be representative of the population of interest.

Table 1 provides summary information on the active variables that we used, overall and by race group (supplementary variables used in the analysis are in Supporting Information S1: Table A1). For *economic capital* we construct income quintiles based on the full population income distribution.[6] Table 1 shows stark racial divisions. Less than 0.4% of White respondents fall into the lowest quintile, whereas 16% of Black and 12% of the Coloured group fall into this quintile. At the other extreme, 87% of White respondents are found in the top income quintile.

A strengths of NIDS is its measurement of wealth, and we include five measures here; (i) a variable on owner occupied housing, divided into not owner occupied, owner occupied with a state (RDP) subsidy, owner occupied, and owner occupied but market value not provided; (ii) perceptions of net worth (divided into 'having something left over', 'break even', or are 'in debt'); (iii) financial assets (differentiated into having no wealth, and having wealth above and below the median levels),[7] (iv) owning a computer and (v) number of rooms in the household. Table 1 shows that the distribution of these assets is not as starkly divided as evident for income, and the racial divides do not seem as strong: 44% of South Africans—and 40% of Black respondents—feel they have 'something left over' in terms of their net worth; 41% (and 41% of Black individuals) live in some kind of owner occupied housing, and 42% live in houses with five rooms or more. That being said, the share in government subsidised housing (RDP owner occupancy) is 10% for Black versus 1% for White respondents, and average household size is 4.2% for Black and 2.8% for White respondents, reflecting underlying racial differences in our capital measures.

For *cultural capital*, our options were more limited since NIDS did not include questions about leisure interests or lifestyles. Nevertheless, in line with Atkinson's (2017) approach, we utilised questions on own and parental education levels, regarded as valuable indicators of institutional cultural capital. These are (i) mother's education (chosen as there was much less missing data than there was for father's education); (ii) respondents' own education; and (iii) self-reported proficiency writing in English. These variables show that stocks of cultural capital as measured in NIDS are very low: 78% of South Africans report mothers with less than secondary school education, and 54% of respondents report their own education to be likewise below secondary level. Forty-five percent report being fluent in English. The racial divides are also huge, larger than for our measures of economic inequality: turning the lens to privilege, 6% of Black respondents have mothers with a post-school qualification, compared to 25% of White respondents. The racial gap is even higher for own education, with 27% of Black and 55% of White respondents obtaining a post-school qualification.

With respect to *social capital*, we use a series of questions asking respondents to rate their trust in (i) people of the same race; (ii) people of other races; (iii) relatives; and (iv) others they know (presumably people such as friends, neighbours, or acquaintances) and (v) a question asking about the likelihood of your neighbour returning a wallet with R200. NIDS questions do not therefore use 'position generator' questions such as adopted by Bennett et al. (2009), which ask whether respondents know people from different occupational groups. In the South African context, it is not clear that occupational identities are salient for large numbers of respondents, given the high rates of unemployment, informal employment, and labour turnover in casual employment. By contrast, all respondents can give views on the extent to which they trust, and because NIDS questions focus on trust for specific groups, rather than generalised trust, they avoid the problems associated with Putnam's (2000) communitarian framings.

Table 1 reveals strikingly low levels of trust towards people of the same and other races. It appears that simply asking about trust on a racial axis lowers the propensity of respondents to claim they trust. Eighteen percent of Black respondents trust other races somewhat, or a lot, compared to 24% who trust someone of their own race. White respondents claim to be more trusting, with 61% reporting at least some trust for their own race, and 56% for other races. In general, there is much more trust in relatives, suggesting that solidarities mainly take place amongst sectional kinship and family lines. Recognising the subtlety of these differential responses between trust questions demonstrates that respondents are discerning in placing trust according to the group being enquired about.

5 | RACIAL DIVIDES IN SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL SPACE

Our application of MCA to the NIDS data leads to two powerful axes summing up 72% of total variance (see Supporting Information S1: Tables A2–A4 for details). As is common in applications of MCA from numerous national contexts, Axis 1 is a general axis, which receives contributions above the threshold from 6 out of 14 variables (highlighted cells, Table 2). It is noteworthy that variables on economic and cultural capital are very strong: notably the respondent's income quintile, and educational attainment. By contrast, variables on social capital and some of those on wealth assets are not relevant in structuring this axis.

By contrast, Axis 2 is very clearly defined by social capital indicators. Almost 70% of the contributions stem from four variables; trust in people of other race groups, same race, in others and in relatives. The only other variables affecting this axis are derived from cultural capital: the respondent's own education, and English proficiency.

It is striking and important that most of our active variables contribute to the first two axes. Axis 3 is clearly an even more distinct social capital trust-axis than Axis 2 with 86% of the contribution stemming from three variables on trust, which largely amplify the differentiation already evident on Axis 2. Additionally, given that there is a clear drop in the eigenvalues from Axis 2 to Axis 3, and that the third axis sums up 9.2%, we interpret this axis as a secondary axis. Axis 4 receives more balanced contributions from the whole set of variables and is therefore also

TABLE 2 Contributions from active variables.

Variables	Relative weight (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5
Income quintile	7.1	14.7	1.6	0.9	5.1	8.6
Property	6.6	2.4	1.4	0.1	12.5	22.5
Net worth	7	2.4	0	0.1	3.8	21.4
Financial assets	7.1	12.1	4.4	1.1	8.9	2.1
Own a computer	7.1	11.5	0.2	0.1	4.8	0.2
Rooms	7.1	1.5	1.5	0.2	4.5	10.2
Mother's education [M_Educ]	6.6	10.6	4.1	1.7	11.6	4.7
Individual education [IndEduc]	7.1	14.4	8.4	2.3	18.7	11.9
Proficiency writing in English [W_Eng]	7.1	11.2	8.8	2.8	9	12.9
Trust others of the same race (recoded) [Tr_OthRace]	7.1	5.5	22.1	33.9	5.6	1.2
Trust other races (recoded) [Tr_Race]	7.1	5.5	17.4	30.4	4.4	0.9
Trust relatives (recoded) [Tr_REL]	7.1	2	9	2.5	4	2.6
Trust others	7.1	4.8	19.9	23.1	5.5	0.5
A neighbour would return a dropped wallet	6.9	1.4	1.3	0.6	1.6	0.4
Total	98	100	100	100	100	100

Notes: Relative weight column does not sum to 100 due to rounding.

more of a general axis. Further inspection of the cloud of individuals shows that there is a strong Guttman effect in plane 1–4. Therefore, Axes 3 and 4 are dropped and we concentrate on the first two for detailed interpretation.

Figure 2 shows the cloud of individuals in factorial plane 1 and 2 and reveals a salient contrast with European nations where differentiation on the second axis tends to be stronger at the top of the capital distribution. This reflects oppositions within the middle and upper classes between those with relatively high amounts of either cultural or economic capital. In South Africa, by contrast, there is rather little differentiation at the top of the capital distribution, but much more at the bottom. This can largely be explained by the fact that the possession of economic and cultural capital is highly aligned in South Africa whereas the possession of social capital is more differentiated, especially at the bottom of the social structure.

The very important implication is that privileged South Africans are relatively uniform and cohesive and stand in opposition to a more fractured and differentiated group of disadvantaged South Africans. The possibility is that it is White South Africans who continue to occupy the privileged positions which are associated with high amounts of both economic and cultural capital. We probe these issues Section 5.

Figure 3 examines the cloud of categories which contribute to both axes. As expected, the first axis clearly describes a hierarchy between high and low volumes of cultural and economic capital, with indicators of the highest volume located in the lower left quadrant, compared to indicators of low volumes, especially of cultural capital, found in the upper right quadrant, and further removed from the barycentre along Axis 2. This is clear visual confirmation of the very strong intersection between economic and cultural capital in South Africa, stronger than seen for European nations. An interesting finding is that amongst the economic capital variables, the most powerful are those for income, financial assets, and computer ownership, whereas variables concerning property ownership, net worth, and size of house are much less important.

Axis 1 is therefore a capital volume axis. Figure 3 also shows that Axis 2 describes an opposition between respondents with very low levels of trust (at the bottom) compared with respondents with high levels of trust in others at the top. This opposition is stark: all categories indicating the lowest trust levels—'Not at all' and 'Just a

FIGURE 2 Cloud of individuals—Factorial plane 1–2. Negative coordinates on Axis 1 are associated with relatively higher economic and cultural capital, see Supporting Information S1: Table A3. Negative coordinates on Axis 2 are associated with relatively lower social capital, see Supporting Information S1: Table A4.

little/Not at all', are in the lower right quadrant. It is striking that those with higher amounts of trust also tend to have lower levels of personal and maternal educational capital, so there is not the overlap between educational attainment and social capital than has been found in European nations.

We now turn to our central analytical concern to see how these patterns are racialised. A useful step is to superimpose supplementary race, age groups, urban-rural, religious denomination, and importance of religion variables into the space, to assess their association with our active variables.

Figure 4 shows with exceptional clarity that the first capital volume axis is linked to racial group. White respondents are located on the left hand of this axis, amongst respondents with high amounts of economic and cultural capital. Black and Coloured respondents are located on the right-hand side. Along Axis 1, the deviation between the White race and all the other race categories is 0.8 SD or more. The deviation between White and Black or Coloured is >1.8 (a huge deviation!).[8] The deviation between Asian/Indian and Black or Coloured is also >0.7 (a notable deviation). The primary capital volume axis is thus also inscribing a hierarchy in terms of racial inequality.

Figure 4 shows that whereas Axis 1 describes an opposition between different race groups, Axis 2 separates the youngest from the oldest respondents. The significance of age is often found in European studies, though is

FIGURE 3 Cloud of categories. Indicators on economic, cultural and social capital—Factorial plane 1–2.

more commonly associated with differing kinds of cultural capital, whereas in South Africa these differences are associated with social capital. There is a perfect rank order along Axis 2 and the deviation is >0.8. The lowest trust levels are more often found among the youngest respondents and the highest trust levels among the more elderly respondents (70 years+).

Further analysis along Axis 2 reveals a geo-spatial opposition (see Supporting Information S1: Figure A1), albeit not the strongest (the distance between the two mean category points, Farms—Urban, is close to 0.5). This may be associated with the propensity of younger Black South Africans to move to more urban areas. Along Axis 1, the opposition between Traditional—Urban is >0.55. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, gender differences are rather small. Finally, the importance of religion is not a cleaving dimension (see Supporting Information S1: Figure A2).

We can present an even clearer picture of the significance of racial divides by projecting race as a supplementary variable within the space of individuals. Ellipses are drawn which contain 86.47%[9] of respondents from each racial group, visually exposing the sharpness of the racial divide (Figure 5). It is clear that White South Africans

FIGURE 4 Race and age supplementary variables—Factorial plane 1–2.

(the green ellipse) are distinctive. They fall on the left side of Figure 5 and are minimally separated on the second axis—indicating that they are much more similar in terms of the levels of trust they articulate than the other race groups. However, White South Africans are not completely separate from the other groups. There is a large overlapping space towards the left-centre of Figure 5, where White individuals are found alongside Asian, Coloured, and Black individuals. Indeed, the Asian ellipse has some similarities to that of the White ellipse, although it does not stretch so far to the most privileged left-hand edge.

In summary, South African social space is deeply divided, with economic and cultural capital being similarly arrayed hierarchically, and with very little separation between them, unlike the situation that Bourdieu diagnosed in France. This is associated with stark racial divisions, in which White South Africans dominate the possession of both economic and cultural capital. The secondary differentiation is associated with social capital, which on the face of it does not appear to be associated with racial divisions, or economic and cultural capital, but separates older and younger people (Figure 5). There is also evidence that there is a certain blurring of the racial divide in the left-centre of the social space, which might suggest that racial divides are less definitive in this area of the space. We can test this more precisely by conducting a cluster analysis to render the partitions more formally in South African social space.

6 | CLUSTERING SOCIAL SPACE IN SOUTH AFRICA

We perform mixed, hierarchical clustering conducted on the first 25 axes. By inspection of the dendrogram, we identify a five-cluster solution. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of these five distinctive clusters. On the privileged, left-hand side of the social space, we find a pink and a black cluster, which hardly overlap with the blue and

FIGURE 5 Ellipses, race categories—Factorial plane 1–2.

red clusters on the disadvantaged, right-hand side. It is unusual to find such distinctive clusters: only the large central cluster (orange) cuts across all the others.

In identifying the characteristics of the clusters, we follow the principles in Denord et al. (2011), highlighting categories that are over- or under-represented that is, where the difference in the percentage of the category in the cluster versus the sample is >5%.[10]

The largest, orange cluster representing 46.2% of respondents, is composed of respondents in the centre of the social space. This is a general cluster, containing similar active variable distributions as found in the full sample, and thus might be taken to represent the 'average South African' (Supporting Information S1: Tables B2.1 and B2.2). This group is characterised by an over-representation of categories that signify little capital of all forms. Over-represented categories include respondents with incomplete secondary education, those not in owner occupied property, and/or living in small properties, and among whom self-reported trust is low. The only supplementary modalities over-represented are Black (89% of those in this cluster, compared to 81% of the adult population), and younger (age 24–39) South Africans.

If this large cluster represents the baseline for 'typical South Africans', there are two clear clusters on either side, two of which represent forms of relative privilege, the other two drawing out relative disadvantage. These are of more direct sociological interest given the aims of our paper. Most importantly, there is an exclusive 'inheritor' cluster (Supporting Information S1: Tables B3.1 and B3.2). Comprising only 7% of respondents, this group is

FIGURE 6 Clustering South African social space.

disproportionately well educated (69% have a post-school qualification compared to 29% of the sample as a whole), come from well-educated families (nearly 100% of their mothers have post-school qualifications, compared to 7% of the sample as a whole), are disproportionately well-off in income terms (65% are in the top quintile of earners, compared to 27% of the sample), and have extensive assets, with 62% reporting above the median value of financial assets (compared to 36% of the sample).

Unsurprisingly, respondents in this *inheritor* cluster are overwhelmingly white, in gainful employment, young, living in urban areas, and more likely to report relatively high levels of trust. They are also slightly more likely to be male. Nonetheless, it is worth reflecting on the fact that although this cluster is disproportionately white, because the White population of South Africa is small, at 8%, 60% of the respondents in this cluster are from other race groups. In short, we should be mindful that the inheritor class cannot simply be conflated with rich White South Africans.

It is the other privileged cluster, which we term the *upwardly mobile*, that is perhaps of even more sociological interest (Supporting Information S1: Tables B4.1 and B4.2). This is a large cluster comprising 24% of the total sample. It consists of highly educated respondents, who characteristically have mothers with only intermediate educational qualifications. In this respect, the cluster is associated with the rise of educational attainment in South African society overall. The respondents also have high volumes of economic capital with 56% being in the top income quintile (compared to 27% overall), and they have disproportionate amounts of financial assets (61% report above median financial assets), with high trust levels towards others.

It is telling that White respondents are again disproportionately found in this upwardly mobile cluster (forming 22% of the cluster), indicating they have been disproportionately able to take advantage of prospects of upward mobility facilitated by educational expansion. However, it is striking that Asian and Indian respondents are also strongly over-represented in this cluster (comprising 5% of the cluster, compared to 2% of the population).

In fact, when we examine the racial composition of the two privileged clusters, a result of the small percentage of the White population, is that despite their disproportionate over-representation, they only make up

approximately a quarter of the respondents in these clusters. Black African, White, Coloured, and Indian/Asian respondents comprise 57%, 29%, 6.4% and 1.4% in the inheritor cluster and 58%, 23%, 6.6%, and 4.6% of the upwardly mobile cluster, respectively. In short, we should not leap from relative propensities to absolute numbers and need to recognise that non-white groups do now form a considerable part of the two privileged groups.

The privileged clusters are distinguished by their age and sex composition. The inheritor group has an over-representation of younger (under 40) and male respondents relative to the upwardly mobile group. This suggests that individuals in the inheritor group, particularly men, experience prosperity at a younger age, bringing to the fore the transmission of intergenerational advantage within this group.

Ultimately, these two privileged clusters suggest more mobility and dynamism amongst the top levels of South African society than might be expected from the aggregate data that we reviewed at the start of this paper. In particular, and largely reflecting the small size of the White population, we should not infer from the dispropor-tionate shares of White respondents in these two clusters that there is a simple categorical racial divide in operation. It is nonetheless remarkable to underscore that even in post-apartheid times, 91% of White South Africans are in either the inheritor or upwardly mobile clusters. It has proven very unusual for White South Africans to be stripped of their historical privileges, even to the extent of becoming part of the representative 'general cluster' of average South Africans.

We can compare these two privileged clusters with the two other clusters of relative—and extreme—disadvantage. The most striking of these is an *excluded* cluster consisting of respondents with no schooling. Interestingly, all respondents in the sample with no schooling (6%) are in this cluster (Supporting Information S1: Tables B5.1 and B5.2). This cluster also contains disproportionate numbers who have mothers with no education (92% compared to 36% overall), who have no financial assets (74% compared to 30%), and low earnings. Although there are also a disproportionate number living in large houses with 7+ rooms, one should keep in mind that this is a heterogenous category, describing both expensive mansions and inexpensive houses where several generations might be under the same roof. This cluster is disproportionately Black (91%), not economically active, female, rural and relatively elderly.

The other disadvantaged cluster, which we call the *precarious*, is larger (17% of the sample) and strongly over-represented by those with only primary schooling, low English proficiency and smaller houses (Supporting Information S1: Tables B6.1 and B6.2). Black respondents, those not economically active and respondents aged 50 and above are over-represented. Very few White South Africans are in these two disadvantaged clusters, reflecting the commonly observed point that privileged groups are usually able to find means to avoid large scale downward mobility amongst their children (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2018).

It seems clear in reflecting on these five clusters that the two privileged *inheritor* and *upwardly mobile* clusters diverge more from the characteristics of the *general* cluster than the *precarious* and *excluded*. By contrast, the *excluded* and *precarious* largely amplify the economic and cultural capital characteristics of the large general cluster. This allows a useful heuristic way of categorising social inequality in South Africa according to the stocks of capital measured here. Roughly two-thirds have little or no capital. Roughly one-third can be characterised as possessing significant capital stocks, and this group can be differentiated between a smaller *inheritor* class and a larger group of the *upwardly mobile*. Despite White South Africans being disproportionately over-represented amongst these two privileged clusters, they contain South Africans from all race groups, including many Black South Africans.

7 | THE RACIALISATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

We now turn to the final part of our analysis, where we show that our model of social space helps clarify the racialisation of inequality by drawing out the structuring of social capital. This is an innovative step in our analysis, and we will demonstrate notable discrepancies in respondents' reported trust levels when they differentiate be-tween trust in their own and other race groups.

We begin by creating a new composite trust variable with five categories (Table 3). Two of these indicate symmetrical trust across race groups, namely (a) those with high trust of both their own and other races (*high trusting regardless of race*), and (b) those with low trust of their own and other races (*low trusting regardless of race*). Of more analytical interest are those who report dissonant levels of trust across own and other race groups, namely (c) those with high trust of their own race group, but low trust of other races (*racially exclusive*) and (d) those with low trust of their own race group, but high trust of other races (*interracially deferential*).

As one might expect, most respondents cleave to symmetrical responses, with just under two thirds having consistently low trust, and roughly one fifth having consistently high trust of their own and other races. Comparing race groups, we see that Black respondents are particularly likely to have consistently low trusting scores, with White respondents being the most likely to be consistently high trusting of both race groups. However, there are substantial dissonant minorities: nearly 9% express the racially exclusive option, with Coloured and Black respondents scoring somewhat higher in this regard. Four percent choose an interracially deferential option.

Figure 7 compares the location of the mean points of the composite trust categories in our social space. Comparing Figure 7 with Figure 6 suggests strong overlap between high trust and the upwardly mobile cluster. Indeed, the upper left quadrant contains all the high trust combinations for same and/or other races.

We explore this further by examining the distribution of responses across clusters (Supporting Information S1: Table B7). In the upwardly mobile cluster, the high trusting group is strongly overrepresented (50% of those in this cluster have these responses, compared to 18% in sample). By contrast, this over-representation is much weaker for the inheritors (27% of whom are racially high trusting). In cluster 3, the general cluster, the low trust category is overrepresented: 82% are 'low trusting regardless of race' (compared to 61% of the sample as a whole). In the two disadvantaged clusters, there is no over-representation.

Table 4 replicates Table 3 for the upwardly mobile cluster. The results are striking. Forty-seven percent of upwardly mobile Black respondents select the consistently high trusting response (compared to only 14% of Black respondents as a whole); Indian/Asian and Coloured respondents who are in this cluster are roughly twice as likely to select these items compared to those in the sample. By contrast, White individuals in this cluster are only slightly more likely to do so (51% vs. 45%). It can also be noted that upwardly mobile Black respondents are more likely to be racially exclusive compared to Black individuals in the sample (19% compared to 9%), indicating a significant reaction amongst this minority. Overall, the low trusting respondents are vastly under-represented in this cluster (only 24% of upwardly mobile Blacks, compared to 67% of the Black sample as a whole). We can infer therefore that a sizeable proportion of the Black upwardly mobile adopt an assimilationist, possibly a 'strategic assimilationist' perspective in which they trust other races as well as their own, but a sizeable minority are also drawn to a racially exclusive perspective which might be consistent with Meghji's (2019) arguments.

TABLE 3 Racialised trust * race cross tabulation (percent within race).

		Race				
Composite trust race Group)	**(Own race, other race)**	**Black**	**Coloured**	**Asian/Indian**	**White**	**Total**
Low trusting	(Low, low)	66.98	52.22	36.23	26.33	61.24
Racially exclusive	(High, low)	9.01	8.96	5.55	7.59	8.81
Interracially deferential	(Low, high)	3.58	5.97	5.09	3.74	3.84
High trusting	(High, high)	13.69	24.92	37.47	44.81	18.07
Missing	(Missing)	6.75	7.93	15.66	17.53	8.04
Total		100	100	100	100	100

Note: Data are weighted using post-stratification weights.

FIGURE 7 Racialisation of social capital—Factorial plane 1–2.

TABLE 4 Racialised trust * race cross tabulation—Upwardly mobile cluster (percent within race).

		Race				
Composite trust Race Group)	(Own race, other race)	Black	Coloured	Asian/Indian	White	Total
Low trusting	(Low, low)	23.66	19.57	11.77	19.94	21.74
Racially exclusive	(High, low)	18.76	13.44	5.47	8.39	15.09
Interracially deferential	(Low, high)	4.5	5.39	7.15	3.91	4.57
High trusting	(High, high)	47	58.26	62.41	50.92	49.83
Missing	(Missing)	6.09	3.34	13.19	16.84	8.77
Total		100	100	100	100	100

Note: Data are weighted using post-stratification weights.

It is therefore apparent that the highest share of high trusting individuals is found in the upwardly mobile cluster. This leads to the vital question of considering whether these relatively high levels of trust are shared across the different race groups in these clusters.

8 | CONCLUSION

This analysis is the first attempt to comprehensively map how stocks of economic, cultural, and social capital intersect to generate systematic and structural inequalities in South Africa, and to consider how far these are associated with racial divides, and to reflect on the extent to which social mobility disrupts these inequalities. We have argued that privilege and wealth cannot simply be seen as an elite phenomenon and are much more embedded in the upper reaches of South African society, hence requiring systematic sociological investigation.

Our analysis draws out four striking features of the South African social space. First, there is an intense interplay between inequalities of economic and cultural capital at the 'top end'. It is not surprising that South Africa is therefore different to the accounts often provided (e.g., Atkinson, 2017) of European nations in not seeing fragmentation between 'intellectuals' and 'industrialists'. Those with high levels of economic capital tend also to have high levels of cultural capital, and vice versa. There is prima facie reasoning to associate this with an enduring racialized divide in which White South Africans typically have highest amounts of both economic and cultural capital. Thus, we argue that racialisation processes might play a central role in the wider structuring of social space. Our findings suggest not simply that different race groups are located in varying parts of the social space, but also that these racial divides may structure social space itself.

Second, social capital turns out to be a divisive force in South Africa. Whereas Bourdieu saw social capital as less significant than economic and cultural capital, in South Africa, which is characterised generally by low levels of trust, it turns out to be a key differentiator on the second axis. This contrast is principally evident amongst Black South Africans, pitting older respondents displaying higher levels of trust from younger Black South Africans. However, our cluster analysis reveals an added complexity to this relationship. The privileged and the excluded clusters display higher levels of trust than the general cluster, in which almost two thirds of younger people are found. This aligns with older groups being more likely to live in rural areas and report higher trust, compared to younger urban dwelling Black South Africans who report being less trusting. The more distinct division between trust levels among the privileged and general cluster, however, is not a function of location or age. Insofar as the low levels of trust in the general cluster may limit the social resources that younger age groups may draw on, it might follow that this could entrench social and racial divisions more strongly.

Third, non-White individuals in the upwardly mobile cluster report much higher levels of trust than are typical of non-White South Africans as a whole. The inference from these findings is that amidst South Africa's entrenched categorical and racial inequality, Black upwardly mobile, more privileged South Africans are relatively more trusting. This might be taken as evidence of 'strategic assimilation', along the lines that Meghji (2019) lays out. Additionally, only a fifth of upwardly mobile Black respondents trust their own, but not other races, suggestive that a minority embrace more racially exclusive modes of social capital.

Fourthly, we should not assume that racialisation is watertight. Our cluster analysis reveals that there is no simple reproduction of social inequality. We are struck by the size of the cluster of upwardly mobile South Africans, where levels of education appear to be rising inter-generationally. Our broad finding that one third of respondents wield significant capital stocks indicates that elements of middle-class privilege percolate well beyond the 8% of the population that is White.

To conclude, we have provided a much fuller sociological analysis of the organisation of privilege and resources in South Africa than has been previously conducted. Our use of a social space perspective has offered insights into both the perpetuation yet also the modulation of entrenched forms of privilege. While confirming how entrenched racial inequalities remain, we have also found important suggestions of fluidity and change. There is no simple reproduction of historical forms of inequality.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors do not have conflicts of interest to disclose.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data are publicly available and can be accessed via DataFirst.

ETHICS STATEMENT

Ethics approval not required given the public nature of the data.

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE MATERIAL FROM OTHER SOURCES

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ENDNOTES

[1] A recent Statistics South Africa Inequality Trends Report found that 74% of overall income inequality in 2015 could be attributed to labour market inequality (Statistics South Africa, 2019).

[2] Black African.

[3] In South Africa, post-schooling comprises any education that takes place after compulsory schooling. Compulsory schooling occurs from the year in which a child turns seven until Grade 9 or the age of 15, whichever occurs first (South African Schools Act, 1996).

[4] Njozela and Burns (2019) use data on trust across five waves of NIDS to create a social cohesion index. Posel (2022) uses the same trust information from NIDS Wave 5 to describe racial differences in willingness to trust.

[5] Adult respondents with proxy responses are excluded because the proxy questionnaire does not include questions on trust. A further 28 respondents did not answer any of the trust questions. Three of the social trust questions were recoded to avoid relative frequencies <5% or to avoid destabilising categories (see Table 1).

[6] Weighted per capita household income is divided into five equal categories.

[7] Financial assets are defined as bank account savings and having unit trusts, stocks, or shares—a narrow definition of financial wealth.

[8] We follow the principles described in Le Roux and Rouanet (2010), in which deviation between two categories >0.5 standard deviation (SD) is described as notable and a deviation >1.0 SD as large. This is a somewhat 'conservative' threshold. Newer studies suggest a deviation >.4 as notable.

[9] This is +/−2 SDs in a two-dimensional distribution.

[10] Note, that if the relative frequency in the sample is <5%, the percentage in the cluster should be >2 times the frequency in the sample to be classified as over- or under-represented. The *p*-value should usually also be <.05, but due to weighting, this does not apply here.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.